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@ e first and t ird case, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784, were originally assigned to t e Second and @ ird Divisions of t e
Court, respectively. @ ey were subsequently consolidated wit t e second, a case of t e Court ‘
 .

àetitioner, a domestic corporation wit principal office at Nos. 1350-1352 Juan Luna Street, @ondo, Manila, and wit a Lumberyard
at Fortune Street, Fortune Village, àaseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, was duly registered as a lumber dealer wit t e
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) under Certificate of Registration No. NRD-4-092590-0469. Its permit as suc was to expire on
25 September 1990.

Respondent Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and respondent Atty. Vincent A. Robles were, during all t e time material to t ese
cases, t e Secretary of t e Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and t e C ief of t e Special Actions and
Investigation Division (SAID) of t e DENR, respectively.

@ e material operative facts are as follows:

On 1 April 1990, acting on an information t at a uge stockpile of narra flitc es, s orts, and slabs were seen inside t e lumberyard
of t e petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, t e SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct
surveillance at t e said lumberyard. In t e course t ereof, t e team members saw coming out from t e lumberyard t e petitioner's
truck, wit àlate No. CCK-322, loaded wit lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since t e driver could not
produce t e required invoices and transport documents, t e team seized t e truck toget er wit its cargo and impounded t em at
t e DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. @ e team was not able to gain entry into t e premises because of t e
&
refusal of t e owner. 

On 3 April 1990, t e team was able to secure a searc warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of t e Regional @rial Court
(R@C) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue t ereof, t e team seized on t at date from t e petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads
of narra s orts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and
s orts of various species including almaciga and supa.+

On 4 April 1990, t e team returned to t e premises of t e petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and placed under administrative
seizure t e remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber wit a total volume of 311,000 board feet because t e
petitioner failed to produce upon demand t e corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally s eets, and delivery

receipts from t e source of t e invoices covering t e lumber to prove t e legitimacy of t eir source and origin. 

àarent etically, it may be stated t at under an administrative seizure t e owner retains t e p ysical possession of t e seized
articles. Only an inventory of t e articles is taken and signed by t e owner or is representative. @ e owner is pro ibited from
disposing t em until furt er orders.,

On 10 April 1990, counsel for t e petitioner sent a letter to Robles requesting an extension of fifteen days from 14 April 1990 to
produce t e required documents covering t e seized articles because some of t em, particularly t e certificate of lumber origin,
were allegedly in t e àrovince of Quirino Robles denied t e motion on t e ground t at t e documents being required from t e
petitioner must accompany t e lumber or forest products placed under seizure.

On 11 April 1990, Robles submitted is memorandum-report recommending to Secretary Factoran t e following:

1. Suspension and subsequent cancellation of t e lumber Dealer's àermit of Mustang Lumber, Inc. for operating
an unregistered lumberyard and resaw mill and possession of Almaciga Lumber (a banned specie) wit out t e
required documents;

2. Confiscation of t e lumber seized at t e Mustang Lumberyard including t e truck wit àlate No. CCK-322 and
t e lumber loaded erein [a  now at t e DENR compound in t e event its owner fails to submit documents
s owing legitimacy of t e source of said lumber wit in ten days from date of seizure;

3. Filing of criminal c arges against Mr. Ri C uy ào, owner of Mustang Lumber Inc. and Mr. Ruiz, or if t e
circumstances warrant for illegal possession of narra and almaciga lumber and s orts if and w en
recommendation no. 2 pus es t roug ;

4. Confiscation of @rucks wit àlate No. CCS-639 and CDV. 458 as well as t e lumber loaded t erein for transport
)
lumber using "recycled" documents. 

On 23 April 1990, Secretary Factoran issued an order suspending immediately t e petitioner's lumber-dealer's permit No. NRD-4-
092590-0469 and directing t e petitioner to explain in writing wit in fifteen days w y its lumber-dealer's permit s ould not be
cancelled.

On t e same date, counsel for t e petitioner sent anot er letter to Robles informing t e latter t at t e petitioner ad already secured

t e required documents and was ready to submit t em. None, owever, was submitted. 

On 3 May 1990, Secretary Factoran issued anot er order w erein, after reciting t e events w ic took place on 1 April and 3 April
1990, e ordered "CONFISCA@ED in favor of t e government to be disposed of in accordance wit law" t e approximately 311,000

board feet of lauan, supa, and almaciga lumber, s orts, and sticks found inside t e petitioner's lumberyard. 

On 11 July 1990, t e petitioner filed wit t e R@C of Manila a petition for ‘
 and pro ibition wit a prayer for a restraining
order or preliminary injunction against Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., and Atty. Vincent A. Robles. @ e case ( ereinafter, t e


 ) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53648 and assigned to Branc 35 of t e said court. @ e petitioner
questioned t erein (a) t e seizure on 1 April 1990, wit out any searc and seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck wit àlate
No. CCK-322 and its cargo of assorted lumber consisting of apitong, tanguile, and lauan of different sizes and dimensions wit a
total value of à38,000.00; and (b) t e orders of Secretary Factoran of 23 April 1990 for lack of prior notice and earing and of 3 May
1990 for violation of Section 2, Article III of t e Constitution.

On 17 September 1990, in response to reports t at violations of à.D. No. 705 (@ e Revised Forestry Code of t e à ilippines), as
amended, were committed and acting upon instruction of Robles and under Special Order No. 897, series of 1990, a team of DENR
agents went to t e business premises of t e petitioner located at No. 1352 Juan Luna Street, @ondo, Manila. @ e team caug t t e
petitioner operating as a lumber dealer alt oug its lumber-dealer's permit ad already been suspended or 23 April 1990. Since t e
gate of t e petitioner's lumberyard was open, t e team went inside and saw an owner-type jeep wit a trailer loaded wit lumber.
Upon investigation, t e team was informed t at t e lumber loaded on t e trailer was to be delivered to t e petitioner's customer. It
also came upon t e sales invoice covering t e transaction. @ e members of t e team t en introduced t emselves to t e caretaker,
one Ms. C ua, w o turned out to be t e wife of t e petitioner's president and general manager, Mr. Ri C uy ào, w o was t en out
of town. @ e team's p otograp er was able to take p otograp s of t e stockpiles of lumber including newly cut ones, fres dust
around sawing or cutting mac ineries and equipment, and t e transport ve icles loaded wit lumber. @ e team t ereupon effected a
constructive seizure of approximately 20,000 board feet of lauan lumber in assorted sizes stockpiled in t e premises by issuing a
receipt
t erefor. 

As a consequence of t is 17 September 1990 incident, t e petitioner filed wit t e R@C of Manila a petition for ‘

and
pro ibition. @ e case ( ereinafter, t e  


 ) was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-54610 and assigned to Branc 24
of t e said court.

In t e meantime, Robles filed wit t e Department of Justice (DOJ) a complaint against t e petitioner's president and general
manager, Ri C uy ào, for violation of Section 68 of à.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. After appropriate preliminary
investigation, t e investigating prosecutor, Claro Arellano, anded down a resolution  w ose dispositive portion reads:

â EREFORE, premises considered, it is ereby recommended t at an information be filed against respondent

Ri C uy ào for illegal possession of approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa and
for illegal s ipment of almaciga and lauan in violation of Sec. 68 of àD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of
1987.

It is furt er recommended t at t e 30,000 bd. ft. of narra s orts, trimmings and slabs covered by legal documents
be released to t e rig tful owner, Malupa. &

@ is resolution was approved by Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre . Bello III, w o served as C airman of t e @ask Force on
Illegal Logging." +

On t e basis of t at resolution, an information was filed on 5 June 1991 by t e DOJ wit Branc 172 of t e R@C of Valenzuela,
c arging Ri C uy ào wit t e violation of Section 58 of à.D. No. 705, as amended, w ic was docketed as Criminal Case No. 324-
V-91 ( ereinafter, t e 


 ). @ e accusatory portion of t e information reads as follows:
 @ at on or about t e 3rd day of April 1990, or prior to or subsequent t ereto, wit in t e premises and vicinity of
Mustang Lumber, Inc. in Fortune Village, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and wit in t e jurisdiction of t is onorable
Court, t e above-named accused, did t en and t ere wilfully, feloniously and unlawfully ave in is possession
truckloads of almaciga and lauan and approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and s orts of various species
including almaciga and supa, wit out t e legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations. 

,
On 7 June 1991, Branc 35 of t e R@C of Manila rendered its decision in t e FIRS@ CIVIL CASE, t e dispositive portion of w ic
reads:

â EREFORE, judgment in t is case is rendered as follows:

1. @ e Order of Respondent Secretary of t e DENR, t e onorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated 3 May 1990
ordering t e confiscation in favor of t e Government t e approximately 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa, end
almaciga Lumber, s orts and sticks, found inside and seized from t e Lumberyard of t e petitioner at Fortune
Drive, Fortune Village, àaseo de Blas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 4, 1990 (Ex ibit 10), is ereby set aside
and vacated, and instead t e respondents are required to report and bring to t e on. Adriano Osorio, Executive
Judge, Regional @rial Court, NCR, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, t e said 311,000 board feet of Lauan, supa and
almaciga Lumber, s orts and sticks, to be dealt wit as directed by Law;

2. @ e respondents are required to initiate and prosecute t e appropriate action before t e proper court regarding
t e Lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions Loaded in petitioner's truck bearing àlate No.
CCK-322 w ic were seized on April 1, 1990;

3. @ e ârit of àreliminary Injunction issued by t e Court on August 2, 1990 s all be rendered
  a

 
upon
compliance by t e respondents wit paragrap s 1 and 2 of t is judgment;.

4. Action on t e prayer of t e petitioner t at t e Lauan, supa and almaciga lumber, s orts and sticks mentioned
above in paragrap s 1 and 2 of t is judgment be returned to said petitioner is wit eld in t is case until after t e
proper court as taken cognizance and determined ow t ose Lumber, s orts and sticks s ould be disposed of;
and

5. @ e petitioner is ordered to pay t e costs.

SO ORDERED.

In resolving t e said case, t e trial court eld t at t e warrantless searc and seizure on 1 April 1990 of t e petitioner's truck, w ic
was moving out from t e petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, loaded wit large volumes of lumber wit out covering
document s owing t e legitimacy of its source or origin did not offend t e constitutional mandate t at searc and seizure must be
supported by a valid warrant. @ e situation fell under one of t e settled and accepted exceptions w ere warrantless searc and

seizure is justified, Ô ., a searc of a moving ve icle. As to t e seizure of a large volume of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber
and s orts effected on 4 April 1990, t e trial court ruled t at t e said seizure was a continuation of t at made t e previous day and
was still pursuant to or by virtue of t e searc warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio w ose validity t e petitioner did not even
question. ) And, alt oug t e searc warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and s orts, t eir
seizure was valid because it is settled t at t e executing officer is not required to ignore contrabands observed during t e conduct
of t e

searc . 

@ e trial court, owever, set aside Secretary Factoran's order of 3 May 1990 ordering t e confiscation of t e seized articles in favor
of t e Government for t e reason t at since t e articles were seized pursuant to t e searc warrant issued by Executive Judge
Osorio t ey s ould ave been returned to im in compliance wit t e directive in t e warrant.

As to t e propriety of t e 23 April 1990 order of Secretary Factoran, t e trial court ruled t at t e same ad been rendered moot and
academic by t e expiration of t e petitioner's lumber dealer's permit on 25 September 1990, a fact t e petitioner admitted in its
memorandum.

@ e petitioner fort wit appealed from t e decision in t e FIRS@ CIVIL CASE to t e Court of Appeals, w ic docketed t e appeal as





.

On 7 July 1991, accused Ri C uy ào filed in t e CRIMINAL CASE a Motion to Quas and/or to Suspend àroceedings based on t e
following grounds: (a) t e information does not c arge an offense, for possession of | ‘, as opposed to  ‘, is not penalized
in Section 68 of à.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting
 ‘ 

t at | ‘
falls wit in t e purview of t e said section, t e
same may not be used in evidence against im for t ey were taken by virtue of an illegal seizure; and (b) Civil Case No. 90-53648
of Branc 35 of t e R@C of Manila, t e FIRS@ CIVIL CASE, t en pending before t e Court of Appeals, w ic involves t e legality of

t e seizure, raises a prejudicial question. 

@ e prosecution opposed t e motion alleging t at | ‘
is included in Section 68 of à.D. No. 705, as amended, and possession
t ereof wit out t e required legal documents is penalized t erein. It referred to Section 3.2 of DENR Administrative Order No. 19,
series of 1989, for t e definitions of  ‘ and | ‘, and t en argued t at exclusion of lumber from Section 68 would defeat t e
very purpose of t e law, .‘., to minimize, if not alt, illegal logging t at as resulted in t e rapid denudation of our forest resources.
&


&
In er order of 16 August 1991 in t e CRIMINAL CASE, respondent Judge @eresita Dizon-Capulong granted t e motion to quas
and dismissed t e case on t e ground t at "possession of lumber wit out t e legal documents required by forest laws and
regulations is not a crime. &&
 &+
Its motion for reconsideration aving been denied in t e order of 18 October 1991, t e àeople filed a petition for ‘

wit t is
Court in G.R. No. 106424, w erein it contends t at t e respondent Judge acted wit grave abuse of discretion in granting t e
motion to quas and in dismissing t e case.

&
On 29 November 1991, t e Court of Appeals rendered a decision in .. 


.
 dismissing for lack of merit t e
petitioner's appeal from t e decision in t e FIRS@ CIVIL CASE and affirming t e trial court's rulings on t e issues raised. As to t e
claim t at t e truck was not carrying contraband articles since t ere is no law punis ing t e possession of | ‘, and t at | ‘
is not  ‘ w ose possession wit out t e required legal documents is unlawful under à.D. No. 705, as amended, t e Court of
Appeals eld:

@ is undue emp asis on | ‘
or t e commercial nature of t e forest product involved as always been foisted
by t ose w o claim to be engaged in t e legitimate business of lumber dealers ip. But w at is important to
consider is t at w en appellant was required to present t e valid documents s owing its acquisition and lawful
possession of t e lumber in question, it failed to present any despite t e period of extension granted to it. &,

&
@ e petitioner's motion to reconsider t e said decision was denied by t e Court of Appeals in its resolution of 3 Marc 1992.
ence, t e petitioner came to t is Court by way of a petition for review on ‘

in ..


, w ic was filed on 2 May
1992. &)

On 24 September 1992, Branc 24 of t e R@C of Manila anded down a decision in t e SECOND CIVIL CASE dismissing t e
petition for ‘

and pro ibition because (a) t e petitioner did not ex aust administrative remedies; (b) w en t e seizure was
made on 17 September 1990 t e petitioner could not lawfully sell lumber, as its license was still under suspension; (c) t e seizure
was valid under Section 68-A of à.D. No. 705, as amended; and (d) t e seizure was justified as a warrantless searc and seizure
under Section 80 of à.D. No. 705, as amended.

@ e petitioner appealed from t e decision to t e Court of Appeals, w ic docketed t e appeal as .. 

.
.

In its decision & of 31 July 1995, t e Court of Appeals dismissed t e petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. Sà No. 33778 for lack of merit
and sustained t e grounds relied upon by t e trial court in dismissing t e SECOND CIVIL CASE. Relying on t e definition of
"lumber" by âebster, Ô ., "timber or logs, especially after being prepared for t e market," and by t e Random ouse Dictionary of
t e Englis Language, Ô ., "wood, esp. w en suitable or adapted for various building purposes," t e respondent Court eld t at
since

 is included in t e definition of

‘a

 t in Section 3(q) of à.D. No. 705, as amended, | ‘
is necessarily included
in Section 68 under t e term 
‘a

 .

@ e Court of Appeals furt er emp asized t at a forest officer or employee can seize t e forest product involved in a violation of
Section 68 of à.D. No. 705 pursuant to Section 80 t ereof, as amended by à.D. No. 1775, w ic provides in part as follows:

Sec. 80. ‘a
 a  



  |

a. -- A forest officer or employee of t e Bureau or any personnel of
t e à ilippine Constabulary/Integrated National àolice s all arrest even wit out warrant any person w o as
committed or is committing in is presence any of t e offenses defined in t is c apter. e s all also seize and
confiscate, in favor of t e Government, t e tools and equipment used in committing t e offense, or t e forest
products cut, gat ered or taken by t e offender in t e process of committing t e offense.

Among t e offenses punis ed in t e c apter referred to in said Section 80 are t e cutting, gat ering, collection, or removal of timber
or ot er forest products or possession of timber or ot er forest products wit out t e required legal documents.

Its motion to reconsider t e decision aving been denied by t e Court of Appeals in t e resolution of 6 February 1996, t e petitioner
filed wit t is Court on 27 February 1996 a petition for review on ‘

in ..


. .

âe s all now resolve t ese t ree cases starting wit G.R. No. 106424 wit w ic t e ot er two were consolidated.

..

. 

@ e petitioner ad moved to quas t e information in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91 on t e ground t at it does not c arge an offense.
Respondent Judge Dizon-Capulong granted t e motion reasoning t at t e subject matter of t e information in t e CRIMINAL CASE
is LUMBER, w ic is neit er "timber" nor "ot er forest product" under Section 68 of à.D. No. 705, as amended, and ence,
possession t ereof wit out t e required legal documents is not pro ibited and penalized under t e said section.

Under paragrap (a), Section 3, Rule 117 of t e Rules of Court, an information may be quas ed on t e ground t at t e facts alleged
t erein do not constitute an offense. It as been said t at "t e test for t e correctness of t is ground is t e sufficiency of t e
averments in t e information, t at is, w et er t e facts alleged, if ypot etically admitted, constitute t e elements of t e
&
offense, and matters | ‘
will not be considered." Anent t e sufficiency of t e information, Section 6, Rule 110 of t e Rules of
Court requires, ‘
| , t at t e information state t e acts or omissions complained of as constituting t e offense.

Respondent Ri C uy ào is c arged wit t e violation of Section 68 of à.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, w ic provides:

Sec. 68.   
 ‘ 
 !


||‘ 
 ‘


 ‘

‘a

 a
" 

 ‘ a‘. -- Any person
w o s all cut, gat er, collect, remove timber or ot er forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, wit out any aut ority, or possess timber or ot er forest products
wit out t e legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, s all be punis ed wit t e
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of t e Revised àenal Code: 
Ô ‘, @ at in t e case of
partners ips, associations, or corporations, t e officers w o ordered t e cutting, gat ering, collection or
possession s all be liable, and if suc officers are aliens, t ey s all, in addition to t e penalty, be deported wit out
furt er proceedings on t e part of t e Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
 @ e Court s all furt er order t e confiscation in favor of t e government of t e timber or any forest products cut,
gat ered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as t e mac inery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in t e area w ere t e timber or forest products are found.

àunis ed t en in t is section are (1) t e   
 ‘ 

||‘
, or ‘
Ô|
of  ‘



 ‘

‘a

 a from t e
places t erein mentioned wit out any aut ority; and (b)

aa‘aa
of timber forest products wit out t e legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations.

Indeed, t e word | ‘
does not appear in Section 68. But conceding ‘#
  t at t is omission amounts to an exclusion of
lumber from t e section's coverage, do t e facts averred in t e information in t e CRIMINAL CASE validly c arge a violation of t e
said section?

A cursory reading of t e information readily leads us to an infallible conclusion t at | ‘
a


a
|‘|
a
a $‘
‘. It is
evident t erefrom t at w at are alleged to be in t e possession of t e private respondent, wit out t e required legal documents, are
truckloads of

(1) almaciga and lauan; and

(2) approximately 200,000 bd. ft. of | ‘
and s orts of various species including almaciga
and supa.

@ e "almaciga and lauan" specifically mentioned in no. (1) are not described as "lumber." @ ey cannot refer to t e "lumber"
in no. (2) because t ey are separated by t e words "approximately 200,000 bd. ft." wit t e conjunction "and," and not wit
t e preposition "of." @ ey must t en be raw forest products or, more specifically,  ‘a
under Section 3(q) of à.D. No.
705, as amended, w ic reads:

Sec. 3. ‘ 
a. --

xxx xxx xxx

(q) Forest product means timber, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, oney,
beeswax, nipa, rattan, or ot er forest plant, t e associated water, fis game, scenic, istorical,
recreational and geological resources in forest lands.

It follows t en t at | ‘
is only one of t e items covered by t e information. @ e public and t e private respondents obviously
miscompre ended t e averments in t e information. Accordingly, even if | ‘
is not included in Section 68, t e ot er items
t erein as noted above fall wit in t e ambit of t e said section, and as to t em, t e information validly c arges an offense.

Our respected brot er, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggests in is dissenting opinion t at t is Court go beyond t e four corners of t e
information for enlig tenment as to w et er t e information exclusively refers to | ‘. âit t e aid of t e pleadings and t e
annexes t ereto, e arrives at t e conclusion t at "only lumber as been envisioned in t e indictment."

@ e majority is unable to subscribe to is view. First, is proposition violates t e rule t at only t e facts alleged in t e information
Ô aÔ a t e law violated must be considered in determining w et er an information c arges an offense.

Second, t e pleadings and annexes e resorted to are insufficient to justify is conclusion. On t e contrary, t e Joint Affidavit of
Melencio Jalova, Jr., and Araman Belleng, w ic is one of t e annexes e referred to, + cannot lead one to infer t at w at t e team
seized was all | ‘. àaragrap 8 t ereof expressly states:

8. @ at w en inside t e compound, t e team found approximately four (4) truckloads of 

a
a
  a and a|a and a negligible amount of narra lumber, and approximately
200,000 bd. ft. of lumber and s orts of various species including almaciga and supa w ic are
classified as pro ibited wood species. (emp asis supplied)

In t e same vein, t e dispositive portion of t e resolution+ of t e investigating prosecutor, w ic served as t e basis for
t e filing of t e information, does not limit itself to | ‘; t us:

â EREFORE, premises considered, it is ereby recommended t at an information be filed against respondent

Ri C uy ào for illegal possession of 200,000 bd. ft. of lumber consisting of almaciga and supa  


||‘|

a ‘ 


| 
 
|  in violation of Sec. 63 of àD 705 as amended by E.O. 277, series of 1987.
(emp asis supplied)

@ e foregoing disquisitions s ould not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of t e respondent Judge's conclusion t at
| ‘
is excluded from t e coverage of Section 68 of à.D. No. 705, as amended, and t us possession t ereof wit out t e required
legal documents is not a crime. On t e contrary, t is Court rules t at suc possession is penalized in t e said section because
| ‘ is included in t e term timber.

@ e Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of eit er  ‘ or | ‘. â ile t e former is included in 
‘a

 a as
defined in paragrap (q) of Section 3, t e latter is found in paragrap (aa) of t e same section in t e definition of "àrocessing plant,"
w ic reads:

(aa) àrocessing plant is any mec anical set-up, mac ine or combination of mac ine used for
t e processing of logs and ot er forest raw materials into | ‘, veneer, plywood, wallbond,
blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or ot er finis ed wood products.
 @ is simply means t at | ‘
is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, t e Code uses t e term
| ‘ in its ordinary or common usage. In t e 1993 copyrig t edition of âebster's @ ird New International Dictionary,
l ‘
is defined, ‘
| , as "timber or logs after being prepared for t e market." +& Simply put, lumber is a

‘aa‘
log or timber.

It is settled t at in t e absence of legislative intent to t e contrary, words and p rases used in a statute s ould be given t eir plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning. ++ And insofar as possession of  ‘ wit out t e required legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of à.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neit er s ould we. %
|‘#



 a  ‘‘
‘‘ a.

Indisputably, respondent Judge @eresita Dizon-Capulong of Branc 172 of t e R@C of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting t e motion to quas t e information in t e CRIMINAL CASE and in dismissing t e said case.

..

. 

âe find t is petition to be wit out merit. @ e petitioner as miserably failed to s ow t at t e Court of Appeals committed any
reversible error in its assailed decision of 29 November 1991.

It was duly establis ed t at on 1 April 1990, t e petitioner's truck wit àlate No. CCK-322 was coming out from t e petitioner's
lumberyard loaded wit lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes and dimensions w ic were not accompanied wit t e required
invoices and transport documents. @ e seizure of suc truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of t e power vested upon a forest
officer or employee by Section 80 of à.D. No. 705, as amended by à.D. No. 1775. @ en, too, as correctly eld by t e trial court and
t e Court of Appeals in t e FIRS@ CIVIL CASE, t e searc was conducted on a moving ve icle. Suc a searc could be lawfully
conducted wit out a searc warrant.

Searc of a moving ve icle is one of t e five doctrinally accepted exceptions to t e constitutional mandate + t at no searc or
seizure s all be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining t e existence of probable cause.
@ e ot er exceptions are (3) searc as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searc es,
+,
and (4) consented warrantless searc . 

âe also affirm t e rulings of bot t e trial court and t e Court of Appeals t at t e searc on 4 April 1990 was a continuation of t e
searc on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of t e searc warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive Judge Osorio. Under
Section 9, Rule 126 of t e Rules of Court, a searc warrant as a lifetime of ten days. ence, it could be served at any time wit in
t e said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplis ed in one day, t e same may be continued t e following day or
days until completed. @ us, w en t e searc under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under t e same
warrant t e following day, provided it is still wit in t e ten-day period. +

As to t e final plea of t e petitioner t at t e searc was illegal because possession of lumber wit out t e required legal documents
is not illegal under Section 68 of à.D. No. 705, as amended, since | ‘
is neit er specified t erein nor included in t e term

‘a


 , t e same ardly merits furt er discussion in view of our ruling in G.R. No. 106424.

..

. 

@ e allegations and arguments set fort in t e petition in t is case palpally fail to s aw
 
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t at a reversible error as been
committed by t e Court of Appeals in its c allenged decision of 31 July 1995 and resolution of 6 February 1996 in CA-G.R. Sà No.
33778. âe must, fort wit , deny it for utter want of merit. @ ere is no need to require t e respondents to comment on t e petition.

@ e Court of Appeals correctly dismissed t e petitioner's appeal from t e judgment of t e trial court in t e SECOND CIVIL CASE.
@ e petitioner never disputed t e fact t at its lumber-dealer's license or permit ad been suspended by Secretary Factoran on 23
April 1990. @ e suspension was never lifted, and since t e license ad only a lifetime of up to 25 September 1990, t e petitioner
as absolutely no rig t to possess, sell, or ot erwise dispose of lumber. Accordingly, Secretary Factoran or is aut orized
representative ad t e aut ority to seize t e Lumber pursuant to Section 68-A of à.D. No. 705, as amended, w ic provides as
follows:

Sec. 68-A  a ԑ
 
 


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. -- In all cases of violations of t is Code or ot er forest laws, rules and regulations, t e Department
ead or is duly aut orized representative may order t e confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gat ered, removed, or possessed or abandoned. . . .

@ e petitioner's insistence t at possession or sale of lumber is not penalized must also fail view of our disquisition and ruling on t e
same issue in G.R. No. 106424. Besides, t e issue is totally irrelevant in t e SECOND CIVIL CASE w ic involves administrative
seizure as a consequence of t e violation of t e suspension of t e petitioner's license as lumber dealer.

All told t en, G.R. No. 104988 and G.R. No. 123784 are not ing more t an rituals to cover up blatant violations of t e Revised
Forestry Code of t e à ilippines (à.D. No. 705), as amended. @ ey are presumably trifling attempts to block t e serious efforts of
t e DENR to enforce t e decree, efforts w ic deserve t e commendation of t e public in lig t of t e urgent need to take firm and
decisive action against despoilers of our forests w ose continuous destruction only ensures to t e generations to come, if not t e
present, an in eritance of parc ed eart incapable of sustaining life. @ e Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect t e
environment by prosecuting wit out fear or favor any person w o dares to violate our laws for t e utilization and protection of our
forests.

â EREFORE, judgment is ereby rendered

1. (a) GRAN@ING t e petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SE@@ING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for aving been
rendered wit grave abuse of discretion, t e c allenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October 1991 of
 respondent Judge @eresita Dizon-Capulong, Branc 172, Regional @rial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in
Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled "àeople of t e à ilippines vs. Ri C uy ào"; (c) REINS@A@ING t e
information in t e said criminal case; and (d) DIREC@ING t e respondent Judge or er successor to ear and
decide t e case wit purposeful dispatc ; and

2. DENYING t e petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 for utter failure of t e petitioner to s ow
t at t e respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in t e c allenged decisions of 29 November
1991 in CA-G.R. Sà No. 25510 in t e FIRS@ CIVIL CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. Sà No. 33778 on t e
SECOND CIVIL CASE.

Costs against t e petitioner in eac of t ese t ree cases.

SO ORDERED.

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