Professional Documents
Culture Documents
UNITED STATES
No. 461
232 U.S. 383; 34 S. Ct. 341; 58 L. Ed. 652; 1914 U.S. LEXIS 1368
PRIOR HISTORY:
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was charged with the use of the mails
to transport coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery.
The District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri
denied defendant's pretrial petition to suppress the evidence seized in a
warrantless search of his room and to return the seized property. The
district court retained jurisdiction of the property. Defendant appealed the
denial of his petition.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and
remanded the case.
No. 236
367 U.S. 643; 81 S. Ct. 1684; 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081; 1961 U.S. LEXIS 812; 86 Ohio L.
Abs. 513; 16 Ohio Op. 2d 384; 84 A.L.R.2d 933
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court
and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
Court's opinion.
STATE ACTOR…
OVERTURNS WOLF…THAT SAID THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DID NOT
APPLY…HISTORICAL POINTS: MORE STATE ARE USING THE RULE, OTHER
REMIDIES ARE NOT WORKING
No. 35
389 U.S. 347; 88 S. Ct. 507; 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
COURT OVERRULES THE TRESPASS DOCTRINE; THUS CAN VIOLATE THE 4TH
EVEN IF THERE HAS NOT BEEN A PHYSICAL TRESPASS.
ESTABLISHING A SEARCH DOES NOT START THE 4TH, IT MUST BE AN
UNREASONABLE SEARCH FOR THE EVIDENCE TO BE EXCLUDED
UNITED STATES v. WHITE
No. 13
401 U.S. 745; 91 S. Ct. 1122; 28 L. Ed. 2d 453; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 132
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
No. 78-5374
442 U.S. 735; 99 S. Ct. 2577; 61 L. Ed. 2d 220; 1979 U.S. LEXIS 134
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW: After the victim of a robbery began receiving phone calls from
the person who claimed to be the robber, the police installed a pen register,
without a warrant, at the central telephone system in order to determine the
identity of the numbers that petitioner, a suspect, was dialing. After the
police discovered that petitioner had called the victim, they charged him
with robbery. Petitioner alleged that use of the pen register constituted an
illegal search within the meaning of U.S. Const. amend. IV. On review of the
state court's decision that it did not, the Court determined that petitioner's
U.S. Const. amend. IV rights were not violated. The Court found that
petitioner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the
numbers he dialed on his phone because those numbers were automatically
turned over to a third party, the phone company. The Court also ruled that
even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone
numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation was not one that
society was prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus, the Court
concluded that installation of the pen register was not a "search" and no
warrant was required.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the order from the state court, ruling that
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by warrantless use
of a pen register.
OLIVER v. UNITED STATES
No. 82-15
466 U.S. 170; 104 S. Ct. 1735; 80 L. Ed. 2d 214; 1984 U.S. LEXIS 55; 52 U.S.L.W.
4425
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 686 F.2d 356, affirmed; 453 A. 2d 489, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment, and remanded for further
proceedings.
CALIFORNIA v. CIRAOLO
No. 84-1513
476 U.S. 207; 106 S. Ct. 1809; 90 L. Ed. 2d 210; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 154; 54 U.S.L.W.
4471
PRIOR HISTORY:
DISPOSITION: 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The court reversed the appellate court's judgment and found
that defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied.
STEVEN DEWAYNE BOND v. UNITED STATES
No. 98-9349
529 U.S. 334; 120 S. Ct. 1462; 146 L. Ed. 2d 365; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2520; 68
U.S.L.W. 4255; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2877; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 3853;
2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2053; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 247
CASE SUMMARY
No. 77-5781
439 U.S. 128; 99 S. Ct. 421; 58 L. Ed. 2d 387; 1978 U.S. LEXIS 2452
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
No. 97-1147
525 U.S. 83; 119 S. Ct. 469; 142 L. Ed. 2d 373; 1998 U.S. LEXIS 7844; 67
U.S.L.W. 4017; 98 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8754; 98 Daily Journal DAR 12129;
1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 5991
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision,
holding that property used for commercial purposes was treated differently
for Fourth Amendment purposes than residential property. One who was
merely present with the consent of the householder could not claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Substantive Argument: They said the initial search was illegal…thus everything
that followed was unlawful
Govt. Action:
--Police looked in window
--Police stopped car
--looked in car
--Arrested the people
--latter searched car
--obtained warrant and searched house
==evidence gained was stuff from the car , statements the arrestes made, stuff from
the apartment
Standing: defendant had no standing to claim of 4th Amendment violation the issue
whether all of the evidence c`ould be excluded if the looking into the window was
unlawful. If the look into the window was unlawful then all the other evidence
would have been tainted. Thus, all the evidence would be excluded. The trial court
said the defendant had no standing in any case the looking into the window was not
a search .
The court of appeals reversed finding that thye had standing and it was a search
1. Not Their Apt
2. Purpose of Visit=Business
3. Couple of Hours
4. No prior Connection
No. 8
393 U.S. 410; 89 S. Ct. 584; 21 L. Ed. 2d 637; 1969 U.S. LEXIS 2701
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment from the court of appeals,
which affirmed the petitioner's conviction after finding the search warrant
supported by probable cause. The court remanded the case to the court of
appeals for further proceedings.
AGULARA TEST: [1] RELIABILITY--- IN THIS CASE WE NEED TO KNOW
WHY THE INFORMATN IS RELIABLE, A TRACK RECORD WOULD HELP,
(can be coroberated (helps w/ great details), track reckord, veracity) [2] BASIS OF
KNOWLEDGE ---IN THIS CASE WE DON’T KNOW HOW THE INFORMAT
GOT THE INFO
ILLINOIS v. GATES ET UX.
No. 81-430
462 U.S. 213; 103 S. Ct. 2317; 76 L. Ed. 2d 527; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 54; 51
U.S.L.W. 4709
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
So they want to put these two away, so the court uses totality of the circumstances
Disent:
--now Magistrates have no guidelines
MICHAEL A. WHREN AND JAMES L. BROWN, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES
No. 95-5841.
517 U.S. 806; 116 S. Ct. 1769; 135 L. Ed. 2d 89; 1996 U.S. LEXIS 3720; 64
U.S.L.W. 4409; 96 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4123; 96 Daily Journal DAR 6635; 9
Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 652
CASE SUMMARY
We don’t use officers subjective defense, and we are not going to establish a
reasonable officer clause
Defense says that the stop was unreasonable and pretextual…should look at what a
reasonable officer would have done
JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
No. 329
333 U.S. 10; 68 S. Ct. 367; 92 L. Ed. 436; 1948 U.S. LEXIS 2583
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The Court granted the petition and reversed, holding that
the warrantless arrest and search violated the Fourth Amendment even
though the officers may have had probable cause to obtain a warrant.
Government Action: Not go into the hall/ Not smell Opium; but Entry into the room and
looking around
But the Court says that we generally need warrants b/c it protects privacy
It is important b/c the warrant is then at the suppression hearing, thus frezzing the
probable cause determination, prevents form ad hoc additions to building probable
cause
What Johnson says is that if the police are ingaging in a search, The presumption is
that there is a warrant requirement…prevents from police getting to wraped up and
ad hoc probable cause
No. 74-538
423 U.S. 411; 96 S. Ct. 820; 46 L. Ed. 2d 598; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 121
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CASE SUMMARY
Government action: Arrest, and Seach of Car [but this was concentual]
Fruit of Poisiones Tree (FOPT), so the issue is whether the arrest is invalid
Did they have probable cause? They have an informant, and gives signal,
and informant gives probable cause to past crimes
Issue is if you need an areest warrant for past crims/fellonies, b/c everyone
agrees that seeing a crime in front of her you don’t need an arrest warrant.
Justification:
There is a statute that says this is ok
There is also a Historical Analysis [common law arrest is ok for felonies]
Hampering Law Enforcement
Citing Precedent [we got cases that says this is ok]
It is also the current state practice
Concurring:
Undercuts Historical Analysis…it has never been before us before, but says
that it is good
RULE: Can always arrest someone for a mister meaner of felony committed
in presence and can arrest someone for a past felony w/o a arrest warrant
[b/c felons pose a public danger]
ANDRESEN v. MARYLAND
No. 74-1646
427 U.S. 463; 96 S. Ct. 2737; 49 L. Ed. 2d 627; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 78
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
Warrant was out for 3 months…staleness is not an issue b/c it is business records
With looking through papers or compter files the govt. is going to look at a lot of
information before getting to what they want
MARYLAND v. GARRISON
No. 85-759
480 U.S. 79; 107 S. Ct. 1013; 94 L. Ed. 2d 72; 1987 U.S. LEXIS 559; 55 U.S.L.W.
4190
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
=================================================
Franks v. Delewarewhen defendat shows that the probable cause
showing was based on an intentional or recklessly false statement the court
hs to take out that evidence from the warrant and still determine if there is
probable cause (notes 101)
No. 94-5707
514 U.S. 927; 115 S. Ct. 1914; 131 L. Ed. 2d 976; 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3464; 63
U.S.L.W. 4456; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3823; 95 Daily Journal DAR 6470; 9 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. S 67
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further
proceedings.
RAMIREZ not going to establish a different rule for when property is destroyed
No. 82-1771
468 U.S. 897; 104 S. Ct. 3405; 82 L. Ed. 2d 677; 1984 U.S. LEXIS 153; 52 U.S.L.W.
5155
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that the
exclusionary rule should be modified to allow the admission of evidence
seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant, even if
the warrant was subsequently found to be defective.
LAC OF PROBALBE CAUSE: UNDER STRICT APPLICATION OF AGULAR/SPENILLI
TEST
WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT NOT ASK THE SC TO REMAND AND HAVE IT DONE
UNDER GATES…THIS IS NOT DONE THOGH B/C THE SC HAS BEEN SIGNALING FOR
A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
No. 770
395 U.S. 752; 89 S. Ct. 2034; 23 L. Ed. 2d 685; 1969 U.S. LEXIS 1166
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
SICA SEARCH:
--no search warrant, they looked all through the house
--there is a debate about how narrow or broad of an area can the police search,
incient to a lawful arrest
--Rule: Immediate lunging area/ wing span/ grapping area can be searched. [this
would include containters, but a locked containt of which the person does not
reasonably have access is debateable]…if there are facts that raise risks, than they
can reley on the emergency excedption or exigency exception
--CHRISMAN, seach w/in the wingspan of the arreste is ok, but in this case the
arrestee requested this. PAGE 139
UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
No. 72-936
414 U.S. 218; 94 S. Ct. 467; 38 L. Ed. 2d 427; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 21; 66 Ohio Op. 2d
202
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OHIO V. TERI…Police can do a pat down only during an incouter that is not an
arrest…why, for the officers safty [this is weird b/c it is a warrantless seach w/o
probable cause]
Everyone on the court agrees that the police can pat the guy down for their own
protection
Officer says that his actions were based on procedure for safety and to look for
evidence
--lower court said couldn’t take it out b/c knew it wasn’t a weapon
--Majority says this is too narrow and adopt [CHIMIAL DOES NOT APPLY B/C
THERE IS NO MORE EVIDENCE NEEDED FOR THE DRIVING W/O A
LICENCE, AND THE RATIONEL ABOUT PROTECTING DANGER DOES NOT
APPLY TO THIS CASE]
THUS, THE RULE ADDS THE POLICE CAN LOOK ANYWHERE
ON ONES PERSON AND IN ANY CONTAINER ON ONE’S PERSON
WHEN THE PERSON IS ARRESTED
THE RATIONELL IS…THAT DURRING A FULL
COSTODIAL ARREST IS MORE DANGERIOUS THAN
THE STOP AND FRISK UNDER TERRIE, ALSO THIS IS
“BRIGHT LINE” AND MAKES IT EASY FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT.
BUT NOW AFTER ATWATER, THE POLICE CAN ARREST FOR ANY TRAFFIC
STOP AND THEN SEARCH THE PERSON, WINGSPAN, AND IN THE NEXT CASE
THEIR CAR
NEW YORK v. BELTON
No. 80-328
453 U.S. 454; 101 S. Ct. 2860; 69 L. Ed. 2d 768; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 13; 49 U.S.L.W.
4915
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the lower state court
and held that items seized in the warrantless search of a passenger
compartment of a vehicle, incident to a lawful custodial arrest, were
lawfully seized during the exigencies of the situation and such seizure
did not violate the safeguards of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the constitution.
SEARCH
ISSUE, WHAT IS FOUND IN THE JACKET…IS THE COCAIN IN THE JACKET
UNLAWFULLY SIEZED
WE KNOW THE POLICE CAN LOOK INTO THE GLOVE BOX BUT NOT THE
TRUNK, BUT WE ARE UNAWARE IF THE GLOVEBOX IS LOCKED OR IF THERE
IS A LOCKED CONTAINER IN THE BACK SEAT
No. 78-5420
445 U.S. 573; 100 S. Ct. 1371; 63 L. Ed. 2d 639; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 13
* Together with No. 78-5421, Riddick v. New York, also on appeal from the same
court.
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The Court reversed and remanded the cases for further
proceedings because the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibited the police from making warrantless and nonconsensual entry
into suspects' homes in order to make routine felony arrests.
No. 79-6777
451 U.S. 204; 101 S. Ct. 1642; 68 L. Ed. 2d 38; 1981 U.S. LEXIS 89; 49 U.S.L.W.
4418
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 606 F.2d 540 and 615 F.2d 642, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment that affirmed the denial
of petitioner's suppression motion where petitioner's U.S. Const.
amend. IV rights were violated when drug enforcement officers, in the
absence of consent and exigent circumstances, entered petitioner's
home and searched for the subject of an arrest warrant without first
obtaining a search warrant.
STEADGALD:
CANT USE THE ARREST WARANT FOR ONE PERSON TO GET EVIDENCE
AGAINST ANOTHER PERSON
=====
IF OFFICER THINKS YOUR HOME, HAS AN ARREST WARRANT, COMES INTO
HOME, CAN LOOK AROUND IN PLACES THAT ARE REASONABLE THAT SHE
MAY BE, ARREST HER, AND DO A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
GO BACK OF SPEGALD
No. 480
387 U.S. 294; 87 S. Ct. 1642; 18 L. Ed. 2d 782; 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2753
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the order granting habeas corpus relief
to the inmate.
….IF SUSPECT HAS BEEN CAUGHT, AND NO OTHER PEOPLE IN HOUSE, THE
SEARCH FOR WEAPONS MUST STOP
ROBINSON PERSON
CHEMMEL WINGSPAN
BELTON THE INTERIOR OF CAR
VALE v. LOUISIANA
No. 727
399 U.S. 30; 90 S. Ct. 1969; 26 L. Ed. 2d 409; 1970 U.S. LEXIS 18
PRIOR HISTORY:
DISPOSITION: Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted; 252 La. 1056, 215 So. 2d
811, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case
for further proceedings.
No. 75-1721
433 U.S. 1; 97 S. Ct. 2476; 53 L. Ed. 2d 538; 1977 U.S. LEXIS 133
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the order from the appellate court that
affirmed the suppression of marijuana seized from defendants.
--DOG SNIFF NOT AN ILLEGAL SEARCH B/C ONLY REVEALS PRESENCE OF
CONTRABAND
--ARREST
--SEIZE CAR AND LOCKER
--SEARCH LOCKER AT THE STATION
WE ARE IN THE PERSONAL EFFECTS DOCTRINE B/C THE EFFECT IS OUTSIDE THE
CAR [THUS TAKING IT OUT OF THE VEHICLE EXCEPTION DOCTRINE]INTRODUCES
A SEPARATE RATIONEL FOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION=THAT THERE IS A REDUCED
PRIVACY EXPECTATION IN ADDITION TO LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE
STILL GOOD LAW, AND WOULD TURN OUT SAME TODAY, ON THESE FACTS THE
SICA RATIONEL DOEN’T COME IN
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. CHARLES STEVEN ACEVEDO
No. 89-1690
500 U.S. 565; 111 S. Ct. 1982; 114 L. Ed. 2d 619; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3016; 59
U.S.L.W. 4559; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3898; 91 Daily Journal DAR 6569
PRIOR HISTORY:
DISPOSITION: 216 Cal. App. 3d 586, 265 Cal. Rptr. 23, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
WE GET RULE, IF THERE IS PC, YOU CAN LOOK IN THE AREA IN WHICH YOU HAVE
PC TO LOOK
…CAN SEARCH IT INSIDE THE CAR, BUT AS SOON AS IT LEAVE THE CAR THE
CONTAINER THEN COMES UNDER THE CONTAINER RATIONEL…ALTHOUGH IT IS
STRANGE TO THINK A SUIT CASE HAS GREATER EXPECTATION OUTSIDE A CAR
RATHER THAN INSIDE A CAR
===
IF COPS WERE LOOKING FOR A GUN, PART OF A ROBBERY, AND FIND AN
UNLOADED GUN IN THE CAR, THAN CAN CONTINUE LOOKING FOR THE BULLETS
No. 75-76
428 U.S. 364; 96 S. Ct. 3092; 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000; 1976 U.S. LEXIS 15
CASE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW: State appealed the judgment that held that local police
violated U.S. Const. amend. IV when they conducted a routine
inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police,
contending that the search and seizure was not unreasonable. On
appeal, the judgment was reversed and remanded on the basis that
the police were indisputably engaged in a caretaking search and such
was not unreasonable. The court reasoned that the owner, having left
his car illegally parked for an extended period and thus subject to
impoundment, was not present to make other arrangements for the
safekeeping of his belongings. Further, the inventory itself was
prompted by the presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside
the car. The court held that there was no suggestion whatever that the
standard procedure was a pretext concealing an investigatory police
motive. The court concluded that in following standard police
procedures the conduct of the police was not unreasonable under U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
OUTCOME: The judgment that held that local police violated the
constitution when they conducted a routine inventory search of an
automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations of municipal
parking ordinances was reversed because the conduct of the police was
not unreasonable. The court reasoned that the police were indisputably
engaged in a caretaking search of a lawfully impounded automobile.
--CAR IS TAKEN TO IMPOUND LOTS [LAWFUL B/C THERE IS A STATUTE AND CAR
WAS IN VIOLATION]
--THERE WAS NO PC FOR THE SEARCH, AND NO WARRANT
JUSTIFICATION, PROTECTS:
--OWNER’S PROPERTY
--PO PO FROM FALSE CLAIMS
--“POTENTIAL” DANGER
REDUCED EXPECATION OF PRIVACY B/C MOVILE AND PULIC TRAVEL
--PC IS IRRELEVANT TO MEET GOVERNMENT NEEDS, IT JUST DOESN’T MAKE SENSE
~ THERE IS JUST NOTING TO DERTERMINE
No. 81-1859
462 U.S. 640; 103 S. Ct. 2605; 77 L. Ed. 2d 65; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 71
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
BRIGHT LINE RULE, SAME JUSTIFICATIONS FROM ABOVE FOR CAR INVATORY, AND
FOR IDENTIFYING THE ARRESTTE
No. 85-889
479 U.S. 367; 107 S. Ct. 738; 93 L. Ed. 2d 739; 1987 U.S. LEXIS 286; 55 U.S.L.W.
4105
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW: The state court held that searches of closed trunks and
suitcases violated the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme
Court reversed. There was no showing that the police, who were
following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation. The police were potentially responsible for the
property taken into their custody. By securing the property, the police
protected the property from unauthorized interference. Reasonable
police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in
good faith satisfied the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might
as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules
requiring a different procedure. The trial court found that the police
department's procedures mandated the opening of closed containers
and the listing of their contents. The discretion afforded the police was
exercised in light of standardized criteria, related to the feasibility and
appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than
impounding it. There was no showing that the police chose to impound
defendant's van in order to investigate suspected criminal activity.
INVENTORY SEARCH OUTSIDE THE IMPOUND LOT, AND EVEN WHEN THE
PERSON
JUSTIFIED BY BRIGHT LINE RULE, IT CAN’T BE INVESTIGATORY, MUST
FOLLOW STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDUERS IS PRESENT AND COULD
MAKE OTHER ARANGEMENTS
===========================
REVIEW
--SEARCH
--ARRESTS
--SEIZURES OF PROPERTY
No. 71-732
412 U.S. 218; 93 S. Ct. 2041; 36 L. Ed. 2d 854; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 6
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 4TH AND TRIAL RIGHTS…GOVT. HAS THE BURDEN OF VALID
CONSENTPART OF THE SHOWING IS THAT THE PERSON ORDINARILY IN TRIAL
HAS TO KNOW THEY HAVE THE RITGHT…BUT IN THIS CASE, THEY DON’T HAVE TO
MAKE THE SAME SHOWING IN REGARDS TO PRIVACY B/C
FACTS THAT HELP: TIME, AGE, REPEDITIVE, TONE, WEAPONS, RACE, LANGUAGE
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
REVIEW
SEARCH
ARREST CS OF PERSON
SEIZURE OF PROPERTY
FOR ANY WARRANT OR CONSENT EXCEPTION, THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE BURDEN
OF SHOWING…THEY DON’T HAVE TO SHOW THAT THE PERSON KNEW THEY HAD
THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
JIMENO: resasonableness goes towards scope and amount of time. All containters
have privacy interests, so presumably the cop can look in any unlocked container
when they get pers when they get permission to look for drugs in a car
UNITED STATES v. MATLOCK
No. 72-1355
415 U.S. 164; 94 S. Ct. 988; 39 L. Ed. 2d 242; 1974 U.S. LEXIS 8
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW: The question before the Court was whether the evidence
presented by the government with respect to the voluntary consent of
a third party to search defendant's living quarters was legally sufficient
to render the seized materials admissible in evidence at defendant's
criminal trial for bank robbery. The Court reversed the judgment,
finding that the government had proven the third party's actual
authority to consent to the search. The Court noted that defendant's
own out-of-court admissions would have surmounted all objections
based on the hearsay rule both at the suppression hearings and at the
trial itself, and would have been admissible for whatever inferences the
trial judge could have reasonably drawn regarding joint occupancy of
the east bedroom. The Court also noted that, under the circumstances,
there was no apparent reason for the trial judge to distrust the
evidence and to exclude the third party's declarations from his own
consideration. Finally, the Court noted that because the third party was
a witness for defendant at the suppression hearing, she was available
for cross-examination. Thus, the risk of prejudice, if any, from the use
of hearsay was reduced.
No. 88-2018
497 U.S. 177; 110 S. Ct. 2793; 111 L. Ed. 2d 148; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3295; 58
U.S.L.W. 4892
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for
further determination whether the police officers possessed a
reasonable belief that defendant's former roommate had common
authority over the apartment.
ACTUAL AUTHORITY=NO
APPARENT AUTHORITY=YES… AND RESUTS IN THE EVIDENCE COMING IN
A NUMBER OF STATES HAVE REJECTED THIS CASE…STATES CAN GIVE CITIZENS
MORE RIGHTS
TERRY BRICE HORTON, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA
No. 88-7164
496 U.S. 128; 110 S. Ct. 2301; 110 L. Ed. 2d 112; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2937; 58
U.S.L.W. 4694
PRIOR HISTORY:
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California Sixth Appellate District.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
No. 85-1027
480 U.S. 321; 107 S. Ct. 1149; 94 L. Ed. 2d 347; 1987 U.S. LEXIS 1056; 55
U.S.L.W. 4258
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
==========================
TERRY v. OHIO
No. 67
392 U.S. 1; 88 S. Ct. 1868; 20 L. Ed. 2d 889; 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1345; 44 Ohio Op.
2d 383
PRIOR HISTORY:
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
No. 78-5066
442 U.S. 200; 99 S. Ct. 2248; 60 L. Ed. 2d 824; 1979 U.S. LEXIS 126
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
No. 78-1821
446 U.S. 544; 100 S. Ct. 1870; 64 L. Ed. 2d 497; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 102
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
Plurality says: no seizure~ # of police, weapons, what they say, [it is helpful to know if
they were informed that they were free to go], race, age, capacity [test= what would a
reasonable person in mendenha’s shoes feel free to leave]. Plurality sees it as not a
seizure so doen’t have to talk about 4th amendment.
7 say that this is a stop [thus a lesser kind of seizure compared to an arrest]
The 3 concurrers says it was a stop and that it was justified by reasonable suspision
She meets reasonable suspision, no luggage, coming from a drug area, last off the plain,
suspicious, meet a profile [meeting a profile is not enough, there has to be individual
reasons]
We are going to lower the standard in drug cases, b/c there is such a compelling
government interest
The plurality says that the other governemtn actions of accompany and search of purse
and person were purley consensual
No. 89-1717
501 U.S. 429; 111 S. Ct. 2382; 115 L. Ed. 2d 389; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3625; 59
U.S.L.W. 4708; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4671; 91 Daily Journal DAR 7328
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision and remanded the case to
determine whether respondent's consent to search was voluntary
under the totality of the circumstances.
Cops w/ badges and insignia, indentify defendant, and asked if could search luggage
Things to talk about [possible searches and seizures]:
--initial encounter
--search of a suitcase
Simply the fact that the encounter was on a bus does not make it a seizure
Remand b/c have to do a free to decline test, where they look at the totality
Rule: would a reasonable person would feel free to decline the requests of the oficers
CALIFORNIA v. HODARI D.
No. 89-1632
499 U.S. 621; 111 S. Ct. 1547; 113 L. Ed. 2d 690; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2397; 59
U.S.L.W. 4335; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2893; 91 Daily Journal DAR 4665
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
Govt. concieded that there was no reasonable suspision to chase when kid’s started
to run
Would a reasonable person stop when popo yells stop when being chsed
There has been no search or seizure at the time the evidence is thrown away
No. 78-1821
446 U.S. 544; 100 S. Ct. 1870; 64 L. Ed. 2d 497; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 102
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
No. 89-1717
501 U.S. 429; 111 S. Ct. 2382; 115 L. Ed. 2d 389; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 3625; 59
U.S.L.W. 4708; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4671; 91 Daily Journal DAR 7328
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision and remanded the case to
determine whether respondent's consent to search was voluntary
under the totality of the circumstances.
CALIFORNIA v. HODARI D.
No. 89-1632
499 U.S. 621; 111 S. Ct. 1547; 113 L. Ed. 2d 690; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2397; 59
U.S.L.W. 4335; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2893; 91 Daily Journal DAR 4665
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
Hensley: you can stop a person for past crimeadditional showing for it being a
right person and that the crime occurred
ILLINOIS v. WILLIAM AKA SAM WARDLOW
No. 98-1036
528 U.S. 119; 120 S. Ct. 673; 145 L. Ed. 2d 570; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 504; 2000
Cal. Daily Op. Service 299; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 389; 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R.
183; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 20
CASE SUMMARY
No. 89-789
496 U.S. 325; 110 S. Ct. 2412; 110 L. Ed. 2d 301; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3053; 58
U.S.L.W. 4747
PRIOR HISTORY:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA.
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and
remanded for further proceedings because when the officers stopped
respondent, the anonymous tip from the informant had been sufficiently
corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged
in criminal activity. The investigative stop did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
Apparently the consent was voluntary and the search was w/in the scope
Argument: that the stop was not based on reasonable suspicision
Before the stop the popo verified her car, apt. building, and the direction of the
car was traveling. Unverified before the stop= name, semi-verfication of
destination, and drugs
No. 98-1993
529 U.S. 266; 120 S. Ct. 1375; 146 L. Ed. 2d 254; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2345; 68
U.S.L.W. 4236; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2409; 2000 Daily Journal DAR
3226; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1642; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 216
CASE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW: The court affirmed a judgment holding that a Terry "stop and
frisk" search of respondent based only on an anonymous tip was invalid
under U.S. Const. amend. IV. Respondent was searched after an anonymous
caller reported to the police that a young black male standing at a particular
bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. The court held that
an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was, without more,
insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. The tip
pointing to respondent lacked the moderate indicia of reliability necessary
because the call provided no predictive information to enable the police to
test the informant's knowledge or credibility. Further, the accurate
description of respondent's appearance was not enough since the reasonable
suspicion at issue required that the tip be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. Finally,
the court declined to modify the Terry standard to license a "firearm
exception" since it roved too far from the court's established reliability
analysis.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed a judgment holding that a Terry "stop and
frisk" search of respondent based only on an anonymous tip was
constitutionally invalid since an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a
gun was, without more, insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk
of that person.
===============================================================
===============================================================
ARVIZU:
Sensors in the road, in a sparce area that is suspect for drug trafficking, kids neas are up
high, driver stiff and ridgid & didn’t look at the cops.
Court said reasonable suspissioneverything that looks purely inoscent can give rise to
reasonable suspission
REVIEW:
No. 83-6766
470 U.S. 811; 105 S. Ct. 1643; 84 L. Ed. 2d 705; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 1523; 53
U.S.L.W. 4382
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
Ditum is important:
UNITED STATES v. PLACE
No. 81-1617
462 U.S. 696; 103 S. Ct. 2637; 77 L. Ed. 2d 110; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 74; 51 U.S.L.W.
4844
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
Threshold: can you seize a belonging errespective to the seizure of the person. So
is the seizure of the luggage only a mini seizure [i.e. stop]only needs RS, or a full
seizure [arrest]needs PC
…………………answer to this question is yes
But in this case, the seizure was unreasonable, took to long and took the bag to
another airport. Here the popo could have had the dog at the seen
====================================================
====================================================
Kabias Case: the presence of the dog did not change the traffic stop. The dog got
there right away and was walked around a car that was lawfully stopped. The
dissent says that bringing a dog to a traffic stop changed the nature of the dog. If
the person would have been held after the initial traffic stop so as to allow the dog to
come, than case would probably be very different
MICHIGAN v. LONG
No. 82-256
463 U.S. 1032; 103 S. Ct. 3469; 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 7; 51 U.S.L.W.
5231
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
Government Action:
--Encounter w/ defendantok b/c car in ditch
--see weaponok b/c open to public view
--seach the passenger compartment, discovers pouch…find it in a pouch
--frisk
--arrest
--impounded the vehicle
--trunk
This is not a search incident to lawful arrest case, b/c searched the pouch first and
then arrested
New rule: can search the are inside the car for the sake of police protection have a
knife and drunk guy, so government interest goes up+ it is the middle of the night in
a rural area. This is not about evidence, it is about weapons and such things which
endanger the officer. Government showing is= reasonable suspicion that the suspect
is dangerous, and that may gain control to weapons.
Seeing the gun, or prior knowledge of armed criminal activity may work to give the
popo a reasonable suspicion that there is a weapon
====================================================
====================================================
Hibble stop suspect, ask him name, and refused to give name…Navada statute
allowed to arrest if refuse to give name. Issue, is it reasonable to arrest him…it
matches the justification of Terri stop…and if they don’t arrest him now, they will
never get his identity
--during a risk popo can remove anything that is immediately apparent that is a
weapon or contraband
MINNESOTA, PETITIONER v. TIMOTHY DICKERSON
No. 91-2019
508 U.S. 366; 113 S. Ct. 2130; 124 L. Ed. 2d 334; 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4018; 61
U.S.L.W. 4544; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4134; 93 Daily Journal DAR 7077; 7 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. S 373
CASE SUMMARY
Government Action:
--government conseeds it was a stopattorney should have contended the legality of the
stop
--the officers friskofficer squeezed the lump in his pocket, and it was immediately
apparent that it was not a weapon.
Can seize drugs und the “plain feel” doctrine, but it was not plain that the lump was
contraband
The frisk is ok b/c it is near a crack house, and it is assumed that guns may be present is
such an area
The additional viewing can’t give you probable cause…the popo blew it by giving the
pocket an extra squeeze.
MARYLAND, PETITIONER v. JEROME EDWARD BUIE
No. 88-1369
494 U.S. 325; 110 S. Ct. 1093; 108 L. Ed. 2d 276; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1176; 58
U.S.L.W. 4281
PRIOR HISTORY:
DISPOSITION: 314 Md. 151, 550 A.2d 79, vacated and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
====================================================
General Notes: Start w/ the government action, don’t start w/ a conclusion that
Popo had reasonable suspicion.
====================================================
YBARRA:
=========================================================
=========================================================
SUMMERS:
NEW JERSEY v. T. L. O.
No. 83-712
469 U.S. 325; 105 S. Ct. 733; 83 L. Ed. 2d 720; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 41; 53
U.S.L.W. 4083
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW: The student's purse was searched after she was suspected of
having cigarettes. The principal discovered that the student had the
cigarettes in her possession, and discovered evidence of marijuana and a list
of alleged users from the school. The State of New Jersey brought
delinquency charges against the student. The student alleged that the
search of her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that a
search by a school official was permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted were reasonably related to the objectives of the search and were
not intrusive in light of the age and the sex of the student. Therefore, the
Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court and held that the
evidence of marijuana was admissible.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the state supreme court's holding against
the State of Jersey in which the evidence of drug dealing was suppressed
and the Court held that the search, which resulted in the discovery of the
evidence of marihuana dealing by the student, was reasonable.
No. 88-1897
496 U.S. 444; 110 S. Ct. 2481; 110 L. Ed. 2d 412; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3144;
58 U.S.L.W. 4781
PRIOR HISTORY:
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Michigan.
DISPOSITION: 170 Mich. App. 433, 429 N.W.2d 180, reversed and
remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
OUTCOME: The judgment finding that the State's sobriety checkpoints were
unconstitutional was reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the court's opinion because the proper analysis was a three
prong test balancing the state's grave interest in curbing drunk driving, the
effectiveness of the stops, and the insubstantial subjective intrusion on
individual liberties.
Everyone agrees that the sobriety checkpoint is a seizure…usually for a seizure
you need PC or individualized reasonable suspicion.
MARTINEZ-FUERTE
Fixed border Checkpoints
No. 99-1030
531 U.S. 32; 121 S. Ct. 447; 148 L. Ed. 2d 333; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 8084; 69
U.S.L.W. 4009; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9549; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6401;
14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 9
CASE SUMMARY
They are just doing investigation of these drivers in this case…it’s not like the
highway safety concern of drunk driving.
LIDSTER
Court distinguishes Edmond b/c it is not about ferreting out crime, but to ask
citizens to help solve a crime. It doesn’t make sense to use individualized
suspicion, Govt. interest is strong, the individual intrusion is low
===============================================
===
Court says can’t do random pull overs…rather they should just look for
evidence of DUI
Can stop you at a border…this is a point of wherever they decide to put the
check point
===============================================
====
Flores-Montano no property or privacy interest…and at borders there is a
high level of govt. interest they can detain and do legthy detentions
SkinnerDrug
No. 96-126
520 U.S. 305; 117 S. Ct. 1295; 137 L. Ed. 2d 513; 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2505;
65 U.S.L.W. 4243; 145 A.L.R. Fed. 657; 12 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1233; 97 Cal.
Daily Op. Service 2723; 97 Daily Journal DAR 4831; 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S
393
CASE SUMMARY
OVERVIEW: The Court held that Georgia's requirement that candidates for
state office pass a drug test was outside the category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches. The Court emphasized that the proffered
special need for drug testing must be substantial--important enough to
override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to
suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized
suspicion. The Court found that Georgia failed to show, in justification of Ga.
Code Ann. § 21-2-140, a special need of that kind. Notably lacking in
respondent officials' presentation was any indication of a concrete danger
that demanded departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule. The
statute was not needed and could not work to ferret out lawbreakers, and
officials barely attempted to support the statute on that ground. However
well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia devised diminished personal
privacy for a symbol's sake; state action that is prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. Where, as in this case, public safety was not genuinely
jeopardized, the Fourth Amendment precluded a suspicionless search, no
matter how conveniently arranged.
Ebara Case: Search Warrant for the Bar, stopped and searched a patron, were they
justified in frisking everyone in the bar. Court said no, to PC that everyone had
narcotics, and Teri Balancing requires individualized suspicionand there was no
individualized suspicion
Summers: Search Warrant for contraband, detain the resident of the home, there is
some suspicion attached to the home does the suspicion transfer to him. Just
keeping him in his home [not a public place], Govt. interest=making sure he doesn’t
flea, making sure doesn’t come back and ambush police [court has never said can
detain resident during a warantless search, or if you could detain non-residentsa
non resident is less likely to be seen as attached to the contraband, and visitors
could not help police in the search]
McCarther: Popo detain guy when they go to get a warrant. Concern for destruction
of evidence/flight…yes detain him but it is just outside his home…this was ok
TLO: full search of student’s pursebefore this never allowed full search on less
than PC. Case allows school official to do a full search just based on reasonable
suspicion
===========
Suspissionless Searchesprior to this there was some govt. showing
Stizallows popo to stop and search with no cause [helps to think of these as special
needs cases
--Road Blocks [In Stiz, court said ok to do DWI, fixed for the duration of the check,
momentary stop, everyone is stopped, there is notice [so no surprise], and govt.
interest in apprehending DUI’s is high. Brown is the test for special needs cases.
Brown= Govt. interest, Effectiveness for meeting interest, Individual interest.
Other OK stops is at boarders, not only can they stop you and do full search, and
disassemble you car, with no showing of suspicion or PC
The only roadblock that is not ok is a General Crime Road Block: When the purpose
of the RB is to investigate if the drivers themselves are engaging in illegal activity
[section 2 on p. 404 gives good review of special needs cases] once department
starts getting into a department wide [implicit intent to get people] than starts
getting away from Wren
--Drug Test [ok for athletes and other students involved in extra curricular activity…
special interest for these people b/c they stay after school and travel, student has
lowed expectation of privacy. Govt. interest in fighting drugs, and student health.]
Skenner case: people involving in operating trains where there is accidents. High
govt. concern for safety where people operating trains and on drugs.
Channler: not ok for drug testing. Brown test no interest b/c appears no problem
and would not be effective
Ferguson: govt. argued special need to protect women and unborn childrenbut if
this was there real concern they would hand stuff over to health officials, but really
your handing it off to the police
SEARCH/SEIZURE
None Minimal Full search or More than a full
arrest [or search or arrest
equivalent]
TENNESSEE v. GARNER ET AL.
No. 83-1035
471 U.S. 1; 105 S. Ct. 1694; 85 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 195; 53 U.S.L.W.
4410
* Together with No. 83-1070, Memphis Police Department et al. v. Garner et al., on
certiorari to the same court.
PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
Govt. Argument: He will escape, it’s a deterrence [it will encourage peaceful
submission], common law rule.
Argument: the need to capture the suspect is not better than death, peaceful
submission argument is not warranted by any evidence, common law argument=
felonies were defined differently and were all punishable by death.
We are maxing out on individual interest in this case
Rule [438]-- [this is a reasonable test—i.e. not what the actual officer was thinkig
but what a reasonable officer would do in the situation] if the suspect threatens the
officer w/ a weapon, or, PC suspect committed a dangerous crime [of serious bodily
injury to officer or others]…AND popo must give a warning…AND, DF is necessary to
prevent excape
SCHMERBER v. CALIFORNIA
No. 658
384 U.S. 757; 86 S. Ct. 1826; 16 L. Ed. 2d 908; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 1129
PRIOR HISTORY:
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
No. 83-1334
470 U.S. 753; 105 S. Ct. 1611; 84 L. Ed. 2d 662; 1985 U.S. LEXIS 76; 53 U.S.L.W.
4367
PRIOR HISTORY:
CASE SUMMARY
Govt. has PC…govt. want’s to remove bullet to match to gun. Individual interest: The
surgery was rather dangerious. Govt. had other evidenceso really didn’t need the
bullet