MODAY VS COURT OF APPEALS 268 SCRA 586
City Revenue Code (QCRC), imposing a real property tax on
Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan
in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing
the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation
of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the
National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of
Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports
Facilities" which was approved by Mayor Bustillo and was
transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its
approval. However, it was disapproved stating that
"expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still
available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the
government center."
Subsequently, the Municipal filed a Petition for
Eminent Domain before the RTC. The Regional Trial Court
granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession
of the land, holding that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's
failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It
added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is
merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by
the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg.
337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of
eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in
Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
ISSUE: Is the ruling of the RTC valid?
RULING:
Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the
Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the
nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for
public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national
legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and
public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and
there must be just compensation.
The only ground upon which a provincial board may
declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order invalid
is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or president making the
same." Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for
the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to
exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang
Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution.
QUEZON CITY VS BAYANTEL G.R. No. 162015
Respondent Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.
(Bayantel) is a legislative franchise holder under RA 3259 to
establish and operate radio stations for domestic
telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and
telecasting. A tax provision in its charter exempted Bayantel
from payment of realty taxes actually, directly and exclusively
used in the pursuit of its franchise.
On January 1, 2002, the LGC took effect which
grants LGUs the power to levy tax on real properties. On July
20, 1992, Congress enacted Rep. Act No. 7633, amending
Bayantel’s original franchise which contained once again the
exemption of Bayantel from payment of realty taxes actually,
directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. In
1993, the government of Quezon City enacted the Quezon
all real properties in Quezon City which included some
properties of Bayantel.
Bayantel did not pay the realty taxes prompting the
QC Treasurer to issue warrants of levy against the
properties. Threatened, Bayantel filed with the RTC a petition
for prohibition with an urgent application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Should Bayantel be granted tax exemption?
RULING:
Yes. The power to tax is primarily vested in the
Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by
local legislative bodies, no longer merely be virtue of a valid
delegation as before, but pursuant to direct authority
conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under
the latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide
which, however, must be consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Section 5 does not change the doctrine that
municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of
taxation. What it does is to confer municipal corporations a
general power to levy taxes and otherwise create sources of
revenue. They no longer have to wait for a statutory grant of
these powers. The power of the legislative authority relative
to the fiscal powers of local governments has been reduced
to the authority to impose limitations on municipal powers.
There can really be no dispute that the power of the
Quezon City Government to tax is limited by Section 232 of
the LGC. Under this law, the Legislature highlighted its power
to thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of
local government units.
Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted
subsequent to the LGC. The Court views this subsequent
piece of legislation as an express and real intention on the
part of Congress to once again remove from the LGCs
delegated taxing power, all of Bayantel’s properties that are
actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its
franchise.
BATANGAS VS ROMULO
On December 7, 1998, President Estrada issued
E.O. No. 48 entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR
DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION." The
program was established to "facilitate the process of
enhancing the capacities of LGUs in the discharge of the
functions and services devolved to them by the National
Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local
Government Code."
Petitioner filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and void
certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts
(GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five
billion pesos of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and
imposed conditions for its release. The petitioner posits that
to subject the distribution and release of the five-billion-peso
portion of the IRA, to compliance by the LGUs with the
implementing rules and regulations, including the
mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the
Constitution that the LGUs' share in the national taxes "shall
be automatically released to them." Petitioner further
contends that to vest the Oversight Committee with the
authority to determine the distribution and release of the
LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an
anathema to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in
the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Respondents theorize that Section 285 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which provides for the
percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs, was not
intended to be a fixed determination of their "just share" in
the national taxes. Congress may enact other laws, including
appropriations laws such as the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, providing for a different sharing formula.

ISSUE: Are the petitioner’s arguments meritorious?

RULING:
Yes. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further
that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned
within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall
not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed
by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule,
the term "SHALL" is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore,
IMPERATIVE.
Under existing law, local government units, in
addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of
their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to
create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources
in accordance with their own priorities. Further, a basic
feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally
mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the
national internal revenue.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a "withholding"
of a portion of the IRA. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.
ARTICLE XI the position of Regional Director but that of Department
Manager A. It is petitioner’s appointment paper and the
FRANCISCO VS DE VENECIA notice of salary adjustment that determine the classification
of her position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives The position of manager in a government-owned or
adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint which was, over petitioner together with Farahmand, a private individual
however, dismissed. A day after the dismissal, a second charged together with her.
impeachment complaint was filed against the Chief Justice.
Respondent House of Representatives, argues that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not
mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House
of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean "to file."

ISSUE: Is the second impeachment complaint constitutional?

RULING:
No. The framers intended "initiation" to start with the
filing of the complaint. Commissioner Maambong explained
that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the
provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the
complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by
the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by
the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in
the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

GEDUSPAN VS PEOPLE

On July 11, 2002, an information was filed against

petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr. Evangeline C.
Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(Philhealth) Regional Manager/Director and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc.,
respectively for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated
July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering
that the principal accused Geduspan was a Regional Director
of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary
grade 26.

ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the

case?

RULING:
Yes. The records show that, although Geduspan is
a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not occupying