EMILE DURKHEIM On the Division of Labor in Society.

Book1, Chp 1: 'The method of determining this function'

In this chapter, Durkheim asks what the division of labor (DOL) in society is. First, he states that
since the DOL increases both the reproductive capacity and skill of the workman, it is the
necessary condition for the intellectual and material development in societies (12). However, the
DOL also has a moral character which is more important. It can create a feeling of solidarity
between two or more people (17).

To explain how the DOL contributes to feelings of solidarity, Durkheim (DH) uses the simple
example of a married couple. He claims that if the DOL between the sexes were reduced to a
certain point, material life would disappear, only to leave behind sexual relationships. The DOL
goes beyond purely economic interests; it constitutes the establishment of a social and moral
order sui generis. However, DH admits that in marriage people are also bounded because of their
similarities. In this sense, they are bonded outside the DOL (22).

The marriage analogy cannot explain the significance of the DOL for large societies. DH asserts,
'these great political societies cannot sustain their equilibrium save by the specialization of tasks;
the DOL is the source...of social solidarity (23). DH states here that Comte was the first to point
out that the DOL was something other than a purely economic phenomenon. Comte argued that
it was the 'continuous distribution of different human tasks which constitutes the principal
element in social solidarity' (23). The DOL has a moral character because the needs which it
fulfills for social solidarity, order, and harmony are moral needs (24).

Law

The most visible symbol of social solidarity is law (24). Law is the organization of social life in
its most stable and precise form. All the essential varieties of social solidarity are reflected in law
(25). We can classify different types of law to see which types of social solidarity correspond to
them. Two types of law exist. The first type is repressive (covers penal law), which imposes
some type of 'damage' on the perpetrator. The second type is restitutive, which does not
necessarily imply any suffering on the part of the perpetrator but consists of restoring the
previous relationships which have been disturbed from their normal form (covers civil,
communal, procedural law).

Durkheim, Emile. On the Division of Labor in Society.

Book1, Chp2 'Mechanical Solidarity, or Solidarity by Similarities,'

In this chapter, DH demonstrates how repressive law reflects a society characterized by

mechanical solidarity. Penal rules express the basic conditions of collective life for each type of
society (32).

The nature of crime 'disturbs those feelings that in any one type of society are to be found in
every healthy conscious' (34). in 'Lower forms' of society (those most simply organized) law is
almost exclusively penal or repressive (37). Penal law demonstrates the strength of the resistance
of collective sentiment to a given crime (38).

The collective conscience is the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average
members of a society that forms a determinate system with a life of its own (39). Durkheim
defines an act as criminal when it offends the collective conscience (39).

It is actually public opinion and opposition which constitutes the crime. An act offends the
common consciousness not because it is criminal, but it is criminal because it offends that
consciousness. A crime is a crime because we condemn it (40). All crimes floe directly or
indirectly from the collective conscience (43).

The role of an authority with power to govern is to ensure respect for collective practices and to
defend the common consciousness from its 'enemies.' In lower societies, this authority is greatest
where the seriousness of the crime weighs the heaviest. Here the collective consciousness posses
the most power (43).

DH argues that in antiquity, people punished for the sake of punishment. However, nowadays
society punishes in order to instill fear in potential criminals (46). Yet, punishment has still
remained an act of vengeance and expiation (atonement). What society avenges, and what the
criminal must expiate, is the 'outrage to morality' (47). It is the attack upon society that is
repressed by punishment.

Punishment is a 'reaction of passionate feeling, graduated in intensity, which society exerts

through the mediation of an organized body over those of its members who have violated certain
rules of conduct' (52). Punishing crime sustains the common consciousness.

Two consciousnesses exist within humans: one which represents individual personalities and the
other which represents the collectivity (61). The force which is shocked by crime is the result of
the most vital social similarities and its effect is to maintain the social cohesion that arises from
these similarities (61).

Punishment publicly demonstrates that the sentiments of the collectivity are still unchanged
(despite the deviant ways) of the offender and thusthe injury that the crime inflicted on society is
made good. In fact, the primary intent of punishment is to affect honest people (63).

In this chapter, Durkheim shows that a social solidarity exists because a certain number of states
of consciousness are common to all members of the same society. This is the solidarity which
repressive law embodies.

Durkheim, Emile. On the Division of Labor in Society

Book1 Chp 3 'Solidarity Arising From the DOL, or Organic Solidarity'

To start his discussion of restitutory law which corresponds to the organic state of society, DH
contrasts it to repressive law. Whereas repressive law corresponds to the 'center of common
consciousness,' restitutory sanctions either constitute no part at all of the collective
consciousness, or subsist in it weakly. Second, whereas repressive law tends to stay diffused
throughout society, restitutory law works through more specialized bodies: ie, courts,
magistrates, and lawyers (69-70).

Despite the removed role of restitutory law from society, society still intervenes in restitutory
sanctioning. The formation of a contract directly concerns the parties involved: nonetheless, if a
contract has a binding force, it is society which confers that force. If society does not give its
blessing to the obligations that have been contracted, then these obligations are reduced to only
moral promises. Hence the presence of society in restitutory law, although not necessarily felt, is
nonetheless essential.

Part of restitutory law, the corpus of real rights (the right to property and mortgage), corresponds
to negative solidarity. Negative solidarity can consist of links between persons and things.
However, relationships between people, though in no way 'real,' can also express negative
solidarity. This occurs when the relationships are created to prevent or repair damage. These
relationships do not imply co-operation (74). Hence, the rules relating to real rights form a
definite system whose function is not to link the different parts of society together, but to clearly
mark the barriers which separate them.

Negative solidarity is actually only possible where positive solidarity is present. for a man to
recognize that others have rights, he must limit his own. This 'mutual limitation' is only
realizable in a spirit of understanding and harmony. To need peace, men must already be united
in a bond of sociability (different from Hobbes).

Aside from 'real' rights which DH considers ultimately expressive of negative solidarity, the rest
of restitutory law (domestic law, contractual law, communal law, procedural law)expresses a
positive cooperation which derives essentially from the DOL (77). For instance, civil law
(adoption, divorce, etc)determines how various family functions are allocated and expresses the
solidarity that unites the members of the family as a result of the domestic DOL (78). The
relationship of the DOL to contractual law is similar. Contracts typically involve reciprocal
obligations that involve co-operation.

Law plays a part in society analogous to the nervous system in an organisms. The system
regulates the various body functions so they work together in harmony. The nervous system thus
expresses the degree of concentration that the organism has reached as a result of the
physiological DOL. Likewise, we can ascertain the measure of concentration that a society has
reached through the social DOL, according to the development of cooperative law with its
restitutory sanctions.

There are two types of positive solidarity. The first kind, mechanical solidarity, links the
individual to society without any intermediary. Society is organized collectively and is composed
of beliefs common to all members of the group. The bond which unites the individual with
society is completely analogous to that which links the thing to the person. The individual
consciousness depends on the collective consciousness.
In the second kind of solidarity, organic solidarity, the society is a system of different functions
united by definite relationships (83). This brings about the DOL. Here each individual must have
a sphere of action and a personality which is his own. Individuality grows at the same time as the
parts of society. Society becomes more effective at moving in concert though at the same time
each of its elements has more movements that are peculiarly its own.

Durkheim, Emile. On the Division of Labor in Society

Book1 Chp4 'Another Proof of the Preceding Theory'

The preponderance of repressive law over cooperative law must be greater when the collective
type of solidarity is more pronounced and the DOL more rudimentary. yet to the degree that
tasks become specialized, the balance between society and the type of law becomes upset and
begins to change (88).

The more primitive a society is, the more resemblances there are between its members. By
contrast, members of advanced, 'civilized' societies are quite distinguishable from one another
(89). Organic similarities correspond to psychological similarities between members of primitive
societies. Furthermore, members of advanced societies are increasingly organically and
psychologically different. Diversity becomes greater as types become more developed (91).
Hence, the higher the social type, the more developed the DOL.

The two forms of law Durkheim distinguishes preceding this chapter vary at diverse levels on the
social scale. In the lowest societies, the state of law seems wholly repressive. DH shows from the
Pentateuch (ancient Hebrew law) that cooperative and restitutory law amounted to little in
primitive societies (93). In fact, the whole society under Hebrew law appeared repressive.
Society insisted on expiation and not mere reparation (94). Repression dominates the entire
corpus of law in lower societies because religion (repressive in nature) permeates all legal
activity (94).

Although repressive law has not diminished in importance in modern times, restitutory law has
expanded greatly and has grown more complex with the development of society (97). Yet,
contractual law (procedural/restitutory)is still not entirely separated from penal (repressive law),
because often the refusal to comply with a contract results in a fine (97).

However, repressive and restitutory law still vary fairly directly with the degree of society's
development. Repressive law, typically involving sanctions for crimes against the whole
community is common in lower, mechanical societies. law is simply an expression of morals.
Where acts of violence are frequent, they are tolerated. their criminal character is in inverse
proportion to their frequency. Thus, in lower societies crimes against the individual are common
and placed on the lower rung of the penal ladder. Instead, crimes against the community take
priority. This is because in lower societies the evolution of the collective consciousness is
widespread and strong, while the DOL has not yet taken place (99).

Durkheim, Emile. On the division of Labor in Society

Book1 Chp7 'Organic solidarity and Contractual Solidarity'
Durkheim bases this detailed discussion of organic solidarity and contracts on a dispute against
Spencer. Spencer claims that industrial solidarity is spontaneous and that there is no need for a
coercive apparatus to produce or maintain it. Social harmony is simply established of its own
accord. Durkheim asserts that, were this the case, the sphere of social action would diminish
greatly because it would no longer be needed except to enforce negative solidarity (149). This is
not the case.

Spencer also argues that the normal form of exchange is contract. For this reason, the extent of
central authority diminishes. As freedom of action increases, contracts become more general.
This general social contract requires the free agreement of human wills and is irreconcilable with
the DOL.

DH states that this type of spontaneous, general social contract has never existed. Societies are
spontaneously contractual only to the extent that an individual chooses to remain in the society in
which he was born, and hence he abides by that society's rules. For Spencer, society would be no
more than the establishment of relationships between individuals exchanging the products of
their labor without any social action intervening to regulate that exchange (152).

Durkheim disputes Spencer by claiming that social intervention is on the rise. the legal
obligations which society imposes on its members are becoming more and more complex.
restitutory law is growing. If social intervention no longer has the effect of imposing certain
uniform practices on everybody, it consists more in defining and regulating the special
relationship between the different social functions (153).

Spencer would answer that not every kind of control has decreased, just positive control.
Durkheim counters that positive control is far from disappearing; in fact, restitutory law is
continually growing (154).

[negative control = regulations which make a person refrain from acting e.g., do not help a
farmer with his crop, simply prevent him from stealing his neighbor's.]

[positive control = regulations which make a person act eg,impose a certain method of farming
upon a farmer]

Durkheim next states that although Spencer is correct in claiming that contractual relationships
are multiplied as society is divided up, he has failed to note that non-contractual relationships are
developing at the same time (155). Durkheim argues that 'private law,' typically contractual, is
really quite public. For instance, marriage and adoption, although private matters, were formerly
endorsed by the church and are now endorsed by civil authority (155). As domestic obligations
become more numerous, they tend to take on a private character.

The role played by contract is continually decreasing, and social control over the way obligations
are regulated is increasing. This is due to the progressive disappearance of segmentary
organization. Everything segmentary is increasingly absorbed into larger society.
The contracts that remain are entirely removed from the sphere of individual negotiation and are
submitted to the regulatory force of society. contractual law exists to determine the legal
consequences of our acts which we have not settled beforehand. It expresses the normal
conditions for attaining equilibrium and constrains us to respect obligations for which we have
not contracted. it is the role of society to determine what contractual conditions are capable of
being executed, and if necessary, to restore them to their normal form (162). And just as society
plays a role in shaping contracts, contracts play a role in shaping society. An extensive network
of relationships which contribute to social solidarity can stem from contracts.

Durkheim also disputes Spencer's idea that exchange of information takes place freely on the
market place without a need for a regulating apparatus. Using a biological analogy, Durkheim
insists that the 'sympathetic nerve system of society must include, apart from a system of
transmission paths, truly regulatory organs which amplify or moderate stimuli according to need
(165). The state's role as regulator becomes increasingly larger and diverse the higher the type of
society (167).

The growth of government is attributable to the progress of the DOL and to the process of
transformation from segmentary societies to organized societies. First, the central organism faced
with less resistance from the segmented forces, begins to develop and become more powerful.
The local organs, instead of preserving their individuality, come to merge into the central
mechanism (168-9). As a society becomes more and more organically organized, disturbances
even of a general character begin to have repurcussions on higher centers, which then become
obliged to intervene (170).

Social life is derived from a dual source: the similarity of individual consciousnesses and the
social DOL (172).

The similarity of consciousnesses gives rise to rules, which under the threat of repressive
measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices. The more pronounced the similarity, the more
completely social life is mixed up with religious life (172).

On the other hand, the DOL gives rise to legal rules that determine the nature of a divided up
society, but punishment for law breakers in this case involves only reparative measures which
lack any expiatory character (172). In organic society, members' dependence on the state
continues to grow. As a result, they are continually reminded of their common solidarity.

Thus DH argues that altruism is not Spencer's conception of an ornament to social life, but it is
the fundamental basis of social life. Every society is a moral society, because men cannot
cohabitate without agreeing and cooperating. Hence, even societies characterized by organic
solidarity and the DOL are moral because cooperation has an intrinsic morality. this morality
grows as the individual personality grows stronger (as opposed to in mechanical solidarity when
morality depends on common sentiment) (173-4).

There are 'two great currents of social life.' The first has origins in social similarityand is
segmentary. it gradually becomes overshadowed by the second type of society, which is
composed of individual differences and organic cooperation. Nonetheless, the segmentary
structure never completely disappears (174).

Durkheim, Emile. On the Division of Labor in Society.

Book 2 chap 2 'The Causes'

In this chapter, DH explains the causes of the DOL. First, the segmentary organization of society
must recede. The segments lose their individuality and they coalesce so that the 'social substance'
is free to enter upon new combinations. Social life becomes more general and relationships
become more numerous. Individuals who were formerly separated from each other draw together
and engage in active exchanges (moral or dynamic density) (201).

The DOL is in direct proportion to the moral density of society. (Moral density also increases
with the growth of physical density). the increase of social density can occur in three ways:
1: the increasing spatial concentration of a people
2: the growth of towns
(towns do no exist in segmentary societies)
(the development of urban centers is not pathological, but is representative of higher society)
3: increase in number and efficacy of means of communication (201-2).

Although societies can increase in volume (absolute size), they do not necessarily increase in
density. A society which grows larger but does not increase its social contacts can remain
segmentary and not evolve into a division of labor (204).The growth and condensation of
societies does not permit a greater DOL, but they necessitate it.

Spencer claims that the variety of environments in which individuals live channels them to
specialize in different paths of labor (eg: seashore ---]fisherman). If this specialization increases
with the size of societies, it is because the internal differences increase at the same time.
Durkheim asks however, is this diversity alone sufficient to bring about the DOL (206)? If such
differences make the DOL possible, they do not impose that division. WHY do men specialize
(208)?

Labor become increasingly divided as societies grow in density not because of external
circumstances, but because the struggle for existence becomes more strenuous (208). Men
differentiate their specialties in order to decrease competition and to coexist (DH draws a
comparison to Darwin's law of animal differentiation --]survival) (209). Hence, any
concentration in the social mass necessarily determines the progress of the DOL (210).

To the extent that the social constitution is segmentary, each segment has its own organs that are
kept at a distance from similar organs by social partitions. but as these partitions disappear with
the advancement of society, the segments begin to struggle to substitute each other. This struggle
eventually diminishes, resulting in specialization. Thus higher societies make room for all their
members (213). humans specialize and increase the DOL in order to survive in new conditions of
existence. Greater economic productivity is merely a consequence of the DOL, and not a cause
or motivation (217).
The DOL must be carried out between members of a society that is already 'constituted.' (Those
people facing competition who are not already in a bounded society will simply flee each other.)
The DOL actually causes the activities which it differentiates to converge and brings people
closer together (217). For this to occur, the members of society must not only be liked materially,
but they must have moral ties (218). Thus, organic society must arise from a mechanical society
which already has a structure of collective beliefs. (this is directly opposite to Spencer's theory
that a society is produced by cooperation. DH argues that cooperation necessarily supposes the
pre-existence of society (219).

For the DOL to function, groups which apparently perform distinct tasks must actually
intermingle and be absorbed into one another (221).

Durkheim, Emile. On the DOL in Society

Book2 Chp5 'Consequences of the Foregoing'

In very simple societies, members can easily replace each other in tasks. Comte and Spencer
would argue that in higher societies, as social organization is perfected, it becomes more and
more impossible for members to switch out of roles. However, DH disagrees. He claims that the
phenomena of substitution is also observable in even the highest levels of society (271).
A member of society must always be ready to change functions to accommodate a break in social
equilibrium. as labor is divided up more in human societies, this elasticity increases.
consequently the function becomes more and more independent of the organ (member of society)
which performs it. For instance in higher societies, men performing different social functions are
distinguished less and less by physical features (2
The DOL is a necessary consequence of the growth of volume and density of society. as the
number of individuals between whom social relations are established increases, men can only
maintain their position by specializing more. Men go forward because they must. Civilization is
but an after-effect (not a cause) of the DOL (276). Furthermore, individuals are more a product
of common social life than a determining factor in it. Individuals depend on the diversity of
social conditions to differentiate themselves (277). The more numerous and diverse individuals
are, the more strongly and rapidly they react together . As a result, social life becomes more
intense. This intensification constitutes civilization (278). The product of these social
relationships becomes an entity in itself (society sui generis).

Spencer purports that the individual has every interest in establishing relationships which serve
him alone. This activity shapes society, and social progress consists solely of improving these
relationships for the maximization of individual ends.
Durkheim contends, 'Spencer does not see in societies a true reality, existing by itself by virtue
of specific and necessary causes, one that consequently bears down upon man, imposing upon
him its own nature and to which he is forced to adapt in order to continue living' (281). (society
sui generis)
In effect, man does not shape society. according to DH, 'it is because society changes that we
must change' (282). DH labels this concept a mechanistic theory of progress.' Because the ideal
of civilization depends upon the ever changing social environment, we will never be without our
goals for society (282).
According to DH, man is more or less entirely guided by social life. He credits very little to the
human psyche alone. He claims that man develops his psychological life in response to his level
of sociability (284). Plus, man has only gained the ability to reason because he is a social animal.
Social life even influences his emotions. as man's social life grows in complexity, so does his
psyche.
We should not present social life as the result of individual natures alone -- as does Spencer.
Individual natures emerge from social life; consequently, social facts are not just a mere
development of psychological facts (286). Everything found in the consciousness of individuals
comes form society.

Durkheim, Emile. On the DOL in Society

Book3 Ch1 'The Anomic DOL'

The DOL is typically a normal phenomenon, but from time to time it enters a pathological state
(291), In certain points of the social organism, certain functions are not adjusted to one another.
As labor becomes increasingly divided up, these phenomena become more frequent .(eg:
bankruptcies, commercial crises, hostility between labor and capital).
DH applies the following ideas from Comte:
The DOL, if pushed too far, can become a source of disintegration, The individual may isolate
himself in his own special activity, forget his fellow workers, and no longer have any idea of
what the common task consists (294). Although the diversity of functions is both useful and
necessary, unity does not arise spontaneously. The task of realizing and maintaining it must be
carried out by the state (295).
DH states that the organ of government develops with the DOL, by mechanical necessity. As
social functions grow and differentiate, more events impact upon the controlling organ whose
role as regulator consequently increases. However, the government cannot be omnipotent; in
reality, the unity of organized societies stems from the spontaneous consensus of its parts. the
government can only 'bestow its blessing' on society. thus, as labor is divided up, a progressive
decomposition over the whole of society can occur (297), furthermore, functional diversity
creates a moral diversity . The collective sentiments become powerless to contain the centrifugal
tendencies brought about by the DOL.
Although Comte saw the DOL as a source of solidarity, he did not perceive this solidarity as sui
generis. for this reason, he saw the disappearance of order in the DOL as a morbid phenomenon
and a threat to social cohesion. However, DH contends that the weakening of the collective
consciousness id normal. It is not possible for social life to be without struggle. Solidarity
between organs in society cannot abolish competition but only moderate it (302).
The regulatory process which stems from solidarity emerges form the DOL. The DOL evokes
definite ways of acting that relate to the unchanging conditions of social life. these habits become
transformed into rules of conduct.
If solidarity does not arise from the DOL, it is because the relationships between the organs in
the system are not well regulated -- they are in a state of anomie. The rules which stem from
social solidarity where organs are in close contact fix the conditions of equilibrium to some
degree. however, if contacts between organs are blocked, they cannot be repeated enough for
rules to take on a definite form. Hence, the rules constituted from these relationships are only
general and vague (304). For example, the conditions of industrial life create low levels of
contact between organs (worker and worker, worker and family, worker and capitalist). Because
these transformations occur with such rapidity, conflicting interests which result from the change
have not had time to strike a new equilibrium (306).
DH recognizes that the DOL has been blamed for turning workers into 'lifeless cogs' (306). But,
he argues that the DOL does not produce these circumstances as a result of its nature. Under
normal conditions, the DOL requires that the individual worker interact with his coworkers. he
works toward a goal which he can conceive of fairly distinctly, and he feels that he is of some
use. Then, the DOL is a source of solidarity.

Durkheim, Emile. On the DOL in Society

Book 3 Chp2 'The Forced DOL'

For the DOL to create social solidarity, it is not enough that everyone have a task -- the task must
be agreeable to him. If the DOL produces unrest, it is because the distribution of social functions
does not correspond to the distribution of natural abilities. Constraint binds people to their
functions, and only a troubled form of solidarity can exist (311).
Normally, labor is divided according to the distribution of aptitude in society. The DOL produces
social solidarity when it arises spontaneously (32). perfect Spontaneity corresponds to absolute
equality in the external conditions of struggle for a position in the DOL. Constraint occurs when
this struggle becomes impossible (313).
Perfect spontaneity cannot exist in any society. inequalities build up through time. For instance,
the hereditary transmission of wealth makes the external conditions of the 'struggle' very
unequal. The 'higher' the society, the less these inequalities exist (313-4).
In an organic society, the sentiments held in common do not possess a great deal of strength to
keep the individual bound to the group. Subversive tendencies emerge more readily than in
mechanical societies. hence, in organized societies it is indispensable that the DOL work to attain
the goal of spontaneity. these societies should attempt to eliminate all external inequalities. They
cannot sustain solidarity unless their constituent parts are solidly linked (315-6).
Equality in the external conditions of the struggle is needed to secure each individual to his
function and to link these functions with each other,. This proposition introduces a long
discussion from DH on the importance of equality in contracts. He states that contracts
necessarily develop with the DOL. There is a consensus of a certain kind that is expressed in
contracts and represents (in the 'higher species' an important factor in collective thought (316).
Durkheim also contends that 'there can be no rich or poor by birth without there being unjust
contracts' (319). these injustices are found more often in less advances societies, where
contractual relations are less developed. Yet as labor becomes more divided up and the social
doctrine weakens, these injustices become more unbearable and people start creating contracts to
make relationships more fair.
Lastly, DH makes a pitch for the importance of society over nature. Contracts regulate social life
because if not, people will take advantage of each other. In the broad scheme, liberty and
equality are products of regulation. Man as a social being regulates things in nature, 'stripping
them of their amoral character.' '[Man] cannot escape from nature save by creating another world
in which he dominates it. that world is society' (321).

Durkheim, Emile. The DOL in Society

Book3 chp 3 'Another Abnormal Form.'
The last abnormal form of the DOL occurs when the 'organs' of the system do not function
smoothly and continuously together to furnish efficient production of social solidarity. Although
the DOL might be highly developed, it is very poorly integrated. This does not always occur
because there is a lack of a regulatory organ, but because the regulator does not distribute work
in such a way that each individual is kept sufficiently busy to increase the functional activity of
every worker (324).
Every increase in functional activity can create an increase in social solidarity when as a result of
becoming more active, the functions become more continuous. When all functions at the same
tame become even more active the continuity of each one of them will be increased even more
(326).
As actions are more solidly linked to one another , they become more dependent on one another
(326). The more individuals which work in a society, the more each individual will specialize. At
the same time, each worker must increase his activity to meet the needed amount of product.
Hence, a second reason for why the DOL fosters social cohesion: 'It fosters the unity of the
organization by the very fact that it adds to its life.'

EMILE DURKHEIM The Elementary Forms of Religious Life

Intro. 'Subject of our Study: Religious Sociology and the Theory of Knowledge.'

According to DH, a religious system is most primitive when it is found in a society with the
simplest form of organization, and when it is possible to explain the religious system without
using any element borrowed from a previous religion. The study of simple religions shows us an
essential and permanent aspect of humanity, as well as leads to an understanding of the religious
nature of man (13). At the foundation of all systems of beliefs there are a number of fundamental
representations, concepts, and ritual attitudes which, despite the diversity of their forms, have the
same objective significance and fulfill the same functions everywhere (17).

Primitive civilizations offer privileged cases of the study of religion. These societies are
characterized by simplicity and conformity of thought and conduct. The religion Durkheim will
analyze in this book is foreign to any idea of a god or divinity. The 'forces' to which the rites are
addressed are very different from those in modern religions, yet they aid us in understanding
modern religions (19). When primitive religious beliefs are systematically analyzed, the principal
categories of understanding are found . In fact, they are a product of religious thought (22).

Religion is eminently social. Religious representations express collective realities. Religious rites
are a manner of acting which arises from assembled groups and are destined to excite certain
mental states in these groups. The categories of understanding are of religious origin; they are
social affairs and the product of collective thought (22). these categories include time, specie,
class, force, personality, and efficacy (23-5).

DH states that society is the highest representation of nature. 'The social realm is a natural realm
which differs from the others only by greater complexity' (31). However, nature does not differ
radically from one case to another. The relations that exist between things are essentially similar
across realms (31). Although the categories of time, space, class, cause and personality are
constructed out of social elements, their social origin points to the fact that they have a
foundation in the realm of nature (32).

Thus DH unites two opposing viewpoints in his theory of knowledge (the categories of
understanding). The apriorists believe that knowledge is made up of empirical fact and
representation. On the other hand, the empiricists only study positive knowledge. DH claims that
the theory of knowledge (wherein the categories of thought have a dual social and natural nature)
combines all the principles of the apriorists and the empiricists. According to him, the categories
of understanding are no longer single empirical facts but are 'complex instruments of [human
thought]' (32).

_________________________

In this chapter DH also postulates on the dual nature of man. There are two beings in man: an
individual whose foundation is in his body and whose circle of activity is very limited, and a
social being which represents the intellectual and moral order of society (29).

Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life

Book 1 Chp1 'Definition of Religious Phenomena and of Religion'

In this chapter Durkheim defines religion. In the first two sections, he sets forth definitions of
religion which are erroneous, in order to assist readers in freeing their minds of misconceptions.
to begin with he argues that the supernatural is not a characteristic of the religious (39). in order
to say something is supernatural, it must happen out of the natural order of things (41). However,
the idea of a necessary order did not exist before the construction of the positive sciences.
Furthermore, religion's main goal is to explain every day events. It is not true that the notion of
religion coincides with the extraordinary or the unforeseen. hence the idea of the supernatural is
not of primitive origin; man has forged it as he has developed science (43).

Next, DH asserts that all religions cannot be associated with divinity or the worship of a supreme
deity. Some religions, Buddhism for example, stress other practices instead. In Buddhism,
salvation is the worshippers' primary concern -- not Buddha (47). DH also contends that even
with the deistic religions, there are many rites which are completely independent of any idea of
gods (e.g.: the Bible forbids wearing garments of flax and hemp) (49). hence, all religious
powers do not emanate from divine personalities (50).

DH now begins his discussion of religion. first, he characterizes all the elementary phenomena
which comprise religion (51). Religious phenomena can be classified in two fundamental
categories: beliefs and rules. Beliefs are states of opinion and consist in representations, whereas
rites are determined modes of action (51).

All religious beliefs classify things as either profane or sacred. Sacred things are considered
superior in dignity and power to profane things, particularly men (52). Men typically consider
themselves inferior to anything sacred; yet if man depends on gods, this dependence is
reciprocal. without the offerings and sacrifices of man, gods would die (53).
Despite the heterogeneity of sacred and profane things, it is possible for the profane to pass into
the world of the sacred. For example, this occurs when men are initiated into religious life with
certain ceremonies (54).

However, the sacred and the profane are so heterogeneous that their differences eventually break
down into antagonism. men are exhorted to withdraw themselves completely fro the profane
world in order to lead an exclusively religious lives. the profane and the sacred cannot approach
each other and keep their own nature at the same time (55).

Hence, we arrive at the criteria for religious beliefs. 'Religious beliefs are the representations
which express the nature of the scared things and their relations with each other or with profane
things. Rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in the
presence of these sacred objects' (56).

The totality if these beliefs, when organized in a way so as to form a system having a certain
unity and a strict independence from other systems, constitutes a religion . A religion is not made
up of a single idea; it is a whole made up of distinct parts. All religions recognize a plurality of
sacred things, in addition to the system of cults -- each with some autonomy (56). Because of the
variety of cults, there exist groups of religious phenomena which do not belong to any specific
religion. If a cult survives while the group of people which practiced it disintegrates, the cult may
remain as folk lore.

There is a distinction between magic and religion. Magic , like religion, is made up of beliefs and
rites. It also has its dogmas, but they are less speculative because they have utilitarian ends.
However, whereas religion has a church and a community of worshippers with common beliefs,
there is no church in magic (60). The magician has a clientele and it is quite possible that none of
them know each other (59-60). magic lacks the moral community formed by all the believers in a
single faith (61). From this DH derives a more detailed definition of religion: 'a unified system of
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things...things set apart and forbidden -- beliefs and
practices which unite all those who adhere to them into one moral community ' (62). Because
religion is inseparable from the church, it is clear that religion is eminently collective (63).

Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life

Book 3 Chp 4 'The Positive Cult -- cont'd'

Religious rites are observed not for the physical effects they might produce, but to remain
faithful to the past and to maintain the groups normal physiognomy. Rites remake individuals
and groups morally (414-5).

DH uses the cases of the Warramunga, the Intichuma, and the Arunta to illustrate the above
proposition. Although they are separate entities, each tribe has a rite which commemorates a
single ancestor. This rite recollects the past and also brings it to the present through a dramatic
representation. The officiant is not an incarnation of the ancestor, but an actor playing a
role(416).
These ceremonies are dramas which are believed to act on the course of nature (418). However,
their most important function is to sustain the vitality of the mythic beliefs common to the group,
and hence, revivify the most essential elements of the collective consciousness. Through ritual,
individuals are strengthened in their social natures. The rite exercises a moral action more so
than a physical action.

Not all rituals are performed with the external goal of acting on nature for material ends. Some
simply represent the past for the sake of representing it (420). When the participants leave the
ceremony, they go with a sense of moral well being (423). Ceremonies attach themselves to
totems, which are incapable of physical effect. They can only exist in representations whose
object is to commemorate the past (424).

Aside from illustrating the nature of a certain cult, ritual representations also serve recreative and
aesthetic purposes. Rituals restore the moral of the group. They allow men to pass from the real
world to an imaginary one. They even pass from the commemorative rite to public merrymaking.
Some religious ceremonies, whose soul object is to distract, were probably ancient rites. Even
games and art have retained a religious character (425). Recreation is one of the forms of moral
remaking, which is the principal goal of the rite.

A religious rite can have a plurality of specific purposes. For instance, fasting is a penance, a
preparation for communion, and it even confers 'positive virtues.' Inversely, many rites can
produce the same effect and mutually replace one another. For instance, to assure the
reproduction of the totemic species, one can resort to oblations, imitative practices, or
commemorative representations. This proves the plasticity and extreme generality of useful
action which stems from the rites (431). Most importantly, common sentiments are expressed in
common acts. The particular nature of these acts is secondary.

Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life

'Conclusion'

In the final chapter, Durkheim equates religion to society. He says that society is the cause of the
sui generis sensations of the religious experience. Furthermore, social action dominates religious
life (466).

In addition, the fundamental categories of thought and science have religious origin. In fact,
nearly all great social institution, moral and legal rules, have a basis in religion. Religion is the
concentrated reflection of collective life, and its principal purpose is to influence moral life (466-
7).

Religion systematically idealizes. Collective life 'awakens' religious thought in order to bring
about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Thus man places
another world -- a sacred, ideal; world -- above his every day profane life (469). In creating new
ideals, society remakes itself (470).

Although certain religious symbols mat disappear with time, every society will always feel the
need to reaffirm the collective sentiments which make up its unity (474-5).
There are two elements of religious life. Feasts and rites (the cult)are a system of practices
oriented toward action. The second is a system of ideas whose object is to explain the world
(476). religion attempts to explain realities by connecting things with each other -- to systematize
them. Scientific logic actually stems from the methodology of religion.

DH next begins a discussion on the concept as a collective representation. Although a concept

may not apply to every individual, it corresponds to the way in which society considers the
things of its own experience (483). By the mere fact that society exists, there is a whole system
of representations by means of which men understand each other.

A collective representation guarantees objectivity because it is collective. It was been able to

maintain and generalize itself because it has sufficient reason -- the men who accept it verify it
by their own experience. Thus, DH takes it as an axiom that religious beliefs contain a truth
which must be discovered (486).

DH reiterates that the categories of knowledge (time, space ,etc.)are social. Since they are
concepts themselves, they are the work of the group (488). The relationships which they express
could only have been learned through society (491). Time, space, and class were all created out
of cooperation (492). Yet logical organization differentiates itself from its original social
organization as societies expand and integrate. Social moulds must readapt. human thought is not
a primitive fact, but it is a product of history (493).

Hence there is not really such a great antinomy between science and religion. Both systems of
thought are directed toward the universal and imply that the individual can raise himself above
his own point of view and live an impersonal life. Impersonal reason is synonymous with
collective thought.

Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.

Book 2 Chp 7 'Origins of these Beliefs'

In this chapter, DH discusses how men have constructed the belief in totems. A totem in religion
is ' a symbol, a material expression of something else' (236). it symbolizes god, but also the
society which worships it (the clan). In fact, the god of the clan is nothing else than the clan
itself, personified under the visible form of the totem (typically animal or vegetable) (236). The
totem's efficacy comes from its psychical power over its worshippers as well as its moral
authority over the society (238).

Because people do not perceive what the cause of the force of the collective conscious is, they
believe it comes from a force outside themselves. This is the moral conscience and men have
always represented it with religious symbols (242).

Consequently humans get the impression that there are two sorts of reality: on the one hand there
are profane things, and on the other, there are sacred things. Society constantly creates sacred
things out of ordinary ones (243). humans add sacred qualities to objects (261). Society
consecrates men and ideas.
The individual cannot penetrate the sacred without 'entering into relations with extraordinary
powers that excite him to the point of frenzy' (250). Hence, in the midst of this effervescence,
DH contends, the religious idea seems to be born (250). By concentrating itself almost entirely
on in specific moments, collective life has been able to attain its greatest intensity and efficacy,
as well as give men a more active sentiment of the double existence they lead (251).

DH explains how collective forces come to be thought of under the forms of totems, especially in
the shape of an anima or plant. he first contends that the transfer of sentiments to a thing comes
from the fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its symbol are closely related in our minds.
The result is that emotions provoked by the one extend to the other. Since widespread emotions
are common to a group, they must be associated to something that is common to all (primitive
clans: plants and animals). This is the totemic emblem(252).

The totemic emblem is like the visible body of god; it represents the collective force of the clan
-- its religious force (253). Religious forces are moral powers because they translate to the way
in which the collective conscious acts on individual consciousnesses (254). Totems have a dual
purpose: they animate and discipline minds, but they also [are believed to] make plants grow and
animals reproduce.

Religion is a system of ideas with which individuals represent to themselves their own society,
and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it (257). Religion strengthens the
bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member (258).

The clan chooses to rally around an emblem because not only does it clarify the sentiment
society has of itself, but it also serves to create this sentiment (262). If social sentiments are
connected with something that endures (emblem), the sentiments themselves become more
durable. Emblems constantly bring collective sentiments to the fore (263).

Social life is only made possible by a vast system of symbols. Yet the clan is not the only society
which uses totemic practices. generally speaking, a collective sentiment can become 'conscious
of itself' only by being fixed on some material object. Social necessity brings about this fusion of
things and social life facilitates their union.

Durkheim also reiterates that because religion fostered the idea that there are internal
connections between things, it opened up the way for science and philosophy. This is of course,
because religion is a social affair which stems from collective thought.

Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life

Book 3 Chp1 'The Negative Cult and its Functions: the Ascetic rites.'

In this chapter DH will illustrate the characteristic attitudes which the primitive observes in the
celebration of his cult, and will classify the most general forms of his rites as well as explain
their origins. DH asserts that every cult has a double aspect --negative and positive. Two sorts of
rites are closely associated to this double aspect (337).
The purpose of the negative cult (or rites) is to separate sacred and profane beings. These rites
forbid certain ways of acting in the form of interdictions. Religious interdiction implies the
notion of sacredness (338-9).

Some examples of religious interdictions are: Australian tribe members (profane) are forbidden
to carry the bones of a dead men (sacred) unless they are wrapped in bark. A moral general
example is: people (profane) cannot consume certain forbidden animal meats (sacred). (341-2).
moreover, if certain foods are forbidden to the profane because they are sacred, other foods are
forbidden to sacred person because they are profane. In either case, contact between the two is
forbidden.

Nothing which either directly or indirectly concerns the profane life should be confused with the
religious lie (344). In general all acts characteristic of the ordinary life are forbidden while
religious events are taking place (345-6). These rules are strongest for the public cult, or public
practice of religion, as opposed to an individual's private practice of religion (which DH
contends is still influenced by social religion) (347).

Up to this point, the negative cult appears only to be a system of abstentions. Nonetheless, it is
found to exercise a positive action on the religious and moral nature of the individual. The
individual cannot lead any religious life unless he begins to withdraw somewhat from temporal
life. In this manner then, the negative cult is a condition of access to the positive cult (348). For
instance, the result of the numerous interdictions of the negative cult in primitive religions is to
bring about a radical change in the initiate to the given religion. after he takes part in the rather
primitive negative rites, he acquires a sacred character and is considered reborn by the rest of the
group (350). y The understanding of the positive effects of negative rites allows us to better
understand the purposes of asceticism. Both ancient and modern religions attribute a sanctifying
and strengthening power to suffering (354-5). DH explains the reason for this :'suffering is the
sign that...certain of the bonds attaching [the individual] to his profane environment are broken;
so it testifies that he is partially freed from his environment' (355). In order to serve his gods (the
positive cult), the individual must sacrifice his profane interests (356).

But asceticism and the negative cult do not serve only religious purposes. Religious interests are
only the symbolic form of social and moral concerns. Not only do the gods demand suffering and
abnegation from their followers, but so does society. To fulfill his duties to society, the
individual will always have to suppress his instincts, whatever the dogmas or mythologies of the
time (356).

The main reason for the necessity of the separating powers of the negative cult is the
'contagiousness' of the sacred world. Certain rites, objects, or people are sacred, yet they cannot
help but to come into contact with the profane, by virtue of the multitude of other things they are
associated with. The sanctity of sacred things is contagiously transmitted to everything which
evokes the idea of them (359). Hence, even the least proximity (material or moral) can draw
religious forces out of their domain. Precautions in the form of the negative cult are essential to
keep things in their separate domains (358-360). From this, DH concludes that 'every profanation
implies a consecration'(560).
The extreme facility with which religious forces diffuse is not surprising. Religious forces are
collective moral forces which are made up of ideas that stem from society sui generis (362). The
sacred contagion' is not a process where religious forces leave the objects in which they are
embodied. The religious value of objects was conferred to them by society. Thus, the same
religious principle can animate very different objects and this explains how plants, animals,
people, and even rocks are made into totems (i.e. Jesus - lamb - fig leaves- -crosses).

To close this chapter, DH draws a relationship between religion and the sciences (for the ten
millionth time). Scared contagion, by showing the connectedness of things, opened the way for
future scientific thought which utilizes the important concept of relationships between things that
do not appear to be connected (365).

Note: negative rites: separate the sacred from the profane via prohibitions positive rites: stess the
individual's commitment and membership in the social community piacular (expiatory) rites:
confirm the loss of group members by specifying ways of cpoing. 'funeral are for the living.'

EMILE DURKHEIM'Anomic Suicide'TS 916-29

DH prefaces this chapter with the statement that society not only attracts the sentiments and
activities of individual with unequal force, but it is a power controlling them (241).
He then asserts that it is a well-known fact that economic crises have an aggravating effect on
suicidal tendency (241). in both Vienna and France of the late 19th century, suicides increased
with the number of bankruptcies 242.
The increase in poverty, however, is not the cause for the increase in suicides. In fact, even
fortunate crises which enhance a country's prosperity affect suicide like economic disasters
(243). If financial crises increase suicides it is not because they increase poverty, it is because
they are disturbances of the collective order. During a disturbance of the social equilibrium, men
become more disposed to self destruction (246).
No person can be happy unless his needs are insufficient proportion to his means (246).
Moreover, satisfactions received only stimulate needs further; thus the more one has, the more
one wants (248). Any obstruction to man's actions to satisfy his needs can be quite painful
Human passions must be limited by an exterior, regulating force. This must be a moral force
which regulates moral needs (248). Society must play this moderating role; it is the only moral
power superior to the individual (249). If the individual respects regulations, is docile to
collective authority, and has a 'wholesome moral constitution,' he will know better than to ask for
more. Hence, this puts an end to his desires. Yet it is not enough that the average level of needs
for an individual be fixed by public opinion. Society must also fix the way opportunities are open
to individuals (250). It must require sacrifices and concessions of its members in the name of
public interest (251).
Typically, the people subject to social regulation are in agreement with it (251). However, a state
of upheaval can occur when society is going through some sort of abnormal crisis. When society
is so disturbed, it is incapable of exercising a regulatory influence. From this comes the rise in
suicide rates (252).
During this time of upset, individuals must struggle to readjust to new social classifications.
Society cannot adjust them instantaneously to their new lives (252). individuals no longer know
limits to their own desires, thus worsening the state of deregulation or anomy (253). Poverty
protects against suicide because it is a restraint in itself. On the other hand, the less limited one
feels, the more intolerable all limitation appears (254).
Anomy is actually a chronic state in the sphere of trade and industry. The progress of capitalism
has freed industrial relations from all regulation (254). religion has lost its power of preaching
asceticism, and the government has become a tool and a servant to economic life. the liberation
of human desires has only been made worse by the development of industry (255).
Anomy, therefore, is a regular factor in suicide in modern societies. Egoistic suicide results from
man's no longer finding a basis for his own existence and altruistic suicide occurs because man
believes his basis for existence is situated beyond life. Yet, anomic suicide results from man's
activities lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings (258).
Economic anomy is not the only anomy which may give rise to suicide. domestic anomy can also
cause suicide. In countries where divorce is prohibited, wives are more likely to commit suicide
than husbands. However, wives are less likely to commit suicide in countries where divorce is
allowed. On the contrary, in countries where divorce is allowed, the husband is more likely to
commit suicide (266).
DH explains the above phenomena by explaining his idea of the purpose of marriage. According
to him, it is the regulation of sexual relations. It forces a man to attach himself to the same
woman forever and this forms the state of moral equilibrium from which the husband benefits
(270).
On the other hand, the unmarried man faces a different situation. His desire for women can go
unchecked. The uncertainty of his indeterminateness condemns him to constant change and
anomy (271).
Women's sexual needs are less developed because their mental lives are less developed. hence,
they do not require strict social regulation as men do. Thus, marriage is not as useful to them for
limiting suicides. Marriage only makes it more difficult for women to change their living
situations if they become intolerable. Consequently, anything that makes marriage more flexible
can only improve women's situation. Divorce protects them from suicide (272).

EMILE DURKHEIM'Types of Suicide'TS 213-18

At the onset of this article, DH sets up three propositions: 1: Suicide varies inversely with the
degree of integration of religious society
2: ' ' ' ' ' domestic society
3: ' ' ' ' ' political society

Thus, suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration of the social groups, of which the
individual forms a part (213).
Egoistic suicide springs from excessive individualism, wherein the individual ego asserts itself to
excess in the face of the social ego (214). Egoism is the generating cause of egoistic suicide. In
addition, the bond attaching man to life relaxes because the one attaching him to society is weak.
The individual yields to the slightest shock of circumstance because the state of society has made
him a ready prey to suicide (216).
Just as excessive individuation can lead to suicide, so can insufficient individuation. In altruistic
suicide, society binds the individual too tightly. In this case, the ego is not its own property; it is
completely blended into a group spirit. Since this type of suicide is characteristically performed
as a duty to a group, DH calls it 'obligatory altruistic suicide.' However, DH does acknowledge
that not all altruistic suicide is obligatory (217). Other forms are 'optional altruistic suicide,' and
'acute altruistic suicide' (this second one can be likened to mystical suicide from religious
fervor ). Altruistic suicide was typically found in lower, ancient societies which were based on
mechanical solidarity. today, the most common type of altruistic suicide is death in war (217).
DH concludes by contending that there is really not such a big difference between altruistic and
egoistic suicide. he recognizes that many people find something moral in altruistic suicide, but he
asks, 'isn't the notion of individual autonomy in egoistic suicide also moral?' furthermore, when a
man commits altruistic suicide, he still values the individual personality, even in others. thus,
every sort of suicide is merely the 'exaggerated of deflected form of a virtue.' The way those
types affect moral conscience then, does not differentiate them into separate types (218).

EMILE DURKHEIM --- Rules of the Sociological Method pp50-146

In chapter 3, DH presents the rules sociologists should use to distinguish normal social
phenomena from pathological social phenomena. Average types depict normal phenomena and
all others are morbid (pathological) phenomena, which have dire consequences for society.
Pathological types can only be defined in relation to a given species. What is pathological for
one group may not be for another (56).

Three rules for establishing the normality of phenomena:

1: a social fact is normal, in relation to a given social type at a given phase of its development,
when it is present in the average society of that species at the corresponding phase of its
evolution.

2: one can verify the results of the preceding method by showing that the generality of the
phenomenon is bound up with the general conditions of the collective life of the social type
considered.

3: this verification is necessary when the fact in question occurs in a social species which has not
yet reached the full course of its evolution. (64).

DH contends that many essential social phenomena come to light when the proper methodology
is used. for instance, although many criminologists assume crime is pathological, they are
incorrect (65). First of all, crime is normal because no society is exempt from it (67). If the
collective conscience of a society is strong, it will designate certain acts as criminal. What
confers the criminal character of an act is not its intrinsic quality, but the definition which the
collective conscience assigns to it. Crime is necessary because it is bound up with the
fundamental conditions of social life and it is useful because these conditions are indispensable
to the evolution of morality and of law (70).
Through crime, individual originality is able to express itself. it directly prepares changes in
society because where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take on a
new form. Crime sometimes helps determine the form they will take (71).
Hence, the criminal plays a definite role in social life. In fact, if a crime in a society drops below
an average rate, this could be indicative of a severs social disorder. with a drop in the crime rate,
a revision in the theory of punishment becomes necessary (72).
DH closes this chapter by stating that the principal object of all sciences is to define and explain
the normal state and distinguish it from its opposite (74). The generality of phenomena must be
taken as a criterion of their normality (75).

In chapter 4, 'The Classification of Social Types,' Durkheim asserts that it is not possible to
institute the laws of science only after reviewing all the facts they express. Too many varied facts
exist (79). It is better to substitute a limited number of types for the indefinite multiplicity of
individuals. This will not only order pre-existing knowledge, but will create new knowledge
(80). Because the nature of the group depends on the nature and number of component elements
and their mode of combination, we must use these general characteristics as their basis. the
general facts of social life follow from this basis. We can call the classification of social types
'social morphology.'

DH proposes to classify social groups according to the degree of complexity in organization

which they represent. The simplest group is the 'horde,' and then the 'clan' which is a compound
of hordes, and then the 'city -state' which is an aggregate of clans, etc (83-84). Within these
types, one can distinguish between groups by the level of integration of their sub-groups (85).
However, the more complex a social group is, the less definite its contours. Nonetheless, DH
chooses to call each social group a 'species,' even if it is formed only once (86-7).

In chapter 5, DH establishes guidelines for the explanation of social facts. He argues that to show
the usefulness of a fact, it is not enough to explain how it originated or why it is what it is.
Instead, 'when the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken, we must seek separately
the efficient cause which produces it and the function it fulfills' (95). the question is not whether
the cause has a distinct purpose, but whether or not a correspondence between the function and
the result exists which is useful to the organism (95).
DH asserts that theories of psychology are insufficient as premises for social reasoning, but they
can test the validity of propositions established inductively. The ultimate explanation of
collective life consists in showing how it emanates from human nature in general (98).
Social phenomena do not derive from individual consciousnesses and hence, sociology is not a
corollary of individual psychology. Social life is not merely an extension of the individual being.
the external impulse to which he submits cannot come from within him (101). Thus, we must
seek to explain social life in the nature of society itself. a whole is not identical to the sum of its
parts; hence, society is not just a mere sum of individuals. It is the system formed by individuals'
association (103). The group acts differently than its members would if they were isolated (104).
The concept of the social milieu as the determining factor of collective evolution is of utmost
importance to DH. The pressure it exerts on groups within the milieu modifies their organization
(116), If we reject the social milieu, sociology cannot establish any relations of causality (117).
The causes of social phenomena are internal and do not spring from the individual (121).
Many attempts to explain social facts have lost all ideas of social discipline. On the contrary,
DH's principle creates a sociology which sees the spirit of discipline as the essential condition of
all common life (124)

In chapter 6, DH sets forth rules for the establishing of sociological proofs. Since social
phenomena are not within the control of the sociological experimenter, he must employ the
comparative method by conforming to the principal of causality. the basis of sociological
comparisons must be the following proposition:

A given fact always has a single corresponding cause (128).

If suicide appears to depend on more than one cause, it is because in reality there are several
kinds of suicides (129).
However, social phenomena are much too complex for the effect of all the causes to be removed
except for one in a given case. DH suggests using the method of concomitant correlations or
variation. With this method, it is not necessary that the variables outside those which are being
compared be excluded (130). Concomitant variation shows how two facts can mutually influence
each other in a continuous manner (130). Sometimes this method introduces a common cause to
two or more social phenomena (132).
Because societies are formed by many elements from preceding historical eras, one cannot
explain a social fact of any complexity except by following its complete development through all
social species (139). Furthermore, to arrive at a fair comparison across societies, one must
compare the societies at the same period in their development (140).

In his conclusion, DH first contends that his method is entirely independent of philosophy; it
abandons generalizations and enters the world of facts (142). Second, his method is 'objective;' it
is dominated by the idea that social facts are things and must be treated as such. If sociological
phenomena are only systems of objectivized ideas, to explain them is to rethink them in their
logical order. Only methodical experiments can extract the 'truth' from things. Third, DH's
method is exclusively sociological (144). A social fact can be explained only by another social
fact, and this explanation is possible by pointing out the principal factor in collective evolution --
the social milieu.
The above three characteristics make sociology a distinct and autonomous science (145).

EMILE DURKHEIM'On the Normality of Crime,' pp. 872-75 in Theories of Society, edited by
Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kaspar D. Naegele, and Jesse R. Pitts. New York: Free Press.

Crime is normal, an inevitable and necessary part of every society. (It may take abnormal forms,
such as when the crime rate is unusually high.) 'A society exempt from it would be utterly
impossible' (872). Since people differ from 'the collective type,' there are some divergences
which tend toward the criminal. However, whatconfers a 'criminal character' on divergences
from the collective type is not 'the intrinsic quality of a given actbut that definition which the
collective consciousness lends them' (873).

Crime has an 'indirect utility' (874): In order for transformations in law and morality to be
possible, 'thecollective sentiments at the basis of morality must not be hostile to change, and
consequently must have butmoderate energy.... Every pattern is an obstacle to new patterns, to
the extent that the first pattern is inflexible'(873-4). This 'moderate energy,' which permits
change, also permits crime. If there were no crime, it wouldbe evidence that change was not
possible: 'To make progress, individual originality must be able to expressitself' (874).
However, crime also has a direct utility. Crime 'in certain cases directly prepares these changes
[progress]. Where crime exists, collective sentiments are sufficiently flexible to take on a new
form, and crime sometimeshelps to determine the form they will take' (874), Example, Socrates;
freedom of thought was once a crime. Socrates' crime prepared the way for a 'new morality and
faith which the Athenians needed, since the traditionsby which they had lived until then were no
longer in harmony with the current conditions of life' (874). Thus,'[c]ontrary to current ideas, the
criminal no longer seems a totally unsociable being.... On the contrary, heplays a definite role in
social life' (874).

Then Durkheim goes on a little jag about pathology and how the normality of phenomena should
be defined,which I am not going to give much more shrift than this, though you may want to read
it in detail: 'If,however, the most widely diffused facts can be pathological [for instance, crime],
it is possible that the normaltypes never existed in actuality; and if that is the case, why study the
facts?... The principle object of allsciences of life, whether individual or social, is to define and
explain the normal state and to distinguish it fromits opposite.... In order that sociology may be a
true science of things, the generality of phenomena must betaken as the criterion of their
normality' (875). This is actually an important issue, and sheds light on whyEmile sets up his
concepts the way he does.

http://ssr1.uchicago.edu/PRELIMS/Theory/durkheim.html