July 18, 2019

TO: Members of the Committee

FROM: Republican Committee Staff

SUBJECT: New Witness Testimony Contradicts Democrat Allegations about White

House Security Clearances

In January 2019, Chairman Elijah Cummings initiated a unilateral and partisan

investigation into what he described as the White House’s “security clearance process.”1 In the
ensuing months, however, the investigation’s real purpose has become clear: to obtain sensitive,
personal information about the President’s daughter and son-in-law, both of whom serve on the
White House staff and were deemed eligible for national security information. Even after the
Committee has received testimony discrediting allegations of improper White House influence
on the security clearance process, the Chairman continued his investigation. Now, new
information from two recent transcribed interviews further shows that the White House security
clearance process has been free from political interference.

Although Chairman Cummings has repeatedly asserted that the White House is engaging
in a “cover-up” of all congressional investigations,2 the Committee recently conducted two
additional transcribed interviews of current and former White House employees. This
memorandum summarizes the key take-aways from these two transcribed interviews.

I. Background

In April 2019, on a Saturday morning, the Committee conducted a closed-door

transcribed interview with Tricia Newbold, an employee in the White House’s personnel security
office who self-identified as a whistleblower. The White House security office processes security
clearances for White House and Executive Office of the President (EOP) employees. Ms.
Newbold, who has been employed by the White House for 18 years, works in the security
office’s adjudications branch. During her interview, Ms. Newbold testified that she chose to
come forward due to her concern for how the security office handles security clearance
adjudications for White House and EOP employees.

1
Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, to Pat Cipollone, Counsel to the
President, White House (Jan. 23, 2019).
2
See, e.g., 165 Cong. Rec. H4414 (June 11, 2019) (statement of Rep. Elijah E. Cummings).
Memorandum to Members of the Committee
July 18, 2019
Page 2

During her testimony, Ms. Newbold lodged a litany of workplace complaints, including
several against her former supervisor, Carl Kline, the former White House Personnel Security
Director. Mr. Kline worked as the Personnel Security Director in the White House security office
from approximately May 2017 until January 2019. As Ms. Newbold’s supervisor, Mr. Kline
would review Ms. Newbold’s security clearance adjudication recommendations in certain
instances. The crux of Ms. Newbold’s complaints centered around 25 instances in which Ms.
Newbold alleged that Mr. Kline overturned her security clearance adjudication determinations—
including for senior White House officials. Ms. Newbold expressed concerns about maintaining
the integrity of the White House security office. According to Ms. Newbold, national security
adjudications, under Mr. Kline, “were not always adjudicated in the best interest of national
security.”3 Additionally, Ms. Newbold alleged that she was the target of certain retaliatory
actions by White House employees for raising concerns about the security clearance process,
such as her two-week suspension.

After Ms. Newbold’s testimony, Chairman Cummings released a memorandum that

cherry-picked excerpts of Ms. Newbold’s testimony that led to misinformation about the security
clearance process and rampant speculation about sensitive background information of White
House employees—including information pertaining to the President’s family. Shortly thereafter,
Chairman Cummings issued a deposition subpoena for the testimony of Mr. Kline, despite Mr.
Kline’s willingness to appear voluntarily before the Committee. After Ranking Member Jordan
intervened to deescalate Chairman Cummings’s manufactured confrontation over Mr. Kline’s
testimony, Mr. Kline participated in a voluntary, day-long transcribed interview.

During the interview, Mr. Kline provided a more complete account of the White House
security clearance process and rebutted certain allegations. The Committee learned that Mr.
Kline was a career public servant who sought to improve and modernize the White House
security office by taking steps such as assessing the office’s efficiency, the construction of a
sensitive compartmented information facility (SCIF), and digitizing the office’s paper files. Mr.
Kline testified that he prepared new written policies for the office and discussed his credit check
and reciprocity policies—two policies that Ms. Newbold had expressed concern with during her
testimony.

Regarding his adjudication determinations, Mr. Kline testified that no one ever attempted
to influence him to grant or overturn a security clearance adjudication determination. Mr. Kline
explained, “I have never been approached by anybody at the White House or outside the White
House to adjudicate a case, one way or the other, in my tenure at the White House.”4 Likewise,
Mr. Kline noted that he never had any of his decisions overturned by any official within the
White House. Mr. Kline testified that when adjudicating a security clearance determination, he
would base his decision on the individual’s file and the standard adjudicative guidelines. He

3
Memorandum from Democrat Staff to Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Summary of Interview
with White House Whistleblower on Security Clearances, (Apr. 1, 2019).
4
Memorandum from Republican Staff to Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Summary of May 1,
2019 Interview with Carl Kline, former White House Personnel Security Director, (May 3, 2019).
Memorandum to Members of the Committee
July 18, 2019
Page 3

further explained he was comfortable with all the decisions he made, which were based on his
over 40 years of experience and objective guidelines.

II. Testimony from the career White House security official rebuts Democrat
assertions about poor White House security

On June 28, 2019, the Committee conducted a transcribed interview of the current White
House Chief Security Officer, Crede Bailey.5 Mr. Kline reported to Mr. Bailey until Mr. Kline’s
departure from the office in January 2019. Below are the key points from Mr. Bailey’s
testimony:

1. Mr. Bailey, an experienced career official, has confidence in the White House security
office and its policies and procedures.

• Mr. Bailey, who has been employed as the Chief Security Officer in the White House
security office since June 2018, has approximately 30 years of experience in the security
clearance field.

• Mr. Bailey testified that he had confidence in the policies and procedures in place at the
White House today. He also stated he had confidence in the Trump Administration’s
ability to protect national security information. Contrary to Ms. Newbold’s assertions,
Mr. Bailey believed the office’s integrity was intact.

2. Mr. Bailey testified that he received no pressure on how to decide security clearance
applications.

• Mr. Bailey testified that he never felt any pressure to issue a clearance from any White
House entity, including the White House Counsel, during his employment. Mr. Bailey
also testified that he never witnessed political pressure on anyone else in the office to
issue a clearance. Mr. Bailey said:

Q. Okay. And so at no point in time during your tenure did

anybody, such as the chief of staff or the White House
Counsel or even the President himself, weighed in to the
decision on a particular applicant?

A. Correct.

Q. All decisions were made by the security office?

A. Correct.

5
Mr. Bailey had previously briefed Committee Members and staff on White House security clearance policies and
procedures in March 2019.
Memorandum to Members of the Committee
July 18, 2019
Page 4

• Similarly, Mr. Bailey testified that to his knowledge, the President had not ordered a
security clearance to be issued to specific individuals, although Mr. Bailey acknowledged
the President would have the authority to do so.

3. Mr. Bailey had no concerns about Mr. Kline’s decision to not concur with lower-level
adjudication recommendations and said he had the “utmost confidence” in Mr. Kline’s
ability to conduct security clearance assessments.

• Although the Democrats may argue that Mr. Kline chose to overturn the first- and
second-line reviewers’ adjudication recommendations without discussing his decisions
with the first and- second-line adjudicators, Mr. Bailey did not express concerns about
Mr. Kline’s decision to not concur or agree with the first and second-line reviewers’
adjudication determinations.

o Mr. Bailey stated such a collaborative decision-making process would be a “labor

intensive” practice. Mr. Bailey testified that “the way the process is designed is I
don’t – I don't need the first or second level reviewer to understand on every case
why I make a decision I make. If they do understand along the way through
conversation, great, it’s the learning opportunity.”

o Mr. Bailey disagreed with Ms. Newbold’s characterization that the current
security policies and procedures were making the “environment less safe.” Mr.
Bailey stated that every decision that he has made has been pursuant to the
applicable government-wide guidelines.

• Mr. Bailey testified that Ms. Newbold did not discuss with him the 25 cases in which she
alleged that Mr. Kline overturned her adjudication recommendations. Mr. Bailey recalled
hearing about the 25 allegedly overturned recommendations from the press.

o Mr. Bailey said that Mr. Kline is experienced, “thorough,” and “was very good at
his job.”

o Mr. Bailey elaborated that he had the “utmost confidence” in Mr. Kline’s ability
to conduct security clearance assessments. Mr. Bailey noted that he too has not
concurred or not agreed with a first or second level-reviewers adjudication
recommendation.

4. Mr. Bailey supported policy changes implemented by Carl Kline, the former White
House Personnel Security Director.

• Since the beginning of his employment, Mr. Bailey sought to improve the White House
security clearance office. For example, Mr. Bailey implemented new security education
training, created a senior advisor for security policy position, and restructured the security
office to increase operational efficiency.
Memorandum to Members of the Committee
July 18, 2019
Page 5

o In questioning Mr. Bailey, the Democrats attempted to establish that the office’s
restructuring, which removed Ms. Newbold from her prior supervisory
responsibilities, was retaliatory against Ms. Newbold. However, Mr. Bailey
testified that the restructuring was to even out the workload between the
adjudication and suitability teams within the office. Likewise, he noted the
restructuring was intended to help staff manage the workload and make the office
more efficient.

o Mr. Bailey further explained that he sought to make the office “one team so that
when there’s a surge in a certain set of tasks, it can be spread across all the
personnel security specialists that have the same skill set to accomplish that
mission.”

o Mr. Bailey testified—as did Mr. Kline—that Ms. Newbold’s suspension was not
retaliatory.

• Throughout the course of their investigation, Democrats have raised concerns that Mr.
Kline ended a White House security office policy about the issuance of credit checks
during the suitability determination process. However, Mr. Bailey did not have an issue
with Mr. Kline’s removal of credit checks during the suitability phase and said that he
saw no need to reinstate it.

o Consistent with Mr. Kline’s testimony, Mr. Bailey noted that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) performs credit checks as part of its background
investigation and receives reports from three major credit reporting agencies.

o Mr. Bailey testified that when he asked his staff to find data on how often a credit
check resulted in an individual being denied suitability, his staff only presented
one example in which an individual was denied suitability solely due to a credit
check in a 12-year span.

• Similarly, Mr. Bailey testified that he supported Mr. Kline’s implementation of a

reciprocity process—a policy that allows employees with active security clearance
adjudications to retain their clearances after they have moved over to a new government
agency.

o Mr. Bailey noted that other executive branch agencies use reciprocity, a policy
that may be efficient during the onboarding of new White House employees. Mr.
Bailey also noted that adjudication standards are consistent across the
government. Mr. Kline similarly testified that the purpose of the reciprocity
policy, in part, was to efficiently on-board employees and to and not duplicate
efforts or cause delay.6

6
Memorandum from Republican Staff to Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Summary of May 1,
2019 Interview with Carl Kline, former White House Personnel Security Director, (May 3, 2019).
Memorandum to Members of the Committee
July 18, 2019
Page 6

o Mr. Bailey testified that he believed Ms. Newbold’s concerns about credit checks
and reciprocity stemmed from her lack of understanding and experience across
government.

• Mr. Bailey was also supportive of Mr. Kline’s efforts to digitize and modernize the
security office. He also believed constructing a sensitive compartmented information
facility (SCIF) for the security office was an improvement for the office.

5. Mr. Bailey expressed concern that sensitive security clearance information reached the
media

• During the interview, Mr. Bailey noted that he had concerns that certain sensitive
information from security clearance files had been leaked to the press. He stated that such
information should never be made public and could place the country at risk. During Mr.
Kline’s interview, he expressed similar concerns, testifying he found the leaks from
someone in the White House security office to be “troubling” and noted that leaks could
be a threat to national security.7

III. Testimony of former career White House Security Official also confirms there
was no pressure on security clearance decisions

On June 26, 2019, the Committee conducted a transcribed interview with Cory Louie, the
former White House Chief Information Security Officer. During his tenure at the White House,
Mr. Louie worked with Ms. Newbold as part of his duties in overseeing the personnel security
office; however, Mr. Louie’s tenure at the White House did not overlap with Mr. Bailey or Mr.
Kline.

1. Mr. Louie, a career employee, was only employed briefly by the Trump Administration
White House security office.

• In August 2015, Mr. Louie was hired to be the Chief Information Security Officer within
the Office of Administration of the Executive Office of the President. As a career
employee, Mr. Louie’s responsibilities pertained to information security, physical
security, information governance, and personnel security.

• In November 2015, Mr. Louie took on the responsibility of overseeing the White House
Personnel Security Division in addition to his other duties. He testified that overseeing
this office took up about 15 percent of his job responsibilities. Mr. Louie did not have any
prior experience with security clearances except for his own experience as a candidate for
a security clearance.

7
Memorandum from Republican Staff to Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Summary of May 1,
2019 Interview with Carl Kline, former White House Personnel Security Director, (May 3, 2019).
Memorandum to Members of the Committee
July 18, 2019
Page 7

• Mr. Louie was only employed for two weeks with the Trump Administration before
leaving the office. Mr. Louie noted that the “White House personnel security office
operated the same prior to January 20, 2017” and during the two weeks he worked in the
Trump Administration. However, Mr. Louie testified he had “no visibility” on how the
White House security office operates today.

o Mr. Louie testified that during his employment at the White House, he did not
know if the President ever directed an employee to be granted a security clearance
over the objections of the Chief of Staff or White House Counsel. Mr. Louie
explained that even though he would be speculating because he does not have full
visibility into the entire security clearance process, he did not recall that any such
situation occurred.

o When Mr. Louie left the White House, he had confidence that the security office’s
policies and procedures protected national security interests. Additionally, when
asked whether he felt pressure regarding the security clearance process, he noted
the only pressure he felt from both the Obama Administration and the Trump
Administration “[was] a pressure for speed and efficiency without compromising
standard.” Mr. Louie did not feel political pressure during his two weeks with the
Trump Administration.

• Similar to the sentiments express by both Mr. Kline and Mr. Bailey, Mr. Louie indicated
that private information—such as information on an individual’s security clearance
application—when put out to the public, “is not a good thing.”

2. The Democrats attempted to elicit personal information about Trump White House
officials and advisors despite Mr. Louie’s limited knowledge of the Trump Administration.

• Mr. Louie stated that during his two weeks with the Trump Administration, he did not
meet with White House Counsel to discuss specific security clearance case files.
However, the Democrats still attempted to solicit information from Mr. Louie about the
status of specific Trump Administration officials’ security clearance files, including
senior White House advisors.

• The Democrats also sought testimony from Mr. Louie about former staff secretary Rob
Porter’s security clearance application. The White House Counsel’s office raised a
concern that the question called for testimony about a specific individual’s case file—a
concern that the White House Counsel’s office also raised during questioning about
security clearance information of Obama Administration officials.

o The White House Counsel’s office discussed the nature and basis of its objection
to the Democrats’ question for a large portion of the latter half of the interview.

o Mr. Louie ultimately did not answer the Democrats’ questions about Mr.
Porter’s clearance during the interview. Mr. Louie’s attorney indicated that he
Memorandum to Members of the Committee
July 18, 2019
Page 8

would not be able to provide the information sought by the Democrats. Mr.
Louie’s attorney explained:

So I wonder whether it might be helpful to move the question. I

mean, I think my understanding is that Mr. Louie doesn’t have,
you know, specific recollections related to a specific moment in
time and a specific security clearance application at the
beginning of the Trump administration. So I don’t know –
regardless of whether he answers or doesn’t answer, I don’t
know that there’s an awful lot of information to be gained.

• Rather than pursuing the facts, the Democrats attempted to utilize the transcribed
interview to make unfounded accusations about the actions of the White House Counsel’s
office. Similarly, despite Mr. Louie’s limited insight into the Trump Administration’s
security clearance process, the Democrats attempted to pry into specific security
clearance and personal information about White House staff and presidential advisors.

IV. Conclusion

While Chairman Cummings continues his investigation into the White House security
clearance processes, it has become apparent that the Chairman is only interested in pursuing facts
that fit his preordained narrative about the security clearance process. Since the Chairman began
his partisan investigation six months ago, we have learned from multiple witnesses that there was
no external pressure to adjudicate a security clearance one way or another within the White
House security office. Despite these revelations, the Chairman remains committed to prying into
the personal lives of President Trump’s children and White House senior advisors to attack the
Administration for political gain.

If you have any questions about these transcribed interviews, or Chairman Cummings’s
unilateral and partisan investigation into White House security clearances, please contact
Republican Committee staff at (202) 225-5074.

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