BELIEFS AND THE BOMB:

THE ROLE OF LEADERS’ WORLD VIEWS AND STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS

ON PROLIFERATION DECISIONS

by

K.P. O’Reilly

Bachelor of Arts
Lawrence University, 1993

Master of Arts
Marquette University, 2004

Juris Doctor
Emory University School of Law, 1996

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in

Political Science

College of Arts and Science

University of South Carolina

2009

Accepted by:

Dr. Harvey Starr, Major Professor

Dr. Donald J. Puchala, Committee Member

Dr. Jerel Rosati, Committee Member

Dr. Akan Malici, Committee Member

James Buggy, Dean of the Graduate School

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ii
 DEDICATION

To all my friends and family who provided encouragement over the course of my

studies and especially to my parents, Katherine and Terrance, for their enduring patience,

love, and support during this project as well as all my other endeavors.

iii
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my dissertation committee members for

their comments and critiques. Special thanks to Dr. Harvey Starr, who as my advisor

bore the brunt of reviewing numerous initial drafts and subsequent revisions. His sharp

eye has helped to ensure the soundness of the research design and to keep the project

focused. Dr. Akan Malici, at Furman University, provided invaluable assistance and

advice in dealing with my numerous questions and facing the occasional methodological

pitfalls that befell me in the course of conducting the operational code analysis.

Throughout the process I received tremendous help from reference librarians literally the

world over. The reference staff at Duke University provided me with unfettered access to

items in storage and helped in locating materials despite of an ongoing library renovation.

Ms. Esta Jones and her assistant Freddie at the Archive for Contemporary History at the

University of the Free State in Bloemfontein, South Africa provided me with a wealth of

information and documents all the while offering tremendous hospitality during my visit.

Special thanks also to Ms. Glenda Lynch for serving as my go between in requesting and

retrieving documents from the National Library of Australia in Canberra. Lastly, I must

thank Dr. Gordon Smith and Ms. Sallie Buice at the Walker Institute for International and

Area Studies, at the University of South Carolina, not only for the travel support provided

by a Ceny Walker Fellowship, but for all the support they have offered during my time at

the University of South Carolina.

iv
 ABSTRACT

Why do countries build nuclear weapons? The revolutionary nature of the

decision to go or not go nuclear highlights the importance of individual decision-makers,

as leaders ultimately draw upon their own conceptions of themselves and the world

around them. Despite the importance of this factor, the role of individual leaders’ world

views and strategic preferences has been largely omitted in the study of proliferation.

This project advances a new analytical framework which provides a systematic and

generalizable approach addressing how leaders’ perceptions of the international system

may influence nuclear proliferation decisions. By utilizing a multi-method approach

employing qualitative, quantitative, and game theory methodologies, this project

develops a framework that captures the interactive and strategic nature of international

politics weighing how views of Self and Other influence decision-making. The result is a

dyadic approach where the key to proliferation lies in understanding a leader’s perception

of the strategic interaction between actors. By understanding the motivations driving

proliferation decisions we may ultimately develop policy solutions that might stem or

even rollback nuclear proliferation. In developing this framework the project re-examines

the proliferation decisions in several countries including South Africa, India, Libya, and

Australia.

v
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................iv

ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... v

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................... viii

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................ix

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER TWO
THE STUDY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION .............................................................. 12
CHAPTER THREE
A NEW ANAYTICAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................... 25
CHAPTER FOUR
CASES AND METHODOLOGY .................................................................................... 49
CHAPTER FIVE
SOUTH AFRICA......................................................................................................... 75
CHAPTER SIX
INDIA...................................................................................................................... 124
CHAPTER SEVEN
LIBYA ..................................................................................................................... 175
CHAPTER EIGHT
AUSTRALIA ........................................................................................................... 211
CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 244

vi
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 257

APPENDIX A – STRATEGIC INTERACTION GAMES ........................................................... 270

APPENDIX B – ARCHIVAL RESEARCH ............................................................................. 271

APPENDIX C – QADHAFI RESEARCH ................................................................................ 272

vii
 LIST OF TABLES

3.1 A Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP) 41

3.2 Holsti Typologies, Preferences and Proliferation Expectations 44

3.3 Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions using TOM 46

5.1 South African Leaders’ Operational Codes 110

5.2 Vorster’s Perceptions of Self and Other 114

5.3 De Klerk’s Perceptions of Self and Other 120

6.1 Indian Leaders’ Operational Codes 161

6.2 Gandhi’s Perceptions of Self and Other 165

6.3 Vajpayee’s Perceptions of Self and Other 171

7.1 Qadhafi’s Operational Code 198

7.2 Qadhafi’s Perceptions of Self and Other 202

8.1 Gorton’s Operational Code 236

8.2 Gorton’s Perceptions of Self and Other 239

9.1 Proliferation “Opportunity” and “Willingness” 246

9.2 Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions applying the

Modified Holsti Typologies 248

9.3 Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions applying TIP 248

viii
 LIST OF FIGURES

3.1 Scale of Influence of Decision-Makers’ Beliefs 31

3.2 George’s Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs 36

3.3 Modified Holsti Typology Matrix 39

3.4 Example of a Subjective Game 42

4.1 Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS) 58

4.2 VICS Coding Example 58

4.3 Operational Code Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs 60

5.1 South African Leaders’ Perceptions of Self and Other 111

5.2 Vorster’s Subjective Game 115

5.3 De Klerk’s Subjective Game 120

6.1 Indian Leaders’ Perceptions of Self and Other 162

6.2 Gandhi’s Subjective Game 166

6.3 Vajpayee’s Subjective Game 172

7.1 Qadhafi’s Perceptions of Self and Other 200

7.2 Qadhafi’s Subjective Game 203

8.1 Gorton’s Perceptions of Self and Other 238

8.2 Gorton’s Subjective Game 241

ix
 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

What makes mankind tragic is not that they are the victims of nature, it is
that they are conscious of it.1

Nuclear weapons have proven to be a problematic feature of the modern world for

both practitioners and scholars alike. For practitioners the spread of these weapons

introduces uncertainty in their dealing with others. Accordingly, for many countries the

spread of nuclear weapons is considered one of the greatest threats to their national

security. Meanwhile, for scholars the spread of these weapons has ignited debate as to

their role and utility in international politics (Sagan and Waltz 2002). Indeed the

presence of nuclear weapons seems to offer several paradoxes. On the one hand, nuclear

weapons indicate a state’s power in terms of military, economic, and technical prowess.

Yet, on numerous occasions, nuclear weapon states have been challenged and defeated by

non-nuclear weapons states as evidenced in the US experience in Vietnam and the Soviet

Union’s adventure in Afghanistan. Even their massive destructive power, which makes

them initially attractive as weapons, is now believed to be driving international norms

prohibiting their use (Tannenwald 2007). In sum, while the benefits of these weapons

may be unsure, they continue to pose potentially serious consequences for global politics

(Asal and Beardsley 2009; Gartzke and Kroenig 2009; Horowitz 2009).

1 Joseph Conrad (1857-1924)

1
 The uncertain and troubling impact of these weapons on the international system

is equaled only by the continuing challenge to understand the motivations for nuclear

proliferation—why do countries build nuclear weapons? This conundrum has led

researchers to refer to the issue as the “proliferation puzzle” (Davis and Frankel 1994).

The inability to grasp the motivations for proliferation has resulted in a “tragic

sensibility” among many proliferation scholars who depict future proliferation as an

inevitable outcome (Hymans 2006). For instance, during the 1960s, proliferation

forecasts predicted the possibility of upwards of 25 nuclear weapons states before 1970.2

With the end of the Cold War predictions asserted the likelihood of rampant proliferation

with the demise of the bi-polar international system (Mearsheimer 1990). Despite such

foreboding predictions, today there are only five acknowledged and four

unacknowledged and de facto nuclear weapons states.3 However, even today

proliferation headlines focus on the recent proliferation efforts by the countries of Iran

and North Korea.

Adding to this puzzle are the frequently overlooked, yet perhaps more interesting,

accounts of states which have purposefully abandoned or foresworn development of

nuclear weapons programs. The number of states abandoning nuclear weapons programs

2 President John F. Kennedy is famously quoted during the course of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
negotiations as saying, "I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10
nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.”

3 The terms “acknowledged” and “unacknowledged” nuclear weapon state is common terminology
referencing states position in the international nonproliferation regime. Acknowledged nuclear weapon
states are those whose status is recognized in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1971. This group
includes the United States, People’s Republic of China, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union
(now Russia). Unacknowledged nuclear weapon states are those states widely recognized to have nuclear
weapons, but are not signatories to the NPT. Currently, this group includes Pakistan, India, and Israel.
North Korea presents its own dilemma as a non-nuclear weapons state signatory to the NPT that has
subsequently withdrawn from the Treaty. While North Korea’s decision to withdraw has been questioned
as to its legality, its tests conducted in October 2006, although of uncertain success, has caused most
observers to consider North Korea a “de facto” nuclear weapons state.

2
during the 1990s was actually greater than the number actively seeking to develop such

capabilities (Roberts 1999). At the end of the Cold War, the world faced the possibility

of four new nuclear weapons states with the newly independent states of Russia, Ukraine,

Kazakhstan, and Belarus each retaining weapons built by the former Soviet Union. The

latter three all relinquished their claims to the weapons, sending them to Russia which

assumed the Soviet Union’s status as a “nuclear weapon state” under the NPT. Even

more astonishing was the move by the South African government to relinquish its nuclear

weapons. In March 1993, Prime Minister F.W. De Klerk announced to the world his

government’s intention to abandon South Africa’s nuclear weapon program which had

successfully constructed six nuclear devices along with various delivery systems. The

South African case is the first instance of a country actually developing nuclear weapons

capability and then subsequently voluntarily abandoning its program. More recently, in

2003, Libya followed these states in ending its pursuit of nuclear weapons. These specific

instances of nonproliferation, along with the cases of Argentina, Brazil, South Korea,

Taiwan, and Sweden, serve as counter-examples to the relatively rare instances of

proliferation which have occurred. More importantly, they present the critical question of

why do some states decide not to pursue or, even more importantly, reconsider becoming

a nuclear weapon state. Only through an accurate understanding the causal elements

influencing such decisions can scholars and policy-makers hope to control, or even

potentially curb, nuclear proliferation once and for all. The critical question then for the

study of international relations is what can be learned from these cases which explain

why states choose to or not to “go nuclear?”

3
 Studies of nuclear proliferation run the theoretical gambit utilizing various

perspectives. Researchers have examined a wide array of variables ranging from the

systemic to the domestic-political level in offering an explanation of this phenomenon.

For the most part the dominant approaches in examining the proliferation dilemma tie

back to the broader ongoing debate in international relations between realism and

liberalism regarding their disagreement as to the critical loci for attempting understanding

and explaining states’ behavior. Nevertheless, the application of these paradigms as

applied to the proliferation puzzle have come up wanting, offering explanations often

found ill-fitting at best or contradicted by actual cases.

Like much of the theorizing in political science, the variables which researchers

point to as critical in the outcome of state proliferation decisions—security, technological

capacity, economic development, domestic political competition—only provide one part

of the picture, the opportunity to proliferate. Few of the models applied to proliferation

have addressed the issue of willingness as a driving force in such decisions (Starr 1978;

Most and Starr 1989). Problematically, the issue of state willingness is internalized and

implicitly linked to the factors which provide states with the opportunity to engage in

proliferation. As is the case for most questions facing international relations scholars, the

debate as to why states choose to “go nuclear” in developing nuclear weapons capability

revolves around the issue of preferences, and the inevitable quandary of where do

preferences come from and for which audience, domestic or international, are preferences

supposed to satisfy.

The bulk of the scholarship examining nuclear proliferation sees preferences as

endogenous, shaped either by the international system or by the domestic political

4
features of a given state. Yet, more and more, international relations scholars recognize

the need to examine the possibility of preferences as exogenous, with the belief system of

the agent playing a role as a causal mechanism (Walker and Schafer 2006a). As

Goldstein and Keohane assert, “ideas as well as interests have causal weight in

explanations of human behavior…[whereby]… causal ideas help determine which of

many means will be used to reach desired goals and therefore help to provide actors with

strategies with which to further their objectives” (1993:4, 13-14) (authors’ italics). Just

as scholars have argued for bringing the state back in to the analysis (Milner 1997;

Milner and Keohane 1996), when it come to critical decisions such as whether to build

nuclear weapons, I argue here that we must also bring the agent back into the analysis. A

better understanding of leaders’ world views and their resulting preferences will add to

our understanding of why states choose to proliferate.

Despite the importance of this issue, the role of individual leaders’ world views

and strategic preferences has been largely omitted as a variable in the study of

proliferation. Too often the choices made by decision-makers are assumed by systemic

conditions, or completely absent from examination, even though it is well-documented

that preferences and perceptions play an important role in international security (Jervis

1976). The extant research on the determinants of nuclear proliferation has primarily

utilized either systemic or domestic level variables in examining this phenomenon (Jo

and Gartzke 2007; Solingen 2007; Singh and Way 2004; Sagan 1996/97; Meyer 1984).

However, with this resurgence of quantitative analysis of the causes and consequences of

proliferation, the role of leaders’ beliefs and decision-making are largely absent and

5
unaccounted for (Montgomery and Sagan 2009).4 Again, these variables based on

external security and domestic politics appear to present only half of the equation,

demonstrating the opportunity, but not the willingness, to proliferate. Moreover, the

revolutionary nature that the decision to go or not go nuclear further highlights the

importance of individual decision-makers, as leaders ultimately draw upon their own

conceptions of themselves and the world around them (Hymans 2006). Initial research as

to the intersection of beliefs and proliferation by Long and Grillot (2000) suggests that

beliefs act not simply as strategic guides, but that beliefs are determinative of the very

preferences which drive state strategy.

In seeking to break new ground to further advance the inquiry on the motivations

driving nuclear proliferation by examining the role of individual leaders’ preferences, this

project aims to address the overarching question—What impact do leaders’ views of the

international political environment have on proliferation decisions? More specifically,

how do perceptions of interactions with others influence whether nuclear weapons are

seen as necessary for achieving political goals in the international system? This project

argues that understanding particular leaders like Saddam Hussein or Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad is the key to understanding proliferation—and crafting strategies to stop it.

Leaders’ world views provide insight as to their “strategic interactions” where decisions

are the result of one’s own preferences and anticipating the actions of others (Lake and

Powell 1999). By understanding leaders’ world views and strategic preferences, we can

obtain a more vivid picture of the motivations driving leaders’ proliferation decisions.

Ultimately, the development of a leader’s interaction framework helps to develop policy

4 See the upcoming special edition of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (forthcoming) for several article
utilizing quantitative methods in examining the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation.

6
solutions as to the types of strategies and tactics which might stem or even rollback

nuclear proliferation.

However, from the outset one caution must be made. This project is not an

attempt to further any theory pertaining to great leaders or great men and women in

history. For the leaders examined, their rise to power was far from being preordained,

resulting more from circumstances and political compromise than historic certainty. In

the cases of South Africa (Vorster), India (Gandhi), and Australia (Gorton), the leaders in

question came to power following the sudden and unexpected death of their predecessors

by way of assassination, heart attack, and a swimming accident. In most cases these

leaders entered their country’s highest office with the most modest of political

expectations being placed upon them. Nevertheless, these leaders each came to face an

enormous decision as to the fate of their country’s future policy concerning the

development of nuclear weapons. These decision-makers deserve our attention then as

students of international relations, as the resulting outcomes of these decisions in turn

shaped world politics (Marfleet and Walker 2006). Accordingly, the attempt here is to

“…rescue men and women, as individuals, from the oblivion to which political scientist

have consigned them” by striving to better understand why they make certain decisions

(Byman and Pollack 2001).

Consequently, this project advances a new analytical framework which provides a

systematic and generalizable approach addressing how leaders’ perceptions of the

international system influence nuclear proliferation decisions. The contention made here

is that application of a cognitive, decision-making framework is both necessary and

useful in explaining states’ proliferation decisions. The inherent nature of the “decision

7
environment” surrounding proliferation decisions makes it an ideal candidate for

cognitive approaches as individuals’ preferences and perceptions hold even stronger sway

in such decision-making situations (Hymans 2006; Holsti 1976). This framework

captures the interactive nature of international politics, weighing how views of one’s self

and others influence decision-making (Walker 2004). The result is a dyadic approach,

akin to the research on the democratic peace theory, where the key to proliferation lies in

understanding the interactions between actors (Montgomery and Sagan 2009).

The project utilizes a multi-method approach employing qualitative, quantitative,

and game theory methodologies to address the research question at hand. Qualitatively,

leaders’ public statements are coded using operational code analysis (Walker and Shafer

2006). This quantitative data is converted into several numerically scored indices

permitting testing of the statistical significance of differences in world views over time

and between leaders, including a proxy average world leader score. The development of

leaders’ world views then lends itself to making inferences about their preferences when

dealing with others; their so-called “subjective games” (Maoz 1990; Walker 1990).

These subjective games constructed from leaders’ perceptions of the international system

are analyzed through use of Brams’ (1994) Theory of Moves (TOM) game construct.

The use of TOM provides for a dynamic examination of sequential moves by players

capturing the action-reaction nature of international politics more realistically than the

simultaneous moves of conventional game theory. The combination of the qualitative

data and the game modeling offers a significant analytical breakthrough, as a leader’s

desired outcome and expected strategies are not simply assumed by imposing exogenous

8
preferences, but are endogenized by inputting their preferences as revealed by their world

view.

The limited use of cognitive models in the study of nuclear proliferation is due in

part to their perceived shortcomings concerning replication and generalizability, thereby

limiting their usefulness in making meaningful comparisons. However, recent

developments in the research program on operational code analysis have done much to

overcome this shortcoming. The principle advantage of operational code analysis is its

ability to convert qualitative data into quantitative data. This allows for particular and

specified measurements which can be made across subjects permitting statistical analysis

to generate probabilistic generalizations. As Walker and Schafer assert, “It is one thing

to say that that a leader is driven by a need for power. It is quite another to say that his or

her need for power is higher than all but 5 percent of the population of other leaders…”

(2006a:27). Such an understanding of a leader’s belief system is critical in understanding

international interactions, as beliefs serve to define their view of the international

environment and orient their strategic and tactical approach given one’s view of the

international system (Malici 2006; George 1969).

By developing the operational codes of leaders, the goal is to determine whether a

leader’s perceived strategic interaction is a “necessary” variable in explaining

proliferation. The aim is not to simply discard the existing macro-theories on

proliferation, but to incorporate micro-foundation in seeking to provide more robust

results (Walker and Shafer 2006b). In doing so the project confronts the challenge set

forth by Sagan (1996-97), when he writes:

The challenge for scholars is not to produce increasing numbers

of detailed, but atheoretical, case studies of states’ nuclear

9
 proliferation and restraint decisions, but it is to produce theory-
driven comparative studies to help determine the conditions
under which different causal forces produced similar
outcomes….But future scholarship focusing on how different
governments assess the nuclear potential and intentions of
neighbors, on why pro-bomb and anti-bomb domestic coalitions
form and gain influence, and on when and how NPT norms
about legitimate behavior constrain statesmen will be extremely
important (85).

The cases developed in the project include South Africa, India, Libya and

Australia. These countries cover an array of proliferation outcomes including instances

of nonproliferation, proliferation, and rollback. The cases of South Africa and India

provide a unique opportunity to examine multiple proliferation decisions made within the

same state. Extensive archival work has been conducted including a visit to the Archive

for Contemporary Affairs at the University of the Free State in the Republic of South

Africa, as well as consulting the National Library of Australia. Given that these cases

have been studied extensively at the systemic and domestic level of analysis, they provide

fertile ground for hypothesis testing of the decision-making framework developed by this

project and permit direct comparisons of outcomes through the application of these

different explanatory models.

The remainder of this project is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two delves

into the existing literature pertaining to nuclear proliferation examining the various

approaches and models that have been used in exploring the proliferation puzzle.

Chapter Three develops the new analytical framework being proposed, expectations for

proliferation outcomes, and the derived hypotheses to be tested. Chapter Four will

discuss the methodology used in carrying out this project, specifically detailing the use of

operational code analysis and the application of the Verbs in Context System (VIC)

10
content analysis coding procedure. The following four chapters will detail the

substantive case studies examining the nuclear developments, the existing explanations

for the proliferation outcome, and apply the analytical framework. They will be

examined in the following order: Chapter Five will deal with South Africa; Chapter Six

will deal with India; Chapter Seven will cover Libya; and, Chapter Eight will examine

Australia. Lastly, Chapter Nine will summarize the findings, offering some conclusions

and parting thoughts as to the efficacy of this new framework in better understanding the

phenomenon of nuclear proliferation.

11
 CHAPTER TWO

THE STUDY OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The development and spread of nuclear weapons has been and continues to be a

problematic field of study in international relations. Despite decades of studies, the

“dynamics of nuclear proliferation remain largely a mystery” (Ogilvie-White 1996:43).

In posing the question “why do states build nuclear weapons?,” Sagan writes, “…given

the importance of this central proliferation puzzle, it is surprising how little sustained

attention has been devoted to examining and comparing alternative answers” (1996-97:

54). Nevertheless, debate has raged over how to contain the spread of nuclear weapons

versus whether proliferation of nuclear weapons is inevitable. Indeed it has been

suggested that the proliferation of nuclear weapons may be a positive outcome in terms of

international security accompanied by the provocative tagline “more may be better”

(Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1990, 1981).

At the most generalized level of hypothesizing, the literature on states’

proliferation decisions has pointed to two separate factors as critical: technological

determinants and motives (Ogilvie-White 1986). The technological determinant

hypothesis posits that the development of nuclear technology develops its own

momentum whereby states will develop nuclear weapons as soon as it becomes

technologically feasible. An early version of this hypothesis was advanced by Kegley

(1980) which asserts that states will develop nuclear weapons when they simultaneously

possess the technological and economic means to do so. This model, however, failed to
12
predict many of the states that would later challenge nonproliferation including Iraq, Iran,

and North Korea. By the 1990s, 30 countries possessed the technological capability to

build nuclear weapons almost immediately with numerous others operating or

constructing nuclear reactors, hence possessing the potential to pursue such a goal (Sagan

1996-97). Yet almost none of these states has acted to develop nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, a principle shortcoming of this model, as acknowledged by Kegley, is the

failure to account for the motives, incentives, and states’ intentions as well as

psychological and cognitive variables. Not surprisingly, the greater part of the

proliferation literature has shifted focus to the motivations underpinning states’

proliferation decisions.

This second class of hypotheses, focusing on motives, has resulted in an abundant

literature. In a comprehensive article reviewing the motive-based hypotheses for

proliferation, Sagan (1996-97) devises three “models” for classifying the various

theoretical conceptions addressing motives for proliferation circulating in the literature.

Sagan labeled them “the security model,” “the domestic politics model,” and “the norms

model.” Of note, Sagan emphasizes that these models are of particular importance due to

the fact that they focus on the “demand” side (i.e. motives) of the proliferation equation

rather than the “supply” side (i.e. technological determinants).

By far the most widely advanced theories regarding proliferation motives has

been the so-called security rationale, or the security model. This significant theoretical

conception traces its origins from the realist and neorealist camp. Similar to the

popularity that the realist paradigm enjoyed during the Cold War period, the security

based conception of nuclear proliferation has taken on “near-consensus” status by both

13
international relations scholars, and perhaps more critically, policymakers (Sagan 1996-

97:54).

Driven by the logic of realism, the security model depicts state decision-making

processes as a unitary actor employing utility-maximizing rationales. Accordingly, the

development of nuclear weapons is the attempt by states to further their own interests.

Specifically, the driving motivation for nuclear weapons stems from national security

considerations which represent the most basic state interest, state survival. As routinely

postulated by realists, the focus on security results from the anarchical nature of the

international system characterized as a self-help system where states must provide for

their own security (Waltz 1979). This security consideration postulate is summarized

whereby “states will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant

military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means; if they do

not face such threats they will willingly remain non-nuclear states” (Sagan 1996-97:54).

Given that proliferation is the result of overt security concerns, realists maintain

proliferation restraint results from the absence of a military threat.

The application of realism’s basic assumptions regarding the international system

seemingly encourages further nuclear proliferation. Once the Pandora’s box of nuclear

proliferation is opened with one state possessing such a capability other states will follow

to ensure their own security. As one US policymaker fittingly summed up the logic of

this model, “proliferation begets proliferation” (Schultz 1984:18). This argument, often

referred to by the title of Waltz’s provocative 1981 article, “The Spread of Nuclear

Weapons: More May Be Better,” emphasizes the importance realism places on the

assumptions of states as rational actors. For Waltz, nuclear proliferation has an air of

14
inevitability, albeit not necessarily immediacy, given that rational deterrence mandates

that states possess second strike capability to truly enjoy the security benefits of such

weapons. According to Waltz, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international

system will impose stability, demanding caution and restraint on state actions.

Linked to this realist security hypothesis is some of the work in formal game

theory modeling. In assessing the future of nuclear proliferation, Bueno de Mesquita and

Riker (1982) assert that the increase in nuclear weapons will serve to stabilize the

international system by adjusting cost/benefit calculations according to when states deal

with nuclear weapon states.5 In modeling the choice to “go nuclear,” the game that is

depicted demonstrates a pay-off structure in accordance with a prisoners’ dilemma, the

game structure commonly used in classic deterrence theory. The logic of the game

dictates that players—as utility maximizers—seek out their best pay-off translating into

the decision to develop nuclear weapons. Players in this proliferation game who choose

not to proliferate always lose, receiving their worst pay-off. The failure to proliferate

when confronted by a nuclear rival only serves to increase the potentiality of war and

blackmail. Bueno de Mesquita and Riker note as supporting evidence the proliferation

case of Pakistan, where that nation’s pursuit of nuclear weapons appears directly tied to

resolving the asymmetry in its capabilities and those of its rival, India.

Nevertheless, it was Waltz (1990), the originator of neorealism, who subsequently

questioned the rational actor assumption driving the security model of proliferation.

Waltz points out that the inherent logic of deterrence ostensibly makes proliferation futile

by weakening states through draining economic resources. Indeed, the deterrence factor

5 As with most game modeling certain assumptions are made. For Bueno de Mesquita and Riker a key
assumption is that nuclear weapon nations possess sufficient second strike capability to inflict unacceptable
losses.

15
of nuclear weapons and the security dilemma they create, leading to spiraling arms races,

has been examined previously (Jervis 1978). A second factor cited by Waltz is the claim

that military leaders dislike the uncertainty that nuclear weapons present. Realism’s

detractors point out that Waltz’s rebuttal points to the major flaws of the realist security

based argument for proliferation; that it fails to account for non-military sources of power

and the shortcoming of the rational actor model for state decision-making (Ogilvie-White

1996). The realists’ focus on resources (i.e. nuclear weapons) as a source of power has

been severely criticized in failing to recognize and solve the problem of transferability or

fungibility of power resources—what may equate power in one setting may be

unworkable, ill-suited, irrelevant, or even detrimental in another setting, creating what is

often referred to as the “paradox of power” (Baldwin 1979; Hart 1976). Furthermore,

Waltz’s discussion of military leader’s thinking delves far a field from the normal

comfort zone of neorealism, reaching into the realm of political psychology, and certainly

well below the systemic level of analysis.

Following in the realist tradition, others have sought to reinforce the security

model of proliferation with its focus on system level causation (Betts 1993; Davis 1993).

These studies too have run into problems that point out the difficulty of addressing the

puzzle of proliferation strictly from the system level of analysis. Davis (1993) argues that

security concerns may lead a state to avoid nuclear weapons where such may serve to

undermine security and instead support the international nonproliferation regime. While

accounting for why proliferation has not experienced a dramatic increase, examples of

states pursuing nuclear weapons which seem counter to their security interests (e.g. North

Korea) or refusing to participate in the nonproliferation regime despite incentive to do so

16
(e.g. Pakistan and India) are not resolved (Ogilvie-White 1996). While seeming to point

out the importance of domestic politics and other unit variables in such decisions, Davis

summarily disposes of such factors as “secondary” to system level factors. Betts (1993)

sought to address the impact state characteristics, but in a strictly realist fashion. In

acknowledging that there may be differing types of states in the system reacting

differently to the forces of the anarchical international system, it is the nature of the

international system, argues Betts, which determines state behavior. States may pursue

nuclear weapons because they seek international prestige, are isolated, or face security

threats. Again, critics of this approach point out that by failing to look at other non-

system level factors Betts fails to provide much in the way of explanation or predictive

power. By example, in the cases of states pursuing nuclear weapons due to international

isolation, such isolation appears precisely “due to their domestic political systems” (e.g.

South Africa and North Korea), hence their status in the international community and

pursuit of nuclear weapons appears tied to the features of their domestic government

(Ogilvie-White 1996:46).

While offering an arguably attractive parsimonious model for proliferation, the

security model, and its associated realist based derivates, has been severely undermined

by those cases where states, despite strong security incentives, have decided not to

develop nuclear weapons. Such cases have put in doubt both its explanatory and

predictive power. In challenging the realist proliferation argument, other scholars assert

that nuclear weapons are dissimilar from other conventional weapons where the decision

to “go nuclear” goes beyond the realm of security and often is the subject of domestic

political considerations. Due to the perceived shortcoming of the security model and its

17
underlying realist assumptions, mounting scholarship has put forward alternative motive-

based hypotheses for proliferation focusing instead on domestic politics/institutions and

norms.

Under the umbrella of “domestic determinants” (Singh and Way 2004) are two

similar yet distinct points of view. The first theory, labeled by Sagan as the “Domestic

Politics Model,” focuses on the creation of domestic coalitions within the government

either supporting or preventing the development of nuclear weapons. Key players in this

model include a state’s nuclear energy establishment, the military, and politicians facing

political parties and/or populations in favor of, or opposed to, nuclear weapons

development. Under this model, proliferation is the result of “parochial bureaucratic or

political interests of at least some individual actors within the state” (Sagan 1996-97:63).6

International threats serve as a rational facade whereby nuclear programs are not drive by

such concerns, but rather “nuclear weapons programs are solutions looking for a problem

to which to attach themselves so as to justify their existence” (Sagan 1996-97:65).

Hence, it is not changes occurring at the international level, but domestic political

concerns and major political changes occurring within a state that drive decisions to or

not to go nuclear. This approach has been variously applied to explain the decisions

reached by states including Argentina, Brazil, India, and South Africa. The domestic

politics model is not without flaws however. Problematically, there is no theory of

domestic politics covering nuclear proliferation that identifies the conditions under which

coalitions are formed and obtain enough power to produce their preferred outcome.

6 These domestic politics models correspond to Allison’s (1971) Model II (Organizational Politics) and
Model III (Bureaucratic Politics), however, their treatment is often blurred incorporating elements of both
into the analysis.

18
 Other theories discussing the role of domestic politics on proliferation decisions

focus more generally on the organization of domestic political institutions. Stressing the

internal make-up of the state, these approaches place the decision of nuclear proliferation

as spanning both the international system as well as domestic considerations. Moreover,

whereas realism is faulted for its myopic focus on military/security goals, these

alternative theories specifically recognize an array of state interests/goals which may

come from either the international or domestic level akin to Putnam’s (1988) two-level

game analysis. Of particular interest here, Solingen (2007, 1994) offers a regime based

model of nuclear proliferation which ascribes importance to the political and economic

orientation of the state. She asserts that democratic states pursuing liberal economic

policies, or “internationalizing” as she labels it, will be less likely to develop nuclear

weapons given their reliance on the global economy and international community. This

result will hold despite a state possessing the requisite technological acumen. Such states

may keep the “nuclear option” open going forward, but see the development of nuclear

weapons as problematic, defeating other state interests. Meanwhile, more inward-looking

regimes, which seek to maintain support through nationalistic appeal, are prone to pursue

nuclear weapons. Leaders in these regimes will cite external threats as justification for

proliferation, but their true motives are based on appeals to nationalism for the purposes

of bolstering domestic political support. While advancing the idea for proliferation

literature to develop its understanding of “nuclear logics,” Solingen’s framework is left

with the lingering uncertainty as to when and why such regime come into power or how

an inward-looking regime might be rehabilitated.

19
 It is also worth noting that subsumed in this institutional approach is what Sagan

calls the “norms model.” According to this model the presence of international norms

relating to nuclear weapons influence whether a country associates prestige with the

acquisition of or the abstention from such weapons. Much of the literature pertaining to

norms and nuclear proliferation draws heavily on concepts advanced in the literature of

embedded liberalism by Ruggie (1983) and normative regimes as discussed by

Nadelmann (1990). Chafetz (1993) contends that within liberal democracies, which he

labels the “core,” the presence of shared norms and values has resulted in cooperation to

prevent proliferation. The basis of this approach lies in the older foundations of the

security communities discussed initially by Deutsch (1957). As to the development of

international norms regarding nuclear weapons, Adler (1992) points to the growth of an

international epistemic community devaluing the “prestige factor” associated with a

state’s development of nuclear weapons.

While the domestic politics and institutional approaches have sought to correct

the perceived overly deterministic state as rational actor assumption of the security

model, they too fail to provide a complete representation of the proliferation puzzle.

First, while stressing the importance of institutions, these models cannot offer insight as

to which institutions or coalitions are most likely to influence policy (Ogilvie-White

1996). Secondly, where realism is faulted for ignoring domestic factors, the focus on

organizations and institutions within a state raises the inevitable agency problem within

politics. Organizations and institutions take on exaggerated levels of importance ignoring

the role of individuals who make up these bodies. Accordingly, the beliefs and values of

the individual are bypassed. These neoliberal institutional models of proliferation suffer

20
then from a lack of an accounting for how individuals learn and how individual learning

may influence policy.7

While the scholarship on proliferation has expanded to look at both system and

domestic level variables, little, if any, research has examined the role of cognitive

variables, or the beliefs of the individual decision-makers, in determining state policy

regarding nuclear proliferation. Generally, the research regarding nuclear proliferation

shares much in common with prevailing theories of international relations whereby they

“assume that leaders’ beliefs simply mirror the foreign and domestic realities that they

face as they make foreign policy decisions” (Walker and Schafer 2006a:4). Beliefs are

viewed as endogenous, merely acting as a conveyor belt providing the decision-maker

with information about the environment. In part, this assumption has been argued as

necessary due to the typically secretive nature of such policy decisions. Furthermore, the

application of cognitive models to the issue of proliferation is looked upon with suspicion

suffering from the same familiar criticism leveled against the use of cognitive models

generally—that they are difficult to quantify to readily offer themselves to generalizable

application.

Despite apparent apprehension, applications of cognitive theories appear to have

much to offer in adding to our understanding of the proliferation puzzle. Perhaps most

importantly, the cognitive approach, in viewing beliefs as exogenous, allows for the

possibility that beliefs might indeed be a causal mechanism. Accordingly, beliefs are put

7 Undoubtedly neoliberalism and other non-system level theories have addressed the issue of learning
(Deutsch 1963; Axelrod 1984; Etheredge 1986; March and Olsen 1988). However, these approaches focus
primarily with learning occurring at the aggregated state/institutional level and do not address specifically
the impact of individual learning. In questioning the analytical viability of the notion of organizational
“learning,” Levy (1994) argues that these bodies do not literally learn, but learn only through the
individuals inside them.

21
forth as operating independently from the surrounding realities or environment which can

steer decision-making by shaping the decision-maker’s perceptions of reality (Snyder,

Bruck, and Sapin 1962). Rather than serving as mirror of reality, it is contended that

beliefs may work to distort, block or re-cast information regarding the environment. As

Holsti (1976) asserts, the influence of beliefs is made even more important when, as is

often the case, the situation is uncertain and the available information is either limited or

far too abundant presenting challenges to leaders to organize and process such.

Moreover, beliefs can play a role when changes in the environment conflict with pre-

existing beliefs resulting in misperceptions and flawed decision-making (Jervis 1976).

The examination of beliefs allows for more rigorous testing of these variables by

answering the question of whether beliefs passively mirror reality or do they, “actively

steer the decision of leaders independent of external realities” (Walker and Schafer

2006a:6-7). Indeed, cognitive models have been applied to an ever increasing number of

situations and actors (Schafer and Walker 2006).

Nevertheless, the application of cognitive frameworks to proliferation decisions is

still an infrequent occurrence. In examining the case of South Africa, Purkitt and

Burgess assert that within the white-minority, apartheid government, leaders’ possessed a

so-called “laager mentality” prompting the decision to proliferate (Purkitt et al. 2002).

This mindset caused these leaders to have a heightened, if not exaggerated, fear of

external threats. While pointing to a belief system as a potential causal variable, this

conception was underdeveloped, uncertain as whether this was a group or individual

psychology, and underspecified, relying on anecdotal evidence (Purkitt et al. 2002).

Subsequently, Long and Grillot (2000), in examining the case of South Africa and

22
Ukraine, also sought to develop the role of ideational factors in these states’ decisions in

the 1990s to forgo nuclear weapons. Driven by what they see as the failure of the

traditional security and domestic politics models to satisfactorily explain these decisions,

they argue that leaders’ beliefs “play a significant role in both preference formation and

strategic choice regarding nuclear policymaking” (2000:36) (authors’ italics). While

bolstering the case for the inclusion of ideational variable in the analysis of proliferation,

the authors stopped far short from developing a comprehensive framework based on

beliefs as influencing preferences.

The most notable effort to date in developing a cognitive model of nuclear

proliferation is Jacque Hymans’ The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (2006).

Hymans offers a comprehensive framework for explaining proliferation decisions by

developing different formulations of identity and nationalism, operationalized in a

concept he terms “national identity conceptions” (NICs). The work seeks to differentiate

leaders based on their own perceptions of identity. What distinguishes Hymans’ work is

that “at a time when most political scientists and many psychologists downplay

individual differences, it is important to stress that Hymans’ categorization applies to

leaders, not states” (Jervis 2006:270). According to Hymans, a leader’s nationalism

might serve to either reinforce cooperation or provide an “explosive psychological

cocktail” that in mixing together pride, ego, and ambition drives certain leaders to seek

out nuclear weapons (Hymans 2006:2). In essence, “Hymans argues that what a nation

stands for and how high it stands in the nuclear race is not only a social factor but is

grounded intersubjectively within the individual leader” (Raum 2006). This

differentiation among leaders explains why proliferation has not simply been driven by

23
the spread of technical knowhow, but remains an infrequent occurrence as the NIC which

favors proliferation lies as an extreme type according to Hymans’ analysis.

Based on the current state of the literature, what this project seeks to do is build

on the proliferation scholarship seeking to better grasp the motivations driving

proliferation outcomes. Specifically, given the recent, yet meager, attention paid to

developing a cognitive understanding of proliferation, the goal of this project is to

attempt the creation of a new analytical framework for examining nuclear proliferation

outcomes based on how leaders perceive their strategic interactions combining their view

of Self and Other in the international system. Theoretically, the project expands on the

existing proliferation literature on the causes of proliferation in two ways. First, the

project offers an important contribution to the study of proliferation by building a

systematic examination of how leaders’ beliefs impact proliferation decisions. Second, it

fills a void in previous studies which have examined the role of decision-makers by

developing an analytical framework that provides for generalizable findings, permitting

meaningful cross-case comparisons. Overall, the project seeks to further develop an

avenue of proliferation research which the literature has only just begun to make inroads.

The next chapter will develop the analytical framework at the heart of this study.

24
 CHAPTER THREE

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION DECISIONS

The goal of this chapter is to flesh-out a framework of decision-making which

addresses the specific question of leaders’ decisions to “go nuclear.” Specifically, this

project endeavors to apply an agent-based, cognitive framework to examine proliferation

decisions. The attempt to develop a foreign policy decision-making approach for studying

international relations phenomenon has a long lineage including the prominent efforts of

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962; 1954). The contention here is that application of a

cognitive, decision-making framework is both necessary and useful in explaining states’

proliferation decisions. As Marfleet and Walker assert, “foreign policy decisions generate

processes of world politics” (2006:54). Nevertheless, the impact of individual leaders’

world views and strategic preferences has been largely an omitted variable in the study of

proliferation, but one that may serve to further substantiate or contradict existing

explanations.

In support of this position three issues are addressed in this chapter prior to laying

out the theoretical framework employed by this study. First, by understanding the

motivations of leaders through a cognitive, decision-making framework the “willingness”

component of the “opportunity/willingness” dynamic of proliferation is purposely

targeted. Second, the inherent nature of the “decision environment” surrounding

proliferation decisions makes it an ideal candidate for examination through an agent

25
based, cognitive approach as individuals’ world views and preferences hold even stronger

sway in such decision-making situations. Lastly, the particular framework used in this

project, borrowing heavily from operational code analysis, is well suited to address the

issue of proliferation, as part of the larger phenomenon of international security, given its

focus on perceptions of power, control, conflict, and cooperation, each of which serves as

foundational conditions in both neorealism and neoliberalism. What emerges is a

framework which allows for the creation of strategic interactions models based on

expectations derived from leaders’ perceptions of themselves and other actors in the

international system.

The opportunity/willingness dynamic

As discussed in the previous chapter, a perceived shortcoming in the proliferation

literature has been its failure to equally address both parts of the “opportunity and

willingness” dynamic of states’ proliferation decisions. The figurative scale points to the

lopsided attention paid to factors which can be characterized as providing the

“opportunity” for states to proliferate including things like external security threats or

domestic government regime type. What is lacking is a better understanding of how such

opportunistic factors are perceived by leaders and affect their willingness to pursue

certain actions. As Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin claim, “it is impossible to probe the why of

states behavior without also doing something about the motivations of decision-makers”

(1962:137) (authors’ italics). What we find is that the proliferation scholarship, as well

as much of international relations, focuses on the “situational” rather than the

26
“dispositional.”8 The motivations of leaders (i.e. willingness) are assumed from the

presence of external conditions. This tension is hardly new, as Harold and Margret

Sprout (1957) noted decades ago, political scientists need to separate and study both the

psychological environment and the operational environment. The advantage offered by a

cognitive, decision-making approach is the attempt to pull out the motivations of leaders

and treat them as an exogenous variable.

The continuing focus on factors which provide the opportunity for proliferation is

troublesome as it treads in the waters of determinism. Nuclear proliferation, like other

political events, require the intersection, or conjunction, of opportunity AND willingness

(Cioffi-Revilla and Starr 1995). The substitution of opportunity for willingness produces

an outcome at odds with how the political world actually operates.9 Indeed, Meyer

(1984) reported over two decades ago that the presence of technological capability was a

deficient indicator of which states proliferate. Why then are we to suppose that factors

such as external threats, alliances, international regimes, regime type, or economic

openness serve as better indicators? While offering improved explanations over the

technology/capabilities hypothesis, these factors, too, serve to set a scene, or in the words

of the Sprouts (1957), a “milieu.” However, this situational environment created by the

presence of these factors is just one of the environments at work. While setting the

context, or operational environment, in which leaders act, there is still the need to link

this environment to the perceptions of the decision maker, their psychological

8 For a recent and accessible discussion the “situational” versus “dispositional” dynamic in the study of
psychology see Philip Zimbardo (2007) The Lucifer Effect. The work revisits the famous Stanford prison
experiment overseen by Zimbardo in 1971.

9 As Cioffi-Revilla and Starr (1995) note the use of opportunity as a stand-in for willingness offers perverse
outcomes when thinking of political events such as war where to contend that the outbreak of war results
from opportunity alone flies in the face of both logic and the weight of historical evidence.

27
environment, for “what matters in decision-making is not how the milieu is, but how the

decision-maker imagines it to be” (Sprout and Sprout 1957:314). Consequently, the

effort is not to isolate decision makers, but to suggest that they represent an important

variable as they “function at the intersection” of the various pressures working in any

given decision situation (Snyder 1962:1).

Operational code analysis is well situated to be of use in examining the

opportunity/willingness dynamic of proliferation decisions given its aim to develop a

subject’s perception of “Self” and “Other.” Leaders’ world views provide insight as to

their “strategic interactions” where decisions are the result of one’s own preferences and

anticipating the actions of others (Lake and Powell 1999). Accordingly, decisions are not

made in a vacuum, but are made in the strategic context of the environment surrounding

the decision-maker. In the instance of nuclear proliferation, the willingness to pursue and

develop nuclear weapons hinges not just on how one sees the world and wishes to act, but

also how one perceives other actors in the international system. While a given leader

may wish to act more cooperatively, perceptions regarding the anticipated actions of

one’s adversaries might demand the pursuit of alternative strategies to counter possible

threats. In developing this relationship between one’s perceptions of “Self” and “Other,”

operational code analysis can aid in illustrating how divergent preferences attributed to

“Self” and “Other” impact strategic decisions (Malici 2006, 2005; Marfleet and Miller

2005; Walker 2004; Maoz 1990). The result is a game-theoretic, dyadic approach where

the key to proliferation lies in understanding the interactions between actors

(Montgomery and Sagan 2009).

28
 The Characteristics of the Proliferation Decision

It goes without much debate to assert that not all decisions are equal in terms of

difficulty, complexity, and ramifications. The decision to “go nuclear” is not a run-of-

the-mill decision. Not only does it have near and long term impacts, some of which may

or may not be known at the time, but it also places significant demands on the allocation

of state resources. It has been described as the nearly ideal-type big decision representing

a “leap in the dark on many dimensions” (Hymans 2006). Of critical importance to this

project’s examination of proliferation decisions are the studies, which in examining “big

decisions,” have found that in such situations individual’s values and beliefs played a

disproportionately influential role (Chong 2000; Holsti 1976). As the Sprouts assert, “the

higher one moves in the hierarchy of a great power’s government, the more one is

impressed by the remoteness of executives from the operational environment in which

their decisions are executed” (1957:321). In such settings the attributes of individual

decision makers cannot be relegated to the status of a residual category as if

characterizing them as just so much background noise. Instead, “a cognitive process

perspective is fundamental and should be at the starting point of analysis, rather than a

luxury to be indulged in order to reduce some of the variance unexplained by other, more

powerful, approaches” (Holsti 1976: 36).

As a “big decision,” the choice of whether to proliferate eschews the typical cost-

benefit calculations that underlie the standard application of the rational choice

perspective (Hymans 2006). In examining these decisions from the rational choice

perspective, Chong (2000) found that in such instances final decisions were most often a

reflection of certain psychological factors. Included among these influential factors were

29
the “core beliefs” of the decision-maker. Mirroring conditional restraints of crisis

decision-making, big decisions typically present situations where relevant information

may either be unavailable or contradictory, yet decision-makers cannot wait for such

discrepancies to be rectified.

Specifically, in the context of the operational code, Holsti (1976) contends that

the role of leaders’ beliefs is amplified in certain scenarios.10 This theme was revisited

by Hymans (2006), who pointed out four of these scenarios which appear to closely

resemble the characteristics of proliferation decisions:

1. Non-routine situations that require more than merely the

application of standard operating procedures and decision
rules;

2. Decisions made at the pinnacle of the government

hierarchy by leaders who are relatively free from
organizational and other constraints – or who may at least
define their roles in ways that enhance their latitude for
choice;

3. Situations that contain highly ambiguous components and

are thus open to a variety of interpretations;

4. Long range planning, a task that inherently involves

considerable uncertainty.

The international scope of the proliferation decision further empowers individual

decision-makers as such foreign policy choices are typically characterized as possessing

“structural uncertainty” (Holsti 1976:31; Steinbrunner 1974).

10 Holsti (1976) came up with seven circumstances where decision makers’ beliefs systems are critical: 1)
Non-routine situations that require more than merely the application of standard operating procedures and
decision rules; 2) Decisions made at the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders who are relatively
free from organizational and other constraints; 3) Long-range policy planning; 4) When the situation itself
is highly ambiguous, and thus open to interpretation; 5) Circumstances of information overload in which
decision makers are forced to use a variety of strategies to cope with a problem; 6) unanticipated events in
which initial reactions are likely to reflect cognitive “sets”; 7) Circumstances in which complex cognitive
tasks associated with decision making may be impaired or otherwise significantly affected by the various
types of stress that impinge on top-ranking executives.

30
 It must be emphasized that just because beliefs may take on a greater role in these

decision environments this does not imply a direct linkage between beliefs and policies.

In accordance with previous research, the claim advanced here is that beliefs act as a

framework or map which “establish the boundaries within which the decision is made”

(Holsti 1976:34-35). The goal is not to exaggerate the individual decision-maker and

ignore the role of bureaucratic politics, but to recognize a sliding scale where one or the

other may play a greater role depending on the type of decision at hand (see Figure 3.1).

In the case of the decision by states to “go nuclear” the role of individual decision-

makers’ beliefs is near its pinnacle.

Small Decisions: Big Decisions:

- Certainty of outcomes Beliefs of Decision-Maker - Taken by top leaders
- Low Stakes - Uncertain outcomes
- Complete information - High Stakes
- Incomplete information
Standard operating procedures

Figure 3.1. Sliding Scale of Influence of Decision-Makers’ Beliefs

Aside from the cognitive arguments asserting how the structural elements of such

decisions heighten the impact of individual decision-makers, the historical evidence

demonstrates the extreme top-down, political nature of proliferation decisions. At the end

of the day there must be an explicit decision by state leaders to acquire nuclear weapons.

As Meyers reminds us, “…it is human decision makers who choose whether to

manufacture nuclear weapons. Atomic bombs don’t build themselves” (1984:17-18). In

nearly all instances of proliferation the final decision rested with one person, who may or

may not have been complemented by a small advising body.

31
 In the case of India’s 1974 so-called “peaceful nuclear explosion,” the final

decision to go forward was Prime Minster Indira Gandhi’s alone and even the initial

decision, made in 1972, to move forward with a detonation was made by her after very

limited consultation with a very small number of close advisors. A similar scenario would

play out in India again two decades later regarding the 1998 testing decision. Less than

100 days into his coalition government, Prime Minster A.B. Vajpayee authorized the

series of nuclear tests occurring in May 1998. Again the decision by an Indian leader

was made alone without consultation of his cabinet which was not informed of the

decision until after the fact. This situation is not unique to India, as the case studies

show, be it Australia, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Pakistan, Libya or North Korea,

the number of individuals involved in proliferation decisions has typically been

extremely small and, more often than not, hinged on the choice made by a single

individual. Although proliferation decisions are not special in this regard, one need only

think of the context surrounding decisions related to war, it shows that this decision to

“go nuclear” exists in a rarified decision environment.

Neorealim, Neoliberalism, and Operational Code Analysis

A goal of this project is to further develop micro-foundations so to enhance

macro-foundations as encapsulated by the paradigms of neorealism and neoliberalism. It

is the connection with the factors stressed by both neorealism and neoliberalism which

provides operational code analysis with an advantage in examining the foundations of

these macro-level theories. First, operational code analysis assumes the rationality of

individual leaders. As we shall see, operational code analysis is built on the premise of

actors making choices in the presence of “cognitive restraints on rationality” (Holsti

32
1977:2). Second, the actions of leaders are based on their diagnosis of the nature of the

international system and the necessity to pursue various strategies to achieve one’s goals

in the given system. How a leader views the persistence and likelihood of either conflict

or cooperation establishes the context for framing strategic preferences in pursuing one’s

goals.

Both neorealism and neoliberalism assumes that leaders will act to protect and

advance their interests. It is well noted that these two theories differ as to the best

approaches to be taken by actors in the international system. Neorealism emphasizes the

need for self-reliance in maintaining and obtaining capabilities to pursue one’s interests.

For neoliberalism, actors can best achieve their interests through cooperation among

states bolstered by international regimes and institutions. While these theories advocate

divergent approaches in achieving ends, both hold as a primary assumption that actors are

rational in the pursuit of their interests. Moreover, both assume that rationality is

imposed from the top-down coming from the objective realities of the international

system in which actors operate. Termed “substantive reality” by Simon (1985), structural

theories hold that actors make choices based on their knowledge of the external

environment which are mirrored by their beliefs.

Operational code analysis also maintains the assumption of rationality, however,

an actor’s rationality is influenced by their beliefs as “subjective representations of

reality” (Tetlock 1998:876). Instead of simply mirroring the external environment,

cognitive theories assert that actors’ beliefs can distort reality to varying degrees. As

Jervis (1976) and others have found, an actor’s beliefs can lead to misperceptions where

actions fail to account for the objective reality of the international system resulting in

33
inappropriate, detrimental, or even disastrous policies. Beliefs, therefore, attain the status

of being critical causal mechanisms, which for operational code analysis, as well as other

cognitive theories, must be viewed independently as having an exogenous role to play

rather than being mere “transmission belts” of the external environment (Walker and

Schafer 2006a; Rose 1998). In summarizing various assertions regarding the role of

beliefs, Walker and Schafer (2006a) write:

They can and often do operate as causal mechanisms

independently of the realities that they are assumed to mirror
in other theories. Instead of passively reflecting reality, they
steer the decisions of leaders by shaping the leaders’
perceptions of reality, acting as mechanisms of cognitive and
motivated bias that distort, block, and recast incoming
information from the environment (5).

It must be noted that operational code analysis utilizes a model of “bounded

rationality” (Simon 1985). Unlike the more onerous instrumental rationality model,

which imposes the expectation that actors undertake an open and comprehensive

examination of costs and benefits, bounded rationality points to actors as seeking

shortcuts where costs and benefits are framed by their beliefs. In this model, beliefs act

to bias decisions with behaviors guided by beliefs of the external environment rather than

being the product of a process meant to optimize potential behaviors (Holsti 1976). As

George describes, operational code analysis allows for bounding “the alternative ways in

which the subject may perceive different types of situations and approach the task of

making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action” (1969: 200).

While differing with structural theories as to the role of actors’ beliefs,

operational code analysis is unambiguously linked to these theories given the

fundamental nature of the beliefs it seeks to assess. Operational code analysis, however,

34
avoids the common pitfall associated with behavioralists’ efforts in applying and

stretching concepts of psychology and psychoanalysis to examine political phenomena,

as it specifically utilizes the conceptual underpinnings of neorealism and neoliberalism

(Holsti 1977).11 From its origins with Nathan Leites’ (1953; 1951) attempts to build a

model for explaining Bolshevik behaviors, operational code analysis has focused on ideas

of power, conflict, cooperation, and control. These factors were articulated by George

(1969) who developed a heuristic framework by posing ten fundamental questions of how

an individual views the world and their position in it (Figure 3.2). George claimed that in

answering these key questions researchers “would capture a leader’s ‘fundamental

orientation towards the problem of leadership and action’” (1969:200). These questions

are further distilled with half of them targeting so-called philosophical beliefs and the

other half illuminating instrumental beliefs. Philosophical beliefs outline the

fundamental assumptions and premises an actor has regarding the nature of politics, the

nature of conflict, as well as the ability to control outcomes versus historical fate (George

1969). Meanwhile, instrumental beliefs provide information as to how the actor, given

their view of the political universe, sees the relationship between ends and means,

specifically what sort of actions (i.e. tactics) will best serve in attaining one’s goals.

Operational code analysis thereby is a twofold process which develops the “world view”

of an individual as to their diagnosis of the political universe along with their tactical

approaches, or “strategic preferences,” to achieve political goals.

11 This is not to say that operational code analysis is devoid of assumptions borrowed from psychology. In
particular the concepts of cognitive dissonance and cognitive consistency theory play not insignificant roles
in operational code analysis as well as many other cognitive decision-making frameworks.

35
 The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code

P-1. What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political

universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the
fundamental character of one’s political opponents?
P-2. What are the prospects for the realizations of one’s fundamental
values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be
pessimistic?
P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4. How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical
development? What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history
in the desired direction?
P-5. What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical
development?

The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code

I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for
political action?
I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and
accepted?
I-4. What is the best “timing” of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s
interests?

Figure 3.2. George’s Ten Questions about Operational Code Beliefs

Linking Beliefs and Motivations: The Development of Operational Code Analysis

In utilizing the questions posed by George regarding leaders’ instrumental and

philosophical world views, Holsti (1977) constructed a typology matrix encompassing a

range of possible operational codes. As conceived by Holsti, these typologies focus

explicitly on what he identified as the “master belief.” For Holsti, the primary belief was

the question George labeled as P-1 focusing on the essential nature of the political

universe. According to Holsti this master belief dominates the other beliefs serving to

constrain the other elements of an individual’s world view.

36
 Holsti’s identifies six operational codes typologies: A, B, C, D, E, and F

(Figure3.3). The delineation of the six types is the result of classifying the groups based

on answers to two fundamental questions:

1. Is conflict perceived as a permanent part of the

political universe, or is this condition at least
potentially amenable to amelioration or eradication?

2. Where does one locate the sources of conflict and the

conditions of peace? In human nature? In the
characteristics of nations? In the nature of the system
within which nations interact? (Holsti 1977:157). 12

These questions correspond to George’s P-1 regarding the nature of conflict (permanent

vs. temporary) and the source of conflict (international system, society, or individual).

The construction of typologies, based on differing operational codes, serves as a critical

first step in making meaningful comparisons.13

Building on this initial foundation, subsequent works have advanced the

operational code typology scheme (Walker 1990, 1983). Expanding on the concept of

“master belief,” Walker increased the number of master beliefs to include Strategic

Approach to Goals (I-1), Ability to control historical developments (P-4), as well as the

nature of the political universe (P-1) as previously identified by Holsti. The revised

Holsti typology matrix constructed by Walker is organized to account for beliefs about

power relationships (P-4) as well as one’s cooperative or conflictual perceptions of Self

(I-1) and the Other (P-1) (Malici 2006). By calculating the scores of the master beliefs for

12 Subsequently, types D, E, and F are collapsed into a single type (Type D) given that all three share the
belief that conflict, while caused by different sources, is a permanent fixture of the political universe
(Walker 1990, 1983).

13As Holsti (1977) notes numerous other studies had previously sought to develop typologies based on
observed traits and behaviors of leaders including Heradstveits (1977), Caldwell (1976), Johnson (1977),
Putnam (1973), and Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962).

37
Self (I-1, P-4a) and Other (P-1, P-4b), leaders’ views can be plotted within the four

quadrants of the Holsti typology.14 These indices are plotted as dimensions on the

vertical (P-1/I-1) and the horizontal (P-4) axes. By using these scores one may locate a

subject’s world view and strategic orientation as standard deviations from the mean of the

norming group of world leaders.15 Placement of a leader’s world view of “Self” and

“Other” is used to reveal predictions about strategic preferences regarding strategies

which are labeled in accordance with game theory terminology of settle, submit,

dominate and deadlock. Again this interactive facet of operational code is helpful as it

recognizes that individuals do not act in a vacuum. Perceptions of others impact the

strategies leaders employs.

The revised Holsti typologies, supported by the master beliefs, provide insight as

to how leaders view the international system (cooperative or conflictual) and also their

own perceptions of their ability to control developments. For example, the quadrants for

Type A and C indicate a leader who views the international system in relatively

cooperative terms. However, Type A leaders see themselves as having more control over

historical developments than Type C leaders. Consequently, Type A leaders are

predisposed toward more ambitious cooperative strategies. Nevertheless, both types

generally seek out cooperative strategies. Conversely, Type B and Type D see the

international system in terms of conflict rather than cooperation. As for control over

historical developments, Type B perceives himself as possessing greater control making

him less likely to shift policy in favor of cooperation. Generally, both Type B and Type

14
For further discussion of the plotting of Self and Other perceptions in the Modified Holsti Typology
Matrix see Chapter Four.

15 The use and development of this norming group is taken up in Chapter 4.

38
D are predisposed to conflictual tactics and strategies in striving to dominate outcomes

(Malici 2006).

Type A
Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding
and miscommunication. A “conflictual spiral,” based
upon misperception and impulsive responses, is the major
danger of war. Opponents are often influenced in kind to
conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based
upon a leader’s ability and willingness to shape historical
development. The future is relatively predictable, and
control over it is possible. Establish goals within a
framework that emphasizes shared interests. Pursue
broadly international goals incrementally with flexible
strategies that control risk by avoiding escalation and
acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise.
Emphasize resources that establish a climate for
negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of
force.
Type C
Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state
system to reflect the latent harmony of interests. The
source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which
permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents
vary in nature, goals and responses to conciliation and
firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless
the state system is changes, because predictability and
control over historical development is low under anarchy.
Establish optimal goals vigorously with a comprehensive
framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks by
limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when
conciliation opportunities arise and delay escalatory
actions whenever possible, other resources than military
capabilities are useful.

Strategic Preference Ordering: Strategic Preference Ordering:

Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit

Type D
Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D),
nationalism (E), or international anarchy (F). Power
disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may
vary, and responses to conciliation and firmness are
uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in the
short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a
power equilibrium. Predictability is limited, as is control
over historical development. Seek limited goal flexibly
with moderate means. Use military force if the
opportunity and circumstances require it, but only as a
final resort.
Type B
Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states;
miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes of
war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is
warranted regarding realization of goals. The political
future is relatively predictable, and control over historical
developments is possible. One should seek optimal goals
vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Control
risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and
resource may be appropriate, including the use of force
when it offers prospects for large gains with limited risks.

Strategic Preference Ordering: Strategic Preference Ordering:

Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit

Figure 3.3. Modified Holsti Typologies Matrix

A major advantage of operational code analysis in examining foreign policy and

international relations is its efforts to develop the strategic interactions of individual

leaders, as revealed by perceptions of Self and Other. This allows researchers to make

39
assessments of possible strategic interactions. The task of building informed models

depicting an individual leader’s preferences is made possible through combining the

operational code with the Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP) developed by

Walker and Schafer (2004), along with Brams’ (1994) Theory of Moves (TOM). Through

TIP, the leader type revealed by the operational code is used to logically deduce how a

particular world view influences an individual’s preferences as to outcomes with others.

Using the terminology of game theory, the preferences are categorized as Settle,

Dominate, Deadlock or Submit. The emerging game is cast as a strategic interaction by

the use of TOM whereby a leader’s perception of Self and Other are played out in terms

of as strategic and sequential moves. The advantage of TOM is its ability to offer a

dynamic examination capturing the action-reaction sequence of international politics

more realistically than the simultaneous moves of conventional game theory. The

combination TIP and TOM offers a significant analytical breakthrough as a leader’s

desired outcome and expected strategies are not simply assumed by imposing exogenous

preferences, but are endogenized by inputting their preferences as revealed through their

world view (Walker and Schafer 2006b). Hence, unlike traditional applications of game

theory, “what emerges is a model in which preferences are not assumed, but

systematically derived” (Malici 2008:37).

The modeling of a leader’s strategic interaction begins with the integration of the

master beliefs. These master beliefs establish the basis for TIP which infers specific

preferences from the combination of the perceptions of Self (I-1, P-4a) and Other (P-1, P-

4b). Based on the operational code scores, perceptions of Self and Other will either be

cooperative (+) or conflictual (-) while attributions of control can be greater (>), less than

40
(<), or equal (=). This results in six different propositions about preference rankings for

both Self and Other as represented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. A Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)16

Prop. 1. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle>Deadlock> Submit>Dominate=Appeasement
Prop. 2. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+,=), then Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit=Assurance
Prop. 3. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit=Stag Hunt
Prop. 4. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, <), then Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock=Chicken
Prop. 5. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-, =), then Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit=Prisoners Dilemma
Prop. 6. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (-,>), then Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit=Bully

The emerging subjective games are structured by the choices for “cooperation”

(CO) or “conflict” (CF) afforded to both Self and Other, with four possible game

outcomes: settlement, domination, submission, or deadlock (Rapoport and Guyer 1966).

Players assume an “initial state” of the game with an evaluative eye as to whether they

can do better in moving or staying in this state. The choices players make vary according

to the initial state; whether moving brings about a more preferred outcome and the

potential countermoves that might be made by the other player.17

An example of a subjective game is shown in Figure 3.4. In this instance the

subject’s perception of Self and Other as Type D leaders with strategic preference

ordering sets of Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit with an initial state of “Deadlock”

with both players pursing conflictual strategies (CF, CF). Given the preferences of the

players (as perceived by the subject being examined) and the initial state, the interaction

16 For a detailed discussion of the TIP calculations see Chapter Four “Cases and Methodology.”

17For a detailed discussion of the rules of the game in Brams’ TOM game construct see Chapter Four
“Cases and Methodology.”

41
between Self and Other will remain in a deadlock situation resembling the classic

prisoners’ dilemma game matrix. Both players, therefore, would rather choose to “stay”

at the initial state of “2, 2” than to expose themselves to possibly being dominated by the

Other. If, however, the initial state is framed as mutual cooperation (CO, CO) then that

would be the final outcome. Since each player “knows” the preferences of the Other,

both recognize that an attempt to “Dominate” (CF, CO or CO, CF) will result in a

countermove by the opponent forcing the game into a less desirable outcome of deadlock

(2, 2) versus the initial state (3, 3).

OTHER OTHER OTHER

CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 3, 3 |← 1, 4 CO Settle Submit CO 3, 3 → 1, 4
__ __
SELF ↓ ↑ SELF SELF ↑ _↓_

CF 4, 1 → “2, 2” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 4, 1 |← “2, 2”

Self’s Strategy*: OUTCOMES Perception of Other’s

Stay Strategy: Stay

*The initial state is in Quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbol “→”
and “→|” indicate the respective strategic choices of “move’ or “stay” by the player with the next move
(Self) given the initial state (Brams 1994).

Figure 3.4. Example of a Subjective Game

Applying Operational Code Analysis to Nuclear Proliferation

The use of operational code analysis provides unique insights in further

understanding the motivations for why leaders choose to proliferate. In particular, the

operational code research agenda has made great strides linking individuals’ world views

to policy outcomes through the development of TIP and modeling strategic interactions

by use of TOM. What remains then is connecting these strategic preferences as

developed by operational code analysis with proliferation outcomes. Most importantly

for this project—what type(s) of leader should one expect to have a greater propensity in

42
favor of proliferation? And how does a leader’s perceived strategic interaction influence

proliferation decisions?

In constructing an initial framework linking a leader’s world views to nuclear

proliferation outcomes, the expectations for proliferation are taken from the neorealist

security model and the neoliberalist domestic-politics model. In adapting these

competing models so to be compatible with operational code, the critical difference is

their divergent views as to the nature of the international system. Grounded in

neorealism, the security model posits a view of the nature of the international system as

one prone to conflict given its anarchical nature and the need for states to be self-reliant

in terms of their own security. States which choose not to proliferate in the face of

external threats do so at their own peril. States pursue nuclear weapons as a means of

enhancing their capabilities so to better achieve their national interests. The general

expectation would be that more conflict-oriented leaders (Type D and B) are far more

predisposed towards nuclear proliferation and have a greater propensity to choose to

proliferate. Meanwhile, the domestic politics model, as pulled from neoliberalism,

depicts the international system as disposed to cooperation. Lesser emphasis is given to

military capabilities and tactics tied to the use of force. States are seen as better able to

attain higher payoffs and greater gains through cooperation with other states in the

international system. Indeed, as Solingen (2007) argues, nuclear weapons are hindrances

to states seeking to pursue cooperation and integration in to the international community.

The expectation, therefore, would be that cooperation-oriented leaders (Type A and C)

are far less predisposed towards nuclear proliferation and have a lower propensity to

choose to proliferate. For a visual representation see Table 3.2.

43
Table 3.2. Holsti Typologies, Preferences and Proliferation Expectations
Proliferation
Typology IR Type Strategic Preferences Strategy expectation
No
Type A Idealist Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit Reward/Deter
(never)

No
Type C Liberalist Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit Exploit
(rarely)

Type D Realist Yes

Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit Compel/Punish
(Defensive) (sometimes)

Type B Realist Yes

Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit Bully
(Offensive) (always)

However, establishing proliferation expectations for the four types of leaders

classified by operational code is only the first step. As noted above, a particular

advantage of operational code is the development of perceptions for both Self and Other,

recognizing the interactive nature of international politics. While leaders may hold Self

perceptions of the world around them, their own strategic preferences, and the tactics

they prefer to use in achieving goals they are cognizant that their actions do not occur in a

vacuum. They must account for the other actors in the international system. The

presence of others in the political universe acts to establish parameters for action either

constraining or presenting opportunities depending on a leader’s perception of others. As

Malici notes, “perceptions about the preferences of others introduce the strategic context,

which dictates to what degree preferences (or, more exactly preference orderings) are to

be implemented” (2008:32). Just because a leader may view Self as cooperative and

wish to pursue tactics emphasizing shared interests does not mean that they will simply

capitulate in the face of what they see as hostile, conflict-oriented others. For each leader

type “submit” is the lowest ranked outcome. While each type assigns different expected

44
payoffs to strategies of conflict or cooperation, the actual payoffs depends on the strategic

interaction with the other player.

Accordingly, in recognizing the strategic interactions between the different types,

the typologies developed by operational code analysis combine for sixteen possible game

interactions. The sixteen strategic interactions are shown in Table 3.3. The

characteristics and preferences of the modified Holsti types along with the logic and rules

of TOM are combined to develop expectations as to outcomes of there interactions. In

the case of a leader with a Self world view of a Type A and a view of Other as also Type

A, the propensity and expectation for proliferation is at its lowest given the belief of a

shared orientation towards cooperation and focus on tactics that emphasize negotiation

and compromise over escalation and the use of force. On the other hand, in the situation

of a leader with perceptions of Self and Other as both Type B we have the most likely

scenario for proliferation. Given the beliefs of Self and Other as conflict-oriented,

possessing a high degree of control over outcomes, and the beliefs that any tactic and

resource may be appropriate, this interaction possesses the highest propensity and

expectation for nuclear proliferation. In stark contrast to all of the interactions involving

Type B, there is an expectation for proliferation given the preference of that type to seek

to dominate outcomes and their use of Bully tactics.

As to Types A and C, proliferation is not expected as both players, given their

expected philosophical and instrumental beliefs of leader share the same best preference

outcome for cooperation, engage in cooperation games with each other. Meanwhile,

regarding interactions between a Type A or Type C and a Type D, the expectation is

against the occurrence of proliferation. While Type D does possess a conflict oriented

45
preference set, the resulting game offers a nonmyopic equilibrium (NME) solution of

mutual cooperation.18 The most recognizable of the interactions is that where

perceptions of Self and Other place both as Type D with a resulting game depicting the

classic prisoners’ dilemma. However, through the use of TOM, the outcome of this game

is not always the deadlock scenario. Rather the initial state defines the final outcome. If

the initial state is one of deadlock the players are inclined to stay at that outcome. A

similar outcome occurs if the initial state indicates either of the players is being

dominated as that player will move to the more preferred deadlock scenario. But if the

initial state is the mutual cooperation outcome (3,3) then neither player is interested in

moving as they realize any move will be countered forcing the game to the less desirable

deadlock outcome (2, 2). Accordingly, unlike conventional game theory, under the rules

of TOM, “settle” is also a NME solution for this interaction.

Table 3.3. Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions using TOM

Other
Type A Type C Type D Type B
Self
No
Type A No No Yes
(never)

Type C No No No Yes

Type D No No Sometimes* Yes

Yes
Type B Yes Yes Yes
(always)
*Outcome Dependent on the Initial State. See Appendix A for detailed representations of all games.

18 For the purposes of using TOM in a two-player game, a nonmyopic equilibrium is defined as “a state
from which neither player, anticipating all the possible rational moves and countermoves from the initial
state, would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because the departure would eventually lead to a
worse, or at least not better, outcome” (Brams 1994:224).

46
 Based on the proliferation expectations from the existing literature, leader

typologies established by operational code analysis, and the subjective games given

strategic interactions between the different types, several rival hypotheses are devised to

be tested. One set of hypotheses is constructed for examining proliferation expectations

based on leaders’ perceptions of Self. Another set of hypothesis state propositions as to

the dynamic strategic interactions of leaders’ perceptions of Self and Other. These

hypotheses are as follows:

Perception of Self:

H1: Leaders possessing an operational code which perceives “Self” as

cooperation-oriented, being either Type A or Type C, exhibiting an
ordered preference set preferring settlement (“Settle”) over domination
(“Dominate”) strategies, will not decide to proliferate.

H2: Leaders possessing an operational code which perceives “Self” as

cooperation-oriented, being either Type B or Type D, exhibiting an
ordered preference set preferring domination (“Dominate”) over
settlement (“Settle”)strategies, will decide to proliferate.

Strategic Interactions (Self and Other):

H3: Leaders perceiving Self as Type A will not decide to proliferate if they
perceive Other as a Type A, Type C or Type D

H4: Leaders perceiving Self as Type A will decide to proliferate if they

perceive Other as a Type B.

H5: Leaders perceiving Self as Type C will not decide to proliferate if they
perceive Other as a Type A, Type C or Type D.

H6: Leaders perceiving Self as Type C will decide to proliferate if they

perceive Other as a Type B.

H7: Leaders perceiving Self as Type D will not decide to proliferate if they
perceive Other as either a Type A or Type C.

H8: Leaders perceiving Self as Type D will not decide to proliferate if they
perceive Other as a Type D only when initial state of the interaction is
“Settlement.”

47
 H9: Leaders perceiving Self as Type D will decide to proliferate if they
perceive Other as a Type D only when initial state of the interaction is
“Deadlock.”

H10: Leaders perceiving Self as Type D will decide to proliferate if they

perceive Other as a Type B.

H11: Leaders perceiving Self as Type B will decide to proliferate regardless of

their perception of Other.

These hypotheses set forth the strongest case for the causal importance of leaders’

world views and strategic preferences in proliferation outcomes. These simple

hypotheses imply a leader’s world view as a sufficient condition for explaining states’

decisions to go nuclear. While advocating the importance of examining beliefs as causal

mechanisms for proliferation decisions, the main assertion being made here is that beliefs

are a necessary condition to explain proliferation outcomes. The effort, at this stage, is to

determine what efficacy can be attained by applying a cognitive, decision-making

framework to proliferation decisions. The hope is that this approach provides an

effective indicator of nuclear proliferation, however, in those instances where it does not

that it can at least aid researchers in determining the appropriateness of pre-existing

models. With this framework in hand, the next chapter will detail the methodology,

especially focusing on the case and data selection as well as detailing the operational

code and VICS, through which the project will seek to apply this new analytical

framework and assess its usefulness.

48
 CHAPTER FOUR

CASES AND METHODOLOGY

Having developed an analytical framework built upon leaders’ perceptions of

strategic interactions, based on their world views of Self and Other, I turn to the practical

consideration of how to test this theoretical framework and the derived hypotheses. In

revealing the nature of the world views and perceived strategic interactions of selected

leaders, the project utilizes a truly multi-method approach employing qualitative,

quantitative, and game theory methods to address the question at hand.

Qualitatively, leaders’ public statements are coded using operational code analysis

(Walker and Shafer 2006). The numerical values and scores generated by the content

analysis allows for quantitative analysis through statistical testing in comparing and

measuring differences among and between subjects. Lastly, the subjective games built

around leaders’ perceptions of the international system are analyzed through use of

Brams’ (1994) Theory of Moves (TOM) game construct. The combination of the

qualitative data and the game modeling offers a significant analytical breakthrough as a

leader’s desired outcome and expected strategies are not simply assumed by imposing

exogenous preferences, but are endogenized by inputting their preferences as revealed

through their world view.

The goal of this chapter is to lay bare the “what” and “how” of this research

project. Discussion of the “what” means detailing the cases and the data chosen for

49
testing the hypotheses derived from the analytical framework. Meanwhile, the “how”

will require further explanation, adding to some of the previous discussion, as to the use

and application of operational code analysis, the Verbs in Context (VIC) content analysis

coding scheme, and sequential game modeling.

Case Selection

The project undertakes the examination of the proliferation experiences of four

countries—South Africa, India, Libya, and Australia. The selection of these four cases

was made for both theoretical and practical reasons; the latter will be detailed in the

subsequent section on data collection. Theoretically, the four possess the critically

relevant dependent variable—in each country leaders made an explicit decision on

nuclear proliferation. While leaders of other countries have made similar decisions, and a

claim here is that this framework could be more widely applied, the critical nature of

decisions in these countries is that they either possessed (South Africa and India) or were

actively developing (Australia and Libya) the technical wherewithal to develop nuclear

weapons. These four cases allow for rigorously testing the devised analytical framework

by virtue of their varying characteristics.

The foremost difference is the nature of the proliferation outcomes. These cases

present the spectrum of proliferation outcomes including the actual development of

weapons (India and South Africa), the decision to cease proliferation efforts (Australia

and Libya), and a rare case of nuclear rollback (South Africa) with a state of its own

volition terminating its program and destroying its weapons stockpile. These countries

also represent a cross-section of the international community including countries

classified as Western and Non-Western, Developed and Developing, and from four

50
distinct geographical regions including the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Pacific, and

the Indian Subcontinent.

Most striking in terms of the international relations literature is the scope of the

regimes types being examined. As highlighted in the literature on the democratic peace

hypothesis, the nature of a domestic government may have important ramifications as to a

country’s decisions. Much has been made over how regime types influence state action

as to their aggressiveness or use of force against other states. Specifically, the question

emerges as to whether certain regime types produce certain types of leaders—for

instance, are leaders from democratic countries more or less inclined to pursue nuclear

weapons versus their counterparts in non-democratic regimes? The four cases examined

cover a range of regime types including democratic regimes (Australia and India), a

flawed or semi-democratic regime (South Africa during apartheid), and an authoritarian

regime (Libya). Perhaps most intriguing, the cases of South Africa and India offer the

opportunity to examine multiple proliferation decisions made by different individual

leaders (Gandhi and Vajpayee in India; Vorster and De Klerk in South Africa).19 In

essence, these cases offer a leadership cross-section whereby we can test the notion of

whether a country produces a certain type of leaders.

Lastly, the cases offer the ability to explicitly test the efficacy of this newly

devised analytical framework to the predominant proliferation explanations. Each of

these cases has been extensively developed in the proliferation literature.20 Yet, the

19This same logic can be applied to the Australia case in examining the change between the Gorton and
Whitlam governments, however due to time constraints on the project such an examination must be left for
another time.

20The exception to this claim is the case of Australia which is certainly the least examined of the four
cases. In part this is due to perceptions that Australia had no need for the bomb given its relationship to the

51
conclusions offered for the respective decisions of these countries have typically

generated more questions than answers given the divergent conclusions. By examining

these cases through the alternative lenses of analysis offered by the security and domestic

politics model, the hope is to see if the analytical framework developed here can either

shed new light on these cases or, in the alternative, provide further support for one of the

previous explanations.

Data Sources and Collection

As mentioned above the cases picked for examination provide a rich and diverse

sampling of cases for testing the analytical framework, but equally important was the

practical matter of being able to obtain sufficient data for each case. Since the goal of the

project is to develop the world views of leaders and how views of self and others in the

international system shape perceptions of strategic interactions, the relevant evidence

comes from those statements made by and attributed to the examined leaders. As the

underlying methodology of operational code analysis is an “at-a-distance” approach, the

relevant data are found in the speech acts (i.e. utterances) of the pertinent leaders for the

selected cases (Shafer and Walker 2006a). Accordingly, the world views and perceptions

of leaders examined here are revealed through their public statements in various forms

including speeches, interviews, and writings.

The public statements selected cover a variety of contexts and audiences

including those aimed at domestic audiences (parliamentary and election campaign

Western alliance, especially the US, during the Cold War and its leading role since the mid-1970 as an
advocate of test limitations and other international arms control measures. However, reassessment of the
Australian proliferation experience occurred with the release of previously classified documents indicating
the desire of the Gorton government and its predecessors to develop an Australian nuclear weapons
capability.

52
addresses), those intended for international audiences (speeches at international

conferences including UN sessions), and major national addresses aimed at both domestic

and international consumption (national independence/holiday addresses). A wide

variety of sources were consulted in gathering available public statements for each of the

relevant leaders. In conducting my research I utilized published collections,

parliamentary transcripts, archived document collections, and internet sources, including

Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, to obtain transcripts of speeches and interviews.

In the case of South Africa, I relied on a published collection of selected speeches

by Prime Minister B.J. Vorster given during the period of 1968 to 1976 while I was able

to use internet sources for several speeches by President F.W. De Klerk given in the late

1980s to early 1990s. In the case of both South Africa leaders, I used parliamentary

statements contained in the official Hansard published transcripts along with transcripts

of other public speeches held at the Archive for Contemporary History at the University

of the Free State in the Republic of South Africa. For Australia, public speeches for

Prime Minister John Gorton were taken from Hansard as well as speeches contained in

the government documents collection at the Australian National Library. In the case of

India, several published collections of public speeches were found for both Prime

Minister Indira Gandhi and Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Lastly, for Libya, public speeches by

Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi dating back to 1980 were readily available through the

use of Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe. The speeches examined were presented in

English or came from official government translations. The sole exception was the case

of Libya where translations came from the various reporting news agencies (i.e. BBC

International News) available through the Lexis-Nexis international news database.

53
 As noted above, the speeches selected cover a variety of context and audiences.

In every instance, however, the key component for a speech was the devotion in whole or

in part to a discussion of foreign policy and/or international affairs. Only speeches

containing such issue/topical substance were deemed relevant to the study and analyzed.

It is important to note that the statements which were selected dealt with foreign

policy/international affairs generally, not just those statements dealing with the issue of

nuclear proliferation. The decision to develop the general world view and resultant

strategic interactions was made for several reasons. First and foremost, selecting only

those speeches addressing the issue of proliferation would result in limiting the

examination to an extremely small, if even existing, sample population. As Hymans

(2006) notes the proliferation histories of most states is woefully lacking and incomplete.

This is not all that surprising as nuclear programs are usually shrouded in secrecy, hence

discouraging and preventing leaders from speaking publicly. Secondly, even in those

instances where a leader does specifically address the issue of their country’s

proliferation decision, the expectation would be for such statements to be self-serving

(Solingen 2007). As Solingen asserts, these statements will likely be slanted in favor of

security based justifications given the greater acceptability of such claims versus

admissions that proliferation was spurred on by domestic institutional lobbying or for the

sake of garnering domestic political support.

Lastly, the use of general statements on foreign policy/international affairs allows

for constructing generalized perceptions of Self and Other and the resulting interaction.

While it can be argued that developing more specific perceptions of Self and Other might

provide greater insight that level of specificity is not without significant pitfalls. A major

54
hurdle is the question what “Other” should be specified? In the case of India an easy

choice might be Pakistan. But what about often cited problem of Chinese nuclear

capability or concerns of standing up to other nuclear states including the US and Russia?

Alternatively, in the case of South Africa the notion of the “Other” is even more

problematic as it appears to include the Soviet Union, Cuban forces in Southern Africa,

Communists in general, neighboring countries, and Black nationalists groups. Moreover,

seeking to narrowly define the Other might serve to either over or under-emphasize the

security model explanation depending on the selection of the Other made. It is very

likely that focusing on a specific “Other” may alter the revealed perceptions envisioning

some actors more or less friendly or hostile as compared to others. However, for the

purposes here a general perception of other actors in the international system as

developed from the subject leaders’ public statements will be utilized.

Operational Code Analysis and the Verbs in Context System

Operational code analysis is one of the most successful and active avenues of

cognitive examination. Of late, it has experienced renewed interest with numerous works

applying it methodology to a wide array of issues and actors (Schafer and Walker 2006).

Introduced by Leites (1953, 1951), operational code analysis is built on the premise of the

importance of internalized rules of conduct and norms of behavior influence leaders

(Holsti 1976; George 1969). Over a decade later, Alexander George (1969) sought to

extend Leites’ research by codify the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of the

Bolsheviks. However, where Leites focused on the influences shaping the operational

code, George more generally sought to develop the operational code as a cognitive filter

influencing preferences for means and ends. George devised 10 questions (see Figure 3.2)

55
that “would capture a leader’s ‘fundamental orientation towards the problem of

leadership and action’” (1969:200). By answering these 10 questions, the “operational

code” or belief system of the subject is revealed according to George and operational

code researchers.21 Taken as a whole, it is argued that these beliefs revealed through the

operational code act as a guide for policy decision-making. Operational code analysis

thereby seeks to devise the philosophical beliefs held by an individual or small group

regarding the nature of the political universe and their outlook as to the effective

instrumental/tactical approaches to achieving their political goals.

The resurgence of research utilizing operational code analysis was sparked largely

by the advances in the development of the Verbs in Context System (VIC) content

analysis coding scheme which not only answered George’s 10 questions, but more

importantly provided a systematic process allowing for measuring what are in essence

psychological characteristics (Walker and Schafer 2006a). Although other coding

schemes have been devised, VICS is the most widely utilized coding scheme in the

operational code analysis research program currently. Similar to other research

conducted in the political psychology field, operational code analysis via VICS employs

“at a distance” methodology allowing for indirect assessment of an individual’s

psychological characteristics (Schafer 2000; Post 2003; Herrmann 1980). A key

assumption of this methodology is that researchers can infer psychological characteristics

based on the individual’s verbal behavior (Schafer and Walker 2006a). One particular

advantage to this approach is the often widely available and vast amount of public

statements made by leaders pertaining to foreign policy. In addition to allowing for

21 George (1979, 1969) purposively sought to place this model for developing belief systems within the
framework of instrumental rationality.

56
systematic analysis of verbal behavior, VICS also provides quantitative data which can

then be used in generating probabilities and statistical comparisons across time and

speakers.

The goal of VICS is to look for “manifestations of beliefs about power in

relationships” (Schafer and Walker 2006a:31). As a coding scheme, VICS works on the

logic of an event classification scheme focusing on verbs. The verbs in a speech act are

coded among multiple dimensions covering both direction and intensity (see Figure 4.1).

The first pertains to conflict and cooperation. Verbs are scored directionally along a

range from negative to positive depending on their conflictual or cooperative nature

(recognizing as well the possibility of neutral verbs). The second dimension distinguishes

between Deeds and Words. This distinction is made for purposes of weighing the

intensity of the verb. A verb indicating a deed or action is weighed more heavily

signifying a higher level of intensity (e.g. attack); meanwhile, words absent of action

(e.g. praise) are weighed less given their lower level of intensity. Further, another critical

feature of the VICS is its recognition of the “direction” of the verb. VICS looks at the

grammatical subject of the verb thereby enabling a determination of whether the verb is

being used by the speaker to describe Self or Other? In essence, what the VICS coding

schemes provides is a picture of how the subject views the world, both in terms of his

role and that of others and the use of power (conflictual or cooperative).

57
 1. Identify the Subject

self or other

2. Identify the tense of the transitive verb as:

Past Present Future

And identify the category of the verb as:

Positive or Negative
Appeal, Support (+1) Oppose, Resist (-1)
words or or
Promise benefits (+2) Threaten Costs (-2)

deeds Rewards (+3) Punishment (-3)

3. Identify the Domain as

Domestic or Foreign

4. Identify target and place in context

Figure 4.1. Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS)

Source: Walker and Schafer 2006

Speaker: President Jimmy Carter, January 4, 1980 Address to the Nation

Quote: “Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned,
sovereign nation of Afghanistan …”

VICS Coding Steps:

1. Identifying the verb-based utterance
For this particular example the whole phrase is one utterance.

2. Code the verb

A. The verb phrase is “have invaded”
B. The direction of the verb is conflictual (-)
C. The verb is a deed
D. Conflict deeds are coded as -3

3. Specify the subject of the verb

The subject is “Massive Soviet military forces.” Jimmy Carter is the
speaker and is clearly no referring to himself or any of his in-group.
Therefore, subject is coded as other.

Figure 4.2. VICS Coding Example

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 The output by the VICS coding scheme for each speech act is a set of 17 indices

which are differently aggregated so to provide scoring of the speakers philosophical and

instrumental beliefs similar to the 10 questions posed by George.22 These indices are

coded either with a P or I, and numbered (i.e. P-1) so to correspond with the pertinent

philosophical belief of instrumental belief question. Starting with the philosophical

indices, which overall provide information about the subject’s beliefs about the nature of

politics and of other actors in the system, operational definitions have been offered by

Walker and Schafer (2006a) for each index which then correspond to the question

inventory constructed by George.

22 Although there are 10 primary questions, for certain questions multiple indices are generated. For I-4
Importance of Timing of Actions the indices of I-4a and I-4b are generated which differentiates between
actions and deeds. For I-5 Utility of Means multiple indices are created to differentiate tactics: Punish (P),
Threaten (T), Oppose (O), Support (S), promise (Pr), and Reward (R).

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PHILOSPOHICAL BELIEFS

Elements Index Interpretation

P-1 NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE % Positive minus % negative +1.0 friendly to -1.0
(Image of Others) Other Attributions hostile

P-2 REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES Mean Intensity of Transitive Other +1.0 optimistic to -
(Optimism/Pessimism) attributions divided by 3 1.0 pessimistic

P-3 POLITICAL FUTURE 1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation** 1.0 predictable to 0.0
(Predicting of Others Tactics for Other Attributions uncertain

P-4 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Self or Other Attributions divided by 1.0 high to 0.0 low
(Locus of Control for Self & Other) [Self plus Other Attributions] control

P-5 ROLE OF CHANCE 1 minus [Political Future x Historical 1.0 high role to 0.0
(Absence of Control) Development Index] low role

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

Elements Index Interpretation

I-1 APPROACH TO GOALS % Positive minus % Negative Other

(Direction of Strategy) Attributions +1.0 high
cooperation to -1.0
high conflict

I-2 PURSUIT OF GOALS Mean Intensity of Transitive Self

(Intensity of Tactics) Attributions divided by 3 +1.0 high
cooperation to -1.0
high conflict

I-3 RISK ORIENTATION 1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation

(Predictability of Tactics) for Self Attributions 1.0 risk acceptant to
0.0 risk adverse

I-4 TIMING OF ACTION 1 minus Absolute Value [%X minus %Y

(Flexibility of Tactics) Self Attributions] 1.0 high role to 0.0
a. Coop v. Conf. Tactics low shift propensity
b. Word v. Deed Tactics Where X = Coop and Y= Conf
Where X = Word and Y = Deed

I-5 UTILITY OF MEANS Percentages for Exercise of Power

(Exercise of Power) Categories a through f

a. Reward a’s frequency divided by total

+1.0 very frequent to
b. Promise b’s frequency divided by total
0.0 infrequent
c. Appeal/Support c’s frequency divided by total
d. Oppose/Resist d’s frequency divided by total
e. Threaten e’s frequency divided by total
f. Punish f’s frequency divided by total

Figure 4.3. Operational Code Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

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P-1. The Nature of the Political Universe: Friendly, Mixed, Hostile23

This index is broadly and generally conceived to develop the “balance” of the

subject’s views of other actors in the political universe. The underlying assumption is

that a leader’s “images of other actors’ policies and actions reflect the leader’s belief

about politics, political conflict, and the nature of other actors” (Shafer and Walker

2006a: 33). This index is therefore computed by a ratio of the frequency of positive to

negative utterances a leader makes when talking about others in the political universe.

The index varies from -1 to +1 with low scores representing a leader possessing a view of

others as more hostile in the political universe. Meanwhile, a score closer to +1

demonstrates a leader views others as more friendly. The specific formula for this index

is the percentage of positive utterances about others minus the percentage of negative

utterances about others.

P-2. Prospects for Realizing Fundamental Values: Optimism versus Pessimism

Related to P-1, P-2 is complementary in its function whereas a leader who sees

the political universe as a friendly, positive place is more optimistic about the realization

of their fundamental values. Conversely, a leader who views the political universe as

filled with hostile actors seeking to block his/her objectives is likely to be more

pessimistic. While balancing cooperative and conflictual utterances, similar to the ratio

for P-1, the formulation of P-2 differs as this index also incorporates the way in which the

subject perceives the intensity of others’ actions. In essence, the degree to which a leader

sees the political universe tilting, good v. evil, affects the level of optimism or pessimism

he has towards his prospect of achieving fundamental values. In calculating this index,

23 The following discussion borrows heavily on the work by Schafer and Walker (2006) which serves as a
compendium of numerous previous writings by the authors discussing the VICS indices offering a detailed
discussion of the theory, assumptions, and operations of VICS.

61
each verb is weighted according to the intensity values of its coding category (-3 to +3)

(see Figure 4.3 above) and divided by the total number of coded verbs. This index varies

from -1 to +1 with negative indicating pessimism and positive scores indicating

optimism. The formula (as indicated in Figure 4.3 above) for the P-2 index is the mean

intensity of utterances about others divided by three.

P-3. Predictability of the Political Universe: Low to High

The goal of P-3 is to examine whether the leader sees others acting in consistent

and predictable ways. Predictability is assessed by using a dispersion measure to

calculate the variation in distribution of observations across the scale of the six verb

categories when a leader is talking about others. Based on the literature of information

theory, the underlying logic is that the “wider the variety of actions the subject attributes

to others, the less predictable are their actions” (Schafer and Walker 2006a:34). The

fewer categories of action attributed to other actors translates into the subject as

perceiving others as more consistent, hence more predictable. Clearly, while not an

accurate assessment of reality, the goal here is to capture the subject’s belief of

predictability. If the subject sees the world in only terms of others pursuing threats and

punishments, he is more likely to believe that the next action of others actors is

predictable. The formula for P-3 is one minus the IQV (Index of Qualitative Variation),

which ranges between 0 and 1 with lower scores indicating that the subject sees less

predictability in the political universe and higher scores represent a higher perception of

predictability.

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P-4. Control Over Historical Development: Low to High

This is the one philosophical belief index that includes both Self and Other

utterances. Through the examination of utterances where the subject indicates either

himself or others as taking action, a comparison is made to see to whom the subject

attributes action in the political universe. “If the subject’s rhetoric indicates that self is

taking most of the action, then self sees self as more in control. On the other hand, if the

rhetoric indicates that others are the ones who act more frequently, then self is attributing

control to others” (Schafer and Walker 2006a:34). The underlying rational and

assumption for this index builds on the locus-of- control literature (Langer 1983;

Kaplowitz 1978; Lefcourt 1976; Phares 1976). A simple ratio is computed using the

number of Self attributions to the number of actions that Self attributes to Other (P-4 =

Self utterances divided by the sum of Self utterance plus Other utterances). The resulting

index ranges from 0 to 1, with lower scores indicating a subject sees the locus of control

residing more with others while higher scores indicate that the subject perceives himself

as having more control.

P-5. Role of Chance: Low to High

Similar to P-3 and P-4, the P-5 index deals with the influence of chance versus

control along with the predictability of events in the political system. The more

predictable the political universe, the more a subject has control (or rather perceives

control) over happenings in the political universe, hence a diminished role of chance.

This index is calculated by multiplying P-3 by P-4. The greater the product of this

equation the lesser the role of chance. To provide directionality for the index, the

specific formula used is 1 minus the product of P-3 times P-4. A higher score

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(approaching 1) indicates a higher role assigned to chance and a lower score

(approaching 0) means a lower role.

As for the indices for instrumental beliefs, the information closely parallels that of

the philosophical beliefs; however, these indices rely upon the subject’s utterances about

himself. It is important to note here that VICS does have limitations whereby specific

goals or objectives of the subject are not specified and if wanted requires additional

qualitative research. Furthermore, strategy and tactics are separated with strategies

varying in direction (cooperation v. conflict) while tactics vary in their intensity.

I-1. Direction of Strategy: Cooperative, Mixed, Conflictual

Another of the so-called “master beliefs,” I-1 attempts to index the subject’s

belief regarding the best strategic direction for actions. Similar to P-1, this index

examines the balance of cooperative and conflictual utterances made by the subject;

however, in this instance the focus is on the sum of utterances made by the subject when

talking about himself or his in group. “The logic is that the more self talks about

cooperative action, the more cooperatively he or she defines the direction of his or her

strategy, and vice versa” (Schafer and Walker 2006a: 35). Score for I-1 range from -1 to

+1 with lower scores indicative of greater utility placed by the subject on conflict actions

while higher scores indicate a more cooperative strategy is utilized. The formula for I-1

is the percentage of cooperative utterances when talking about Self minus the percentage

of conflictual utterances about Self.

I-2. Intensity of Tactics

Similar to its philosophical belief counterpart, P-2, I-2 seeks to attribute an

intensity level to a subject’s use of tactics. Verbs are weighed according to the six-point

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intensity scale (see Figure 4.1 above). The total score for each verb is summed and then

divided by the total number of utterances providing an average level of cooperation of

conflictual intensity which the subject’s rhetoric demonstrates. The index ranges from -1

to +1 with lower scores indicating the subject’s belief in the utility of conflictual tactic,

while a higher score indicates the utility placed on cooperative tactics. The formula for I-

2 is the mean intensity of utterances made when talking about Self divided by three. (This

is done to arrive at an index with a maximum value of +1 so to be in common with the

other indices).

I-3. Risk Orientation: Averse to Acceptant

Similar to the economic theory behind investment portfolio distribution through

risk balancing, index I-3 attempts to capture a subject’s risk sensitivity through

examination of the range or diversity of actions taken by Self as indicated by a subject’s

rhetoric. A wider diversity of actions means that the risk associated with any one action

types is reduced where a narrower range of actions increases the risk should such action

fail (Morrow 1987; Snyder and Diesing 1977). As for the index of P-3, the IQV is used

as a measure of dispersion but in this instance only as to the utterances regarding Self in

the six verb categories. The index ranges from 0 to 1 where scores at the lower end

demonstrate a subject’s rhetoric as well diversified, thereby risk adverse. Meanwhile

higher scores showing a narrower Self action rhetoric indicates a subject who is more risk

acceptant. The formula for I-3 is one minus the IQV to obtain the directional orientation

of the index.

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I-4. Importance of Timing of Actions: Low to High Flexibility

Continuing on with the investigation of diversity of actions, the index for I-4

seeks to uncover the flexibility of a leader’s action. As laid out by Schafer and Walker

(2006), the logic underlying I-4 is that the level of diversity of action (I-3) speaks to the

frequency of action and, therefore, flexibility of action. I-4 is separated into I-4a and I-

4b, with the first examining the diversity of actions in terms of cooperative versus

conflictual actions and the latter measuring the distribution of a subjects rhetoric in terms

of words versus deeds. Both indices range from 0 to 1. The specific interest here is on the

absolute value (indicated by the bracket in the formula below) rather than the direction of

the subject’s tactics which is already shown in I-1. Therefore, I-4a is calculated by one

minus the absolute value of [the percentage of cooperative Self utterances minus the

percentage of conflictual Self utterances] and I-4b is one minus the absolute value of [the

percentage of word Self utterances minus the percentage of deed Self utterances]. Higher

scores indicate greater diversity in cooperative and conflictual tactics and lower scores

indicate lower diversity. Together I-4a and I-4b indicate how a leader manages two

different types of risk and, therefore, provides greater insight as to the subject’s risk

orientation (I-3). “The first one [I-4a] balances the risk of domination by others against

the risk associated with deadlock as an outcome. The other [I-4b] balances the risk of

doing too much against the risk of not doing enough” (Schafer and Walker 2006a:37).

I-5. Utility of Means: Low to High

The goal of this index is to seek to operationalize the subject’s belief as to the

utility of different tactics that mark the exercise of power. “Does the leader value

cooperative words or perhaps conflictual deeds? Or does he or she see value in

66
conflictual words?” (Schafer and Walker 2006a:37). Accordingly, six categorical indices

are used which correspond to the six verb categories used by VICS (see Figure 4.1

above). The six indices comprising I-5 are: I-5 Punish; I-5 Threaten; I-5 Oppose; I-5

Support; I-5 Promise; and, I-5 Reward. Each is computed as a percentage of the total

verbs coded when a subject is taking about Self (i.e. for I-5 Punish the sum of all Self

utterances coded as “Punish” are divided by the sum of all Self utterances). Each index

ranges from 0 to 1 with lower scores indicating lees utility and higher scores indicating

more utility for the particular tactic in the exercise of power.

Typologies, Preferences, and Subjective Games

Once the operational code scores are generated providing quantitative data based

on the public statement of the subject, the data are used for comparison against a norming

group, plotted within the Modified Holsti Typology Matrix (for perceptions of Self and

Other), and used to determine the proper strategic preference script according to TIP.

Through the development of the strategic preferences arrived at by the assumptions of

TIP, the preference ordering then permits the construction of the leader’s subjective game

revealing their strategic interaction.

Comparison against the Norming Group

To begin making meaningful analysis of what the operational code scores tell us

about a given leader it is necessary to draw inferences from some established baseline.

By using a baseline, one can start talking about whether a subject sees the international

system as more or less cooperative or conflictual, how confident they are that political

goals can be achieved, and what sort of tactics are viewed as most helpful in achieving

one’s goals. A possible baseline would simply be the use of the mid-point for the various

67
operational code indices, typically either 0 or .5 depending on the specific index.

However, rather than rely on such an artificial baseline, the operational code research

agenda has sought to develop a more meaningful measure by creating a proxy operational

code for the “average world leader.” Developed by Walker and Schafer (2006a), this

average leader proxy has been created by compiling 164 public statements of a variety of

real world leaders. The norming group represents the average world leader insofar as it is

composed of world leaders variously selected from poor and rich states, weak and strong

states, and from states with different types of regimes.24 In scoring the statements as if

devising the operational code of a single individual, the generated operational code offers

a baseline from actual world leaders rather than some assumed operational code.

Using this average world leader proxy as a norming group comparisons can be

made between it and a given subject leader’s score. For example, by comparing P-1

scores we can speak of a subject as being more or less cooperative or conflictual in their

world view as compared to the average world leader or whether a subject believe they

have a greater ability to control or predict future outcomes (P-4) than then other world

leaders. This comparison can be done by examining statistical significance. Accordingly,

comparisons do not merely show that a difference in a particular index exists, but

whether such differences are actually meaningful rather than the result of mere chance.

Plotting Self and Other the Modified Holsti Typology Matrix

To begin the process of building towards strategic preferences and ordering

scripts, which ultimately leads to the construction of a leader’s subjective game, the

operational scores are used to plot Self and Other within the Modified Holsti Typology

24 The norming group data are collected by Dr. Mark Schafer at LSU as part of an ongoing project
attempting to catalogue different world leaders operational codes.

68
Matrix (see Figure 3.3). By calculating the scores of the master beliefs for Self (I-1, P-4a)

and Other (P-1, P-4b), leaders’ views can be plotted within the four quadrants of the

Holsti typology. The plotting of points relies on the use of the Verbs in Context System

(VICS) coding scheme developed by Walker et al. The scoring of values for the master

beliefs is a follows: P-1 (The nature of the political universe) is scored by computing a

simple ratio of the frequency of positive to negative utterances made by the leader about

the political universe. The scoring index runs from -1 to +1 with a negative score

indicating a hostile view of others in the political universe while a positive score indicates

a friendly view of others. I-1 (direction of strategy) is computed similarly to P-1, but

only as to the negative and positive utterances made by a leader about one’s Self.

Indexed from -1 to +1 a lower, negative score indicates that the leader attributes greater

utility to conflict-oriented action while a high, positive score means greater utility placed

on cooperative action. P-4 (control over historical developments) focus on utterance

made in reference to both Self and Other as to action taken. Computed as a ratio of Self

action attributions to Other action attributions, the index is scored from 0 to 1 where a

lower score indicated that the leader sees others as having more control while higher

scores indicate a greater sense of Self controlling historical developments. These

indices are plotted as dimensions on the vertical (P-1/I-1) and the horizontal (P-4) axes as

shown in the Modified Holsti Typology Matrix in Figure 3.3. The I-1 and P-1 indices are

plotted on the same axis as they both capture the strategic orientation of actors. While I-1

is about Self’s strategic orientation, P-1 is about Self’s perception of Other’s strategic

orientation.

69
 By using these scores one may locate a subject’s world view and strategic

orientation as standard deviations from the mean of the average world leaders. The Plots

are z-scores calculated for each time period in question by subtracting the mean for the

sample of average world leaders (aka the norming group) from the mean score for the

subject and dividing by the standard deviation for the sample of world leaders. The

coordinates for Self are calculated with the I-1 and P-4a indices and the coordinates for

Other are calculated with the P-1 and P-4b indices of the operational code construct.

Placement of a leader’s world view of “Self” and “Other” in the Modified Holsti

Typology Matrix (see Figure 3.3) is then used for predictions about strategic preferences

regarding strategies based on the critical characteristics associated with each of the four

leader types. Preferences are labeled in accordance with game theory terminology of

settle, submit, dominate and deadlock.

TIP calculations

TIP further refines the expected preferences by calculating the differences

revealed by the master beliefs as to critical notions of conflict versus cooperation,

represented by P-1 for Other and I-1 for Self, and the perception of control over historical

developments attributed to Self and Other, as depicted by P-4a (Self) and P-4b (Other).

Slightly different results are expected as the operational code literature has developed the

operational score indices for use with TIP by taking a subject leader’s sample of public

statements to create a single aggregate speech producing a single composite operational

code.25 The signs in the TIP propositions (see Table 3.1, p.40) indicate whether a

25This differs from the previously discussed operational code scores and the plotting of self and other
scores in the Modified Holsti Typology Matrix which utilize a computed mean derived from the operational
code scores produced for each of the given leader’s public statements.

70
leader’s I-1 and P-1 indices are “above” (+) or “below” (-) the mean for the average

world leader baseline. The signs for the P-4 indices indicate whether they are “greater

than” (>), “less than” (<), or “within” (=) one standard deviation of the mean for the

average world leader.26

An example of how TIP may differ from the modified Holsti typologies can be

seen in the example of TIP propositions #2 (see Table 3.1) where the designated

preference ordering of Settle> Deadlock> Dominate> Submit is the result of the

perception of either Self (or Other) as cooperative (+) and having approximately equal

control over historical developments (=). A leader classified as either a Type A or Type

C can fall under this proposition, as both see the international system in cooperative

terms (position along the “P-1/I-1” Y-axis). In this example, TIP offers a modification

from the ideal types, especially for the Type A, which occurs as a result of a subject’s

diminishing confidence over the ability to control historical events (position along the “P-

4” X-axis approaching zero). Hence such a Type A leader is expected to be more

cautious given the perception of reduced control over outcomes. Therefore, the

preference ordering is altered slightly with Deadlock switching places with Dominate as

the second most preferred outcome. The use of the TIP calculations may similarly alter

the assumed strategic preference scripts for the other types as well. In those instances

where such a modification occurs to a leader’s preference ordering it will be explicitly

noted.

26The mean values for the average world leader norming group are: P-1=.30, SD=.29; I-1=.40, SD=.43; P-
4=.22, SD=.13).

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Utilizing TOM

In order to test the predictions about preferences devised by TIP, they can be

formally modeled based on Brams’ (1994) Theory of Moves (“TOM”) (Walker 2004).

The use of game theoretic modeling provides a rigorous, logical structure to develop a

leader’s perceptions of Self and Other to see how the ordering of strategic preferences

influences the strategies and tactic a leader employs in their interactions with others.

TOM is seen as possessing greater saliency as to the matter at hand—the examination of

leaders’ interactions with others—due to its emphasis of on a sequential player moves

rather than the simultaneous moves requirements of conventional game theory (Walker

and Schafer 2006a).27 Accordingly, TOM better capture the action-reaction nature of

international politics (Malici 2008). Just as in the real world, actors’ choices are not made

in a strategic vacuum, but they are cognizant of how the preferences of others might

impact the achievement of one’s own political goals. Through using TOM as a vehicle to

play out the preferences predicted by TIP, one can attempt to examine “how agents in the

real world are likely to exercise power and what kind of political world the interplay of

the exercise of power is likely to produce between them” (Marfleet and Walker 2006:58).

For the purpose of the current project, this method allows for exploring how an individual

leader’s perception of their interaction with others should influence actions.

As in any game, the application of TOM is governed by certain rules of play.

These rules assume that players are acting rationally to achieve the best outcome possible

given their own preferences. Players’ individual outcomes are ranked order from 1

(lowest) to 4 (highest) depending on their preference ordering. Moreover, the players are

assumed to possess full/complete information as to each other’s preferences. The

27 For a full account of TOM see Brams’ book Theory of Moves (1994).

72
outcome of a game depends on each player pursuing their best possible state while

recognizing that certain outcomes may be either encouraged or frustrated by the moves of

the other player in achieving their preferred final state. However, it is important to note

that TOM does not specify the player’s goals. That critical function is carried out by the

operational code via TIP, which supplies the preferences for both players based on our

subject leader’s perceptions of Self and Other. Consequently, the games being modeled

do not reflect two objective, real players, but rather replicates the interaction between the

subjective, perceived conceptions of Self and Other exhibited by a leader’s world view.

In playing out the subjective game in accordance with TOM, Brams (1994)

established five guiding rule for its use:

1. Play starts at an outcome that is called the initial state and is

located at the intersection of a row and column in a 2 x 2 payoff
matrix.

2. Player 1 or Player 2 can unilaterally switch its strategy and

thereby change the initial state into a new state, in the same row
or column as the initial state.

3. If Player 1 is the first to switch strategy, Player 2 can respond by

also unilaterally switching its strategy and thereby moving the
game to a new state and vice versa.

4. Moves and countermoves go on until the player whose turn it is

to move chooses not to switch strategy. This results in the game
achieving its final state and the outcome of the game.

5. Neither player will move from an initial state if doing so leads to

a less desirable outcome or leads to cycling back to the initial
state.

As noted in the rules of TOM, the “initial state” of the game can be critical in

influencing the outcome of a particular game. Depending on players’ preferences, the

initial state of the game can either drive the players to choose to stay or to move to a

73
different outcome. This was shown in Figure 3.4, whereas the application of classic

game theory instructs us that there is only one solution to the “prisoners’ dilemma,”

TOM, in contrast, indicates two possible outcomes depending on the initial state of the

game.

Given the importance that the initial state has on game outcomes, this should not

be arbitrarily assigned. The initial state should be established either by the researcher’s

desire to examine alternative outcomes or by applying the “history” of the specific

interaction being investigated (Malici 2008; Brams 1994). Given the aim of this project,

the initial state will be derived from the analysis of the existing historical and case study

examinations of the states taken up in the substantive case chapters. For those cases

where disagreement persists as to the initial state each possible initial state will be

discussed in assessing outcomes.

Armed now with the “what” and “how” of this study, the following chapters will

undertake the substantive investigations of the proliferation experiences in South Africa,

India, Libya, and Australia. Each chapter will be comprised of three basic elements: first,

a brief overview of the history of the nuclear programs; second, discussion of the

prevailing explanations for the proliferations decisions found in the existing literature;

and, lastly, application of this project’s new analytical framework though developing the

world views and perceived strategic interactions of the leader making the proliferation

decision. In the cases of South Africa and India two leaders from each country will be

examined in terms of their proliferations decisions: Vorster and De Klerk in South Africa

and Gandhi and Vajpayee in India. In the case of Libya, Libyan leader Mu’ammar

Qadhafi is examined. Finally, as for Australia, I will look at Prime Minister Gorton.

74
 CHAPTER 5

SOUTH AFRICA:
THE APARTHEID BOMB

The reason for all the attention paid to the South African case is easy to

understand. In declaring their nuclear capability and their unilateral step to abandon their

nuclear weapons program, the South African government became the first and only state

providing the international nonproliferation regime with an instance of “rollback.”28

Indeed, South Africa has come to be seen by many as an exemplary model for the

nonproliferation regime; an exemplar to encourage the realization of the limited utility,

and futility, of nuclear weapons for the vast majority of states. Nevertheless, in

attempting to develop the lessons to be learned from the South African proliferation

experience, questions and uncertainty abound. The South Africa case is simultaneously

one of the most studied incidents of nuclear proliferation yet one of the most ambiguous.

Explaining South African proliferation has been a matter of conjecture given the

secrecy surrounding the program and the extent of South African nuclear. Even the

public statement by Prime Minister F.W. De Klerk made in March, 1993, revealing the

extent of the secret program and announcing the government’s unilateral actions in

dismantling its six nuclear devices has been viewed with some skepticism. Suspicions

28For the purposes of a definition, “rollback” is a condition where a state voluntarily acts to dismantle its
nuclear weapons program through one or more of the following actions: eliminates its nuclear weapons
programs, relinquishes at least some of the technical means to acquire nuclear weapons, or accepts a
control regime (e.g. NPT) to prevent it from going nuclear (Horton 1999).

75
have been further reinforced by the fact that much of the relevant documentation as to the

development of the program was purposively destroyed by the government leading up to

De Klerk’s nuclear mea culpa (Masiza 1993; Harris, Hatang and Liberman 2004; Fig

1998).29 Despite subsequent revelations by individuals with intimate knowledge of the

program, it remains unclear if sufficient evidence will ever emerge to explain South

Africa’s proliferation foray in accordance with existing proliferation models.30

As to the decision to proliferate and the rollback decision, it should come as no

surprise that there are several competing hypotheses. Much attention to date has focused

on the rollback decision with less paid to examining the motivations for the initial

decision to go nuclear. The usual suspects of proliferation explanations pointing to either

external security or domestic politics have been applied to South Africa’s rollback.

Problematic for the case of the security model are disputed assessments about the South

African security situation at the time of the proliferation decision. Meanwhile, as for the

domestic politics model, again the matter is whether the changes occurring to the South

African government under De Klerk (rollback government) were at variance with those

of the Vorster government (proliferation government). This has been largely assumed,

but little developed. Thus one of the hopes here is to offer a combined analysis as to why

South Africa chose to proliferate in the 1970s and subsequently made a proliferation U-

turn when, less than two decades later, the state renounced it nuclear weapons program.

The South African case is of particular interest as scholars have discussed the

possible role that leaders’ psychology played in its proliferation decisions. Specifically,

29Fig (1998) contends that approximately 12,000 documents were destroyed by the De Klerk government
before the March 1993 announcement. South African officials have maintained that the destroyed
documents related only to the weapons making process to avoid that knowledge from being used by others.

30 See De Klerk (1999), Stumpf (1995).

76
Purkitt and Burgess (2002) claim the existence of a “laager mentality” held by the white,

nationalist leaders played a significant role in the decision to proliferate. Accordingly,

white leaders in South Africa shared perceptions about the increasing international

isolation and fears of expanding communist and Black Nationalist which served to

rationalize their need for nuclear weapons. While introducing the idea of a world view

shared by South African leaders at the time, the concept has not been adequately

developed and only antidotal evidence alluding to this world view has been put forward.

Specifically, Liberman notes that:

it is difficult to discern whether they are referring to the

individual psychology of South African leaders John
Vorster and P.W. Botha, distinctive aspects of Afrikaner
nationalism and strategic mythology, or the levels of
nationalism characteristic in all insecure states” (2002,
193).

In picking up on this debate, the aim of this chapter will be to systematically examine the

role individual cognitive factors may have played in the South African proliferation

decisions.

In accordance with its analytical framework, this project will develop the world

views and strategic preferences for the two South African leaders of consequence

regarding South Africa’s proliferation journey: B.J. Vorster and F.W. De Klerk. The

existing literature will be engaged pointing out both the strengths and weaknesses of the

various approaches applied to the South Africa proliferation decisions. The goal will be

to develop how individual leaders’ preferences offer insight as to proliferation choices.

Through developing the world views of these two South African leaders we can reassess

which, if any, of the existing proliferations models offer a good fit for explaining the

South African proliferation experience.

77
 Dating the South African Proliferation Decision and Rollback

A problem in studying the case of South African nuclear proliferation has been

the difficulty in determining the exact point in time when the decision was made to step

across the nuclear threshold. Researchers have speculated on a range of dates from as

early as 1971 all the way until 1979. In part, this difficulty has been caused by the closed

nature of government decision making in South Africa, a condition common in

examining states’ decision making regarding nuclear proliferation. There remains a great

deal of secrecy shrouding the decision to go nuclear with many documents from that era

still protected under government secrecy laws. Moreover, efforts have been further

complicated as voluminous amounts of documents from the relevant period related to the

nuclear program were wantonly destroyed by the De Klerk government coinciding with

its revelation of South Africa’s nuclear arsenal (Harris, Hatang and Liberman 2004; Fig

1998). The puzzle for the South African case is determining when the tipping point was

reached and an explicit conscious decision made by its leaders to pursue military

applications in the form of nuclear weapons.

Two critical dates have been referred to in assessing the time frame for the South

African proliferation decision. The earliest is 1974 when Prime Minister Vorster

approved the construction of test site in the Kalahari Desert for conducting a nuclear

detonation (Purkitt and Burgess 2004; Fig 1998). However, even then it’s unclear if the

envisioned test was for weapons development purposes or a continuation of peaceful

nuclear research (Stumpf 1995).31 An important aspect causing many to discount the

notion of 1974 or any date prior was the apparent lack of interest expressed by the South

31Further clouding the dating was De Klerk’s speech in March 1993 in which he states that the decision
was “taken as early as 1974.”

78
African military to acquire a nuclear capability. Clearer evidence of military application

and the expression of interests by the South African military emerge in 1977-78. Overall,

Vorster’s decision to pursue nuclear weapons is portrayed as a gradual process rather

than a discrete and distinct action (Liberman 2001).

Despite the destruction of records tied to the weapons program, researchers

uncovered a previously unknown memorandum dated March 21, 1975 from the Chief of

Defense Staff to the Chief of the South African Defenses Forces detailing the potential

acquisition of a Jericho missile system from Israel (Harris, Hatang and Liberman 2004).

While revealing the close nature of the ties between South Africa and Israel at the time,

the document also sets forth an argument in support of the acquisition of a nuclear

weapons capability. The memorandum cited the need for such capability in light of what

was asserted as a “significant nuclear threat to South Africa” (Harris, Hatang and

Liberman 2004). While not conclusive of any firm decision regarding the development

of nuclear weapons by the Vorster government, the memorandum helps to advance a

more complete picture of the rationale circulating within the government during the

surrounding period.

Interviews of key advisors of the Botha government confirm that in 1979 the

Botha government decided to pursue nuclear capabilities (Horton 1999; Purkitt and

Burgess 2002). At that time, a steering committee of high level officials, including

Botha, was created to develop nuclear policy which subsequently issued the

recommendation that South Africa develop a credible nuclear deterrent capability. While

indicating South Africa’s movement towards a nuclear weapons deterrence policy, the

key push for proliferation is linked back to the Vorster government and the events of

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1977 surrounding the Kalahari test site. Discovery of the secret desert test site by a

Soviet surveillance satellite resulted in Vorster disbanding the overt PNE (Peaceful

Nuclear Explosion) program and movement towards the development of a secret nuclear

deterrent (Stumpf 1995). After the discovery of the Kalahari site, the Vorster

government subsequently focused on the question of the necessary requirements of a

“sufficient” nuclear deterrent for South Africa (Stumpf 1995).32 The development of an

initial deterrent strategy by the Vorster government in 1978, prior to relinquishing power

over to Botha later that year, provides the brightest line of demarcation indicating South

Africa’s first step across the nuclear threshold moving from exclusively peaceful to

weapons capabilities. Hence for the purposes of examining the initial proliferation

decision this study will utilize 1978 as the critical date.

Crossing the Nuclear Threshold: The Vorster Government

Initially, the realist based security model appears a fitting explaining for the South

African proliferation decision. The portrayal of the security model explanation depicts

South Africa as an isolated state within the international system on the verge of achieving

full blown pariah status. As Betts writes, “The government in Pretoria perceives a major

threat to its security and little prospect for external help in reducing it” (1979:97). By the

mid-1970s, mounting diplomatic initiatives in the United Nations against the South

African government had gained greater acceptance. The growing ostracism of the South

African regime based on its apartheid policy served to strain already tenuous relations

32 According to Stumpf the deterrent strategy approved by Vorster was based on three phases: Phase 1)
Strategic uncertainty in which the nuclear deterrent capability will not be acknowledged or denied;
Phase 2) Should South African territory be threatened, for example, by the Warsaw Pact countries through
the surrogate Cuban forces in Angola, covert acknowledgement to certain international powers, e.g. the
USA, would be contemplated; Phase 3) Should this partial disclosure of South Africa’s capability not bring
about international intervention to remove the threat, public acknowledgement or demonstration by
underground test of South Africa’s capability, would be considered (1995:5-6).

80
with the UK and the US, both whom were South Africa’s most prominent supporters in

terms of diplomatic, economic, and security matters. Yet, neither of these states wished

to stand against the growing tide of anti-apartheid sentiment within the international

community.

Coinciding with this picture of increasing international isolation were the

dramatic events occurring in Southern Africa beginning in 1974 directly affecting South

African security. Deterioration of Portuguese control over its two territories, Angola and

Mozambique, following the fall of the Caetano government in Lisbon, erased nearly two

decades of South African efforts to build a security zone in Southern Africa. South

Africa now faced a pro-Soviet, Marxist-Leninist regime in Mozambique and, in the

ensuing chaos that engulfed Angola, multiple black-nationalist groups along its borders.

Consequently, security concerns in Pretoria were only exacerbated by the enlargement of

the Angolan conflict in 1975 by the introduction of Cuban combat forces, supplied by the

Soviet Union. Indeed this dire view of South Africa’s security situation was reinforced by

Prime Minister De Klerk during his March 24, 1993 speech addressing South African

nuclear proliferation. As for the underlying causes for South Africa’s proliferation, he

stated, “the decision to develop this limited capability was taken as early as 1974, against

a the backdrop of a Soviet expansionist threat in Southern Africa, as well as prevailing

uncertainty concerning the designs of the Warsaw Pact” (De Klerk 1993).

Applications of the security model in the case of South Africa have offered

alternating strategic motivations. On the one hand, the development of nuclear weapons

are depicted as a response to the direct and overt security concerns facing South Africa,

both in terms of regional black nationalist and international communist threats. Stumpf

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(1995) notes that the deterioration of the South African security situation coupled with

the international restrictions on South Africa’s ability to purchase conventional weapons

provided the government with a viable argument that it had no alternative but to develop

as nuclear deterrent capability. On the other hand, the strategic motivations are tied to

the Vorster Government’s attempts to forge a closer security relationship with the “West”

to achieve security guarantees in hopes of ensuring the survival of the white-minority

government in Pretoria (Horton 1999). According to this second line of reasoning, the

development of the South African bomb is viewed as a lever for the government to exact

implicit security guarantees from the US and the western alliance in light of the failure to

gain more explicit security arrangements (Moore 1987; Betts 1979).

While possessing apparent validity given the changing circumstances of South

Africa’s security environment in the 1970s, the application of the security model

rationale has been reassessed and criticized as an erroneous explanation for South African

proliferation motives. These critiques typically take one of two directions. First, the

security concerns are overstated in light of the actual threats facing South Africa in the

1970s (Long and Grillot 2000). Second, the expositions of security motivations offered

by South African leaders provide no clear, unified voice, but rather depict muddled,

disjointed, and even contradictory rationales (Reiss 1995; Moore 1987).

This debate over the application of the security model necessitates a

reexamination of the historical context surrounding the South African proliferation

decision. Accordingly, this section will briefly reexamine South Africa’s external

relations under the Vorster Government including both regional relations (i.e. Southern

Africa) and relations with the “West.” As to the “West,” South African relations with the

82
US and UK will be examined in particular, along with its relations with the international

community generally by using its relations with the UN as a surrogate. Particular

attention will be paid to period starting in 1974 that for many observers signifies a major

change in South Africa’s security environment. Lastly, the section will address the topic

of the strategic motivations allegedly driving the South African proliferation decision.

The Vorster Government’s “Outward Policy”

Having spent the entirety of his political career focused on internal, domestic

affairs, B.J. Vorster suddenly found himself facing several foreign policy issues,

including the controversies regarding Rhodesia and South West Africa. Despite earning

a reputation for an iron-fisted and uncompromising approach to law and order issues as

justice minister, as Prime Minster Vorster would engage in an ambitious and proactive

approach to foreign affairs. Under an initiative that would be called the “Outwards

Policy,” Vorster sought to engage South Africa with the rest of the world. The central

aspect of the policy was to establish and deepen ties to the newly independent black

African states. Not only was such action important in its own right in hoping to “dissuade

some black states from harbouring [sic] guerillas, and, more generally, encouraging co-

operation,” but “South Africa’s relations with Africa largely determined the state of its

relations with other powers” (Geldenhuys 1978:7). By the late 1960s, South African

foreign policy under Prime Minster Vorster exhibited a level of self-assurance previously

unseen. This confidence was buoyed by the ongoing economic growth, a positive

external security environment, and calmed internal political setting.33

33Indeed the last half of the decade of the 1960s has been labeled by some South African historians as “the
years of confidence” (Barber and Barrett 1990).

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Foreign Relations in Africa

The early 1960s had given South Africa pause for concern given the mercurial

landscape following the creation of so many newly formed independent states in

Southern Africa. The fears that the removal of British colonial rule creating newly

independent black African states would present a situation of a South Africa surrounded

by hostile states had subsided. Indeed by the late 1960s the removal of British influences

in the region were portrayed as an advantageous situation creating a leadership vacuum,

one which the government in Pretoria believed it could fill as the leading regional power

(Barber and Barrett 1990; Barber 1973). While its Outward Policy sought to reduce

political isolation globally, equal emphasis was placed developing and enhancing

regional ties. However, these regional diplomatic initiatives would prove problematic.

In playing to its strength of economic exchange, the government sought to

increase diplomatic ties by expanding trade relationships. Yet, despite the best efforts of

the Vorster government, the issue of apartheid was unavoidable when proposing relations

with the black governments of Africa. South Africa’s policy was seemingly trapped in

time, of a past era of international relations, seeking to find mutual interests narrowly

framed in terms of material gains, but rejecting any interference with what it deemed its

internal affairs or even seeking to create common political positions with its neighbors

(Barber and Barrett 1990; Cockram 1970). In spite of the challenge posed, considerable

efforts were expended by the South African government to build relations with black

African states. At the height of the Outward Policy, South Africa had opened dialogues

with over a majority of the black African states (Geldenhuys 1978).

84
 Complicating South Africa’s attempts to develop regional and international

relations was its ties to Rhodesia. The Rhodesia situation exemplified the character of

the Southern Africa bloc whereby membership “implied either supporting ‘white’

Rhodesia or at least abstaining from active hostility” (Barber and Barrett 1990:135). At

the center of the storm was the disputed Universal Declaration of Independence (“UDI”)

issued by the White minority government in November, 1965. Facing the prospect of a

black majority ruled government following the British withdrawal from the territory, the

all-white, colonial established government, declared independence for Rhodesia and

appointed itself as the rightful government. The role of South Africa’s Verwoerd

government in influencing this decision is a matter of some speculation. While Britain’s

anger over the illegal declaration resulted in UN sanctions, the South African government

neither praised nor condemned the action wishing to continue normal relations with its

neighbor (Barber 1973). While portraying itself as taking a neutral position in the

continuation of its relations with Rhodesia, South Africa’s position was tantamount to

acceptance of the Rhodesian regime given the dependence of the latter in the form of

trade, transportation, financing, and communications (Cockram 1970). The South African

support for Rhodesia has been characterized as a combination of “hard-headed

calculations and ‘gut reaction’”(Barber and Barrett 1990: 137). Initially the actions of

the Smith government in Rhodesia presented unwanted attention placing South Africa in

a difficult position. Yet, as the Rhodesian affair continued, the state took on a proxy

status for South Africa with the success or failure of the white government serving as a

mirror for South Africa’s own fate.34

34 Vorster stated “Today Rhodesia, tomorrow some other state, and perhaps the day after South Africa
herself.” (Barber and Barrett 1990:137).

85
Foreign Relations with the West: the US, the UK, and the United Nations

Viewing themselves as very much part of the West, a top priority for the Vorster

government was enhancing relations with the leading states in the Non-communist world

(Purkitt and Burgess 2002; Long and Grillot 2000; Geldenhuys 1978). As to the US,

South African motivations were grounded in the perceived international legitimacy that

could be garnered by a close relationship. Additionally, from a geo-political viewpoint,

ties with the US would serve to strengthen South Africa’s security position.

Nevertheless, the diplomatic efforts expended to engage both of these key states came

with mixed results, and were best characterized in terms of a diplomatic stalemate with

relationships preserved, but not improved. Particularly as to the case of relations with

Britain, the close historic connection between the two states served to preserve the

relationship which appeared diplomatically stunted in the face of simmering tensions

over apartheid and the Rhodesia issue.35 As one observer notes, South Africa’s

relationship with the West “was, in short, a complex and confusing love-hate

relationship” (Geldenhuys 1978:7).

The simultaneous rise of South Africa’s economic fortunes and Cold War

strategic concerns often overtook principled stands taken by the British and US

governments. In the scheme of the geo-political and strategic landscape, the closure of

the Suez Canal in 1967 and the growing presence of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean

35 While Britain’s relations with South Africa, particularly the white Afrikaner population, have a long and
complicated history, a watershed moment is seen as British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s “Winds of
Change” speech delivered in Cape Town on February 3, 1960. During the address, Macmillan tempered
Britain’s support of South Africa due to its apartheid policy stating that “…there are some aspects of your
policies which make it impossible for us to do this without being false to our own deep convictions about
the political destinies of free men to which in our territories we are trying to give effect.”

86
raised the importance of securing the Cape route (Cockram 1970). Coinciding with the

attempts by Britain to reduce its overseas commitments, these events offered the South

African government maneuvering room in its bargaining position with the West (Barber

1973). South African leaders played up the vital importance of their state to the security

of the West both in terms of the African continent and also as the gateway to the Indian

Ocean and South Atlantic. Portraying itself as the “Southern Flank,” successive South

African governments would make the argument for closer ties between their country and

the West, even seeking to entice NATO to extend membership to South Africa (Horton

1999). The strategy by South Africa to link its security and geographic importance to the

security of the West would be seen time and time again.

Overall, the relationship with the US during this period was one of frustration and

exasperation for the South African government. While critical of the stances taken by

Britain which limited their relationship, the Vorster government found it extremely

difficult to deal with the Americans whose policy towards South Africa was viewed as

chaotic at best and schizophrenic at worst. Part of the difficulty in the relationship was

the differing operating procedures of the respective governments, where the Vorster

government was generally restricted to a small cabal of high ranking officials making

policy, the US government with its multiple inputs and outputs was perceived as much

more difficult to influence, let alone predict. As Barber and Barrett (1990) noted, “For

Pretoria the plurality of the US decision making process was frustrating” (161).

Nevertheless, the late 1960s witnessed increasing economic and technical

cooperation between the two countries. Official diplomatic channels remained cool,

however, with South African Ambassadors shunned from the White House and

87
contentious votes cast by the US in the United Nations against South Africa. Some relief

was offered with the arrival of the Nixon Administration and its centralized foreign

policy coming from the White House. The realpolitik approach to international affairs

advocated by incoming National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was viewed as an

opportunity to build relations between the two states while avoiding the divisive issue of

apartheid. However, the Nixon administration’s approach constituted largely a

continuation of previous US policy where alongside condemnations of apartheid were

active steps to further economic ties and even the easing of arms sale restrictions.36

While Vorster’s Outward Policy made headway elsewhere, the relationship

between South Africa and the United Nations was a bitter and antagonistic one. Actions

taken in the UN General Assembly openly attacked the policy of apartheid and sought to

isolate South Africa within the organization. In 1969, an effort was made to remove

South Africa’s delegation from the UN Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD). In 1972, the General Assembly’s preoccupation with apartheid was

apparent with over a third of the assembly’s resolutions being anti-apartheid resolutions.

Finally, in 1973, it rejected the credentials of the South African delegation. This action

was followed the subsequent year by banning the delegation’s ability to speak from the

assembly floor. In essence, the member states had defacto kicked out South Africa from

the General Assembly. It came as little surprise that South Africa countered the move by

36 In the planning format in the Nixon/Kissinger national security apparatus, a National Security Study
Memorandum (NSSM) regarding US policy towards South Africa was written in 1969. Indicating that the
US had no vital security interests in the region and although concerns over apartheid continued the threat of
violence had been reduced by the containment of black nationalists by the Vorster government. Of the
policy options included in the memo, Nixon choose the options which sought to continue relations and
foster contact between white and black states in the region to further cooperation and minimize cross
border violence. Instability possibly brought on by the escalation of cross-border violence was viewed as
advantageous only to communist elements given the remote odds of toppling the South African government
at the time.

88
withholding part of its UN contribution and withdrew its UN ambassador. Although the

possibility of quitting the organization was openly discussed and threatened by Vorster,

South Africa maintained its participation seeing continuing advantages in UN

membership. The South African government, while dismayed by the actions occurring in

the General Assembly, hoped that the body’s actions would be depicted as overzealous.

South African officials were quick to point out the fact that many of those states voting

against South Africa had their own significant problmes in the areas of human rights and

representative government. More to the point, the actions of the General Assembly,

while certainly causing angst for the South African government, remained toothless.

While these actions found support from numerous member states, they failed to garner

support from any of the five permanent member states of the Security Council.

Directly linked to the troubled relationship between the UN and South Africa was

the issue of South West Africa (future Namibia). At the heart of the dispute was South

Africa’s claim to possess and control the territory which opponents argued should be an

independent state. While contested throughout the 1960s, the matter came to a head in

1970 when the dispute was brought before the International Court of Justice. A previous

case challenging South Africa’s control of the territory had been rejected based on the

lack of standing of the claimant states to assert the claims. This new action was brought

by the Security Council seeking an advisory opinion on yet another General Assembly

resolution which had declared the occupation as illegal. Despite the defenses offered by

South Africa in support of its claim, the court’s opinion issued in 1971 stated that the

occupation was illegal and South Africa should leave Namibia. The Vorster government

rejected the court’s finding as a political sideshow lacking legal merit and continued to

89
assert its right to control the territory.37 The dispute would continue throughout the

1970s deepening the rift between South Africa and many member states in the UN. In

most cases gridlock within the Security Council left such matters unresolved. This

situation would change, however, when in 1977 the Security Council finally modified the

previously voluntary arms sale embargo, ongoing since 1963, to a mandatory embargo.

The Watershed Year of 1974: Years of Apprehension and Détente

The military-led coup in Lisbon, in the spring of 1974, serves as a critical turning

point in South Africa’s security situation. The events in Portugal would have a profound

impact upon the security situation in Southern Africa. Where just a year earlier Marxist

movements in Southern Africa were largely contained, the change of course by the

Portuguese government, served to empower the liberation movements in Angola

including the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA. Indeed, the Marxist leaning FRELIMO was

suddenly on the verge of taking power in Mozambique. The importance and the rapid

nature of these development cannot be overstated from the South African perspective

because “within a few months the political and security situation in Southern Africa had

changed fundamentally and the outlook for Pretoria had become threatening” (Barber and

Barrett 1990:176).

While the presence of these liberation groups in Angola and Mozambique was

nothing new, this threat had been previously minimized with South Africa providing

token assistance to the Portuguese authorities in combating these groups. The South

37South Africa’s administration over the South West had initially been mandated and overseen by the
League of Nations following the First World War. Despite the formal termination of the League in 1946,
successive South African governments argued that its power of supervision continued and that the UN did
not succeed the League’s power of supervision over the mandate (Geyser 1976).

90
African “cordon sanitaire,” its buffer zone which it had spent decades securing, had now

vanished (Geldenhuys 1978). South Africa faced states which not only possessed hostile

ideologies, but regimes that had secured their position through the force of arms.

Furthermore, the fact that these movements were openly supported by communist powers

fed South African leaders’ worst fears of communist aggression and expansion in the

region. These fears were heightened in 1975 with the introduction of Cuban troops,

heavily supplied by the Soviet Union, supporting the MPLA in Angola. The Portuguese

colony that had previous provided a regional security zone for South Africa was now the

site of a proxy war between the superpowers.

The changing strategic landscape in the region forced South Africa to move from

the forward footing of the Outward Policy to a more defensive position (Fig 1998). This

change of policy instituted in 1975 would become known as South Africa’s détente

policy. The decision in choosing the policy of détente was depicted by Vorster as the

choice between escalating the conflict in the region and seeking peace (Geldenhuys

1994). Yet this new era of détente in Southern Africa would be short lived in light of the

collapsed settlement negotiations over the future of Rhodesia in 1976 and the intervention

of South African Defense Forces into the Angolan conflict. In light of anticipated, but

ultimately unforthcoming support of the US for South Africa actions in Angola, Vorster

begun to see the true extent of his country’s isolation, where, in the face of communist

expansion in Africa, South Africans “were on their own in a hostile world” (Geldenhuys

1994: 274). Further contributing to South Africa’s security concerns was the domestic

resurgence of Black Nationalism underscored by the tragic Soweto incident of 1976 and

the death of black activist Steven Biko in 1977. By 1977 the point of reference for South

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Africa’s foreign policy turned away from an emphasis on dialogue to a defensive posture

with an eye toward fending off a “total onslaught” from domestic and foreign threats

(Purkitt and Burgess 2002; Horton 1999).

Problematic Nature of South African Nuclear Strategic Thinking

The development of South African nuclear weapons capabilities in the 1970s

cannot be tied to the “possession, development or capability for development by any

possible adversaries in Africa” at the time (Moore 1987). During the period of the 1970s

no state in Southern Africa could be considered a potential proliferation risk. South

Africa “had few, if any, targets for nuclear weapons” at the time (Long and Grillot 2000:

28). Even for the troubled year of 1974, South Africa unquestionably possessed military

superiority in terms of conventional weaponry as compared to its neighbors. Despite the

introduction of Soviet-supplied Cuban military forces into the Angola conflict in 1975,

South Africa’s land and air forces were sufficiently capable to meet any action directed at

South Africa by those forces. Moreover, there was no indication of any intent by the

Cuban forces to invade South African territory. “In reality, South Africa during the 1970s

faced less threat of invasion or attack than any other state seeking to develop weapons of

mass destruction” (Purkitt and Burgess 2005).

The real challenge to South African security came not from outside the states, but

from within. “The principal threat the current South African government faces is internal

revolution and guerrilla warfare, perhaps supported by bordering states” (Betts 1979:

100). Targets for a South African bomb would most likely constitute one of its own

cities falling to internal factions, or rebel staging areas in neighboring states (Long and

Grillot 2000). Accordingly, nuclear weapons had little if any saliency in dealing with

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such threats. In actuality, the regime’s continued posturing regarding the development of

nuclear weapons could adversely affect internal security by encouraging groups like the

ANC to focus its activities within South African territory (Moore 1987). Moreover, the

anticipated blowback from the international community, let alone any retaliatory action

by a state like the Soviet Union, made the South African nuclear strategy seem

“incalculably reckless” (Betts 1979:100). The possibility of adverse reaction from the

international community was particularly relevant in light of the events which followed

the 1974 nuclear detonation by India (Stumpf 1995). The development of the South

African bomb has been viewed as a potential lever for the government to exact implicit

security guarantees from the US and the western alliance in light of the failure to gain

more explicit security arrangements (Moore 1987). In essence this tactic amounted to

“nuclear blackmail” which observers assert was a lesson learned by South African leaders

in light of the 1973 Yom Kippur war (Betts 1979).38

Moore (1987) offers up the perceptions of South African leaders at the time,

preoccupied with the security issues, as a critical element whereby:

…despite her overwhelming quantitative as well as qualitative

military superiority, South Africa retains a paranoia about the
beleaguered situation of the white population at the Southern tip
of black Africa. She may thus have developed nuclear weapons
for the same purpose as she developed a seemingly unnecessary
overwhelming conventional superiority: to convey the
impression, both to her own people and the outside world, that in
spite of the odds against her, the South African regime can
survive indefinitely in a nuclear “laager” (129).

38 During that conflict it is believed that Israel was able to sway US intervention, both to block potential
Soviet involvement and seek a resolution of the conflict, by revealing to the US their nuclear capability and
a willingness to use should the situation deteriorate.

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As a South African observer noted at the time, the nuclear option “while fraught with

considerable risks” presented a “last ditch stand” for the country (Geldenhuys 1978:14).

Hence, the perceptions held by South African political leaders of the international

environment, while arguably objectively flawed, appear as a powerful motivational factor

serving to rationalize their actions in pursuing nuclear weapons.

The Domestic Politics Model Applied to South Africa’s Proliferation

More recent studies of the South Africa case have examined domestic politics

models as a persuasive explanation (Liberman 2001; Horton 1999; Sagan 1996-97).

While political pressure from opposition parties was non-existent during the period, the

role of organizational and bureaucratic structures in South African have been depicted as

affecting the proliferation decision. Specifically, studies have stressed to various degrees

the influence of the nuclear science community in driving the decision (Horton 1999;

Betts 1979). The number of institutions and individuals with knowledge of the program

was always limited. Even early on when it was geared towards civilian applications, the

program was classified and treated as a top secret project (Stumpf 1995). This only

served to increase the influence of the small circle of actors involved in directing the

program. It is estimated that only about 300 people were involved of the nuclear program

at any one time, with fewer than 1,000 total and only approximately 6 to 12 officials were

involved in program decisions (Horton 1999).

This secrecy and rarified policy environment appears to have been promoted by

South African society at the time. Not only was the future of the nuclear program little

debated, but at least among the ruling white community, it is argued that there existed a

united front forming a general consensus about foreign and defense policy (Long and

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Grillot 2000). Another take on the role of political culture in South Africa asserts the rise

of an “executive state” which marginalized the legislature and political parties resulting

in ineffective mobilizing institutions for the citizenry (Giliomee 1994).39 What is seen in

South Africa at the time is a government with leaders possessing wide discretionary

powers, accompanied by a large bureaucracy functioning under the principles of non-

accountability and secrecy (Giliomee 1994).

The start of the South African nuclear program dates back to its support of the

Allies’ Manhattan Project during World War II. At that time South Africa was a critical

player given its abundant natural uranium deposits which supplied both the US and UK

atomic programs. Following the war, South Africa continued to openly pursue civilian

nuclear technologies. These efforts were largely aided by both material and knowhow

from the West including the US, UK, and France. Indeed, South Africa became a

founding member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”). From the

outset, the South African program was envisioned as a way to develop energy

independence and enhance production in the highly-lucrative and prized mining sector of

the national economy (Stumpf 1995).

By the late 1960s, South African nuclear scientists had developed the ability to

enrich uranium in order to create a byproduct suitable for use in an explosive device.

Research as to the theoretical and technical possibilities of detonating a peaceful nuclear

explosion (PNE) began as early as 1969. Formal authorization for “preliminary

investigations” for a PNE came in 1971, coming from the minister of mines with hopes

of harnessing nuclear technology for economic gains rather than military applications.

39 Giliomee draws a direct connection with the “imperial presidency” theory as devised by American
historian Arthur Schlesinger and applied to the US presidency since World War II.

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Not until 1974 did Vorster sign-off on proceeding with developments for conducting a

PNE which included the use of the later controversial Kalahari Desert test site. Despite

the apparent civilian orientation which served as the impetus for the testing, the program

was classified as secret by the government (Horton 1999; Stumpf 1995; Betts 1979).

According to domestic politics model proponents, the advances made from the

late 1960s to mid-1970s are credited as the “result of the nuclear scientists’ general

prestige, their monopoly on nuclear expertise and the tight secrecy shrouding nuclear

explosives research” (Liberman 2001:65). Rather than pointing to the ambitions of

Vorster to develop nuclear weapons, the chairman of the South African Atomic Energy

Board (“AEB”) during the early 1970s, A.J. “Ampie” Roux, is portrayed as an influential

player in the development of the South African nuclear program. In particular, Roux

held a special position possessing direct access to Prime Minister Vorster and, therefore,

able to push for enrichment activities and the PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion) (Purkitt

and Burgess 2002). Although as one observer notes, “it is unclear whether he [Vorster]

needed much persuading” in going forward (Liberman 2001:47). Specifically, while

cloaked in terms of civilian and peaceful use, its asserted that undoubtedly Vorster

understood that a successful PNE would translate into a de facto nuclear weapons

capability (Purkitt and Burgess 2002; Liberman 2001). In 1976, Vorster when asked

about South Africa’s nuclear weapons capabilities responded, “We are only interested in

the peaceful applications of nuclear power. But we can enrich uranium, and we have the

capability. And we did not sign the nuclear-nonproliferation treaty” (Betts 1979:92).

While the distinctions between peaceful and military application of the nuclear

research in South Africa increasingly blurred, the failure of the government to establish

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limits is depicted as being caught up in the momentum of seeing just how far the program

could progress (Purkitt and Burgess 2002). Additionally, the motivations for the PNE

have been tied to AEB organizational concerns over the need to pursue the program in

order to retain key scientists from the previously discontinued Pelinduna reactor program

(Liberman 2002). It is also noted that despite the alleged development of such explosives

for commercial use, the AEB never conducted a feasibility study as to the costs of such

explosions. Moreover, optimism in going forward with the PNE was allegedly reinforced

by the relatively limited outcry and protests over the Indian PNE in 1974 (Reiss 1995).

Therefore, South Africa officials believed they could follow suit in overtly demonstrating

their capability to produce nuclear explosives through a similar “declaration by

detonation” (Horton 1999).40 Indeed, while not publicly disclosing the intention to

detonate a nuclear explosion, the South Africa government also did little to conceal the

test site, other than its remote location, with support structures and facilities at the site

built above ground. The rationale for this construction decision appears to buttress

claims of the influence of organizational politics over the South African nuclear program

as weapon designer, J.W. de Villiers, commented, it was just “too damn expensive to go

underground completely” (Reiss 1995:10).

The discovery of the Kalahari test site by a Soviet surveillance satellite in August

1977, and the subsequent international rebuke, including the US and Soviet Union, led to

the cancellation of the test by the Vorster Government. More importantly the event led to

the transfer of oversight of the South African nuclear program from the civilian-oriented

AEB to the South African Armaments Corporation (ARMSCOR). This change in

40Stumpf (1995) offers a clearly different picture claiming that the secrecy surrounding the South African
program increased in light of the adverse world reaction to the Indian PNE.

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program management signified the transformation of the program from the “exploration

of nuclear explosives to the development of a viable nuclear deterrent” (Horton 1999:7).

With the program’s future in jeopardy following the international discovery of the

Kalahari test site, it is alleged that the AEB supported the militarization of the program in

order to maintain the nuclear program. A secret nuclear program offered an “alternative

raison d’être” for work in the field of nuclear research that otherwise appeared untenable

in light of international criticism of the exposed South African program (Liberman

2001:65).

The use of this organizational model builds its case upon one of the key

shortcomings of the security model, notably the apparent lack of military involvement for

much of the early stages of the program, certainly until 1977. While the potential overlap

between civilian and weapons applications were recognized by the late 1960s, it does not

appear that the military was involved until the AEB requested the use of a military base

in the Kalahari Desert as a test site in 1974. No clear indication of the military’s

involvement in planning and strategy in respect to developing nuclear weapons is seen

until a 1975 SADF memorandum (Harris, Hatang, and Liberman 2004). Another

intriguing example of the military’s lack of involvement in the developmental stages is

that the early nuclear devices constructed were too large to be deliverable and, therefore,

of no practical use to the military (Sagan 1996-97).

Despite the growing acceptance of the domestic organizational politics model for

explaining the proliferation case of South Africa, many questions remain. The domestic

politics model provides a picture where the institutional structure of the South African

nuclear community led to a version of mission creep, as those inside the AEB continually

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pushed the limits and goals of the program. While the organizational explanation notes

the impact of the AEB’s support of continuing the nuclear program in secret after the

1977 Kalahari incident, it falls short of explaining the rapid transformation of the

program from one focused on civilian technologies to one focused on the exclusive

development of a nuclear deterrent capability. Given the previous detachment of the

military from the nuclear program, the speed with which the transition from civilian to

military occurred is especially startling. It has been argued that while the organizational

model seems strong early on in the program, the increasing secrecy placed on the

program suggests that weapons development was always the intended goal (Liberman

2001). Particularly, when coupled with the Vorster government’s refusal to sign the NPT

the ultimate weaponization of the program appears a top driven process. The fact that the

Vorster government did not make any overt decisions as to the direction of the nuclear

program until after the Kalahari incident in 1977 reinforces the “latent” nuclear deterrent

strategy mentioned above. This critical juncture in the South African case points to an

apparent indecisive intersection of the domestic politics and security models of

proliferation.

In pointing to the “confluence of events” pertaining to capabilities and threats,

Purkitt and Burgess summarize the situation that “[F]aced with growing threats and the

capability to build weapons of mass destruction, South Africa’s political leaders opted to

build six nuclear weapons” (2005:27). Certainly the domestic politics model offers a

viable rationale for the decision by the Vorster regime to develop a nuclear weapons

program. Nevertheless, it appears difficult to completely divorce the decision from the

surrounding context of security threats, be they real or perceived.

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 A Proliferation Backslide: De Klerk’s Rollback Decision

From the end of the Vorster Government in 1978, following a domestic political

scandal, the South African nuclear weapons program moved rapidly from infancy to

adulthood under the Botha government. Operating under a defense doctrine of “Total

National Strategy” calling for the need to prepare for “total onslaught” from communist

forces, efforts to produce nuclear weapons and delivery systems were increased

(Geldenhuys 1994, 1978; Horton 1999). As acknowledged by Prime Minster De Klerk,

South Africa had by the late 1980s developed six completed nuclear devices, started

construction on a seventh, and possessed the wherewithal to build several more. Within a

decade, however, South African thinking on nuclear weapons would go from viewing

them as a national imperative under the Botha government to unilateral dismantlement of

the program under De Klerk. In emphasizing the dramatic and swift nature of this change

in thinking Reiss writes, “South Africa took five years to build its first nuclear

device….[E]nding the program, however, took less than twenty-four months” (1995:17).

As with the inception of South African nuclear program, the motivations for the sudden

change of course leading to the rollback decision remain uncertain.

Explanations for the South African rollback have embraced both the security

model and the domestic politics model. Meanwhile, another explanation for the rollback

decision combines aspects of both the security and domestic politics models. According

to this third domestic politics hypothesis, the action by the De Klerk government is

viewed as seeking to prevent the South African nuclear arsenal from eventually falling

under the control of a black-majority government which might then threaten the white

minority or provide such weapons to more radical states (Horton 1999).

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 In terms of the external security environment, by the late 1980s the situation in

Southern Africa had steadily improved so to alleviate South African concerns over the

prospect of “total onslaught” (Albright 2004; Long and Grillot 2000; Stumpf 1995).

Meanwhile, proponents of the domestic politics model see the action by De Klerk as part

of his larger efforts to liberalize the South African state (Liberman 2002). While keen to

reform internal domestic politics, the policies pursued by the De Klerk government

simultaneously sought to promote a new portrait of South Africa so to bring it back into

the good graces of the international community. Especially, in appealing to the

international community, the signing of the NPT and the later announcement on the

dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program were viewed as important steps.

The Security Model: the end of the Cold War in Southern Africa

By the end of the 1980s the security environment in Southern Africa dramatically

improved from that in the late 1970s. In 1988, the “Tripartite Agreement” was signed

bring a ceasefire and peace agreement to South West Africa providing for the creation of

an independent Namibia. The beginning of the end of the Cold War brought about a

drop-off in Soviet involvement in the region as evidenced by the withdrawal of the

previously Soviet-supplied Cuban combat forces in Angola which had grown to a high of

50,000 troops. The Soviet Union had also begun to significantly reduced aid given to the

ANC and discouraged the “use of armed struggle and pursuit of a radical socialists

agenda” (Liberman 2002:74-75).

The brokered peace in Namibia and Angola brought to an end over a decade of

regional involvement in insurgency and counter-insurgency fighting by the South African

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Defense Forces. In light of the Tripartite Agreement, the inevitable decrease in SADF

activities brought the prospect of significantly reducing levels of military spending.

Indeed starting in 1989 to 1993 the military budget decreased nearly 40% (Liberman

2002). Accordingly, in this budgetary environment of increased competition over

allocations, the escalating costs of the various delivery systems tied to the nuclear

program began to bring protests from South African military leaders who saw lessening

need for such systems and better use of such expenditure on conventional forces (Purkitt

and Burgess 2002).

Regardless of the clear improvements in the security environment for South

Africa, the security model offers an indeterminate explanation for a proliferation rollback

scenario. Strictly in terms of costs, the continuation of the nuclear weapons program at

its modest state of development in South Africa was not a significant budgetary item

straining state capabilities.41 Moreover, the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons

program appears at odds with realist logic in terms of security and capabilities gains.

While immediate security concerns had been reduced for the state, the uncertainty of

future security threats, according to neo-realist assumptions, should have prompted South

Africa to hold onto such capabilities rather than abandon them.

The Domestic Politics model: the end of apartheid

For the De Klerk government, the domestic politics model explanation operates

on two levels: domestically and internationally (Horton 1999). Central to domestic

41 The expenditures for the program are a matter of debate. Fig (1998) disputes the official numbers which
state the expenditures for the nuclear weapons program as between 200 and 400 million rand. He estimates
that the total cost of all the various elements connected to the weapons program as at least 5 billion rand (in
1993 prices). Horton (1999) estimates that the program likely cost approximately 7 billion rand.
Meanwhile, Stumpf (1995) weighs in closest to the government estimates claiming the lifetime expenditure
for the nuclear deterrent program ran about 680 million rand.

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political explanations is the fact that De Klerk came into power ready to make significant

reforms internally regarding the apartheid system which fed the international isolation

crippling the country’s economy. Subject to economic sanctions by all OECD countries

and experiencing over 100 companies pulling out of South Africa between 1985 and

1988, the domestic economic situation was grim (Long and Grillot 2000). The moves by

the De Klerk government in the late 1980s are portrayed as an effort motivated by the

country’s leadership to avoid further isolation by the West (Long 1996).

De Klerk calculated a greater advantage in divulging and dismantling the nuclear

program then in retaining it. As De Klerk recounts, “the global and regional strategic

situation had changed dramatically….[u]nder these circumstances, the retention of a

nuclear capability no longer made any sense—if it ever had in the first place—and had

become an obstacle to the development of our international relations” (De Klerk 1999:

273-274). By signing the NPT, South Africa would be taking another positive step in

reforming its image with the international community. Realizing the need for political

and diplomatic solutions to the country’s international isolation, the nuclear deterrent was

increasingly seen as “a burden rather than a benefit” (de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993:

103).

The calculation that the country should abandon its nuclear weapons program in

order to normalize its international relations was made almost immediately by the De

Klerk government. Having previously served as the minister of mines and energy affairs

during the Vorster government, De Klerk held a working knowledge of the size and

scope of the nuclear program (De Klerk 1999). Upon coming to power in September

1989, he authorized the creation of a high level committee to review the current and

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future status of the nuclear weapons program. This committee was composed of officials

with no loyalties towards the program and was headed by a chairman, the Minister of

Minerals and Energy, Dawid de Villers, who expressly opposed it (Liberman 2002). Not

surprisingly the committee, in November 1989, made a recommendation to De Klerk

calling for the termination and dismantling of the program. As the recommendation was

a foregone conclusion, De Klerk immediately appointed a technical working group to

advise him as to the quickest timetable for dismantling the program and the earliest date

for accession to the NPT and the conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA

(de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993). On July 10, 1991 South Africa joined the NPT and

in September signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Of course, this welcomed

action by South Africa would be reassessed in light of the subsequent revelation of the

extent to their nuclear activities by De Klerk two years later.

As a matter of addressing the role of domestic organizational politics, it too

appears to offers an imperfect explanation for South African rollback. The expectation

under this model would be for the continuing existence of the program. Once created the

various institutions and actors benefiting from the program are expected to protect their

vested interest in seeing its continued survival. Considering the long history of the South

African nuclear program, having over a decade of weapons development at the time, the

swift reversal on the program goes against the expectations of the organizational politics

model.

While the military’s stake and position on the issue remained somewhat unclear,

making it less than a forceful advocate for the program’s continuation, clearly both

Armscor and AEC had larger stakes. Dismantling the nuclear weapons program also

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meant that the delivery platform programs tied to the nuclear weapons program were in

jeopardy. These programs reportedly employed approximately 26,000 individuals with a

budget of over 2 billion rand (Liberman 2002). Meanwhile, the opening of the country’s

nuclear program would also mean an end for the AEC’s uranium processing and

enrichment programs, which employed nearly 8,000 workers, would be slashed by two-

thirds (Liberman 2002). Additionally, that the head of the state’s nuclear agency, AEC

Chairman J.W. de Villiers, who had overseen the program for a decade, placed his loyalty

with the newly elected government in supporting the dismantlement further undercuts the

utility of the organizational model.

In the end, the fate of the program was decided with little governmental in-

fighting, no leaking of details to the press, but with surprising bureaucratic silence and

acquiescence. In part this is due to the changes instituted by De Klerk regarding the

decision-making bodies he relied upon. He subordinated the role of the State Security

Council (SSC), which was the primary advisory body under Botha, making it reportable

to the Cabinet. Moreover, among the cabinet members was a smaller group of trusted

advisors who shared and reinforced the president’s views. This informal, but influential

group would be called De Klerk’s “kitchen cabinet” (Purkitt and Burgess 2002).

Diplomacy also returned to the forefront of South African foreign policy replacing the

“security imprint” which vanished as did the notion of “total onslaught” (Geldenhuys

1994). Notably, De Klerk frequently immersed himself directly into foreign policy

through personal diplomacy. The situation in South Africa appears to be a case where the

establishment was shaped in large measure by the preferences of a single leader, De

Klerk, instead of the other way around. Contrary to an organizational politics

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explanation, presidential leadership served as the preeminent factor for the nuclear

programs termination (Liberman 2002; Horton 1994).

A more persuasive explanation for the proliferation decision by De Klerk appears

to come from the domestic politics model building on the explanation put forth by

Solingen (2007, 1994) which argues that South Africa’s rollback was a function of the

coming to power of a more liberal, outward oriented regime. Accordingly, there is an

expected correlation among a government’s economic orientation, nationalism, and

nuclear policies. Those states which are closed off economically and highly nationalistic

are more likely to pursue nuclear weapons as compared with more economically liberal,

internationally oriented states. As applied to the South African case by Liberman (2002),

this model contends that the South African decision was not the result of any significantly

different pressures facing the Botha government versus the De Klerk government. Rather

the decision was based on the differing responses by De Klerk to relatively similar

stimuli. In essence, the key variable in the South African case appears to be the very

nature of the leader at the time of the decision—where Botha was motivated to maintain

the nuclear program, De Klerk came to an opposite conclusions.

De Klerk is seen as embracing economic liberalism requiring realignment of both

domestic policy and the country’s international standing tarnished by the domestic

apartheid system. Consequently, while Botha was unwilling to yield in the face of

international sanctions, “De Klerk responded much differently to the same incentives

faced by P.W. Botha” (Liberman 2002: 80). For De Klerk changing policies regarding

nuclear weapons and signing the NPT was seen as accomplishing dual purposes. By

joining the NPT, South Africa would increase its international standing and open the way

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for lifting the sanctions adversely impacting the South African economy.

Simultaneously, De Klerk hoped that increased international credibility and

improvements in domestic economic fortunes would strength his hand in negotiating both

with his own Nationalist Party and the ANC on possible power sharing arrangements.

One anecdotal indicator of De Klerk’s international orientation is the fact his visits

abroad surpass all of the trips taken by South African leaders since 1948 (Geldenhuys

1994). Perhaps the most striking difference between De Klerk’s foreign policy approach

and that of his predecessors is the appeal made by his government requesting that the UN

Secretary General intervene to aid in restarting negotiations with the ANC in 1992. This

action indicated a sea change as previous attempts for international mediation had been

imposed rather than requested, criticized rather than welcomed by the government, and

where earlier claims of sovereignty and non-interference gave way to international

cooperation (Geldenhuys 1994).

Although offering a persuasive argument for why the South African government

changed course on its nuclear policy in relatively rapid fashion, a couple of critical

underlying questions remain unanswered. First, it is unclear when and why De Klerk

adopted this economically liberal, internationally oriented identity. Having spent his

entire political life as a member of the ruling Nationalist Party and serving in various

ministerial posts under the Vorster and Botha governments, De Klerk was hardly some

political upstart when taking the presidency in 1988. Little in his political resume up to

that point would have indicated him to be a major reformer. Indeed his reputation up

until then depicted him as one of the more conservative members of the Botha

government (Giliomee 1994). Second, while much evidence points to De Klerk as being

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more free-market oriented than his predecessor, less evidence points to a decline in

nationalism which is another aspect of Solingen’s theory. This is due in part to the

difficulty in defining nationalism, which in turn is further complicated by the fact that

one’s economic leaning and nationalist versus internationalist orientation are seemingly

linked. Undeniably De Klerk’s reform efforts represented a clear break with the National

Party’s legacy in creating and maintaining the apartheid system. It is less clear, however,

if this was due to his international orientation or astute political calculation of the

domestic political reality recognizing the need to work out a compromise to maintain

some degree of power for the white minority.

The motivation for South Africa’s nuclear rollback decision was likely a

combination of security and domestic political issues arising at the same time. However,

these factors provided merely the opportunity for a decision to be made in changing the

country’s nuclear weapons policies. It was the willingness on the part of the De Klerk

government to reassess the policy and determine that the program was not in the

country’s best interests that led to dismantling. The conditions paving the way for

reassessing the program emerged during the late 1980s, yet it was not until the coming of

the De Klerk government that the decision was made (Liberman 2002). In destroying a

program the state had invested so much time and resources, “the decision to dismantle

South Africa’s nuclear weapons bears much of F.W. de Klerk’s personal imprint” (Reiss

1995:19). The combination of the operational environment and the apparent preferences

of the De Klerk regime provided a perfect storm for causing South Africa to become the

first and only country to abandon a domestically derived nuclear weapons program.

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 The World Views and Strategic preferences of South Africa’s Leaders

Having laid out the respective arguments asserting the various explanations for

South Africa’s proliferation decisions, we now turn to an examination of the world views

of B.J. Vorster and F.W. De Klerk. By examining their depictions of the international

system, their resulting strategic preferences, and perceptions of Self and Other, hopefully

greater insight and clarity can be brought to understanding their respective decisions. For

both leaders their operational codes were developed by subjecting a sample of public

statements to analysis by the VIC coding scheme using the Profiler Plus software

program. Statements were collected starting from the beginning of each leader’s

government up until the relevant proliferation decisions. For Vorster this period covers

statements starting in 1967 through 1976.42 Meanwhile, for De Klerk the relevant time

frame is from 1988 up until the March 1993 announcement revealing the previously

secret weapons program. The scores of both are reported in Table 5.1 along with the

scores of the average world leader proxy, or norming group, developed by Walker and

Schafer (2006a). Each leader was compared against the norming group by use of

ANOVA testing with statistically significant differences reported. The scores of the

master beliefs were then used in plotting each leader’s perceptions of Self and Other in

the Modified Holsti Typology Matrix (Figure 5.1). Using the typology and master belief

scores, the strategic preference for Self and Other is used to construct each leader’s

subjective game in accordance with the assumptions of Walker’s Theory of Inferences

about Preferences (TIP) and Brams’ Theory of Moves (TOM) as discussed previously in

chapters 3 and 4.

42Discussion regarding the dating of the South African proliferation decision during the Vorster
government can be found at the beginning for this chapter.

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Table 5.1. South African Leaders’ Operational Codes
Philosophical & Instrumental Norming
Beliefs Vorster De Klerk Group
P-1. Nature of Political Universe .326 . 501*** 0.301
(Conflict/Cooperation)
P-2. Realization of Political .159 .312*** 0.147
Values (Pessimism/Optimism)
P-3. Political Future .152 .182 0.134
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
P-4. Historical Developments .241 .254 0.224
(Low Control/High Control)
P-5. Role of Chance .962 .952 0.968
(Small Role/Large Role)
I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals .332 0.401
(Conflict/Cooperation) .658***
I-2. Intensity of Tactics .127 0.178
(Conflict/Cooperation) .368***
I-3. Risk Orientation .357 .452** 0.332
(Averse/Acceptant)

I-4. Timing of Action

a. Conflict/Cooperation .594** .294*** 0.503
b. Words/Deeds .488 .456 0.464

I-5. Utility of Means

a. Reward .155 .238 0.157
b. Promise .066 .152 0.075
c. Appeal/Support .445 .438 0.468
d. Oppose/Resist .155 .064** 0.154
e. Threaten .030 .031 0.034
f. Punish .149 .076 0.112
*** indicates significance at the .01 level using a two-tailed test
** indicates significance at the .10 level using a two-tailed test

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 Figure 5.1. South African Leaders’ Perceptions of Self and Other

The Operational Code and Strategic Preferences of B.J. Vorster

The operational code of Vorster reveals a world view showing little variance from

that of the average world leader.43 This seems at odds with what conventional wisdom

might have anticipated given Vorster political reputation gained during his days as an

“iron fisted” Minister of Justice during the Verwoerd government and outspoken

supporter of the apartheid system (Barber 1973). These expectations, however, fail to

recognize the distinction between how Vorster acted at the domestic level versus the

international level. As shown by numerous historiographies of South Africa’s foreign

relations, the Vorster government was very proactive in seeking to establish and improve

43 For Vorster 29 public statements were examined resulting in 952 coded verbs.

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relations both regionally and globally through the Outward policy of the late 1960s and

Détente policy of the mid-1970s. Nevertheless, the South African government, despite

its best hopes and desires to develop relations with its African neighbors, could not avoid

the spillover effect its controversial domestic policy of apartheid would have on its

external relations. Consequently, this split personality characterizing the country’s

domestic and foreign policies, staunchly asserting its right to an internal system of

inequality while advocating relations with other states on a basis of equality and

sovereignty, appears to be reflected in the world view and preferences of Vorster.

The type of leader and the strategic preferences revealed by Vorster’s operational

code point to an individual utilizing a broad range of tactics, including both cooperative

and conflictual tactics, endeavoring to push interactions to his advantage. What develops

is an assertive type of leader where all options, including the development of nuclear

weapons, are seen as reasonable in maintaining one’s position and achieving political

goals. Regarding the nuclear option, Vorster stated during a 1976 interview with

Newsweek, “We are only interested in the peaceful applications of nuclear power. But we

can enrich uranium, and we have the capability. And we did not sign the nuclear-

nonproliferation treaty.” Above all else, Vorster appears motivated to ensure the survival

and preservation of the white-minority regime in South Africa from threats from within

and from outside the country.

While only one statistically significance difference is found between Vorster’s

operational code and that of the average world leader, the more substantial finding is the

revelation of his leader type, the inferred strategic preferences, and the structuring of his

subjective game given perceptions of Self and Other. Vorster’s aggregated speech scores

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(.062, -.072) result in plotting him as a Type B leader type on the Modified Holsti

Typology Matrix. Type B leaders fit in the category of so-called “offensive realists” as

defined by international relations scholars (Mearsheimer 2001). Strategically, these

leaders avoid action that might be interpreted as appeasement and vigorously pursue their

optimal goals preferring to limit the means employed rather than end results. Having a

higher degree of confidence over one’s ability to control historical development, and

hence outcomes, these leaders are more optimistic as to the realization of political goals.

Tactically, Type B leaders will be open to a wide array of tactics which assist in

achieving their goals, including the use of force when situations present themselves with

benefits outweighing costs. These leaders seek to dominate interactions with others and

therefore are viewed as more conflict-oriented. For Vorster, as a Type B leader, his

preference ordering is Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit. This ordering reflects the

belief in ultimately achieving one’s goals along with a tactical fluidity born out of one’s

confidence about outcomes.

In contrast to his Self perception, Vorster’s operational code expresses a nearly

reverse image view of Other. The plotted scores for his perceptions of Other are located

within the Type A quadrant of the Holsti matrix (-.086, 031). Accordingly, Other is

similarly viewed as being relatively optimistic as to achieving goals; however, these

goals are characterized as more international then individual in their orientation. Such

broad goals are to be reached through emphasizing shared interests among parties.

Tactically, Type A leaders seek to utilize tactics which limit the possibility of escalation,

focusing on negotiations and compromise, and seeking to avoid the use of force. Overall,

this type is characterized as cooperation-oriented in their view of the international

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system. Given this disposition, their strategic preference script places settlement as the

optimal outcome. The ordering of their strategic preferences is Settle> Deadlock>

Dominate> Submit. This perception of Other by Vorster seemingly fits with the notion

that he had become disillusioned with the prospect of the international community,

especially the US, forcefully countering the growing communist threat in Southern

Africa. Indeed, at its most extreme, Type A leaders can be viewed as engaging in

appeasement so to avoid conflict. Consequently, how Vorster sees the world and how he

perceives others see the world are inherently at odds.

Table 5.2. Vorster’s Perceptions of Self and Other

Modified Holsti
Holsti Strategic Preference TIP TIP Strategic
Type Ordering Proposition Preferences

Self Type B Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit #6 Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit

Other Type A Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit #2 Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

When applying the principles of TIPs to Vorster’s perception of Self and Other,

the difference between the two is further reinforced. As to Self, Vorster’s scores for his

master beliefs place him in line with TIPs proposition #6. The aggregated scores position

Self as less (-) cooperative in outlook than the average world leader. Vorster also views

himself as possessing greater (>) control over historical development and outcomes.

Therefore, the resulting ordering of his strategic preferences for Self is expressed as

“Settle> Deadlock> Dominate> Submit” just as indicated by the Holsti typology matrix.

Meanwhile, Vorster’s aggregated master belief scores for Other aligns it with TIPs

proposition #2 whereby Other is more cooperative (+) and equal (=) as far the ability to

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control outcomes than the average world leader. According to TIP then Other’s ordering

of strategic preferences is “Settle> Deadlock> Dominate> Submit.”

OTHER OTHER OTHER

CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 2, 4 1, 2 CO Settle Submit CO 2, 4 →| 1, 2
___
SELF ↓ ↑ SELF SELF

CF 4, 1 “3, 3” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 4, 1 |← “3, 3”

Self’s Strategy: Stay OUTCOMES Other’s Strategy: Stay

Game state(s) in quotations indicate the “initial state” for the players
Game state(s) in bold indicate the final state (outcome) of the game
Arrows indicate moves by players, arrows with bars indicate a “non-move”

Figure 5.2. Vorster’s Subjective Game

The strategic interaction between Vorster’s perception of Self and Other results in

a subjective game as depicted in Figure 5.2. Given the very different ordering of the

preference sets for the players the game is a conflict game. While Other may seek to

pursue a game strategy of assurance leading to cooperation/cooperation outcome (2, 4),

this outcome is unstable, as Vorster is prone to pursue bully tactics. As a result, he is

expected to push the game from that state to one of conflict/cooperation in seeking to

dominate the interaction and achieve his highest valued outcome (4, 1). The inevitable

outcome is a state of Deadlock (3, 3) regardless of the initial state of the game.

However, for the sake of playing out the scenario, we can refer to the historical

accounts describing the state of affairs between South Africa and the international

community. Over the course of the Vorster government, South Africa faced mounting

pressures in light of growing international criticism of its apartheid policy. Beyond its

domestic policies, South Africa was condemned for its support of the Ian Smith

government in Rhodesia and its control over the South West Africa territory. By the early

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1970s, efforts to turn voluntary sanctions against South Africa into mandatory ones were

afoot and increasingly strained relations with the international community placed South

Africa’s UN membership in doubt. Given these facts, the most accurate description for

the initial state of the interaction would be that of deadlock.

Accordingly, as moves and countermoves by the players caused by their divergent

interests would merely result in cycling back to the state of Deadlock, the natural

outcome of “3, 3” calls for both Self and Other to employ a strategy of “stay” at the

initial state. Of course it is possible to hypothesize the initial state of the game as being

other than Deadlock. Perhaps some observers might interpret the historical record as

offering a different starting point. Nevertheless, no matter which initial state might be

argued to be most appropriate, the intrinsic outcome caused by the differing strategic

preferences remains the same and ultimately drives the game to Deadlock.

The case studies reviewing South Africa’s proliferation decision have offered

indeterminate answers why the Vorster government progressed down the road of

weapons development. Arguably both security concerns and domestic organizational

politics appear to have played roles to varying degrees. Yet, through the analysis of

Vorster’s world view and strategic preferences, a different conclusion emerges, one that

points to his view of the international system as a considerable factor for the proliferation

decision. While external security threats and a growing domestic nuclear complex

provided opportunities for justification, Vorster, based on his operational code, needed

little in the way of prompting. Revealed as a Type B offensive realist, Vorster’s concern

was with the development of capabilities in vigorously pursuing outcomes. A full array

of tactic and resources, including the use of force, are seen as legitimate in achieving

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one’s objectives. Opponents are viewed as both rational and deterrable, where the

possibility of war comes from appeasement. Overall, Vorster’s highest strategic

preference is to dominate his interactions with others. Accordingly, Vorster’s pursuit of

nuclear weapons capability is a natural outgrowth of his conflict-orientated view of the

international system and resulting strategic preferences. Vorster’s favorable proclivity

toward nuclear proliferation is not in reaction to Other, but generated by Self motivations.

Indeed, the outcome that Vorster, as a Type B leader, would choose to proliferate adheres

to the framework devised by this project and supports the hypothesis whereby Type B

leaders will seek to proliferate regardless of their perceptions of Other.

The Operational Code and Strategic Preferences of F.W. De Klerk

Perhaps it is not surprising to find that President F.W. De Klerk offers a contrast

to B.J. Vorster in several ways. Not only does De Klerk present a different leader type

regarding his perceptions of Self, but he also displays a leader who views the world in

significantly more cooperative terms even as compared to the average world leader.44

This cooperative–oriented world view combined with his perceptions of Self and Other,

lead to a strategic interaction represented by a subjective game where strategic

preferences point away from the need for and utility of nuclear weapons.

As shown in Table 5.1, De Klerk’s revealed operational code paints a portrait of a

leader who views the international system in a more cooperative light. Overall, when

compared against the average world leader proxy group, De Klerk is found to differ from

this group in several key indicators. De Klerk’s operational code is significantly different

44 For De Klerk 28 public statements were examined resulting in 638 coded verbs.

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at the .01 level from the norming group across both philosophical and instrumental

beliefs including P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2.

The most important findings are those indicating statistically significant

differences between De Klerk and the norming group concerning the critical master

beliefs. Here one observes that as to two of the three master beliefs, P-1 and I-1, De

Klerk’s operational code differs significantly (.01 level) from the average world leader.

Specifically, as to the nature of the political universe (P-1), De Klerk views the world in

much more cooperative terms. Perhaps not surprising then is the finding that De Klerk is

far more disposed towards the use of cooperative approaches in achieving political goals

in the international system (I-1) than the average world leader as well. Meanwhile, as to

the third master belief, perceived control over historical developments (P-4), De Klerk’s

score is neither significantly greater nor less than that of the norming group.

Accompanying these results are the finding of significant differences between De

Klerk and the norming group as to P-2 and I-2. While neither is classified as a master

belief, both point to fundamental differences in De Klerk’s philosophical and tactical

approaches to the world. As to P-2, De Klerk’s operational code points to him as an

optimist regarding the realization of political goals. Simultaneously, while expressing

optimism in achieving his goals, De Klerk is prone, according to his operational code, to

engage in far more cooperatively-oriented tactics. Elsewhere, we find slightly less

significant (.10 level), but still interesting results as to De Klerk’s risk orientation (I-3)

which rates him as more risk acceptant than the norming group. Also, as to the utility of

means, De Klerk’s operational code shows less reliance on “oppose/resist” tactics as

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when compared to the average world leader, albeit at the slightly less .10 level of

significance.

From De Klerk’s operational code we are able to plot both his perception of Self

and Other within the Modified Holsti Typology Matrix. In plotting these sets of scores

what is found is that De Klerk’s perception of Self places him firmly in the category of a

Type C leader (.236, .597). This, of course, correlates with the operational code scores

which point to a generally more cooperatively-oriented world view than the norming

group. Meanwhile, De Klerk’s calculated scores for the purposes of developing the

Holsti typology places Other in the Type A quadrant of the matrix (-.236, .699). Using

the common labels of international relations, what we see is a situation of a liberalist

leader in De Klerk operating in a world filled with idealist others. Both types see the

world in overall cooperative terms. While the ordering of their strategic preferences

differ (Others’ Settle> Deadlock> Dominate> Submit versus De Klerk’s Settle>

Dominate> Deadlock> Submit), the critical aspect is that both inherently prefer

settlement as the best outcome.

As to the specific case, the general tactical approaches associated with these types

are worth pointing out. While desiring settlement first and foremost, De Klerk as a Type

C liberalist is prone to employ so-called “exploit” tactics. Type A idealists of the sort De

Klerk perceives Other to be are apt to pursue an approach employing “reward” or “deter”

tactics. In essence, De Klerk sees Other as more cooperative then even himself. This

appears to reinforce the notion that De Klerk believed that by altering South Africa’s

approach to the international community such actions would in turn bring benefits (i.e.

rewards) most notably being the end of international isolations and embargoes.

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 Table 5.3. De Klerk’s Perceptions of Self and Other
Modified Holsti
Holsti Strategic Preference TIP TIP Strategic
Type Ordering Proposition Preferences

Self Type C Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit #2 Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

Other Type A Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit #2 Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

In further examining the strategic preferences of De Klerk’s world view the

principles of TIPs are applied which emphasis the role of the master beliefs (P-1, I-1, and

P-4). Again it should be remembered that the combination of these master beliefs

generate preference set for both Self and Other. As to both Self and Other, De Klerk’s

scores land firmly in line with TIP’s proposition #2. In each instance, his scores place

both Self and Other as more (+) cooperative in outlook than the norming group while

neither is seen as possessing any advantage (=) as to control over historical

development/outcomes. Accordingly, the preference sets for both Self and Other are

order similarly expressed as “Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit.” Both Self and Other

are described as playing an “Assurance” game based on their strategic preferences.

OTHER OTHER OTHER

CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 4, 4 1, 2 CO Settle Submit CO 4, 4 →| 1, 2

SELF _↓_ ↑ SELF SELF

CF 2, 1 “3, 3” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 2, 1 ← “3, 3”

Self’s Strategy: Move OUTCOMES Other’s Strategy: Move

Game state(s) in quotations indicate the “initial state” for the players
Game state(s) in bold indicate the final state (outcome) of the game
Arrows indicate moves by players, arrows with bars indicate a “non-move”

Figure 5.3. De Klerk’s Subjective Game

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 The resulting subjective game, given De Klerk’s perceptions of Self’s and Other’s

preferences, is expressed in figure 5.3. The result is a Mutual Assurance game with both

players interested in cooperation so to obtain their highest preference. Regardless of the

initial state, the game eventually reaches resolution by settling on the outcome of

“cooperate, cooperate” which is the highest possible payoff for both players given their

preference ordering scheme (“4, 4”).

In examining this case, the “initial state” which best characterizes the state of

affairs between South Africa and the international community at-large appears to be the

game-state of “Deadlock.” The existing scholarship examining the historical context

surrounding De Klerk’s rise to power in South Africa has pointed to the strained

relationship between South Africa and much of the international community. Subject to

widespread economic sanctions from the West, including the US, by the late 1980s,

South Africa was experiencing international isolations, accompanied by increasing

economic distress. South Africa had acquired full blown pariah status as to its standing

in the international community. The cause for this state of affairs was the continuation of

the apartheid system inside of South Africa.

Nevertheless, the previous governments had remained steadfast in resisting calls

to abolish the apartheid system despite facing mounting international pressures. The

white-minority government in South Africa and the international community was at an

impasse as the De Klerk government came into power. De Klerk’s world views and

strategic preferences are indicative of a leader prone towards greater cooperation with

others in the international system. His view of Self is actually more tempered or

pragmatic, casting himself as a Type C, than his view of Other, who he perceives as Type

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A. This appears to reinforce the view that De Klerk saw the international community as

ready to cooperate and reward the domestic political reform started in South Africa.

However, De Klerk did not rush blindly forward in enacting reforms. This was evident in

the contentious negotiations with Black Nationalist groups, in particular the ANC, which

were extremely contentious. De Klerk held firm on a power sharing arrangement

throughout the discussions and rebuffed socialist economic overtures threatening his

efforts to liberalize the country’s economy so to integrate it into the global economic

system. Perhaps, no better words to describe De Klerk’s political outlook can be found

than those he used to describe himself:

Politically, I would say I am an idealist who chases

ideals, but with the knowledge that an ideal that is not
practically applied in the realities of South Africa is
something that cannot be achieved and, therefore,
is not to be chased. I am a practical idealist.
(De Klerk, 2/10/1989)

In evaluating the South African case under De Klerk, the evidence here lends

additional credibility to the Solingen (1994, 2007) and Liberman (2001) hypothesis

regarding the disdain of nuclear weapons and proliferation by outward-looking, liberal-

internationalist leaders and regimes. However, of even greater consequence, the De

Klerk case bolsters the efficacy of the decision-making framework developed by this

project. As hypothesized, the incentive to proliferate and develop nuclear weapons is

slight where a leader perceives the overall strategic interaction as between Type A and

Type C leaders. This interaction produces a mutual cooperation game where the players,

through the use of cooperative tactics, are able to attain their best strategic outcome. Not

surprisingly, the utility of nuclear weapons and the benefits of engaging in proliferation

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are negligible in this scenario. De Klerk’s actions attest to the fact that he perceived far

greater benefits in relinquishing South Africa’s nuclear weapons and signing the NPT as

opposed to continuing its modest and secretive program.

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 CHAPTER SIX

INDIA:
CROSSING THE LAKSHMAN REKHA45

India’s proliferation experience, similar to South Africa’s, also hinges on two

separate events. The first proliferation event was the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion

(“PNE”) during the Indira Gandhi government. The second key event was the series of

tests authorized by the A.B. Vajpayee government in May 1998. However, whereas

South Africa offered instances of proliferation and subsequent rollback, India provides a

case of serial proliferation within a single state. The country’s ambiguous nuclear

posture after 1974 was made manifest by the nuclear explosions in May 1998 which

expressly demonstrated India’s weapons capability. While both the 1974 and 1998

events served as overt displays of India’s nuclear prowess, differing explanations have

emerged regarding the underlying motivations spurring them on.

The existence of external security threats is part of the equation as India appears

to live in a dangerous global neighborhood. India finds itself bordering two nuclear

weapons states (China and Pakistan) while in close proximity to a third (Russia). Its

balancing act of nonalignment during the Cold War meant that it was largely left to its

45 “Lakshman Rehka” refers to the Hindi epic, the Ramayana, where Lakshama draws a protective line in
the ground around his brother’s wife, Sita, as he goes in search of his brother, Rama. Anyone other than
Lakshama, Sita, or Rama crossing the line would be engulfed by fire erupting from the line. Nonetheless,
the story then tells of how Sita was tricked into crossing the line by King Ravana who kidnaps her. In
modern Indian usage, the term refers to a strict convention or a rule, never to be broken. It often refers to
the ethical limits of an action, traversing which may lead to undesirable consequences.

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own devices concerning security and defense. During the Gandhi government (1968-

1977), US support of rival Pakistan and India’s turn towards the Soviet Union served to

highlight the country’s precarious position in the international community. The US-tilt

towards Pakistan further intensified during the 1980s as the two combined to frustrate the

Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. The nature of the US policy in the region

served as an ongoing source of frustration for successive Indian governments as the US

was seen as supportive of a flawed democracy in Pakistan and also turning a blind eye

towards Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. The notion of a rising Pakistan, as well as regional

power concerns vis-à-vis China, has been offered as justification for why the 1998 tests

were conducted by the Vajpayee government (Dixit 2001).

However, interpretations of Indian proliferation motives differ as much as the

personalities of the two leaders who authorized them. On the one hand, Indira Gandhi is

viewed as a complex character both as a stateswoman committed to pursuing an

alternative path for India during the Cold War and the political leader of a country

undergoing transition and turmoil. On the other hand, A.B. Vajpayee is depicted as a

domestic political creature, with nearly 40 years of minority and majority experience in

the Indian government, driven by a brand of Hindi nationalism and pride wanting to

assert the rightful place of India in the region and the world. Despite the differences

between these leaders, explanations for Indian proliferation have been largely constrained

by the application of the usual suspects of the security model and the domestic politics

model.

As to Gandhi’s 1974 decision, initial support for the security model rational has

been replaced by a growing acceptance of a domestic politics explanation. Facing

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increasing domestic political unrest, Gandhi’s decision is viewed as a way for her to

consolidate her government’s position through the national achievement of a successful

nuclear detonation (Perkovich 1999). This has also been labeled the “diversionary”

domestic political explanation (Sagan 1995/96). There is also an argument favoring the

domestic organizational politics model given the size and influence of the Indian nuclear

science community which traces its roots back to independence. However, the security

model still resonates as a potential basis given regional events including a growing China,

which had become a nuclear weapon state in 1964, as well as the 1971 Indo-Pakistan

war.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Vajpayee’s 1998 decision has been depicted as a

complex mixture of motives. In light of a rising Pakistan, the decision of the Vajpayee

government appears to be a classic security driven response (Paul 2002, 1998). Yet

domestic politics attains some amount of footing in explaining the decision given the

agenda of Vajpayee’s Hindi-nationalist oriented BJP Party in demonstrating the country’s

scientific prowess and serving as a point of national pride increasing India’s international

prestige (Kampani 1998). In particular, the role of nationalism has been recently

examined and credited as a significant motivating factor for Vajpayee (Hymans 2006).

The wealth of explanations for the Indian decisions points to the crux of the

problem confronting the existing proliferation models—there are too many explanations.

None alone is sufficient in explaining the proliferation outcomes. The result is a muddled

picture and uncertainty as to the motivations for Indian’s proliferation experiences.

While these current explanations offer ample “opportunity,” they lack insights as to the

“willingness” of why these two leaders, unlike their predecessors, made the decision to

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go forward with explicit proliferation acts. Furthermore, that the same explanations are

applied to the Indian decisions seems at odds with the fact that by most accounts the two

leaders in question differed greatly in their personalities and political objectives.

Consequently, the goal of this chapter is twofold. First, both incidents will be

examined and the contending explanatory models explored, establishing their strengths

and weaknesses. Second, the world views and strategic preferences of Gandhi and

Vajpayee will be developed and examined through the lens of the decision-making

framework central to this project. I will re-appraise the efficacy of the various

proliferation explanations in light of this new evidence, determining whether any of these

models provide traction in understanding the Indian proliferation episode. Lastly, in

setting the stage for the inquiry a brief primer on the historic development of the Indian

nuclear program is provided.

The beginnings of the Indian Nuclear program: 1948-1966

While a relatively new state on the international scene gaining independence from

Britain in 1947, India had by the time of the 1974 PNE one of the most developed nuclear

energy programs of any country. Almost immediately upon the birth of the nation, Indian

leaders recognized the potential of nuclear energy and its potential to drive development.

The importance placed on the development of an indigenous nuclear energy program

extended far beyond basic resources needs. For India’s elites, “the capacity to master the

atom represented modernity, potential prosperity, transcendence of the colonial past,

individual and national prowess, and international leverage” (Perkovich 1999:13).46 As

46 For an authoritative history of the development of the India nuclear program and the political debate
surrounding it, Perkovich (1999) offers an exhaustive examination weighing in at nearly 600 pages of text
and noted references.

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one of the first policy actions, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru introduced the 1948

Atomic Energy bill to create the new Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The

importance of this enterprise was demonstrated by the fact that the entire sector was

nationalized with ownership of all raw materials reverting to the state and granting the

state-run AEC a complete monopoly over nuclear energy affairs. Indeed the Indian

nuclear science community is older than the state itself. Having sent its most promising

young scientists for training in the universities in Great Britain, India found itself with a

large number of highly trained scientists in the area of nuclear physics. Most prominent

among these individuals was Homi Bhabha, who earned a PhD in physics from

Cambridge University in 1935 and eventually headed India’s fledgling Atomic Energy

Commission overseeing its rapid growth.

From the beginning, the nuclear program’s aim was the development peaceful

nuclear energy. Prime Minister Nehru had tied the development of peaceful nuclear

energy with his emphasis on international disarmament (Abraham 1998). Nehru

understood the inevitable intersection of peaceful and weapons uses of atomic energy, but

actively sought to cast the program strictly in terms of peaceful, civilian usage. However,

no absolute rejections of the potential military applications of the technology were made.

This ambiguity as to the India nuclear program was increased given the immediate

secrecy used to shield the work of the AEC as established by the 1948 Act.47 The

secrecy extending over the program was far more elaborate than that for either the British

or American programs. In further emphasizing the priority given to the program, it was

47 Nehru in responding to critics asserted that the need for secrecy rested in the fact that the state needed to
protect its fledgling program, its knowledge and resources from the potential interference and exploitation
from the industrialized countries.

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placed directly under the authority of the prime minister who would oversee the AEC and

related entities.

While resistant to the calls made by countries like the US to internationalize

control over atomic energy and fuels during the 1950s, India did avail itself of

international cooperation such as the Atomic Plowshare program. In particular, India

developed close ties with both the US and Canada. From 1955 to 1974 India sent 1,104

scientists and engineers just to the Argonne Laboratory in the US alone (Perkovich1999).

Meanwhile, the Canadian government provided fuel and joint development of the RAPS-

I natural uranium reactor (CANDU reactor) in Rajasthan. Despite the significant level of

international cooperation from the likes of the US, Britain, and Canada, by the end of the

1950s, the India nuclear program had failed to meet its own lofty expectations. Not only

had the AEC not yet been able to build an “Indian” reactor, but the development of

nuclear energy capacity had not translated to overall economic development for the

country. This was also in spite of the significant level of resources devoted to the

program by the state. However, there was relatively little debate over the spiraling costs

of the program. In fact, with the advocacy of Bhabha, along with Nehru’s unflagging

support, the program continued unabated with the Lok Shaba passing, with little debate,

the revised Atomic Energy Act of 1962, further increasing the state’s control over nuclear

activities.

As the Indian nuclear program developed so, too, did its prospects of developing

nuclear weapons capability. At the same time mixed signals regarding the intention of the

India program persisted. In 1961, Nehru announced that the program could, if it wanted,

make atomic weapons “within the next two to three years,” although he added the caveat

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that “absolutely under no circumstances shall we do so” (Perkovich 1999:38). The

inclusion of new language in the 1962 Act clouded the issue as the state was charged with

engaging in nuclear activities “for other peaceful purposes and for matters connected

therewith.” The additional language, and for other matters connected therewith, was seen

as a change in course opening the door to the possibility of nuclear deterrence (Abraham

1998). This growing uncertainty about the future of the Indian nuclear program was

occurring at the same time India was a vocal proponent of various universal disarmament

measures.

Alongside this increasing nuclear ambiguity, unfolding events throughout the

1960s would highlight India’s security concerns. Fall 1962 marked the outbreak of

military conflict with the Peoples’ Republic of China over the disputed Sino-Indian

border. The tensions that had been building regarding the Ladakh territory boiled over

with the Chinese army overrunning Indian forces in the region on October 20th. The

venture turned into a humiliating rout of the Indian military, ended only by a unilaterally

imposed ceasefire by the Chinese, who in the end vacated the territory it had occupied in

the action. Roundly seen as a debacle for the Indian military, exposing its deficiencies,

the government would nearly double the defense budget for 1963-64 with military

spending accounting for nearly 28 percent of the national budget (Perkovich 1999:46).

More importantly, the incident fueled public debate over the need to develop an India

nuclear deterrent capability. From a capabilities standpoint, the Indian nuclear

community appeared headed towards giving the country a bomb option. However, Nehru

continued to resist such overt pursuit of nuclear weapons. Despite mounting political

pressures, he maintained that such action would undercut India’s diplomatic efforts to get

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the nuclear weapons states to stop testing. For the time being India’s nuclear policy

remained largely unchanged, continuing along its uncertain path where on the one hand

developing its technical wherewithal while on the other avoiding any explicit political

decision.

In large measure the duality of India’s nuclear policy resulted from the imposing

presence of the two principal architects of the country’s nuclear efforts: Bhabha and

Nehru. Not surprisingly then, the death of Nehru on May 27, 1964 brought with it a

reappraisal of nuclear policy. In the face of a new prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri,

who was a neophyte as to India’s nuclear program, Bhabha’s influence in the absence of

Nehru began to sway policy. Furthermore, events in the region would reignite the debate

over nuclear policy.

On October 16, 1964, China exploded a nuclear device. Still smarting over the

disastrous border clash with the Chinese just two years before, the Chinese atomic test

gave pause to Indian leaders. Directly following the Chinese test, Bhabha announced in a

nationally broadcasted radio address that India could produce a weapon with 18 months

and at a relatively low cost. Moreover, he specifically discussed the strategic nature and

deterrent power of atomic weapons.48 Advocates favoring the development of nuclear

weapons seized upon Bhabha’s statement especially as to the ease for the country to

develop such capabilities. However, the shift in policy would by no means happen

48 As to both the date and cost of developing a testable weapon, Bhabha was extremely optimistic to the
point of misleading as to the relative swiftness and ease of producing a testable device. As Perkovich
(1999) notes the calculation of 18 months appears to have no basis in fact given that the AEC had, at the
time of the radio address, yet to acquire any weapons grade materials. Further, there had not been any
systematic analysis as to the potential costs. The projected costs appeared to have derived strictly from
Bhabha’s own personal estimates.

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overnight; a growing food shortage in the country dominated much of the government’s

focus.

Furthermore, Shastri, like many Indian leaders of his generation, took his political

cues from the examples of Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru. For him, the debate over

developing nuclear arms was at odds with the political legacies of Gandhi and Nehru

concerning non-violence and disarmament. In the face of mounting political pressure

even from within his own party, Shastri could no longer adhere to the status quo. After

nearly two months of debate in the Lok Sabha, a new course was charted for India’s

nuclear program. Given the personal disposition of Shastri, the policy chosen was a

halfway measure; moving away from Nehru’s avoidance of an overt test yet far from the

clear cut adoption of a weapons program encouraged by Bhabha. The result was a policy

which authorized going forward with the means to conduct a “peaceful” nuclear test, but

without explicit authorization for carrying out such a test. While couched so to be

consistent with Shastri’s views, it is unclear if the prime minister realized the artificial

nature of this distinction in labeling the test as “peaceful.” As Perkovich (1999) notes, it

is unlikely that this contradiction was lost on Bhabha who appears to have gotten exactly

what he had wanted—authorization to proceed towards testing. The path towards testing

was further reinforced by escalating tensions over Kashmir, culminating in open

hostilities between India and Pakistan in August 1965.

Fate would again intervene in India’s nuclear path, however. Within two weeks

both Shastri (January 10, 1966) and Bhabha (January 24, 1966) would die unexpectedly.

Not only were the architects of the new nuclear policy gone, but with the sudden passing

of Bhabha, the leading voice of the Indian nuclear program was lost. Nehru’s daughter,

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Indira Gandhi, was elected prime minister. She faced a steep learning curve regarding

the nuclear program, as it is unclear what prior knowledge she might have possessed.

Nevertheless, in becoming the prime minister, she became head of the country’s nuclear

activities like her predecessors. It is with a terrible sense of irony then that Bhabha’s

death occurred on the same day she was sworn-in, at the time when she might have most

relied on his advice for the nuclear program. Consequently, Indira Gandhi took over the

Indian nuclear program largely as a blank slate. While Shastri and Bhabha had laid out a

path, it was far from irreversible. It would be Indira Gandhi who would take her country

across the nuclear threshold in authorizing the 1974 detonation.

The path to a “peaceful” Indian nuclear test

In attempting to explain Gandhi’s proliferation decision authorizing the 1974 PNE

three models have been commonly applied. Given Indian concerns over a nuclear armed

China and continuing tensions with Pakistan, the country’s actions are viewed as

motivated by security needs given these external threats. Increasingly, however, the

rationale for Gandhi’s decision is seen to stem from internal domestic politics factors.

On the one hand, there were strong intra-governmental politics at work given the

increasing size of the AEC’s programs and building momentum for a test. On the other

hand, the proliferation decision is depicted as a calculated move of diversionary politics

by Gandhi in the face of growing domestic unrest and political opposition to her

government (Sagan 1996-97).

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 The Security Model: nuclear weapons make the best neighbors

At first glance, India’s security situation leading up to the 1974 tests appears to

offer abundant justification for viewing the actions of Gandhi as a reaction to external

threats. Tensions with neighboring China and Pakistan, periodically manifesting in open

conflict were a constant concern throughout the 1960s. The Indian military fiasco against

the Chinese along the northeast border area in 1962 was still a lingering memory.

Concerns over conventional military capabilities vis-á-vis China were further heightened

by the successful Chinese atomic test in 1964. Meanwhile, Gandhi’s rise to power came

directly on the heels of the negotiated cease-fire with Pakistan ending the 1965 border

conflict.

Indian security concerns of the time must also be viewed in the broader global

context as well. Committed to its policy of non-alignment, India walked a fine line in

trying to separate itself from the two superpowers and their respective spheres of

influence. Relations with the US would become particularly strained given its seemingly

unqualified support for rival Pakistan while offering much more tepid support for India.

Accordingly, the security model explanation has focused on both the regional and

international aspects of the country’s security. Each of these security environments have

been portrayed as leading India down the path of proliferation and, in accordance with

neorealist thinking, would drive any state similarly situated to develop a nuclear deterrent

capability (Paul 1998). However, in further examining the nature of India’s security

situation and the nature of the decision-making surrounding the 1974 test, numerous

problems emerge with an explanation grounded in the security model.

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 The threat of a nuclear capable China is often pointed to as a reason for India’s

pursuit of nuclear weapons. Despite indications pointing to an imminent Chinese test,

Indian leaders were still taken by surprise over the event. The Chinese test undeniably

influenced the debate over the development of an Indian nuclear deterrent capability.

However, explaining the delayed reaction of the Indian government is problematic for the

security model. If the Chinese threat was so considerable why did Indian leaders wait a

decade before conducting their own test? While reluctantly authorizing the AEC to

proceed with the initial steps towards a future test, the Shastri government expended great

effort in seeking out nuclear guarantees from the superpowers. In summarizing the Sino-

Indian situation, Abraham writes:

Under the implicit codes of the contemporary international

system, an Indian nuclear test would have been read as a
straightforward and appropriate response to Chinese nuclear
tests from 1964 onward. Additionally, given the state of
American and Soviet relations with China, an Indian nuclear test
at that moment would have hardly had the international response
it was to have a decade later; indeed, an Indian test in 1966
would have been conducted with tacit superpower approval. Yet
no Indian bomb followed. How do we make sense of this?
(1998:127).

The troubled relationship between India and Pakistan is well documented. By the

time of Gandhi’s government, the two countries had already clashed twice (1947-1949

and 1965-1966) over the contested Kashmir region. This relationship would reach the

boiling point again in December, 1971, over the disputed independence of Bangladesh

(former East Pakistan). The singular and cumulative impact of these incidents on India’s

proliferation 1974 decision remains unclear however.

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 The historical record shows that after both the 1965-66 and 1971 conflicts,

debates in the Lok Sahba addressed the need for Indian nuclear capabilities. Opponents of

the security model highlight that both times this debate was short-lived. Notably the

debate occurring in the aftermath of the 1965-66 campaign was quelled in part by input

from India’s defense community. At that time the Director of the Institute for Defense

Studies and Analysis, Major-General Som Dutt, asserted that development of a nuclear

weapons program would not alleviate India’s security concerns and would likely

undermine the county’s security interests (Perkovich 1999). Then again after the 1971

conflict, political debate was stunted in part by the nature of India’s overwhelming

victory over the Pakistani military. While the earlier conflicts were relative stalemates,

the 1971 conflict was viewed as a resounding military victory for India. The necessity of

a nuclear deterrent was diminished in light of the demonstrable conventional military

superiority over Pakistan.

Like the alleged Chinese threat, several questions remain unanswered by the

security model regarding the Pakistani threat. First, if Pakistan presented such a critical

threat to Indian security interests why was it that no definitive proliferation action taken

until 1974? Second, following the 1971 victory, which revealed both a qualitative and

quantitative military edge, why should India change the nature of the arms race between

the two states from a conventional to an unconventional one? Such a shift would seem to

be self-defeating from an Indian strategic context. Indeed historical reports indicate that

Pakistan’s efforts in obtain its own nuclear arsenal were greatly accelerated after the 1974

PNE.

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 Further clouding India’s security situation was its complicated relationships with

the two superpowers caused by its policy of nonalignment. Most problematic was the

seemingly unqualified US support given to rival Pakistan. This was a particular sore spot

for Indian leaders, as US military aid was perceived as serving to embolden the

Pakistani’s in their disputes with India. This situation would come to a head during the

Gandhi government during the 1971 war. As India prepared to invade (western)

Pakistan, the US intervened to stop the Indians from toppling the government in

Islamabad. Notably, the Nixon administration sent a naval task force led by the carrier

USS. Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal to further convey their demand that the Indians

cease offensive operations. The Enterprise incident would linger in the minds of many

Indian leaders signifying the need to develop the capabilities to deal not only with

regional threats, but also the superpowers (Thomas 2002; Paul 2002).

Nevertheless, given the real and perceived threats facing the country, casting

Gandhi’s proliferation decision as one motivated by security concerns is complicated by

the nature of the decision-making process. In the series of meeting leading up to

Gandhi’s decision, no senior military officials participated in the discussions. As for the

discussions in going forward with the test, there is no recollection of those present

pointing to discussion of military and strategic considerations. As will be detailed here

below, the nature of the discussions appeared focused on technological concerns and

capabilities in going forward with the test. Indeed, the historical account shows that the

military was not consulted, but rather was informed of the final decision only 10 days

before and only because of the fact that a military base would be used for the test (Sagan

1996-97).

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 Domestic organizational politics model: India’s Atomic Cult

Following the sudden death of Prime Minister Shastri, the Congress Party again

faced the dilemma of choosing a leader to succeed the Nehru legacy. In picking Nehru’s

daughter the party sought to link back to that legacy. However, they were not seeking

another strong willed powerful figure; she was chosen precisely because she was not

viewed in such terms. Rather Gandhi was seen as a candidate with political legitimacy

due to her family ties, but also someone that could be controlled by the party leadership

while also to thwart the rise of another ambitious party member, Morarji Desai

(Mansingh 1984). Despite low expectations in 1966, Gandhi would become a powerful

force in Indian politics serving as prime minister until 1977 and again from 1980 until her

assassination in 1984. Internationally, she would become the very symbol of her country

much in the same way as her father.

As to the nuclear program and the test detonation in 1974 at Pokhran, the decision

was Gandhi’s alone to make, but it is unclear if she truly desired the test and whether it

reflected her own policy preference. Mansingh (1984) contends that “Ms. Gandhi was

persuaded to authorize a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) if only to keep the Indian

scientists happy” (59). This belief, that the decision to test was not wanted by Gandhi, is

supported by the fact that in the aftermath of the PNE no significant efforts to develop an

explicit Indian nuclear deterrent would materialize until the 1998 tests. However, the

subsequent criticism and sanctions imposed by the international community and

particularly its principal nuclear partners, the US and Canada, may also have served as a

disincentive in further pursuing weaponization.

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 The fact that the Gandhi government insisted on calling the 1974 test a “peaceful

explosion” appears indicative of a situation where the motivations for the test were

uncertain. The explosion foreclosed the country’s longstanding policy to maintain

diplomatic options and flexibility concerning nuclear weapons. Peaceful or not, the

explosion underscored India’s ability to build nuclear weapons (Moshaver 1990). If the

explosion was based on military needs, the device exploded was ill-suited for military use

as it was relatively crude and exceeded any practical delivery platform. Further

development aimed at constructing a device of greater military utility could have been

performed without the test. The effort to label the test as a peaceful nuclear detonation

has been characterized as “a compromise between the diplomatic option and a weapons

programme” (Moshaver 1990:45).

From an organizational politics model vantage point, the Indian nuclear

community, as nurtured by Nehru and Bhabha, had developed into a significant

institutional player. It was viewed as the show piece for the country’s economic

modernization. The nuclear program had received over half of all of the government’s

research and development spending starting in the 1960s (Moshaver 1990). That the

prime minister was the head of the state’s nuclear industry further served to enhance its

status and influence.

As one commentator notes, the nuclear energy community “became a government

within a government” (Moshaver 1990:51). This perception was heightened by the

secrecy insured by the 1948 and later 1962 Atomic energy bills. There was neither public

debate as to the future direction of the program nor accountability to anyone other than

the prime minister. The AEC was “fully insulated from all scrutiny” allowing them to

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“reassess their position, reorient their objectives, and consolidate their influence”

(Abraham 113). Portrayed as a symbol of Indian development, a virtual cult came into

being, populated by both scientists and politicians, obsessed with the success of the

program with the goal of maintaining its elevated status serving to further politicize the

program (Moshaver 1990). As global attitudes on potential civilian applications of

nuclear energy waned, the Indian nuclear community needed continuing justification. A

nuclear test provided just such justifications, particularly in light of the ongoing

difficulties in obtaining targets for energy production. The policy shift by the Shastri

government allowing the AEC to take the necessary steps leading up to a nuclear

detonation provided such a raison d’état. In recognizing the prime minister’s

reservations over atomic weapons, it was then AEC head Bhabha who sought to frame

the nature of the discussion by labeling the future test as a “peaceful” rather than military

one.

The AEC, and the nuclear establishment in general, was the largest proponent

within the government favoring a nuclear weapons program. Certainly, Bhabha had

vocally supported and made an argument for such a program on numerous occasions after

the Chinese test in 1964. With his death some of the momentum for pushing forward with

a nuclear weapons program diminished. Nevertheless, with the previous policy

established by the short-lived Shastri government the AEC had begun preparations for a

peaceful detonation. However, the pending change in AEC leadership would shift the

organization’s priorities deemphasizing the PNE. The importance of AEC leadership in

setting the organizational agenda serves to underscore the domestic politics explanation

while also accounting for the delayed reaction to the 1964 Chinese test.

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 As Bhabha’s successor, Gandhi chose Vikram Sarabhai to head the AEC. He did

not share his predecessor’s enthusiasm for a nuclear weapons program and disputed both

the ease and cost at which such a project could be had. Specifically, as to the cost of the

program, unlike Bhabha, he noted that such a weapons program would require a “total

commitment of national resources” which he saw as unwise given other more pressing

national needs (Moshaver 1990:37). Unlike Bhabha, who fully embraced the military

potential of India’s nuclear program, Sarabhai sought to more clearly demarcate the

limits of the program, specifically eschewing the pursuit of military applications. During

his period of leadership, movement on the PNE was held in relative check with

preliminary work continuing, but no action taken to pursue a specific test date. His goals

for the future development of the country’s space and nuclear programs were spelled out

in the official report he released in 1970 entitled Atomic Energy and Space Research: A

profile for the decade 1970-1980. Nowhere in the report did it mention the development

of nuclear weapons or of a need to conduct a PNE (Perkovich 1999). Sarabhai’s impact

over India’s nuclear community was cut short, however, by his unexpected death on

December 30, 1971.

With his passing, the Indian nuclear community was again at a crossroads.

Throughout its history the organization “had always been dominated by a single figure”

(Abraham 1998:134). Its two leaders, Bhabha and Sarabhai, had been influential in

moving the nuclear agenda forward, although both had very different conceptions of how

nuclear weapons might fit into this future. As Sarabhai’s successor, Gandhi picked Homi

Setha who had come into the nuclear program under Bhabha and was one of the

remaining scientists who had in essence been mentored by Bhabha. Not surprisingly, the

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course he would lay out for the nuclear program would be more akin to his mentor’s and

he was much more comfortable with the potential military ramifications of the program.

For Setha the development of nuclear weapons was not a matter of cost/benefit analysis,

but rather as a matter of proving Indian technical prowess and power (Perkovich 1999).

The discourse surrounding the nuclear program had shifted once again. “The AEC was no

longer in the business of institutional innovation: it was time to hold on to what was in

place and look for strategies of institutional maintenance” (Abraham 1998:137). One of

these strategies was the reconsideration of conducting a PNE.

By the end of 1971 there was renewed momentum for nuclear testing. With the

removal of Sarabhai’s opposition to conducting a nuclear test, the new leadership

vigorously pursued the PNE and placed it at the top of the organization’s agenda. The

debates among the various government agencies show the AEC as the strongest

institutional advocate while the External Affairs Ministry was the leading voice of

opposition.49 Even as this debate was ongoing, technicians and scientists continued their

work finalizing the bomb design including its electronic and explosive trigger. As one

commentator notes, while there might have been debate continuing at the highest levels

of government, at least for the nuclear scientists though the decision of going forward

was fait accompli (Abraham 1998). As one leading Indian advisor stated, “it [the final

decision] was to be merely a formality as the preparations had advanced to such an extent

that we could not have retraced our steps” (Ramanna 1991). Yet, in examining the

driving forces behind the test, Moshaver (1990) notes that by the early 1970s serious

49 Adding to the organizational model explanation crediting the nuclear community as responsible for the
test is the fact that the Indian military was largely absent from the early discussions and was not directly
involved in the program until needed for its explosive expertise for the device trigger and the use of a
military base in the scarcely populated Pokhran area.

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doubt had been cast on the utility of nuclear explosions for civilian purposes undercutting

the proffered Indian rationale for the PNE.

Rather than the result of a single decision, the 1974 PNE is viewed as a series of

actions which laid the groundwork for the eventual test (Perkovich 1999). True to

bureaucratic incrementalism, the decision was comprised of a series of necessary steps,

where at any point in time the entire process could have been derailed had the Gandhi

government seen fit. Nonetheless, final authorization was at the discretion of the prime

minister. When time came for the final decision, it was Indira Gandhi’s alone to make.

It is telling that of the small circle of advisors consulted by Gandhi, three of the

five would come directly from the scientific and nuclear community.50 The main

argument raised to Gandhi by one scientist was that “given the expense, time, and the

critical stage the experiment had reached” it was impossible to postpone the test

(Ramanna 1991). Meanwhile, non-scientist members of the advisory group raised

concern over possible economic risks. Despite warnings as to potential consequences in

going forward with a test, this group underestimated the blowback.51 This failure to

properly account for international backlash would serve to impede and derail India’s

nuclear program for years to come. The test, which was so forcefully advocated by the

nuclear community as a matter of scientific progress and symbolism, would have a

paradoxical effect. Instead of a series of tests and the development of a nuclear deterrent

50 According to Dr. Ramanna, the group of advisors meeting with Gandhi leading up to her decision
comprised of himself, P.N. Haksar, the former principle secretary to the prime minister, D.P. Dhar, the
incumbent principal secretary, Homi Setha, head of the AEC, and Dr. B.D. Nag Chaudhuri, scientific
adviser to the defense minister.
51 The subsequent reactions from both the American and the Canadian should not have surprised the Indian
government given that the US government said that it would not distinguish between a “peaceful” and
“non-peaceful” explosion. Meanwhile the Canadian prime minister had written Ms. Gandhi explicitly
stating that the use of any materials supplied by Canada in any test explosion would be treated as a
violation of the nuclear cooperation agreement.

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capability, the future of India as a full-fledged nuclear weapon state would be put on hold

until the 1990s as Gandhi rejected any further nuclear tests.

The lack of a strategic rationale, diminishing justification of civilian applications,

and the picture of building institutional pressures combine in making a strong case for the

domestic organizational politics model. Yet, even those who met with Gandhi to discuss

the PNE have no particular insight into her thinking. An authoritative explanation proves

illusive as not a single piece of paper detailing the decision-making process exists.

Accounts of the meetings indicate that the prime minister was silent throughout, asked no

questions, and never offered any explanation for her decision (Sagan 1996-97). Whatever

calculations she made in reaching her decision are unknown. However, in light of the

growing domestic unrest in the country directly before the PNE, a secondary domestic

politics explanation has surfaced. This explanation argues that the 1974 test was

conducted as a political diversion by Gandhi to draw attention away from mounting

domestic turmoil and dim political outlook.

Domestic Politics Explanation: Gandhi’s Diversionary Atomic Bomb

The notion that Gandhi’s decision authorizing the May 1974 PNE was the result

of domestic political calculations focuses on the question of the timing of her decision. If

a PNE was desired by the government it could have conducted the test earlier. However,

the progression towards the PNE appears as one of fits-and-starts, the idea that to the

May 1974 test was inevitable appears little supported by the historical records.

Meanwhile, the diversionary politics hypothesis points to the combination of the nature

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of the decision-making process and the surrounding domestic situation at the time as

offering a proper explanation for the proliferation decision.52

As mentioned earlier, Gandhi reached her decision following a series of meetings

with an extremely small group of scientific and personal advisors. Notably absent from

these meetings were senior leaders from either the military or ministry of external affairs.

The absence of the military is seen as reinforcing the conclusion that the decision was not

grounded in strategic calculations. As noted above, the military was neither consulted as

to how nuclear weapons would be integrated into military planning, nor what sorts of

deployment requirements they might have for such a device. The Ministry of External

Affairs was even further removed from the deliberations as the Foreign Minister was only

advised of the test a mere 48 hours beforehand (Sagan 1996-97). The lack of foreign

ministry involvement is all the more puzzling given clear indications that a detonation

would have international ramifications. Furthermore, as Indian officials claimed the PNE

was for advancing India nuclear science and potential civilian applications, it is curious

that there was no discussion of the need for follow-up tests. There was no systematic

plan for how to proceed after the test—the PNE was an end unto itself. The final

decision appears significantly flawed given the lack of input from other ministries, scarce

debate about potential international reaction, and failure to implement meaningful follow-

up. These shortcomings support to the contention that the apparent haste and quickness

52 Building on the work Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) the diversionary hypothesis develops the idea of
adopting much harsher tactics against out-group members as a strategy to maintain cohesive identity with
the opponent in a conflict. A society in a conflict is extremely hospitable, cooperative and helpful toward
in-group members but can be rude, exploitative, and hostile toward out-group members. See Pruitt and
Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (2004). In terms of the relationship between
foreign and domestic policy, the external foe becomes a scapegoat since internal problems are either
blamed on the external opponent, or leaders use military force to divert the attention from the internal
situation (Cashman 1993).

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in reaching a final decision suggests that it was made with a focus “more on immediate

political concerns rather than on longer-term security or energy interests” (Sagan, 1996-

97:67).53

That political considerations may have trumped other concerns at the time is easy

to conceive given the domestic situation in India in early 1974. Economically, the

country experienced inflation of 30 percent between 1973 and 1974. Prices for goods

were climbing at double digit rates, unemployment continued to rise, and there were

ongoing food shortages throughout the country. The promise of economic development

and prosperity was by the early 1970s still unrealized as over 40 percent of the population

lived at or below the poverty level. Marches and protests against the government were a

daily occurrence. Just in one city alone, Bombay, there were over 12,000 recorded

strikes and sit-ins during 1972 and 1973 (Perkovich 1999:168). Government policy was

at a loss to resolve these problems as it too lacked sufficient funds to stimulate growth

and investment. Public dissatisfaction with the government was extremely high.

Clearly, the shine of Gandhi’s sweeping electoral victory in 1970 and the 1971

military victory over rival Pakistan had faded. Rifts emerged within Gandhi’s Congress

Party in light of the domestic troubles and accommodation with the Communist Party.

While maintaining its national control, the party suffered losses in several state elections.

This was seen as a major setback for the party that had dominated Indian politics since

independence. At the beginning of 1974 widespread rioting erupted in the state of

Gujarat, home of the major opposition party, and continued for months. The situation

53 Although not cited by Sagan, the claim borrows from the hypothesis conceived by John Muller in his
work War, Presidents and Public Opinion (1973) which develop the so-called “rally-round-the-flag effect”
where national leaders can seek out crisis or bold action, including dramatic technological developments, to
foster and develop public support.

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was so bad that Gandhi gave into demands and dissolved the state parliament. Nationally,

a railroad workers’ strike occurred in May involving 1.7 million workers. The

government in seeking to end the strike reacted strongly braking up protests across the

country and arresting nearly 20,000 strikers. The rail workers strike and the government

crackdown were still ongoing on May 18th as the test at Pokhran was carried out.

In analyzing the situation surrounding Ms. Gandhi, Perkovich writes,

“indisputably the prime minster was thoroughly beleaguered. [I]t would have been

unnatural for any politician not to concentrate on her political standing when considering

whether to authorize an act as dramatic as a PNE” (1999:175). Indeed the news of the

test brought a surge in Indian public support for the government and the prime minister.

The test, in evidencing the country’s scientific achievement, buoyed national pride

despite the otherwise gloomy domestic predicament. Opinion polls taken a month after

the test reported that 90 percent of Indians were “personally proud” of the achievement

(Sagan 1996-97:68). Public approval of Gandhi rose by over a third, lifting her from her

all time low in public approval recorded just three months prior. Both domestic media

reports and even political opponents celebrated the news casting the test as lifting India’s

prestige and ranking in the international community. This boost in popularity would

prove fleeting, however, as by September 1974 Gandhi’s approval rating sunk to

historical lows given persisting domestic problems.54

The immediate aftermath of the test provides proponents of the diversionary

politics explanation with strong supporting evidence. However, rather than providing

54Several studies on the nature and duration of the rally effect have examined how significant gains in
popularity prove to be very short-lived and even reversing to below event popularity level (Hertherington
and Nelson 2003; Curren, Schubert, and Stewert 2002; Callaghan and Virtanen 1993). Baker and O’Neal
(2001) claim that the size and duration of increases in popularity are influence by the combination lack of
opposition and media criticism.

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indisputable evidence in support of this hypothesis, the circumstances offer indirect

support by further discrediting the security and organizational politics motivations.

Despite claims by some domestic sources that the test gave India membership into the

“nuclear weapons club,” Ms. Gandhi specifically commented that the explosion was part

of continuing research and that India was “firmly committed to only peaceful uses of

atomic energy” (Perkovich 1999:178). This sentiment was repeated by a public

statement issued by the AEC directly after the test which stated India “had no intention of

producing nuclear weapons” (Perkovich 1999:178). Subsequent inaction in developing

military capabilities reinforces the perception that security motivations were unimportant.

More importantly, rather than leading to a golden age for the Indian nuclear community,

Gandhi subsequently refused to authorize any additional tests.55 Later accounts assert

that she felt she had been misled and that upon reflection she questioned the merit of the

test (Perkovich 1999). Nevertheless, the 1974 test would forever change Indian nuclear

policy. Following the 1974, India would adopt a “nuclear option” strategy whereby it

possesses the capability if security demands required it, but would otherwise refrain from

developing military capabilities. This middle of the road policy would continue until

1998.

A Hindu Bomb: Examining the proliferation decision of A.B. Vajpayee

More than twenty years of Indian nuclear weapons ambiguity was swiftly and

demonstrably ended by nuclear tests conducted at the Pokhran test site on May 18, 1998.

The series of five tests was authorized by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee whose

55 While characterized at the time as a success, later revelations point to the fact that the test experienced
several significant problems including a less than expected energy yield as well as the venting of fallout
into the atmosphere (Perkovich 1999).

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government had come to power just two months before. Unlike the mixed signals of the

1974 detonation with its label as a “peaceful” test, these tests were unequivocal

demonstrations of Indian mastery of the atom for weapons use. However, like the 1974

test, the underlying motivation for the 1998 decision to cement Indian’s nuclear weapons

status is the subject of much debate. In an interview shortly after the May tests,

Kushabhau Thakre, president of the BJP, offered his own views on the decision:

It was not only proper but very timely as well. Our neighbors, China
and Pakistan, were equipped with nuclear bombs and China tested
them much earlier. They had armed themselves fully with the
nuclear bombs and also missiles of various ranges. All our
experiences of the past made us think about it and it was decided
boldly to test nuclear bombs. It was very necessary for India to go in
for the tests to modenise [sic] our armed forces and to bring our
arsenal up to date. Our armed forces wanted it. Our scientists had
also thought that we should go for nuclear tests. For some political
reasons, the previous governments dithered and did not order the test
of nuclear devices, perhaps out of fear of the unknown. (Thakur and
Sharma 1999:--).

As indicated by Mr. Thakre’s statement there appear to be numerous plausible

explanations stemming from both the security and domestic politics model.

From a security perspective, Vajpayee’s decision is viewed as an immediate

reaction to Pakistan’s Ghauri missile test carried out in April 1998. More broadly, India

saw itself losing ground both regionally, to Pakistan, and internationally, as compared to

China and the US. Alternatively, domestic politics model advocates assert that by

conducting a successful nuclear test, the Vajpayee government and the BJP Party hoped

to consolidate and strengthen their electoral positions. With the exception of the Rao

government (1991-1996), the country had experience successive weak, coalition

governments since Gandhi’s assassination in 1984. Indeed, Vajpayee would subsequently

become the longest sitting prime minister since Gandhi. The decision also realized a long

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standing political objective of the BJP as well as gratifying the party’s nationalist brand

of politics. Again, as is so often the case in studying proliferation, both explanations shed

some light on the case, but each face a variety of shortcomings in resolving why the

decision was made when it was and by this particular Indian leader.

The Security Model: Wither India?

The end of the Cold War meant a dramatic reversal of fortune for India in terms

of national security. The demise of the Soviet Union left India on the losing side of the

Cold War having aligned itself with the Soviet Union in 1971. Indian was now alone

facing an even more powerful US. For Indian strategic planners there was an inescapable

conclusion, “India was pretty much on its own” (Kapur 2001:204). Even more pressing,

national security concerns regarding regional rivals Pakistan and China were being

exacerbated. As to Pakistan, the decade of the 1980s witnessed even tighter US-China-

Pakistan connections. While US support for rival Pakistan had always been distressing,

the increasing Sino-Pakistan ties were of even greater concern given the nature of the

ongoing cooperation between those countries. Meanwhile, China’s rise posed a

challenge to India’s regional and international position. Lastly, in a broader security

context, renewed international efforts at arms control measures, particularly the extension

of the NPT and signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”), were seen as

potentially foreclosing Indian nuclear aspirations (Paul 2002).

As for its troubled relationship with neighboring Pakistan, India’s decision for the

May 1998 test can either be viewed as the culmination of growing concern about its

security situation vis-à-vis Pakistan or an immediate response to recent Pakistani

provocation. As to the former, territorial disputes had plagued the Indo-Pakistan

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relationship. Having already fought on three separate occasions, the two countries only

narrowly averted the outbreak of hostilities in 1990 over Kashmir. While the Indian

military had demonstrated its clear edge over Pakistani forces in 1971, this conventional

superiority was now in question by the early 1990s. The influx of significant military aid

and other assistance by both the Americans and Chinese fueled Indian concerns. During

the Regan Administration, the US provided $3.2 billion in assistance to Pakistan of which

half was devoted to military aid including advanced hardware like the F-16 air superiority

fighter (Ayoob 2000). The perceptions of eroding conventional military superiority

fueled proliferation proponents of the need to re-evaluate Indian nuclear policies

(Ganguly 2000).

While the US-Pakistan relationship had long irritated Indian leaders, the nature

and extent of military cooperation between Pakistan and China was far more alarming.

Since the 1960s, China was Pakistan’s largest supplies of conventional arms. But more

troubling than the transfer of conventional arms was the suspicion that China was

providing assistance to Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programs. The extent of assistance

on the nuclear front was significant both in terms of resources and technological

knowhow. As one observer reports:

China became the major supplier of nuclear know-how and

hardware [to Pakistan] in a bid to counter India’s military
capabilities. Chinese assistance included the provision of
weapons-grade uranium, technical information on uranium
enrichment, and help in setting up the Kahuta ultracentrifuge
uranium enrichment plant which became operational in the
mid-1980s. (Ahmend 1999:186).

The US government nevertheless turned a blind eye to these activities despite its own

intelligence which estimated that Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons capability by the

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late 1980s. Meanwhile, US sanctions against India put in place following the 1974 PNE

were still actively enforced. The purposive acts and omissions by China and the US

regarding their relationship with Pakistan was seen by Indian leaders as “undermining the

‘natural’ balance of power in the subcontinent so such an extent that it emboldened

Pakistan in the 1990s…”(Ayoob 2000:125).

The most prominent expression of Pakistani boldness was its successful test of the

Ghauri immediate-range ballistic missile on April 6, 1998. Politically, the test was

perceived as a challenge to the newly constituted Vajpayee government. Strategically, the

missile presented a new threat given its ability to be fired from a mobile launch platform

and, by possessing a range of 1,500 km, it could strike any target inside of India. More

troubling, the missile featured the ability of carrying non-conventional as well as

conventional warheads. Subsequently, it became known that the missile was an

adaptation of a Chinese design leading to the conclusion that China either directly

provided it or willing permitted a third-party, presumably North Korea, to transfer it to

Pakistan. The Ghauri test served to further crystallize Indian concerns over Sino-Pakistan

relations, triggering the Indian response leading to the May 18th tests (Ayoob 2000;

Ganguly 2000).

Internationally, India struggled to claim what it perceived to be its rightful

position as one of the leading states in the international system following the Cold War.

The two major hurdles in achieving this status appeared to be China and the US, both of

which were notably nuclear powers. As towards China, India’s concerns went beyond

Beijing’s problematic ties to Islamabad. China presented a challenge to India both in

terms of security and prestige. Kapur (2001) characterizes the relationship between India

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and China during the immediate post-Cold War period as most closely resembling a

ceasefire. Notably, the 1994 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreements, while reducing

tensions, did not resolve the dispute, but instead maintained the status quo. With the push

to modernize the Peoples’ Liberation Army, the conventional military balance between

the two states, began to tilt in China’s favor. Of course, China continued to hold the

advantage in terms of strategic arms. This development was compounded by increasing

Chinese involvement in regional affairs, most notably in the cases of Myanmar and

Nepal. Moreover, Sino-Indian relations were still strained by the unresolved border

dispute which caused of the brief outbreak of hostilities in 1962. Globally, China was

viewed as a rival for international recognition and stature. Indian leaders were perplexed

why it should be that a communist country, which had demonstrated periodic hostilities

towards it regional neighbors, should be afforded the status of a first rate power while

India continued to be seeded in the second tier.

Even India’s relationship with the US remained challenging, just as it had during

the Gandhi government. The country’s bid to remain independent became even more

challenging in light of the perceived US hegemony directly after the Cold War. Indian

strategist could not help but see the challenge presented by the sizable military advantage

the US possessed both in terms of conventional and strategic arms. While the probability

of direct military confrontation was remote, the 1971 USS Enterprise incident persisted

as a reminder for many Indian leaders of the potential for US intervention in the region at

the expense of Indian interests (Paul 2000; Thomas 2000). This concern was further

compounded by the show of force by US military interventions in the Persian Gulf and

the former Yugoslavia. Both incidents vividly demonstrated the vast superiority of the

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US military as well as its ability to project US military power globally (Thomas and

Gupta 2000). The campaign against Serbia especially caught the eye of Indian leaders

given that the action had been taken without any international authorization, such as a

UN resolution, and without any international sanctions (Subrahmanyam 2002). Lastly,

efforts to improve relations were difficult given increasing US interests in developing its

economic ties with China.

Coinciding with the various security challenges facing India, momentum was

building within the international community for arms control measures which might

foreclose India’s future development of a legitimate nuclear force. In the mid-1990s two

significant arms control measures, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), would emerge at the top of the global agenda.

Both agreements presented challenges to India’s continuing nuclear posture. India had

refused to sign the NPT on the grounds that the treaty as written established a system of

nuclear apartheid between the nuclear weapon states (“NWS”) and the non-nuclear

weapons states (“NNWS”). Furthermore, in creating nuclear weapons “haves” and “have

nots,” the treaty did little to require the nuclear weapons states to reduce their arsenals or

offer meaningful security guarantees to the non-nuclear weapons states. Despite these

apparent flaws to the treaty, India remained one of the few non-signatory states to the

NPT. More problematically for India then was the subsequent effort to indefinitely

extend the treaty which was discussed during the 1993 NPT extension talks. While India

persisted with its protests, it now faced the dilemma that future attempts to develop

nuclear weapons might be deemed illegitimate under the treaty. Further, as a non-

signatory it would have no guarantee of nuclear cooperation for civilian purposes as

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specifically provided to NNWS under the treaty.56 Meanwhile, the CTBT, which had

stalled during the Cold War, achieved a breakthrough as the US government, under the

Clinton administration, now favored for the agreement. The international momentum for

the CTBT further pressed India to move away from its existing ambiguous nuclear

posture which it had taken since 1974 (Paul 2000). These developments are seen as

forcing Indian leaders to move away from the country’s middle-of-the-road strategic

position and either move forward with a test or have this strategic avenue subsequently

closed.

Despite the surplus of strategic motivations for India to conduct the 1998 tests, it

is unclear whether these considerations played a significant role in the final decision

made by Vajpayee. As in the case of Gandhi, the decision environment surrounding

Vajpayee appears to undercut the application of the security explanation. Vajpayee and

his defense minister vowed to conduct a strategic review before any decision was made

on India’s nuclear posture, however, the veracity of these statements have been

questioned. Specifically, Perkovich (2002) contends that “in reality the BJP was not

going to proceed so strategically,” and just hours after surviving a no confidence vote on

March 28, Prime Minster Vajpayee authorized going forward with the tests (46). Again,

just as was the case in 1974, no military leaders were involved in the final discussion.

“The decision was not dictated by a national security strategy, because there was none”

(Perkovich 2002:46). Rather, the 1998 decision is characterized as the fulfillment of a

56 In 2005 The United States and Indian signed an agreement to permit US assistance to India’s civilian
nuclear energy program. In addition to lifting a 30 year old ban on US assistance following the 1974 PNE,
the agreement in essence allow India to receive technologies and materials akin to that permitted to non-
nuclear weapon state signatories to the NPT without requiring that India accede to the treaty.

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desire dating back to 1996 when the previous BJP-led government fell to a vote of no

confidence just before being able to authorize any testing.

Critics further point to what they see as the specious security rationales offered by

government officials in justifying the tests. As an initial explanation for the test, the

Vajpayee government asserted that the tests were the result of security concerns

regarding China. However, many argue against this proffered strategic rationale as China

at the time posed an unlikely military threat and, for the Chinese, they faced numerous

other issues of far greater importance then threatening India. Furthermore, Indian

strategic thinking on nuclear strategy prior to 1995 had been sporadic, hardly establishing

anything close to a consensus as to the incorporation of nuclear weapons into Indian

security doctrine (Ollapally 2000). Moreover, the strategic argument is seen as falling

short as “the long-term factors that framed this decision had not significantly changed

since the mid-1960s, nor were the short-term calculations that critical” (Cohen 2000:15).

A key motivation appears to emanate from a political-psychological need by the

BJP to have India be considered a major power on the international stage (Perkovich

2002). While the calculus for power status in the international community was shifting to

economic power, as evidenced by China’s increasing global stature, the explosion of a

nuclear bomb was a far cheaper and faster route in seeking respect and proclaiming

India’s position in the world. Lastly, if indeed the tests sought to solidify India’s security

setting, this state of affairs was short-lived and dramatically upset by the Pakistani

nuclear test conducted 10 days later on May 28th. For many observers, the role of the

BJP, their political philosophy, and their calculations about the domestic political

equation lie at the heart of the 1998 proliferation decision.

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 Domestic Politics: A political test for the BJP

Rather than emanating from external security concerns, some observers see the

decision by Vajpayee as best viewed through the lens of domestic politics. The BJP, and

its predecessor the Jana Sangh Party, had long supported the development of an Indian

nuclear force since the 1964 Chinese test. A major reason for failing to act on their policy

compunction was the fact that other than heading a short-lived 13 day coalition

government in 1996, the BJP had always been in the opposition. The change in the

domestic political dynamics in 1998, with the rise to power of a BJP-led government,

appears to be a significant factor in shaping the decision environment regarding the 1998

proliferation outcome.

On two previous occasions in the 1990s the Indian government appeared on the

verge of going forward with a nuclear test. Successive governments had maintained an

ongoing readiness to test on short notice since 1988 (Kapur 2002). In particular, the Rao

government was readying to conduct a test in 1995, but halted due to warnings by other

countries, chiefly the US, of possible international backlash (Ganguly 2000). The second

occasion was during the brief BJP-led government of 1996 where Vajpayee sat as prime

minister. That 1996 government fell in 10 days to a no confidence motion before any

final decision on testing could be made. It is notable that while six successive

governments had possessed the ability to conduct a test, not until the rise of a successful

BJP-led government was a decision made and carried out. The rising political fortune of

the BJP appears to have finally aligned India nuclear opportunity (i.e. technical prowess)

and willingness (i.e. BJP policy preferences). Even proponents of a security based

explanation recognize the special nature of the BJP noting that:

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 There is an element of truth in the argument that the BJP also saw
the nuclear arena as a place where it could assert its nationalistic
credentials well, and it seemed to have calculated possible electoral
support for such a move (Paul 2002:94).

Stephen Cohen (2000) contends that the fragile status of the multiple coalition

governments ruling the country since 1990 impacted the political context of the decision.

The weaker and fractured nature of the governing coalitions that abounded since 1990

allowed the BJP, with its pro-bomb policy, to attract new followers and assert its policy

preference. Combined with diminishing voices of opposition to nuclear weapons, this

“created an environment in which the decision to go nuclear was domestically politically

acceptable and, perhaps, politically essential for those on the Indian right” (Cohen 2000:

28).

Specifically, for the BJP bringing to fruition a nuclear test was seen as appeasing

internal party rumblings as well as attempting to broaden the party’s electoral success.

Within the party, going forward with a test showed that Vajpayee could deliver on one

party’s key policy platforms. This helped to unify the party which was showing signs of

stress caused by the need to compromise on various policy objectives given the coalition

make-up of the government. As for increasing electoral fortunes, conducting the nuclear

tests provided an immediate policy result which could be taken to the voters in case

another election was soon needed as occurred in 1996 (Cohen 2000). In summing up the

role of the domestic political context, Cohen states, “the bomb tests have important

strategic consequences, but Indian strategic decisions are also at the mercy of an

increasingly tumultuous domestic political system” (2000:31).

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 The speed by which this crucial decision was reached appears to have been

motivated by concerns that the window of opportunity might quickly close on Vajpayee

and the BJP just as it did in 1996. Reports allude to the fact that Vajpayee had made up

his mind to conduct a test in 1996, but deferred given the defeat of that coalition

government to survive an initial vote of confidence measure (Ayoob 2000).

Subsequently, in 1998, having survived an initial vote, Vajpayee wasted no time in

carrying out the tests fearing the possible collapse of his governing coalition. The tests

received overwhelming support from the public after they were conducted. This popular

support was borne out by the fact that nearly every political party came out in support of

the tests, including the Congress Party, the party of Nehru and Gandhi, which was now

the main opposition party (Thomas and Gupta 2000). However, if driven by the thought

of increasing the party’s and government’s status, the lesson of Gandhi in 1974 equally

applied two decades later. The wellspring of public support and any political momentum

won by Vajpayee’s government was extremely fleeting and faded quickly.

However, arguments pointing to the nature of the BJP as central to the

proliferation decision must be tempered and treated with care. A non-BJP government

under Prime Minister Rao had also made an initial decision to conduct a test only to be

ultimately cancelled due to international rather than domestic political pressures (Ganguly

2000). If not for US reconnaissance satellites detecting activities at the Pokhran test site

in 1995, the Rao government may very well have carried out its test. Though offering a

compelling explanation, the problem with the domestic politics explanation is it reliance

on the rising political fortunes of the BJP. The BJP’s rationales for the tests, as attributed

by others and the party’s membership, present intertwined motivations drawing on ideas

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of nationalism, pride, historical security concerns, both regional and global, as well as

immediate external threats.

The World Views and Strategic Preferences of Indian’s Leaders

Studies of the Indian proliferation decisions present the entire range of

proliferation explanations. The surrounding contexts for the two decisions offer ample

opportunity for pointing to numerous factors as potentially decisive to the final outcome.

Again, however, what many of these factors point to are opportunities for proliferation,

but not to the actual willingness—the drive by the specific political actors, Gandhi and

Vajpayee—to cross the proliferation threshold. By applying the interactive decision-

making framework of this project, I hope to clear some of the tress from the forest of

proliferation explanations and whittle down the range of plausible explanations.

What is discovered in developing the world views and resulting strategic

preferences of these two leaders are two very distinct approaches to the world. In the case

of Gandhi there continues to be some degree of uncertainty given a paradoxical result in

light of her world view and the eventual proliferation outcome. Nonetheless, the

developing picture highlights the role of domestic politics while diminishing the

applicability of the security model. Meanwhile, a portrait of Vajpayee emerges, which

while strengthening the hand of the security model, points to a leader inherently

predisposed towards proliferation given his view of the international system.

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Table 6.1. Indian Leaders’ Operational Codes
Norming
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs Gandhi Vajpayee Group
P-1. Nature of Political Universe .391 .294 0.301
(Conflict/Cooperation)
P-2. Realization of Political Values .233 .149 0.147
(Pessimism/Optimism)
P-3. Political Future .161 .195 0.134
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
P-4. Historical Developments .229 .316* 0.224
(Low Control/High Control)
P-5. Role of Chance .963 .924 0.968
(Small Role/Large Role)
I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals .434 .636** 0.401
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-2. Intensity of Tactics .243 .285 0.178
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-3. Risk Orientation .391 .392 0.332
(Averse/Acceptant)

I-4. Timing of Action

a. Conflict/Cooperation .4458 .364 0.503
b. Words/Deeds .443 .471 0.464

I-5. Utility of Means

a. Reward .190 .171 0.157
b. Promise .039 .220** 0.075
c. Appeal/Support .488 .637** 0.468
d. Oppose/Resist .217 .114 0.154
e. Threaten .206* .004 0.034
f. Punish .058 .064 0.112
* indicates significance at the .05 level using a two-tailed test
** indicates significance at the .01 level using a two-tailed test

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 1.25

TYPE A (I-1/P-1) TYPE C

0.75
Vajpayee (Self)
(.724, .546)

Gandhi (Other)
(-.039, .314)
0.25
Gandhi (Self)
(P-4) (.039, .076)

-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
Vajpayee (Other)
(-.724, -.024) -0.25

-0.75

TYPE D TYPE B
-1.25

Figure 6.1. Indian Leaders’ Perceptions of Self and Other

The Operational Code and Strategic Preferences of Indira Gandhi

So what would be the expectations of the world view for Indira Gandhi leading up

to the 1974 PNE? Differing images of this leader emerge from the various historical

accounts. Internationally, her portrait appears as a complex and nuanced composition.

She simultaneously advocated against the use of force in the international system while

practicing her own brand of realpolitik in establishing India’s global position. The Indo-

Soviet Friendship Agreement in 1971 marked a major departure from the policy of

nonalignment and critically impacted US-India relations. At the same time as this bold

policy stroke, however, it is claimed that Gandhi failed to push harder in striking a more

favorable deal with Pakistan after the Indian military victory that same year. On the

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domestic front, by 1974, her government’s position was faltering in the presence of

growing domestic turmoil. Yet, it had been less than three years since her government

had come to power on the crest of a convincing and lopsided electoral win. Just prior to

the electoral victory, she had masterfully engineered an intra-party reformation

solidifying her base of support within the Congress Party.

Perhaps not unexpectedly then, the world view and strategic preferences of India

Gandhi prove equally complex.57 Specifically, one discovers that in terms of her

perception of the strategic interaction between Self and Other the decision to go forward

with a nuclear test appears problematic. The picture that develops appears to further drift

away from a security-based explanation reinforcing the role of domestic politics in the

decision process.

In first developing Gandhi’s operational code what one finds is a leader, who

based on a sampling of public statements, appears quite similar to the average world

leader (Table 6.1). In analyzing her statements from 1968 to 1974 (before the PNE),

Gandhi’s world view shows almost no statistically significant differences. In particular,

as to the master beliefs (P-1, P-4, and I-1) no significant discrepancy is found. Gandhi

appears to view the international system in a relatively cooperative fashion, recognizes

the same degree of future political uncertainty as most leaders, and is similarly

predisposed to use cooperative tactics in achieving her goals. Of note, however, outside

of this relative normalcy, Gandhi’s world view does show a greater propensity (at the .01

level) in the use of threatening tactics with a score of .206 versus the average world

leader score of .034. Nevertheless, as regarding the other more conflictual tactics (i.e.

oppose/resist and punish) no difference is reported.

57 For Gandhi 26 public statements were examined resulting in 1035 coded verbs.

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 As to Gandhi’s leadership type, the calculation of her master beliefs results in

plotting her Self identification as within the Type C quadrant of the Modified Holsti

Typology Matrix (Figure 6.1). As a Type C leader Gandhi is characterized as more

hopeful regarding the ability to avoid conflict, but recognizing the problematic nature of

the permissive, anarchical nature of the international system where a variety of factors

may cause conflict and war. Perhaps in a nod nonalignment, such leaders recognize the

need alter the international system as under the existing state of anarchy the predictability

in attaining one’s goals is low. Yet, such leaders will seek to pursue optimal outcomes

through cooperative frameworks seeking to establish shared goals. Their expected

strategies and tactic reflect their pessimism over historic control and predictability of

outcomes. Type C leaders will tend toward conciliation with others utilizing various

means emphasizing share goals. Given the unpredictability of the international system

escalation is to be delayed as a means of controlling risk of conflict. The anticipated

ordering of Type C leaders’ strategic preferences is Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit.

Overall, as a Type C leader, Gandhi would be expected to be guarded in the

accomplishing political goals and seek to avoid immediate escalation when interacting

with others in the international system.

As for her perception of Other, Gandhi views them as Type A leaders. Similar to

Type C leaders, Type A leaders are more cooperative-oriented and more apt to use

cooperative strategies in pursuing political outcomes in the international system. In

contrast to Type C leaders, Type A leaders see conflict as resulting from

misunderstanding and miscommunications, and therefore it can be potentially eliminated.

Moreover, a distinguishing feature of this leader type is an optimistic view of achieving

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political goals due to one’s ability to shape the future and control historical

developments. This optimism leads to greater willingness to use a variety of strategies

which emphasize shared interest. As a result, the tactical approach utilize by these

leaders is characterized by endeavoring to prevent escalation, a willingness to negotiate

and compromise, and make the use of force a last resort. Accordingly, the strategic

preference ordering for Type A leaders reflect their desire to achieve settlement and

avoid confrontation whereby their ordering script is Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit.

Table 6.2. Gandhi’s Perceptions of Self and Other

Modified Holsti
Holsti Strategic Preference TIP TIP Strategic
Type Ordering Proposition Preferences

Self Type C Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit #2 Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

Other Type A Settle>Deadlock>Deadlock>Submit #2 Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

However, in establishing the strategic preference ordering in accordance with

TIPs framework what one finds is that Gandhi’s perceptions of Self and Other results in

slight modifications of the ordering. Based on the data, Gandhi expresses relatively

similar views as to Self and Other regarding their orientation towards the international

environment and degree of control over historical developments. Such similarity is

reflected by the relatively close proximity of her plotted scores for Self and Other as

shown in Figure 6.1 above. For both, Gandhi perceives Self and Other as being more

cooperative-oriented (+) in their world views. Further, neither is seen as possessing any

greater level of control over historical development (=) than the average world leader.

Consequently, Self and Other the ordering of their strategic preference expressed as

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Settle> Deadlock> Dominate> Submit. Both are seen to be guided by a tactical approach

resulting in an assurance game.

OTHER OTHER OTHER

CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 4, 4 1, 2 CO Settle Submit CO 4, 4 →| 1, 2

SELF ↓_ ↑ SELF SELF

CF 2, 1 “3, 3” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 2, 1 ← “3, 3”

Self’s Strategy: Move OUTCOMES Other’s Strategy: Move

Game state(s) in quotations indicate the “initial state” for the players
Game state(s) in bold indicate the final state (outcome) of the game
Arrows indicate moves by players, arrows with bars indicate a “non-move”

Figure 6.2. Gandhi’s Subjective Game

The resulting interaction game is a cooperative game as shown in Figure 6.2.

According to Gandhi’s subjective game both Self and Other will strive for a final game

state of “Settle” (“cooperate, cooperate”) were both receive their optimal strategic payoff

(4, 4). This game presents a situation where the initial state does not impact the final

outcome. No matter the initial state of the game, both player will pursue a “move”

strategy so to bring about the “cooperate, cooperate” outcome. The only exception to this

move strategy is of course when the initial state is already at the mutual cooperation

point. Given that both player value settlement over domination outcomes, each will be

willing to what might otherwise be a vulnerable strategy anticipating that the other player

will also move so to achieve the optimal mutual cooperation outcome (4) versus the sub-

optimal dominate (2) or deadlock outcome (3). The combination of image types and the

resulting subjective game displayed by Gandhi is identical to that presented in the

examination of South African Leader F.W. De Klerk whose strategic interaction was also

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characterized as a mutual cooperation game. However, despite the similarities between

these leaders very different proliferation outcomes were produced as Gandhi would start

her country down the proliferation path while De Klerk sought to close the door on his

country’s nuclear aspirations.

The resulting outcome of Gandhi world view and subjective game provides

further evaluation as to the motivations behind the 1974 PNE. Foremost, the nature of

her perceptions of Self and Other and the resulting strategic interaction appears to further

cast doubt on the importance of security concerns in explaining the outcome. The

decision seems to run completely counter to the expected nature of the interactions

between Gandhi and others in the international system. Rather than seeking to control

risks, the PNE was a major gamble that in many ways backfired in terms of the

international system. Indeed, Indian nuclear proliferation resulted in undermining efforts

at cooperation with key countries like the US and Canada. Notably, where Gandhi’s

perception of Other points to conflict as arising out of misunderstanding and

miscommunication, the test sent mixed messages to the international community despite

the government labeling it as a “peaceful” detonation. Specifically, as to neighboring

Pakistan, the PNE is seen as directly motivating subsequent Pakistani governments to

redouble national efforts in developing nuclear capabilities. At the same time, however,

the aftermath of the Indian test reinforces Gandhi’s subjective game as no additional tests

were conducted and it appears no significant advancements were made in developing

India’s nuclear-strategic posture during her tenure.

The picture that emerges of the 1974 PNE is one of an anomalous event detached

from the international environment as perceived by Gandhi at that time. The conclusions

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reached from examining Gandhi’s subjective game leads away from a systemic, security-

based explanation. At the same time, Gandhi’s world views and strategic preferences do

not signify her as a leader predisposed towards the use of force, escalatory tactics, or

driven by a need to accumulate military resources and capabilities. Through a process of

elimination, the foremost explanation for the decision to go forward with the 1974 PNE

appears grounded in the domestic political environment.

The Operational Code and Strategic Preferences of A.B. Vajpayee

Initial expectations for Vajpayee’s world view and strategic preferences, not

surprisingly, are colored by his long standing political affiliation with the BJP. The brand

of nationalism practice by the BJP, and as the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS, Indian

People's Union) Party before, preaches an Indian assertiveness in international affairs.

Specifically, as to nuclear weapons capabilities, the BJP and its forerunners have called

for an Indian nuclear deterrent dating back to the 1964 Chinese test. In examining the

Hindi nationalism tinted politics of the BJP, Hyman (2002, 2006) described it as

“oppositional nationalism” with the primary opposition being Muslims and by extension

Pakistan. Hyman argues that the motivation for the decision is not found in either

strategic policy or domestic politics, but from Vajpayee’s emotions feed by this

nationalist impulse to obtain the bomb. Such a description might lead to an assumption

that Vajpayee possess a conflictual-orientation towards the international system, whereby

nuclear weapons as seen as a requisite resource in facing the world. The picture borne

out here in analyzing his world views offers a differing portrayal of Vajpayee however.

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Nonetheless, in then examining his perception of strategic interactions with others in the

international system one can see how the desire for nuclear weapons manifests itself.

In comparing Vajpayee to the average world leader what is found is a leader who

by and large conforms to the mean (See Table 6.1 above). For the most part, Vajpayee

sees the world as no more cooperative or hostile than the typical leader.58 Indeed the

differences that do occur point to greater reliance on cooperative strategies and tactics. A

statically significant difference (at the .01 level) is found as to his strategic approach to

goals. Vajpayee’s (.636) operational code points to him as more inclined than the

average world leader to utilize cooperative strategies in seeking to attain his political

goals. Tactically, he is more likely to use the tactic of “promise” and “appeal/support”

than the average leader. Most importantly, one finds that Vajpayee’s world view shows a

significant difference regarding two of the three master beliefs. As noted above, his

strategic approach to goals (I-1) shows a greater tendency towards cooperative strategies.

Also, as to P-4, the degree of control over historical developments, Vajpayee has greater

confidence (significant at .05 level) about his ability to control developments.

Using Vajpayee’s master belief scores what is found is that as to the Modified

Holsti Typologies, his Self scores (.724, .546) place him inside the Type C quadrant.

Meanwhile, his view of Other (-.724, -.024) place it just in the Type D quadrant in the

matrix. Both results are represented in Figure 6.1. The primary difference between these

two types comes from their view of the nature of conflict in the international system and

how such impacts the development and pursuit of political goals. Where Vajpayee sees

conflict as the result of the anarchical nature of the international system, Other sees

conflict as a permanent feature of the global security environment. Both types share a

58 For Vajpayee 23 speeches were examined resulting in 1333 coded verbs.

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relative pessimism as to the achievement of one’s political goals, but this pessimism

occurs for different reasons. For a Type C, pessimism as to achieving end results stems

from the nature of the international system (i.e. anarchy). Nevertheless, they are prone to

establish optimal goals which are pursued by seeking out shared interest where possible

as conflict is a temporary condition. When interacting with others conciliatory

opportunities will be taken advantageously, as they emerge, with the hope of avoiding

and putting off escalation. Meanwhile, Type D’s pessimism results from a perception of

conflict as an inherent and permanent feature of the international system. Concern

focuses on the distribution and equilibrium of power among states. Goals are tempered

in light of such pessimism and are more flexible. The problematic nature of outcomes,

good or bad, resulting from limited predictability are mitigated by the use of moderate

means. The use of military force is judiciously applied depending on the presence of

opportunity and circumstances.

In essence, Vajpayee see himself as being more cooperative-oriented than others

in the international system. This is due to a belief that conflict is temporary, and can be

overcome by the actors in the international system, as shared interests do exist. As a

Type C, the prescribed ordering of Vajpayee’s strategic preferences places settlement as

the most preferred outcome. At the same time he is reluctant to remain at a situation of

deadlock resulting in the frustration his comprehensive goals. Consequently, the strategic

script is represented as Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit. As for Vajpayee’s

perception of Other as Type D, the resulting ordering of strategic preferences reflects the

permanence of conflict. Given concerns over the likelihood of conflict, and

preoccupation with the equilibrium of power between actors, Type D leaders seek to

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dominate outcomes whenever possible. Yet, due to the uncertainty of outcomes, their

tactics are moderated so that settlement remains a viable outcome. Accordingly, the

predicted ordering of preferences for Type D is Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit.

Table 6.3. Vajpayee’s Perceptions of Self and Other

Modified Holsti
Holsti Strategic Preference TIP TIP Strategic
Type Ordering Proposition Preferences

Self Type C Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit #2 Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

Other Type D Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit #5 Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit

The expected strategic scripts of Self and Other coming from the Modified Holsti

Typology Matrix are further refined by application of the TIPs. This additional step

further refines the preference ordering by examining the level to which the differences

based on the key propositions of conflict (-) versus cooperation (+) and control over

historic developments (>, <, or =). Vajpayee’s scores for his perception of Self coincides

with TIP proposition #2 as it is more cooperative (+) in its orientation toward the

international system while having possessing an equal (=) view of one’s ability to control

historic developments. The script remains the same as plotted in the Holsti matrix:

Settle> Dominate> Deadlock> Submit. Similarly, the strategic script for Vajpayee’s

perception of Other remains unchanged as the scores indicate a conflict-orientation (-)

and control (=) places it within the purview of TIP proposition #5. Therefore, the

ordering remains the same: Dominate> Settle> Deadlock> Submit.

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 OTHER OTHER OTHER
CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 4, 3 1, 4 CO Settle Submit CO 4, 3 →‫׀‬ 1, 4
_
SELF ↓ ↑ SELF SELF

CF 3, 1 “2, 2” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 2, 1 ← “3, 2”

Self’s Strategy: Stay OUTCOMES Other’s Strategy: Move

Game state(s) in quotations indicate the “initial state” for the players
Game state(s) in bold indicate the final state (outcome) of the game
Arrows indicate moves by players, arrows with bars indicate a “non-move”

Figure 6.3. Vajpayee’s Subjective Game

In combining the strategic preference scripts for Vajpayee’s perceptions of Self

and Other the resulting interactions is expressed as a subjective game in Figure 6.3. The

asymmetric scripts result in a subjective game in which the initial state of the game is

determinative of the final outcome. As indicated the particular game possess two non-

myopic equilibriums: the mutual cooperation outcome of “cooperate, cooperate” (4, 3)

and the deadlock outcome of “conflict, conflict” (3, 2). Which of these outcomes is

achieved is wholly dependent on the game’s initial state. Clearly, if the game starts at the

state of mutual cooperation both players will choose a strategy of stay as neither will

receive as better outcome as any move by one will result in a countermove pushing the

outcome to the less optimal 3, 2. If the game started in a state of “conflict, cooperation,”

Vajpayee would be prone to “move” in shifting his strategy to one of cooperation so to

achieve his most preferred outcome of “Settle” (4, 3). If, however, the initial state was

“cooperate, conflict,” Vajpayee would counter Other’s conflict strategy and again choose

to “move” altering his strategy to move away from his least preferred outcome of

“Submit” (1, 4) to his second best outcome of 3, 2 occurring from Deadlock. Looking at

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the game one last time, it becomes clear that in the event of an initial state of “Deadlock”

(“conflict, conflict”) both players will choose to “stay.” The outcome is driven by

slightly different motivations for Self and Other. For Vajpayee (Self) move will result in

his least favorable outcome (“Submit”) as Other will not subsequently move off its most

favored outcome (“Dominate”). Vajpayee’s perceived strategic interaction hinges on the

actions of Other to make the first move switching from a strategy of conflict to

cooperation. Only once Other has made such a decision to move will Vajpayee

reciprocate with cooperation of his own bring the game to a best outcome of “Settlement”

(4, 3).

Hence, given the impact of the initial state on the game outcome, it is critical to

properly gauge the proper starting point for when Vajpayee returned to power in March

1998. Combining Vajpayee’s view of other actors in the international system as

generally more conflict-orientated along with the problematic state of affairs India’s

security setting indicate the most suitable initial states to be either “Submit” (cooperate,

conflict) or “Deadlock” (conflict, conflict). The precarious nature of India’s security

situation in the mid-1990s can be viewed in terms of the assertiveness of its regional rival

Pakistan as highlighted by the Ghauri missile test in April of 1998. Such action was

viewed by some as a direct challenge to the incoming BJP-led government which was

more than willing to deal with such provocation head on. Indeed, one would be hard

press to otherwise characterize the initial state, given the setting of 1998, as one likely to

drive towards a final outcome of conflict and hence deadlock.

While the extent of the security threat facing India leading up to May 1998 is a

matter which can be debated, the point here is not to seek out the objective fact, but rather

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determine the subjective perceptions of Indian leaders, specifically, Prime Minister A.B.

Vajpayee. Certainly, domestic politics played a role in developing India’s nuclear

program. The amorphous “nuclear option” policy provided Vajpayee with the technical

means and opportunity for the tests. However, whether stemming from short term

provocations from rival Pakistan or more historic security concerns re-emerging in the

aftermath of the Cold War, Vajpayee and the BJP were long time adherents to the idea of

a nuclear weapons capable India. As Hyman (2006) notes the nationalist bent of

Vajpayee and the BJP is not unique, as several parties run on nationalist platforms, rather

what distinguished the BJP was the nature of their particular brand of nationalism which

he described as “oppositional nationalism.” Such sentiment may very well have colored

the thinking of Vajpayee, yet it is not necessary to seek to intrude into his internal

thought process. By his public statements, Vajpayee presents a world view suggesting

the divergent preferences he perceives for Self and Other. While possessing the belief

that cooperation is possible, he nonetheless views others as predisposed to dominate

outcomes. Accordingly, caution is in order as opponents vary calling alternatively for

conciliation or firmness as the situation might dictate. The uncertainty of the country’s

regional and geo-strategic position coinciding with Vajpayee’s perceptions of strategic

interactions with others worked to solidify his willingness to cross the nuclear threshold.

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 CHAPTER SEVEN

LIBYA:
RATIONAL PROLIFERATION?

In December 2003, the Libyan government announced that it had decided to cease

all activities aimed at developing nuclear weapons capability and allow international

inspectors to examine and verify the country’s weapons program. The announcement

caught many proliferation watchers by surprise as it ended a journey which Libya had

embarked upon over three decades ago. The resulting nonproliferation headlines have

hailed the situation as a great success story for the nonproliferation regime (Bahgat 2005;

Sokolski 2004; Ronen 2003). The case of Libya is characteristically reported as an

instance where the regime recognized that the costs associated with nuclear weapons

were far outweighed by the benefits to be had through cooperation and nonproliferation.

While disagreements surface as for the precise reason for this change in Libyan policy—

was it a result of delicate and painstaking diplomacy or was it a matter of regime survival

in the face of the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq—much of the story behind the Libyan

experience remains untold (Jentleson and Whytock 2005/06). The end of the story has

received the lion’s share of the attention with far less consideration lent to understanding

why Libya sought nuclear weapons in the first place. A better understanding of the

underlying motivations is a critical part of the equation if one is to determine the “fit”

between Libyan motivations at the beginning of the process and those held at the end.

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Was this outcome the result of internal domestic change or caused by actions taken by the

international community which pointed out the “error” of the Qadhafi regimes’ way

concerning nuclear weapons? In either case, if Libya is to be cast as a model for

nonproliferation “success” to be repeated elsewhere, the proper motivational framework

needs to be constructed.

Accordingly, a goal of this chapter will be to reconstruct the Libyan case by

examining the development of its nuclear weapons program under the direction of Libyan

leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi. The challenge presented is to avoid the seemingly circular

logic that shrouds the accounting of the Libyan proliferation efforts. Most notably is the

reference of Libya and, especially, Qadhafi as a rogue state and leader (Takeyh 2001;

Hoyt 2000; Litwak 2000; Tanter 1998; Klare 1995). Such thinking has led to the

intractable circularity of reasoning that Libya/Qadhafi was a rogue due to the pursuit of

nuclear weapons; meanwhile such weapons were sought after because Libya/Qadhafi was

a rogue. A more careful treatment, as attempted here, reveals that the motivations for the

Libyan program were indeed hazy. Accounts of Libyan motivations appear to point to a

confluence of factors ranging from security concerns to regional dominance to the

importance of symbolism and status. Rather than being unique, however, Libya’s initial

steps along its proliferation journey are not unlike those of the other states examined in

this study. Yet, in distinguishing the Libyan case from the crowd, the proliferation

decision made by Qadhafi in 2003 to terminate the program has been depicted as a

relatively straight-forward example of clear-eyed rationalism whereby the costs and

benefits of the nuclear program were examined in both strategic as well as economic

terms.

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 Indeed, the strategic preferences and resulting perceptions about interactions with

others as revealed by Qadhafi’s world view point to a decision-maker heavily influenced

by the surrounding environment. As neither an idealist nor an offensive realist, Qadhafi

shows himself to be self-protective leader, prone to tit-for-tat strategies meeting conflict

with conflict and cooperating when benefits are assured from other actors. As indicated

by the historical accounts, it appears that Qadhafi was prepared to negotiate with the US

on its nuclear program a decade before the 2003 declaration. Given the perception of US

unwillingness to negotiate at that time, Qadhafi persisted in a strategy of meeting conflict

with conflict and continued to advance Libya’s nuclear efforts. However, a shift in US

strategies and tactics starting in the late 1990s, bolstering the gains to be had from Libyan

reconsideration of its nuclear program, paved the way for Qadhafi’s switch to

cooperation and end Libya’s proliferation adventures.

Libya’s nuclear program: missteps through the proliferation wilderness

Libyan nuclear ambitions were a constant feature since the rise of the Qadhafi

regime following the officers’ coup which deposed King Idris I in 1969. Almost

immediately after assuming power, the government sought to acquire nuclear capability

“right off the shelf” through purchasing an assembled weapon from the People’s

Republic of China in the course of intermittent discussions running from 1969 to 1971

(Bowen 2006). As these overtures were ultimately rejected by the Chinese, the Qadhafi

regime allegedly made similar inquires with several other governments including France,

India, and the Soviet Union during the rest of the 1970s all to no avail.

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 As its efforts to purchase a nuclear weapon were spurned, the Libyan government

began in earnest to develop a domestic nuclear infrastructure in the mid-1970s. Unlike

other countries which proliferated, Libya had no domestic capability, possessing neither

an established nuclear program like South Africa, nor a pool of scientific and engineering

knowledge to call upon as in the case of India. Thanks largely to the vast revenues

coming from its oil resources; the government was fiscally capable of undertaking such a

grand project as developing a domestic nuclear industry from scratch. Accordingly, as an

initial step the national Nuclear Energy Commission was established in 1973. Its first

task was to acquire both nuclear knowhow and necessary equipment from abroad in order

to put in place the critical first steps for developing a domestic capability. Given the lack

of a significant industrial base, the Libyan program faced the recurring handicap of being

nearly completely dependent on outside sources for even the basic fabrication of

equipment.

The first major development for the Libyan program was the successful

negotiation for the construction of a research reactor by the Soviet Union in 1975.

However, mixed signals from the Qadhafi regime, which simultaneously declared the

civilian nature of their nuclear program while calling for an “Arab bomb,” prompted

proliferation concerns from the Soviets. Consequently, the Soviets required that in return

for supplying the IRT-1 research reactor the Libyan government must ratify the NPT,

which had been signed by Libya under King Idris in 1968, as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Furthermore, Libya also had to enter into an IAEA Safeguards Agreement. These steps

sought to restrict the Libyan program as one devoted to only peaceful civilian

applications. Nevertheless, as Bowen (2006) notes, “the Libyan leader was consistent in

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his inconsistent pronouncements on the nuclear issue” (18). Throughout the 1970s and

1980s, Qadhafi would make repeated contradictory statements on the one hand decrying

nuclear weapons while on the other hand indicating a desire to possess such weapons.

This uncertainty surrounding the motives for the Libyan program served to hamper its

development as many states were unwilling to be a potential accomplice to Libyan

proliferation efforts. The successful agreement with the Soviet Union stood out as the

only major achievement during the initial phase of the Libyan program

During the 1980s the program would continue to be aided by the state’s oil

wealth, but is characterized as one of fits and starts, and ultimately setbacks. The decade

proved to be a challenging one as external support diminished and deteriorating foreign

relations, most notably with the United States, would hinder its development. The most

prominent positive development during this period was the completion of the IRT-1

reactor at Tajoura and the supply of enriched uranium fuel by the Soviet Union in early

1981. This was a crucial development as this research facility would become “the focal

point of the country’s clandestine nuclear activities for the next 10-15 years” (Bowen

2006: 32). The role of Soviet patronage cannot be underestimated as it was the major

supplier of technical expertise, equipment, and fuel for the Libyan program. This

reliance on a single supplier, however, would prove costly as the nuclear reactor deal

between Libya and the Soviet Union, which had entailed the construction of 440

megawatt reactor at Sirt, expired in 1986. The proffered reasons for the demise of the

cooperation agreement with the Soviets vary and include Soviet concerns over Libya’s

ability to make payments given US sanctions as well as Libyan concerns with reactor

designs in the wake of the Chernobyl incident (Bowen 2006). However, a leading factor

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for the change in the relationship is linked to the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as the new

Soviet Leader. The reappraisal of past policies in Moscow appears to have concluded

that continuing nuclear cooperation with Libya presented too great a risk given possible

Libyan proliferation (Bowen 2006).

In light of this situation, Libya attempted in vain to procure other suppliers

including Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Belgium, and Japan. In particular, the instances of

Libyan attempts to deal with Belgium and Japan exemplified the frustrations of the

Libyan program given its dependence on external assistance. Attempting to push forward

with a second reactor, the Libyans started negations with the Belgian company,

Belonuclearie, in 1986 to provide design and other services for the Sirt project. These

talks were abruptly terminated by the Belgian government which interceded, at the

request of the US government, over concerns that the project did not appear compatible

with the alleged civilian applications. Meanwhile, in seeking to build its own Uranium

Conversion Facility (UCF) to enrich uranium for fuel use, the Qadhafi regime was able to

order conversion modules from a Japanese company in 1986. Yet, indicative of the lack

of native expertise, the modules sat in storage for over a decade as they were delivered

unassembled and without operating manuals.

The most significant period of advancement in the Libyan nuclear program

paradoxically came right before the decision to terminate the program. Starting in 1995,

Libyan efforts would be reenergized again by the involvement of an outside party. This

time the services would not come from a sponsoring state, but rather from the now

infamous A.Q. Khan network overseen by the similarly named Pakistani nuclear scientist.

While the Pakistani government has repeatedly denied its involvement with the Khan

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network, it is believed that at the very least the Pakistani government willingly turned a

blind eye towards the enterprise. Regardless of potential ties between the government

and Khan, that Libya would seek out assistance from an individual with ties to the

Pakistani nuclear program is hardly surprising. A Libyan-Pakistani connection regarding

nuclear issues dates back to Libya’s initial efforts in the 1970s. Indeed the Pakistani

program was greatly aided by the Qadhafi regime which assisted by diverting uranium it

acquired from Niger to Pakistan. Libya also provided financial assistance to the

Pakistani program during the late 1970s which has been estimated between $100 million

to $500 million (Bowen 2006). While Libyan support might have been motivated by the

notion of creating an “Islamic bomb” in Pakistan, this reasoning appears superficial as

Libya’s real interest was a nuclear quid pro quo. It was hoped that the Pakistanis would

in turn provide assistance in jump starting the Libyan nuclear program. There is evidence

of exchanges of personnel and training; however, nothing indicates the transfer of any

critical technology or material from Pakistan to Libya as occurring. While this earlier

nuclear relationship would be cut short by the military coup overthrowing Pakistani

President Bhutto in 1979, these countries would again be brought together through the

subsequent dealings between Libya and the A.Q. Khan network in the mid-1990s.

This relationship with the Khan network brought about the greatest advances for

the nuclear program. Its role in assisting the Libyan program cannot be underestimated.

As US Ambassador Donald Mahley stated in 2004, following inspections of the program,

the Libyan program would have been constrained “if not thwarted altogether,” had it not

been for the involvement A.Q. Khan (Bowen 2006). Through the use of an extensive and

complex global network of suppliers used by Khan, he was able flout the various export

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control laws restricting the transfer of dual-use technologies. While Libya primarily

benefited from access to technology and materials to aid in the enrichment process, the

network also provided opportunities for Libyan scientists and technicians to receive

training abroad. Once again, the ability of the Qadhafi regime to divert resources from

the country’s oil revenues made the entire undertaking possible as it is estimated that

Libya spent between $100 to $500 million US dollars in the span of five to seven years

starting in the late 1990s (Bowen 2006:37).

By early 2000, the Libyan program had taken significantly steps forward where in

2002 it was installing and testing numerous centrifuges acquired from the A.Q. Khan

network. Indeed reports indicate that by the end of 2003, Libya had either received or

placed orders for a significant quantity of equipment for the enrichment process including

placing an order for 10,000 advanced centrifuges (Bowen 2006). Despite these advances

in available equipment, the Libyan program had yet to undertake uranium enrichment of

any consequence. As was the case during the earlier period of the program, Libya was

still dependent on others for obtaining fuel having failed at its own domestic attempts.

The Khan network was able to provide fuel but of such low grade (≤1% U235 versus the

>90% U235 needed) so to be essentially useless for weapons application.59 The most

alarming revelation was that the Khan network provided Libya with weapons’ design

blueprints and documents. Although still far from possessing the requisite material and

knowhow to build a weapon, the schematics included the fabrication process for the

essential inner core including the detonating mechanism required to set off the requisite

chain reaction. However, subsequent inspections of the Libyan program reported that no

59 The source of the material has been claimed to be North Korea another suspected client of A.Q. Khan.

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action had been taken by the Libyans and key parts of the fabrication plans were not

included.

This last stage of the Libyan program was of course brought to a close by the

December 2003 government announcement terminating the program. While marked by

significant strides, this period again points to the recurring challenges facing the Libyan

program—most critically, its utter dependence on external sources for materials and

knowhow. As of the 2003, decision ending 30 years worth of nuclear ambitions, the

Libyans were still years away from developing the necessary equipment and materials for

fashioning a functioning nuclear weapon.60 Yet, what proved shocking to proliferation

observers and inspectors alike was that despite being subject to a decade-plus of

international sanctions, and despite the presence of international export control

agreements, the Libyan government had been able to make as much progress as it did in

spite of its intrinsic limitations. While hailed by some as an example of the success of the

nonproliferation regime, the Libyan case also demonstrates the dark side of proliferation

showing the difficulty of deterring a determined would-be proliferator, especially one

with the ability to channel significant resources to a program.

Indeed, the recounting of the Libyan proliferation journey points to the Libyan

government’s willingness to devote significant resources to its nuclear ambitions. Given

the determined efforts by the government spanning nearly 30 years, particularly in light

of expenditures of nearly half a trillion dollars in the years just prior to 2003, why would

60 As is often the case in estimates of countries’ nuclear weapons capabilities, there is disagreement as to
how far Libya was from acquiring a domestic nuclear weapons capability. Before 2003 the US had
estimated that Libya could develop nuclear weapons as early as 2007 and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon predicted in 2002 that Libya would be the first Arab state with a nuclear weapon (Shapir 2002).
Upon inspections in late 2003, however, the Libyan program was found to be still far from building an
actual weapon (BBC News, December 20, 2003).

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the Qadhafi regime suddenly decide to terminate the program? Why was it that previous

motivations for nuclear weapons no longer held sway? Recent examinations of the

Libyan case exploring these questions describe a highly rational process of weighing

costs and benefits (Braut-Hegghammer 2008; Joffé 2004; St. John 2004, 2003).

Nevertheless, it is only now in the aftermath of the Libyan experience that the initial

proliferation rationales of the Qadhafi regime are being scrutinized.

Libyan proliferation motives: uncertain beginnings, but a rational ending

As is the case with the several countries examined here, explanations for why the

Qadhafi regime decided to pursue nuclear weapons offer differing motivational drivers.

These explanations cover the full spectrum of proliferation logics ranging from domestic

politics interests (Solingen 2007) to security concerns (Bowen 2006) to ideological

motivation (Braut-Hegghammer 2008). The problem with these multiple explanations is

not that they fail to capture the rationales for the Libyan proliferation experience, but

rather each appears to offer motivational insights at particular moments during this

journey. Given the nearly thirty years that the Qadhafi regime pursued the acquisition

and development of nuclear weapons changes in motivations were perhaps inevitable.

Over time official statements by the regime, especially statements by Qadhafi himself,

have offered up various rationales which might be driving the regimes’ actions.

However, the failure to properly comprehend the impetus for the Libyan program is

problematic in then understanding why the regime was willing to walk away from a

program they had so long coveted and to which they had allocated considerable

resources.

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 The initial political and ideological motives which early on fueled Libyan foreign

policy appear to have also been driving factors in the Qadhafi regimes’ interest in nuclear

weapons (Braut-Hegghammer 2008). From the outset, the Qadhafi regime promoted the

goals of Pan-Arabism, a cause which Qadhafi felt, given the demise of Gamal Abdel

Nasser in Egypt, could be taken up by Libya. While early efforts at a federation of Arab

states floundered, the rhetoric of Arab unity provided a platform for anti-Israeli and

increasingly anti-Western, and by default anti-American, posturing. The inability to strike

a unified front on issues such as dealing with Israel led Qadhafi, who was now espousing

his newly developed “Third Universal Theory” calling for global transformation and

change through violence and revolution, to target both Western and Arab government

alike with attempts at subversion and outright aggression. Most prominent of these

efforts was the uncovering by the Egyptian government of Libyan involvement in a 1974

attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. With Libya’s state coffers flush

with seemingly ever-increasing oil revenues, Qadhafi went about funding a wide array of

international revolutionary and terrorist groups, including the Shining Path, Abu Nadal,

and even the Irish Republican Army (IRA), throughout the 1970s into the 1980s. Along

these lines, the possession of nuclear weapons served two symbolic needs associated with

the regimes’ foreign policy goals throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. First, the

development of such capabilities would cement Libya’s, and in turn Qadhafi’s, role as the

leader in the pan-Arab movement, prompting other Arab states to follow its lead.

Second, such development would provide a power counter-weight to both the “Israeli

bomb” as well as those of the West more generally.

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 A direct consequence of the revolutionary policies pursued by the Libyan regime

was the deterioration of relations with the West, principally the United States. The

ideological need for nuclear weapons transformed into a security motive as allegations of

a Western threat to Libya, because of its revolutionary brand of politics, became a self-

fulfilling prophesy. Initial US indifference towards the new Libyan regime became one

of confrontation. This situation was further exacerbated by Libya’s own policies and its

links, direct and indirect, to numerous terrorist acts during the 1980s.

However, it is unclear as to when security concerns replaced ideology as a

principle driver of Libyan proliferation. Subsequent interviews of individuals involved in

the Libyan program reveal that security of the regime was an absolute priority of the

regime upon taking power (Braut-Hegghammer 2008). Nuclear weapons were seen as

potential security “fix” which could offer the regime “a national deterrent against external

intervention” (Braut-Hegghammer 2008:60). Indeed, Bowen (2006) asserts that from the

outset that Qadhafi’s motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons, as was the case for all

policy decisions, was the “overriding imperative to stay in power and the need to deter

and defeat internal and external challenges that could threaten his regime’s security” (12).

Nevertheless, the nature and extent of the security threat facing Libya and its importance

in driving Libyan proliferation efforts has not gone unchallenged.

Solingen (2007) argues that of all the Arab states, Libya offers the weakest case

of external threats justifying the development of a nuclear arsenal. Both in terms of the

near and more distant security threats claimed by the Qadhafi regime, the justification for

acquiring nuclear weapons due to external threats is argued to be illusory. None of its

immediate neighbors posed any significant threats to Libya and those confrontations that

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did arise were entirely the doing of the Qadhafi regime. A prime example is the conflict

initiated by Libya with neighboring Chad in 1978 renewing territorial claims over the

Aouzou territory. Indeed, Libya’s quest for nuclear weapons likely drove Algerian

proliferation efforts (Solingen 2007). Moreover, the usual suspects in Libya’s security

equation, the US and Israel, posed little threat to Libya at the time of the original decision

to proliferate. Considerable efforts were expended by the regime well before the 1986

US air strikes on Tripoli seeming to deflate claims that security concerns regarding the

US played a role at the initial stage of the program. As for Israel, despite frequent

references to the need for countering an “Israeli bomb” made by Qadhafi, Libya’s

proliferation efforts beginning in 1969 predate by four years Israeli Prime Minister

Sharon statement in 1973 highlighting Israel’s ability to strike Libya seen as implying an

Israeli nuclear capability.

Even proponents of the security explanation note some of the shortcomings of this

explanation. Specifically, the ambiguous and contradictory statements offered by

Qadhafi about his country’s nuclear ambitions are said to reflect “under-developed

strategic thinking on the part of the regime” (Bowen 2006:19). Moreover, while the

regime spent considerable sums on arms in the 1970s and 1980s, these purchases

appeared geared more for winning prestige points lacking any basis in actual military

needs (Braut-Hegghammer 2008; Bowen 2006). The ultimate difficulty of the security

based model for explaining Libyan proliferation is its intertwined nature with larger

international political ambitions held by the regime. As Braut-Hegghammer concludes,

“the Libyan regime saw its pursuit of nuclear weapons both as a means and an end: a way

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of providing security through deterrence while increasing Libya’s political status in the

region at the same time” (2008:63).

Turning away from systemic explanations for the regime’s nuclear ambitions,

Solingen (2007) argue that the real motives for the program stem from domestic political

considerations. Rather than being a matter of some vague security calculus, Qadhafi’s

decisions about the nuclear program was simply a part of his larger calculations for

retaining power domestically. Accordingly, the nuclear program was ideologically

driven as asserted by security model advocate, but instead of being for foreign

consumption this was part of a larger domestic political agenda pushing a “populist,

nationalist inward-looking model” (Solingen 2007: 226). Domestically, the nuclear issue

aided Qadhafi on two fronts. First, the pursuit of nuclear weapons provided an avenue for

placating the military by channeling resources and elevating its status by promising

sophisticated weaponry. The military would prove to be a key political ally, especially in

light of the 1976 coup attempt by the Ministers of Planning and Foreign Affairs which

was prompted in part by their disagreement over military spending. As for the

population-at-large, nuclear weapons offered Qadhafi an opportunity to prove himself a

modernizer and a powerful leader solidifying his pan-Arab credentials and provide public

support for his foreign adventures. The irony of Qadhafi’s nationalistic and xenophobic

domestic policies was, as Solingen (2007) points out, that the state was almost entirely

dependent upon foreign exchange coming from the country’s oil exports for funding both

its domestic and foreign policy programs. Consequently, as Libya’s relations with the

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West and the international community soured over the course of the 1980s, Qadhafi’s

political position domestically would be adversely impacted.61

It should comes as little surprise that depending on what one discerns as the

motivations for Libyan proliferation also influences one’s explanation for why the

Qadhafi regime decided to terminate the program in 2003. Again multiple explanations

are offered ranging from concerns about being subject to American military action, à la

Iraq, to internal concerns focusing on the need for economic liberalization. While

pointing to differing factors responsible for the decision by the Qadhafi regime, these

explanations fall into two different camps: the rational actor and domestic politics. The

first, the rational actor camp, points to the ever-increasing realization by the Qadhafi

regime that the costs of pursuing nuclear weapons was outweighed by the gains that

could be achieved, in terms of international security and economics, by abandoning the

program. The second, the domestic politics camp, also finds that the decisions was

spurred on by perceived benefits, but rather than being driven by external factors was tied

to the regime’s realization of the need to reform and liberalize the economy to preserve

its political power at home.

As noted by one observer, the Libyan about-face of its long-held nuclear

ambitions has capture so much attention as “it is a rare example of nuclear rollback and

arguably the only one that did not follow from regime change or large-scale domestic

political transition” (Braut-Hegghammer 2007:1). Consequently, the remaining puzzle is

to determine what caused the same government that for so long doggedly pursued nuclear

weapons to subsequently come to view the same as unnecessary and even damaging to

61For a detailed historical account of Libya’s domestic political situation during the Qadhafi regime see
Dirk Vandewalle (2006) A History of Modern Libya.

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Libyan political goals. Of equal interest as well is the question of determining when this

change of mind was realized.

In the aftermath of the December 2003 declaration by which the Qadhafi regime

vowed to abandon its nuclear and other non-conventional weapons (i.e. chemical and

biological) programs, numerous scholars have begun to examine the events leading to the

Libyan decision. Although some Bush Administration officials were prone to credit US

actions against Iraq as showing Qadhafi the risks of continuing down the proliferation

path, others have argued that the process shows the final result of a prolonged diplomatic

effort that started in 1998. But in crediting the diplomatic maneuvering of the British and

the Americans for achieving the 2003 breakthrough, a fact has been overlooked by many

is that the Libyan regime appears to have been willing to put its nuclear program on the

negotiating table over a decade before. As early as 1992 Libyan officials sought to open

back channel discussion with the US, through approaching former US democratic senator

Gary Hart (Hart 2004). Hoping to improve its contentious relationship with the US

caused in large part by the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, the Libyans reportedly asserted that

in order to normalize relations and remove sanctions “everything was on the table” for

negotiation, including their weapons of mass destruction programs (Hart 2004).

However, these offers were spurned by the then George H.W. Bush Administration and

continued until the end of the Clinton administration. As Libya commentator Bruce St.

John notes, “For all its emphasis on deadly arms, the White House thus apparently missed

an opportunity to disarm Libya earlier, perhaps setting the stage for a peaceful resolution

of the Iraqi crisis” (2004). The account that is emerging regarding the changes in Libyan

policy, or in the words of one observer, the story of “who blinked first,” suggest that

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progress was only achieved once the US was ready to become a willing negotiation

partners to an eager Qadhafi regime (Zoubir 2006; Joffé 2004; St. John 2004).

The shift in Libyan attitudes on its weapons programs is argued to be the result of

strategic calculations by the Qadhafi regime as it increasingly recognized the costs of

nuclear weapons, both in terms of security and economics, outweighed the potential

benefits. Joffé (2004) claims that a comprehensive reassessment of Libyan foreign policy

occurred in the aftermath of the 1986 US air strikes Tripoli and Benghazi. Accordingly:

the Libyan regime came to the conclusion that it could no longer

ignore the reality of American power, not could it afford to tweak
America’s nose with its policies of support for international
terrorism, whether merely rhetorical, as it claimed, or substantive,
as the West believed (Joffé 2004:221).

This claim is challenged by others, who assert that the 1986 incident, along with other

factors, actually reinforced the regime’s desire to develop a deterrent capability (Bowen

2006). However, as this period has been characterized as pointing to the inherent tension

between Libyan security needs, which following 1986 served to justify the drive for a

nuclear capability, and its adventurous foreign policy, which was causing the current

security dilemma (Braut-Hegghammer 2008). The result of this conflict was that

throughout the rest of the 1980s Libya’s nuclear ambitions remained nebulous.

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Libya, like

many countries that had played US-Soviet tensions to their advantage, was forced to

reassess its policies during this re-orientation of the international system. Pragmatism

was the order of the day replacing previous revolutionary ideology as the regime “made

incremental, but ultimately wholesale, changes to both the rhetoric and practice of its

external relations” (Bowen 2006:52). Coinciding with domestic economic problems

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exacerbated by international sanctions, the security rationale for nuclear weapons was

also reappraised. Increasingly nuclear weapons were viewed as having little to offer

Libya strategically or militarily. Indeed, Libyan leaders came to the growing conclusion

that nuclear weapons were “bringing insecurity and Libya was perceived to be safer

without them” (Bowen 2006:64). Lacking either ideological or security rationales for

nuclear weapons, “the regime appears to have drawn the conclusion that it would be in

Libya’s interests to abandon the pursuit of nuclear weapons if a favorable ‘exit strategy’

could be found” (Braut-Hegghammer 2008:66-67).

Yet, what proves intriguing about this notion of the Qadhafi regime’s growing

disenchantment over the benefits of proliferation in the early 1990s is the fact that almost

simultaneously the regime had stepped up its proliferation activities by cultivating ties

with the A.Q. Khan network. Bowen (2006) claims that the Qadhafi regime saw the

nuclear program as a “bargaining chip” to obtain maximum benefits from the West and

the US in particular. Meanwhile, Braut-Hegghammer (2007) contends that this was a

purposive decision by the regime, acting in the tradition of realpolitik rather than

revolutionary ideology, in pursuing a “two-track policy.” Accordingly, the regime was

actively seeking to improve its relations with the West on the one hand, while continuing

with its nuclear program as an insurance policy against the failure to reconcile and given

the country’s increasingly tenuous international position. While increasingly doubting the

value of possessing nuclear weapons, the regime “appears to have found it necessary due

to escalating conflict with the West” (Braut-Hegghammer 2008:67).

The Libyans’ strategic calculations were further revised in 1999 as Britain, under

the Blair government, opened a dialogue with the Qadhafi regime in the spring of that

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year. These discussions were initially aimed at resolving the deadlock over the Lockerbie

incident and negotiating a settlement for the victims’ families. The Clinton

Administration in the US also joined the discussions subsequently near the end of 1999.

This opening provided the regime a window of opportunity to escape its international

isolation and to normalize its relations with major Western powers. Consequently, the

terrorist attacks against the US on September 11, 2001 offered Libya a chance to show-

off its rehabilitated image as Qadhafi publicly denounced the attacks and expressed

remorse for the victims and their families. Qadhafi had no affinity for radical Islamic

groups like Al-Qaeda and had been targeted by such groups in the past due to his unique

interpretation of Islam which stood in stark contrast to their own. Indeed the Libyan

government willingly shared its intelligence on Islamic fundamentalist groups with the

British and American intelligence services (St. John 2004). It appears that at the time,

Libyan officials recognized the problems caused by continuing the nuclear weapons

program and the potential hurdles it might throw in the way of Libyan political interests.

This became more and more apparent as the Bush Administration stepped up its concern

over Weapons of Mass Destruction, especially the nuclear proliferation efforts of

countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Being grouped in with these other “rogue

states” was a body blow to Libyan efforts to restore its international legitimacy.

Moreover, Libyan officials were informed that UN sanctions, which had been

temporarily suspended, would not be permanently lifted until Libya ceased its pursuit of

WMDs (Beaumont, et al. 2003). These events finally tipped the scales against Libyan

proliferation as the program now was seen by the Qadhafi regime as a roadblock to fully

normalizing its status with the international community and, in light of US actions against

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Iraqi, served to only compromise the regimes’ security. Ultimately, in March 2003 a

Libyan delegation opened talks with British and American officials to dismantle Libya’s

unconventional weapons programs and open them to international inspections (St. John

2004). These talks concluded with the December announcement by the Libyan

government and Qadhafi’s statement that Libya had made “a wise decision and a

courageous step,” in aborting its weapons programs.

Taking a slightly different cut at Libya’s decision to abort its nuclear program,

Solingen (2007) also see the process as stemming from a rational calculations of costs

and benefits, but argues that the factor of utmost concern driving Qadhafi’s decision-

making was domestic politics. She contends that, “Qadhafi’s ultimate decision to declare

and surrender his nuclear weapons program must be seen against this background of

declining resources, domestic challenges to his rule, and the embrace of a new model”

(2007:223). This new model meant abandoning the previous nationalist, inward-looking

philosophy and turning to a more international, outwards orientation and adoption of

economic liberalization. A decaying oil infrastructure, dropping oil prices, and problems

in nearly all facets of the state’s economy throughout the 1990s pointed to the political

necessity of reforms and paved their way. The money being poured into the nuclear

program increasingly conflicted with other national priorities including rehabilitating the

state’s oil sector. Further, according to Solingen, the weak state of economic affairs in

Libya exposed Qadhafi to domestic challengers as evidenced by a military uprising in

1993 and a 1996 assassination attempt. By undertaking economic reforms Qadhafi sought

to quell domestic unrest due to economic struggles and build increased political support.

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 This argument clearly finds support among many commentators pointing to

Qadhafi’s primary interest as being regime survival (Bowen 2006; St. John 2003).

However, the level of concern over internal domestic opposition is unclear. Qadhafi

appears to have maintained a tight grip over Libyan politics and even bolstered his

control as of the late 1990s (St. John 2002). Both a military uprising in 1993 and

problems with Islamic groups in the mid-1990s were harshly suppressed eliminating any

significant internal opposition. This seems hardly indicative of a regime willing to or

needing to compromise with internal domestic groups. Also the claim about the growing

concern within the regime over the diversion of resources to the nuclear program does not

align with the fact that throughout the latter half of the 1990s Libya appears to have

increased its spending as it went on a proliferation shopping spree with the aid of the

A.Q. Khan network. Perhaps the most astonishing aspect of this transformation from an

inward-looking to an internationally-oriented regime advocating economic liberalization,

is that no significant political reforms or change in government occurred. Unlike the case

of South Africa where sweeping economic reforms were bought on by a new

government, the key actors in Libya remained largely the same. Indeed, the economic

reforms in Libya have been largely unaccompanied by any significant political reforms

diminishing the Qadhafi’s regime control over the state (St. John 2002).

It appears that the success story of Libyan nonproliferation offers a complex

portrait where credit for the decision to abandon the nuclear program is spread among an

array of external and internal factors. Nonetheless, whether one sees the decision as

grounded in either systemic or domestic factors, one important feature has emerged

regarding Libyan policy-making. Libyan policy, in both the domestic and foreign

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context, is characterized by a degree of flexibility whereby the Qadhafi regime has shown

a willingness to make adjustments to political realities on the ground. In moving forward

to examine how Qadhafi’s world view might have played a role in the decision to

terminate the nuclear weapons program, this flexibility will be shown to be an outgrowth

of Qadhafi’s own perception of his strategic interactions with others in the international

system.

Qadhafi’s World View and Strategic Preferences: A Pragmatist revealed

Previous discussions of the Libyan leader’s personality and impact on Libyan

policies offer significantly divergent views. During the period of contentious US-Libyan

relations of the 1980s, US President Ronald Reagan called Qadhafi the “mad dog of the

Middle East,” and Newsweek magazine placed him on the cover of an issue with the

caption “the most dangerous man in the world.” Now, however, in light of the regime’s

cooperation in the areas of terrorism and WMDs, Qadhafi has been called the “rogue who

came in from the cold” changing his revolutionary stripes and seeking to ingratiate

himself and Libya with the international community (Tadyek 2002). In terms of Libyan

foreign policy, judgments also vary. For some observers Qadhafi’s decision-making

process is characterized as being “haphazard and rarely following any given theory or

ideology” (Black 2000: 12). Indeed, as noted above, his statements about Libya’s need

for and development of nuclear weapons varied over time, often contradicting previous

pronouncements. In summing up this notion of Qadhafi as an elusive or haphazard

thinker and strategist, Black (2000) provides a picture of the Libyan leader whereby:

Qaddafi’s [sic] ideology and rule are constantly changing,

sometimes in different directions. Always experimenting, he
tinkers with the Revolution and its ideological mix,

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 employing Islam, socialism, and populism in varying degrees
to suit the situation at hand. The Revolution of today is
unlike the Revolution of 10 years ago, and almost certainly
unlike what it will be 10 years from now (13).

Meanwhile, other Libya-watchers assert that Libyan policy has been marked by

far greater continuity than some might give it credit. As St. John claims, “Qaddafi’s

[sic] quixotic personality masks a relatively stable political system in which external

policies often reflect a need to maintain domestic legitimacy” (2002:476). Indeed,

whether Qadhafi is seen as either a reformed or unrepentant revolutionary, a mercurial or

steady strategic thinker, a recurring adjective used to describe Libyan policy under

Qadhafi is pragmatic. This characterization of Libyan policy ties back to the claim that

the primary motivation for Qadhafi is his own and his regime’s survival. Through the use

of operational code analysis, and the application of both TIP and TOM, this project

weighs in on this emerging consensus about the nature of Libyan decision-making by

providing insights on Qadhafi’s own strategic preferences. Accordingly, in systematically

developing his world view and strategic preferences, we can more fully examine

Qadhafi’s view of the international system as well as how his perceptions of interactions

with others are indicative of the recent changes in Libyan policy, particularly the

willingness to forego its nuclear program.

The Operational Code and Strategic Preferences of Mu’ammar Qadhafi

In subjecting Qadhafi’s public statements to operational code analysis and its VIC

coding scheme, the results lead to the conclusion that in several key areas, including the

critical master beliefs (P-1, P-4, and I-1), Qadhafi exhibits a world view different from

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that of the average world leader.62 In sum, the results indicate that Qadhafi views the

international system as a generally hostile forum, prone to conflict, and a place where

achieving political goals is difficult. The results are reported in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Qadhafi’s Operational Code

Norming
Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs Qadhafi Group
P-1. Nature of Political Universe
-.132** 0.301
(Conflict/Cooperation)
P-2. Realization of Political Values
-.159** 0.147
(Pessimism/Optimism)
P-3. Political Future
.140 0.134
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
P-4. Historical Developments
.206 0.224
(Low Control/High Control)
P-5. Role of Chance
.971 0.968
(Small Role/Large Role)
I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals
.095** 0.401
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-2. Intensity of Tactics
-.006** 0.178
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-3. Risk Orientation
.316 0.332
(Averse/Acceptant)

I-4. Timing of Action

a. Conflict/Cooperation .656** 0.503
b. Words/Deeds .345* 0.464

I-5. Utility of Means

a. Reward .093 0.157
b. Promise .043 0.075
c. Appeal/Support .411 0.468
d. Oppose/Resist .244* 0.154
e. Threaten .077 0.034
f. Punish .133 0.112
* indicates significance at the .10 level using a two-tailed test
** indicates significance at the .01 level using a two-tailed test

Qadhafi is less inclined to utilize cooperative-oriented strategies and tactic (I-1

and I-2) then the average world leader. Especially as to the tactics used, he is more

62 For Qadhafi 50 public statements were examined resulting in 3,747 coded verbs.

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disposed to the use of conflictual tactics. Notably, Qadhafi relies more on the means of

Oppose/Resist (I-5op). Of particular importance is the revelation that regarding the

critical mater beliefs, Qadhafi’s world view indicates a statistically significant divergence

(at the .01 level) from the average world leader both as to the nature of the political

universe (P-1) and as to the strategic approach to goals (I-1). As to his view of the

political universe, Qadhafi sees the world in far more conflictual terms scoring in the

negative range for P-1 (-.132) versus the positive score for the average world leader

proxy indicator (.301). As for his strategic approach to goals, Qadhafi remains on the

positive side of the ledger (.095) indicating some use of cooperative means, but the use of

a cooperative-based approach is at a significantly reduced level than that of the average

world leader (.401).

In light of the general representation of the international political environment

expressed by Qadhafi’s world view, it should be anticipated that he is will be one of the

two leader types expressing a conflictual-orientation. Indeed it comes as a little surprise

that when plotting Qadhafi within the Modified Holsti Typology Matrix he is found

firmly within the Type D quadrant of the matrix. As shown in Figure 7.1, Qadhafi’s

scores (-.197/-.760) places him on the negative side of both the P-4 axis as to control over

historical outcomes as well as I-1 axis revealing a conflictual view of the political

universe. As a Type D leader, the portrait of Qadhafi that emerges is one which displays

the quintessential characteristics of a realist. Accordingly, he views conflict as an ever

present condition of the international system. Given the likelihood of conflict, the focus

is on the distribution of power and the concern of maintain an equilibrium of power vis-à-

vis other actors. Power disequilibrium is seen as the major contributing factor in the

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outbreak of war between states. The reactions of other actors may vary, hence providing a

pessimistic outlook for achieving goals over the long term. However, in the short term,

goals might be achieved through the quality of leadership one can bring to bear and by

attaining equilibrium of power. In going forward in this international political universe, a

Type D leader is expected to pursue limited goals, given limited predictability and control

over historical developments, through the use flexible and moderate means. While the

use of force remains a potential option, a Type D leader will be hesitant to employ force,

using it only as dictated by particular circumstances and as a last resort. Accordingly, the

strategic preferences of a Type D leader is represented as Dominate > Settle > Deadlock

> Submit. By and large, the view of the world and challenges it presents drive a Type D

leader to be pragmatic and practical as to ends and means.

1.5

TYPE A
(I-1/P-1) TYPE C

0.5

(P-4)

0
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1

-0.5
Qadhafi (Self)
(-.197/ -.760)

-1

Qadhafi (Other)
(.196/ -1.343)
TYPE D TYPE B
-1.5

Figure 7.1. Qadhafi’s Perceptions of Self and Other

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 Plotting of Qadhafi’s scores regarding his perception of Other also places it in one

of the two conflict-oriented leader types. Unlike the perception of Self as a Type D

leader, Qadhafi perceives Other as a Type B leader. While sharing a similar conflictual

outlook regarding the international political universe, Type B leaders differ dramatically

as compared to Type D leaders as to the nature of conflict. Where Qadhafi, as a Type D

leader, observes conflict as an ever present condition of the system, Type B leaders

believe that conflict is temporary and the result of miscalculation and appeasement of

others. This is significant difference as outcomes are seen as determinable by pursing the

“right policy” and thereby political goals can be achieved. This increased predictability

means that Type B leaders are more likely to pursue their optimal goals and, in having a

sense of control over historical outcomes, are willing to use a full array of tactics to

achieve their goals. These tactics include the use of force when the prospective gains are

viewed as outweighing the risks. Again, it is important to distinguish, that where the

unpredictability of outcomes leads Type D leaders to avoid violence, the perceived

predictability and ability to control outcomes makes the Type B leader more willing to

engage in the use of force. Accordingly, the strategic script evidences this difference as

Type B leaders are more assertive in their preference ordering preferring expressed as

Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.

The ordering of the strategic preferences for Qadhafi’s perceptions of Self and

Other are further analyzed by examining the aggregated operational code scores in

accordance with the propositions set forth by TIP. Accordingly, the degree to which each

views the conflictual/cooperative nature of the international political system and the

extent of control over historical developments attributed to each are critical factors. What

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is discovered is that for Qadhafi’s perception of Self and of Other these factors point to

the same TIP proposition. In both cases, the scores regarding the nature of the

international political system place them as more conflict-oriented (-). Additionally, as to

the nature of control over historical developments, Qadhafi’s scores for Self and Other

indicate that neither is seen as having any advantage over the other. The scores for both

indicate an equal (=) degree of control over historical developments. The TIP result for

Qadhafi’s perceptions of Self and Other is that both fall under proposition #5 as they

share a conflict-oriented approach to the international political system (-) while also

possessing an equal degree of control over historical developments (=).

Table 7.2. Qadhafi’s Perceptions of Self and Other

Modified Holsti
Holsti Strategic Preference TIP TIP Strategic
Type Ordering Proposition Preferences

Self Type D Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit #5 Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit

Other Type B Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit #5 Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit

Consequently, the strategy script assigned to Qadhafi’s perceptions of Self and

Other in constructing his subjective game is Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit.

This result coincides with the expectation of Qadhafi’s view of Self as plotted in the

Modified Holsti Typology Matrix. However, the application of TIP offers a slight

modification with the strategic preference ordering for Qadhafi’s view of Other. As

plotted in the Type B quadrant of the modified Holsti matrix the associated strategy script

is the more aggressive one of Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit. In using the

expectation set forth by TIP, the resulting strategic script changes to Dominate > Settle >

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Deadlock > Submit. While this preference ordering retains the same conflictual-oriented

script preferring domination overall, the relatively modest score of .19 along the P-4 axis

(control over historical development) results in a score of an equal degree of control (=).

In applying TIP, the resulting strategic scripts for Qadhafi’s perceptions of Self and Other

offer an intriguing subjective game, one that closely approximates the historic

relationship between Qadhafi’s regime and the international community.

OTHER OTHER OTHER

CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 3, 3 1, 4 CO Settle Submit CO 3, 3 →‫׀‬ 1, 4
_
SELF ↓ ↑ SELF SELF

CF 4, 1 “2, 2” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 4, 1 ‫←׀‬ “2, 2”

Self’s Strategy: Stay OUTCOMES Other’s Strategy: Stay

Game state(s) in quotations indicate the “initial state” for the players
Game state(s) in bold indicate the final state (outcome) of the game
Arrows indicate moves by players, arrows with bars indicate a “non-move”

Figure 7.2. Qadhafi’s Subjective Game

The strategic interaction inferred from the preference ordering for Qadhafi’s

perception of Self and Other is shown in Figure 7.2 above. The resulting subjective game

is one commonly referred to as the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Self and Other share the

same ordering of their strategic preferences whereby both seek to dominate outcomes

when possible and this outcome is their most valued (represented by the numerical value

of 4). Although both would prefer a cooperative settlement which yields their second

best outcome (3, 3), this particular interaction can and often does result in a sub-optimal

“deadlock” outcome with both sides receiving their third best outcome (2, 2). As well

developed in the traditional game theory literature, the reason for this sub-optimal

outcome is driven by the fear by held by each player that the other will “defect” from any

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cooperative arrangement given the ever present temptation to push the interaction to one

where it can dominate and receive his best outcome. Meanwhile, the player who

cooperates only to have the other defect ends up with their least desired outcome (1).

This player is deemed the “sucker,” for they should have foreseen that the other player

would defect. However, where traditional game theory offers deadlock as the solution to

this game, the application of TOM and its concept of sequential move by the players

offers two potential solutions to this game.

According to TOM, the traditional deadlock outcome of the Prisoners’ Dilemma

remains a possibility, but so does the more preferable outcome of settlement (3, 3).

Whether this interaction results in settlement or deadlock hinges upon the initial state of

the game/interaction. As hypothesized earlier in accordance with the interactive

analytical framework driving the project, the combination of two Type D leaders as

perceived by a subject leader may or may not result in an expectation of proliferation

depending on how the initial state of the game is cast—either as cooperation or conflict.

If the initial state of the game places the players in a condition of settlement (3, 3) then

neither has an interest in moving and therefore choose the strategy of “stay” to remain in

this condition. The logic of this strategy holds as a move by one player, given the

temptation to dominate the outcome and receive one’s highest payoff, will logically be

countered by the other player, who acts to avoid their worst outcome, pushing the game

to deadlock (2, 2). In moving from settlement to deadlock the players receive a lesser

payoff or outcome. The settlement condition is preserved, in spite of its seemingly

tenuous hold, by the anticipated “tit-for-tat” strategy employed by the other player

(Axelrod 1984).

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 Unfortunately, the nature of the players in this game allows for cooperation only

when that is the initial state. In all other starting positions the game inevitably results in a

deadlock (2, 2) as both either players’ attempt to dominate the outcome is frustrated and

prevented by the other. When, as is often the case in such games, the initial state is that

of deadlock (2, 2) both player will choose the strategy of “stay” rather than risking the

possibility of being dominated. Therefore, given the inferred subjective game for

Qadhafi, his perception as to the initial state of the game is crucial in determining

whether he chooses to cooperate or be in conflict with the international system.

The unique puzzle presented by the case of Libya is the apparent transformation

of Qadhafi’s subjective game from one with a conflictual outcome of deadlock to the

cooperative settlement game that has evolved since the start of this decade. In reviewing

the historical accounts of the relationship between Libya and the international

community, especially the US, during the period of 1980s and 1990s it would be a near

truism to describe it as one of conflict and tension. The most appropriate initial state for

Qadhafi’s subjective game would be that of Deadlock (2, 2), with both sides employing

conflictual strategies. Again this initial state appears most suitable in light of the US’s

use of force and economic sanctions as well as the Qadhafi regimes’ support of

international terrorism and development of their nuclear program. How then did the

outcome of this game change from one of Deadlock to Settlement? Much is made about

the role of the US and its efforts to persuade Qadhafi to change Libyan policy,

particularly as to its development of weapons of mass destruction. Depending on who

one asks the critical aspect of this persuasion might be the economic burden of sanctions,

the fear of US military action, most acute after the 2003 invasion of Iraq over alleged

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WMDs, or the role of the concerted diplomatic engagement that begun in 1999 by the

British and US governments. Regardless of the driving factor, what has purportedly

occurred was either a significant transformation of Qadhafi’s world view or a realization

of the significant gains to be won by altering Libyan policies. For these observers,

Qadhafi recognizes that his regimes’ previous revolutionary policy stood in the way of

normalizing relations with the international community and the economic benefits to be

had from cooperation. In applying the ideas of TOM, this argument contends that the

US, and the international community more generally, possessed “moving power” in that

Qadhafi realized that the other player could continue to frustrate his effort to dominate

outcomes and could perpetuate the less desirable deadlock outcome while bearing

relatively less costs than him (Brams 1993). Accordingly, this logic contends that

cooperation by Qadhafi on a host of issues, including Libya’s nuclear program, was

brought about by showing how his willingness to change strategy from “stay” to “move”

by adopting cooperation over conflict would lead to the more preferable outcome of

settlement (3, 3).

While seeming to offer a nice package for explaining the changes in Libyan

policy resulting in the abandonment of its nuclear program, the claims that Qadhafi

underwent some transformation of his world view or that the efforts of the US, and

others, moved Qadhafi to change Libyan policy appear negated by the both the data and

historical accounts. First, the data offer no support for the claim that Qadhafi underwent

some acute change or transformation in his world view. Indeed, closer inspection of

Qadhafi’s operational code over the period starting in 1980 until the December 2003

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declaration reveals that his world view remained largely consistent.63 Secondly, various

accountings of the development of Libya’s nuclear weapons program point to the notion

that it was the refusal of the US to alter its conflictual strategy that prevented an earlier

nuclear disarmament of the Qadhafi regime. The Qadhafi regime, through backchannel

contacts, sought to open discussion with US on a range of issues including the nuclear

weapons program as early as 1992 and again in 1999 (Indyk 2004). The failure of the

US to seize this opportunity reinforced Libyan concerns about regime survival serving to

reinvigorate the weapons program and developing the relationship with the A.Q. Khan

network.

It was not until the lengthy and involved negations with the British and the

Americans, beginning in 1999, that Libya altered its policy. Even then during the course

of the talks, Libyan proliferation efforts continued in earnest, as evidenced in 2002 when

the US intercepted and stopped a ship in the Mediterranean Sea carrying sensitive

equipment, most notably advanced centrifuges for enrichment purposes. Once these

discussions indicated the readiness of the West (i.e. the US) to terminate sanctions and

normalize relations with Libya, which offered a potential economic windfall for the

country, did the regime move swiftly to end their nuclear program. As if hitting the reset

button on a giant proliferation pinball machine, Qadhafi’s perceived strategic interaction

appears to have undergone a reorientation with the initial state of the game reinforcing

the gains to be had through mutual cooperation and settlement.

This notion of the US possessing moving power to cause a resultant change in

Libya policy is further complicated by two developments. First, if one is to claim that the

63 For research on the notion of Qadhafi’s operational code changing over time see appendix – providing
representation of data analyzed for a separate project presented at the 2007 International Studies
Association Conference

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US possessed and employed moving power in this interaction, why did it take so long for

Qadhafi to recognize it? The 2003 declaration on Libyan WMDs was almost 20 years

after the US airstrikes on Tripoli and over a decade after the imposition of US and

international sanctions. The portraits of Qadhafi that emerge paint him as a keenly

attuned to political realities domestically and internationally, and quite adaptable for the

purposes of his own political survival. It seems at odds with this portrayal for Qadhafi to

either ignore or to be oblivious to the fact that the US could better weather a perpetual

deadlock situation with Libya then vice versa. Alternatively, if indeed the US actions

towards Libya in the 1980s enlightened the Libyan regime of the need to change its

external policies, which can be surmised by the attempts to initiate a dialogue in the early

1990s, why did the US fail to take advantage of this opportunity? At this juncture a

discussion of US foreign policy exceeds the scope of this project, but this poses a

dilemma by providing an instance where one player seemingly employs moving power in

altering the Other’s strategy only to fail to pursue the matter to push the game to a more

beneficial outcome.64

The case of Libya’s proliferation escapades has shown the difficulty in applying

existing explanations of proliferation. The overlap and intermingling of systemic and

internal considerations produce a complex picture with both pointing to the importance of

regime survival. Neither of the prevailing models for proliferation, security concerns nor

domestic politics, offer a satisfactory picture as in excluding one another they each seem

to miss important elements which influenced the decision-making. Further complicating

these efforts is that determining precisely which factors might have weighed more

64 See George (1993) where he similarly discusses the idea that other pressing foreign policy concerns
facing US policymakers likely played a role in diminishing American attention to Iraqi territorial claims
that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

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heavily than others appears extremely difficult and perhaps impossible to realize.

However, the various examinations do offer a common finding which has been extremely

useful for the purposes of this project in applying a cognitive based decision-making

framework. In particular is the assessment by some observers that the decision to go

forward with the program and the subsequent decision to terminate the program was the

outcome of a purposive and rational calculation. Accordingly, how Libyan leader

Mu’ammar Qadhafi views the world and perceives his interactions with others proves

essential.

The pragmatism with which some have imbued Libyan policy appears to be a

direct off-shoot of Qadhafi’s perceptions of the world. Qadhafi’s view of the world is

that of a classic defensive realist, where power matters as the international system

remains of place of potential conflict. At the same time, however, one must be cautious

and flexible (i.e. pragmatic) in their approach due to the unpredictable nature of the

system and inability to dictate outcomes. In seeking to acquire nuclear weapons

capabilities so to dominate outcomes with others, Qadhafi appears to have been pursuing

his optimal strategic preference. Yet, with the increasing realization of Libya’s inability

to dominate outcomes, being opposed by others, like the US, who drove the state of

affairs to one of deadlock, Qadhafi shifted strategies and tactics towards the greater gains

to be had through settlement. However, as evidenced by the historical accountings,

Libyan policy did not just change overnight, but rather change occurred as the potential

gains became more definite and fear over being dominate by Other dissipated.

In turning to assess the merits of the analytical framework applied here, the

findings suggest that the use of perceptions and strategic interactions offer valuable

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insights to the Libyan case. Qadhafi’s subjective game, derived through the application

of TIP, reveals an interaction between two Type D leaders. According to the

hypothesized framework, the pairing of two Type D leaders presents the most uncertain

of the anticipated outcomes, denoted as a “sometime” proliferation occurrence. This

uncertain outcome is caused by the influence of the initial state of the interaction in

driving a particular proliferation result. Given the perception regarding both players’

preference to dominate outcomes, both are believed to be inclined to push the game to a

deadlock outcome with both players receiving a sub-optimal outcome. Yet, when the

interaction is presented with an initial state of settlement, which is the second best result

for the players, this state is preserved as neither player gains any additional benefits by

moving out of this state of affairs. There is much more to do in developing the Libyan

case as to the idea of whether changes in policy occurred due to US moving power or as a

result of a shift in American strategies towards cooperation with an apparently willing

Libyan partner. Nevertheless, the expectations derived from examining Qadhafi’s world

views and perceived strategic interaction appear to align with the historical accounts in

offer a compelling explanation for the change in Libya’s proliferation policy.

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 CHAPTER EIGHT

AUSTRALIA:
WALTZING WITH ATOMIC MATLIDA

Of the recent revelations of counties that sought and took initial steps towards

developing nuclear weapons capabilities, including Sweden, South Korea, Egypt,

Algeria, and Taiwan, perhaps none is more of a surprise then the case of Australia. The

disbelief over the idea of a nuclear armed Australia is understandable given that this

country has been a strong advocate for international arms control measures, especially in

the area of nuclear testing, since the 1970s. Additionally, most laymen fail to grasp the

security concerns facing Australia in the 1950s and 1960s propelling its quest for nuclear

weapons. Cases like Israel and India present clear situations where security concerns

were readily apparent. Such is not the case for Australia as most observers hardly think

of its corner of the world as a dangerous global neighborhood. While Australia’s role as

an atomic ally to the US and UK, providing material support and even its territory for

atomic testing, is recognized, its desire for an autonomous nuclear weapons capacity is

little explored or understood. Only since the end of the Cold War, particularly in the last

decade, has the story of Australia’s own proliferation journey garnered much attention.

This “discovery” was spurred on in part by the release of previous classified documents

revealing the interests of various governments in obtaining an Australian nuclear

deterrent capability.

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 The story that has come to light points to the period of the late 1960s as a critical

juncture for Australia’s nuclear ambitions. During this time all the various pieces of the

nuclear puzzle appear to be floating about in the Australian political environment. In

terms of capability, Australia, having sought to build ties with the British and Americans

in the area of atomic cooperation, had developed various components of a nuclear

infrastructure. In terms of security concerns, the decade of the 1960s was an anxious

time for many Australian leaders. The situation in Southeast Asia, most notably the

Vietnam conflict, as well as issues regarding neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia, were

seen as the domino theory in action and falling right in front of Australia’s doorstep. This

was further complicated by the British decision to pull back its military presence in the

region. Meanwhile, the governing Liberal Party, which had been in power since the end

of World War II, was undergoing a transformation with the retirement of Robert Menzies

who had been the country’s longest serving prime minister occupying that office for over

18 years.

At the end of the 1960s the man in charge of steering the Australian ship of state

during this turbulent time was Prime Minister John Gorton, who led the government from

1968 to 1971. After serving as a pilot in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in

World War II, Gorton was active in politics serving as a senator, as a member of

governing Liberal Party, and holding various ministerial posts in the Menzies and Holt

governments, including the post of Minister of the Navy (1958-1963). Although

established as a solid fixture in Australian national politics, Gorton’s resume was hardly

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viewed by many at the time as someone likely to assume the position of prime minister.65

Gorton’s elevation to prime minister was brought about by the disappearance of Harold

Holt, who presumably drowned while swimming in the ocean, on December 17, 1967.

Disagreement within the governing coalition of the Liberal Party and Country Party

brought down Holt’s supposed successor, Deputy Prime Minister William McMahon,

creating competition for the spot. Supported by leaders in both the Liberal and Country

parties, Gorton was elected prime minister on January 9, 1968.

Coming to power as he did following the sudden death of Holt, Gorton pursued

few new policies in either the domestic or foreign policy realms. Particularly in the area

of foreign policy, his government was consumed by the inherited policy concerning

Australia’s involvement and support for US efforts in Vietnam begun under Menzies.

Domestically, this policy had become a controversial wedge issue between the

government and the leading opposition party, the Labor Party. Nevertheless, Gorton was

an outspoken proponent of his country’s continued military participation in Vietnam.

Throughout the 1960s there was a resurgence of foreign policy matters dominating the

attention of Australian leaders. Overall, in the area of national defense, Gorton is viewed

as more hawkish than his predecessors. He has been depicted as the political

embodiment of a budding Australian nationalism (Hymans 2007, 2000). In terms of

nuclear proliferation it is not surprising then to find that, given his more hawkish

tendencies, Gorton has been labeled as “Australia’s most pro-nuclear prime minister”

(Walsh 1997:11). The combination of growing concerns over Australia’s security

situation and Gorton’s own proclivity towards developing an Australian nuclear deterrent

65In fact the political episode of Gorton’s rise to power was at the time dubbed the “Gorton Experiment”
by journalist/author Alain Reid (1971) who was highly critical of Gorton both personally and as prime
minister.

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capability would bring the issue of Australian nuclear ambitions to a head during the

years of the Gorton government.

However, the dilemma over Australia’s nuclear aspirations was not an overnight

development. Issues related to atomic policy had been handled by Australian

governments dating back to World War II when it supplied raw materials to the Allies’

atomic bomb projects. The possibility of a home grown nuclear weapons capability was

ever present in the minds of Australian leaders. Yet, similar to the case of India,

successive Australian leaders avoided making clear choices as to the country’s nuclear

position. Caused by either a lack of technical capability or military justification at

various times, Australian policy regarding nuclear weapons development was in a

nebulous state as John Gorton came to power. Consequently, before delving into the

topic of Gorton’s world view and perceived strategic interaction, a brief discussion of the

state of Australian nuclear policy by 1968 is necessary. Also, as in the preceding cases, I

will lay out the explanations given by others regarding the causes that almost drove

Australia to a “go nuclear” proliferation outcome.

Australian Nuclear Development: “Brother can you spare a bomb?”

Australia’s introduction into the world of atomic energy and weapons was

triggered by its possession of significant uranium reserves. Discovered at the end of the

nineteenth century and mined sparingly for various and limited commercial purposes, this

reserve would be used to support the efforts of both Britain and US in their secret atomic

bomb projects during World War II. This was especially the case of the British who had

no indigenous source of uranium. While an eager partner, early hopes that Australian

assistance in providing uranium would be favored by sharing technical information, as

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some sort of quid pro quo, never materialized (Cawte 1992). Due to the immense

secrecy surrounding these efforts, the Australians were kept out of the loop regarding the

details and ultimate end use of the material.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Australian government under Prime

Minister Chifley (1945-1949) initially rejected the idea of developing nuclear weapons.

This rejection was not so much a moral or ethical stand, but rather a reflection of the

country’s lack of any meaningful nuclear infrastructure, apart from uranium mining, and

concern over the level of expenditure needed for such a program (Cawte 1992). Australia

also was at a technical disadvantage, lacking a domestic atomic scientific community,

which was exacerbated by the unwillingness of either the US or the British to share

technical knowhow due to secrecy concerns.

While the likelihood of developing an atomic weapons capability were relatively

low, Australia, like many countries during the initial stage of the atomic revolution, was

very much interested in the potential of this new technology for energy production. The

early claims about nearly limitless and cheap atomic energy was especially seductive to

Australian leaders who had critical concerns over energy needs as the country imported

all of its oil and had limited coal reserves. Indeed the real value placed on atomic energy

by Australian leaders during this period was its economic potential. Consequently, the

lack of cooperation by either the British or the American was suspected by some

Australian leaders, not as a strategic/military matter, but as an effort to deny them the

economic potential of this emerging technology (Cawte 1992).

Seeing the potential of atomic energy, the national government embarked on

creating bodies for coordinating atomic development. Foremost among these new bodies

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were the Atomic Energy Research Advisory Committee and the Australian National

University in Canberra both established in 1946. The former would advise the

government on atomic policy. Meanwhile, the university marked the attempt to develop a

domestic atomic science community as the centerpiece of the university was a school of

nuclear physics (Cawte 1992). Despite these efforts it was readily apparent that their

country was playing catch-up compared to the British and Americans. There was little

question that significant advancement of Australian efforts to develop its own atomic

energy program, peaceful or otherwise, would require outside assistance.

The bid to develop Australia’s own nuclear program continued through the 1950s

under the Menzies government (1949-1966). Efforts to build cooperative links to assist

Australia’s nuclear program were re-focused with particular attention paid to enhancing

ties with Britain. In this attempt, Prime Minister Menzies would pursue a sensitive and

controversial relationship with the British regarding nuclear cooperation.

Indeed, in December 1951, an agreement was reached between the two countries

whereby Australia offered the British several sites for conducting above ground atomic

tests.66 For the Australian government this agreement was touted as serving to forge a

cooperative arrangement between the two states which would benefit both. However, the

agreement did not specify any requirement of technology sharing on the part of the

British. As Cawte (1992) contends:

At least as the Australian government saw it, the test represented

their part of an unstated arrangement. Australia would assist
Britain now in the area of atomic energy on the understanding
that Britain would reciprocate. The arrangement was intuitive

66 Leading up to the decision the British under Churchill had been leaning towards a similar offer extended
by the Americans, however, British concerns on becoming overly dependent on the US made the Australian
offer ultimately more attractive.

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 rather than contractual—something it felt Britain could be relied
upon to honour [sic], but not the USA (41).

Between 1952 and 1963 the British conducted approximately a dozen major and minor

tests, including their first atomic test, code-name “Hurricane,” on October 3, 1952 off the

western coast of Australia.

Around the same time, the Australians moved to formalize their nuclear

community creating the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (“AAEC”) which was

established through the 1952 Atomic Energy Bill. This new body was charged with the

dual responsibilities of advising the government on nuclear policy and also becoming the

central clearinghouse of all atomic research. Like the statutes in other countries which

established national atomic energy oversight bodies, the Australian legislation provided a

high degree of secrecy for the commission’s activities. Nevertheless, despite the

creation of the AAEC and the cooperation with Britain over atomic testing, progress on

receiving technological cooperation from the British was slow. Concerns over the type of

information to be shared, British goals of an exclusive right over Australian mined

uranium, and growing concerns over Britain’s compliance with any agreement served to

frustrate Anglo-Australian cooperation (Cawte 1992). Not until 1956, after years of

extensive negotiations, would the Menzies government sign a formal agreement on

cooperation on atomic energy, however, this partnership was not with the British as

expected but instead struck with the Americans.67

While the main goal of the Australian atomic efforts centered on energy and

industrial use, the military potential was not lost on Australian leaders. Previous

discussions about attaining nuclear weapons capability which had been curtailed during

67The document was entitled “Agreement for Cooperation of the Civil Use of Atomic Energy Between the
Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the United States of America”

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the Chifley government were renewed in the 1950s. With the building Cold War tensions

given the Korean Conflict, the security dialogue in Canberra openly discussed the

potential need for an Australian atomic bomb. However, in recognizing that such a need

could not be satisfied in the near term given the fledging state of the country’s nuclear

infrastructure, these discussions focused on the possibility of obtaining, or “sharing,”

nuclear weapons from Australia’s allies, primarily the US or UK. This move

corresponded to a 1955 US policy which authorized the Department of Defense to station

nuclear arms in NATO countries. The Menzies government sought assurances from the

US that a similar policy would apply to the Australia, New Zealand, United State

Security Treaty (“ANZUS”) as well. A leading proponent of a sharing arrangement was

the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). As a demonstration of its commitment to the

idea, the RAAF had gone so far as to refit Australian aircraft, notably the Canberra and

Sabre, so to be fully compatible with American nuclear weapons systems to facilitate

ordinance transfers (Cawte 1992).

On multiple occasion, from late-1957 through 1958, Australian national

documents indicate inquiries by the Australian Ministry of Defense about obtaining a

weapon, either by purchase or, better yet, for free (Walsh 2000; Cawte 1992). Initial

attempts to persuade the British to “supply” the RAAF with nuclear bombs had garnered

little interest on the part of the British. Moreover, it appears that Menzies had “no

enthusiasm for the project” and happily let the request die offering little support (Walsh

2000:3). Despite the lack of any push from the prime minister’s office, the Australian

Air Marshal, F.R. W. “Shug” Scherger, pressed the matter, writing an informal request to

his British cohort in August 1958 inquiring about a possible “purchase” of a tactical

218
nuclear weapon (Walsh 2000; Cawte 1992). The correspondence was apparently done

without authorization from the Prime Minister’s office and was “a kite-flying exercise

and not an official approach by the Australian government” (Cawte 1992:108). This

time, however, a more favorable response from the British kept the issue alive pending a

state visit to Australia by British Prime Minister MacMillan slated for January 1959.

While Menzies raised the issue at the January meeting, and in follow-up discussions with

British official, he was a somewhat apprehensive proponent of the effort. Nonetheless,

his efforts were enough given the increasing affinity of the British towards the proposal

(Walsh 2000).68 Discussions about the matter would continue over the remainder of the

year. Yet, by the end of 1959, the Menzies government would lose interest and

ultimately discard the idea of acquiring tactical nuclear weapons (Cawte 1992).

While this period was notable for the efforts expended in possibly acquiring

nuclear weapons, little was done to address Australia’s own domestic capacity to produce

such weapons. As one observer characterizes Australian nuclear policy at the time “that

while Australian defence [sic] planners were keen to buy ready-made weapons from

overseas, or better still receive them for free, they did not favour [sic] the development

and manufacture of weapons in Australia itself” (Cawte 1992:108). Australian interests

in nuclear weapons appeared constrained by the perceived costs of such weapons, not

only in terms of economic resources but also in terms of alliance costs (Cawte 1992). By

the end of the 1950s, it appears that Australian leaders recognized that the US, not

Britain, would become their critical security partner, but one unwilling to share atomic

weapons (Reynolds 2000).

68While part of this affinity was due to military and strategic incentives evaluated by the British, another
powerful motivation was the economic incentive as it was hoped that such a weapons transfer would
coincide with an Australian purchase of British bomber aircraft to deliver the weapons (Walsh 2000).

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 By 1964 the Australian nuclear program was at a crossroads. The early luster and

promise of atomic energy for industrial and power generation had been largely overstated

causing Australian civilian atomic development to stall-out at an undeveloped state.

Moreover, the lack of enthusiasm for developing a native nuclear weapons capability

resulted in a lack of coherence regarding Australia’s proliferation policy—Australian

proliferation was neither rejected nor embraced. While the Holt government would seek

to give some direction to national nuclear policy, its short tenure would leave any

significant changes to the succeeding Gorton government.

Australia’s bid for the Bomb: Domino Theory and the Bomb Lobby

The recent examinations of Australia’s foray into nuclear proliferation in the latter

half of the 1960s under the Gorton government have offered up two explanations. On the

one hand, conflicts in Southeast Asia starting in the late 1950s brought the issue of

national security to the forefront of Australian politics. On the other hand,

intergovernmental politics appears to have played a role as institutional actors, such as

the RAAF and AAEC, kept Australian nuclear weapons aspirations alive. Both of these

issues, rising security concerns and the presence of interested domestic actors, converged

during the government of John Gorton. Moreover, Gorton had established himself as

favorable predisposed towards the idea of an Australian nuclear deterrent. Lastly,

growing momentum from the international community pushing for a nuclear

nonproliferation treaty would force the Australian government to come to grip with its

proliferation aspirations.

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 Applying the Security Explanation: Asian Dominos

By the time the Gorton government came to power in 1966 the country’s security

outlook had undergone profound changes over the course of a decade. During the 1950s

foreign policy, particularly as to security matters, took a back seat to the government’s

emphasis on economic development coming out of World War II. However, changes in

the international environment forced Australian leaders to pay closer attention to external

matters as by the early 1960s “foreign policy seemed suddenly relevant” (Cawte

1992:111). The rising importance of foreign policy can be traced to three major

developments: regional instability as witnessed by various conflicts, including Indonesia

and Malaysia; increasing concern over the potential nuclear threat posed by China; and,

the changing alliance dynamics in light of British withdrawal.

Regionally, the early 1960s were an uncertain time as problems in neighboring

states would demand the attention of Australian leaders. With the backdrop of the Cold

War, a principle culprit of this regional unrest was seen to be the influence of the global

communist movement. By the beginning of the decade the concept of the “domino

theory” was fully developed as the US and its allies sought to contain communist

expansion. In Canberra this became more than just a theory as the perception was that

Australia literally stood at the end of a line of countries where the efforts of communist

subversion were in full effect. Of immediate concern was the stability of neighboring

Malaysia. While the “Malayan Emergency” (1948-1960) had passed ending a decade

long counterinsurgency against communist rebels waged by British and Commonwealth

forces, including Australian forces, there was still uncertainty as to how long this internal

peace would last. Indeed hostilities would break out between government forces and

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anti-government communist insurgents in 1967. Elsewhere in the region communist

forces were blamed for an unsuccessful coup against Indonesian leader Sukarno in

September 1965. Besides growing concerns over perceived communist aggression,

Australian leaders also faced regional instability caused by a territorial dispute between

Malaysia and Indonesia over the island of Borneo. Periodic skirmishes beginning in

1962 eventually escalated into a full military confrontation where in 1965 Australia

would commit its military forces in support of Malaysia. While an agreement was

reached in 1966 terminating hostilities, Australian anxieties over the regional security

situation persisted in light of the full withdrawal of British military forces from the

region.

Adding to Australian unease over communist activities in the region were the

activities of China. Much of the blame for insurgent activities in the region was pinned

to China which, under the leadership of Chairman Mao, was spreading an ideology of

revolutionary national liberation. Of great interest to Australian defense planners was the

state of the Chinese nuclear program. In the years leading up to the Chinese atomic test

in 1964, the Australian government had continued to monitor its progress and had been

relative well-informed as to the potential timeline of the Chinese program. For outsiders

the presence and development of the Chinese program was viewed as a bellwether for

Australian proliferation efforts. Approximately a year and half before the Chinese

explosion, US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, on February 12, 1963, wrote a

memorandum to President Kennedy which cites Australia as a likely proliferating state

especially if China followed through on its program (Reynolds 2000:207). The

Australians through their intelligence efforts were mindful of the likelihood that the

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Chinese would conduct an atomic test in late 1964. However, the apparent level of

sophistication of the device tested was a matter of concern for the Australians as they

were caught by surprise at to the advanced state of the Chinese program (Hymans 2000).

Nevertheless, reaction by the Menzies government did not express a high degree of

urgency. It was more than a year after the Chinese test before the government authorized

the AAEC to undertake a study evaluating the possibility of a domestic nuclear bomb

program and the estimated costs of such a program. The subsequent Holt government

would commission further studies in 1967 (Walsh 2000).

Lastly, adding to the dilemma of the regional security situation was the evolution

of the alliance politics undertaken by Australia starting in the late 1950s. Until the late

1950s Australian national security interests were synonymous with the British

Commonwealth’s, or, as it became referred to after World War II, the “Fourth Empire.”

Based on their shared history and commonalities, the fostering of an Anglo-Australian

relationship had been a given for previous governments in Canberra. Certainly the

relationship appeared to serve both countries’ strategic interests. For Australia, seeing

itself as a small country, it gained the support of a larger nation. Meanwhile, Britain

could utilize Australia as a forward base of operation for its interests in Asia. Perhaps no

better illustration of this special relationship was the agreement on British nuclear testing

in Australia. However, while Australian interests in maintaining this relationship would

continue, it was the interests of the British that would rapidly transform and significantly

diminish Anglo-Australian ties in the area of national security.

The turning point in the regional security situation occurred in 1957. In spring of

1957 discussions between the US and Britain at the Bermuda Conference occurred which

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would forever change British global priorities. As historian Wayne Reynolds

summarizes, “the Bermuda Conference of March 1957 signalled [sic] the end” of the

Fourth Empire (2000:216). Following the conference, Britain would essentially defer to

the US on matters of nuclear strategy. This had immediate implications for Australia’s

attempts to acquire nuclear weapons as the US subsequently adopted a policy to

discourage other allied nations from developing independent weapons capabilities

(Reynolds 2000). Aside from affecting Australian desires to have “keys to the

cupboard,” the narrowing of British worldwide interests would directly impact

Australia’s regional security environment. Most notably was the British troop

withdrawal from Malaysia. Indeed, well before the 1967 speech by British Prime

Minister Harold Wilson, the writing was on the wall that British forces would no longer

be stationed “east of Suez.”

The withdrawal of the British from the region left Australia with only one viable

strategic partner in the region—the US. While already embedded in a regional alliance

with the Americans by virtue of ANZUS, concerns persisted over US commitment to the

region. This was a particularly worry during the Eisenhower administration which had

sought to limit US commitment abroad. However, US involvement in Vietnam offered

the Australians an opportunity to deepen their strategic relationship with the US. The

belief held by many Australian leaders was that, “Australia had to do what it could to

make itself indispensable” to the US (Cawte 1992:112). Seeking to establish its

credentials as a valuable partner, the Menzies government agreed in 1964 to commit

Australian military forces to the Vietnam. While domestically controversial at the time,

the government’s portrayal of the matter as one honoring alliance commitments was best

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summed up by Menzies’ own slogan, “going all the way with LBJ.” Yet, by 1968,

mounting US disenchantment over the conflict in Vietnam and moves to reduce US

involvement raised the specter of another “great and powerful friend” abandoning the

region (Reynolds 2000:4). The era promoted a Janis-like policy dilemma for the

Australians as they publicly sought to interweave their policy with the Americans, but

privately focused on the need of greater self-reliance in foreign policy (Cawte 1992:112).

The need to act independently helped to keep the nuclear option viable.

This notion of a more autonomous Australian foreign policy fit well with Prime

Minster Gorton’s own sentiments. Gorton had been a long advocate for developing an

Australian nuclear weapons capability. While Menzies deferred to Australia’s allies on

the nuclear issue, favoring nuclear guarantees, Gorton possessed a greater sense of

Australian nationalism “increasingly sure of its capacity for independent thought and

action” (Hymans 2000:7). As Cawte (1992) describes, “for Gorton, defence [sic] was an

either/or question of forward defense within the Anglo-American alliance or ‘Fortress

Australia.’ Gorton clearly favored the latter”(116). He openly questioned the value of

such joint security arrangements. Gorton had as a senator argued against the logic of

extended deterrence and, in paraphrasing France’s Charles De Gaulle, questioned if the

Americans would really sacrifice San Francisco for Sydney (Walsh 2000; Hymans 2000).

In fact, shortly after Gorton’s election the British announced their withdrawal from Asia,

and America announced the limiting of its bombing campaign against North Vietnam

(Walsh 2000). These developments reinforced Gorton’s desire to develop a home grown

capability. This desire is viewed as a driving factor in the efforts to build a 500MW

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nuclear reactor in Jervis Bay which could provide the necessary fuel for weapons

production (Reynolds 2000; Cawte 1992).

Domestic Politics Explanation: The Australian bomb lobby

While the security situation of Australia appears to offer manifest justification for

the Gorton government’s desire to develop an independent nuclear deterrent, another

critical factor appears to have been the presence of governmental institutions and actors

with nuclear ambitions. The presence of a “bomb lobby” was a critical factor in keeping

Australian nuclear aspirations alive through both the Menzies and Holt governments until

a more inclined leader like Gorton emerged on the scene. As Walsh (2000) notes, while

there was a change in political leadership, “what had not changed during this period was

the fact that important constituencies within the Australian government were still

lobbying for an Australian nuclear weapons capability” (10). As discussed earlier, the

Australian military, particularly the RAAF, was a leading advocate of governmental

attempts to obtain tactical nuclear weapons. This advocacy would continue as a major

military purchase during the Gorton government was the acquisition of US made F-111

fighter/bombers which were capable of carrying nuclear ordinance. However, little

evidence suggests that the military made any push for a domestic weapons production

capacity. The role of leading advocate for domestic production would fall to the AAEC.

Charged with the task of advising the government and directing all nuclear

research, the issues of both civilian/industrial and military nuclear production fell under

the authority of the AAEC. As to the issue of civilian/industrial nuclear production, by

the early 1960s the AAEC found itself in the same predicament as similar bodies in other

countries seeking to tap nuclear energy’s potential. The vast optimism that nuclear

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energy would solve energy issues (“being too cheap to meter”) or that peaceful atomic

detonations could be used in mining or harbor construction, had fizzled given economic

and technical realities. Accordingly, half of the organization’s mandate was a non-

starter, leaving the area of weapons development as the only meaningful path for

continuing the nuclear program. While the initial intent of the Chifley and Menzies

governments was to focus on the economic potential of nuclear energy, the AAEC had to

pursue other means to justify its organizational existence. In characterizing the role the

AAEC would play in the proliferation debate, Cawte (1992) writes:

…in establishing the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, it

[the government] had, like Frankenstein, created a monster—a
modern institutional Prometheus— which, in seeking to find an
alternative raison d’être, tried to drag Australia to the threshold
of becoming a nuclear weapon state. By the late 1960s it had
almost succeeded (97)(author’s emphasis).

The standard bearer for the AAEC on this issue was none other than the chair of

the commission, Sir Philip Baxter. Serving on the AAEC since 1954, Baxter became

known for his “bureaucratic acumen and influence over government policy” and was

viewed as the “dominant bureaucratic nuclear policy advisor” (Walsh 2000:10). This

dominant position was jealously guarded by Baxter who had on occasions used the

secrecy provisions of the AAEC’s enacting legislation to prevent other ministries from

appointing their own nuclear scientists (Cawte 1992). However, while a vocal advocate

for developing the nuclear energy infrastructure, which would fall under the aegis of the

AAEC, Baxter’s motivations appear derived from his own broadly conceived security

concerns. While Australian security concerns might have offered a pretext to conceal a

bureaucratic politics agenda, Baxter’s focus on security is well documented and appears

earnest. For Baxter the development of Australian nuclear capabilities was tied to a sort

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of colonial manifest destiny. Speaking in 1957, Baxter said. “Australia is the last big

continent which the white man has to develop and populate. It will be a difficult task but

the use of atomic energy should make both easier and more certain” (Cawte 1992:96).

Throughout the debates during the Menzies government on the acquisition of

nuclear weapons from the US or Britain, Baxter repeatedly urged the development of a

plutonium producing reactor facility over the “acquisition” strategy (Reynolds 2000).

Although these previous pleas had failed to gain traction under earlier governments,

Baxter would find a like-minded partner in Gorton wanting to bring the country into the

nuclear age. Now teamed with Gorton, Baxter’s plans for developing a power reactor at

Jervis Bay gained momentum as initial plans were devised while simultaneously studies

were authorized to examine the “technical, political, and strategic aspects of an

Australian bomb program” (Hymans 2000:10). While development of the Jervis Bay

reactor was portrayed in terms of economic benefits through power generation, outsiders

who studied the proposed plans for the reactor at the time noted that “its stated rationale

seemed bereft of logic—that is, except a possible military logic (Cawte 1992:126). In

fact, the design specifications for the plant pushed for by Baxter ensured that it would

produce sufficient amounts of enriched plutonium which would be required for weapons

purposes. The military application was of course not lost on Baxter who stated at the time

that:

The growth of this industry and the expertise and the facilities
which it will create will provide a basis from which an
Australian government, at any future date, feeling that nuclear
weapons were essential to provide this nation’s security, could
move with minimum delay to provide such means of defence
[sic] (Cawte 1992:127).

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Unfortunately for Baxter and the AAEC, their fate, as well as that of the Jervis Bay

project, was directly tied to the electoral fortunes of John Gorton. With the fall of

Gorton in 1971, the Jervis Bay project would be shelved by McMahon and the later

action by the Whitlam government in signing the NPT would foreclose the possibility of

an atomic-armed Australia.69

Lastly, the elevation of John Gorton not only gave new voice to long time

advocates within the government like Baxter, but also brought in a group of new

individuals who also favored an independent nuclear capability. Gorton’s cabinet was

seen as reflecting his own independent, maverick political sensibilities. Bucking the

more traditionalist views of Menzies or Holt, Gorton’s cabinet was made up of “party

rebels or young up-and-comers” seeking to shake things up (Hymans 2000). Even

ministers from outside those ministries traditionally associated with the proliferation

discussion came into office with a stated view. In the case of W.C. Wentworth, the

Minister of Social Security, who was a strong advocate for an Australian bomb, he

allegedly conditioned his support for Gorton on investing in nuclear weapons (Cawte

1992). Wentworth’s interest went so far as to drive him to interrupt a cabinet meeting of

the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, of which he was not a member, to make

heard his views on the NPT and the need for Australia to have atomic weapons (Cawte

1992). Nevertheless, despite a more vocal bomb lobby, there remained many within the

government who sided with the previous thinking that such action on nuclear weapons

did not serve Australian interests either economically or in terms of security. This

69 McMahon upon taking power in March 1971 authorized a reexamination of the Jervis Bay project by the
Treasury. The analysis bore out that the actual cost of the project would be approximately $140 million
(Australian dollars) rather than the $80 initial cited. Further, in terms of cost for the power generated the
report claimed that cost of the over to be generated by the reactor would be 100 times more expensive than
that of a modern coal plant (Cawte 1992).

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division within the cabinet would become most apparent in the discussions over the

government’s response to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that would arise

during the first few months of the Gorton Government.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Australian ambiguity

In the face of the changing Australian security situation and the presence of

influential government actors, including a leader, who were pro-bomb, perhaps the most

significant factor driving Australia to make a decision on its proliferation ambitions came

from the international community. By 1968 a revised version of the nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) replaced the previously unsuccessful drafts and had gained

wide international support. For the Australian government, however, the NPT proved

problematic as the Treaty provisions provided that the nuclear weapons states, being

those currently possessing nuclear weapons, should not provide weapons technology or

materials to non-weapons state. Australia, which had sat on the fence on the issue of

proliferation for over a decade, suddenly faced the dilemma that the ultimate decision on

proliferation might be taken out of their hands by the Treaty. For the Gorton government

dealing with the NPT and the growing international pressure to see countries like

Australia join as non-weapon states would butt against the nuclear aspirations held by

many in the cabinet including Gorton himself.

The internal debate within the Gorton Government would reveal the challenge

posed by the NPT issue forcing a revisiting of the rationales asserted by both sides of the

issue and placing members of the government on opposite sides of the proliferation issue.

For Gorton, and those in favor of pursuing an independent Australian nuclear capability,

the issue at first was simple—Australia should not sign the Treaty. Publically, Gorton

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and others from this camp cited the technical flaws of the Treaty including verification

and enforcement as grounds for Australia’s resistance to signing. Meanwhile, those

favoring signing the NPT rested on a traditional view of Australia’s foreign and national

security policy. Led by the Minister of External Affairs, James Plimsoll, the pro-NPT

advocates argued the importance of the Treaty in preventing other countries in the region

(e.g. Indonesia) from obtaining nuclear weapons and that the possibility of an Australian

weapons program sometime in the future was not worth alienating current allies,

particularly the US, over the issue (Hymans 2000). The visible and irreconcilable

differences amongst the cabinet served to prevent Gorton from acting on his own

inclination to reject the NPT out of hand.

While unable to simply reject the Treaty, the Gorton government pursued its

nuclear agenda pushing for the Jervis Bay reactor project and entering into a then secret

nuclear cooperation agreement with France dealing with fuel reprocessing. These efforts

were acted upon with some urgency with concerns that the NPT might work to prevent

such nuclear developments in the future regardless of whether Australia was a member of

the Treaty. Moreover, it appears that the Gorton government was interested in advancing

the nuclear program as much as possible in case of the eventual requirement to accept the

NPT. Walsh (2000) points to a previously classified US study detailing the April 1968

visit to Canberra by Secretary of Defense Dean Rusk’s where over the course of the visit

various Australian officials sought to get a better idea of “just how far they could go

under the treaty toward developing nuclear-weapons capability….”70 Nonetheless,

70The document and volume number cited by Walsh (2000): The US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency During the Johnson Administration (U), Volume I, Summary and Analysis of Principle
Developments, [1968], pp. 90-91, Administrative History of US ACDA, Box 1-2, Lyndon Baines Johnson
Presidential Library.

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despite the wishes of Gorton and others to simply ignore the NPT issue, by 1970 the

pressure on the government due to changing circumstance would force a decision.

However, this showdown would set the stage for a peculiar outcome leading to only

further uncertainty about Australia’s nuclear future.

Both international and domestic circumstance would require the Gorton

government to revisit the issue of NPT membership. Internationally, the NPT had proven

to be well received with countries signing it at a fast clip. Even previous hold-out

countries like West Germany and Japan had moved to sign the Treaty. This action would

served to undercut Gorton’s position as these two countries had voiced concerns about

the Treaty similar to those put forward by Australia, but in the end agreed to sign the

NPT as written. Australia was quickly becoming conspicuous in not signing the Treaty.

Concerns were raised by some Australian leaders that failure to sign the NPT might serve

to isolate it from the international community and damage its international reputation

(Walsh 2000; Cawte 1992). Domestically, the Gorton government had experienced a

setback in the 1970 general elections losing several parliamentary seats. Although

maintaining his hold on the leadership, Gorton was forced to reshuffle the cabinet

abandoning some of the upstarts appointed in 1968 and bring in more established Liberal

Party members. Foremost of these new appointments was William McMahon as Minister

of External Affairs. McMahon was a political rival who would shortly challenge

Gorton’s leadership and briefly assume post of prime minister in 1971. McMahon would

be a forceful advocate voicing the traditionalist arguments while also pointing to the

growing list of countries signing the Treaty making Australia’s position unsustainable

(Cawte 1992).

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 The resulting pressures inevitably meant something had to give on the NPT. On

February 18, 1970, Gorton announced that Australia would sign the NPT, but would not

ratify it. As Gorton stated, “we wish to make it plain that our decision to sign is not to be

taken in any way as a decision to ratify the Treaty, and of course, the Treaty is not

binding on us until it is ratified.”71 The result was an outcome engineered by Gorton

which sought to appease NPT proponents while still keeping the door open for Australian

nuclear weapons development. In signing but not ratifying the Treaty, Gorton was taking

advantage of the particular language and requirements of the NPT. Under the provisions

of the NPT, countries that signed the treaty before it entered into force were not bound by

the treaty until they ratified it, however, countries that signed the treaty after it entered

into force (following ratification by the three co-sponsors and 40 other states) would be

bound from the time of signature (Walsh 2000).72 By virtue of this tactical, albeit

perhaps “cynical,” reason for signing the Treaty, Gorton prevented Australia’s

proliferation decision from being made by others (Cawte 1992:129). For Gorton the

issue of the NPT had been resolved, regardless of how it played to some, as he had no

intent to bring it up for ratification.73

What Gorton failed to recognize was that the tenuous nature of Australia’s

proliferation aspirations could only survive as long as he remained in power. Gorton

himself would lose a leadership struggle in the Liberal Party with his political rival

William McMahon succeeding him to the top post. Within 24 months of Gorton’s

71 “Signing of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. John Gorton. 18
February 1970.
72 Australia would in fact be the second to last country to sign the NPT before it entered into force on
March 5, 1970.

73Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam would remark that the actions by the government in signing the NPT
was done so in the “most grudging and graceless manner possible.”

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departure, Labor Party stalwart, Gough Whitlam, would be elected prime minister,

marking the end of 23 years of Liberal-National Party coalition governments. One of

Whitlam’s first acts would be the ratification of the NPT in January 1973. By this one

action Australia affirmed its international status as a nuclear non-weapon state ending

nearly twenty years of nuclear aspirations and uncertainty.

The World View and Strategic Interactions of John Gorton

The reasons why Australia made a concerted effort for an indigenous nuclear

weapon capability for the period of 1968 through 1971 appear have some basis for

grounding in both the security and domestic politics explanations. Walsh (2000)

especially notes the organizational influences, the role of the so-called bomb lobby, in

pushing for such a program. However, like the other countries examined here, the

Australian case presents a situation where the matters of security and presence of

interested domestic actors existed well before a proliferation decision was made. These

situational factors provided the opportunity for justifying and developing a nuclear

weapons program, but it appears to have been the desire and nuclear aspirations of John

Gorton which sought to bring this possibility to fruition. Moreover, given the speed with

which these nuclear ambitions were derailed following Gorton’s political fall, the critical

weight to be given to these factors is severely in doubt.

The role of Gorton appears to be a critical piece of the Australian nuclear puzzle.

It is contended that the elevation of Gorton introduced a new breed of Australian

politician, one more comfortable in asserting Australian independence breaking from the

Commonwealth leanings of predecessors like Menzies and Chifley. In developing this

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portrait of nationalism possessed by Gorton, Hymans (2006) asserts that Gorton’s brand

of nationalism combines a concern over a perceived threat with a need for autonomy.

The findings here support the notion that a perceived threat posed by others in the

international system played a significant role in structuring Gorton’s world view. The

finding from Gorton’s strategic interaction suggests that his proliferation aspirations

appear to be a manifestation of concern about Other rather than an inherent feature of

Gorton’s perception of Self. In developing the operational code of John Gorton we find a

leader that is not drastically different from that of the average world leader.74 As shown

in Table 8.1, Gorton exhibits no statistically significant differences from the average

world leader as to any of the master beliefs (I-1, P-1, P-4). Only two significant

differences emerge.

74 For Gorton 26 public statements were examined resulting in 810 coded verbs.

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 Table 8.1. Gorton’s Operational Code

Philosophical & Instrumental Beliefs Gorton Norming Group

P-1. Nature of Political Universe .279 0.301
(Conflict/Cooperation)
P-2. Realization of Political Values .134 0.147
(Pessimism/Optimism)
P-3. Political Future .201 0.134
(Unpredictable/Predictable)
P-4. Historical Developments .213 0.224
(Low Control/High Control)
P-5. Role of Chance .949 0.968
(Small Role/Large Role)
I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals .506 0.401
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-2. Intensity of Tactics .238 0.178
(Conflict/Cooperation)
I-3. Risk Orientation .467* 0.332
(Averse/Acceptant)

I-4. Timing of Action

a. Conflict/Cooperation .314** 0.503
b. Words/Deeds .469 0.464

I-5. Utility of Means

a. Reward .493 0.157
b. Promise .063 0.075
c. Appeal/Support .198 0.468
d. Oppose/Resist .115 0.154
e. Threaten .014 0.034
f. Punish .118 0.112
* indicates significance at the .05 level using a two-tailed test
** indicates significance at the .01 level using a two-tailed test

In the case of I-3 we find that Gorton differs from the average world leader at the

.05 level of significance. The I-3 index address the concept of a leader’s risk orientation

in terms of the variety, or diversification, of tactic mentioned in the subject rhetoric

(Walker and Schafer 2006a). This index is measured from 0 (low) to 1 (high). A lower

score (approaching 0) indicates diversity in the subject’s rhetoric, representing the desire

236
to spread the risk of rely on any one tactic, and being risk adverse. Meanwhile, higher

scores indicate less diversity and greater risk acceptance. Based on Gorton’s score (.467)

versus that of the norming group (.332), Gorton is likely to be more risk acceptance. The

other noted difference is for the I-4a index, where the difference was statistically

significant at the .01 level. This score approximates I-3 as it seeks to measure the

flexibility in the tactics reflected in the subject’s rhetoric, however, I-4a measures this in

terms of cooperative and conflict action. Measured from 0 to 1, the higher the score the

greater the subject’s flexibility in alternating between cooperative and conflictual action.

Gorton’s score (.314) versus the norming group’s score (.503) indicates that Gorton is

less inclined to alternate between conflict and cooperative actions. This conforms to the

common perception of Gorton as moving away from the traditionalist view of Australian

reliance on great and powerful friends seeking instead greater independence and self-

reliance in foreign policy. While Gorton’s operational code scores reveal few significant

differences, development of the leader types reveal an important disparity between his

perceptions of Self and Other.

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 Figure 8.1. Gorton’s Perceptions of Self and Other

In using the aggrateged speech scores to plot the perceptions of the typologies for

Self and Other, what emerge are two distinctly different leader types. For Self, Gorton’s

perceives himself as a Type A leader (-.314, .393). Accordingly, the expectation is a

leader viewing the international system as a cooperative place and prone to use

cooperative tactic in achieving political goals seeking to avoid the early use of force.

Reflecting Gorton’s national confidence, a Type A leader believes that the future is

relatively controllable and predictable and therefore is optimistic about the achievement

of political goals. Type A leaders see misperception and miscommunication as the major

causes for conflict. Although adversaries may act impulsively or irrationally, they can be

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dealt with through tit-for-tat conditioning as they are seen as responding in kind to

firmness or conciliation. However, Type A is not a perfect fit for Gorton for while the

ideal Type A is flexible in their strategies seeking to lower risk, Gorton’s operational

code indicates him as being less strategically flexible (I-4a) and more risk acceptant (I-3)

than the average world leader. Overall, in placing himself in the Type A quadrant,

Gorton’s ideal strategy preference ordering script is represented as Settle > Deadlock >

Dominate > Submit.

Meanwhile, as for his perception of Other, Gorton’s scores place Other in the

Type B quadrant. Type B leaders share in common with Type A leaders beliefs about the

controllability and predictability of historical developments. However, given that they

see the world as a conflict–oriented place, this optimism emboldens them to utilize more

aggressive strategies and tactics. While a variety of means may be employed so to

achieve their political ends, Type B leaders are more willing than others to use force

when the gains outweigh the costs. This aggressive nature attributed to Other appears to

correspond with Gorton’s preoccupied with the communist threat in Asia. The

preference ordering for Type B reflects their more assertive nature as it rates domination

as the most preferred outcome. Their overall idealized strategic script is shown as

Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.

Table 8.2. Gorton’s Perceptions of Self and Other

Modified Holsti
Holsti Strategic Preference TIP TIP Strategic
Type Ordering Proposition Preferences

Self Type A Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit #2 Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit

Other Type B Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit #5 Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit

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 In developing Gorton’s perceptions of Self and Other, before constructing his

subjective game, I apply the TIP calculations in order to see if modification of the

startegic preference ordering scripts is necessary. For Self, the results are “+, =.” This

means that Gorton’s I-1 score (.570) is “above” (+) the norming groups score in terms of

the nature of the political universe, as Gorton score reflects a more cooperative view of

the international system than the average world leader. As to optimism over ability to

control historical developments (P-4a), Gorton’s score indicates that he sees himself as

having the same (=) level of control as the average world leader. Accordingly, based on

the TIP propositions (see Table 8.2), Gorton’s preference ordering is modified switching

the postions of “Deadlock” and “Dominate.” The resulting script is Settle > Dominate >

Deadlock > Submit. The preference ordering for Other is modified as well. The TIP

calculations result in Other falling under proposition #5 (−, =). Gorton’s P-1 score (.274)

is “below” (−) the score for the average world leader (.301) meaning that Gorton’s

perceives Other as less cooperative than does the average world leader. As for control

over histroical developments, Gorton’s Other is seen as having the same (=) ability as the

average world leader. The resulting modification to the Other’s strategic preference

ordering script leads to a slight water-down Other, that while still seeking to “Dominate”

outcomes ranks “Settle” over “Deadlock.” The new script is Dominate > Settle >

Deadlock > Submit.

Having modified the strategic preference ordering scripts for Self and Other,

Gorton’s perceived strategic interaction can now take shape. The resulting subjective

game is a deadlock game as shown in Figure 8.2. Gorton’s subjective game is similar to

the one exhibited by Prime Minister Vajpayee of India. The game presents a strategic

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interaction where the initial state of the game proves critical. This game possesses two

non-myopic equilibriums: the mutual cooperation outcome of “cooperate, cooperate” (4,

3) and the deadlock outcome of “conflict, conflict” (3, 2). Which of these outcomes is

achieved is wholly dependent on the game’s initial state.

OTHER OTHER OTHER

CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 4, 3 1, 4 CO Settle Submit CO 4, 3 →‫׀‬ 1, 4
_
SELF ↓ ↑ SELF SELF

CF 2, 1 “3, 2” CF Dominate Deadlock CF 2, 1 ← “3, 2”

Self’s Strategy: Stay OUTCOMES Other’s Strategy: Move

Game state(s) in quotations indicate the “initial state” for the players
Game state(s) in bold indicate the final state (outcome) of the game
Arrows indicate moves by players, arrows with bars indicate a “non-move”

Figure 8.2. Gorton’s Subjective Game

In pointing to the historical records, Australia was at the time immediately leading

up to and during Gorton’s government embroiled in the Vietnam conflict, just coming out

of the Malaysian Emergency, and dealing with the attempted coup in neighboring

Indonesia which threatened to destabilize that country. Additionally, the decision of the

British to withdraw its worldwide troop presence from anywhere “east of the Suez”

undermined the Anglo-Australian alliance. Most importantly, it appears that Gorton

perceived threats and saw Australia as in a state of conflict, both regionally and globally,

with communist aggression.

With an initial state of “Deadlock” (conflict, conflict) Gorton will choose to

“stay.” His action is driven by the asymmetric scripts Gorton perceives for Self and

Other. This result presents the second best outcome for Gorton. Gorton will not move

first to switch strategies from conflict to cooperate one as the result will be Submit (1, 4)

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with Gorton receives his least desired outcome. This game emphasizes the importance of

the interaction as the impetus for shifting the game to its best outcome for both players

lies with Other.

For the sake of comparison we can point to the other potential game outcomes had

the initial state been different. The most notable difference of course occurs where the

game starts at the state of mutual cooperation (“Settle”). In such a game, both players

will choose a strategy of stay as neither will receive a better outcome. Any move by one

will result in a countermove pushing the outcome to the less optimal 3, 2. In the game

started in a state of “conflict, cooperation,” Gorton would be prone to move, shifting his

strategy to one of cooperation, so to achieve his most preferred outcome of “Settle” (4,

3). This would come about from a magnanimity strategy where once Other cooperates

Gorton can reciprocate shifting from a conflict strategy, causing him to dominate, to a

cooperative strategy to achieve his preferred settlement outcome. But if the initial state

was “cooperate, conflict,” Gorton would counter Other’s conflict strategy and choose to

“move” by altering his strategy to move away from his least preferred outcome of

“Submit” (1, 4) to his second best outcome of Deadlock (3, 2).

The revelation of Gorton’s perception of his strategic interaction with others

appears to provide further leverage in understanding what motivated this leader to

advocate and push for an Australian nuclear weapons capability. Given Gorton’s

perception of Self as a Type A and Other as a Type B, as plotted in the Modified Holsti

Typology Matrix, the analytical framework would expected a proliferation occurrence as

the outcome. This is based on the perception of Other as more conflict-orientated and

more likely to engage in the use of force when the occasion arises. Even with the

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modification resulting from the application of TIP, Gorton’s perceived strategic

interaction reinforces the importance of Other as the game remains stuck in deadlock

pending a cooperative shift by Other. Holding with that expectation, John Gorton did

take action to further his country’s nuclear ability as exemplified by the push for the

Jervis Bay reactor program. However, unlike the case of A.B. Vajpayee, who possessed a

similar perception of the strategic interaction, Gorton’s Australia lacked the coinciding

technical capability to fulfill his nuclear aspirations. Unlike the other cases where

proliferation went forward such as South Africa with Vorster and India with Vajpayee,

Australia under Gorton offers a reverse image with a country presenting the willingness

(i.e. Gorton’s world view) but not the opportunity (i.e. nuclear technology). Gorton

actively sought to keep the nuclear option open until Australian technical expertise could

catch up to his nuclear ambitions. The calculated effort to stave off the imposition of a

decision by virtue of the NPT through signing, but not ratifying the Treaty serves as a

salient example of the length to which Gorton’s was willing to go in keeping the window

of possibility open for an atomic Australia. The case of Australia, perhaps better than

any of the other cases, keenly demonstrates the impact a leader can bring to the issue of a

country’s proliferation decision. Not only was Gorton’s desire for a domestic nuclear

weapons capability not shared by his successors, but in the course of just two years any

ambiguity as to Australia’s nuclear future would be clarified with its ratification of the

NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Before the end of the 1970s Australia would

transform itself from an aspiring nuclear weapons state to an enthusiastic advocate of

international arms control measures.

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 CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this project was to attempt the creation of a new analytical framework

for examining nuclear proliferation outcomes. Based on a preliminary application to

several historical instances of proliferation decisions, the analytical framework devised

appears able to offer a new understanding of individual leaders as critical factors in

explaining proliferation outcomes. Specifically, leaders’ perceptions of themselves and

others in the international system, placed in the context of their perceived strategic

interactions, provide unique and useful insights as to the motivations behind proliferation

decisions. In particular, the examination of the role leaders’ perceptions play in

proliferation decisions re-emphasizes the need for the scholarship to equally address the

“opportunity” and “willingness” driving proliferation outcomes. To date, far more has

been done to examine the opportunity side of the proliferation ledger. A balance must be

struck recognizing that neither alone is sufficient in explaining outcomes. Only through

combining insights from both can the pieces of the proliferation puzzle be put together.

This linkage between capability (i.e. opportunity) and intent (i.e. willingness) is

made clear in several of the cases studied. Each of these cases highlights the importance

of individual leaders’ proliferation “willingness.” In India, the differing intentions and

nuclear ambitions of Gandhi and Vajpayee resulted in dramatically different courses

being charted for India’s nuclear future. As demonstrated by the 1974 PNE, India clearly

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possessed the technical acumen to go forward with the development of nuclear weapons

under Gandhi. Yet, Gandhi provides us with a picture of a reluctant proliferator. She

possesses a relatively cooperative view of the international system and her interactions

with others. The development of such weapons did not fit with her world view and

strategic interaction with others. Accordingly, the willingness for proliferation was

largely absent and the decision points to the role and influence of domestic political

calculations. While proliferation occurred it was in a sense stillborn as rather than

capitalizing on the technical achievements and breakthroughs resulting from the PNE, the

Indian nuclear weapons program would languish for over two decade under a policy of

opaque proliferation. Not until 1998 would a convergence come about between Indian

proliferation opportunity and willingness with the rise to political power of Vajpayee.

Vajpayee’s world view and strategic interactions presents an asymmetric interaction

where concerns over others’ actions drive the situation to one of deadlock feeding the

continuation of conflictual actions resulting in an incentive to proliferate.

The case of South Africa during the 1970s presents another instance of the

convergence of technical capability with a leader’s nuclear ambitions resulting in an

occurrence of proliferation. However, for Vorster the drive to proliferate is not brought

about by concern about others, but rather as a result of his perception of Self. Viewing

himself as an offensive realist, he appears driven by the need to acquire power resources

and capabilities so to maintain maximum flexibility of means for achieving his political

goals. Meanwhile, South Africa under De Klerk offers the opposite case, where despite

possessing the capability (indeed actually possessing a handful of nuclear devices), the

preferences and perceptions of the leader points to nuclear weapons as ill-fitting with

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both the means and goals being pursued. The presence of nuclear weapons stood as an

impediment to the world view and strategic interactions perceived by De Klerk who saw

the world in much more cooperative terms than his predecessors.

Lastly, the case of Australia strongly points to the need for proliferation

opportunity and willingness to exist simultaneously. Gorton presents a leader for whom

the acquisition of such weapons fits with his strategic interaction with others, who he sees

as more hostile and prone to conflict. However, despite Gorton’s efforts to develop and

maintain the viability of an Australian nuclear option, the lack of a sufficient

technological infrastructure, caused in part by the hesitancy of the previous governments,

ultimately frustrated Gorton’s nuclear push. The case of Australia also reinforces the

lesson of South Africa in demonstrating how fragile a country’s nuclear ambitions can be

as a change in leadership or government can significantly alter proliferation outcomes.

Table 9.1. Proliferation “Opportunity” and “Willingness”

Country Opportunity Willingness Proliferation
(Leader) (Technical Capability) (Proliferation Motivation) Outcome

Australia
No Yes No
(Gorton)

India Yes No Yes

(Gandhi)

India Yes Yes Yes

(Vajpayee)
No
Libya No Yes→No
(renunciation)
(Qadhafi)

South Africa Yes Yes Yes

(Vorster)
No
South Africa Yes No
(rollback)
(De Klerk)

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 What the results also emphasize is the importance of casting the proliferation

decision in an interactive context. Based on the operational code scores one finds only a

handful of notable differences between these leaders and the average world leader. Those

that sought to proliferate did not exhibit themselves as being far more disposed to

viewing the international system as a hostile place or more likely to use conflictual

tactics. On the flip side, those that decided against proliferation are by no means pacifists

prone to only cooperative strategies and tactics. Indeed, one needs only look to the

example of Mu’ammar Qadhafi to find a leader possessing a significantly more conflict-

oriented view of the world yet still decided to cease Libyan proliferation efforts.

The major breakthrough achieved by this approach is the acknowledgment that

the decision environment surrounding proliferation decisions is a strategic one, where

actions are taken not only based on one’s own interests, but also the expectations and in

anticipation of others acting in their own interests. The complexity of the leaders’

perceptions are fully revealed by classifying their perceptions of Self and Other by use of

the Modified Holsti Typology Matrix and seeking to subsequently model these

perceptions through TIP and TOM. Once these strategic interactions are better

developed, a picture presents itself where perceptions of Self and Other can either

reinforce mutual cooperation or drive conflict. Although discovering the case of South

Africa’s Vorster who’s nuclear ambitions appear clearly derived from his perception of

Self, further research is need to determine how often such may happen.

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 Table 9.2. Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions applying the
Modified Holsti Typologies

Other
Type A Type C Type D Type B
Self
No Yes
Type A No No
(never) (Gorton)

No
No
Type C (De Klerk & No Yes
(Vajpayee)
Gandhi)

Yes
Type D No No Sometimes*
(Qadhafi)

Yes Yes
Type B Yes Yes
(Vorster) (always)
*Outcome Dependent on the Initial State.

Table 9.3. Proliferation Expectations for Strategic Interactions applying TIP

Other
Type A Type C Type D Type B
Self
No
Type A No No Yes
(never)
No No
Type C (De Klerk & No (Vajpayee & Yes
Gandhi) Gorton)
Sometimes*
Type D No No Yes
(Qadhafi)

Yes Yes
Type B Yes Yes
(Vorster) (always)
*Outcome Dependent on the Initial State.

In chapter three, expectations about proliferation outcomes were represented in

Table 3.3. In matching the variety of strategic interactions coming from TOM with

proliferation outcomes several hypotheses were derived. After developing the strategic

interactions of the six leaders and the historic result in the foregoing chapters, we can

now revisit these expectations. Overall, the incentive to proliferate and develop nuclear

248
weapons was anticipated to be slight where a leader perceives the overall strategic

interaction as between Type A and Type C leaders. This interaction is expected to

produce a mutual cooperation game where the players, through the use of cooperative

tactics, are able to attain their best strategic outcome. This outcome is confirmed in the

case of De Klerk as not only did no proliferation occur, but he made the landmark policy

choice to rollback South Africa’s nuclear weapons program. However, in the case of

Gandhi her strategic interaction (Type C v. Type A) is not expected to result in an

occurrence of proliferation, yet such did occur. In her case, the framework did not

produce the anticipated results. The fact that there is a divergence between the expected

results based on Gandhi’s perceived strategic interaction and the historical outcome, does

not render the framework useless, but rather leads to further puzzles about why this

occurred. Why wasn’t Gandhi able to act upon her preferences? Was there something

particular about the decision-making environment or structure operating at the time

which inhibited her? Moreover, the result forces a re-examination of the other competing

proliferation explanations. Specifically, the nature of Gandhi’s strategic interaction

appears to undermine the claim that her decision was based on external threat while

buttressing the claim that the decision was the result of domestic politics factors.

The case of South Africa’s Vorster presents findings in accordance with the

expected hypothesis. Based on the framework’s expectations, the inclusion of a more

conflict-oriented Type B leader into a strategic interaction, results in a decision in favor

of going nuclear. Notable as well is that fact that Vorster in the only case of a leader

viewing himself as conflict-orientated (Type B) while perceiving Other as cooperative

(Type A).

249
 Meanwhile, the case of Libya under Qadhafi highlights the interactive nature of

the framework. The development of a domestic nuclear capability appears to have driven

by Qadhafi’s conflictual view of his interaction with others. Based on the Holsti

typologies Qadhafi perceives Self as a Type D while seeing Other as a Type B. This

combination of a Type D and Type B is expected to result in a proliferation outcome.

However, in applying TIP, the interaction is moderated presenting an interaction between

Qadhafi and Other as both Type D. The resulting interaction is a classic prisoners’

dilemma where the initial state of the game guides the outcome. Accordingly, the

resulting deadlock characterizing much of the 1980s and 1990s spurred on Libyan

proliferation efforts. However, the Libyan experience shows the possibility of resetting

of the game. The incentives offered by the international community in the late 1990s

outweighed the perceived benefits of proliferation causing the game to move to a state of

mutual cooperation. Nevertheless, this game remains unstable given incentives to defect

unless the benefits of mutual cooperation are sustained. Recent news accounts points to

the fact that Libyan leaders have begun to raise qualms about the extent of the benefits

forthcoming from the international community.75

The most challenging cases are those involving Vajpayee of India and Gorton of

Australia. For Vajpayee, his strategic interaction reveals a game between Self as a Type

C and Other as a Type D. Based on the assumptions of TOM, the framework’s

expectation is that this interaction should result in a Settlement outcome and no

proliferation as a result. Clearly the historical account points to a flagrant episode of

proliferation by India. Why this contradictory finding? In this case, the inherent nature of

75“5 Years After It Halted Weapons Programs, Libya Sees the US as Ungrateful,” New York Times (March
11, 2009).

250
the game comes into play. When the initial state is one of deadlock, caused by mutual

conflict, the structure of this game demands that Other be the first to move from a

strategy of conflict to cooperation. Vajpayee has no incentive to be the first to move as

his optimal strategy is to stay at Deadlock and avoid the possibility of being dominated

by Other. The onus is on Other to move so to prompt a “magnanimity strategy” where

following Other’s moving pushing the game to a state of Indian domination, Vajpayee

will reciprocate with cooperation moving the game to his more preferred state of

Settlement (4, 3).76 In terms of this game, Other holds the strategic initiative. The

historical context leading up to the Indian tests in May 1998, not the least of which being

Pakistan’s missile tests, point towards continuing conflict prompting Vajpayee to

proliferate.

Lastly, in the case of Gorton, the plotting of typologies on the Holsti matrix

present s finding for a interaction between a Type A Self and Type B Other. This

interaction has the expectation for proliferation. Indeed, the historical account shows that

while he was ultimately unable to develop an Australian nuclear weapons capability due

to infrastructure impediments, Gorton undertook actions necessary to realize such

potential and to maintain the viability of a nuclear option. However, for the purpose of

the project, Gorton’s strategic interaction was revised based on the TIP calculations

resulting in a modified game depicting Self as Type C and Other as Type D. As

discussed above, the expectation for this game is no proliferation. As in the case of

Vajpayee, the expected final outcome of mutual cooperation is based on Other making

76 Walker and Schafer (2006a) discuss this game in the context of examining decision-making by Israeli
leaders, Rabin and Peres, over the course of Israeli-Egyptian conflict in the 1970s and 1980s.

251
move from conflict to cooperation. Until such move by Other the game remains fixed in a

situation of deadlock.

In addition, the use of this new analytical framework, as applied to the cases

developed here, provides insights about other questions pertaining to international

politics. Notably the findings allow for some preliminary discussion of the role that

regime type can play in proliferation outcomes. The potential impact of regime type can

be measured in two ways: first, are certain types of regimes more likely to proliferate?;

and, second, do certain regime types produce certain types of leaders? As to the first,

little here supports the notion that regime type influences proliferation. The one non-

democratic/authoritarian regime examined, Libya, presents a situation of a country

engaging in a prolonged effort to develop nuclear weapons, but where ultimately the

regime terminated its program in light of perceived benefits. In the case of the flawed

democracy of South Africa (during apartheid) we find a leader (Vorster) driven towards

the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but also a leader (De Klerk) who so lacked any

interest in such weapons as to advocate and push for their destruction. Meanwhile, the

democracies in India and Australia each present leaders driving proliferation outcomes:

one who accomplished proliferation (Vajpayee) and another who actively sought to

cultivate a proliferation capability (Gorton). Moreover, the case of India is the sole case

where domestic determinants appear to have played a role in the proliferation outcome

(Gandhi). This result seems to give credence to the notion that democratic regimes, with

their broader electoral base, might force leaders to adopt preferences different from their

own.

252
 The evidence is also inconclusive as to the idea that certain regimes types foster

the development of certain types of leaders. The South African case presents nearly

diametrically opposed types of leaders. Vorster clearly viewed the international system as

a conflictual place and favoring conflict-orientated tactics. Yet, only a decade later, De

Klerk would come to power with a very different world view and strategic interaction

dictating the use of cooperative strategies and tactics. In India one witnesses a similar

occurrence as between Gandhi and Vajpayee, but the divergence in their perceived

strategic interactions is enough to alter their respective outlooks as to the best way to

interact with others. Lastly, in the instance of Libya, Qadhafi presents a leader seemingly

more flexible in his approach to the strategies and tactics best employed. An opposite

result might be expected whereby an authoritarian leader might be more extreme in his

views given the lack of internal political opposition. Nonetheless, as stressed by Libyan

observers, Qadhafi’s flexibility appears in line with his ultimate goal of preserving his

regime’s power.

A related question then is whether certain global neighborhoods promote the rise

of certain leaders. The essence of this question is whether certain types of security

environments are more likely to produce types of leaders interested in proliferating. The

problem with this question is the subjective nature by which threat can measured and

assessed. As detailed in the cases of South Africa and India, the extent of the external

threat at the time of the decisions by Vorster and Vajpayee are highly contested.

Nevertheless, the perception of threat that matters is that of the leaders themselves,

especially how perceptions inform their view of the international system and of others.

This approach does not attempt to dismiss the impact of security issues, but to highlight

253
the importance of viewing security through the eyes of national leaders and seek to

endogenize their perceptions rather than make post hoc assumptions about a country’s

security situation.

Moreover, seemingly more important than either regime type or notions of the

external security environment is the nature of a country’s nuclear policy. The longer that

a country’s policy regarding nuclear proliferation remains uncertain or ambiguous, while

in pursuit of nuclear technology, the more likely that proliferation will occur. Clearly,

advancements in nuclear knowledge present the opportunity for proliferation. What one

observes from the cases here is that time and again lingering ambiguity over a country’s

nuclear intentions kept the door ajar for the pursuit of weapons capability. In India, both

Gandhi and Vajpayee inherited the unsettled nuclear policies of their predecessors. For

Gandhi, she followed the ambiguous policy of her father, Nehru, who while emphasizing

the peaceful aspect of nuclear energy failed to explicitly foreswear the weapons option.

Vajpayee in turn came to power after nearly two decades of uncertainty as to Indian

nuclear policy where technological capabilities had progressed to the point of being “a

screwdriver away.” Similar cases arise in both South Africa and Australia whose nuclear

community had been active since the end of World War II. On the one hand, the Vorster

government in South Africa inherited a highly developed nuclear scientific community,

yet no clear policy about the development of nuclear weapons. On the other hand,

Gorton came to power with an underdeveloped nuclear infrastructure, but followed the

Menzies government, which although not developing a domestic capability, had made

overtures to its allies to procure such weapons keeping the idea of Australian

proliferation very much alive. These historic examples raise concerns over the current

254
Iranian nuclear program as the uncertainty and ambiguous nature of the programs lends

credence to speculation that weapons development is the end goal.

In conclusion, what this project sought to accomplish is the development of a new

analytical framework for understanding proliferation which might be reap benefits both

in terms of theorizing about proliferation and aiding policy-makers confronting the

dilemma of proliferation. Theoretically, the project expands the proliferation literature by

offering a systematic examination of how leaders’ beliefs impact proliferation decisions.

Additionally, it complements previous studies examining the role of decision-makers by

developing an analytical framework that provides for generalizable findings, permitting

meaningful cross-case comparisons. Perhaps most importantly, the analytical framework

advancing the importance of placing proliferation decisions within a strategic context to

more closely approximate the true nature of international politics.

Policy-wise, the project sought to take up the challenge issued by George (1993)

for academics to provide practitioners with policy-relevant knowledge. Rather than

offering a theory of proliferation which specifies “assumptions that states can be regarded

as rational unitary actors,” this framework provides policymakers with an actor-specific

model where the differing behavioral patterns of individual leaders can be examined

providing the “correct image of the opponent” (George 1993:9,125). By possessing

greater knowledge about the underlying motivations of individual leaders driving

proliferation decisions more effective counter-proliferation policies can be fashioned.

These policies might take the form of security guarantees, economic assistance, or

coercive means depending on the leader being dealt with and whether their perception of

the strategic interaction is subject to modification. The general claim presented here is

255
that pessimistic assertions that “proliferation begets further proliferation” are not

conclusive (Schultz 1984). The most important policy lesson which might be taken away

from this project is that nuclear proliferation is not an inevitable occurrence driven by

systemic factor, but rather individuals can and do actively shape the international

environment.

256
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 APPENDIX A. STRATEGIC INTERACTION GAMES

Type A Type C Type D Type B

CO CF CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 4, 4 1, 2 CO 4, 4 1, 3 CO 4, 3 1, 4 CO 4, 2 1, 4

Type A Type A Type A Type A

CF 2, 1 3, 3 CF 3, 1 3, 2 CF 2, 1 3, 2 CF 2, 1 3, 3

Type A Type C Type D Type B

CO CF CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 4, 4 1, 2 CO 4, 4 1, 3 CO 4, 3 1, 4 CO 4, 2 1, 4

Type C Type D Type C Type C

CF 3, 1 2, 3 CF 3, 1 2, 2 CF 3, 1 2, 2 CF 3, 1 2, 3
270

Type A Type C Type D Type B

CO CF CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 3, 4 1, 2 CO 3, 4 1, 3 CO 3, 3 1, 4 CO 3, 2 1, 4

Type D Type D Type D Type D

CF 4, 1 2, 3 CF 4, 1 2, 2 CF 4, 1 2, 2 CF 4, 4 2, 3

Type A Type C Type D Type B

CO CF CO CF CO CF CO CF
CO 2, 4 1, 2 CO 2, 4 1, 3 CO 2, 3 1, 4 CO 2, 2 1, 4

Type B Type B Type B Type B

CF 4, 1 3, 3 CF 4, 1 3, 2 CF 4, 1 3, 2 CF 4, 1 3, 3

CO= Cooperate Nash Equilibrium is underlined

CF= Conflict TOM NME is circled
 APPENDIX B. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH

For the purposes of collecting public statements for the relevant leaders three

major archival sources were used. The Duke University Library in Durham, North

Carolina was used to collect the Hansard’s parliamentary transcripts for Australia, India

and South Africa, as well as for finding other secondary sources. For the collection of

public statements for South African leaders B.J. Vorster and F.W. De Klerk archival

research was conducted at the Archive for Contemporary History at the University of the

Free State located in Bloemfontein, the Republic of South Africa, during late May of

2008. While there I was granted access to the archives’ private papers collections for both

Vorster and De Klerk and was able to select documents for photocopying by the archive’s

staff. Lastly, in the case of Australian leader John Gorton, the National Library of

Australia’s (NLA), in Canberra, Australia, holds a collection of papers for John Gorton.

As I was unable to travel to Australia, I employed a private research, Ms. Glenda Lynch,

to assist with accessing the NLA’s collection, reviewing pertinent documents, securing

copies of requested materials, and sending hard copies of documents to me via

international airmail. With the assistance of Ms. Lynch, I was able to obtain a document

index for the papers held in the NLA’s collection and then indicate the documents I

wanted photocopied. She would go to the library collections’ desk making the document

requests and the library staff would pull and photocopy the documents.

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 APPENDIX C. QADHAFI RESEARCH

Operational Code of Qadhafi 1980-2005

Philosophical (P) & 1980-1992 1993-1998 1999-2003 2003-2005 Norming

Instrumental (I) Beliefs (n = 30) (n = 14) (n = 7) (n = 5) group
(n = 164)

P-1. Nature of Political Universe

(Conflict/Cooperation) -0.125** -0.099** -0.225** 0.117 0.301

P-2. Realization of Political Values

(Pessimism/Optimism) -0.158** -0.122** -0.232** 0.009 0.147

P-3. Political Future

(Unpredictable/Predictable) 0.157 0.110 0.124 0.118 0.134

P-4. Historical Developments

(Low Control/High Control) 0.266 0.163 0.201 0.206 0.224

P-5. Role of Chance

(Small Role/Large Role) 0.965 0.982 0.974 0.975 0.968

I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals

(Conflict/Cooperation) 0.188** -0.047** -0.043* 0.164 0.401

I-2. Intensity of Tactics

(Conflict/Cooperation) 0.032** -0.045** -0.096 0.007 0.178

I-3. Risk Orientation

(Averse/Acceptant) 0.357 0.285 0.201 0.240 0.332

I-4. Timing of Action

a. Conflict/Cooperation 0.659** 0.603 0.743 0.736 0.503
b. Words/Deeds
0.339 0.319 0.422 0.619 0.464
I-5. Utility of Means
a. Reward 0.106 0.082 0.057 0.122 0.157
b. Promise 0.036 0.069 0.024 0.013 0.075
c. Appeal/Support 0.452 0.326 0.397 0.447 0.468
d. Oppose/Resist 0.216 0.280 0.294 0.207 0.154
e. Threaten 0.038 0.166** 0.074 0.024 0.034
f. Punish 0.152 0.078 0.154 0.188 0.112
* Significant difference as compared to the Norming group at the .05 level (two-tailed test)
** Significant difference as compared to the Norming group at the .01 level (two-tailed test)

272
 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) testing of Qadhafi’s Operational Codes 1980-2005
1980-92 / 1993-98 / 1999-03 /
Philosophical &
1993-98 1999-03 2003-05
Instrumental Beliefs

P-1. Nature of Political Universe

-0.125 -0.099 -0.099 -0.225 -0.225 0.117*
(Conflict/Cooperation)

P-2. Realization of Political Values

(Pessimism/Optimism) -0.158 -0.122 -0.122 -0.232 -0.232 0.009*

P-3. Political Future

(Unpredictable/Predictable) 0.157 0.110 0.110 0.124 0.124 0.118

P-4. Historical Developments

(Low Control/High Control) 0.266 0.163* 0.163 0.201 0.201 0.206

P-5. Role of Chance

(Small Role/Large Role) 0.965 0.982 0.982 0.974 0.974 0.975

I-1. Strategic Approach to Goals

(Conflict/Cooperation) 0.188 -0.047 -0.047 -0.043 -0.043 0.164

I-2. Intensity of Tactics

(Conflict/Cooperation) 0.032 -0.045 -0.045 -0.096 -0.096 0.007

I-3. Risk Orientation

(Averse/Acceptant) 0.357 0.285 0.285 0.201 0.201 0.240

I-4. Timing of Action

a. Conflict/Cooperation 0.659 0.603 0.603 0.743 0.743 0.736
b. Words/Deeds 0.339 0.319
0.319 0.422 0.422 0.619
I-5. Utility of Means
a. Reward 0.106 0.082 0.082 0.057 0.057 0.122
b. Promise 0.036 0.069 0.069 0.024 0.024 0.013
c. Appeal/Support 0.452 0.326 0.326 0.397 0.397 0.447
d. Oppose/Resist 0.216 0.280 0.280 0.294 0.294 0.207
e. Threaten 0.038 0.166* 0.166 0.074 0.074 0.024
f. Punish 0.152 0.078 0.078 0.154 0.154 0.188
* Significant difference between indices at the .05 level (one-tailed test).

273