DDB.

lrettt-78

DEFENSEINTEIIIGEIICE REPORT

THESO\TET
MOTORTT.FDRIFIT
BATTALION

1978
SEPTEMBER

.,)2)
TIIE SOWET MOTORIZED RIFII BATTALION

DDB-11dt197-78

InformationCutoff Date:
Z) Dec€mber'197,

This oublicationsuDersedes
Sovist Tactics: The Motorized nifle Battalion.
AP-1-22G3+04, November1964,
which shouldbedestroyed.

Thi. i5 a Depa.nnmr of Osl6ns6 lf,rellisene Docum6nr

Pr€oacd bv th. Sovi.Vw.r$w Pact Divbion.
Oiroctoralo for Int.llig.nc. R...!rch, Defen* Intelligenco Ag6ncy
author: Mdor FoblnM. Frasche,
Tacljcalnd Or$nl!8don Secrion,
G,olnd Forc€. Bdnch
 PREFACE
This study, a follow-up to Ihe Soviet Motorized Rifle Company
{DD|-1100-7/-76},was written to familiarizethe reader with the organization.
training, tactics, and equipmentof the Souet motorizedrifle banalion (lvlRB).lt
was especiallywritten for troops, troop commanders,unit intelligenceofficers,
seruiceschools,and othercwho requiredet8iledknowledgeof the SovietMRB.
The study concentrateson the operationsof those MRBS equippedwhh the
BMP (infantry combat vehicle). The organization,training, tactics, and equip-
ment of the BlvlPequippedMRB are analyzedwithin the context of Soviet doc-
trine. Soviet tacticaltrends since the October 1973War are also considered.The
scopeof the study is restrictedto those operations(nuclearand nonnuclear)rele-
vant to northernand centralEurope,

Studies which addressin greater detail some of the subiectscovered in this

'L
Soviet Offensive Doctine: Combined Atms Operations Veaus Antitank
Deterses{U), DDI-1100'138
76, July 1976.

2. Soviet TacticalTrcndsSince the October lgn Wat (Ul, DDI-11@-160-77,

Aoril 197/.
3. TheSovietMoto zed RifleCompanylul, DDl1100--n-76,October1976.

4. Soviet Military Opeetions in Built-Up Areas (U), DDI-1100-I5S77,July

1977.

5. Soviet and Warsaw Pact niver Crcssing: Doctine and Capabilhies lul
DDI-1150-7-76,
September1976.

6. Evaluation of Soviet Night Combat Capabilhies(U), DDI-1i00'173-7/,

February1978.
(Ul, DDI-I200-74-76,
7. SovietAmphibiousWaiare Capabilities May 1976.
8. Soviet TacticalLevelloglstlcs {U), DDI-1150-co1+n,Decetnbet1gn.

9. Soviet Field Anilery Tactics and Techniqueslul, {DDB-1130878to be

published).

Addresseesare requestedto lorward informationwhich will supplementor cor-

rect this report, Ouestions6nd comments should be refered in writing to the
DefenseIntelligenceAgency{ATTN: DA-184),Washlngton,D.C. 20301.
 S U MM A R Y
lll€ Sovietsstressthe decisivenatureof the offensiveand emphasi2e the meetingengagementmorethan
a.y othertype of offensiveaction, High ratesof advanceare anticipatedfrom the actionsof combinedarms
unirsoperatingin coniunctionwith airborne,airmobile,and specialoperationsforcesin theenemyreararea.

Sincethe October1973War, the Sovietshaveplacedeven moreemphasison combinedarms operations,

and have rnadenumerousorganizationaland tacticaladjustmentsto increasethe suruivabilityof their tank
forces.The tank ramainsthebackboneol combinedarmsdoctrine.

Though relativelysmall, the BMP-squippedldRA is highly maneuverableand possessesconsiderable

organicfirepower,particularlyin antitankweaponry.The MRB is often augmentedby motorizedrifle regi,
rnentand/or divisionalassetsto form a heavilyreinforcedcombinedarms groupingto carry out a varietyof

The battalioncommander'sage, education,and politicalawarenessprovidethe theoreticalbasisfor effec-

irve command.Frequentfield trainingand lengthypeacetimecommandassignmentspartiallyoffset his lack
ot combatexperi6nce.Thoughtechnicallywell trained,the IMRBcommandefoften failsto exploitthe strong
pointsof his men and equipmentduring fiold exercises.Moreover,his initiativeis constrictedwithin narrow
paramete.sby institutionaland operationalconstraints.

Eattalion-leveltraining is highly centralized,stressesfundmentals,and results in effective battle drill.

"Moral political"training,while boringfor many, is probablyeffeclive.Trainingeffectivenessis complicated
bYthe 2 vsar term ofservice,
The MRB is capableotconductingoperationsunderspecialconditions,althoughthe amountofsuch train
ing variesaccordingto geographiclocationand mission,

Th€ BlrP-equipped MRB normally operatesas part of the regiment and is mosr effective when so
employed.Discrepanciesbetweendoctrineand practicehavebeennotedin severaltypesof fulRBoperations.
Thesediscrepancios,
along with constraintson battalionlevelleadership,resultin vulnerabilities
which may
b€ erDlokedbv Westerncommanders,
 TABLEOFCONTENTS

SUMMARY

1. INTFODUCTION
CHAPTER

CHAPTER 2, D O C T R | N E , T A C T | C S , T R E. N
..D
..S
........ 3
SectionA - Doctrine. . . . . , . , . , . 3
SecrionB 7
SeclionC - TacticalTrendsSinceThe Ocloberl973War 12

CIiAPTER
3. THEMOTORIZED
RIFLEDIVISiON
AND I\4OTORIZEO
RIFLEREGII\4ENT
.

:8APTER4. THEMOTORIZED RIFLEEATTALION 25

SectionA - Op8rationalPrincipl€sand lvlissions. . . . . . . . . 25
SecrionI - Organization,R€sponsibilities,and Equipment 26
Commandand Conrol
SectionD BattalionRearServices. 36

SHAPTER 5. BATTALION LEVELLEADERSHIP ,.,.......,. €

SectionA - Iniroduction €
SectionB - T h e H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p € c. .t .i .v.e. €
- The Present 52

CHAPTER 6. B A T T A L I O N I R A I N I N G A N D S U B U N I T T A C. .T. .I .C. .S. . , . , . . . . . 57

SectionA - TrainrngPhilosophyand Obiectives 57
- TrainingSchedules. . . 57
SeciionC CompanyandSectionTraining andTactics 59
SeciionO B a t t a l i o n T a c t i c a l T r a h. .i .n. s. . . . . @
SecdonE Evalu8tionof BatalionTraining..... 70

SHAPTER 7. T H E M O T O R I Z E D R I F L E B A T T A L I O N I N C O M B A T . . . . . . . . . , . , . , . . . . 71
SecrionA Offen6iveOperations 71
SectionI - DefensiveOperation6 9o

CHAPTER 8.
SecrionA
SectionB
SectionC
SectionD

SectionF

:HAPTER9.

APPENDIX
S o v i eSt y m b o l s , .........,.13s
v11
 LISTOF ILLUSTRATIONS

1 . S o v i eO t f f e n s i vDeo c t r i nl es B a s e o d n C o m b i n eAdr m sC o m b a t .........3

2 . Airborneand Heliborne TroopsAre Sel€ctively UsedTo MaintainOffensive Momefltum........... 4
a . A i r b o r nDe r o pi n t h eE n e m R y earArea ................ 4
b . H e l i b o r nFeo r c eR s u s hT o E s t a b l i a s hB r i d g e h e a. .d. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BasicFormsof Maneuve ..................... 5
a. FrontalAttack .......................... s
b. Shallow E n v e l o p m e{ S n ti n g l e .) . . . . . . . . . ................ 5
c. DeepEnvelopment(Double)............ ................ 5
The MeetingEngagement ................... ....................... 6
5. B a t t a l i o n A n t i t a n k R e s e r v e s R e s p o n d D i r e c t l y t o t h e B a t t a l i o n C o m m a n d e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . , I
a . A n t i t a nR keserve i nsa B T R - E q u i p pUendi t ....................... 8
b. ABIMPEquipped lvlotorized RifleBattalion AntitankReserve ......... 9
6. T f a f f i R
c e g u l a t o r s ACi o d m m a n d ei n r sC o n t r o l l i T
ngheiU r nits ...........9
7. The RegimentalChiefof Artillery(on the right)CoordinatesRegimentalAnillery During
P h a sO e n eF i r e. , , , . , . .....,.,, ro
8. H i g h P e r f o r m a n c e A i r c r a { t i n S u p p o r t o f t h e M a i n A t t a c k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1
9. The MotorizedRifleDivision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. T h e l v l o t o r i z e d R i l l e D i v i s i o n ' s P r i n c i p a l w e a p o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
a . 7 6 m mD i v i s i o nGa ul n Z , I S3 . . . . . ..........14
b . 1 o o m m A T c u n[ ,. 4 - 5 5 /112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........14
c. 122mm H o w i t z eN r ,4 - 1 9 3 8 / D -.3.0. .. . . . . . . ........14
d. 122mm R o c k eLt a u n c h €BrI M2 1 . . . . . . .. -..........15
€. 152mm H o w i t z eD r ,- 1 .. .............15
f. FROGTEL,FROGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
s . G A I N F U L T ESL A , 6 ..... .. ............. 16
r t _ The MotorizedRifleDivision'sPrincipalEquipment . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
a . T r u c kM , i n eD e t e c t oD r ,i m . . . . . . - . . . . . . . ,.,.,.,.16
b. TrackedFerry,GSP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
c - P o n t o oP n M Po n K R A Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
d . T r a c k eAdm p h i b i a K n ,6 1 . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... i7
e. lr.4ine ClearerBTR-5oPK,l\r-1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
f . t ! 4 i n e f a ySePr ,A r m o r e d. . . . . . . . .........17
g . T r u c kD , e c o nT, M S - 6 5. . . . . . . . . ......... 18
' 2 The l,lotorizedRifleRegiment(B[IP-Equipped) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
PrincipalWeaponsin the MotorizedRifleRegiment(BlvlPEquipped). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
a. MediumTank,T-62164/72................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1s
b . l 2 2 m mS PH o w i t z e r ........20
c . 2 3 m mS PA A G u n Z , SU-23-4 ... ..........20
d. SAI\4 {SA-9IGASK|N ........ 21
e . A T G ML a u n c h e r v e h i c l e3A T. . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
' a Principal Equipment in the Motorized RifleRegiment (BlvlP-Equipped) ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
a T r u c kD , e c o nA, R S 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........21
5 Truck, Decon,DDA-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
: . B i d g e ,T a n kL a u n c h e ld\ ,4 T U. . . . . . . . . . . . . .........21
a Bridge,TruckLaunched,Tl\rl\r....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
e. Ditchinglvlachine
{ 1 ) l \ 4 D K - 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
(2) lvlDK2in Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1 . D o z e ra, A T / B A l - l v l / P K -.T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........23
g . M i n eC l e a r i nPgl o w K , l \ 4 T - 4. . . . . . . . . . . . ...........23
" . M i n eL a y e rT, o w e dP , MR'3.............. ..........23
. M i n eR o l l e K r , l v l T -.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .23
 1 5 . T h el v l o t o r i zRedi f l eB a t t a l i o{ nB M P - E q u i p p e. d , .}. . - . . . - . . . . . . . . 26
16. PrincipalWeaponsand Equipmentof The MotorizedRifleBattalion{BMP-Equippod)
a. lmmm Mortar I
b. 8MP ............ 27
c. Truck, UAZ-@ 27
d. Truck, GM-66 a
e. Truck,ZIL 130 2A
f . T r u c kV, a n ,Z l L i M a i n t e n a n c. e . .). . . a
g. Truck, POL{4,000or5,200Liters} B
h. Truck, FieldKitchen,Van PAK-200. . . E
i. Ambulance,UAz-450 30
j. Trailer-lrounrEdFieldKitchen.KP-125 30
1 7 . B a t t a l i o n H e a d q u a r.t.e. .r,s. . . . . . . . . . . 30
e di f l eC o m p a n(yB M P - E q u i p p e
1 8 . T h el \ r o r o r i z R . .d. .). . . . . . . .
19. The Monsr Batt€ry I
2 0 . T h oC o m m u n i c a l i oPnl a s t o o n. . . . . . . . . . . &
21. nepresentative Communications Net in a Motorized Ritle Battallon g
22. TheUseof LineCommunicarions by a lrotofizedRitleBattalion in the Detens€, . , . -.............
23. MotorizedRifleBsttalionRearServiceElemontsin an Ass€mblyAret
24. MotorizedRifleEanalionRearServiceSupportEiementsDuringthe March . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cl
25. RearServiceSupportDuringthe A$ack
26. RearSeruiceSupportin the Defense
27. The SupplyPlatoon 40
28, AmmunitionResupply to the Companies in the Defense..........
2 9 . R e l u e l i nt hgel v l o t o r i zR ed i f l eB a t t a l i o nC' so m b aEt l e m e nD l su r i n g t hM
6 a r c h. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 42
30. The SupplyPlatoonDeliveringFoodto AuackingCompanias €
3 1 . D i v i s i oBna k e rP yersonne . .l. . . . . . . . . . . ,
3 2 . T h e M e d i c € l ASi dt a t i o n. . . . . . . . .
3. MedicalEvacuationDuringan Attack . . . . . . . a6
34. T h s R e p a i r w o r k s h o
. ,p. . . . , . . . , . . . . . , 6
35. Repairand Evacuationof Weaponsand EquipmentOuringan Atack
3 6 . S e n i o r S o v i e t \ A / V l l C o m m a n d e r s w e r e F l e x i b l e , E n e r g e t i c a n d F u l l o f l n i l i a t i v e . . - . . .50 ........
a. MarshalZhukov,Chielof the Gener6lStafl in E€rly1941and DeputySupremeCommander
Thereafter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
b. FrontCohmandersEremenko,Konev.Rokossovsky,andTimoshenko......................
37. UntilOctoberl94l,TheUnitPoliticalOfficerHadToCountersignTheCommender'sOrders........6
38. Batt6iionCommandersAre Young lvlenwith Considerablg PeacetimeCommandExperience. . . . . . . . 52
*). The RegimentalCommanderand His Staff ErerciseTight ControlOver
S u b o r d i nU a tnei t s ..-............,....,...54
4. A R e p r e s e n t a t i v e S i x - M o n t h T r a i n i n g S c h e d u l e l o r a B M P - E q u i p p e d U n i t . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41. A Typicalweek-Day TrainingSchedul€ . . . . . . . . 69
42. TheMo(ar BatteryCommander 6t HisForward Obs€rvation Post ........ @
4ii. FlagSignalsUsedby the lvlonarBattory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4, Thelvlortar Battery Duringthe March ..-...... @
a . A sP a n o f t h B eattalio F no r m a t i o n ......... 62
b. BatteryMarchOrder - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 62
,15. M o r t aBr a t t e rDye p l o y m lernotmt h eM a r c .h. . . ..................... €B
4 6 . l v f o r t aPro s i t i oi n t h eD e f e n s.e. . . . . -. -...... u
4 7 . O o e r a l i o n s o f tM h eo r t a Br a t t e r vF ' so r w a rO d b s e r v a t iP oo ns t .....,.,.,,65
48.Moral-PoliticalTraininginaCombinedArmsUnitPriortoanExercise.........................6€
49. CombinedArms Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - . 6s
5 0 . T a c t i c a f l M aO r crhd e r o f al v l o t o r i z Re di f l eB a t t a l i o.n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -72
51. ControllileasuresDuringthe March . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5 2 . V e h i c l e s aD r ei s p e r s e ad n dC a m o u f l a gD u r i n gL o n gH a l t s
ed -... -.......74
53. SecurityDuringthe March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 7E
54. SA-7 GunnersAreThe MotorizedRifleBattalionCommander'sPrimaryl/lsansof Air Defense . . . . . . 78
55. NBC Reconnaissance ls Conductedby lvlotorizedRilleBattalionAssetsand/orby
BRDM-Equipped SpecialistsfromRegiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
56. ChemicP a le r c o n nM e la r k i nag C o n t a m i n a tAerde a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
57.Condition L se a d i ntgo a l , 4 e e t i n Egn g a g e m e .n. t. . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
58. A ReinforcedMotorizedRifleBattalionConductinga lvleetingEngagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
59.SovietFigu.esforNATODefensivePositions............................................ 83
60. ArtillerySupportfor FirstEchelonBattalionsinthe Breakthrough ........84
61. A ReinforcedMotorizedRifleBattalionDeploying{rom the lvlerchto Panicipatein a Division
B r e a k t h r o uOg ph e r a t i o n ........... Ea
62. U Z - 2B a n glao r eT o r p e d o ........89
63. T a n k s C l e B areachesThrou Mgi nh eF i e l dfso r[ I o t o r i z eRdi f l e T r o o p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @
u. T h el / l o t o r i z eRdi f l eB a t t a l i oi n t h eD e f e n s e ........................ 94
A R e i n t o r c e d l M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n A c t i n g a s t h e F o r w a r d A r e a S e c u r i t y F o r c. e. ..9. .7. . . . . . . .
66. A ReinforcedN4otorized RifleBattalionActing as th€ RearGuardDuringa RegimentalWhhdrawal . . . s9
67. R e l i ei nf P l a c e ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
68. T h sl J r b a n i z a t F i oanc t o r .................... r03
69. A R e i n f o r c eMdo t o r i z eRdi f l eB a t t a l i oAnt t a c k i nagB u i l t - U p A r e a .. -.........105
70. Combat-in-Cities Exercises ................. ..... -. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7 1 . Flamelhrower Personnel Playan lmportantRolsin UrbanCombat ........107
72. A Reinforced l,4otorized RifleBattalion Defendinga Built'lJpArea ........10€
73. A B T R - E q u i p p e d M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n P r e p a r i n g f o r a H e l i b o r n e O p e r a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l
14. I n e F L U U b E H S e n e s r r o v r d e A f - G r o u n d S u o D o n , , , , . , , , . , . , . , , , . , . , , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , , , 1 1 0
75. H e l i c o p t e r c u n s h i p / T r o o p C a r r i e r s . . . . . . . . . . ..................... i11
a. HIND ........... . -. -. -.............. i11
b . H t P. . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... l]1
76. T h eH O P L I TPEe r f o r mTsa c t i c aRl e c o n n a i sn sc ae. ..... -. -. -. -. - -.....112
n. T h e H I P C a n C o n d u c t A e r i a l l v l i n e l a y i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
74. T h eH e a v y T r a n s pHo er tl i c o p t eHr O , oK ......... r13
79. C o m m u n i c a t i oi nnt sh eA s s e m b l y A r e a .,......114
80. A M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n i n a H e l i b o r n e A s s a u h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r r 5
8 1 . Reconnaissance of BothRiverBanks lJsually Precedes th€ MainAss€ult... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
a. T h e s e n i o r E n g i n e e r o f f i c e r c o n l r o l s t h e C r o s s i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 8
SelfPropolledArtiileryandzSU-23-4sSupportingaRiverCrossing...........................1t9
u. T-62sPreparingfor a RiverCrossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
85. SA-TGunnersSupplementOtherAirDefenseWeaponsDuringaWater-crossingoperation........r20
86. A ReinforcedlvlotorizedBifleBattalionAssauhinga Water Barrierand Establishing
a Bridgehead -. -. -. -.121
4 1 .AttachedArmor RejoinslvlotorizedBifleTroopsAs Soon As Possiblein a RiveFcrossing
Operation. . , . . , . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
88. A R e i n f o r c e d M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n D e f e n d i n g a R i v e r L i n e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . l 2 3

x1
89. A Roinforced Motorized Rffl6 Battalion Conducting a Night Attack . . . , . , , .127
Sn. A Reintorced Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Night Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i29
91. NavalInfantryon Paradein Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . .130
92. NavalIntantryOft€n Formthe FirstEchelonin a Se€bomoAssauh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13r
9 3 . E m b a r k a t iaonndo e b a r k a t i oPno i n t s ............132
Sl4.AmDhibiousShios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . .13'
a . A L L I G A T OCRl a s s . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ...,... -133
b , R O P U C HCAl . s s .. . .,. -.................133
c. POLNOCNYC|aSS.. . .. . - .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .1ir4
9 5 . A m p h i b i o uAs$ a u l t sM a yB eC o n d u c t oWd i t hA i rC u s h i oVne h i c l €.s. . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . r34
96. A Roinforced Motorized Rifle Sattalion Conducting an Amphibious Assault - . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . 138

xli
 1. INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER
1. RELEVANCE
Flvl lO0-5examin6sthe basicdoct nal concepts
of the United States Army and pres€ntsthe prin-
ciplesdeemednoc$sary for winning the land bat-
tle. For thos€ m6n tasked with directing and
fighring th6 battle {that is, for colonelsand cap-
tainal, The Soviet Moton2ed Rille Eattalion is par
ticularlyrelBvant.BMP-equippedMRBs are widely
distributedthroughoutthe ground forces, poss€ss
mobility and firepowor superior to that ol BTR-
equipped MRBS, and allow mol€ flaxibility in
employment. The MRB is the major maneuver
elementof the molorizedrffle r€gimont(according
to the Soviets, tho most irhportant unit in rh€
ground forces) and plays 6n irnportantrole in of-
lensive and defensivo ooerationa. Studv oI the
MRB reveals strongths to be countered and
weaknessesto be exploited; and providesan in-
sight into Soviet op6rationalprocsdures at the
nsxt higherlevel.
2. CONCEPTUALAPPROACH
A straightlorwardanalysisof MRB opsrations
per se would b6 hisleadingand dangerous,as the
[/lRB normallyoperatesas part of the MRR and,
in addilion, may receiveadditionalsupport frcm
the motorized rifle divlsion (MRD). Accordingly,
this studv analyzesthe MRB within the context of
regimentaloperations,and illustraressome of the
MRD'sequipm€nt whichmay€lsobe in support.
3. DIAGRAMS
The tactical diagrams arc not templates and
should not be used as such. lroreover, while
illustratingSovi€t tactical concepts, they arg not
intended to portray rigidly how ths Soviets will
conductevervooeration.
 CHAPTER2. DOCTRINE.TACTICS,AND TRENDS
SectionA - Docttine
1 .G E N E R A L
Soviet doctrine sl.esses that the offensive ts
ihe decisivefofm of combat. To achievesuccess,
the Soviets stress high averagerates of advance
r30 50 kilometersper day in nonnuclearsituations
and 50-m kilometels per day when nuclear
weapons are used) by combin€d arms units
lilgure1).
To achieve such high rates of advance, the
Sovietsadvocatethe concentrationof numerically
superiorlorces and firepowerw;thin selectedsec-
:ofs; the use ot airborne, heliborne,and special
3perstionsforces throughout the depth of the
enemyreararea;and the achievement of surprise
figure2). Shouldnuclear/chemical weaponsnot
3e used, conventionalartillerywould be used to
schievethe desired density of firepower. Soviet
{r tings stress the crilical transition from non-
-!c ear to nuclearoperations, and frequendyex-
:'cise going from one mode of combat to the
Detensiveconcepts are less frequentlydescrib-
.l and practiced.Ahhough they acknowledge
'-ar a parricularsitualionmay diclaredefensive
::ton, the Sovietsstressthat the primarypur-
::se ol the defenseis to preparefor the resump-
::. of offensiveoperationsassoon as possible.
':1..::-
7
- :l
Figore 1. Sov et OlrenslveDoclrine s Basedo. CombinedArms Cornbar.
':'-r-sh rh. meeling ehgaoementis ofiensiv6in nature, the Soviers,in order Io emphaszeiG frpodance, r€cosnizeit as a
:-: : . rormol combar.
2. OFFENSIVE
PRINCIPLES
Soviet olfensive doctrine is based upon com-
bined arms operations,that is the closely coord-
inatedefforts of the missile,tank, motorizedrifle,
attillery,and combatsupportunits.This doctrine
does not separat€ fire and maneuverj it seeks
ways to improve their integration and effec,
In fo"ning combined arms group,ngs,the
Soviets do not cross-attach units as in some
Western armies. Within a Soviet motorized rifle
regim€ntfor example,one tank companymay be
assigned1o a MFB, but that I\,'lRB will not, in
turn, assignone of its N4Rcompaniesto the tank
battalion. In the Soviet Army, units are often at
tached or placed in support of othe. units,
Attachm€nts are more responsiveto the com
mander of the unit to which they are attached,
while units placed in support are controlied
throughtheirparentunitcommander.
The Soviets idenrify rhree types of combat
action''tl:e meeting engagement,* the offense,
6nd the defense.The offenseis funher subdivid'
ed into the attackand its exploitation, and the
pJrsuitculm:natiag in encirce.nent.The offensive
is conductedby maximizingmaneuver,firepower,
and shock action. Approximately80 percentof a
battalion'stactical training is offensive in nature,
a biasalsor€flectedin the Sovietpress.
t engagementand generallywhenever the enemy
o. Airbon. Drop in the Ene6y Reot Ateo.
b. Ho,ibo.ne
Forc€sFlsh 16trtobli5l'd Brdg.h.od.
Fieure2. Anborneand HeliborneTroopsAre Set€ctivety
Usedto MainiainOtlensiv€
Monentum.
The Soviets define maneuver as the movement
of a forco into a favorable position {in relation to
the enemy), from which it can launch an effective
aftack.The frontal attack and the enveloDment
are the basic types of haneuver describedby the
Soviets, who clearly favor the latter (figure 3).
Envelopmentis often employed in the meeting
has an assailabl€flank. Envelopmentis also often
conducted in conjunction wilh a frontal attack
designedto pin down enemyforces.
8€'caused rheir perceptionsof the fluid nature
ot modern war, the Soviets place more emphasis
on the rne€ting€ngagement(combatbeween op
posing columns rdpidly advancing toward each
oth€d than on any other form of offensiveaction
(figure 4). Meeting engagem€ntsrequire a high
degree of;nitiativ€ because of their inherent
-- Th€ n€ed to seizeand haintain the in-
itiative.
-- Freedornol .n€neuver,often with open
flanks-
.- Comb€ron a wadefront.
Rapidtroop deploym€nt.
.. tr4obile,highspeedcombat.
Although th€ Soviets believe th€t their
numerousintelligencegarhering means will help
commanders ptepate tor the meeting engage-
ment, they acknowledgethat planningmust often
be conducted with incomplete data on enemy
forces. Soviet comrnandersare encouraged1o ag-
gressively seek rne€ting engagements and to
make rapid decisions based upon availabte in-
telligence.
Nuclear and nonnucl€ar breakthrough opera-
tions may be conducted against hasty, prepared,
or fortified defenses. In the breakthrough,the
Soviets envision penetration, accompanied
wheneverpossibl€by envelopment,the relegation
of pockets of resistance for destruction to
second-echelon formations,meetingengsgements
with advancing enemy reserves,and pursuit of
withdrawing enemy forces. Against a prepared
defensive position, and when nuclear weapons
are not used, the soviets concentratea reinforced
battalionand the fire of m-100 artillerypiecesper
kilometer of breakthroughsector, while exerting
pressureall along the remaining portion of the
 In nuclearbreakthroughop€rations,the Soviets
rely primarilyon nuclear weapons and penetratE
enemy defenses in column. Pursuit operations,
conductedon frontal, parallel,or combinedaxes,
have the purpose of cutting off and de6troying
enemy forces. Tactical hgliborne and airborne
lorces occupy and hold locationsin the snemy's rrrrt'S+rrn
re€r and otherwise attempt to disorganizeand
delayhiswithdrawal.

3. DEFENSIVE
PBINCIPLES
A
For the Soviets,the purposeof the dgfenseis
ro inflict maximumcasualties,to hold the defend-
ed area,and to creat€favorableconditionsfor the
I
resumptionof the offensive.

Sovietdefensiveconceplsinclude:

Stabrrt-Achieved by d€fensein depth, clos6-

V coordinat€dtire and obstacleplans, and strong

Secuity-Providdd by combat secuity lorces

which give e€rly waming, prevent enemy recon-
naissanceof the main defensive position, forcg
fi€ enemy to deploy prematurely, inflict max- f+f
.num casualties,and coordinatelong-rangefires
on enemylormations.
Use of key te'/ain-lncludes a fire and obstaclo
6. shcllow Env.lophenr (shg,e,
dan which restricts the enemy's freedom of
-aneuver and canalizeshis lorces into prepared
xillinggrounds.

Dispersion-Ailows maximum protection from

huclear and chemical weapons by posi1bning
ttoops on a wide front dnd in grcat depth.

All-rcund detense-Pteparedalternateand sup-

p€menrary positions provide 3mo defensive
..p€bilities. Battalion strongpoints, echolonedin
oepth wirh €xtensivebarriersEnd fire pbnning,
xovide the backboneofthe regirhentaldefense.
Delensein depth-Echelonedbattalionstrong-
tdnts absorb the momentum of the attack and
I tolride time for mobilEreservesto counterattack,
Antitank defense-Ptovided by the liberal
I a4ocatjonof antitankweaponsdown to all levels,
l and $e formation of strong antitank reservesat .. DeapE^velop eht (Doeble).
Sanalionleveland above.
Figure3. BasicFofmsol Maneuver
Cootdinated fircs-Planned to destroy the at.
tackerapproachingthe defendedarea, in tront of
 -./,..-

cr\\s.+
l_--ll
-G#
I E
^ RsEisr d.mnb d.id r dqts r 3eF.d

1r-i
A L-J
i f
]
_:I
-1
L-J
.
\
tL

\r nn

B. Th. rcvai@ suard.ft.mpr 106id!d rhe m6ti^9.ns.Fm'ft ll) .8 ed.s @rrs r2) ,Dd su!@ds rhs
rn.ci hr rhe dr b6dy(3)

Figure4.
TheMeetinS
the forward 6dg€ oI the battle arga (FEBA), on
the flanks, and in prepared killing zones within complexity and inherent danger of withdrawal
the defendedarea. Nuclearstrikssare plannedby
division and higher units agains! the en6my's
nucl9ar weapons, major reserves,€nd command
and controlposts.
Mobile countenftack to.ces-Requirodto
launchcountetattacks,Sovietcommanderc from
trattalionand up maintainreservesfor this puF
pos€
Approximatety20 percentof th6 battation.s
tac
ticaltrainingconcerns
dgfensiveoperations.
4. WTTHDRAWAL
Withdrawaloperations,initiatedonly by the
next highercommander,are conductedby rhe
sovists to regroup.occupymore favorabli ter-
E.gagem€nr
rain, or to escap€ enemy pressure. Du€ to th6
operations,panicularlyunder snehy pressure,the
Soviets try to achieve su.prise by conducring
them on multiple rout€s at night or during other
condirionsof limiredvisibiliry.
The groupingof forces for a withdrawalin-
cludes convering{orces, the rear guard, main
body, and flank security dotachmentslwhen
necessary). Normally,the Sovietsleaveone-third
to doceivethe enemv
:1"il1:fi':::J:"contact
Coveringtorcesdepartsuddenlyand.as a rule,
Aft€r the main body has passsd
simultaneously.
through' the covering then withdraws
-force
lhroughthe rear-guardshouldthe enemypress
lhe withdrawingforces'lhe rearguardwithdraws
6
 in a leapfrog manner, rend€ringmutual fire sup-
port. lf the rear guard is successful,withdrawalof
the main body is unimpeded.
The rear guard occupies defensavepositions
b6hind first-echelondefense forces. Subsequent
defensive positions ar€ designatedfor the rear
guard, wh;ch conducts ambushesand erects bar
rigrsas it withdraws to subsequentpositaons.The
rear guard moves to subsaquentpositions in a
leapfrog manner, rendering mutual support and
defendingeachposition.
Prior to arrivsl of the rear guard in the newly
Section B - Tactics
1. GENERAL
In spite of the superiorqualitiesof the BMP vis-
a-vis the BTR, we are not aware of any new
regulations governing employment of 8MP-
equipped and BTR-equippedunits. Soviet com-
manders still seem to be debating the tactical
€mploymentof the BMP in an effort to maximize
ns principalsrrengthsvis a vrs the BTR: superior
lirepower {panicularlyanthank)and cross'country
mobility, and better crcw protecrion.Training as
also being condricted to determinethe optimum
use of BMPSoperatingin close coordinataon with
tanksandartillery.
The BMP'S superiorityover the BTR makes |t
likelythat the BN4P-equipped units of a motorized
rifle division {MRDI wiil be assigned these key
- Reconnaissance.
al
-- Usein the forwarddetachment.
lg
- Positioning in the first echelon during
nuclea. conditions,and/or if enemy delenses
have been sufficiently neutGlized; otherwise
in th€ second echelonas an exploitationforce
tin
en {The BTR-equippedregimen(s) would {orm
to the MBD'sfirstechelon).
- Operatingon the mainaxisof attack.
2. ECHEIONSANO RESERVES
ed a. Geneal
In the West, there has been an overdramatiza_
'Byl@quenrlywrrting'secondechelonkerudl,"Sovietw.heBhaveconrriburedbrhecontusio..
7
designated area of d€fense, reconnaissance
groups are formed. These groups conduct a
survey oI the new ar€a, determinethe area to be
occupiedby each unit, designat€approachroutes
to them, mark off any mined or contamanated
areas,and test the water, As the main body ap-
proachesthe area, its subordinateelementsare
met by guides from the reconnaissancegroups
and ars takento theirdesignatedareas.
Security is organized as soon as the lead
elementsclose on the new defensiveareas, and
engineeringwork is begun,
tjon of the Soviet deployhent system, as well as
confusion' over how the system, particularly
echelonment,works. Basically,the Soviet syst€m
of echelonmentwhh "t!vo up" and "one back" is
sihilar to our own and seeksthe same effects in
theattac(r
- Timelybuildup of ths attackeffort.
'' Beating the enemy in th€ use of corres-
pondrngreserves.
- Preventingan overdensityof lroops and
eqlipment {thereby denying the enerny
lucrativenucleartargets).
Achievinghigh rates of advanceby attacks
in depth.
And in the defensel
- Presenting the enemy with a series of
defensiveposilions.
- Preventingan overdensityof lroops and
equipment. The difterence beoveen the
Soviet and US systemsconcernsexactnessin
terminologyand preparation.
b. Definitions
The firsi echelon is the most important
echelonand normallyconsistsof up to two-thardt
of the forces available.In the attack it comprises
the leading assaultunits; in the defense,it com-
prisesthe forwardd6fenseunitson the FEBA.
 The second echelon, normally consisting oI
about one-third ot the availablelorces, gives the
commanderthe capabilityto intensifythe attack,
to shift rapidly the attack effort from one axis to
another,to repulsecounterattacks,and to replace
heavilyattritedf irst-echelonun;ts.
The commanders of the first and second
echelonsreceive their missionsprior to combat.
First-echeloncommandersare assignedimmedi6te
and subseouentobiectivesand an axis of further
advance, while second-echelon commanders
receive an immediate objective and an axis for
further adv6nce. Commandersmust get permis-
sion from the next higher commanderto commit
their second echelon. A second echelon as not
committ€din a piecemealfashion.
Reseruesclearly differ from echelons.Wh€n
the Soviets wrile "second echelon (res€rvol,"
they are not equating the two; they m€an that
sometimes a cohmander will have a second
echelon and at other times a reserve,
Starting at battalion level, commandersnor-
mally haintain reserves,usuallyconsistingof l6ss
than one'third of the forces available. Reserves
may be of severaltypes lantitank, branch, com-
bined arms) and be employed separatelyor to-
gether, The commander ot the reserverac€ives
no specific mission prior to battle, but must be
pfeparedto carryout a numberof contingsncies,
c. Employment of Echelonsand Reserves
The commander's decision tor the emDlov-
ment of his force deoendsuoon lVlETT.rFor ex-
ample, bec€usea hasty defense does not have
well-coordinatedfire and obstacleplans, speed in
rhe atrack, combined with maximum combat
power forward, is preferred to echeloning, Ac-
cordingly, a single echelon and a reservowould
mostprobrblybe us€dto attacka hastydef6ns6.
Moreover, unless a commander r€ceives
augmentation, he must weaken his assault
elements in ordsr to have tlvo echelons and a
branch or combined arms reserve. For thas
reason,units at regimentallevel and abov€ may,
when attacking in two echelons,have chemical,
engineer,and antitank reserves,but no moto zed
rifle, tank, or combined arms reserve.lf sullably
augmented, they may have two echelons plus
branch,combinedarms,and/orother reserv€s,
'MBsion, 6n€hy, r6iiain€ndwoarher,troopsdvailabl6.
The MRB is the lowest level where echelon-
meni occurs in the Soviet Army (the Sovietshave
experimented with echelonment within com-
panies,but this practicehas been discouragedby
general officers who wrote that such practice
dis$pates the company's combat power and in-
creasesthe command and control problems of
the comoanvcommander),
When two ech€lons and a reserve are
employed,reserveslor BTR- and BMP-equippad
battalionscould consjsrof 6 designatedMR unit
{normallya plaroon), usually taken from the se-
cond echelon,or a olatoonfrom an attachedtank
The antitank reserve of the BTR-equipped
[,4R8is normallyils antirankplatoon of manpack
SAGGERSand SPG9s, whilefor a BMP- equio-
ped MRB it may be pan of an attachedtank com-
pany or an anached platoon of rhe MRR'S an-
titank missile ban€ry (figur€ 5). Both types ol
reserves ar€ usuelly under the battalion com-
mander'sdirectcontrol.
Dependingupon METT, the banalion'ssecond
echelon{reserveloperatesfrom 1 to 3 kilometers
behind the first echelon in order ro avoid un-
necessarylosses, while being close enough for
timely commitment to banle. When a second
echelon passes through a firsr €chelon. the
former lights independentlyof the latter, and is
usually supponed by fjre froh the first echelon.
Reserves and the second echelon are recon-
stituted as soon as possiblefollowing theh com-
mitment.
d. Anriron*t6ov.! Jt o 8lR-Equtppod
Uni,.
Figur€5. &ttalion AnlitanhReserves RespondDirectly
io the BattallonCommander.

. A B[P.Equipped lAototi2ed RIll. B.nolton Antttank
: g!re5. Battalion Reserves
Antitank RespondDrrecllyto
theBatialon
Commander.(Contnued)
3. COMMAND AND STAFF
In the Soviet Army, position and branch are
..ore importantthan rank, lt is not unheardof for
3 Commanderto be junior to his chief of staff
3nd/or one or moresubordinate commanders, A
Soviet major commandinga regimentcould have
eutenantcolonelsas his deputies,Moreover,the
:cmbined arms commandercommandsattach-
-ents, regardlessof whether or not the com-
-rander of the attached unit is superior in rank.
Shouldan aftilleryor tank battalioncommanded
ay a major or lieutenantcolonel be attachedto a
r,!RBcommandedby a captain,the IVIRBcom
-3nder would commandboth battalions.
. ChainofCommand
lo reconstitute a destroyed command ele-
-*_1. the Sovietsfirst attenpt to util;zethe unit's
!.3 3ble assets.shouldthe battalioncommander
:E -epacitated, he would normallybe succeed-
r: .v his chief of staff and the first N4Rcompany
::--'13nder (who is normallythe senior company
::Tmander), respectively. The battajion com-
nander may designatehis political officer to be
'ris successor, since this man is well trained
.nilitaily. The regimentalcommandermay appoint
one of his staff officers to temporarilycommand
:hebattalion,
The battalion'schief of staff, the deputy com
mandersfor politicalaffairs and technicalaffaiis,
and the headsof the variousrear serviceelements
communicatewith their countelpartsat regiment,
thus relievingthe battalioncommanderof many
and supplydetailsand allowinghim
administrative
to concentrate on implementingregimentaltac-
4. TRAFFICREGULATORS
Extensiveuse of tmffic regulators(figure 6) by
the Soviet ground forces is often interpretedas
indicating a weakness in mapreadingskills.
Thoughmapreading seemsto be a problemat the
lower levelsdue to a number of factors (see 7re
Soviet Motorized Rille Conpany, DDI-1100-T|-76,
October1976,paragraphs51.53),the extensive
use of traffic regulatorsrnay aid the achievement
of high rates of adv6nce-Traffic regulatorsmove
out with the advanceguard battalion,and their
placementat key locationsspeedsup the move-
ment of Sovietcolumnsby aidingcommanders in
the control of their subordinate elements,
Because the Soviets move under vinual radio
silenceduringthe march (preceding enemycon-
tact), traffic controllers are panicularly useful.
Theyare alsovulnerable. lvloreover.if ihey ate in-
capacitated, advancing columns may have dif-
ficulty.
t
f i
Fieure6Traflic ReellatorsAid Commandersin Con
t r o l l i r E T hrel J n i l s .
5. ATTACKTIME AND OBJECTIVES
In the Soviet Army the at'racktime (H hour) is
the time the first man reachesthe enemy FEBA,
whereas in most Western armiesthe attack time
refersto crossingthe lineof departure.
A unit is given intermediateand subsequentob
jectives and a direction for fufther attack. The
depths of these objectivesdepends upon IIETT
and whetheror not nuclearweaponsare used,
The unit's immediate objective includes the
enemy'sforward positions;the subsequentobjec
tive, his reserves.The battalion'ssubsequentob-
I
iective is included in the immediateobjective of
the regiment; the subsequent objective of the
,j
regimentis within the immediateobjectiveof the
T division, etc.
6. COMBINEDARMS OPERATIONS
Sovietemohasison combinedarms oDe.alions
has increasedover the last 5 years. [Iotorized rifle
r€giments and divisions and tank divisions are
units with an excellentmix ol motorizedrifle, aF
tillery. tank, and engineer troops. Recently,
motorized rifl€ comoanies have been added to
tank regimentswithin tank divisions.These com-
panies may be the p€cursors ot liR battalions
becoming organic to tank regiments. Combined
arms conceDtsand how thev affect the [lRB are
describedb€lowi
a. Tanks
A tank unit(s) is usuallyattachedto or in sup-
port of a MRB, Normally, however, tanks are
placed in support, thus allowing lhe rank com-
rnander to maintain control over his subunits.
Such an afi6ngementfacilitatesmassing of pla
toon and companytireson particularobjectives,
When cenlralizedcontrol of tanks is not prac-
tical {for example,in combat in built-up areas6nd
in forests), however, tank platoons may bs
I decentralizedand rqspondto l/lR company com'
I manders.
b. Attilery
To achieve desired fire suooort in a
breakthrough,the Soviets form regimental,divi-
sional, and 6rmy anillery groupings {respectively
RAG, DAG, and AAG). An anillerygroupingis
I temoorarvin nature and consistsof two or more
artillerybattalions.Wh6n a RAG is formed it does
I not includo the lrRR's organic artillery battaljon.
The battalionis, howsv€r, normallyplacedin sup-
oort of the MRR'Ssubordinatemotoriz€drifle bat-
talions. In some cases each of the artillery bat-
talion's battsries may bs attached to a lvlRB. In
such cases. coordinalion of arlillerv fire is
accomplishedby the aftillery battery commander
{working wilh the MRB commanded under the
close suosrvisionoI thg artillerv battalion com-
msnder(workingwith th€ IVIRRcommander)-
Artillerysupportfor an ofiensivsmay be divid-
ed into thr€€ phasesr preparatorylires {phase
10
one), fires in support of an attack (phasetwo),
and fires in support o{ operations within the
depths of the enemy's dafenses {phase three),
The battalion commander's control over his
organic monars and attached artilleryvarieswith
The MRB commander,though responsiblefor
rhe lraining and €mploymentof his organic moF
tar battery, does not always have control over
this unit. The regimentalchief of artillery plans
and supervisesthe training of the mortar batterigs
(as well as the regiment'santitank means)in thg
regiftent s subordinatebattalionsand supervases
execution of the fire plan by organic regimental
artillery,to includemortars{figure7}. Artilleryfire
planning is centrally coordanatedwith flexibility
built in to allow lor close suD9ort ol maneuver
ChElol Artillery(onthe rieht)
Figu.eT-TheR€timental
C@rdinat€s
Resimerial
ArtilleryDurinsPhase
During phase one, all artillery, including mor
tars, and all weapons {tanks and antitank guns)
firing in th€ preparation,are centrally controlled
by means of a fire plan. During phas€ two, the
MRB'S organic mortars are controlled by the
MRB, The attached anillerv battery, while less
centralized.is responsiveto requests for fires
from rhe IMRB, while still being controlled by
higher headquaners.During phase thGe. attach-
ed anillery, whh the senior commander's ap-
provsl, could advancewith the [lRB to provide
close support, In the aftack, the mortgr battery
displacesaccording to the tactical situation {see
chapt€r 6 for details). Firing oltside a maneuver
unit's boundariesis not permittedwithout ap- trained for specific rnissions.The latter type of
provalf romhigherauthority. engineeris normallyorganicro atmy andftunt

Duringtraining,when employedin an indirect Ffom his seniorcommanders, the MHB com-

fife role,Sovietanillery(depending upon the type
of artillerybeing fired) will not fire within 300
rrelers of friendlytroops mou4teo in APCs or
within 200 meters of friendly tanks. Artillery will
not fire within 400 meters of dismountedtroops.
Artilleryfired in the difect fire mode will fire much
closer, Peacetimefire restrictionswould be con-
siderablyreducedin wartime.
mander receivesengineer support to enable his
unit to crossnaturaland manmadeobstacles,and
1o colstruct defensivepositionsand barrierc.
N4RBIroopsare trainedto performson'eengineer
tasks such as buildingweaponsemplacements
and trenches,emplacingand clearingminesby
hand,andcamouflaging weaponsandequipment.

Dufing the pursuit, attachedartillerywoutd

provide close support and on call fires. Owing to
the speedof pursuit operations,a continuingbar
rage of fire foMard of the maneuverunits is not
deemedpractical.
The prol;feration,types, and quality of Soviet
engineer equipment complement their doctrine
stressing high rates of adv6nce. Rivercross;ng
equipment,mineclearers,and minelayersare par
ticularlyimpressive(seechapter3).
There are two types of Soviet engineers:Sap-
per, or combatengineers found at regimentand
division,and moreskilledengineers organized and
Direct air support to an l,4RB commander
would be a rarity, since the IMB division com-
mander normally directs supporting air assets
through air liaison staffs. Forwardair controllers
could, however,be assignedto a regimentattack,
ingon a division s mainaxis,
This is not to say that Soviet tacticalair assets
wouid not be used to "prep" an area prior to an
i.4RB attack. For example, Soviet high peF
formanceaircraft{suchas the FLOGGER seri€s)
and or helicoptergunshipsoften "prep" areas
prior to a fiver crossing,on the main axis of at-
tack, €nd in other selectiveoperations{figure 8).
Th€ l\lBB commander has no directorganiccom,
municationwith high-performance aircraftor at-
tack helicopters.

.:t$:x*.t.'l-,'"

-- -:il::Rl:e:-' -

11
 SectionC - TacticalTrcndsSincetheOctober198 War

1.GENERAL combined arms operationsbuil! primarily around

the tank. lt should be noted rhat in the 1973w6r.
Thg Octob6r1973War had considerableimDsct tank gunnery destroyed rhree to four times as
on the tacticaldoctrineof someW€sterncoun- manvtanksas did antitankmissiles.
lries, but did not c€useany ladicalchangeain
Sovietdoctrineor tactics,in spite of a dgofous 3. TRENOSSINCETHEWAR
examination oI basicdoctrinalprinciples.Th€se
principlgslor the mostpartgo backto WorldWar Sinc€ October 1!m, rhe Soviets have tak6n
ll. and rcmainthe primaryoriginof curent Soviet numeroussteos lo incr€se the viabilitv of their
doctrinalthinking.Sovietoffensivedoctrine,built tank forces and to allow for anticipated losseSoI
aroundths tank and enMsioning high€tes of ad- armored vehicl€s. Th6y have incroased the
vance,remains basically
unchanged. numbers of ranls and anillery pieces {especially
self-propelled artileryl within the MRD. and ar6
2. SOVIETANALYSISOFTHEWAR stressingthe use ot combined arms units oven
more than previoudy. Moreover, ther€ are clear
While impr€5sedwith the increas€dcomplgxity indications that hdi:opters will be assign6d a
of modern defens€s.the high exponditur€of greatsr role in ofiefldv€ op€radons.
munitions,and the lothalityof antitankweaponry,
the Soviets werc equary impressed by the Nowherc aa6 dEse tr€ids morc apparent lhan
snhanced otf€nsive capabilitiesp.osentedby in the op€radroaE ot Sovbt battalionand regimen-
mobileair defgnsesvstemsand wellcoordinated tal comb€t groupa€6.

L2
 R I F L ED I V I S I O N
C H A P T E R3 . T H E M O T O R I Z E D
AND MOTORIZED H I F L ER E G I M E N T

1 .G E N E B A L dependentop€rations.The lvlRD is organiz€das

shown in fjgure L The tvlBD'sprincipalweapons
Although the N4RBhas considerablefirepower, andequipment areshownin figures10and 11.
it lacks sufficient organic combat and combat
support elementsfor many types of operations, 3. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEREGIMENT
For this reasonit usuallyoperatesas part of the
f RR. Since the MRB is normallyreinforcedor Though capable of independentaction, the
motorized rifle regimentnormallyoperatesas part
supported by regiment, and sometimes by divi-
sion, the organizationsand equipment of the of a division, The division commanderallocates
MRD and the MRR will be covered in this additional support to his regimentsas required.
Regimentalattillery,for example,may be reinforc
chapter.
ed with units from the division's artillery and
2, THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEDIVISION muk;ple rocket launcherbattalions,forming a
regimental artiherygrouping(RAG).The regimen-
The MRD is a well.balanced unit possessing tal commanderrequestsnuclearfire supportfrom
sufficient combat, combat suppon, and combat division.
service suppon units to enable it to conduct a
variety of offensive and defensive operations The BMP-equipped MRR;s organizedas shown
under conventional or nuclear conditions- ln figure 12. Some of the regiment'sprincipal
Although it normallyoperatesas part of corps or weapons and equipmentare shown in figures 13
army, the l\4RD;s fully capableof conductingin- and 14.

F l g u r9e.T h eM o t o r 2 eR
dl eD vE,on

13
 o. ,6hm Oivisiondl Gun, zts 3

h.I00nhAfGun, t -55/I t2.

-'-i+=
:-=-

:=
c. I22nm Howitzer,M-I938/D-30

Figuret0.The Motori2edRille Divisiont Princip3lWeapoi s.

T4
 e. |52mmHowirzit,D-L

F s u r eI 0 . T h eM o t o r D eRdi l l eD i v i s t o n , s p r ipnacI W e ap o n s(.C o i tn u e d )

f5
 -.s\i I i,:is+\. '

l.i--

a
.
a--'
s\
g GAINFUIIEl,5A 6

Figure l0.Th€ MotorizedRil eOivlsion s Pr ncrpalWeapon5(Conlrn!ed)

.--:.---.--'..-

o. frtck, Mine Dete.tot, Dim.

.. PonloonPMPon KRAZ

f r E u r e t t . T n e M o r o r r e o R r ' l e D ' r orlrscPi p d l E q L i o m e n l

 d. ftdckad Anphtbidn, K 6t

e. hline Cl.oter BIR-''PR, M 1972

W
|.k i^eloyer, SP, Atdoed

FiSure11.Ihe MotorizedRilleD vision'sPrincipa

I Equipnent.(Conrinued)

I7
 9 lruck, Decon.IMS 65
RifleOivision's
Fieurer 1 TheMotorized Principa (Continued)
I Equipment.

(8MP Equpped)
RilleRegimeni
Fipure12 TheMotorized

18
 o M.diuh fonk, f-62'

o M e d t u mf . n k , 1 . 6 4 .

. Medium fohk, f 72 '

Fisure13.Pr ncipalWeaponstn
the MolorzedRiiteResimeii(BtVp-Equipp€d).

l9
 '
. 23nn sP AA Gun, zSU23 1

theMotorizedRilleRegrment
Ficure13.PrlncipalW€aponsln (Continued)
(BMP Equipped).

20
 e. AIGIA Louncher Vehi.le Af.3.
'
d. sAMrsA.9)6ASKIN.
NOTE
' Alsoioundin otherunitsln ihe motorized
rilledNision
Fi€ure13.Pr ncipalweapons inthe Motorized RilleRegime.i(BMP.Equipped).(Contin
ued)

5.

o lfuck, De.or, ARS-,1.

b.Iruck, De.on, DDA 66.

Eridse,f onk Lolnched,Mf U

1 4 .P r n c r p a l E qpum e n t i n t h le\ , l o t o r i zReidi l eR e gn r e n t ( B MEPq up p e d ) .

Figure

2r
 :11*

d Bnd\e. rru.kLounched ltuA

*Er--''-'

.. (t ) MDK-2DitchtngAo.hine.

e. (2)MDK 2OitchinsMd.hine(inopaatran)

Figure 14. PrincipaI Equipment in the Molorzed RiileReg ment(BMP Eq!rpped).(Continued)

22
g. Lrihe Cleori^g Pl6w, KMf.l

i. Min. Rollet, KJAI.5

NOTE
A l o l t h e a b o v e e q u i p m esnats o l o u n d i n o t h e r u n tnst h e m o l o r z e d r i l l e d i v i s o n .
Figure14.Principa I Equipnenlinthe Motorized RilleRecimeni (BMP'Equipped). (Cofiin!ed)

2i
 CHAPTER 4. THEMOTORIZED RIFLEBATTALION
SectionA - OperationalPinciplesand Missions
1, OPERATIONALPRINCIPLES A second-echelonbattalion may be given any
of thefollowing
missions:
Although it normally operates as paft of the
regiment, the [r1RBmay aiso be designatedthe - Assuming the mission of severelyattrited
division reserve. In the latter role, the battalion
firct-echelonunits.
op€ratesunder the division commander.In addi
tion to their normal operations,IMRBSmay also -- Exploitingthesuccessof the first echelon,
participalein operationsunder specialconditions
(seechapter8). - Eliminating bypassed pockets of enemy
resistance,
Becauseit is relatively"light" in combat and
'Counterattacking.
combat-supportelements,the battalionis normal
iy reinforced by regiment and/or division. This -. Destroyingenemyforces on the flanks and
augmentationmay occur when the battalionacts in the intervalsbetweenaxes of attack and in
as a forward detachment,advance,flank, or rear the rearofattackingtroops,
guard; when it attacks or defends in the first
echelonof the regiment;or when it conducts in- -- Attackingin a newdirection.
dependent operations. For such operations, a
Sovietbattalioncommander couldbe allocated, in As a divisionreserve,the l\,4R8would be given
addition to his own assets,one tank company* a no mission p of to combat, but would be
l22mm howitzer battaiion, an antitank guided prepared to executea numberof contingencies:
missileplatoon, an antiaircraftmissileand anillery -- Flepulsingenemycounterattacks,
platoon,an engineerplatoon,and a chemicalpla-
-- Combatting airbornelandings.
2. MtSStONS - Beplacing weakened first-echelon units
(rarely
done).
The missionof the MRB dependsupon the role
it has been assignedwithin the regimentalcombat -- Intensifyingthe attackeffort.
formation, lt may attack or defend as part of the
first echelon,be placedin the secondechelon,be '- Exploitingsuccess,
designatedas pad of the division res€rve,or be
The MRB may also be assigneda numberof
assignedspecial missions. As part of the regi
ment's first echelon in the attack, the battalion special missions:forward detachment or recon
naissanceelement (the N,4RB would be the basis
would have the mission of penetrating enemy
for a reconnaissance group)for division,advance
defenses,neutralizing enemv toops and equip-
guard of the regiment,and flank or rear security
ment, and seizingand consolidatingthe enemy's
guard for the division (see chapter 7, section A,
defensivepositions.Fhstechelonbattalionswould
paragraph4 for further details). lt may also be
also take pa.t in repellingenemy counterattacks
given a variety of missionsin heliborneoperations
and pursuinga withdrawingenemyforce. ln the
and, on occasion,in ship-to-shoreoperations
def€nse,first-echelonbattalionshave the m|ssron
of defeatingor wearing down the enemy's initial
assaultelements.

'< panoi the regimenfsinstechelonin a bre.kihroughoperation,the MBB commandermay b€

sivonmorolanksuppon.

25
 Section B * Organization, Responsibilities,and Equipment

1. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEBATTALION in figures 15 and 16. For a detailedlist and photos

of weaponsand equipmentat companylevel,see
The organizationand principal weapons and
The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company,
equipmentof the BMP,equippedMRB are shown
DDt 11q0,7/,76.

1h..upp|Yehton|.d.l,ulu.

FiC!re 15. The Motorzed R lle Battalron(BMP.Eq!rpped)

o.l20nnMor,ar.
I WeaponsandEquipment
Figure16.Principa oflhe MotortedRitteBartation
(BMp,Equpped).
26
 .r..

''fi,; .
nZ'

..ftutk,UAZ.69.

Figure 16. Principa Weaponsa nd Equipmentoi the Motonzed Rille Batlalion(BMP Equ ipped).(Continued)

27
:..s-

28
 g. Irr.k, POL (1,000 ot 5,20OLitett)

l. ftuck, v6^, ztL (Mointeha^.e).

!E::

ft
eo i o r z eR
a i e a p osran dE q ! i p m e n t o l t hM
F c u r e1 6 .P r i n c i p W ( B M PE q u i p p e d( )C. o n t i n u e d )
d i f l eB a t l a l o n

29
 for technicalaffairs,the battalioncommunications
officer {who is also the communicationsplatoon
leader,and the supply platoon leader la pEpot-
srch,:k.roughlyequivalentto warreniotlicerl

i Anhulonce, UAZ a50.

1 7 B € t l a l o nH e a d q u a r t e r s .
FiEUre

ll) The battalion commander is resoonsible

for his unit's mobilizationreadiness,combat and
political training, €ducarion, military discipline,
and morale.He is also responsible for the units
eouiDmentandfacilities.
(21 The battalion chief of staff is the com-
mander's"rjght arm.' He has the authorityto
give orders to all subordinateelementsand in-
sures compliancewith orderc from the batlalion
commanderand highercommanders.The chief of
stalf draws up the combat and training plans
ibasedupon the regimentalplan and the baltalion
commander'sguidance)for the unit and insures
Weaponsand Equipment
FitL,re16.Principal ofthe Molorired that they are carriedout, He also insurcsthat re-
R(le Aattalion(BMP-Equ
ipped).(Continued) quired reports are preparedand dlspatchedon
2. SUEONDINATEELEMENTS time to regimentalheadquarters.He is principal
organizerofaear servicesupportfor the battalion.
a. Th6 Battalion Headquafterc
{3) The deoutu battalion commander for
The battalionstaff consistsof six officersand political affairs organizesand conducts political
6ight enlisted men (figure 17). Office. personnel trainingdesignedto rally rhe battalion'spersonnel
includ€ the battalion commander, the battalion eround the Communist Pafty and th€ Soviet
chief of statf, the deputy battalioncommanderfor Government. He repons through the battalion
politicalaffairs, the deputy battalion commander commanderto the regimentalpoliticalofficer,

30
 (4) The deputy battalion commander for functions as the head of the forward observer
technical aff6irs supervises the battalion's {FOl/reconnaissance
section,
maintenanceseruiceelement and reports direcdy
to the botblion commanderor chief of staff. The
technicalaffahs officer is responsiblefor the com-
bat, political,and specializedtraining of rear ser-
vic€s personnel,and for the technicalconditionof
rheirequipmsnt.

{5) The communicationsofficer is a battalion

staff officer and the communications platoon
leader.lt is his responsibilityto train banalionper'
sonnelin signalproceduresand to supervisecorh-
municationstraining of the battalion, to include
the conduct of classesfor radio operators and
periodicinspectionsof communications equip-
rnent. In combat, the battalion signal officer
receivesinslfuctions from the senior regimental
signal officer, as well as from the battalioncom-
manderand chiefof staff.
(6) The supply platoon leader may be a
prapotshchik or senior NCO. He works closely
with the battalion chief of staff on all aspectsof
banalionsupply.
(7) Enlistedpersonnelin the battalion head-
quart€rsincludea sergeantmajor and his driver,a
chemicalinstructor/dosimeler operator,a senior
nedic lthe feld'sheL who headsthe medicalsec-
:ion, is a medical assistant whose skills fall l8 TheMoiorlzed
Frgure RlleCompaiy(BMP
Equrpped).
somewhere between those of a nurse and a
!hysician), two clerks,a driverand gunnerfor the
aattalioncomfiander's BMP, and a driver for the Each mortar platoon contains wvo squads,
:hiefof staff'sAPC. each of which containsa crew chi€f, a gunnef,
one telephone opbrator, a loader, one ammo
b. TheMotoized Rifle Company anda vehicledriver,
bearer,
The battalion'sprimarymaneuverelementsare d. TheCommunications Platoon
s lhree motorized rifle (l/lR) companies. The
3MP-equippedirR company is organizedas The communicationplatoon'sorganizationand
srown in figure 18- For detailed information on equipment are depicted in figure 20. The com-
'-6 unit, the reader should .efet to The Soviet municationsplatoon leader has an NCO assistant
\.otorized Ritle Company. DDl1100-77-76, and tlvo sectionleadels.
::rober 1976,
e. Battalion Rear ServiceSupport
c. The Battalion Mortat Battery
The deputy battalioncommanderfor technical
The mortar battery contains six l20mm moF affairs is assistedin supervisingrear seruicesup-
r.s and is organized and equippedas shown in port elementsby the supply platoon leader, the
. S J r e1 9 . NCos responsiblefor the repair workshop, and
the medicalaid station.
The mortar battery commanderis assistedby
-€ headquartersbatlery platoon leader,who also

3I
 FBufeI9 TheMortaraaltery

Figure20.TheComhunicationsPtat@n

32
 SectionC - Commandand Control
1.COMMAND
Tho Sovlatsroggrdcornmandas the exorcla€ot
conotrntand offactivecontrol.ThebattElioncom-
ntanderleliosprlmarilyuponhis chiefof 8taff,but
b roluctant to dal€g€te authority, pref6rdng to
nlake most docisiong hirns€ff. Company con-
fiEnders and the command6rsof other oqanic
a.d atboh€d uniE ara clogelysupervis€dby th€
hgttalioncommanderand/or the chiel of statf.
zco tnol
In th6 offuiEiw, th€ p.irmry rneansc'f oont ol
of th6 MBB is radio,althoughm668engeE, p€r-
aonElcontactbelwe€ncommsnde6,aignglfh.e6.
tlags, snd s vadetyof oth6r methods6rs a|so
us6d. Prior to contacti radio silonceb Etrictlv
ob3€rued,excoptingreporE from loconnsissanc€
olslh€ntsand th6 crossingot phaselln63.A typs
ot battalionradionet is shownin figur62l .
In tfi€ detense,the battalionr€lir6 primsrily on
wire. although messengeGrsignsl flar6, and
radio6ar6 also usedext€nsiv€ly.A battalionin th€
d€fons€would employa wire sryatemas shown in
lburc2'
,1
 ELEMENTS
Z'D RIFT€BA'TALION
MOTOR

cosMNDEF r:-^r toRr^R

--:-Phror) l Fr ' z3 )| E A T E R Y

-rl
KEY
-------S..----.D"'Nd'dN"i!
-----S"=-co*-ar"r.
----S-----F,,. --.-S--
suoonna.
NOIES

r Radd ued mry be rh. Flotro7 Rtr37L23 -- h,v. R1z65tor dEtu^ted @n

,i if$!iiJ:T;Ti"i$i *,, . ''ir' ban'bnmu

iii iiiriiii pl'r'""". 'r'" arnquop.d N'd'.d
i iiil ""iijl";;;o *n' rrtr'*.r a - 5 @t o' ' ( ' e N B ch r l i ' 3 t
icalionsN€l lna MolorizedRitleBattalion
Commun
Fieure2l Representatlve
34
 d

KEY
+
A Pratoonr@&r'6 Mmad o6sda o. Fs1

A' @ M.drr bareryji fin4 @iiionozonn)

r >-
.l
A Telephme non onn8 or mtor *rion

NOTES
r. $iE euld ak b€laidlrcm @n deqtrcn pbr@nb6deBlo squad

2 ououts aE rod. Mry 5c70 mdie6 abo! virc in op€n leraii to pmvidd sh;her ror wn€ t6ns .hekinc ihe iins in mb.t
RirreBattalionin the Delense.
Figure22.TheUseol lineCommuni6tionstyalvotorazed
 Section D - Battalion Rear Setvices
1. GENERAL and combat servicesupportelementshave normal
spacing between vehicles in the column {figure
Pfior to the march. the lvlRBnormallyoccupies 24). During the attack (figure 25), €nd in the
an asssmblyarea, For operationalconven:ence, delense {figure26}, the rear servicesare position
reliabledefense,and protectionof the rear service ed closelybehindthe combatunits.
elemenls,the latter normallyoccupy the center of
the MRB area{figure23}. The battalion's administrative 6nd logistics
respon$bilitiesare purposely minimizedlo allow
During offensiveand delensiveop€rations,the the battalion commander to concentrate on his
MRB'S rear seruice elements are positioned to primary mission'defeating the enemy in combat.
enable them to provide rapid material,technical, The regimentassumesmost of the battalion'sad-
and medical support, In order to maintain minist€tive burden and augments the battalion,
frsedom of mansuverduring the marc as required,logistically.

AA)

A
A &h. m,nnunr6n appt Fnr

A P
A\ A
in an AssembyArea
Fi8ure23MolorizedRilleBatialDnRearS€rviceElements
36
 tr--rsr
# # fi # c''d c4a d"d c-tt9 #-Jt +--H{r
----T-

I(EY

58'.* "* ,n,.n*",-,".

n@i!- dL bdt lh, t.ido'tld |||n
btri. tnd adill..Y in dd drhi
"'tu

€€","""..,""*-,,,"" Fdd knn.n lqn 9|d r7olnDt

t-/ \' rd *,1h fJlr rni.r

# *,r"rion..'uni,io",*.r

SQo',"-*"**,*,*

NOTES
., rruds,6 ons pr€d{ ftrns|#:fr.;tr-f,lffi, o5,.5odldi du.m,!.dnffie,.id so
i Dn.^6 bk.n '8..^d €h
|i1oM'
""€rE
r.2{I) tErd dunn. tdbl('!r}fui4
Ouringlhe March
Figure24. ltoto'i2ed RitleEsftalion R€r S€ruic! SupportElements

37
 v
E
al
-rrl
A
tr
d

o(
I

E 4
*rrl
n
.010.
F
A A
N
A I

A
A
A
F gure25.RearServrce
SupporlD!rinCth€ Atlack

38
 .-r.;i*.
R
'v(
g '.:.'.ln
':r,ii',

KEY

6il
A @ comtsry,hmunitbi spot @'nr

A
A E@ Mld minele]d lafr'ts&im|:nd |nii'nk)

sotu.o20nm)miflisposron

Fi8ure26. RearServiceSupport
in the Deiense

39
2. ADMINISTRATION necessary,the batlalion's supply pl€toon (ligure
271 picks up suppliesfrom regiment. Priorlty lor
The regimentalassistantchiel of staff for psr- resupply is ammunition, POL, technical supplies
6onnelis responsiblofor maintainingall personnel {repair parts), rations, and nontechnicaleupplies.
records.such as officers' leavesof absence{bat' Resupplynormallytakos place prior to battle and
talion keeps records of enlisted perconnel on at the end of the day. The Sovierstry to r6upply
l6ave), daily strength r6ports, and peBonnol at night or during other periods of limired visibil-
awards. In combst, h6 is also responsiblefor ad' ity. Emptyvehiclesreturningto battalionand regi-
ministrationre$rding POWS, captured m8teriel, ment are used to evacuatepersonnolend aquip-
and processingof personnelreplacements.
Forms and reoorts maintainedat battalion in- The battalion chief of staff. assistedby the
clude strength r6porte,training schedules,supply battalion t€chnical officer, the supply pl6toon
and maintenancerequisitionforms, and political feader.and the hatlalionfeld'sheL has the overall
reoorts. Ths battalion commande. is assistedin responsibility for coordinating the battalion's
hiB administrativeresponsibilitiesby his principal logisticrequirements.
staff officersand clericalpsrsonnel.
There is no forrnal re3r service element at
3. SUPPLY company level, where the company commander,
assistedby his technicalofficer and lirst sgrgeant,
a. Genenl
handle all logisticsfunctions. Normally, the bat-
Normally the r€giment, using its organic talion delivers supplies to its subordanate
assets, deliverc supplies to the battalions. This
principle is flexible, however, and whsn

rlEr'mLotd'Ui^!80[d
ldr'ndr6h,f.p*l'/:o

Fi8ur€27 TheSupplyPlatoon

40

The chi6l of th6 battElionammunitionsupply
point (BPB) is usually an NCO from the supply
platoon. He signsfor the ammunitiondeliveredby
regiment,deliversrequestedamounts to the com-
panies, and keeps the remainder on trucks
{th6r6bylacilitatingrapid delivery)at the battalion
BPB. Additional excess ammunition may be company lirst sergeants maintain ammunition
stored on lhe ground, particularlywhen ths bat
talionis occupyinga delensiveposition.
During a high-spe€doffBnsive,platoon guides
lead the battalion ammunition carri€rs lo in-
dividual combat vehicles. In the del€ns€, com-
p€ny ammunirion supply point6 (RPBS)may be
€stablished(figure 28). This procedu16reduces
theexposureof supplyvehicleslo enemyfire.
The battallon's support platoon lgader and
statusteDorts.

t\\
-----:: |; l
GlJ tj::r

4
\

s/9
<D\-

\
-d^
K-
KEY

5
Badi|ionanmutritbi9',|yFni <tt
@ cdFiy annunrbn suprt Fir P
J't @
NOTES

dt io the bad.riona6m!i,rbi !up

idtr'durr @nbar shrcr.s

Resupplyto the Compa

Fi8ure28 Ammunition niesInI heDelense
a
C. POL
The deputy battalioncommanderfor technical
affahs is r€sponsiblefor allocatingfuel to the bat'
talion's subordinateelements, The motor trans-
port squad leadero{ the supply platoon normallY
.unsthe battalionrefueling point{BZP).
To decreasethe need for refueling, vehicles
have supplementaryPOL containers which are
refilled after use, only in €xtreme emergencyare
vehicles refueled in combat. The Soviets make
every effort to refuel prior to an engagement,at
the end of the day, after the cohbat mission,and
prior to a river crossing.When on the march, the
preferredhethod of refuelingis to simultaneously
refuel v€hicles positioned on both sides of the
POLtankers{figure29).
CCCCCC
-6i
F glte 29. R e t l eI n E l h eM o t o r i z eRdi ie B a i t a l i osnC o m b aEl l e m e n D
In combat, Soviet soldiers are supposed to
receiveat least trivohot mealsper day. When this
is not possible,they eat dry rations and bread.
Four hundred grams of bread and 3 dry combat
rationsprovideover4,000caloriesper dsy.
The MRB has 4 mobilelield kitchenswhich
prepare hot meals and transport them to subor-
dinate units {figure 30). Sealed thermos con
tainersfor each platoon are picked up by platoon
represent6tiveswhen soldierscannot individually
pick up lheir radons.The divisionbakeryprovides
fresh bread {figure 31), which may be baked on
CCCCC
KEY
--J;l
IE-:;F{!J
a_l
tue kld $,'h k&r c*.
t su rn g t h eM a r c h
42
 Lr^.. ::8
Fq^i i,.,
In^("""$
F-[^',
,$
t-(^tfl
I-{r'""."
KEY

lgj

.fil

fl{

+
olo

NOTES

Foodto AtiackinsCompanies
Figure30.TheSupplyPlatoonDeliv€ring

43
 is responsiblefor the distributionot clothing and
for bath and laundry services,Soviet regulations
specifythat active duty personnelmust bathe and
change their underwearat least once a week, a
period extendedto every 10-12days during com-
bat operatrons.

The battalionmedicalaid station (tigure 32) is

the lowest level of organizedmedical support in
the Soviel Army. The section ot four men is
headed by the feld'sher. The aid station's func-
tion is to provide firct aid and to prepare
casualliesfor evacuation to the regimental aid
station {figure:l:l). Although subordinateto his
Fieure
31.Division
Bakery
Personner. battalion commander,the /e/d1rrel takes instruc-
tionsfromtheregimentalmedicalofficer.
The battalion food supply point (BPP) is run
Medical aid at battalion level is rudimentary
by the head of the supply platoon's ralion sec'
and includesbandaging.splints, morphine injec-
tion. A water supply point is constructednear the
tions, and simple operationsto preparewounded
BPP or, when this is not practical,a centralwater
for evacuation.The two medical orderliesin the
distributionpoint is used. Water is deliveredwith
section are aided by regimental orderlies in
food to the companies. lndividual water
collectingthe wounded from the battle area and
consumptionis figured on the basisof l0 liters of
carryingthem to the battalionaid station.
water per d6y (15litersin hot climates).

It is the responsibilityof the chief engineerat

regimentto establishwater supply points, which
are then maintainedby subordinateunits. Rubber
ized materialwhich protects the water from con-
taminationis usedfof storage,

e. Clothing

In combat, the battalionrequestsreplacement

clothing on the basis of worn-out, lost, or con- F i E 0 r3e2 . T h eM e dc a l a i dS l a l i o n .
taminated. The clothing supply chief at regiment

44
 d

-----\5

fu*.t.*"
f
A
.r;t
G\
\-Fs/

v- Lna sheher(Ficurcsrherunermlnded)
crouporwdundcd

6
=.

EI
LI

I
ourin8theAtta,k.
33 M€di6l Evacuation

45

I
4. MAINTENANCE The deputy battalion commandertor technical
af{airscontrols r€pairand €vacuationof damaged
For some time, the Soviets have had a field €quipment from a technical observ€tion point.
maintgn€ncedoctrine str€ssing rapid battlofield . This obseruationpoint, normallvlocatod I to I h
reoair as close to the frontlinesas oossible.ouF kibmeters from the frontlino, includes a radio
ing World War ll, 7t&) percenr of the disabled ooerator
and attachedmaintenanceDorsonnel.
Soviet vehicles r€turned to combat; of these,
m-90 percent were repairedin 1 to 2 days (the lf a vshiclecannot be repeiredin plece, or is in
lsraelisenjoyed a similar high repair rate in the danger of capture, it is evacuatedby regimental
Ocrober1973Warl. Such raoid reoak is of critical assets to previouslydesignatsdlocations {figuro
importance,panicularlyin a war with high r€tes
of attrition. This emphasison rapid repah as an
essential element of soviet offensive doctrine
with itsanticipatedhigh ratesofadvance.

The d6puw battalion commanderfor technical

affairs direcrly supervises the repair workshop
{figure 34). A repair or repair-evacuatergroup
{BG, or REG)may be createdby augmentingbat-
talion asseb with regimentalvehicles. Sattalion
BEGsnormallyonly conduct repairswhich can be
comoletedin a veryshorttime (5 hou|sor less).

Figure34 Th€Repanworkshop,

46
t
)
-..-

)r& F=-a=

l1^"*"
J%<
n(
ltl]\

I s,bbn 6mmds\ mnm

n
4:L\ 6,trt'0. .eru.r"3 F d o..

l!!A 8.n'ron rd suoet@r, c"

ll!!\ sdsroi anmui,di sppry@'nt -Ei

Zq\ 6"ia o 'ednc ob$rydm @d a

E "",.,"",,.,", X q

EE" r,ir:itf %1:#,i"J."1,'i:t

:;;H"ii,i%", x
ft **."*"
€

r+
x#""*,"'"- I
I
/----r-1

)6
n dq up m e nD
F i 8 u r e 3 5R. e p ar a n dE v a c u a t | o inW e a p o n s a E t urin€theAttack
 CHAPTER
5. BATTALION.LEVEL
LEADERSHIP
SectionA - lntrcduction
1 .G E N E B A L initiative, and as suffering from institutional
restrainls and lack of recenlcombatexperience,
It is difficult to generalizeabour an army's Usuallysuch analysesconcenlrateon the nega-
leadership.lt cannot be n€atly wrapped in a box rive aspectsof Soviet military eadershipwithour
and labeled "outstanding," "average," or differentiatingbetween various leadershipleveis,
'medioc,e."Wioe vdriarionsn education,r'ain
and witho!t consideringthe frarneworkwithin
ing, personalities, exper;ence,operationalcon whichleadership ls exercised
in the SovietArmy.
cepts,as well as numerousother factors,make
generalizations concerningleadershipboth dif' This chapter, which begins with a brief
ficult 6nd dangerous,For example,]t has been historicalperspective, analyzesthe Soviet IMRB
the practice oI some Western analyststo depict commanderand the operatjonal and institutional
Soviet military leadershipas lackingflexibjlityand factorswhich affect his eadership-

SectionB - TheHistoical Percpective

1, WOBLDWAR II for it !!as greater than the urge to take

World War ll providespadicularly relevantdata

on the combat performance of Soviet com- The reasonsfor this dichotornyof responsibil
manders. Although the impodance of this his- jty, flexibility,and initiativewhich separatedthe
rorical perspecive ca1 be overe-nphasired. ir seniorSovletcommanders (armyand lrora level)
must be realizedthat in spite of Soviet lessons from theirsubordinates (divisionleve and below)
learnedfrom the VietnamWar and the ast two may be primarily attributedto two faciors:(1) the
conflictsin the MiddleFast,WorldWa' ll remairs Sovieitheoryof commandand (2)the high losses
by far the primary origin of cufient Soviet doc of officers(pafticularly divisionleve and beow)
trina and leadership concepts.World War ll doc suffered in the first year of World War ll. These
trina concepts were carried out by junior com- factors often resuked in better qualified highel
manders who today constitute the seniorleader- commandersbeing flexibleand exercisinginit
ship in the SovietArmy. iative,while restrictingless experienced subor

2, THE EASTERNFRONT(1941.1945I
Sov;etfeld orde.swere 1ot o' rhe Amefcan
a. H;ghetand Lawet Level SovietLeaderchip "mission" type, but specified in considerable
Campaignson the eastern front are replete detail how a mlssionwas to be accompiished,
with examples of a striking lack of initiative Overcentralization of commandand highiydetai
ed ofders had a predictable effect on the ower
displayedby Soviet commanders,pafticularly
those at division level and below, as opposedto level leadership;initiative was stifled, and com-
the flexibiljtyevidencedat higher evels.The Ger manders were very reluctant to do €nythingwith-
mans had a high regardfor the senior Soviet out an order--preferably a written order.
commanders (armyand tort level),characterizing
Soviet commandersat divisionleve and below
thern as flex;ble,energetic,and full of initiative were primafily imp ementors rather than
(figure36). At divisionleveland below,however,
innovators/planners, The battalioncommander's
Soviet Leadershipwas for a long time considered duties were cleary and narrowy prescribed.
by the Germansto be inflexibleand indecisive,as Orderswere usuallyfolowed without any devia
wellasdesirous of avoiding
responsibility: tion and under the closestcontrolof the next
Spiritedapplicationto a lask, born of the highercommander.
decisionof an individua,was a rarity.. . The
Russiansmallunit commander's fear of doing
something wrongand beingcalledto account
49
d. Mor.hdl Zhuk6v, Chj6l ol the Ge^e.dl St.ll in Eddy t94t h Fron, Comno^det Etenenko.
ond Doputy Suptehe Con1oadet lh..&lre..

b FrcntCtnndndq Ronev. FrcntCommoid€r

b. Frcnt
b Commond€rPotols. ky.
Pololeo4

Figure36.SeniorSovietWWllComma
ndersWereFlexibleEnereeirc
and Full of Initiaiive.
50
 pertise in the technical aspects of their trade,
Soviet leaders were in fact well trained along
technical and lactical lines, but often failed to
grasp the spirit of doctrinal concepts and there
fore often acted in a ste.eotypedmanner rather
than in responseto circumstances,

d. The Political Otficet and the Commander

Fro.n 22 June 1941(the date rhe Germ€nsin-
vaded the Soviet Union) to October 1942 (when
Stalin decreedthat military commanderswere to
be solely responsiblefor the conduct of battles),
rhe polirical officer often complicated decrsion.
making, for he had to countersign the com-
mander'sorders(fig'rre37). This dual command
system was inefficient and often tactically
disastrousin thewar'sinitialstages.

The October 1942 decree eliminatedthe dual

command system by subordinatingthe political
officer to the military commander. lt should be
added, however, that the role played by the
political officer was an imponant one, and con
b Fto^tCoDmond.r rinosh.nko tributed to ultimateSoviet victory. In general,the
FiSure
36.seniorSoviet WWlrComanders wereFexble,
Enersetic (Continued)
andFul ol Intialive. political officer was a fanatical and brave man
who set an inspirjngexample for troops, often,
b. Soviet Regulations
the pol,trcalofficer was more prone to act in a
Soviet field service regulations of the lare criticalshuation thanthe commander.
1930sand early war period also contributedsigni-
The question is, how'much have conditions
ficantly to the lack of initiativeand responsibilhy
changedsinceWorldWar ll? Do Sovietcommand
at the lower levels- These regulationstried to
procedures, regulations,discipline, and training
have it both ways; they paid lipserviceto the
continLreto stifle the leaderchipat battalionlevel,
need for exercisinginitialive while making clear
or hasthis leadershjpimproved?
the dangersof failurewhen exercisjnginitiative.lf
a battalion commanderexercisedinhiativewithin
th€ context of the regimentalcommander'splan
and was successful, he (the battalion com-
mander) was safe. On the other hand, initiative
exercisedoutside the establishedplan and which
r6suhed in f€ilure, left the battalion commander
op€nlo severepun|shment,

c. Trcining and Discipline

German officers also concludedthar the rigid

pattern of Soviel training and severe discipline
resulted in lethargy, as w€ll as lack of initiative
and flexibility at the lower levels. The Germans
also noted, however,that as the war progressed,
Sovietlower levelleadershipimprovedsomewhat.

Significantly,German writers do not criticize F gufe 37. Untll ocrober1941 The Un t potiic? Oitic€r
the Soviet lower level leadershipfor lacking ex- Bad to Count€rsignTheConmandefs Orders

5I
 SectionC-ThePresent
I, THE SOVIETMRB COMMANDER sions from commissioning schools (somewhat
similarto Wesr Point). Other sourcesof commis
a. Age and Rank sion include reserveofficer training programsand
Today's Soviet NllRBcommander is between direct commissions;the former produce junior
the ages of 27 and 39 and varies in rank from lieutenants who are commissioned in the re-
seniorlieutenantto lieutenantcolonel,A senior serves, while the latter are probably not exten-
lieutenant commanding a battalion would prgb- sively used in peacetime.Therefore,the ma;ority
ably be 25-28years old and be on the list for pro of Soviet battalion commanderswould be grad-
motion to captain. While few senior lieutenants uates of 3 to 5 y€ar commissioningschools.
command battalions,the soviets have for some Graduatesof the 4 and 5 year train;ng schools
time been attempting to place younger, more are most prevalent,and receivemore deta;ledand
energeticmen in command(figure 38). [4ost bat- higher level training than graduatesof the 3-year
talion commandsseemto be held by captainsand schools,Both systemspreparepersonnelfor com-
m€jors, althoughthe authorizedrank is lieutenant mandaswell as technical-specialist positions.
colonel {at regimentallevel and below, over 65 Battalioncommandersin the rank o{ captain,
percentoI the officersare under30 yearsof age).
major, and lieutenant colonel may have also at
tended the junior or senior advancecourse of 10
months' duration. Noimally, the former are at-
tended by captains and majors; the latter by
maiorsand lieutenantcolonels.The junior course
is primarilygearedto tactical and staff training at
ihe battalion level, whereas the s€nior course is
concernedwith regimentaloperations,upon com-
pleting these courses, officers return to their
units.
c. Political Awareness

The battalion commanderis politicallyaware,

and is probably either a candidate member or
member of the CPSU. Nonparty afiiliation is a
realdet mentto an officer'scare€r.

Although it is probable that no Soviet bat-

talion commandershave had combat experience,
this factor can be overemphasized when judging
the capabilitiesand limitations of battalionlevel
leadership.Lack of combat experiencemay be
Fisure38. BattallonCommandersAre Your8Menwilh offset to a certaindegree by extensivepeacetime
Considerable
Peacetime
CommandExperence. commandand field training. The maio ty of bat
talion commanders have probably had lengthy
platoon and companycommand. h would not be
The battalioncommandertoday is much bet unusualfor an officer to be a platoon leaderfor 3
ter educatedthan his World War ll predecessor. years and a company commanderfor about the
At the outbreakof World War ll, about 7 percent same length of time prior to becominga battalion
of the Soviet olficer corps had receiveda higher
education; today, the figure is well over 50 per-
cent (excludingreserveofficers, the figure would Battalionfield trainingexercisesare numerous,
be much higher),Almostall the current juniorof- particularly whhin those units in a high state of
receivedtheir commis
ficers {lieutenant-captain) readiness. The battalion commanderpanicipates
52
in a minimum of wo field training exercisesof at 3. OPERATIONALCONCEPTS
AND PRO-
least2 days' durationper year, and may parti CEDURES
cipate in as many as six FTXS;that is, two bat
Becausethe Soviets, in the event of war, an-
talion exercises,two as part of the regiment,and
ticipate deploying a force of great magnitude,
two as part of the division.
they apparently believe that highly centralized
e. Responsibilities control may be the only effectivemethod. Soviet
operationalproceduresseem centeredaround the
The battalioncommander for his regiment,whjch is describedas the most impoF
is responsible
unit's combat readiness,its combat and political tanr maneuverunir in rhe Sovietarmy.The regi-
training,and the education,militarydiscipline, nen( is fte lowesrlevelunil whh a tull plannirg
politicalawareness,and morale of the personnel staff and combinedarms and rear serviceunits.
under his command. His principal assistantsin Whereas the regiment has the capabilityto plan
fulfilling these responsibilitiesare his chief of operations, its subordinate battalionsdo not and,
staff, deputy commanderfor polhicalaffairs, and subsequently,implementregimentalorders,
deputycommanderfor technicalaffairs,
Accordingly, vi.tually all aspects of battalion
level training are closely controlled by the
his staff (figure39).
Despiteperiodiccompla;ntsin the Soviet pfess regimentalcommanderand
The political, artjllery, communications,and rear
concerninginstructionin the serviceschoolsand
serviceofficerson the regimentalstaff are respon
relations between the military and the party's
siblefor the training,supervision, and often the
representativeswithin the battalion, the com
contro of theircounterpartsat battalion level,
mander'sage, education,and politicalawareness
provid€ the theoretical basis for effective Soviet regimentalcommandercget minutelyin-
b6ttalionlevel leadership.Soviet battalion com- volved in the handling of their subordinate
mandersmust be considered educated,poiiticaly elements.Although the regimentalorder contains
aware men who have dedicatedtheir lives to the generallythe sam€ data found in the combat
military profession. Lengthy periods of platoon orders of most Westernarmies,the implementing
and companycommandand frequentfield exer- instructionsissued by Soviet regimentalcom-
cisespfovide a good foundationfor technicaland mandersare more detailed,and illustratethe pen-
tactical proficiency, Let us now examine the chant for close control over battalion operations.
operational and instructional framework within The Soviet regimentalcommanderwill sometimes
which the battalioncommanderoperates. designate a specf/b subelement within a sub-
ordinate battalion to perform a cenain task.
2, SOVIETCOMMAND THEORY
Ratherthan order that the first battalionprovidea
The Soviets regard command as continuous company or a platoonto guard the left flank,
control and direcdonof units and the organization Soviet regimental commandershave been known
of their combat activities. Centralizedcontrol at to designate which cornmander or platoonshould
the highest possiblelevel is an importantelement accomplish the task. The regimental commandel
of Soviet command theory as is the principleof also states where each battalion, company, pJa-
one-man command, which will be discussedin toon, and squad will deploy into columns and
the section dealingwith the [,4R8commandef final attackpositions.
andthe pady.
Having received the regimental commander's
The concept of centralized control at the order and guidance,subordinatebattalioncom-
highestpossibleleveland how it affects battalion- mandersd€w up plansto implementthem. Prior
level operations becomes clear when examined to issuingthese plans to thek subordinates,bat'
within the framework of Soviet operationalcon- talion commandersare required !o get final ap-
ceptsand procedures. provalf romthe fegimental commander.

53
 FiSure39.TheResim€ntal
Comma
nderand HisStatlExercise
During the attack, control is so centralazed at
r€gimentthat there is litrle direct lateralcoordina-
tion betwe€n two attacking first-echelon bat-
talions {coordination is done at regiment).
ltloreover, using all of his communicationscapa-
bililies, regimentalcommanderswill, on occasion,
address specific companies rather than go
through the battalioncommanders.The degfeeto
which this is done varieswith the Dersonalitaes in-
volved,but it doesoccur.
During the aitack, the battalioncommande.has
the authority to allow his subordinatesto bypass
an enemy position. but he needs the regimental
comm6nder'sapprovaltor the batralionto bypass
a position or to commit the battalion's second
echelon {reserve). Should the battalion com-
mander be unable to talk to regiment, he would
be expect€d to commit his second echelon
(reserve)on his own initiative and inform reoa-
m€nt as soon as possible,
This highly c€ntralizedcontrol by regimentover
battalion operationspenains in normal offensive
and defensiveoperations,The situation is some,
what more flexible in the hasty defensebecause
the regimentalcommanderdoes not have time to
TishtConlrolover Subordinate
Units.
give lengthy, detail€d orders. Battalion com
mandersare given the forward edge ot the banle
area and have more latilude in positioningtheir
men and conducting the battle with;n theh
assignedareaof responsibility.
Not surp.isingly,the battalion commanderex-
erts the same close control over his subordinates.
In the field,companycommanders are told what
to do and how to do it. Fire planningand coord-
anation,and logisticsresupplyare handledat bat-
lalion level. While centralizedcontrol at battalion
levelsimplifiesproblemsof commandat company
level, it is more difficull and time consumingfor
companies,platoons,and squadsto receivetime-
ly fire support. A squad requ€stfor artillery fhe
would go up the chajn of command to th€ bat-
talaon commander, who would then coordinate
the r€questwith attached or supporting artillery.
Such a system makes high casualitiesat the
lower levels probableand could adverselvaffect
4. THE MRB COMMANDERAND THE -The battalion political officer, at present
PARTY subordinateto the battalion commander,has the
right to issue orders to others in the battalion.
Although one man command is an important Moreov€r,the deputy regimentalcommanderfor
principle of Soviet command theory, disagrce polltical
affahs may issue orders to subordinate
ment betweenthe militaryand the party has been battalions. This dual chain of
command could
noted, and centers around the latter's interpreta complicatethe battalion
commander'siob.
tion of one-man command, Whereas the profss-
sional military believesin one-mancommand, the On the posiiive side (from the Soviet view
party inforcesthe concept of one-man command point), it should be noted that in addition to his
political skills, the battalion political officer is a
trainedmilitaryman and probablycapableof lead-
The party's r€prgsentatives at battalionlevel in- ing the battalion in military
operations. Further-
clude th6 deputy battalion commanderlor poli-
more, by handling political and other duties
tical affairs; a party group headedby an elected
assignedby the battalion commander, he frees
soldier, NCO, or officer; a komsomol organiza-
that individualtoconcentrateon other matters,
tion; and a people'scontrol group. The missions
of these individualsand organizationsare to in- ''Also on the positive side, the party's
sure party control over the battalion, to aid the representatives at battalionlevel may aid the com-
battalioncommanderin unit training, and to help manderby assistinghim in maintainingunil readi
maintaindisciplineand politicalawarenessamong ness, training, and discipline.lt would, therefore,
battalion personn€|. While it is difficult to be inaccurateto depict the influenceof the party
heasure the full impact oI the party on the bat- representatives as strictlynegative,
talion commander's leadership,a few observa-
tions may be mad6: Nevertheless the basisfor conflict betweenthe
party and the military exists and should not be
-The most important criteriafor officer promo disrnissed.The often strident and bitter disagree-
tion is a high degree of political awarenessand ment beween the militaryand the party;n the
the fulfillment of politicalduties, not military and 1960s continues today albeit at a much lower
technical Droficiencv.As an article in Red Star lev€l of intensity. Should either the party or the
made cle€r, an officer lacking "party passionand military gain in authority at the expenseof the
fhmness" will not make a good commander no other, latent resenlmentcould surface with sub-
matter how brillant his knowledgeof military at- sequent impact on combat readiness-asituation
fairs. The importance of ideology and party which hasoccufiedthroughoutSoviethistory.
loy8lty has resulted in the incursion of political
objsctives and criteria into the battalion com- 5, REGULATIONS
mander'snontacticalwork (it is doubtful that par-
tv reDresentatives interfere in the tactical deci- fhe 1975 Disciplinary Regulations of the A hed
sionsoI the battalioncommanderl. Fotces of the USSB ate remarkablysimilarin tone
to thosethey replaced:
-The number of party representatives and the
zealous manner in which they attempt to carry Exact, timely and incontrovertiblefulfi,,
out their duties is irrilating to sohe battalionand ment of orders is the fundamentalconr
comoanv commandeE. Recommendationsmade bat activity of the commander. (The
by these party representativesmay be closer to 1942-1gS lnfantry Combat Regutations.)
orderc, as cohmanders have been criticized by An order from a superior is law to the
higher politicalorgansfor not carryingout recom subordinate.An order must be fulfilled
mendations made by party representatives,0n absolutely, exactly, and immediately.
the other hand, some battalion and company 119{8 Disciplinaty Regulations of the
commanders assign duties to their political Amed Forcesof the USSR.
deouties which hinder their oolitical work. Fre
quent transf€rof politicaldeputiesfrom one com-
pany to another,with the appar€ntaim of rendeF
ing them moreinnocuous, is alsoa frequenlprac
flce,
 The suoerior'sorder is a law for subor- methodically planning for the me6ring engage-
dinates. The order must be carried out ment and trying to for€see €very possiblecon-
without demur. exactlvand on time- {The tingency, only to fail when somethingunforeseen
1975 Disciplinary negulations of the
Amed Forcesof the USSR.)
Combat In built.up areasand fonested regions,
These new regulationsemphasizethe necessity river crossings,and retrogradeoperationsalso de-
for strict compliancewith orders and regulations mand a high d€gree of initiativeand flexibilityat
and restrictcommandchoicesby spellingolt pre- 6ll levels.lroreover, in nuclearwar rh6 disruption
scribod actions in great detail. While dem6nding and destruction of command and control
full obediencs and compliancewith orders, the echelonsworild be far greaterthan under conven-
regllations at the same time give lipseruiceto the tional circumslances and would place even
importance of initiarive. Battalion commanders greaterdemand ontacticalinitiativeandflexibility.
and their subordinatesare continuouslyurged in
the Soviet or€ss to use their initiative and to be The operational and lnstitutional lramework
flexible. This is easiersaid than done, however, within which the battalion commanderoDerates
within a svstem which oreachessubordinationto hardly encouragesthe inhiativgand flexibility re-
authority, conformity,and exacts severepenalties quired in independentoperatons, To the con-
for not obeying orders. lvlarshalGrechko, whil6 trary, it emphasizesoperating under close r€gi-
urging more initiative and flexibility by Soviet mental supervisionand control. Ahhough it can-
commanders, also wrote, "The display of in- not be definitively stated how Soviet battalion
commanderswould react, they would probably
itiativeas a rule is connectedwith risk," A variety
of sourcesindicatesthat ba(alion and lower level oerformwell when under the direct suoervisionof
commanders associate initiative with career regiment, but less efiectively when acting in-
jeopardy and prefer to act accordingly; that is, dependsndy.Tacticalopponunitiesshould, there-
within the narrowconfinesof regimentalorders, fore, exist for more floxibleWesterncommand6rs.
In the meeting engagementthese Western com-
5. TACTICALIMPLICATIONSOFTHEABOVE manderc, through initiative and daring, could
The narrow oarameterswithin which the bat- "pile up" Soviet forward detachftents and ad-
talion commanderoperales are expeciallyimpor- vance guards, and force regiments,and possibly
tant when examinedwithin the context of opera- divisions, todeployprematurelyorinconfusion.
tions which place a premium on flexibility and Manv Soviet militarv men seem worried over
initiative. The meeting engagementis a case in
rhe lack of flexibility6nd initiativeat the battalion
pornr.
and lower levelsand have, panicularlyin the last
The early phase of the meeting engagement few years, pressedfor gr€ater initiative at thgse
(that is. belore the regimental commander can levels. Concrete results Irom these effons have
com€ forward and control the battle) placescon- yet to be soen. Becauseinitiative and flgxibility
siderable stress on the banalion commander's have politicalas well as military implications,the
ability to respondquickly to rapidly changingcir- problem of instillingthese traits has been espec-
cumstances.To be successful,he must be fl€xi- ially ditficult. 11shorild be not6d, however, that
ble and be able to exploit succ€ssachievedby in- the Soviets have made progrossin this area, In
atiativeand surprisewhile maintainingmomentum accordancewith rheir post-World War ll opera-
through high-speedmaneuverand corectly ap- tional concepts,they have allowedmore flexibility
plied firepower.And yet the Soviet presscontains and initiativeat divisionand regimentallevelsthan
numerous examples of batlalion commanders was the caseduringthe war.

56
 CHAPTER
6. BATTALION
TRAININGAND SUBUNITTACTICS
Section A - TrainingPhilosophyAnd Objectives
I. PHILOSOPHY a combat skill, preparationfor instruction,ex-
ercises,and the organizationof th€ir life and
Trainingis centraliz6dat the highestlevel possi-
leisufetime.
ble and stresses.to a degree unparalleledin the
West, thg closest superyisionby superiorsover 2. OBJECTIVES
subordinates.This philosophyis clearly reflectod
at battalionlevel. Broad training objectivesare designedto insure
politicalreliabilityand to achievea high state of
While the battalion commanderhas some say combat readiness.Another objectiveseemsto be
as to how his unit will be trained,a great deal of to keep the troops fully occupied under the
battalionlev€l training is planned and controlled closestpossiblesupervision,even during so-called
by the r€gimentalcommanderand hisstaff. freetime,
Within the battalion, supervisionjs very clos€, Although there aro some notablediscrepanciss,
evenfor juniorofficerc: training reflectsSoviet doctrine in that it conc€n-
trates on offensive combat 0196nizedaround
The lieurenantsf€el the expsrioncedguiding
combined arms operations,with tanks providing
hand of their seniorsat every step-mastering
the backbonewithin combinedarmsgroup;ngs.
Section B - Training Schedules
1. GENERAL (political training, tactical training, etc.) to be
taught by the battalion.Priorto informinghis bat-
Training programsvary in accordancewith the talion coftmandersof what they will teach during
unit's readinessstatus, the weather, geography, a training phase, the regimental commander
and with troop rotalion {May and November). checkswirhthe division command€r for aooroval.
There are two training peridds {summer and
winterlwhichareeachofO months'duration. The regimental commander is responsiblefor
the training of his banalioncommandersand their
The yearly training program for the ground deputies, while rhe first deputy regimentalcom-
forces is established at Ministry of De{ense mander is responsiblefor the training oI the bat'
(MOD) l6vel and subsequently refined and
talions' companv commanders. Moreover, the
elaboratgd upon by the N4ilitaryDistricts, the political, artillery, comrnunications,and rear ser
Groups of Forces,and divisioncommanders.For vice officers on the regimentalstalt are responsi-
a typical dmonth schedulelor a BMP-equipped ble for the trainingand supervision(and often the
unit, seefigurerK). control) of their counterpans at battalion level.
The rEgimentalcommanderand his staff br€ak Trainingprogramsfor many battalionsubelements
down the numberot hourslor each broad subject 6nd individualsare accordinglydrawn up by the
regimentalstaff.
 NUMEER
OF IIOURSTAUGHTPEf,SUBJECT

'{///#/,#ff
NOTES

Freure40A Rep.esenlalive lora BMPEq!rppedUnil

S &MonthTrarnngSchedule

2. THE BATTALIONTRAININGSCHEDULE The seftiannual training plan is the battalion

commander'sbasictraining document, He checks
Although the regimentalcommanderplans and with the regimentalcommanderto insurethat lhe
supervisesmuch of the trsining of his battalions, latter's goals will be met. Figure41 reprosentsa
a battalion commandermay {with the regimental typical dey within a we€kly {Monday-Friday)
commander's approval) change the number of schedule.Although new regulationsreduced the
hours designatedwithin a particular block. He amount of military tralning
{exclusive oI PT,
may, for example,want his companiesto spend maintenance,and sports) per day lrom 7 hours to
less time on reconnaissanceand more time on th€ 6, ths length of th6 duty day remainedabout the
meeting engagementand request approval from same, because unlike the old system, political
his regimentalcommander, training {up to 4 hours per week) is not counted
The battalion command€ralso tains and cor as part of milirarytrajning.
rccts his subordinateson a daily basis, concen- Sixty to sixty-fivepercentof the trainingtime is
tEting primarily on his Mn companies.Twacea supposedto be spent on fi6ld training and prac-
year, lor 4 to 5 days at a time, he conducts
tical exercises with weapons and equipment,
classesfor his platoon leeders. In addition, and Moreover about ,1()percent ot
the tactical firing
usuallyprior to the beginningof a winter or sum- and tactical exercis€sare suDDosedto be
con-
mer training period, he garhers his ofiicers and ductedat night.
NCOS and explains the training program/ its
goals,and instructionaltechniquesto be used.To Soldiersnormallywork half a day on Saturday
his company commande.s he gives the total {maintenanceand/or organizedsporF) and have
number of hours per subject, Company com- the rest ot th€ we€kend ofI. This tim€ off is.
mandersorganizetheir weekly training plans bas- however, usually supervised, particularly tor
6d upon specificguidancefrom battalion. forcesstationedoutsidethe USSR.

58
 GR€ANDCLE^N NC OF M L TARY EOUIPMENI

F r C ! r e 4 1A T y p i c aW e e kD a y T r a r r r n g S c h e d ! l e

Section C - Companyand Section Trcining and Tactics

1 ,T H EM O T O R I Z E D
R I F L EC O M P A N Yregimental artiliery commander, the battation
commander, and the battalionchiefof staff. Mor-
Companycommandersdraw up theif training tar battery training is designedto achieve pfofi-
schedulesbasedupon detailedguidanceby the ciency in assignedduties, familiarization wirh
battalioncommanderand the battalionchief of other-than-assigned duties (cross-training),
and
staff. Companyvainingmay be dividedinto four tactical proficiencyof the battery operatingas the
individual(to inclLde eadership
categories: traln battalions primarymeansof indirectfiresupport,
ing for sergeants),weapons and equipment,
moral-political,
andtactical. b. Individual Duties and Trcining

Becauseof the semiannual troop rotationsin 11)Thebatterycommander

May and November,;t is difricJkfo' !€iring ar
the company level to proceed logically from
squadand platoon up to companylevel. Probaby
most of May and \overrbe. are spe'rrir ar ar-
tempt to assimilatethe new recruits (who have
completed4 weels of basicrrailing i1 rhe regi-
menfs ad hoc training company) and get them
ready as quicklyas possiblefor f;eld ere.cises.
whichrravo, maynot be in logicalsequence,
The companyannuallyconducts,at leastfive
companylevel field exercisesof 1 to 1 '/, days
each under the direct supervisionof the battalion
For fuftherdetailson MB companytrainingand
tactics, see lre Soviet Motoized Rifle Company,
DDt 1100Z-76.
2. THE MORTAR BATTERY
a, Genetal
The mortar battery,normallycommandedby a
captain, is supervised in its training by the
The morrarbattey com.nanderis rhe prin-
cipal fire controllerof his unit. From his forward
observationpost he computesfire data and relays
other fke miss;ons recdved from his banalion
commander and the regimental fire controicenter
{figure 42). He directly supervisesthe training of
his battery.
(2) The headquartersand headquarterspla-
This platoon leader has administrativeand
tactical functions. He assists the batte.y com-
manderin administrativetasksand headsthe bat-
tery's forward observer/reconnaissance section,
This latter responsiblilitvgives the battery the
capability to establish wvo forward observer
posts, aithough normally there is only one. The
headquartersplatoon leader trains the forward
observer/reconnaissance sectionin targetacquisi-
tion and fire missiontechniques.He also trains
the radio telephonesection, with the help of the
battalion communications pi6toonleader,

59
 mal, over, or under weight-necessitatingcorrec
tions by the fuze setted, placing the correct
chargeon the round, and setting the fuzesfor in'
stant or delayaction; loadercand carriers,in 6ddi-
tion to their normal function, receive cross
training as gunners. The driver of the section's
GAZ 66 truck is trained in vehicularmaintenance
and digging in his vehicle in the defense,as well
as antitank tactics (the driver is armed with an
RPG-7and is responsiblefor providinghis section
with antitank protection), Battery personnelare
alsotrainedin the useof flag signals(figure43).

lo,
I

I-Y
Fi8ure42.The
MortarBattery at hisFo ard
Comnrander A
Observation
Post

(3)Themortarplatoonleader

In addition to supervisory responsibilities FI

\
D-\or
regardinghis own platoon, the {irst platoon leader
normallyis in chargeof the battery on the march ,^
{the battery commander, with his forward
observer/reconnaissancesection, during the F8ure43FIaBS gnas LJsed
bythervortar
Battery
march precedeshis battery looking for suitable
deploymentpositions and an observationpoint),
and is the designatedreplacementshouldthe bat-
t6ry commanderbe incapacitated.Platoonleaders
feceive fire commands from the battery com- (1)General
mandef and pass them directly lo their gun crew
lvlonar banery training concentratesprimafily
commandeE. Platoon leaders are trained in all
on offensive operations of the N4RBand N4RR.
aspects of mortar equipment and fke computa-
Positioning dtiring the march and deployment
tion, and as replacementslor the battery com-
from the march, battery fire positions,and types
mandershouldthe needarise,
of fkes arepartacu larly emphasized.
{4)The mortarcrew
{2)lvlission
Membersof the mortar crew, headedby an
The missionof the battalionmortar battery is
NCO, receivetheir primary specialtytraining and
to provide the banalionwilh close-inindirect fire
some cross-training.The NCO is trained to per'
suppo(, to include high explosive,illumination,
form each frJnctionof his section, to include the
andsmoke.
technical aspectsof the hortar and its ammuni-
tion. setting up, fire commands, and low-level (3)Themarch
lactics. Gunners receivetraining in sighting and
sight corrections. Fuze setters are trained in On the march, the mortar battery com-
checking the shell weight {mort6r rounds have mander is at the head of his eight-vehiclecolumn
markingsindicatingwh€theror notlhey areof nor-
60
within the battalionformation {figurerl4). Normal- platoon l€ader. lf a second OP is tactically
ly, the headquartersand headquartersplatoon desirable,
the headquartersand headquaderspla,
leader,the foNard observer/reconnaissance per toon leader, aided by an RTO, could establish
sonnel, and communicationspersonneLac-
company the battery commander.The first pla- {5) Communications
toon leaderridesin the secondvehicleand is in
actualchargeof the batterycolumn.Within the Although radios are the primary method of
battery, orders on the march are normally sendlngfire missions from the OP(s)to the guns
transmitted by flags;gnal. during the offensive,wire is also used, time and
tactical situation permitting. In the defense,wire
{4) Oeployment fromthe march is the primary m€ans of communicationbetween
the OP and gun positions.Two R105/107radios
Whenever possible, the battery cornmander a.e wirh ihe OP and rwo are ar the badery posi-
selectsthe battery positionsand the observation tion, in addition to telephones and several
post (OP) prior to the march, and proceeds kilometers of wire, providing
a sufficient com,
directly to the OP, leavingbattery deploymentto m!nica onscapability.
his first platoon leader,When unexpectedand
rapid deploymentfrom the march is calledfor, (6) Typesoffires
the battery commanderfirst selects the deploy-
mentareaandthenoccupies hisOP. Mortar crews practiceblockingfires againsta
hostileassduli,openng cofiidorsthroughmine-
Individual mortarpositionsare designated by fields, destructionof fixed targets, and zonal ba.-
the batlery commande.{or first platoon leader)by rage fires as patt of regimentalartilJeryprepara
using a r€d flag which indicatesthe directionand tion. Althoughthe rangeof the 120mmmortaris
lire rhe .no4arsare to occupy.Urlessoil.erwise about 5,700 meters, opt;mum distances for
ordered,gun conmandersposltiontheir mortars engagementlie between4,000and 4,500meters.
along the indicatediine at 20 meter intervals
(7) Antitankprotectionand batterydefens€
{figure45).Alter detaching theirmonars,vehicle
drivercoffload ammunitionand (time permitting) The battery's primaryantitank protectionlies
revettheirvehicles. in the RPG-7firesof the vehicledrivers.All other
gmm
In the offensive, individual modar positions battery personne are armed either with the
usuallyconsistof a small pit for proper setting of pistol {lvlakarov) or the 7.62mm modernized
(AKM). No lookout posts or orh€r
the base plate. In the defense, more elaborate assault rifle
positionsare constructed (figure46). ln both the specia security measuresare known to exist for
olfense and defense, the mortars are normally
deployedin a straightline. (8) Displacement
The OP, normally located on an elevated Displacementof the batteryvaries.lf the bat-
position (figure 47), is occupied by the battery talion has attachedartillery (or can be supported
commander,the forward observer/reconnaissanceby regimental artillery) the mortars normally
section, designatedradio teephone operators,displacetogether; otherwise, the battery would
and possibly the headquartersand headquarters displaceone platoonat a tim€, so that two pla-
toonsareproviding
continuous
f iresupport,

67
 :i$ -*a+" , Poo =*o -.,-o- -{-@F -.rF-- -<t!r *tt-.Dr .+} .# .-<l

A $ PANTOFTFE AA.|.IAON FORSAIbI{

<€ --DF -*D' *pF *p' .*!F <+ -#

B BATIIRY ARCHOFDCR

KEY

n mrd c.rum
;o Airr.r, b.rt.||onrnnueom bd.')

-<nO=!!- rum. |ith ' rh.d Lnks .id ,nik.y

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ir.tortr.d rill.onprry in ne.tr @tqmi

P s.rblloi.onmrnd.r'! @nof dufrs th. nxih

*}} r'bn.t b.ri.o ( r2onn) $ nt.h .orumn,

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..C au"rr.uo,,.r,r",or.
-"-@F AitL (Elr b.fi.fy 'i mrah co!mi -+ Md.,i rz{rnn)
rd.dr r'sr
Figlrezl4.Th. MortarBatt€ry
Ourlnglhs
March.
 - --?-!*J-\--r!--a!--a! ---!_\_/ -fi
<+_l
J | ->t >t .>2 >-/

r/ ,r'/,r'/ ,r'/
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KEY

Tru4 (ened he5 dende subsquenrFriion) me8 rde;id

-1J

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r,|on:r(r2onm) h nnneF lon

NOTES

2rh.$endl9|atdEdep|oy.

Fisure45. Mortar aatt€ry D€ploym€ntlrcm the March

 KEY

Mon.. (r20mn) in rrnngpoliloi

NOTES

Fr8ure46Mort.r Posrtronn theDetense.

64

'-::_-
 . KEY
)at\ *"-- ',.'*'

Mona.brery ( r2omn) 'n rris posirbi A

0 gl

ir\ry Lheb..i"*hc.. Ererh-e*r

-o<
NOTES
nddi Fd {oP) s usd lor rffn

nd'indlherac]m.nta
,| Ihe enio. liriB ofiicc| noma '

. FiEwe47. Operations
of the MortarBalterys Foruard Observation
Post.

65
3. THE BATTALIONCOMMUNICATIONS scenariosto test his men, the exercisesafe ac-
PLATOON tually planned and conducted undef the close
supervasionof the deputy regamentalcommander
Communications personnel receive specialist for rear services,When the battalionwants to use
training prior to reporting to their assignedunit. some of its organic rear servicesequipmenl/ it
Such lraining lasts 6 months and is divided into must requestpermissionfrom regiment-
basic, spec;alized,6nd general military subjects,
with specializedrraining accounting for most of
the instruction, The deputy battalion commander for
In addationto supervisinghis platoon'straining, technjcal affairs is respor.3iblefor the technical
the battalioncommunicationsofficef, jn conjunc- training of his repairworkshop personneland for
tion with the battalion chief of staff and the supervisingthe technical training within the fulR
regimental communicationsofficer, draws up a companies.In lhis latter task he is assistedby the
signaltrain;ngprogramfor the battalion.This pro- conpany technicaloff icers,
gram concentrateson the operation, care and After induction, personnel designated 1o
cleaningof radios and telephones,and on com become mechanicsand driversare trained either
municationssecuritYmeasuresand procedures.In on the job or in training units within the an-
training and combat, personnel from the bat- duclee's division or mjlitary djstrict. ln addition,
talion's communications platoon operate the eachman is requiredto attenda 1%, ro 2-monrh
radios of the battalioncommander,chief of staff, course on repairingmilitary vehicles. orivers are
the company commanders, medical point, and designated"driver-mechanics,"and as such, are
supply platoon, as well as lay wke and perform authorized to go beyond those first-€chelon
messengerservices,The plaroon is also responsi maintenance procedures allowed their counter-
ble for the care, cleaning,and storing of the bat parlsin manyWesternarmies,
talion'sNBCequipment.
On paper, approximately35 perc€nt of unit
4. BATTALIONREARSERVICES raining is devoted to specialty training. Each
a. Genenl motorpoolis supposedto have classroohsreplete
with trainingaids to conduct this training,as well
The battalion chiel of staff has the respon- as cross-trainingin c€rtain skills. Evidenc€sug-
sibility of supervising the training of battalion gests, however, that cross-training is seldom
headquarterspersonnel,His primaryassistantsare practiced and that classroom maintenance in-
the deputy battalioncommanderlor technicalaf- structionis often perfunctory,
fairs, who supervisesthe technical training at
Field maintenancetraining, however,is oft6n
companylevel {the companytechnicalofficer pro-
vides the trainingl, the supply platoon leader mor€ thorough and realistic, DriveFmechanics
(responsiblefor the battalion's materielsupport), and the battalion repak workshop actively par-
ticipate in field training exercisesand have been
and the b6ltalionteld'tl,e/, responsiblefor sanita-
known to take inoperableequipment with thgm
tion and medicaltrainingof battalionpersonnel.
f or r€pakunderfield conditions.
b. Supply
Driver-mechanicstake p€raodic proficiency
The supplyplatoonleaderrrainshrsammuni- tests. Those who do well receive a specialty
tion, POL, and ration personnel.ln the field he is rating and increased pay, These ratings are
primarilyan implementorof his supedors'instruc, transferableto civilian occupations, resuhing in
tions regarding the localions of the battalion better than-average salaries,
distribution points for ammunition, rations, and
POL. and supervisesthe activatiesat these loca- Battalion training for v€hicle operators in-
volves periodic classes on maintenance and
tions,
vehicularcomponenis.The quality ol this iraining
Special supply platoon exercises normally varies widely and in some units is frequently ig-
precedebatralionexercises.While the supply pla- nored. The requiremenls, however, for vehiclo
toon leader may provide input for exercase operatorsto remainwith their vehiclesand assist
maintenancepersonnel in effecting repahs pro-
vides additionalon-the-jobtraining for drivercand
increasesthe driver's mechanicalknowledge.The
difficulty of ke€ping adequatelytrained futl-time
mechanicsis aggrevar€dby the 2-year term of
servic€ in th6 ground forces. l/lost of the
mechanics are 2-year conscripts who often
become proficientjust in time to rotate back to
civilianlife.
The deputy battalioncommanderfor political
affairs recervestraining guidanceand supeNision
from the doputy regimentalcommanderfor poli,
tical affairc. The battalion political officer then
supervisesthe effods of the companypolhjcalof-
ficers. Though political indoctrination is often
presentedby the politicalofiicers at companyand
battalion level, commanders at these echetons
alsopresentpoliticalinstruction.

The primary organizerof modicaltraining at

battalion level is the chief of the regimental
medicalservice.In addition to organizingthe bar- MRB personnel receive up to 4 hours ol
talion's medical Vaining, he also supervjsesit, moral-political training per week. Subject matter
working cfosely with the batlalion feld'she. ano includes the unit history, selected foreign and
histhree-mansection. domestic news items and their impact on the
CPSU and Soviel policies,NATO mehbership
Ar baftalion level. medical training is and policies(wirh heavy emphasison the Unit€d
rudimentaryand stressesfirst aid and evacuation States and West cerrnany), The People's
procedures as well as personal hygiene and Republicof China, and id€ology.The last- men-
sanitation, MRB personnelreceive approximately lioned classeslocus on Nrarxism-Leninism and its
12hoursof medicaltraining peryear. principal"corrupters"-ThePeople'sRepublicof
5. MORAL-POLITICAL TRAINING China,Albania,and occasionally the Yugoslavs,
dependingupon the politicalclimateat the time.
a. Genercl lrovies, usually of World War ll vintage and
which glorityrhe SovietArmy,are often shown.
Hea\,yemphasisis p,acedby the Sov;etson
what they term "moral-polkical"training in order Generalthemeswhich pervadethese l€ctures
to help maintain party control over the armed
forces and to prepare men for the increased
demandsplacedupon them in modernwar ({igure {1) The West, generally described as the
4at. villain, ringed the USSR with hostile alliances,
and forced the peace-lovingWarsaw Pact coun
lroral-political training attempts to ac'
trjes into a strong defensive posture, thereby
complishthe followingtasks: necessitating large defense expenditures. The
{1) Promotesolidarityaround the Communist USSR and irs allieswant peace;Chinaand the
Palty ol the Sovjet Union (CPSU)and supportfor
the obiectivesof the Sovietstate. (2) China, once a peace-loving Socialist
(2) Explainrecent CPSU and governmentac- country like the ussR, is now an enemy of
tivitres,as wellas certaininternationaleven!s. socialismand covetsSovietterrhory.

(3) Increase the discipline and political {3} Warsaw Pact nations are friendly to the
awarenessof personnel. USSR, equal in rights, and voluntarilylinked
politicallyand economicallyto the USSR.
(4) Insure proper understandingof security
proceoures. (4) The eventual decline of the West and
capitalisft and th6 worldwide victory of socialism
{5} Inculcate personnelwhh hatred for the are inevitable.
enemiosoI the USSB.

67

in a Combined
Fisure48.Mora PolilicalTraioing
d. Aftitude Towatd Morcl-Political Trcining
Since the MRE s membershave no accessto
for€i€n publications, lhey are laughl in an in.
tellectual vacuum and are therefore unable to
form objectiveopinionsabout the actual slate ol
affairsabroad. Becauseof these constraints,they
probably believe most of the information pre
sented on foreign affaks, while perhaps being
morc skepticaI about domesticmatters,
For the professional oflicets, pftpotshchiki,
and NCOS,moral-politicaltfaining must be taken
s€riously, since lheir careers depend on b€ing
politicallyaware. For the 2-yeardraftees,many of
whom do not want to serve in the first place, the
attitude is far less lntense, and often depends
upon the topic and the mannerin which the poli-
tical officer pres€nts his lectures. While movies
are usually enjoyed, the stereotypedand all-too-
often repetitious presentation of morafpolilical
lecturss (especiallythose on Marxism-Leninism)
often induces sleep among those forced to at
tend.
6, OFFICER AND NCOTRAINING
Ahhough the Soviet pressemphasizesthe train_
ing oI iunior officers and noncomissionedofficers
(NCOS)within units, the training of NCOSseems
more organizedand formalizod, and with good
rea6on.The SovietNCO is 18-19yearcold lthat
is, the same age as the men he leads),has had 6
months oI specializedNCo training, and linle or
no leadershipexperience.The junior officers have
receivedfar moretrainingpriorto commissioning,
68
ArmsUnil Priortoan Exerose.
Soviet reluctance to del6gate authorhy
manifests itself in the treatment of NCOS.
Evidenceindicatesthat Soviet NCOSare misused
and overlysupervised,In reality,lip serviceis pajd
to the grade of NCO, while more experienc€d
pnpo$hchik and officers carry out NCO as well
as officer duties. [,'loretrainingand a higher NCO
retentionrate (the majorityof NCOSleavethe ser-
vice Lrponcompleringtheir 2-yearservicerequire
ment) may not alleviatethe problemswith NCO
leadership,due to the Soviet penchantfor control
at the highestpossiblelevel.
ln keepingwith Sovietbel;efin commandand
control centralizedat the high€st level practical,
much of the baftalionofficer and NCO training is
conducted by regiment. This is particulaflytrue
regardingthe officers and NCOSof the battalion's
communications,mortar, and rear service units,
as w€ll as the politicaloff icers.
Training is provided through methodological
training cources, independentstudy, and exer-
cises conducted by omnipresent senior com-
mandeE. The training is very detailed, even for
the most basic subjects.Ouite often the training
precedesdrilland trainingexercises,
Company commanders and platoon leadeE
tlain their NCOs. In some units companyfirst
sergoants receive leaderchip training Ovice a
month. BattalionlevelNCO trainingis conducted
aboutoncea month,
 Section D - Battalion Tactical Training
1. COMMAND AND CONTROL allocatedto the MR companiesin order to pro-
vide company commandorsand platoon leaders
In the field, all available
meansof communica- with combinedarmsexperience.
tions are used to insurecentralizedcommandand
control at the highest level possibleand also to Tactical drills repeatedlypracticed include the
insure command and control if a command post march, the meeting engagement,water-crossing
is "knockedout." operations,negotiationof min€Ii€lds,antiair (with
increasing emphasis on antihelicopter tactics)
Battalion operationsare conducted under th€ defense,and operationsin an NBC envhonment,
close supervisionof the regimentalcommander, The battalion may also receive helibornetraining
This supervision is such that on occasion the (at least one battalionper l,'lRD is trainedto con-
regimentalcommander will bypass his battalion duct heliborne operationsl. Combat in cities,
commandersand give orderc to thek subordinat€ whilenot particularlystressed,is practiced.
companies.Battalioncohmanders, ofren bypass-
ing their subordinalecommandersto give orders During defensiveexercises,the battalion com-
to individual vehicle commanders, exercise the manderalso practiceswith combinedarms group-
samedegreeof supervision. ings, H€ may also receivemore engineersuppo(
to help his unit dig in, and to place minefieldsand
2. FREOUENCY OFTRAINING
The lvlnB in a high readinessstatus conductsa Over the past 3 or 4 years,there has been more
minimum of two battalionfield training exercises emphasis on dismounted attacks and on air
of at least 2 days' duration per year. A battalion gfound support,primarilyby FLOGGERDs and
could be involvedin as many as six field exercises the HIND assaulthelicopter.Air support seemsto
(two battalion,two as part of the regiment,and
be largely preplannedand primarilyemployeclon
two as part of the division)a year. a division'sprimarydirectionof attack, in suppo(
3. FIELDTRAININGEXERCISES of a river crossing, and in support of heliborne
operations.
Battalionfield training concentratesprimarilvon
offensivecombat with combinedarms groupi;gs. L;veJire exercisesand demonstrationsand ex-
Normaltv.the battationcommanderwi have;r- tensive use of field training aids are also
tachedtanks 6nd anillery,in support, Air defense, characteristic
of battalionexercises'
chemical,and engineerunits are provided as re-
quired (figure 4!')- Anachments may be funher

Fisu.e49.Combin€d
ArmsCombat

69
 Section E - Evaluation of Battalion Tnining
1. STRENGIHS While technicallywell trained, Soviet battalion
and company commandersoften fail to exploit
With the caveatthat the quantitYand quality of ths strong points of their men and €quipment in
battalion field training varies considsrablyin the lield situations.They experienceproblemswhen
Soviet Army, those banalionsin a high readiness tacedwith the unexDected.
statussDenda lot of time on practicalexercises.
ln at least one afea there is a cle€r discreoancv
Battalionfi6ld training stressesoffensive com- beoveenwhat is suoDosedto be done and what
bat with combinedarms groupingsand is, for the is actuallydone. Doctrinally,the Soviersmaintain
most part, consistentwith soviel doclrine, which that night time and other condi{ons of reduced
envisions high rates of advanca bY combined visabilityare no impediment to operations. Bat-
arrhs units in both nuclearand nonnuclearsitua- talions are accordingly supposed to conduct
tions. The critical transitionbetw€sn nuclearand about 4{) percentof their firing and tactical exer-
nonnuclear operations is panicularly stressed. cises at night. During their field vaining, bat-
Though often st€reotypedand repetitious, bat- talions often use the night to preparofor daylight
talion training stressesfundament6lsand r€sults exercises; that is, they conduct 6dministrative
in €ffectivebattledrill. moves by road to position men and suppliesfor
Battalionotficers must be consideredpolhically an anack th€ next day. Night firing is conducted,
rsliableand well trained in the technical asp€cts but 6ctual tactical training involvingcross-country
oftheirtrade. movement aooears to be seldom conducted,
When it is, vehicle headlighlsand flashlightsere
2. PROBLEMAREAS often used as orientationaids, despitea variety of
exc6llsntnightvisiondevicesin the battalion.
Battalionand company-levelofficers are havang
problemscoordinatingl R-tankattacksand effec- These problem are€s must be w€ighed wirhin
tiv€ use of lhe BMP. Frequently, tanks out the context of Soviet doctrinal concepts. Rigid
distancetheh lvlR support or the MR troops will and stereotvDeddrills do t6ach basic fundamen-
dismount too far to the rear to adequately sup- tals, but when combined with centralizedcontrol
pon the tanks. In addhion to these tactical pro- at the highest level and lack ot inidariveat the
blems, the Sovietsare still trying to deiermine op lower levels, will probably initially result in high
timumemolovment of the BMP. casu6lties. lt should be noted, however, that
quantitiative superiority has often outweighed
qualitativesuperiorityin pastcampaigns,

70
 CHAPTER7. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEBATTALIONIN COMBAT
Section A - Offensive Operations
.I, FOBMATIONS km/hr. lf tanks, and aftilleryare attached,the
^ averagespeedtor day marchesis 20 to 30 km. hr
The three basic formations used by the s o u ' e I a t n i g h r I. 5 t o 2 0 k m / h r .
ground forcesare lhe march, approach
and combatformations. The interual between vehicles is up to 50
meters during road movement and 50 to 10O
The march is organizedto insure high speed meters during tactical cross-countrymovement,
and rapid unit deploymentinto the approach Both the interval and the speed ot the vehicles
march and combat formations. lt involves iask- are increasedwhen crossinga contaminatedarea
organizedunils. This lormation is used when con- orwhenunderairattack,
tact with an intact enemy force is not imminenl,
to penetrategaps in enemydefenses,and to con- Contfol measuresalong the route of advance
duct the exploitationand pursuit. includeinitialstart pointsand easilyrecognizable
conrrol(phase)lines(tigure51). The numberand
When contact whh lhe enemy is imminent, spacing ol these control measuresis dependent
Soviet units deploy from the march to the ap- upon the lengthof the march,the conditionof
proach march formalronrtha( is, d'visionsize the roads,and the weather-Comm!nications dur-
units deploy successively into regimental-, ing the marchare accomplished by messengers,
battalion-, and company-sizeformations, Thes€ fiags,andradio(whenphaselinesarecrossed).
formations are dispersedlaterally,in depth, and
with meansof reinforcement. They may be in ln a motorizedmarch, hahs of up to 30 minutes
line, echelon(right or left), wedge, or inverted occurevery2 to 3 hours.Dufingthe secondh6lf
wedge. While possibleto penetratedisrupted or of a motorizedmarch, a long halt of 2 to 4 hours
overly extendeddefensesin the approachmarch is held. Such long halrsare not held at night so
formation, Soviet units will deploy into combar as to make maximum use of the hours of dalk-
formation10overcomestrongerdefenses, ness. During sho( halts, distances between
vehiclesin column formationare not changed;
The combat formation is formed when Soviet men and vehiclesmaintainthe propermarch in-
columns deploy into lanearformations echeloned iervals. Ouring long halts, vehiclesare dispersed
in depth. These formations include first and se' andcamouflaged (figure52).
cond echelons, reserves(combined arms, tank,
eng;neer. chem'cal). and arlille,y groupings The Soviets divide the march into two distinct
Should the attack be successtul, Soviet units elements:the movementorganization and march
would redeploy into march tormation for more security. Movement organizationis designed to
rapidconductof the pursuitandexploitation. insurehigh speed,rapidcombatdeployment. and
effective control. Tanks and artillery are usually
2, THE MARCH toward the front, and antiakcraft weapons are
The Sovietsdescribethe march as an organized distributed throughout thecolumn(s).
troop movementconductedin column formations All-roundsecurityis providedduringthe march
on roads or crosscountry {figure 50). Troops are lfigure53) to insureuninterrupted movement,to
trainedto be ready for action at any time. ll prevent surpnse attack, lo keep enemy recon-
possible, the march is conducted at night or
naissanceunits from observing the main body,
under conditionsof limited visibility.The speedal and to create the most favorableconditions for
which the marchis conducteddependson many deploymentof the main body in a meeting
factors: enemy, terrain, weather, makeup of the engagement,Advance, flank, and rear guard
column, condition of vehicles,the level of driver units insureall-roundsecurityduringthe march,
rrarnrng,erc. In addition, stationary flank outposts often oc-
Averagespeedslor a EiMPequipppedbattalion cupy crilicaltefiainunrilthe main body has pass-
by day are 30 to 40 km/hr and by night and dur ed.
ing other conditions of limited visibility 25 to 30
7I
RECONTIAISSANCEPATROL coM Arlo TANXCO.HQ zndMRCt) 3rdMRCC)
PATROL VEHICLE
(l{itu! r 6lly) 2ndTt/2nc
Anihry S.ltrlioi Cnn.f d.r
-al-!'D. Flrrr( SECURIw

Ord.rota Moioriz€d
Fiture50.TactlcalMarch RitloB.ttalion.
 I
C.N'R.LL,,E,
*)T#'l
.iial;;

I
_t I

KEY
-<nto=!!r ihhdsandanFiyinna(h.o|uhn

NOTES

fte 'nnd Ii. {p.rnr)B sh.rld on in esit l4nu.br. r.rrn ralqE lnd r a drEneton rhe.snbt '6 *hi.h.Rhl.! r". MRBro becif'he mrd dn

conrorrii.s lporfc) &r s:dd.d on e6it ft.oenabb r.rm raru'.

Dunn.lhon h.hr r. 6luh. r0r6d

Freure51.ControlM€asL,r€5
OunngiheMarch.
 4

Fiaures2. Vehicresare
oispereedandCanoulagedDunns
LonsHatts

74

_-
 -..{-qU ,/--,-.-J€r{iai\
--''-:: -- -

i;k1
*?$"-?
:'tr\
'.*:

56rd

XEY

-<tt|o=!lu nddd d]. b.r.ron .aird4. b anks:nd anirLt 'n 6nh .olcn.

"<-lto=!'o MordEd iir. @iprny'.'irorc.d b

+ug'

rl}rl$ltlr. .r.nk 'ont D6id3.n bEh.d bt

5-6d Ir.d n'n r.rd (rn.p.6 r .nd t.rtu*)

NOTES

99.0v'd.dbyil3o*iadrl'*'dd.la.hn.n[slouiby.4'n.d
sr d by h€h.r isdqurn .i
Aftd,ed ;"s*a ..lrns !lm. d 'i

FiSure53-S€or.ityDur;nttheMarch.
3. ORGANIZATIONFORCOMBAT preparepersonneland equipment,designationof
security elem€nts, information regarding attach-
Based upon METT, the regimentalcommander ments,and the time and locationfor receiving the
allocates tank, artillery, air defense, antitank,
engineer, and chemical units to his battalions. (3) The regimentalcommander'smarch order
Battalion commandersthen organize their units
to his battalioncommanderincludes:
for the march. Whenever feasible, attachments
aremadepriortothe march, .. Informationon enemyand friendlyforces,

Becausg of the need to act decisively and -. Topographica I data,

I and met€orologica
quickly, and because the meeting engagement
- The mission.
may be conducted against a force equal io or
greater then their own, Soviet battalion com- -- Executionof the mission {start time and
manders normally place attached tank, anillery,
location, coded referenceand control points,
and antitank forces near or at the head of their
securityinformation,and coordination).
marchformation.
-- Administration
andlogistics
data.
4. MOVEMENTTOCONTACT
-' Comm6ndand signalinformation.

(4) AftEr reading th€ regimental com-

(ll For ihe march, rhe MRB may be given
mander's march order, the ba[alion commander
the missionof advanceor flank guard, forward or
completeshis €stimateof the situationand deter'
rear detachment, or be designated part of the
mines:
mainbody of the regiment.
- Column formation and composition of
{2} As the regiment's advance or flank secuntye|ements,
guard, the MRB has the mission of insuring the
uninterruptedmovement and the security of the - Actions to be conducred by security
main body. lt must also prevent enemy recon- elementsand the main body where contact
naissanceelementsfrom reachingthe main body, with the enemyis possible.
and most importantof all, insurefavorablecondi-
-- use ofattachments,
tionsfor the mainbodytod€ploy.
(3) When acting as a forward detachment, - NBC, air d€fence,and cover and conceal-
the MRB has the mission of conducting recon- ment measures,
naissanceor to seizeand hold koy terrainuntil the (5) The battalion commandef and his stafl
arrivalofthe mainbody.
then draw up the march order. Since recon-
b. Planning the March naissanceof the route is usually impossible,the
battalion commander makes a detailed map
(1) The lvlRB commandef and his chief of analysis of the terrain through which his unit
staff begin planningfor ihe march after receivhg must pass. Prio. to issuing the combat ordef to
a regimentalwarning order. The battalion com" his unit, lhe battalioncommanderhas his march
mander studies the mission, briefs his chief of orderapprovedby the regimentalcommander.
staff and technicaldeputies,calculatesmovement
tables (or directs h;s chief of staff to do so), and {6) The march order is a highly detailedplan
issu€s{throughthe chief of staffl a warning ordar in which the battalion commander attempts to
to his subordinate elements. The IIRB com- toresee and pre'plan for actaonswith the enemy
mander meets his attached artillery commander along the march route. and to control the actions
and coordinateshis movement plan with the ar- of his subordinatecommandersas much as possi-
tilleryfire plan. ble. Along with the regimentalorder, the MRB'S
march order forms the basis for the battalion
(2) The battalioncommander'swarning order command€r's combat order to his subordinate
to his unit describesthe conditionsunder which elements.Tho narch order states the battalion's
the march will be made, its l6ngth, actions lo mission, control measures,command and signal
16
 instructions, the informationlistedin paragraph c, Commandand Contrcl
4.b.{4)above,and detailedinstructions to each
(l ) The battalioncommander and the attach-
subordinaleunit on actionsto be taken in the
event of enemy action at the most critical points ed artilery commander are normally locatedwell
along the march route. This detajledapproach forward in the march, either with the advance
detachment (when the battalionacts as the ad-
often becomesmechanicalin nature and is indi
cative of the battalion commander's efforts to vanceguard of the regiment)or at the head of
controlthe actionsof his companycommanders. the battalion's main body. His posltion with the
He not only tellsthem what to do, but when and advancedetachmentenableshim to best observe
how to do it. When the "enemy" does the unex- enemyaction,formulatehis plans,and deployhis
pected, Soviet companycommandersoften fail to unit.
(2) To controlhis unit duringthe marchthe
The battalionmarch order gives the regirren- battalion commander relies upon messenger,
tal commander as to whetheror fl€gs, traffic controllers,and to a lesserdegree,
a clearindication
generallystays on radio
not his orderwas understood. Once the regimen. radio. While the battalion
listening watch, the passingof phaselinesand
tal commander has confirmed the [,'lRB com-
mander's march order, the latter is then free to othercheckpoints are reportedby radio.NBC and
issue verbal combat orders (which are recorded airwarnings are also transmitted by radio.
fof the record by the battalion chief of staff) to d. Canductofthe March
hissubordinateelements,
(1) The march is controlledas tightly as
{7) The verbal combat order from the N,4RB possible,with the starting times, passageof con-
commander to his unit commandefs is a combina- trol points, and the speedand spacingof vehicles
tion of data defivedfrom the regimentalorder and rigidlysupervised. lf a vehiclefalls out due to
the battalioncommander'smarch plan. lt in' recrncal diificdlty,rhe commander or drivergives
the designated signal to prevent following
-- Enemyandfriendlyforces. vehiclesfrom slowingdown. lf the vehiclecan be
.epai'edby rhe crew and/or tf'e baitalionmain-
- Themission. tenancesection, it will rejoin the column, resum-
ing its corect place at a designatedrest a.ea;
-- Detailed instruction for each of the bat
otheMise the vehicle will be evacuatedby regi'
talion'ssubordinare elemenls,coordinating in-
structions, actions upon enemy contact and i2) Gorges. b.idges, builtup areas, riveF
antiaircraft
andNBCdefense. crossing points, and other such potentially
- Command andsignal. hazardousareas for the column are crossed
without haltingand at maximumspeed.Special
- Logisticsdetails. eifort is made to bypassbuilt up 6reas.Attached
engineefsuppon, usually part of the combat
(8) often, however,the battalioncommander patrol when the battalionacts as
reconnaissance
must organizethe march under more difficult cir- the advanceguard of the regiment,supervisesthe
cumstances. Duringthe defense,for example,he removalof obstacles,
may oe assigneda counterattackmissionbv regi
ment or division,and may have considerablyless (3) During shon halts, the column halts in
time to plan for the march and meeting engage- order and at intervalsestablishedin the battalion
ment, His actions are accordinglyabbreviated. He commander's order, Crews of air defense
is aided in rapid dissem;nationof orderc by his weaponsand des;gnaiedair seniriesremainon
communicationsnet, which includeseveryvehicle alert.
in the battalion; therefore, data concerning the
(4) During long halts, companiesdisperseto
enemy and the mission passed to the battalion
preparedto move out on
commanderon his frequencywould not have to asslgnedareas,but are
be relayed individuallyto platoon and company short notice, These areas are selectedto take ad-
commanders, vantage of natural tefiain features for protection

77
against nuclear weapons. Hot food is prepared glovss in addition to their masks. lf it is not f6asi-
whilethe menchecktheireouipmentand res ble to bypassa contaminatedzone, the battalion
passesthroughas quicklyas possible.
(5) Higher headquartersor an elementwithin
the MRB m6y inform the battalioncommanderof Personnel exposed to loxic agents b6gin
approachingenemy aircraft. The battalion'sreac- preliminarytreatmenl immecliately;equipmenl is
tions dopend upon the terrain it is ini if cover is decontaminated when decontamination Doints
sufficient along the route oI march, the battalion can be established.
halts and attemDts to conceal itself {rom aerial
(7) Actions taken during the march by bat-
observation; othelwise. vehicles increase their
speod, lengthenthe intervalbetweenvehiclesand talion peFonnel reacting to a nuclear attack de
€ngage the aircraft with every availableweapon, pend upon the status of the battalion{wherherit
to include attachedair defenseweapons, organic is moving or in a rest area, and in the latter case,
SA-7s {figure 54), tank machineguns,and small whether personnelare mounted or dismounted),
arms. ATGMS mountedon the BMP may be used and the time of day, and the location of the
against attacking helicopters.At night, vehicular nuclear burst. For example, if during movement
night vision devicesare used, and porsonnelfire the battalionis alertedto a nuclearburst upwind,
at enemy aircraft only on order of their company personnelwould don protectiv€gear and increase
or battalioncommander. speed in an effort to cross as rapidly as posslble
that section of the route threatened by radio
(6) NBC reconnaissanceis conducted con activhy; if the battalionis "nukod" during rhe halt
tinuously throughout the column (figure 55). and personnelare outside thejr vehicles,p€rsonal
Although warning of an NBC attack normally is proteCtivemeasuresafe taken, After the snocK
recelvedfrom higher headquanersover the NBC weve passes,protectiveeqLlipmentis put on and
warnang net, the bafialion commander may re- aid provided to casualties,The battalion com-
ceivs biological/chemicalwarnings from attached mander assessesthe damage, attempts to re-
chemicalpergonnel{dosimetersare organacto the establishcontact whh subordinatesand regiment,
battalion as are peBonnel trained in monitodng and issuesorders for rescueand recoveryopera-
NBC eff6cts). When the battalionacts as the ad- tions, As a rule, the aftereffects of a nuclear
vance guard of the regiment, attached chemical strike are deah with by the battalioncommande/s
personnelfrom the regimenralchemical defense own resou.ces. lf the banalion sustains heaw
company are normally located with the recon- casualties,it is reolaced,
naissancepatrol. Contaminat6dareasa.e marked
accordingly{figure56). e. Temination of the March

NBC warnings are transmittedat once using By properly organizing and conducting the
all availablecommunicationsmeans. Personnelin m8rch, the battalion commandersets the stag€
clossd vehiclesput on their gas masks, while all for the meeting engagement,the first phase of
othe6 put on protective capes, leggings and destroyingthe enemy'sforces,

FiSure54.SA'TGunners
AreTheMotorized
RitleBattalionConmandefsPrimaryMeansol Ai D€lense.

78
 ta

il
r'
\

.rdf:
' : , .f \

NBCReconnaissance lsConduciedby Motorized

RrlleBattalionAsseisandlorby BRDM.
EquippedSpecialistslrom
ReEiment.

5. THE MEETINGENGAGEMENT

a. Chancteistics
The meeting engagementis describedby the
Sovietsas combat beNveentwo rapidlyadvancing
columns, resultingin an intensestruggledesigned
to seize and maintain the initiative. The rapidly
changing situation, the presence of gaps and
open flanks, and freedom of maneuverallow the
more able and aggressivecommanderto defeat
forces of equal and even superior strength. In-
complete intelligence regarding the enemy's
forces is no excusefor the Soviet battalioncom-
mander,who is trained to anticipatethe meeting
engagementat likely locations along his march
route. The meeting engagement(figure 57) may

- In a surpriseattack when the enemy is at-

tempting to occupy forward defensive posi-
tions.
-. During a breakthroughwhen approaching
enemyreservesate €ncounteted.
Figure56.Chemica
I PersonnelMarkinEa Contaminated - Duringthe pursuit.
79
 - In the defeGive. when a counterattack ig
orderedtodestrcy an €nemypenetration,
To achigvesucce$ in the meoting engagement,
the Soviots str€ss:
ryF
- Contintlousreconnaissancg,
t <r-'*o=!E
- lmmediate reEctions of battalion com-
manders.
**:
- Beatingthe enemy to the punch with fire 'd
lH>- ,
<{ei
and maneuver.
- Well-organized
combatsupport.
-\5.,n
.,',j.,.,
--
b, Objective

The objective of the meeting engagemgntis

* E
the destruction of the engmy's forces and con-
tinuation oI thg march, or the seizureof terrain tt
which will insure {avorableconditionsfor subse-
quent oparations.From the point of contact, the
depth of the objectivecould theo.eticallybe up to
8 kilometers, the length {computed by the
Sovietsl of an snemy battalion column in march
Iormation, In actuality,the depth of the objectivg
would probably be l6ss. as en€my lorces would
^*tP;
C IN ]HE DEFTHSOFIH€
ENETiVOEFENSES
be moving rapidly forward upon contact. lf it is
unable to achieve this objectivs, the advancs
guard of the regimentis raskedwith delayingthe
largestpossibleenemy fo.ce, and giving th€ rest
4
_<t/4
oI the r€gimentthe time and intolligencedata ro
enableh to enter the battle offectively.

c, Commandand Contol
=u$rf n
The battalion, acting as th6 regiment'6 ad- D COUXIERAIT^CXOT N €NEMYPENNR^TION
vance guard, operatas5 ro 10 kiloneto6 ah€adof
th6 rcgimontal main body. The battalion com- KEY
mander c€nnol be as tighrly supervised as is -<ttltOavu
Moronz.de reg'n.ii,nfl,..h o uhn
usually the case. Moreover, the {luid, dyn€mic "
nature of the meeting engagement imposes addi-
-<{lO+Eo
tional st€in on the battalioncommanderin his ef-
forti to contrcl the actioni of his subordinates.
The increasingmobility of his {orces and those of .<+owo 6nFry€nrorced bvbls h
Hlghusr,iif
the enemv continuallvreducethe limited amount
of time a commands has to organizga rneoting
engagement,
F€u'e 5 7 Cond't|ons
Leading
to a M€t in8l-ngaBemen
I
Once contacl has been made, radio is the
primary m6ans of control. Instructions by the bat-
talion commanderare. ol n€cessity,bri€f, Tactics
are based on well-rehealsed battle drill.

80
 d. Conduct ot the Meeting Engagement mally a(acks molnted, with tanks precedinqthe
MR troops and supponed by artilleryand mortar
(1, Initialstage
fire. Should enemy antitankfire be heavy,the
The meeting engagementcommenceswhen MRB would attackdismounted.When attacking
the advanceguard's advancedetachmentclashes dismounted,the infantry attempts to stay within
with enemy security forces {figure 58). The ad- 200 meterc of the tanks in order to render effec-
vance detachmentattemptsto destroythe enemy rivemutuarsuppo(, BMPssupporrthe arror- in
and continue its mission, or, ;f forced on the fantry atack by fire. lf antitankfhe is exceptional
deleneveby a sup€riorenemy,to hold,ts posi. ly strong, attached tanks would stay back with
tion and supportthe attackby the mainbody. the B[{Ps and support the attacking djsmounlecl
infantryby fire.
(2) Deployment
The final deploymentline is selectedas close
The battalion commande.moves forward as as possibleto the enemy in order to reduce his
quickly as possible, makes an estimate of the opponun;tyfor using nuclearweapons,Whenever
situation, and issues o.ders to his attached ar- possible,a concealedapproachto the deployment
tilleryto supportthe advancedetachment,The lineis used.
artillerydeploysfrom the march, supportsthe ad
vance detachm€ntby {ire, and preparesto sup' Specificattack fiontagesdependupon [rETT
pon the deploymentand attack of the main body. and whether nuclear or nonnuclearconditions
Havingformulatedhis plan, the lvlRBcommander prevail, In a nonnuclearsituationand whh two
gives any necessarychanges regarding aftach companies in the first echelonand one acting as
ments and orders lhe deploymentof h's unit second echelon or reserve,the battalionfrontage
Normally, he attacks in one echelon, retaining would be about 1 kilometer.Undernuclearcondi-
one or t1]voplatoonsin reserva,To facilitaterapid tions, ihe frontage would be about 2 kilometers.
resupplv, th€ battalion rear se.vice elementsare When all three companies attack abreast, these
moved well torward. The banalion commander's frontages wolrld be increased wilh the following
coordinating instructions
include: guidelines; in nonnuclear conditions, 500 meters
-- Missionof the advancedetachmentof the per company front with 200 meters lateralinterval
guard, between companies; under nuclear conditions,
advance
800 meters per company front and 4O0 to 500
-- Artillery (to include mortar) fire suppo( metersbetweencompanies,
plan.
Ierarn restraintsmay 1oi allow t\e bar
-. Sequenceof deploymentfof the tank and tarions subele.nents to atack on l;nejcompanies
tulRunits. a.e accordinglyecheloned{right, left) or anack in
- Combined wedge lormation.The attack is developed,nto
armscoordination. the depths of the enemy formation as rapidly as
- Coordinaronsignals(madeorigrnally prior possible. Thereis no moppingup of smallenemy
to rhe march, they a.e given last minute groups; this task is handled by the regimental
refinement), mainbody.

The regimentalcommanderis notified of his {4) Termination

advance guard commander's plans for the
meeting engag€ment,and supports him with ar-
tillerytireswhen within range.
(31Theattack
In most fteeting engagements,the enemy
may not have had time to properly preparethe
terrain, to create a complete fire plan, or to
deploy his antitank weapons. In order to take
maximum advanlageof these factors, as well as
the characterisricsof the BN4P,the battalionnor
8l-
The meeting engagementat battalion level
terminateswhen the enemy has been destroyed,
lorced to retire, or when the fu1RBhas to assume
the defensive.In the first two situationsthe lrRB
resumes lhe march or launches pursuit opera-
rions. lf forced on the defensive,the battalionat-
tempts to inflict maximum casualtiesand buy
rirnefor ihe regimertto dep'oy.ln the l6nercase,
the advance guard l\rRB supports the attack of
the mainbodybyfire.
 -<FO=.ro -<-Htc=!ro

d*a y rtrc$ 13 rm, It pdrcts rclr 'he ad%(e ddadhe

i k|*P
qip# / -*<---*-;t ,'
;;Q.1f
" t :i''\.
/ abn"-n,

<+O-ud

**+". "t

KEY

<#A=!o

<#a_TU silo t
(9
""-^,..,,.",,,."
.-da=ou "" *-
ff!,';f'iif "f,1i3;"' @
Mofr bareq (r2omn)dn ihe

F gure54.A Rerntorced
Motori2ed
RrlleBzttalio.Conductinga
MeelinCEngageme
nt

82
6. THE BREAKTHROUGH positions. The [,4R8's subsequentobjective en-
compassesenemy reservesto a depth of up to 4
a- Characteistics kilomelers from the FEBA.ln nuclearoperations,
the MRB's immediate objective is up to 2,500
The Soviers only reluctantly conduct
meters; its subsequent objective is up io I
breakthroughoperations,preferringinsteadto ex-
ploit gaps in the defensesand defeat the enemy kalometers,
in a series of meeting engagements. Break-
through operationsare often time-consumingand
attritional. They are conducted against three
lypes of defensesrhasty, positional,and fortified.
The hasty defenseis the easiestto bre6chsince il
lacks closelycoordinatedfire and obstacleplans.
The difference between positional and fonified
defensesis on€ of degree, with the latter being
better prepared,more complex, in greaterdepth, f ' B L a 5 9 S o v r e'rr g u r e rl o r N A r O O e i e r s r v e
Dosrlors

and therefore more difiicult to breach. Whether

or not nuclearweaponsare employedalso affects c. Oryanization fot Combat
Soviet attack frontagesand formationsin a break
lhrough operation. When nuclear weapons are The Sovietsachievedesiredsuperiorityin men
employed,they are directedagainstthe strongest and equipmentfor the breakthroughby concen-
pan of the defense,throughwhich the attacking trating (for a relativelysho( period of time) on a
force proceeds as rapidly as possible, often in na.row frontage. The N4RBis heavily reinforced
battalioncolumns.Thus,in nuclearconditions the with up to two tank companies,one or more ar-
breakthroughmay more closely resemblea pur rrlery battalions,a platoonof combai engineers
suit, since nuclear and other weapons of mass {equippedwith flame throwers, obstacle-clearing
destructioncan so disrupt defensesthat units in equipment,etc), and a.chemicaldetachment, As
column formation may penetrate them, When describedin chapler 2. when aftacking on a l-
nonnuclearconditionsprevail,large amountsof kilometerffontage,the [4RB commandercould
conventionalartilleryare concentratedto support have 60 100 moriar and artille.y tubes in supporl
th€ breakthrougheffort, which is usuallydirect€d (fisure@).
at theweakest pointin theenemy'sdefenses,
d. Aftack Frcntagesand Fomations
The breakthrough,regardlessof the type of The l,4RBmay attack as part of the regimenfs
defenseit is directedagainst.attemptsto concen- lirst or second echelon. As part of the first
trate numericalsuperiorityin men and equipmenl echelon, it normally attacks with three heavily
on a narrow sector, whalepressureis maintained reinforcedcompanies:two in the first echelon{or
alongnonbreakthrough sectorsas well. with all three companies in the first echelon
b. Objective against a hasty defense)attacking on a frontage
of about 1,000 meters, and one in the second
The objectiveof the breakthroughis threefold: echelon (reserve).lf the enemy's defenses,par-
to split and dispersethe €nemy'sdefense,to con- ticularly his antitank defenses, have been sufti-
duct the pursuit, and to completethe destruction ciently neutralized, the battalion would attack
ol enemy forces. The assigned depth of the mounted''otherwise dismounted. lvlETT deter-
lvlRB'simmediateand subsequentobjectivesis, in minesthe batalion formation,althoughfor con-
part, based upon Soviet calculations of NATO trol purposes,an attack on line is preferredover
defenses {figure 59), and on whether or not echelon{left, right) formations.
nuclearweaponsare used. In nonnuclear opera-
tions, the MRg is assignedan immediateobjec-
tive of 1,000to 1,500 meters;that is, a distance
just beyond the depth of the enemy's fomard
defending companies but short of h;s reserve

83
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NOTES

^s ldep(h iuhbeE or weapois ro be nedffed erl

Fieure60Art lerySupportlorFlrstEchelonBattalions
in TheBreaklhrough.

84
 e. Attack Planning - Antiaircraftdefense,

Whether he is attacking from the march ol Othertypesofsupport.

through friendly forces in close contact with the
enemy, the battalion commander performs l. Commandand Contrcl
thesameplanning
basically tasks: The battalion commander exercises control
personallyand through his chief of staff, and at
Analyzes
the mission,
all times is supposedto be within 500 meters of
- Disseminates
thewarningorder. his firct echelon. The battalion chief of staff is
located with the battaiion commander.When an
- lvlakesan estimat€of the situation,
artilleryunit isattached to the MRB, the artillery
- Conducts reconnaissance,lwith suoor- commanderwill normallyaccompanythe l\rRB
dinatecommanderswheneverpossible), commandef; the mortar battery commanderwill
also be close by, while forward obseNers ifrom
-- Formulates
hisplan. the attached artillery) will accompany the first-
echeloncompanies,When the MRB leavesthe
- Checkshjs plan with the regimental
com- assemblyarea,the battalioncommander,with the
attachedartilleryand mortar batterycommanders,
- lssuesthe attackorder, is located where he can best control his unit.
Companyand platoonleadersare at the headof
-- Supervisespreparations. their respective elements. Guides are also
employed to insure speed and aid in control of
- Notifies the regimentai commander of
the battalion.
readrnessstatus,
Though rad;o is the primary means of control
The battalioncommanderrs plan, while not in in the atlack, flags, flares, and messengersare
NATO format, covers basicallythe same informa
tion.
The command post (CP) is located on terrain
-- Enemyandf riendlysituation.
from which the commandermay best observethe
attack. The CP is rarely moved ouring a
counterattack,upon commitment of the reserve,
- Firesupport. dufing a transitional phase(i.e., switchingfiom
the attack to the defense),or during heavyenemy
- Readiness
time (for the battalionattack).
'' Command
andsignalinstructions. g. Breakthtough frcm the March
-- Resupply.
Normally,when the MRB, acting as pan of
It is given orally and recorded by the battalion the regiment, attempts a breakth.oughfrom the
chief of staf{. After the order is given, sup- march, it will first occupy an assemblyarea to
plementaryinstructionsare issued.These instruc make final preparationsfor the assault. When
properly chosen, the assembly area provides
tionsare highlydetailed, and involveeveryaspect
of the operation: dispersion,offers security from enemy observa-
tion and fke, and makes it more possible to
-' lvlutualsupport. achievesurprise,
- Politicalwork. Attempting a breakthroughfrom the march
entails strict coordination of deployment times
- Reconnaissance,
with nuclear and/or conventional fire support,
- ProtectionagainstNBCweapons. engineersupport, and movement control, lt may
also be conductedthrough forces in contact, thus
- Reafservice
support, involving a passageof lines. This type of opera-
tion involvesextensivecoordinationwith the unit
to be passedthrough.
85
 In addition to METT, the determinanrfor the lvlR troops follow tanks through br6aches
battalion's attack frontage is the nec€ssity to made in minefields(figure 63) and lh€n d€ploy in
cr€areth€ requiredsuperiofityin men and eqLrip- line behindthe tanks and assaultthe enemy'sfor-
m€nt from the enemy FEBA all the way to the ward positions. The actions of th€ battalion
battalion'ssubsequentobjective.The deprh of the change most dramatically after th€ fowvard
batlalion's immediateand subsequentobjectiv€s delenses have been breached. Tank supported
also vari€s according to lvlETT; under nuclear first-€cheloncompaniesattempt to exploit suc-
conditions,these objectivesare deeper than dur- cessand widen the gaps in th€ defens€sas rapid-
ing conv6ntionaloperations. ly as possible. Efforts are made to prevent the
enemy from re€stablishinghis defenses,or wath-
The MRB'Sformation also deoendson lllETT. drawing in an orderly fashion. Strongpoints
Line formationis usuallyused in open terrainand establishedin the depth of the defenses are
when the enemy FEBA is comparativelystraight. bypassedwheneverpossible.
The line formation allows maximum firepower to
the front and facilitatescommandand control. ln The reinforcedsecond-echelon{rcseru€}com-
other 6ituations, the battalion commander may pany would be committed to aid a faltsring fkst-
gchelon (right or left) his companies.The w6d9e echelon unit, to exploit the success ot th€ first
is commonly used in the depth of the enemy's echelonby continuingthe attack into the depths,
d€f€n6es,after the breakthfoughhas been achiev- or to dealwitha counterattack.
ed, Norrnallythe battalionattacksfrom the march h. Brcakhrcugh frcm a Position in Close
mount€d in BlvlPs,althoughenemyfire may force Contact
a dismounted of "mixed" attack. In the latter
case, part of the l\4RBfights from BMPS,whjl€ Factors increasing the complexities of this
the oth€rpan tightsdismounted. type of attackare:

When the MRB leavesthe assemblyarea, il
moves as rapidlyas possibleto the enemy FEBA,
and deploys according to the regimental com-
mander's order. Guidelinefigures are rhat bat-
talions deolov into columns I to 12 kilonelers
Irom the FEBA; companiesform columns4 to 6
kiloh6ters lrom the FEBA, and platoonsI % to 4
kilom€tersfrom the FEBA. Squads form assaull
linEs as close as possibl€to the enemy lusually
within 300 to 1,000 meters of the FEBA-s6e
figure61).
A 30-45minute anillery preparationis planned
to inflict maximum damage on the defender up
unlil the time lhat the assaultline is reached;ar-
tillery and monar fires are then shifted into the
d€oths of the enemv's defenses. Ereachssare
madEthrough minefieldsby a combinationof ar-
tillery fire, ranks, and s:rppers.Tanks {equipped
with KMT-4 mine olows and KMT-5 mine .oller
assemblieslof the leading battalion in the main
attack, with supporting infantry and sapperc,
clear one path per attacking platoon (three per
company). BTR-50 PKs. hurling explosive line
charg€s, clear paths several meters wids and a
few hundred meters long, and are supplemented
by sappersarmed with the UZ seriesof bangalore
torpedoes{figure 62}, each of which can clear a
lan€2-to 3"meterswide.
86
- The constant threat of nuclear and conven-
taonalfire, nedessitatingthe dispercalol person-
nel- Assault positions must, thereforc, be only
brieflyoccupied.
-- The difficulty of concealing attack prepara-
tions; elaboraterusesmust be devisedto achieve
- The threat of suddenenemycount€rattackduF
ing the passageof lines.
- Elaborateengineer pfeparationof the assauh
ltne,
In addition to the problems he deall with
when organizingan attack from the march, the
battalaoncommanderalso determinesthe follow-
ing:
-- The assauhposition his battalionwill occupy,
and the routesthey will use to occupy it,
- B[rP locationsand proc€duresfor using them
in supportof the dismountedattack.
ldeally,the [4RB occupiesthe assauhposition
during darkness or other periods of reduced
visibility.BMPs are ;nitiallyleft in the r€ar lmoving
up to revetmentswhen given the sign6ll, while
dismounted infantry move to their assault posi-
tions bv wav of concealed.outesand com-
munications trenches. To achieve surprise, the
MRB's first-echelonassault companies will oc-
cupy the second trench of the defendingforces.
During preparatoryfires, the first-echelonassauh
companies occupy the firct trench, while the
second-echeloncompany (reserve)occupies the
second trench; attached tanks occupy a desig
nated assemblyarea and are given a start line,
normally located 1-2 kilometersfrom the FEBA;
attachedengineersare locatedin communications
trenches close to the companiesthey will sup
port; the battalion mortar battery and attached
and supportinganillery occupy positionsprior to
the time the MRB occupies its assaultposjtions;
the battalionmedical Doint is located iust behind
the second-echelon{reserve) company; the re-
mainingbattalionrear serviceelementsare further
back, but generally within 4 kilometerc of the
FEBA.
Forces relieved by the ft.4R8 during the
passageof lineswill do on€ of three things: retire
to the rear, supportthe attack by fire, and/or join
in the attack. In the firct case,they may be form-
ed as a reserveor sent further to the rear for rest;
in the second, their organic and attached
weaponswould participatein the preparatoryfires
in support of the attack; in the third case, they
would support the initlal assault by fire and par-
ticipate in one of the regimenfs attacking
When given the attack signal, first eche'on
assaultcompanies,following closgly behind thek
attached tanks and supported by BIMP fires,
penetratethe enemy's forward defensesand at-
tack his reserves,The battalion commanderand
his staff follow closely behind the first echelon
and, in turn, are followed by the battalion's se-
cond echelon lrcserve). Mortars, attached ar
tillery, and air defense forces move on order to
supportiheattackintothedeprhof thedefenses.
 T

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oit ofe drhe ree med 5 hdbidis s $tui n dera

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Molori2ed
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rna DlvisionBr€akihroughOperalDn.
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Throushi/tineFieldstor MolorizedRifleTroops
Fisure63.TanksClearBreaches

89
7. THE PURSUIT coveringforce. Having done so, the IVIRBeither
deploys into a single column ln march formation
a. Obiective or conducts the pursuit on paralielaxes. In tho
The objoctive oI the puGujt is to prsvent an former case, a company reinforced with tanks,
organizedwithdrawal and complete the destruc- enganeers, and chemicaltroops forms the forward
tion ot enemy forces as rapidly as possible.The patrol of the advance guard, and a seriqs oI
ldRB anemp6 to achievethese objectivesby ex- meetrng 6ngag9ments take place. ln a pursuit on
ploiting nucloarandlor nonnuclearstrikes,and by parallel €xes, the battalion sends out stronger
the mobility 6nd lirepower of the battalionand its security eloments to the thr€atgned flank(s).
attachments. The MRB normally conducts th6 Thes€ elements consist ol r€inforced mobile
pursuit (as part of the regiment) frontally, on patrolsand reconnaissance personnel.
parallelrout€s,o. bya combinationrhereof.
Attached engineer and artillery units play a
b. Conduct of the Pursuit key role in purcuitoperations,as do helibohe end
or airborne troops. Engineersremove obstacles,
Aware that the enemy is withdrawing, th€ help prepare detours around damaged parts of
|\IRB commander reorganizes his forces as the route, and lay mines on th€ en€my's with-
necessary/ maintains close contact with the drawal routes and probable counterattackdxes.
enemy ithereby making it more difiicult for thE Artillery lires up to maximum range, deploying
enemy to use nuclearweaponsagainstthe MRB), from columns into often less-thsn,idealliring
and informsrogimentot his actions. positions.Artillery must be able to quickly come
out of action and reioin the march formation,
The regimental commander then radios his Prompt
receipt of target data largely d€termanes
ordersto the MRB commanderfor the conduct of
the successof the artilleryduring the pursuit. Th€
the pursuit, A battalionis usuallyassigneda pur- new
self-propellodartilleryunits ar6 especiattywell
suit 6xis, told what enemv torces are to b6 suited
for pursuit operations. Heliborne and/or
destroyed,and given objectivgsto be seizedand airborne
forces seize key terrain in the enemy
the s€quencgin which to act, The battalioncom- rear,
ther€bydisruptingenemywithdrawal.
mander, personallyor through his staft, raoros
missionsto his organic and attached units while Rear servics personnel of th€ battalion also
on the move. The depth of obj6ctivesd€pends play a key rols during pursuit op€rations. They
uponthe situation. follow closelybehindthe combat formations,and
keep their counterpartsat regim€nt informed re,
The banalion, attacking initially in its form€r garding
the medical, supply, and maintanance
{ormation-a first and sscond 6chelon kesewel-- status
of the MRB and itsattachments.
fkst attemptsto desnoy the withdrawingenemy's

Section8 - DefensiveOperations
1. GENERAL -- During an advanc€ in order to repel
counterattacks
by superior
forces,
The Soviets view the defense as involuntary
and temporary. lt is resortedto when off€nsiv€ -' Tosecuretheflanksot themainbody.
operationsare not possibleor advisable.The aim
of ths defon6e is to defeat the ensmy at the - To consolidatepreviouslywon gainspriorto
FEBA and cr€ate favorableconditionsfor renew- furtheradvance.
ing the offen6ive. - As a t€mporary measure to "mask"
2. CONDITIONSFORTHE DEFENSIVE priorto 6 withdrawal.
reorganization

Usually the battalion go€s on the delensavs - As a resuh of an unsuccoss{ul

meeting
when in close contact with th6 enemy and undgr engagement,
the f ollowingconditions:

90
3 . P O S I T I O N I N GO F T H E M B B I N T H E allowedthe banalioncommander,the planning
DEFENSE sequence,and the inhial natufe of the defensive
position. Doctrine stresses the need to vary
The N4RBin the defensemay be position€d:
defensive alignments to avoid presenting
-' ln the division'sforward afeasecurityzone. stereotypeddefensesto the enemy.
-- As part of the regiment's first or second After receivingthe missionfor the regimental
echelon in the prirnary or secondary area of commander, the battalion command€r begins
organizing his assigned sector, The regimental
order will be as complete as possible. As a
Independently of the regiment. minimum,it containsthe battalion's mission,trace
of the FEBA,andbattalion boundaries.
As part ofthe divisionreserve.
h. The Hasty Defense
Normally the battalion defends as part of the
regiment,althoughit may act independently in Due to necessity,the MHB commanderis
very broken,woody, or swarylpyterrain,or in a allowedmore initiative and flexibilityin organizing
lessimportantsectionof the defense. a hdsry detersp: there :s no tine for rhe regimen
tal commander to issue an order with detailed
4. MtSStONS
supplemenlary instructionsandsupervision.
An lvlFB assigned the fotuard are6 security
The battalion first attempts to consolidateon
zone has the mission of delayingthe enemy as
the line it has reachedor tries to seize more ad
long as possible while inflicting n_axirnJn
vantageous terrain, Enemy counterattacksmust
casualities,
be repelled.renforcementsreceivedfrom regi-
As pan of the regiment'sfirst'echelondefense, ment, and the positionstabilizedand organized
the MRB has the missionof holdingits assigned according to doctrine.
area,and inflicringmaximumoamageon r.le at-
c, The Positional Defense
tacker.When locatedin rhe 'egimelts p'imarv
area of defense,rhe IVRB receivesgrealelein Organizationof a positionaldefenseis central
forcement and is assigned a small€r area of ized by regiment. Orders are detailed and
responsibility.Operating in a secondary sector, defensespreparedin a logicalorder and according
the MRB has a largerarea of responsibility and to doctrine. Positionaldefensesare characterized
less reinforcement, In the regiment's second by well-coordinated fire and obstacleplanning,ex-
echelon, the battalion def€nds its assignedposi- tensivefield fortifications,great depth, and strong
tion and participatesin counteratt6ckslaunched
by regiment and/ordivision.
d. Fotmation.Frcntage,and Depth
As the divisionreserve,the fvlRBmay be used
to reinforce foMard defensesor as a counteF The battalion defensivearea {figure 64) is up
ro 2ll, kilometers wide (5 kilomererc undernuclear
conditions)and up to 2'l, kilometersdeep- lt is
5. ORGANIZINGTHE DEFENSE organizedaccordingto the principlesoutlinedin
chapter2.

Although the battalion'sdefensivealignm€nt

The Sovietsbelievethat modernwarfareoften
dependsupon lVlETT,the l\,4R8usuallydefendsin
allows little time to plan and organizea properly
one echelonwith all l,4Rcompanies on line(minus
coordinated defensive position. While 't is
a platoon in reserve). Single-echelonalignment
sometimespossibleto organizea defense when
permits the greatest simultaneousconcentration
units are not in contact, more often the l,4BB
of firepower, bur reducesrhe depth of the posi
commander must quickly assume the delensive
tion. When the IMRBdefends on a narrow fron-
while in contact with the enemy (hasty defense).
tage and/or greaterdepth is required,the MRB
The circumstances under which rhe defenseis
deploysin two echelons,with two reinforcedMR
assumed determinesthe flexibility and initiative
91
companiesin the first echelonand one in the se- - The number of tank approacheswithin the
cond. Reservoswould be located funher back, batralions AO.
Th€ distance between the first and s€cond - The regimentalcommander'santitankpl6n,
echelonsis up to 2 kilometers.This gap makes it
more difficult for the enemy to destroy both the - The assesshent ot the enemy's armor
tirst and second echelons with tactical nuclear capability.
weapons, while enabling the second echelon to
rapidly reinforce the first echelon or to quickly {4) Mortars
counterattackp9netratrons,
The battalion mortar battery is deployed in
e. Positioning of Subotdinate Elements
accordance with th€ overalllire plan and is posi
{ll The molorizedriflecompanies tioned to provide close-in suppon for the com-
panystrongpoints.
Each lVlR company organizesa strongpoint
up to 500 meters in width {1,000 meters under (5) Rearservic€s
nuclear conditions)and 250 meters in depth (500
The MRB'S rear serviceelementsare located
metercfor nuclearconditions).Normally,all three
in covered and concealed positions within the
platoons defend in one echelon. For more infor-
battalion area of operation {AOl. Rear service
mation on the company in the defense,see lre
elements are responsiblefor their own security
Soviet Motoized Rifle Conpany, DDl1100-n-76.
and defense,and frequently change locationsto
{2) Attachmgnts avoiddestructionfrom enemyairand artilleryfire.

Armor, anillery, engineer, and chemical

troops attachedto the MRB are further allocated
The fire plan is regarded as the principal
to the MR companies, depending upon the
means of defeating the enemy and insuring the
numberand types ol attachmentsreceivedby bat
stability of the defense. Indirect and direct (par'
talion, and according to the importance ot the
ticularlyantitank)fires are closelytied in with the
sectors the compani€s are defending, Priority
barrierplan, and given first priorityin the defense.
would go to the company{s) defending in the
lMassedfires are organizedin coniunctionwith sir
main sector. Though artillerymay be assignedto
strikes on the mosl dangerousavenues of ap-
the companiesfor di.ect fhe support, anillery is
proach in accordancewith the regimentalcom-
usuallypositionedto provideindhectfiresuppo(.
mander'splan. The fire plan attemptsto lorce the
{3) Reserves enemy into killing zonesand separatehis infantry
from supporting armor. To confuse the enemy
The l/lRB commanderpositions his res€rves and increase the survivability of crew-serv€d
wh€re they can most rapidly and effectively weapons, dummy positions are constructedand
stabilizethe d€fEnse.Key terrain, enemy avenues rovingcrew-serv€d weaponsdesignated.
of approach,and commitmentcalculationsfor the
reseryes are key factors in determining where De{ensive fhes forward of the FEBA are
res€rueswill be posilion€d within the batalion organizedby the battalioncommander'ssuperaols
are6 of operation(AO). Commitmenttime for the to as great a depth 6s possible.Firesare primarily
reserves.when mounted, is based on speedsoI concentratedon tank approacheson previously
m-30 kilometersper hour in daytime and 1t20 selectedfire lines, usuallyunder ground observa-
kilometersper hour at night. lvlovingon foot, four tion. The distance between lines is 400 to 600
tofivetimestheamountoftimei6 required. meters on high-speedavenues of approach; on
less favorableavenuesof approach,the distance
In addition to his regular reserve(usuallya
platoon), the MRB commander often maintains is less. Along a line 2m to 400 meters from the
FEBA, artillery fire is used to separateattacking
an antitank reserve.The size and compositionof
infantry from their tanks and to stop second-
the antitank ressruedependsupon the following
echelon forces. Final protectivefir6s are planned
factors:
within 100 metersof the FEBA, while concentra-
- The importanceattachedby the regimental tions are plannedthroughout the battalionAO to
commanderto the battalion'sdefensivearea, Iacilitate defeat of enemy lorces which have
92
broken through the defenses.The battalioncom- The battalion'santitank defensesare situated
mander has the authority to call for or swhch to provide fire 2 to 3 kilometersforward of the
supporting fire in his area, while company coh- FEBA. The Blt P's ATGI4S are the primary
mandershave the authority to do so only r€gar- weapon for long-rangeantitank fires. On open
dingfire immediatelyin front of the FEBA. ground there may be up to 20O meters between
tanks in defensiveoositionsand uo to 100 meters
The battalion'sfire plan,includingantitank,ar between antitank guns. Tanks and antitank guns
tillery, mortar, and small arms fire, is primarily may be located up to 600 metersfiom the FEBA,
based on tank-defeatingweapons. The plan pro- although terrain is an imponant determinant.
Each antitank weapon has a primary and secon-
- Suppon for the first and second echelon dary sector of fire as well as primaryand alt€rnate
postt|ons.
{roserve),with priorityto theformer.
g. The Ba er Plan
'' Destructionof enemypenetrations.
Bafiier and fire olans comolementeech other.
- Protectionof flanks and gaps not occripigd Engineer obstacles are constructed to restrict
by friendlyforces. enemy maneuverabilityand disrupt his combat
formations. lMixedminefieldsare laid forlvard of
Cov€rageof barriers. the FEBAand throughoutthe d€pth of the defen-
- Overlappingconcentrationsof fire in front sive position, particularlyalong tank approaches.
perimeterof antitankobstaclesis within
of the FEBA, on the flanks, and ;n key areas The outer
within th6 banalion'sAO. 200 to 400 metercof the FEBA so that thev may
be easilyobservedand coveredby fire from anti-
- Rapid maneuver of fire along the FEBA tank weapons, lJse ol natlral obstacles.such as
andwilhin the AO. rivers, canals, lakes, swamps, ravines, dense
woods, high embankments, rocky ridges, and
deeosnow, is siressed,

93
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6 4 . T h e M o r o r i z e d R i f r e A a r t a tI inotnh e O 6 t e n s e .

94
6. CONDUCTOFTHE DEFENSE enemy on the fudh€st approachesto the fotward
area security zone, These fires concentrate on
nucleardeliverysystemsand armor, and become
Conduct of the defensive battle by the bat- more intenseas the enemy advances.Recon-
talion beginswith the detection of enemy forces naissance elementsfrom r€gimentand division,
and theiradvancewithin range of the battalion's augmented by special reconnaissance detach
weapons.The baiialionmav conducta defenseir ments from the MBB in th€ security zone, r€port
the forward area securityzone, in the regiment's on the enemy's size,location , a nd activities.
firstorsecond echelon, orasthe division reserve. The MRB in defense of the forward area
h. Actions of the Battalion in the Forr/ad Arca security zone att€mpts to hold its positions and
Secu ty Zone force the enemy main body to deploy, while in
flictingmaximumcasualties. Initi6lenemyprobes
In assigning a battalion to a forward area by reconnaissance elements are engaged from
securityzone, tne divisioncomrranderassignsa alternate positions and by roving guns, with the
larger-than-normal frontage.The NrBBaccording- objectives of deceiving the enemy regardingthe
ly normalydefendsin one echelonard reiainsan true nature of the defenses and of forcing the
MR platoonin reserue (figure 65). The battalion enemy's main body to deploy. when the enemy's
commanderis given his zone of responsibility,main body deploys,the MBB attempts to sepa'
told where he will establishcompanyand platoon rate attackingtanks from their infantry, to prevent
strongpoints, the sequenc€ in which he will penelr€iior. and to bLy tirre for the main
organizehis positions,the obstacleand fke plans, defenses.Penetrationsare dealt with by the bat
andthewithdrawal plan. talion'sreserves. The MRB withdrawson orderof
the cornmanderwho is commandingth€ forward
The planningand conductof the defenseof a
forward area security zone may be divided into
two parts: the first encompassesthe positions c. The Battalion Defense as Paft of the Regi-
and plansto defendthem,whilethe seconddeals ment's Fitst Echelon
with conductinga fighting withdrawalthrough
the maindefenses on the FEBA.
After friendiy reconnaissanceforces and the
Becauseof the extendedfrontages assigned, battaion which defended the forward security
the MRB is heavilyreinforcedwith a.mor, aF area have passed through the first-echelon
tillery, engineer.cherrical.and sometimesair defenses, enemypfobesof the FEBAare handled
defenseforces, particularlywhen defendingin the much the sameway as alreadydescribed. Unlike
primary sector; in a secondarysecior, reinforced tne secLrilyarea.however.the 'irst echeonposi-
companies{ratherthan a banalion)are used. In tions are to be held at all cost, for the entire
both cases,arr;lle.yfire f.om the n"aindefensesis defensivepositionrestsupon their retention.
"on call,"
The battaion commanderand his staff and
Companies and platoons occupy normal subordinate commanders in the first echelon
defensivefrontages {500 meters and 150 mete6 observethe enemy's preparatoryfires and try to
respectively, under nonnuclearconditions)but detefminethe directionof the main attack so that
have larger gaps betweencompanies,Such a men and equipmentmay be repositloned accord-
defense is made possibleby greaterdecentraliza- ingly. Final protectivefires are used to stop the
tion of the baiialions anached and o ganic enemyshort of the FEBA,Penetrations are dealt
weapons; companies receive artillery, mortars, wih with'n the individ,ral corrpanyslrongpoints
and antitankweaponswhile platoonsreceive6d and/or by the fu1RBcommander'sinfantryand
ditionalantitank weapons.Attached tanks are us-
ed extensively in tank ambushesthroughoutthe
When defendingas part of the regimenfsfirst
echelon,the MRB's counterattackcapabilityis
The divisioncommander's long-range artillery limited.Only when smallnumbersof the enemy
and supportingair begin the destructionof the
have penetrated,or when these penetrationshave battalion commander must fely on his organic
resulted in heaw losses1o the attacker. do the assets to conduct r€scueand firefighting opera-
batlalion reserves,when launched independently tions, Eattalion reserves reinforce the st cken
of regiment, have a good chance of succgss, lf are6as soon as possible.The battalionmay move
such favorableconditions do not exist, tha bat to alt€rnatedefensiveareasonly on order of the
talion reservesengage the enemy from prepared r€gimEntal(or high€r)commander.
positions. The destructionof farsuperior enemy
Iorces which have penetratedthe battalion'sAO d. The Eattalion Defmding as the Regiment's
would fall mainly to the regimentalcommander
and hissecond-echolon and reserveforces. In this role, lhe lr4RB is located near the
The IMRB commander fhst informs the enemy's main avenue oI approach into the regi-
regimentalcommanderof his counterattackdeci- ments position and is organi.ed in depth. The
sion. lf the decision is apDroved,the battalion banalion is assignedmissionsto destroy enerny
reseruesnormallyattacr'mountedand use con- penetrations.The lvlRB may accomplishits mis-
cealedroutes to their attack positions{if they at' sion fiom its fortified positions,by counterattack-
tack dismounted, extensiv€ use is made of ing independently,with the divisioncommander's
trenches, communicationstrenches, and other reserves,or in coordinationwhh adjacentsecond
concealed aoDroaches).Antit6nk and other re- echelons.Regimentaland divisionalartillerywoutd
s€rves may be employed separatelyor togother, support the second-echelon MRB in any
The attack is suppodedby regimentalweaponsas countefatlack,
well as bv the MRB'S firsl-echelon companies.
When the battalion'sdefenseshave been reestab- e. The MRB as Division Reserve
lished, the lvlRB commander reconstitutes his As division reserve, the IVIRBwould be ap
res€rves,usuallyfrom units which have not been propraatelyreinforced and assigned no specific
seriouslvdeoleted. mission prior to combat; it is ordered ro be
lf the delending battalion is subjected to preparedto react to a number of contingencies,
nucl€ar and/or chemical attack, ad hoc NBC but would most often be used as a counterattack
_-
reconnaiss€nceparties {formed from MRB peF force. In this role it would be supportedby the
sonnel) are sent into the affected area to r€port tilleryof divisionand army.
radiation/chemicalreadings.Command and con
trol and the fire and obstacle plans afe reestab-
lishedas quickly as possible-Ammunition resupp-
ly and medicalaid are also increased.Initially,the

96
 6-- c-'-- \

"ri

KEY

@o
A k,I.ry blld'on ii I'r i. Fron5 rdond n.r
b.rw..i posnEisidelr abs$ued roiErt

@
'N ^",,,.,--*,* 1*.b..*)

j-l Anin.ry bau4! (bns.d)

Figure65.A R€infded MoioriredRitleBattalionActinsasTh€ForwardAreaS€€urity

For@.

97
7. DISENGAGEMENT
AND WITHDRAWAL Acting as the second echelon of the regiment,
an MRB is usually designatedthe rear guard of
The Soviets recognize that retrogradeopera- the regament.lt is
heavilyreinforcedfor this role
ljons, particularlywhen forces ar€ in contact, are and occupies previously prepared positions,
lts
very difficult, and subsequently require con, mission is to delay
the enemy and gain time for
siderable planning, coordination, and control. the withdrawal of the
main body. After the regi-
Withdrawal occrirs on order of the senior com- ment's main body has passed
through the rear
mander and, whenever possible,is conducted at guard, the coveringforces
attempt to break con-
night or during other periodsof reducedvisibility. tact wilh the enemy, passthrough
the rear guard,
Withdrawals are employ€d to buy time for the and rejoin the main
body. Rear guard operations
main defenses,to occupy mor€ favorabledefen- are conducted along
a series of delaying posi-
savepositions,or to consolidatethe defense. tions, lvlaximumuse is made of artillery, monar,
The regimentalcommander'swithdrawatoroer and long-range ATGM fires to prevent enemy
is detailedand includesthe mission, routes, and interference with the withdrawat.
formation to be used. intermedialedelayingposi
The main body commanderorganizesreinforc-
tions, control measures,and specifics regarding ed flank guards to
counteract envelopment
the new defensiveAO. Wathdrawalfollows dis- forces. Flank guards
lay antipersonneland anti-
ongagement,and involvesa covering force, rear tank minesalonglikely
avenuesof approacnano
guard,andmainbody.
delay the ene..r until the main body has passed.
The disengagementof the batt6lionmain body Forward secunty detachmentsare also used to
is coveredby designatedplatoonsreinforcodwith occupy critical terfain along the withdrawal route
tanks. anillery. mortars,and engineersthat try to until passage of the main body. During wkh-
presentan unchangeddefensivealignmentto the drawal, reconnaissanceactiviries, paniculady at
enemy, COunterattacks, air, artillerv,and nuclear night, are intensified lo ascenain the location.
fires as well as smoke, are employed by the size,andintentionsofthe enemy.
covering force to halt enemy attacks before the Withdrawalsar€ also characterizedby a scor-
main body withdraws. The coveringforce, under ched earth" policy; people,
livestock,and equiD-
commandof the MRB commander,remarnstn ment
are evacuated,while roads, bridges, com-
occupiedpositionsand tries to delay and decetve municationslines
and supplies, and installations
the enemvand oreventintorferencewith th€ main
body. The main body withdraws in the following
order: rear services, designatedmonar and ai-
tached towed a(illery, and mixed teams of
motorized rifle troops, SP artillery, and tank
troops{figu.e66).

98
 +rt Fn r drb. h.tb[d! d lh. aernr .Li!Ii.
Irrelt Eiilo'ad !bi6d lo ..1 - lr. @finl

Fid .dt ro. b.frrdE (dr!r rir o{rir h.

6) riItd..r (2) rh'crh lh. 'Y a[tn l$.
.dnB ! na'ld.!d sd *n.5n b||l.Io.) r|d
p?oed. lh. nud.'n d lli r..iBr3 dii b.dy

l3), tilhdnt lhe$

rh. dr au.'{ ad atr rls Dh d,
o dtur.d.nrr.ry
ft. MiR(t. fin '11,.@nd @nt*[hd.!6
r.). .nd .ri.brbh6 ne d.Ln.i* p6ii.6 (a)

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____i {4}

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A
r|ol..ird db dp..r 'i lh. d.rd. 6__dadh.t b.tr.l-. in fi|l. arilEs

rbkrd ill. pbron 'i lh. dden* 0

otori:.d irl. r.stn.nl ii nrt.n d!n. 1'--i-OiviNi bo!,rd.ry

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r|dwEdli|e@9.n'4inl..edb'
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r|otrird dfl. dr.ir rh tu'd' 6lunn

O rnr*v un tv int*'r pqti."

Fisure56.A R€inlorc.dMolorizedRill! 8lttalionActint.sThe R..r GuardDurinS,Retimcnt'lWthdr6vvrl'
8. RELIEFIN PLACE The commanderof the battalionbeing relieved
exercises control until the relief is completed.
The relief of the battalion is normally ac- Shouldthe enemyattack while the reliefis in pro-
complishedat night {figure 67). In order to ac- cess, the relievingbattalion, under the command
quaint himself with the dispositionsand defense of the outgoing commander,assistsin repelling
plan of the IMRBhe is to relieve,the commander theattack,
of the.elieving battalion analyzesthe defenses
with his company commanders and platoon At the aDoointedtime the battalioncommander
leaders. He receives the available information who is taking over the defensemoves his unatto
about the enemy and his dispositionsand studies the reliel area by concealedroutes. The relief is
the systeh of outposts, defense installations, carriedout successivelyby platoons,Guidesfrom
obstacles and passages, distribution of firing the unit to be relievedmeet their replacementsat
points, roads, communications,security,and the designatedlocationsand leadthem to their defen-
protection of the flanks and limitng points. In sive positions, The commander of the outgoing
coordinationwith the outgoing commander, he battalion turns over a skeich of the defenses,
plansthe relief. defensive installations, permanent communica-
tions facilities,and reserveammunitionon hand.
The MRB commander handing over the The companiesof the outgoing battalion,having
defense indicates the following to his subor turned over their strongpoints, assemble in
otnates: designatedareas. The outgoing battalion with-
-- Proceduresfor transferringthe defense. draws after the new MRB has occupied the
defenses, confhmed the functioning of com-
- Assemblyarea{s)afterthe relief. munications, made liaison with supporting ar
tillery, and manned security outposts. After the
- Deceptionmeasures.
relief, the new battalion maintains the same
- Designationof guides. routine and level of activitiesthat existedprior to
the relief.
- Designationof locationsfor traffic control
posts,
- The time for starting and completing the
tmnsfer.
- The proceduresro be followed in the event
of an enemy attack while the relief is in pro-

100
--a\-..,,.
5

J B i... ---zt
-"7ffffi

..-j' )
--)-" I

a
aa \, -.
--l-\-: '----------\-,r-
KEY

IB Mrcd mrerrerd(air Frenier aid :ni bnk)

I_

N (n!nb€Ed)
an ery concenraron

P
A
@o

@
NOTES

codes ton the 5ih MR81lhe unir b€ig rehvd) !d!rd edab sh tafi i,i (ihe {rh MRB)

esNcybypj'i6ns

Figure67.Rerieiin Place.

r0t
 C H A P T E R8 . T H E M R B O P E R A T I N G
U N D E RS P E C I A LC O N D I T I O N S
SectionA - General
This chapter will concentrateon the following Soviel doctrine cov€rs a number of operations
battalion offensiveand defensiveoperationscon- conductedunderspecialconditionsin which pro-
ductedundef specialconditionswhich have par- cedures,planning,and tacticsdifferfrom normal
ticular applicability to Northern and Central operations,
Europe:combatin built-upareas,heliborne opera-
The doctrine,specialequipment,training,and
tions, water barrier operations, night combat,
historicalexamplesfor these operations(except-
seaborneassault,and defenseof a coastline,
ing seaborneassaultand defense of a coastline)
The Soviet approach to conducting combat were discussed in The Soviet Motoized Rifle
operationsunder special conditions is to emploY Conpany, DDt1100-n-76,which also contains
regularunitswith as few TO+E modifications as data on operationsunder extremeweather condi
possible.Since the l\4RB is expected to operate fions, mounran operations,and operalionsin
undervariousconditionsof terrainand w€ather, forestsand swamps,

Section B - Combat in Built-up Areas

1 ,G E N E R A L Small, widely scattered, lightly defended set-
tlements may often be attacked by company- or
Urban combat differc from combat in the fie d battalion-size units acting as foMard detach
in severalimportantaspects:higherthan-normalments, thus freeing the main forces to continue
ammunitionexpenditures and casualt;es, slower the march. Wdl-defended vill6ges and towns,
rates of advance{5 to 15 kilometersper day anti- however,which lie astride the regiment'saxis of
cipatedby Sovietplanners),reducedcentralized advanceand which cannotbe otherwiseneutralaz-
control with correspondinglygreater demands ed or bypassed,will be subjectedto full scale at-
placed on small unit leadership, restraints on tack,
rnaneuver, observation,and weaponsdnd equip
ment usage, and limited reconnaissance op-
portunrtres,

Soviettrainingfor urban combat

Signif;cantly,
is not commensurat€ with the rapidand continu
ing urbanization of WesternEurope(figure68);
this trainingseemsto be sporadicand conducted
primarilyup throughcompanylevel.The Soviets
seem to believethat, for the most part, they c6n
avoid urban combat by neutralizing urban areas
with chemicaiand/or nuclearweapons,rapidly
bypassingthem, or quickly seizingthem from the
march.

In both the offensive and defensiv€phasesof

urban combat, frontagesare considerablyreduced F , g u r6e8 .T h eU r b a fzl a t r c iF a c l o r .
and combinedarms combat strongly emphasized,
Supporting weapons and equipment are
decentralizedmore than normally, with some 2, OFFENSE
tanks and artillerypiecesbeing attacheddown to
squad level. up to 50 percent of a division'sar-
tillerymay be used in this mannerand utilized The battaiion officers study large-scalemaps
primarilyin a directfire role. Flamethrower units (to include city maps) oi the urban complex,
as w6ll as other engineerand chemicalpersonnel analyzeavailable intelligence, and numberblocks
arealsoattacheddown to the lowestlevels. and objectiveson their maps. PrepaEtionis
103
hindered by the fact that effective prior recon- the march, the battalion normally attacks dis-
naissanceis difficult to obtain; normally recon- mounted. when it has only one obiective, the
nasissanceelementsmust fight to obtain data on MRB usuallyattacks in assaultgroups;wh€n it is
the city's defenses-a slow and costly proc€ss. given a subsequentobjectiveprior to attack, two
Pafticularattention is paid to the dirsction and lor more) groups may be used, with the second
width of streets, key buildings (communications having the missionof seizingthe subsequentob
centers, train stations, utility buildings,factories, j€ctive. In both cases, a platoon is normally rc-
etc,), and other areas whose seizure would aid tainedasa reserveforce.
theattacker,
d. AssaultGroups
b. Command and Control
Due to the localizednature of urban combat,
Becauseof the decentralizednature of urban supportingweaponsand equipmentare decentral-
combat, the IMBB commander is given g.eater ized to make possiblethe formation ol combined
authority than is normally the case to plan and arms assault groups. Nrotorizedrifle troops form
conduct the battle. Although allowed the flexi- the basis for these groups. Within the battalion,
bility and initiative he is normally denied, the the l/lR company is the basis for an assault
IVIRBcommanderpossessesa very smallstaff and group. Reinforcementis heavy. Typical assault
must often organizea very difficult operationin a groupswithin the battalionwould consistof :
shod periodoftime.
- A motorizedriflecompany.
Commandand control in urban combat is com-
.. Oneor tlvo tank platoons,
plicated by the reduction of fadio efficiency.
Although radio is the primary means of control, - One artillerybattery (which may in turn be
considerableuse is also made of messengersand subdivid€damongplatoonsl.
wire. Limited observationalso afi€cts command
and control. The battalioncommandersets up his .- A combatengineer(sapper)platoon,
command post {CP) where he can best control
- ChemicaI and flamethrowerspecialists .
the actions of his unit. The CP is situated closer
than normally to the first echelon due to the - One bridge platoon or section (if a water
problems imposed by rcduced observationand obstaclemust be crossed).
reduced radio effectiveness.Observationposts,
located in attics and other high places. are con' e. Conductof the Attack
nectedby wire io the CP. After the attack begins,
the battalion commander and his staff advance Direct and indirect anillery fire precedesthe
behindthecompanyassault groups. battalion attack. The duration of the artilleryfire
variesconsiderablyand dependsupon the nature
c. Objectives. Frcntages, and Fonations of the defensesand amount of structuraldamage
Depth of obiectives,attack frontages,and for- required. Too much artillery fire can create
mations depend upon the forces available, the obstaclesfor the attacker.Smoke is often used to
nsture and density o{ structureswithin the urban aid the attacker in reachingthe first buildings. lf
area, and enemy defenses,As a planning guide. antitank fire is not too heavy, infantry and sap-
however, the battalion attacks on a frontage of pers follow closely behind their attached tanks
(equippedwith mine rollersor plows if minefields
up to 600 meters {200 to 300 meterc for an MR
company). lts objective may be to seize one or are present).Sappersaid tho tanks in mine clear-
two city blocks. lvlain attack axes are located ing. They also help clear barricades,eliminate
along th6 major routes into the urban area to booby traps, destroy or create openingsin build-
facilitatethe capture of key areas and the cross- ings, and construct CPs, medical stations, and
ing of the area as rapidly as possible(figure @). storageareas.Sappersare w6ll oquippodwith ex-
When it cannot rapidly seizethe urban area from plosivesand minedetectiondevices,

104
 wl

tffi
tm
4w

:\
:\ \

KEY

0 + 0 Mds".ddh@ts,y

i
8
rii
a\

x
RrfleBattalionAtiackincaBuill'upArea.
Motorized
FiEure69.A Reinforced
r05
 Once inside th€ town {figure 70), the ass6ult
gfoups attack along parallel streets. Tanks mey
lead the assaultin wedge formationwith one tank
]T€
'_.a
in the middle of a .oad and two behind on each
side. with infantrvhgn on both sides ol the street
firing at buildings on the opposite side. Flame-
thrower personnel {figure 71) assist in the
destniction of heavily fortified strong poinG.
BfulPs remain farther back and suooort the in-
fantryandarmorbvfhe,

Artillerv attach€d to the comoaniss lollows

closelybehindth€ infantryand tanks and provides
direct lire support. Indirectfire support is provid-
ed by the battalion mortars and regimental/divi
i*,
sionartillery.
The MRB commander keeDs anv attached
bridging equipment under his control until an
assaultgroup is rcady to attempt the water cross-
ing. At that time, the bridging equipment is 6t-
tached to the assaultgroup commander;it reverts
to the battalion commander'scontrol upon coft-
pletionof thecrossing,

The battalionrear services,limited as they are

in manpower and equipment, have a particula y
difficult task in urban combat in keepingthe l\4RB
suppliedand mainlainsd.Supply prioritiesare am-
munition, water, and food, with the {irst placing
especially heaw demands. Supply dumps are
eslablishedas far forward as possible,and regi-
mental rear servic€sprobably deliver suppliesto
the battalionsupply dumps once they are €stab-
lished. Battalion mess areas. ammunition. w6ter
vehicles and traileB, and the aid station are
establishedbelow ground level whenever possi-
ble. Fi6r aid lreatment and evacuationstations
areestablished behind€achMR comDanv.

When the battalion's objectiveis seized. it is

fortified and either providesthe basisfor regimen.
tal defense along th6 line newly gained, or the
jump-off point f or continuingthe attack.

3. DEFENSE

Not surpisingly, the Soviets have w tt6n

relativelylitlle on defsnseof an urban area. Since
defense of an urban area resticts maneuver,it
takes fewer taooosto defend it than to attack at.
Those principlesalready describedr€arding de-
Figore70.Combat.in-Cil
iesExercis€s.
centralizedcontrol and heavv reinforcement of
subordinateunitsapplyto the defense.

106
 FiSrre71.FlamethrorerPeEonnolPlayan lmportantRolein UrbanConbat.

A battalion's frcntage v6ri66 according to its 4. VULNERABILITIES

mission as part of the regiment, but normally it
will defend in two echelons,with iivo reinforcod Becauseot the major emphasison field
comoanieslorward and one back. The battalion maneuvers, a lack of larg4scaleurban training,
defensive ar€a (figure 72) b bas6d on company and a logistics€ffon gearedtor blitzkriegwar, it
strongpointssupplementedby ambushesthrough- is doubtfulthat Sovietgroundfo.ces€rewell p.€-
out the battalion's AO. Th€ battalion CP is paredlor urbancombat.
locatedwithin th€ most important6trongpoint. The MRB commanderwith his small Bteff
The company strongpoint, containing inIantry, would havs a particularly ditficulttask in urban
armor, artilleay.sapperc,and ch€mical personngl, combat. Heavily reinforced with all-armssupport.
is organizedfo. all-rounddel6ns6and mutual fire he has relativolylinle iime to Dlan a very drlficult
opsration and b suddenly givon the flexibilityand
sripportwith olher strongpoints,lt rnay consistol
one or morebuildihgs, initiativehe is denied in other operations.This
pertainsto his subordinatecommandersand
Engineersuppon for the defenseb greaterthan NCOsaswoll.
in the attack. Exlensiveantr'tanktnd anlioerson-
nel obstaclosare establishd in the streets, in in- DuringWorldWar ll, the SoviEtArmygaineda
tgrualsbetweon slrongpointsand on approaches formidable r€putalion ior urb6n combat. Whil€
to barric€dss,A battalion dofending in the r6gi- currentSovietdoctrineseeksto svoidurbancom-
m€nt s main d€fensiveareacould roceivsenoingor bat, the rapidly increasingurbanizationof
5!pportfrom both regimentand division. WesternEuropemakessuch combatalmo6tin-
ovitablewith subseouenl advers€sffecl on Soviet
Eecause ti6 delender can intlict greater loss€s ratesof advanco.
on the enemylrom prepa€d positions{particular-
ly in a buill-up arqa), counteraltacksar€ rarely The MRB musr be judg6d capabieof con-
launchedbelow rcgimentallevel In urban combat. ducting urbancombatoperations,Due to limita-
Strong mobib.eserves are msintainod st both tionsalready how€vsr,suchoperations
discussed,
regimentaland divisionleveltor this purpo6e. could bevervcostvandslow.

I07
EI

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A
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@

A
""",,".,".-",.,.,."
Figufe72. A Rliniorc€dilotorizedRill€BatlalionDelendinea Built'upArea.
108
 Section C - Helibone Operations
1. GENERAL helibornEoperation,the MRB could operateup to
m kilom6ters behind the FEBA. lt could also
Ovgr the past few yearsthere has b€en a mark- operateto the s:rmedistanceacting independent-
ed increasein numbeF and types oI helicopterc ly. although a more normal operationaldepth is I
within the Groups of Soviet Forces Germany to 10 kilometers-thal is, within range of sup-
(GSFG) with a correspondingincreasein capa- porting artillery. The Soviets want linkup by ad-
biliti€slor heliborneoDerations.The Soviets cur- vance guard elemenls with the heliborne MRB
rently have the capability to conduct within a few hou6, and prefer to conduct the
simultaneously several battalion-size heliborne operationwithin range ol friendly artillory,These
oo€rations in Central Europe with airbotn€, factors, however,will not precludethe MRB from
special purpose, and/or motorized ifle troops. being inserted up to 80 kilometers beyond the
This section addressesthe use of the ltlRB in FEBA to seize an important objective. ln such a
heliborneopsrations. situarion, the lrRB could receive additional
In wartime, Soviet helicopterregim6nts,subor- helicoptergunship support and/or be rginforced
dinate to tactical air armies,are assignedto each with artilleryand/ or additionalmortars.
front. Some ot these regimentsseem specifically 4. FORCEORGANIZATION
lailored to lifr motorizedrifle battalionsin a varie-
The organization and capabilities of BMP-
ty of combat operations, Although heliborne
equippedforces and BTR equippedforces clearly
operationsin regimentrlstrcngth are occasionally
favor the latter (figure73) Ior heliborneop€rations.
described.the MRB is consideredbv the Soviets
In additionto the tacticaladvantagespossessedby
to be most suited for a variety of missions.At
the BMP vis-a'visthe BTR (seeChapter2, Section
leasl one MRB per motorizedrifle divisionis train-
B, paragraph 11,the 8MP-equipped regimsnt'sself'
€d to conductheliborneoperations. propelledartillery cannot be transportedby heli-
2. MtSSTONS copter, while the towed artill€ry (minus atsprime
movers)of BTR-equippedregihents is h€licopter
H€libornemissionswhich are given to the [,4R8 transportable.APca are also not transportableby
includea;dingin maintainingoffensivemomentum helicopter.Becaus€the Sovietsare stillformulating
by capturingkey terrain,blockingenemy resetues doctrine for the optimum employment of BMP-
and resupply efforts, interdicting withdrawal equippedunits, and sincetheseunits also havethe
routes, aiding amphibiousforces in th€ seizureof capabilityto conduct heliborneoperations,such
a bgachhead,and attackingcommandand control operations will be addressed here. Moreover,
sitgs. principlesof employmentare generallythe samefo.
BTR-€quipped and BMP-equipped units.
3. DEPTHOF OPERATIONS
Although lvlETT determinosthe augmEnration
The operational depth ot an [,4R8 heliborne
an IVIRBreceivesin conductinga heliborneopera-
operation depends upon severalfactors: the im-
portanceof the objective,whether the MRB acts tion, the MRB normally operates with few
vehicl€s. In addition to saDoerand NBC t€amsat-
ind€pendentlyor as pan of the regiment, the
tachod from regimgnt,the MRB can rec€ivean air
amount of supponing anillery and/or close air
control element of three-tofiv6 men from army to
suoport assets available,lhe estimated time for
coordinateair support from gunshipsand tactical
linkup,and the natureof enemydispositions
aircraft. Close air-groundsupport is provided by
The importance of the objective is the over- helicoptergunships, while tactical air strikes are
riding lactor in determiningthe operationaldepth prepranned.
of th6 mission.Acting as part of the regimentin a

I09
 FiEure73.A BTR-Eq!ipped
Motorized
RifleBattalrcn
PreparingtoraHeiiborne
Operation.

5. AERIALEMPLOYMENTCONCEPTS can iay mines on likely enemy avenues of ap-

proach into the obiectivearea. The [iRB is trans-
High performance aircrcftsuch as the FLOG. ported by HlPs to the LZ{s)
and receivesrern-
GER s€ri€s(figure74) and the HIND and HIP forcements,supplies,and
additionalcombat sup-
helicopter gunships {figure 75) suppress enemy port (Iield
artilleryand antitank guns as requiredl
defenseswithanthe flight corridorand provide air fromH0OKs{figure78).
support for the l\ilRB.HOPLITESperform taciical
reconnaissance (figure76), while HIPS(figure77)

F r g u r7
e 4 .T h eF L O G G E R S e nPer so v d e A iG
r roundSupport

lI0
 &,;!}

It
t h. BtP
Gunship/TroopCarrierc
Figure75.Hellcopter

111
FiCUre
76. IheHOPITTE
P e . l o r m s T d c l . aFl e c o n n a r s s ' r L c .

'-r+:
r!E
Fisur€ 77. The HIP Can ConductAeriaI MineiayinB.

r12
 1'tr
F i 8 ! r e7 4 .T h eH e a vT
y r a n s p oF
r te lc o p t e rH O O K .

6, THE HELIBORNEASSAULT helicopterforce commanderduing the planning

phase of the operation, Helicopters remain
separate
fromthe MBB untilloadingtime.
Planningis very thorough for a heliborne h. Command and Contrcl
operation, and is centralizedat the highestlevels.
Having receivedhelicopterassets frcm front, rhe Sppcial i.nportanceis arrachedro ensuring
army headquarters, in conjunctionwith air force secrecy and uninterruptedcontro, In the
personnel,does the detailedplanningregarding assemblyarea, communications are conducted
the heliborne force, fightersupport,coordination primarilyby wire and messenger, with radioson
of artileryfires,and controlof friendlyair defense listeningsilence(figure79). Duringflight and in
systemsalong the flight corridor.The operation theassault, radiosareprimarily reliedupon.
would probably be in supportof a first-eche on
divisionon the army's rnainaxis of attack.The The fvlFB commanderrides with the com
N4RBwould probably corne from the division's mander of the helicopt€rforce, while his com
secondecheon regiment,or from the army's pany commanders ride with the helicoptercom-
secondech€iondivision,dependingupon METT. mander's subordinate commanders.The IMRB
Army planningis fudher refinedat divisionand commander ands and occupiesa place in the
regimental level. assaultfrom which he can bestcontfolhisunit,

The N4RBcomnanderiakes pari n planring

the assaukphaseof lhe ope aiion and sJpervises Once landed, the battaiion often attacks in
his unit'spreparation The plan one ech€|o1,as th,s fo,mationplacesmaximum
for the operation.
ningsequence for the command€r and his staff is combatpower.orwa'd.O1e platoonrs in reserve
essentiallythe sameas organizing an attackunder (figure80). In some situations, two echeionsare
norrnalconditions.,q specialfeatureof this p ann
ing, however,is the landingphasein which the
MRB commandergivesthe andingsequenceof After landingthe l\.4R8in the landingzones
his unit and coordinating Usualythe (LZs),the helicopter
instructions. troopand equipmentcarriers
commanderconducrsno p':o. recon'rais return to a safe are6, preparefor a second lift, or
I\y'FlB
sanceof the landingareaor objective.The MRB returnto their basearea,Gunshipsremainin the
commander and his chief of staft work closely objectivearea as long as possibleto render close
with regimentaloperationsofficers and the airsupport.
113
 The actions of the MFB during attack, in the 7. DEFENSE
objective area, and during the reorganization
phasefollow normalSovietdoctrine. In the defense, the IVIRBhas the mission of
holding its positions while inflicting max,mum
casualtieson the enemy. In addition to its at,
tachments, it can be aided in this task by
helicopters laying mines along likely enemy
avenuesof approach,and by on-callgunship{and
possiblyfighter) support. The MRB's defensesare
organizedgenerallyasdescribedin Chapter5.

Once linkup has been achieved with the ad,

vance guard, the lvlRB, from its defensiveposi,
tions, supports the movement of the advance
guard. The lvlRB's vehicles are brought forward
by its parent unit and, atter linkup, the heliborne
IMRBremounts its BIMPSand conducts mounted

8. VULNERABILITIES

Althoughflcxible(in that both 8MP- and BTR-

KEY equipped units may be used), Soviet heliborne
rr- comnlnBnon.ei&r I banaoi)
operationswiih motorired rifle troops have impoF
tant vuJnerabilities. A heliborneMRB is (at least
E
I
initially) a felatively lightly equipped force with
restrictedground mobility and limited sustainabil,
ity, particularlyagainst a mechanizedopponent.
Perhaps for these reasons, Soviet heliborne
I
operctions involving N4RBtroops are invariably
r conservativein nature, usuallytaking placewithin
l-\ rangeofsuppor ng adilleryJke.
/'a\

thed rcdoi or €d'o.0nmu 6rois

z-,.,4
in ihe AssemblyArea.
Ficure79.Comrnunrcations

TI4
 ''',:i

.:-.J:
J;

-E
\\

KEY
-<nto=!ru /.=--.\
\ alJ _,/ Panrod dq16bru

.<- P
.J?

NOTES
bFdNel:) depeid lpoi METI A5,

F gure80.A Motori2ed
RiileBaitalionin a Heliborne
Assa!lt
 Section D - Water Bariet ODerations
1. GENERAL lf a forward detachment has been designated
and has accomplishedits missionof 6stablishinga
Whenever possible,the Soviets try to force a bridgehead,an MRB, acting as th6 lead regi
wat€r barrierfromths marchon a broadfront, with rnent's advancoguard, would be given lhe mis-
minimum delay in appro6chingand crossingthe sion of expandingthe bridgehead(in conjunction
obstacle.Th;s type of hasty crossingis usuallyat- with the forward detachment)or passingthrough
temptgdagainstnonexistentorweak defens€s,and the bridgeheadand continuing the €ttack. l{ a
when the curent and condhion ol the banks on crossing cannot be accomplished,the advance
both sides of the obs€cle are favorable. Hasty guardhasthe missionotclearingthe nearbank,
crossings reduce the attacker's vulnerabilify to
nuclearfires and enablohim to raoidlvcontinuethe In the absonc€ ot a forward detachmenr,the
lead regiment's advance guard would be given
the mission of linkup with airborne/heliborne
When a hasty crossinghas failed due to €n6my forces and/or securing and oxpanding a
def€nses and/or unprepared or poor crossing bridgehead.
sites, the crossingis methodicallyplannedand a
deliberatecrossing attempted, Deliberatecro$- Whetheracting as the division'sIorwa.d detach-
ings are time-consumingand costly. Moreover, menl or the rggiments advanceguard, the MRB
they slow offensivemomentum and increasethe would be h€avily6ugmented,containingup to:
attackor'svuInerabilityto nuclear fires.
- Onea.till€rybattalion.
The BMP equippedMRB is paniculaflyw€ll
- Two tank companies.
sujtsd to conduct a river crossingbecauseof the
BIMP's antitank capabiliti€s.The BlvlP'equipp€d - Oneairdefense platoon{twoZSU-234s).
MRB needs lewer tanks (and, therefore, less
engineersupport)than a non-BMP-equipped unit, - Oneantitank platoon(BRDMS).
and can- therefore,cross a water obstaclelaster
- Onebridgeplatoon{or section).
than a BTR-equippedN4RBwith armorsupport.
- Onesapperplatoon,
2. ROLESAND MISSIONS
.. OnechemicaI detachment,
The IVIRBmay cross 6 w6te. obstacleas a divi-
sion's forward detachment.as the advanceguard Acting as part of the main body, the lvlRB
of a regiment, or as part of the regimentalmain would approach crossingsiles on a broad front
and in marchformation.
Knowing that his unit musl cross one of more The remainderof this section will discussthe
water obstacles,a division commanderwill nor- MRB acting as the advance guard of the divi
mally task a regiment (most probably a regiment sion's lead regimentmaking a hasty crossingand
in the division'smain body during the march) to establishing a bridgehead.
providean llRB to serv€ as the nucleusof a lor-
ward detachment(in some circumstances,an en- 3. THE CROSSING
tire rcgimentcouldact as a f orwarddetachmentl,

As the division'sforward detachment.the IVIRB

would have the missionof linkupwith a heliborne
or airborne force, or to seize and exDand a
bridgehead from the march. The bridgehead
could be up to 7 kilometersdeep on the lar bank.
Forward detachments,in their race to seize and
oxpand bridgeheads,try to avoid contact with
withdrawingenemyf orces.
116
Planningfor the crossing of a water barfier
beginsas early as possible,prefsrablybefore the
rnarch. Basedupon all availableintelljgenceand a
careful, detailed map study, the senior com-
mander designatesthe number and approximate
locationsof crossingsites. developsa concept of
operations,and insures that prior to the march.
torward detachments,advance guards, and lead
regimentshave adequate6ngineersupport. In ac- crossing.In addition, he givesfire missionsfor aF
cordance with new int€llig€nceand changes in tillery and mortars in coveringthe assaultand in
the tactical situation {otten provided by combat support of aclions on the opposite tank,
and engineer reconnaissancepersonnel,figurg assemblyarea for lanks to carry out snorkeling
81), the olan is refined and new instructions (or ferry crossing)operations,details of logistics
issuedduring th€ march. No formal combat order support,and comrhandandcontrolinstructions,
is issued {or a hasty crossing. Regimentaland
divisioncommandersofien €xerciseclosesupervi- The advanceguard is heavilyrcintorcedfor its
sion of the crossingtrom commandposts located mission. The ord6r of march of the advance
nearth€ waterobstacle. guard is organizsdto place the bulk of the com-
bat power and key engineer uni6 and items of
The regimentalcommandergives detailed in-
equipmentas far torwardas possible,
stmctionsto his advanceguard commanderas to
how he is to preparefor and accomplishhis mas- b. CommandandContol
sion, Though he carriesout his missionsepamtely
from the regimentalmain body, the MBB advance During the march, the battalion commander
guard commanderis still closelysupervisedby hisand staff, along with the attached artill€ry bat-
senior commander. He maintainsconstant radio talion cornmander, are well torward. situated
communicationswith the regimentalcommander behind the advance party. During the assault
and may have a regimentalstaff officer whh him crossing.the battalioncommanderexercisesclose
to makE sure that everythinggoes according to personal control from a command oost located
plan, near the water ba(ier. The organizationand con-
Vol of rhe crossing sites are delegated by the
To his organic and attached commandersthe senior engineer officer present {figurg 82). The
advance guard commander gives the mission, battalion command€r and the attach€d artillery
march order, reconnaissancedata. location of battalioncommanderprobably cross th€ obstacle
cro6sing sites, assault sch€dule. and order of behindthe {irsrecheloncomDanies.

ol BothRiv€rBanksUsuallyPrecedes
Fisure8l. Reconnaissanc€ the MainAseult

lI7
 FiSure82.TheSeniorEn€ineerOflicerCoitrols
c. Secuing the Neat Eank
lf the near bank has not been seizedby a fo.-
ward detachmentor heliborneforce, the advance
guard accomplishesthis task and establishscross-
ing sites. Every effort is made by the advance
guard to sdze the near bank quickly and to pre-
vent the enemy from organizing an effective
defenseor destroyingexistingcrossing$tes. The
reconnaissance patrol crossesas soon as possible
and conducts active reconnaissanceof the far
bankand bridgeheadobjectives.
Attached engineercestablishandlor improve
crossingsites. Trackedamphibiousferriesgo into
assemblyareas and wait until the far bank has
been seized belore transportingthe artillery bat-
talion. (Bridge-layingtanks go into position and
aid in getting the advance party across narrow
water obstaclesup to 20 meters in width.) Ap-
proachesto the water obstacleare marked, and
control points are establishedto maintain move-
mentand preventcongestion.
The advanceparty crossesas rapidlyas possi
ble and continuesits missionon the far bank. lf it
is unable to cross, it takes the enemy under fire
and awaits the arival of the advance guard's
main body. Smoke is used to conceal crossing
locaflons.
118
theCrossing.
An MRB will normally cross a water obsracte
in one echelon with all three companiesabreast
(two abreastif the advanceparty crossesearlier)
and 50 to 100 meters betweenvehicles.This foF
mation places maximum combat power forward
and allows for the mosr rapid crossing of the
obstacle. BlvlPs, white in the water, fire th€ir
mainarmament andSAGGERS as required.
Attached artilleryand mortarsprovidetire sup-
port (figure 83) and smoke, and displaceby bat-
tery on order. Attached tanks go into an
assemblyareaand preparetor the crossing{figure
84) or, if the enemy fires trom the far shore are
particularlyheavy,they provide direct lire support
for the [4R8. Air defense elements set up on
ground from which they can provide air defenso
and direct fire support for the entire crossing,Air
defensefires are supplementedby the battation,s
SA-7 gunnersatop the BMPSduring the c.ossing
(ligure85).
Havingcrossedthe obstacle,the MRB pushes
rapidly inland 5 to 7 kilometersand establisnesa
bridgehead{figure86). The MRB's attachedranks
and anillery cross as soon as possible(figure 87)
and lake up assignedpositionswithin the bridge-
head. The sappe.platoonaids the MRB In rm-
proving its defenses,while other engineerperson-
nel remainbehind to further improvethe crossing
sitesfor the regimentalmainbody.
Fisure83.Self-propelled
Art rleryardZSU-23.4s
Supportine
a RiverCrossing.

FiSure 84.T52s Preparingfor a Riv€rCrossing.

 hC

ArtilleryandzSlJ23 4s SupporiingaRiverCross
Figurea3.Selt-propelled ns.

Figure84.T62s Preparing
lor a RiverCrossing.
Figure85.SA.7GunnersSupplement DuringawaterCrossingOperation
OtherAir DeienseWeapons

120
 ,fli. -:!: l'1! i .

ff); .:a:^i

KEY
-..*o-E b*! dd aniko m manh eruhi

i:i
>d(

K9
\d en[ Podonbndse*.l.is IPMP)

/-r+1 Denroye brdge

P
NOTES
r.Th. h Lhcb4n io$e run 'e the Fe! nmedai.dbranv!
1hoox.."|dbe,dha'ry'"

inBa Bridtehead
int a Wat€rBarier andEstablish
Fiture86.A RernrorcedotorizedRitle83llalionAssaull

L2I

:-..4"@AZia#;.
Figure87.AttachedArmorR€joinsMotorized
Rill€TroopsasSoon
4. DEFENSE
OFA BRIDGEHEAD
When the enemy is too strong lor the regi-
ment's advanceguard to continue the march, it
defends the bridgeheadand waits for ihe regi
mentalmain body. Normallythe bridgeheadhas a
radius of 5 to 7 kilometers (depending upon
IVIETT)and denies the enemy observationof the
crossingsites. Usually the l,,lRB has the bulk ol
its combat power on the enemy side of the
obstacle,but it leavesa small securityforce with
engineerson thefriendlysideof the river.
Special features of the MRB'S defense of a
bridgeheadare:
- Flanksrest on the water barrierto increase
the stabilityof the defense.
.. Antitank, air defense, and artillery within
the bridgehead are greater than in normal
- Large reserves of ammunition, rations,
POL, and other suppliesare bought into the
bridgeheadas rapidly as possible(helicopters
can play a key role here until the regimental
mainbodyarrives).
- Specialcamouflagemeasuresaie taken at
the crossingsites.
r22
C
as Possibte
in a RiverCrossine
The defenseof any bridgeheadis expectedto
be mafted by particulardetermination.Acting on
jts own, far in front of the regiment'smain body,
the MRB conductscounterattacksas necessaryto
preservethe integrity of the FEBA. Though con-
siderablyaugmenled, the l\4RB is still stretched
p.etty thin and, with its back to the water, con-
ductsa desperatedefense,
5. DEFENSE
OF A RIVERLINE
In organizingth€ defenseof a river line on only
one bank, the Soviets normally designate the
FEBA as the water's edge of the friendly oank
(figure 88). Regimentand division normallysend
reconnaissance forces and combat securityforces
to the far bank. lslandsin the river are occupied
and fonified to prevent surpriseenemy crossings
and to provide flanking fires against enemy
forces. Crossingsites on the far bank and fords
are mined, obstacles constructed in the water,
and banksscarped.Antitank and artilleryfhes are
closely tied in to the obstacle plan. Dams and
other installationswhich could be used to llood
the river are guarded and doslroyed on ord€r of
the regimental commander,
The MRB, as part of the regiment's {irs!
echelon defenses,has the mission of preventing
the enemy from establishinga bridgehead.The
organizationand conduct of the defenseis similar
to th€talreadvdescribedin ChaDter5.
 1:Tt]|iR9!.:
sEcLrR,noP-;} zj_._:.;)::.-(
'jl.-,-:lttj.-'

i
I
_nJ._::.'-_.
';'. ---- ' -';ooo5

0
A",/

o A
A
6d E
A

P IW ah Ery.oi@dDioi (irn*'.d)

A r--a--r
-v7
A
f- -tI obn&6 o. a rus b*

A .n
A @ i:,,i#Jl!;lg1""
Frgure88. Moloirz€dRrlleBattalionDele.drngaRiverL'ne
A Reinlorced
t23
6. VULNERABILITIES combat until after unsealing,which takes about
20 minutes. lt may, however,fire atter emerging
While formidablg, Soviet river crossingtechni- from a snorkelcrossing.
quescontaincertainvulnerabilities:
- Convary to doct.ine, the Soviets seldom
- Intended crossingsites may be prematurely
practiceriver crossingsduring night or other con-
revealedby reconnaissancepersonnel, ditions of limited visibility- lt is more likely that
- Although heavilyreinforced,the lVlRB,when ths Soviets conduct rcconnaissance,resupply,
preparationunder conditions of
establishing and defending a bridgeh€ad, is and engineering
vulnerable to counterattack, particularly in the limited vasibilityand conduct crossings durang
early stages,when it is separatedfrom its attach- daylighthours.
ed tanks and rear services, ln the absence of - River crossingsare very complex operations
bridges.rhe tanks must sno*el or be transportsd requiring close timing and coordination. Some
by lerry, while the rear servicesmusl also be fer- lack of control, congestionat crossingsites, and
riedacross- late arrival of crossing equipment is inevitable
-- Snorkels are vulnerableto fire and may be (particularlyduring operarionswith high rates of
damaged prior to crossing. While under water, advance),with subsequentopportunitiesfor the
tanks are vulnerable to a numbef of defensive defense.
measures, to include undercut banks, tetra- .- Regardlessof the Soviet's formidable afiay
hedrons, floating logs, and napalm (napalm of amphibious vehicles and their excellent
detonatedon the water's surface would suck all engineerequipment,water barriersar€ obstacles
the sif out of the lanks under water, causingsut- which will slow down the tempo of attack, par
focation), Moreover, once a tank is sealedfor a ticularlywhen the barriersarewelldefended.
water crossing, it cannot engage in sustained

SectionE-NightCombat
1 .G E N E R A L 2. THE NIGHTMARCH

The Sovier view on the importance of night
operationsis containedin this typicalquote:
Under contemporaryconditions, there is
an incr€asein the significanceand expan-
sion of the night altack which requires
persistent training of troops for opera-
tionsundernight conditions.
In spite of this written emphasis on night
operations, actual pfactice of night combat
techniques is spor6dic and often unrealistic.
Although this section concentrateson how the
Soviets say night operations should 6e con-
duct6d, the vulnerabilitiesparagraphat the end of
the section illustrat€sthe disparity betw€en doc-
trineand practice.
Night attacks may be supported or unsup'
ported, illurninated or nonit\$minated. Norma\\y a
Soviet night attack occurs after an artillery
preparationand will involve extensiveuse of il-
lumination,
While the planningsequenceand operations
order format are the same for night and day
movements, the MRB commander takes addi-
tional measuresto cope with difficukiesposed by
nighl operations. These measures prilharily in-
volve commandand control, and security,and in-
cludethefollowing:
.- The march column is shonened, with 25 to
30 meters between vehicles,and reconnaissance
and secudty units operatecloser than normal to
the mainbody.
- Reconnaissance and security units are larger
and more numerousdue to the greater threat of
surPriseattackby enemyforces,
- Speed is reducedto 15 to 20 kilometersper
houf for a mixed column of BlvlPs, tanks, and
wheeled vehlcles lthls speed also depondsupon
the condition of the vehiclesand roads, and on
the traininglevelof drivers).

124
 - Shon halts of 20 to 30 minutesevery 2 to 3
hoursare plannedto help reducedriverfatigue
{longhaltsarenormally not allowedat nigh0.
-- Observerswith njght vision devicesare plac-
ed throughout
thecolumn.
-- The regimentalcommander'splan for traffic
control is augmented as necessaryby the bat-
talion commander. Exlra vaffic controllers are
detaiLedand posted a! road junctions and other
keyfeatures alongthe route,
.. Signalsfor control,warning,and target in-
dication primarily involve the use of light and
pyrotechnics.As during day marches,radios are
on listeningsilence,althoughNBC and air warn'
ings, as well as the crossingof important phase
lines,are reported.
lf organizedproperly,the march formation pro-
videslor the rapidmovement,security,and com-
mand and controlof the column,while avoiding
the need to reform in the event of a night
meetingengagement.
3, THE NIGHTMEETINGENGAGEMENT
Although gen€rally conducted in the sam€
manneras in daylight, the night meeting€ngage'
ment is more complicated.lts successprimarily
depends upon the initiaiive and flexibility of the
battalioncommanderand his subordinates, as augmented with tank, artillery, engineer, and
well as upon the skillful use of night vision chemica' unils. A typical battalion grouping
devicesandilluminationequipment.
While helping to conceal the battalions ad'
vance,night also slows down the MRB's initial
deploymentand complicatescommand and con-
troldue to observationand orientationdifficulries.
lrore emphasisis placed upon reconnaissance
to the flanks, and guides may be detachedlrom
reconnaissance groupsand securityforces to help
the MRBdeploy.
4. THE NIGHTATTACK
The M88 engages an night operataonsin atr
phases of combat. Nighr operations may be a
cont;nuationof a daytimeoperationor the precur-
sor of a new skge of combat. The IMBB may be
expectedio launchindependent nighi attackslor
limited objectivesor to attack as part of the regi'
when possible,pr6parationsfor night combat
are done during daylight.This allowsthe battalion
commanderthe time and visibilityto point out the
objectives, control features, and targets to has
subordinatecommanders.ln addition to normal
attack preparations, rhe battalion commander
doesthefollowing:
.. Designatesa guad6companyand compass
bearingfor the advance.
Determinesthe method of employingnight
visionequipmentand plansto supplement his
superiors' iilumination plans {see paragraph
ol,
' lssues instructionsfor mutual recognition,
target identificationand coordination,and the
method of signaling when phase lines hav€
beenreachedand objoctivestaken.
-- Ordersthe checkingof nighr visionequip.
mentandvehiclelights.
Requestsaddition6l illumination,signalin0
equipment, and tracer ammunition as r€-
qurred.
c, Augmentation
As in other types of operations,the MnB is
would, in additionto th€ MRB assets,contain:
-- Onetankcompany.
- Oneattilleryba(ery.
- Ones€pperplatoon.
- Onechemical detachment,
lf enemy minefieldshave to be negotiated,at
least one tank per platoon would havo 6
d. Thellumination Plan
tn" -T-":99t and his steff
.,|."q',t"1'"1.
preparethe illumination plan This planincludes:
- lllumination of obiectives,axes of attack,
obstaclesand reler€ncepoints.
- Blindingof enemynight visionequipment.
125
 -' llluminationtargetsfor air and artillery Battalionnight anack frontagesover moderate
terrain are the same as during daylight: 1 to 2
- Designationot sp€cificbatteriesto provide kilometers,
In rugged terrain, however, int€rvals
illumination.
betweenBMPSare reduced,€nd the lvlR8 attacks
llluminarion is planned so as to silhouene on a n€rrowerfrontage.
enemy forces and to interferewith the enemy's g. Conductof the Attack
nighrvisiondEvices.
An artill€ry preparationof 20 to 30 minutes
The battalion commander supplements the
usuallyprecedesahenight ass6ult.{When secrecy
regimentalcorhmander'silluminationplan wirh his
oulweighsother fectors, there may be a silenrfire
own 6ssets, White arm bands are used by the plan.
i.€., artilleryon call, or th6 artilleryprepara-
companies for mutual recognition; luminous
tion may be ot shoner duration,)Sappers,closely
designs are put on combat vehicles to identify
{ollowed by tanks and dismounledinfantry, move
unils; flares arc used to signal the crossing of
out to prepare passagesthrough enemy mine-
phas6 lines and the capture of objecrives;move-
fields. Under optimum conditions (i.e., good
m6nt routes and passagesthrough minefieldsar€
trafilcabilityof the ground, light and/or neutraliz-
usu8lly mark€d with luminous markers turned
ed enemy antitank defenses,and good illumana-
towardsthe attackingtroops.
tion). tanks may prece€ddismountedinfsntry by
e. CommandandConttul 150 meters. Normally, how6ver, tanks and in
fantry attack closely togeth€r, separatedby only
In the altack, the battalion commandercon- 10 to 20 meters, therebyfacilit6tingclose coord-
trols the advance of the guide company and ination, command, and control. BMPSalso move
movesdirectlybehindit. closer behind their infantry than during daylight
and suppo.t the attackby fire (figure89).
L Objectives, Rates ot Advance. Attack Foma-
tions and Frcntages Organic mortarsand attachodartillery provida
illuminationand direct and indirecr lire suooort.
Under favorableconditions,the d€pth of th€ The anached anillery commander accompanies
lvlRB'sobjectiveswill be the same as during day- the MRBcommander in the anack.
light operations.Under less favorablecondirions,
Ior example, when the attack musl occur over The battalion commanderrEportsto regiment
the crossingof phaselines and the seizurooI ob-
broken rerrain, the banalion objective may be
lt is the batralion commander'srgspon-
shortensd. lf enemy resistance is light or if iectives,
sibility to initiate pursuit of withdrawing ensmy
nuclgarweaponsare used, the N'IRBmay attack
forces. Should the enemy be too strong, the
mounted and aim for deeper objoctives 8nd
MRB establishesnight defensive positions and
higher rates of advance. The Soviets antjcipate
preparesto repulseenemycounterattacks,
night rates of advanceof 1.5 to 2 kilometercper
hour, and faster rates over especially level, h. Trcnsition lrcm Nighttime to Daytime Operc-
treeless ground without extensive manmado
obslacles.
The major factor in changing from nighttime
Usually, the MRB will attack dismounted in to daytime operations is continuing the attack.
on€ echelon,all three companiesabr€ast,with a Belors davbreak. additional t6sks are allocated
platoon in rese.ve.This formation placesthe bulk and ammunition rcolenished. The battalion re-
of the battalion's combat power foNvard and serve, if not committed during $e night. is used
facilitatescommandand control. When the lvlRB to maintSinthe momentum of the attack, Becon-
commander is less sr.ire of his flanks and the naissanceis intensified,and antiaircraft dofense
enemysituarion,he may attack with two reinforc- 6nd c€mouflage measuresincreasedas daylight
ed companiesin the first echelon and one rean- aooroaches, ll his first-echelon battalions are
forc€d cohpany in the second echelon {reserve). unable to immediatelyconduct the pursuit, the
In night attEcks the second echelon {reseruelis regimental commander commits his second-
clos6rto the first echelonthan during daylightat- echelon battalion or reserve to continuo the
tacks. momentumof the atteck.
t26
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r.1l'. pnido.r mrhd or @ndu.t'4 [um'n.rF E Fin* 'rlun'n.ro 5.dr.lir3.lsaid otid!.! ror shon p..k{s oI

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iruniirloi overa 4* lironrin arca

Fisure89.A Reinlorced
Motoraz€d
RilleBrttalionConductanga
NightAttack.

127

I
5. NIGHTDEFENSE Prior to daylight, the l/lFB commander plans
for the transition to daytime defense; casualtaes
Thr6€ major factors involvedin a night defense are evacuated,resupplyis accomplished,person-
are security, illumination, and forward defenses nel are fed, and the manningof defensesis again
(Jigure 90). The lvlRB, ;n addition to normal
changed,resultingin more depth to the defensive
defensivemeasures,makes the following special
preparatrons:
6, VULNERABILITIES
- Listening posts and foot patrols to the
{ront and flanks are increased in order to The discrepencybetlveendoctrine and practice
reducethe possibilityofsurpriseattack. is considerable.Although they are supposed to
spend about 40 percentof their tacticalfiring and
-- A larger percentageof pe.sonnel on the
tactical exercisesat night, Soviet units often do
FEBA are maintainedat full combat readi- not meet the requirement.Frequently,night tacti-
cal exercisesare unrealistic;despite a variety of
- The manningof daytimedefenseschanges; night vision devices, vehicular headlights and
crew-servedweapons are moved to alternate flashlightsare often used to help maintaincontrol
fi.ing positionsand attached and supporting and orientation,
artillery and tanks are moved closer 1o the As in World War ll, the Soviets will probably
FEBA. The IMRB'Srear services also move continue to use the night primariiy for troop
movement, attack preparation, construction of
-- The availabilityand serviceabilityof night fortifications, and resupply. Night attacks in
visiondevicesarechecked. greater than regimentalstrength will probablybe
a rarity {at least initially) and be undertaken
-. Periodicilluminadonof the terrain forward primarilyto take an objectivewhich could not be
of the FEBA is scheduled.The senior com- takenduringdaylight.
mander'silluminationplan is supplementedby
battalionassets,as in the offensive. The complexitiesof night operationsare par
ticularly evident at battalion level and below.
- Guide posts are established within the Two-year conscripts. inexperiencedNCOs, and
MRB s AO to aid counteratiacking forces. junior officers unaccustomedto flexibilityand in
itiative, make night combat a costly affair. Higher
The IVIRB commander positions his second commanders seem reluctant to comm;t their
echelon (reserve) on key terrain astride the forces at night. Soviet commandersare, however,
enemy's must likely avenue of penetration. aware of their deficienciesin night operationsand
Counterattacksare launchedby the battalion'sse are attemptrngto cofiect them,
cond echelon {reserve)in accordancewith the
regimentalcommander'sdefense plan, CounteF
attacking forces nofmally have a shallow objec-
tive. Upon elimination of the penetration, con-
solidationtakes placealong with further efforts to
improvedefenses,

128
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i
Fitur€ 90. A Reinfmed Moloriz 6d Rill€ Battal|oo'n a NEhl Dal6ns€.
i
I
 Section F - Seabone Assault and Defense of a Coastline
1. GENERAL - Seaborne assaults were rarely conducted
by units largsr than a regiment. This was an
Although rslalivslylittl€ has been written about part du€ to a criticalshortageof landingcraft,
th6 MRB conducting Seaborneassaultsand cl€- and the subsequent use of fishing boats,
f€nding a coastline, thes€ are probably current launches, and whatever else was available,
missions of some motorized rifle troops, More- Seaborn€assaultswere freouentlvconducted
ov6r, there is sound historicalprecedentfor using st night and usually successful in spite of
army troopsin this manner. highcasualties.
2. HISTORICATPEBSPECTIVE - The existence of seaborneassault forcss
immobilizedlargenumbersoI Germantroops,
During World War ll, th6 Soviets conduct6d
ovor 100 seaborneassaults.Twenty-fivenaval an- - The naval commanderwas usuallyin com-
fantry brigades of 3000nen each usuallyprovided mand whjle forces were afloat, while the
thg first-echelonassault forces in these opela- senior landing force commander w6s in
tions. Special naval detachments (armed and changeoncethelandingsitewassecured.
lrained for land combat, but separatefrom the
naval inlantry) and army units often comprised Today, the Soviet naval infantry {figu16 9l),
the second echelonand reservesfor these opera- consisting of approximately15,000men organized
lrons, in 6 regiments, has the primary lnission of
seaborne assault, ln event of war, because of
Five factors in World Waf ll Soviet seaborne their small numbers and light equipment, Soviet
assault operationshavecurrentrelevance: naval infantry would probably be augmented by
- Soviet naval infanlry, relatively lew in specially trained ermy units. Dus to r€lalively
small numbers of amohibious craft. sea assault
number. had to be sugmented by naval
operationswould probably be conductod in bat-
detachmentsand army units.
talion and regimentalstrength. Wh6n6ver possi.
'- The naval intantry were usuallywithdrawn ble, navalinfantry would form the first echslonoI
oncethe beachheadwas secured, the assaultforce (figure 92), with motorizedrifle
units comprisingthe second echelonand reserve;
in other cases,sp€ciallytlained army forc€s might
comprisethe wholeassaultforce.

'*i; ik{')a '^..-i

'i:S,$ i

Fi8ure9l.Navalln,anlryonParad€in Moscow.
I30

Fi€ure92. NavallniantryOllenFormTheFifst Echelon
rna
3. MTSStONS
The [4RB in a seaborneassaultcould have the
following missions:
-- The capture of key teffain and installations
(islands,land areasborderingstrategicstraits,
po s, coastaI airfields,etc),
.' The conduct of divErsionaryraids and commanderprobably lands wiih (or immediately
reconnaissance.
-- Securinga beachheadfor the openingof a
Thes€ opefationswould be primarily designed
to aid land offensivesalreadyin progressor about
to stan, Ouite often, seaborneassaults involve
heliborn6and/ or airborneforces,
4. THE ASSAULT
Strategic seaborneassaultmissionswould be
planned primarilyat frcnt level by a joint opera-
tions group consistingof naval,air, and army per
sonnel. The landing force is assigneda wailing
'15
area, l0 to kilometets from the embarkation
point, a main embarkationpoint with one or two visibility.l\,4issile
alternates,and a main debarkation point with one
or two altarnates{figure 93).Unnecessary concen-
tration of forces is avoided during embarkalion
l3l
and transit phases to decreasethe damage of
nuclearattack.
In addition to normal attack planning,the
MRB commanderconductsreconnaissance of the
waiting area, embarkationpoint, and ths alternate
sites, preparesmen and equipment for loading
aboard ships, and conducts loading and beach
assaultexercissswilh the naly,
b. Augmentation
As in most other operations, the MRB
receivesreinforcementaccordingto l{ETT. In this
case,it hasbe€nreinforcedasfollows:
One tank company {PT-76 amphibious
tanks).
- Oneartillerybattery.
- Oneairdefense
platoon,
-- Onesapperplatoon,
- One ground'air-navysuppon team {to ad-
justnavalgunfire
andairsuppo().
Loading principles include unit integrity and
reverce loading (first off, last on). Logistical
elementsload first, followed by the reserve,se-
cond echelon, and first echelon. The battalion
behind) his fi|st echelon. Whenever possible,
loading and moving to the objectivearea is done
at nrght.
d. Trcnsport Craft
The Soviet Navy uses three principletypes of
amphibious ships: the ALL|GAToR ctass LsT,
the ROPUCHAClassLST, and the POLNOCNY
ClassLslvl ({ig!re 94). The Sovieis are also using
air-cushionvehicleswhich, becauseof their speed
and ability to operate over land and water, pro-
vide a new dimensionto amphibiousoperations
(figure95l.
e. Tftnsit and fueassault Phases
ldeally, transit of the amphibioustask force
occtirs during darknessor other periodsof l;mited
and antisubmarineescort vessels
protect and provide cover for lhe assaultforces.
Ships armedwith missiles,guns, and rocketspro-
vide preparatory fire and navalguniire suppoft for
the assault troops during th€ latter's inland ad'
vance. Minesweepers,under cover of naval and
air bombardment, clear channelsthtough mine_
fields and are {ollowed by hydrographic and
hydfometeorological vessels, which provide
weather data, take soundings,determinethe bot-
tom contours in approachesto landing sites, and
mark the cleared channels through minetields.
NaW undeMater demolition teams are trans-
ported by high speedwatercraftand/or helicopter
to clear water and b€ach obstacles,lf possible,a
minimum of one channel is clearedfor each MR
The assault may be preceded by a
heliborne/airborneoperation in conjunction wath
air attacks in the objective area (figure 96).
Heliborne/airborneforces often have the mission
of blocking the arrival of enemy reinlorcements
into the beachhead. In an unopposedlandingor
against light resistance,the MRB in most cases
offloadson the beach.
In an opposed landing, BlvlPs, amphibious
tanks, and/or tanks equippedwith snorkelsleave
their landingships at sea and swim ashore.Once
ashore,the lvlRB'sattack is similarto that aheady
described-

,'2.,,4:,tl:
-ji I -t l.t MRBASSEMBTAREA
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F gure93 EmbarkatonandDebarkaiotrPornts

t32
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b ROPUCf,ACloss

F E U r e 9 4 A n ! p hb i o u s S hp s .

I3l
 . POTNOCNYCi!!s

Fisure94.AmphlbiolsShps. (Continued)

Figure95.Amphibious
AssautisMayBeConducred
WithAnC!shionvehictes.

r34
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NOTES
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FiSure96. A R.inlor@d MoiorizedBifle B:italion Conductingan Amih ibiousAssault.

 5. DEFENSE
OFASEA COAST ground-basednaval air power, In the latter case,
ai.-ground support liaison personnel are also
assignedto the MRB. Naval engineers,whjte not
The defenseof a sea coast is very simatarto attachedto the MR8, constructwater and oeacn
the defenseof a river line. Normatlythe MRB wijl obstaclesin frontof the FEBA.
def€nd a coastline as part of the regiment,
e. The Baftalion Defensive Position
though it may defend isolated sectors indepen
As an normal operations,reinfo.cedcompany
strongpoints form the basis of the battalion's
defensiveposition.Time permitting,alternateand
The [/lRB's missionis to prevent amphibious, dummystrongpoints arealsoorganized,
airborne,and helibornelandingswithin ;ts area of
L Conduct of the Defense
operations.
The conduct of a coastaldefenseis practically
c. Frontages, Depths and Fotmations
the same as defenseof a ver line. Everyeffort is
When the battalionis assignedits normalfron- takenro destroytheenemvin thewaterandro wipe
tage of 2.5 kilometers {5 kilometers in nuctear out his airborne/heliborne forces beforethey move
conditions), it usually defends in two echelons; out of theirlanding
and dropzones.
when given a wider frontage, it defends In one
6. VULNERABILITIES
echelon,with all threecompanies on lineand one
platoon in reserue.Depth of the battalionforma Amphibiousiandingsare unlikelyunless the
taonis up to 2.5 kilometers.The FEBA is tocated Sovietshavelocarair and navalsup'emacy-adif-
as close as possibleto the water's edge and is ficult task in somegeographicalareasin l;ghrof the
usually not more than 500 meters from k. The presentlack of sufficientseaborneairpower.Naval
missionof the battalionreseruereflectsa greater air and otherair forces,when within range,support
than normal concern for enemy airborne, heli mostamphibious operations,bLltmay not be as ef-
borne, and diversionaryforces in the baftalion,s fectiveas air supportprovidedby carrierbaseda|l-
rear area.The missionof the reserveis to combat power of certainwesrer4 rations, due to the proxj
theseforces,as well as to destroy penetrationsby mityofthe carriers andspecializedpilottraining.
amphibiousforces.

d. Augmentation The relativelysmall numberof amphibiouscraft

also limits Soviet seaborne assauli capabilities,
Along with the usual artittery, air defense,
althoughthe large Soviet merchantmarineparl|ar-
armor,engineer,and chemicalsupport,the MBB ly offsetsthis problem.
can be supported by coastal batteries and

136
 CHAPTER
9. CONCLUSIONS
The Soviets recognizethree types of combat
actionr the offense,the defense,and the meeting
engagement,with the latestpracticedmost often,
Soviet doctrihe stressesthat the offensive is the
only decisivstorm of combal and ihat rhe main
purposeof the offensiveis lhe completedestruc.
tion of the enemy's forces. The Soviets hope to
achievehigh rates of advance(30 to 50 kilometers
per day in conventionaloperationsand 60 lo 80
kilometersper dav under nuclearconditions)from
combined arms units operating in conjunction
with aarborne,heliborne.and special opemtions
torcesin the enemyreararea.
Since the October 1973War, the Soviets have
olaced €ven more emDhasison combined arms
operations and have made numerous organiza-
tional and tactical adiustments to increase the
survivabilitv of thejr tank fofces. Numbers of
tanks and artillery pieces {especiallySP anillery)
whhin the l\.4RDhave increased.The tank rema,ns
the backboneofcombinedarmsoperations.
The BlvlP.equipped IMRB is a highly maneu
verable, but relatively small, combat unit with
considerableorganic firepower, particula y anan-
titank weaponry. lt normally ope.at€sas part of
the [4RR. The MRB's si2e and limited organic
logisticalassetsmake augmentationnec€ssaryfor
many operarions.The MRB is often augmented
by motorized rifle regimeni and/or divisional
assets to form a heavily reinforc€d combined
armsgroupingto carryout a varietyof missions.
The battalioncommander'sage, educataon,and
oolitical awarenessorovide the theoretical basis
for effective command. His field training and
peacetimecommand assignmentspanially offset
his lack of combat experience.Soviet command
theory and operationalconcepts, however, result
in haghlycentralizedcontrol at regimental level
and constrict the MRB commander's initiative
within the nanow parametersof highly derail€d
orders. Though technically well trained, Soviet
battalionand comoanv commandersoften fail to
exploatthe strong points of their men and equip
ment during field training ex€rcises.Training pro-
cedures indicate the limhed flexibility of tunior
officers and NCOS. lrore flexible Western com
manders should be able to exploit these weak-
nesses,particularlyduring operationswhich place
a Dromiumon initiativeand flexibilitv.
Battalion-level training, technically thorough
137
and highly centralized,stresseslundamentatsand
results in etf€ctive banle drill. Taclical training
which asrepeatedlypracticedincludesthe march,
the meeting engagement,wateFcrossingop€ra-
tions, negotiating minefields, 6ntiair and anti-
helicoptertactics, and operating in an NBC en-
vironment. Moral-politicaltraining is stressedand,
while boring for many, probablysucceedsin con-
veying th€ propagandaof the CPSU. Trainingef-
fectivenessis complicat€dby the 2-year term of
servaceand the subsequenthigh turnover ot con-
scriots.
The N4RBis capable of conducting offensive
and defensiv€ oDerationsunder Special condi
tions: combat in buih'up arcas, heliborneopera_
tions, water barrier ope.atlons, night combat,
seaborne assault. and defense of a coastline.
Training for these operationsv6ries. Though the
lvlRB musl be judged capable of conducting
urban combat operations,these operationscould
be costlv and slow. At l€astone NIFB per IVIRDis
trained to conduct heliborne operations. Thes6
operationsare normally conduct€d whhin range
of Soviet arlillery, due to the limited staying
power and mobility of the heliborne force.
Though formidable, Soviet river crossing capa-
bilhies also possesslimitations. Crossing opera-
tions are complexand would slow down the tem-
po of attack, particularlywhen the water obstacle
is well defended.When eslablishinga bridgehead,
the [rRB is esoeciallvvulne€ble to count€ratGck.
Battalion night combat training is not consistent
with doct nal requirements,which call for more
night tactical training than is actually conducted.
Two-year conscipts, inexperiencedNCOS, and
iunior officers not accustomedto flexibilityand in-
itiative would initially mske night combat costly.
Very few IvlRBs receive training in seaborn€
assault. In wartim€, MF troops would probably
provide the second echslon tor naval infantry
assaultforcesandsecurethe obiective.
The MRB is most effective when ope€ting 6s
part of the regiment,The institutionaland opera-
tional frameworkwithin which the battalioncom-
mander operates, however. is not conducive to
the flexibilityand initiativerequiredin independent
battalion oDerationsand in other ooerations in
which the regimentalcommanderand his staff are
not present.This would be especiallytrue during
nuclearconditions,
 APP€tlOlX
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 DISTBIBUTIONLIST
DOD AND JOTNT AGENCIF,S 8362 DIA,IDB.l8l I
8576 DIA/DB.I I
AOO9 OASDATOMENERGY I 85?6 DIA,'DB.IA t
AOIO AFSCOL I 8591 DIATIDB.IE 1
A016 DABPA I B?34 DIAT|DB.SE I
AO24 DEF NUCLEANACCY I 8663 DIAr'DB.1E2 2
AO85 NATDEF UNIVERSITY I B??? DIA,IDN.2BI I
4100 osD I 8552 DIA/I|SS-2
A1T5 OASDTSA I 8856 USDAOAUSTRTA I
AI1? OASDPA&E I 8856 USDAOBELGIUM I
A137 OASDA/MBF8.PP I 8869 USDAOBULGARTA I
A300 JCS I 8862 USDAOCANADA I
4315 JCS/SAGA 2 B8?1 USDAOCZECTTOSTOVAK I
4325 JCS/J-3 I 8872 USDAODENMARK I
A335 JCS/J-1 I 88?6 USDAOENGLAND I
A34O JCS/J.5MILSEC I B8?8 USDAOFINI,AI\ID I
4353 JSTPS I B8?9 USDAOFRANCE I
436T USLOSACLANT B88O USDAOGEBMANY I
A36,( USR&DCOORDSHAPE 8882 USDAOGBEECE 1
.{096 NEACP 8886 USDAOHUNGAiY I
AO9? DIAGRPANMCC 8693 USDAOITALY 1
A1o4 OASD(CCC&r) B9O8 USDAONETHEA.LANDS I
A362 USDOCOLANDSOEAST 8912 USDAONORWAY I
4363 USNMRSTIAPE 891? USDAOPOLAND' t
.136A USNMC/NATO 8918 USDAOPORTUCAL I
,\835 UNITMM 8919 USDAOROMANIA I
49T6 MAAGIBAN 8933 USDAOTUBKEY I
8934 USDAOUSSR I
DIA 8939 USDAOYUGOSLAVIA I

8010 DIA,aDIO
BO55 DIA,'DT.4B
8080 DIA/SWS D008 NISC I
BIOO DIA,IDB DO32 NAVPHIBSCOL I
BT32 DIA/DE.I Dr50 cMc{INT)
BT34 DIA,'DE.2 D15T NA\'EODFACIND HEAD
BI55 DIA/RDS3A4PP D162 NISCCBDDET OOO3
8159 DIA,IDT.IAI D159 NAVAIRDEVCEN
8162 DIA,IDT'IA2 D2O2 NAVWARCOL
8169 DIA,'DT.2D I D2T6 NAWVPNSUPPCEN
8322 DIA,'DN.2G1 I D21? NAVWPNCEN
8351 DIA/RDS.3D2 I D246 NAVSUBFWPNCENDAHL
8363 DIA/DB.IB2 I D24? NAVSURFWPNCENWOAK
836,I DIA,'DB-189 1 D249 NAVPGSCOL
8485 DIA/IS I D263 NOSC
85.!5 DIA/VP I D280 0P-098D
8565 DIA,/DB.IFI I D492 NAVSCOLEOD
8566 DIA/DB.IT2 t D6O? COMINEWABCOM
B57I DIA/DB.4G1 I D6TO CHNAII\'AA(MAT{90
8573 DIA/DB.4E I D56O NMEDITSCHINSTBETH
8674 DIA/DB.4G5 I D?66 NAVCOASTSYSLAB
86?9 DTA/DN.2B2 DgOO NFOIO
B58O DTA,/DB.IBs I D9?1 0P{09F
B58I DTA,/DB.IB I D9?2 0P{09U
8682 DTA/DB.1C I D058 0P404
8583 DIAIDB{D I D496 DTRSSPO
B58! DIA,IDB.TB4 30 D8T4 NAVSUPPACTTI
8586 DTA,/DB.4D1 I
8693 DIA/DB.IG2 I AIB FIOBCE
B59il DIA/DB-II' 2
859? DTA/DB.IGI 1 EO16 AFIS/INC I
8615 Dh/DN-2C 1 EOl? AFIS/TNSA.W I
8722 DIAIDB.6B I EO18 AFIS/TNSA{ I
8731 DIATDB.sF I EOi|6 ?602AINTELG/INOAA I
B?3? DIA/RDS.3B3(LTB) 6 EO63 AF/INAI(A I
8?63 DINJDB.4Cs I EO64 AI'/INAKB I
B?87 DIA/DB.IF3 1 E1OO TAC {460BTSI|LDD) 3
8262 DIAMS$3B I E2OO AAC t
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 E3O3 AF/TNAP I J615 FICEU&I-ANT
E'08 AF TL I J6I7 COMNAVSURFLANT
E4IT ASDMDAICD I J576 COMPTTIBGRU2
Er29 SAMSO(It{Dl I J991 FITCLANT
E436 AI'EWC/EST I K005 clNcPAc
E{3? AFISIINI I KOO? COMUSJAPAN
E438 USAI'SACS/TTVL I K020 coMusTDc
E461 AULILSE I K1OO PACAFS48ETG
E6OO s42OTCHTG/IIMNL I K115 6TH AF
E552 69rr g€TYS{Mt I 13(x) IPAC (CODEIC.LI
8663 6912SCTYS I K4O8 COMLATNTINGPAC{'282)
E659 69318C',IYS I K5fl) CINCPACFLT
E660 694,{SCTYW I K5O5 FTCPAC
E663 6948SCTYS(M) I K515 COMSEVENTHFLT
8665 6964SCTYS I K65O COMNAVSURFPAC
8566 698rSCTYS I K658 COMUSNAI?HIL
E567 6986SCTYS I It6?9 FLTCOBG&U 1
E?OC USAFSS/TN I I'05 CINCSAC
8lo9 AMD I w14 SAC 5!l TMSfTGOML
E4r0 ADIC I NOO5 USBEDCOM

U&S COMMANDS OTHM

COO6 CINCAD I m55 CIA/OCR/ADD/SD 1{

HOO6 USCINCEUR I P0A5 STATE 1
H(x)6 USEUCOMDEFANAICTR t F090 NSA _ 6
H0r0 S0TFE tJ.3) t RI45 ACDA 2
Hrol USAFEag?ErE{tRC} I SO3I' FRDLIBOFCONG I
1t007 sll-t( PURSE I
'TDTALDIA DISTRIBUTION 42a
AIMY DISTRIBUTION

Active Any. USAR: To he dirlributed iD accordlDc. with DA Foh l2-9A requir€hdts fd Militlry
tltelisaeB (qty requireb&t bL.t No.33?).ARNG: NoD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,900
MANTIIE COBPSDISTBIBUTION

Distributio!cod€:Lgl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4?5

DISTRIBUTION LIST (MICROFICHE)

DIA
8852 DrAr|&DS.9A2CSTOCK 5
873? DIA/RDS'3B8ILIB} 1

AI,MY
C20o VSAAG PUBCTR 50

NAVI
DSEI FIRSTPACO4?O

AIB FORCE
EroS AFWL
U&SCOMMANDS
K4OE COMT,ATWINGPAC{42B2) I

TSTAL PRINT 69
DL-2