lll

ilrltililliltillilillillilllllilllllllililililillil -76
DDI-1100-77

nee

i.ir'lv? | 1_:,3
,.P*,r!r, ioPy

THE SOVIET
MOTORIZED
RIFLE COMPANY
ocToBER1976
tr--
t
_--------.------
.Dffi
N
1
@/?/6 'ffi-L/-/)
T
to
I

J THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPAI{Y

,1
I
I
l
ii
ii
1

,r

'

l.
7-76
DDr-1lOO-7

Informatior Cut'Off Date:

June 1975

I
I

This document was Fepared by Major Robert M. Frasch6 of the Tactics and
Organization Section, Ground Forc€s[vlBFR Branch, Soviet/WarsawPact Dvision,
Drcctorate for Inteligenc€ (ResearchCenter), and is releasedfor publication by
authodty of the Drector, Defens€lnteligenc€ Agency.

{;ffifW,
cott{tYl,$nAlr
Ml[.rNotvrAs
\o PREFACE
This study war *rittcn for the us€ of serviceschoolsandfor unit inteligence officeF
,s an aid in pr$€nting classeson the organization,biining, tactics,atrdequipm€ntofthe
motodz€drifle company.
Th€ material presert€d on unit organlzationshould be u!€d as a guide or y. Soviet
organizationsvary widely d€p€ndingupon thetr manninglevels,weaponsand equipm€nt
mix,locatton andother factors. Dff€rencesin squadarmam€nt,capabilities,andnumben
of men per .rmor€d penonnel carrter (APC) exist betweenunits. Although old€r APC'S
are dbcu$ed, this study concentrrtespdmarily on the BMP€quipp€dmotorized dfle
comp8nies,sincethey gobably representthe d€sir€dst ndard-
The list of Sovietsymbolsusedmey be found in Appendix I.
Corunents, correctionsand suggestionsfor improvementof this study are requested.
They slrculd be sent thmugh proper channelsto the DefenseIntelligenc€Agercy, Cround
Forc€s/MBFRBranch,ATTN: DB-1B4, Washington,D.C.20301.

)o

lio l
 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
l lhis study examinesSovietoffcnsiveand defensive doctrineand the orSanistion,
training,racticsand cquiprnentof the Sovietmotorizedritle company.Emphasisis
placedon tlrc comp,rny equipped with the infantrycombalvehicle(BMP).Themotorized
rifle companyis organized, trainedandcquippcdprimrily fol a wal of rapidmovemcnl
and short durltion. Maneuverduringtacticaloperationsis restdctcdto wcil-rchcrn€d
combal formrtions and is oficn dictated by hisher authodty. Tactical doctrin€
cmph-asizes offensiveaction-Coordination of fire andmovement is practiccd, but usually
in clo!.ly regulated exercises.During operatioff, riflemen Sencrallyremain in lfteir
personnel calriersuntil conionted with seriousanti-rrmorfire, thendismounlto assaolt
positionswith supportfrom tanks,artillery,mortan,andt}lcil own pcrsonnel carriers.
2. Motorizedrine companyofficcrsreceive extensive professional andpoliticaltrainingin
schools,but areSivenlittlc opportunityto exercise initiativeandlackcombalexperience,
Conscripts rcceive prc-induction tmining prior to being assigncd to deir units.Although
th€ effectivcncss of pre'induction trainingis uneven, it has shown improvement in somc
,Jcas and may eventually provide cons(ripts with the n€c€ssarybasic military skills
befor€ they enter the army. About half of th€ consc.ipts,including sergea'tsand APC
crew members, rcccivesix montl$ specialisttrainingbeforethey reportto their units.
Other conscriptslcam thcir duties by repetitiveon-the-jobtrainmg and are not
cross{rained. The lrainingprognm lrnddhciplinarymearure!produccsoldienwho can
perforn their duticsadequately. Thcy arenol expectedto exercise initiaiivc.Tiaining,
andhenceindividualandunil effectiveness, aredegadedby thc lacl tlut conscnpbserve
only two ycars.Ncwtroopsarerotatcdinto unitssemi-annuauy.
3. Equipmentof thc motorizedriile companyprovidestlrc mems neededto conduct
r-o operationsand successfullyaccomplishlikely missions.Tlrc htroduction of the BMP is
lhe most significantrecentimprovemenlin the companytequipffenldnd consrderably
incrcascs its firepower.Shortcomings ofcompanycquipmcntinclude:
a. Squadleade$,whendisrnounted from th€irpenonnclcarriers, haveno radios.
b- Radiosavailablc to platoonleaders in dismounled operations hav€limitcdrange.
c- ThemaingunoI the BMPdoesnor havc stabilizer.
d Saggerantitank guided missilcsclnnol be effectivelyfired at night Mthout
illumination.
4. Sovietmotorind rinc companies, particularlythoseequippedwith BMPS, arecapable
of conductingeffectivccombatoperations. Althoughsomequalitativedeficicncies exist
in trainhg,equipmcntdndofganization, the Sovietsapparendy considcrtllal quantitative
superiorityis adequ,rte compensation.

?l
flo TABLEOF CONTENTS
THESOVIETMOTORIZED
RIFLECOMPANY
P.rr
Prcfacc iii

ExecutiveSunrJn{y

Tableof Corrcnts

List of Figur€s

Introduction xin

CHAPTERI, PERSONNEL
AND TRAINING

CHAPTER2.
Sectionl.
[.
I[.
v.
CTIAPTER3. HIGTIERLINITS 1l

f\l CTIAPIER4.
SectionI.
TIIE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANY
G e D e r.a. l. . . . . . . . . . . . .-.--------- r'1
II. M i s s i o r. s. . . . . . . . . . . . ....-....... l?
llt. O r g r n i z a t ,i o. .n. . . . . . . ............17
lv. E q u i p n e n. .t . . . . . . . . . ..........,. 20
C o m m a na dn dC o n t r o. .l .-.-.---. --- 2l
\{. A d m i n i s t r a tai o nn dS u p p l y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -........... 28

CHA?TER5. MOTORIZEDRIFLECOMPANYTRATNNG
SectionL I n t r o d u c t i.o. n. . . . . . . . -...........3l
[. W e a p oanns dE q u i p m eTnrta j n i n.g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3l
llt. M o r a l P o l i t i cTarl a i n i n g ...........3?
IV. chemical Eiological & Radiological Training ,....-........ 38
I a n dN a v i g a t i.o. n. . . . . ...-........38
VI. PhysicalTraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
vlI. J u n i oO r f f i c earn dN C OT r a i n i n. g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --.... -.... 40
YII. Tactica.lTraining . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 41

C}IAPTER6. THE MOTORZED RIFLE SQUAD

Sectiorl. G e n e r.a, l. . . , . . . . . . . . ......-...-.41
lI. M o v e m etnotc o n t a c t . . . .-...,....,.45
III- F o r m a t i o.n. s. . . . . . . . . ............45
IV. OffensiveAction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4I
DefenriveAction . . . - . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 5I
 I

'IIIE Plce
CIIAPIER 7. MOTORZEDRIFLE PLATOON
S e c t i oI n. Introductlon .........,.......-..... s5
lI. M o v e m etnotC o n t a c. .t . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . 55
IIL Fornations. - . . . - -..-......---..... 57
lV. OFensiA v ec t i o t r .. . .... ... .... .... . 60
V. Dcfensive Action ... .. . ... . .. .. . .. . . 6l

CTIAPTER8. T}IE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANYIN COMBAT

S € c t i oLn M o v e m etnotC o n t a c t . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . . . . . . . . , . . - . . . 65
II. The MeetingEngagemcnt. . . - - . . . . . , . . . - . - - - . . . . . . . - . . . . . . , 59
IU. BreaktfuoughOperations. . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . . - - . . . . 72
lV, D e f e n s iO
v ep e r a l i o n s ...,............ ?5
V. Withdrawal ........................ 80

CIIAPTER9. THE MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY OPERATING UNDER SPF-

CIAL CONDITIONS
Sectionl. G € n e r.a.l. . . . . . . . . . . . .............83
II. OperationsUnderExtremeWeatherConditions- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E3
I.
Iv.
Operationsin Forests.nd Swarnpc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . 9l
Opentionr io Mountaira
W a t eBr a r r i eOr p e r a t i o n s
... . . ...... .. 93
.............99
x
vt. C o m b aht B u i l t - u fpu e a.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5
v[. Helibome op€rations .... . .. . . . -. .. . 110
I vm. N i e hO
t peEtions .,..-.........--,. 115

Appcndix€s
l . L i s to f s y m b o l s . . . . . ...............,123.\24
II. A TypeCareer Patt€min BasicCombatDuty itr Peacetim€. . . - -.... 125
I T I . ( X f i c eAr g eL i m i t a t i o n. .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . - . - - . - . - - . . - 1 2 7

I
fio LIST OF FIGURES
page

Figurc L Vanedelhnicslructureofthe SovietAnny . . . . . - . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

7 . P r ei n d u c r i ot n
r a i n i nf ga c i l i tay t a s e c o n d asrcyh o o l . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . I
3 . A DOSAAF training facility for specialists . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Youngofficcrsat a conmissioning school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
5 . C o m b i n cadr m st e a mi n t h ea t r a c k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 3
Basic order of march of a Soviet formation anticipatinga mccting
e n g a g € m e.n. .t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . . 4
7 . Dcploymcntof unitsfrom the line of rnarchinto a meetingcngagement. . 5
8 . T h eb r e a l t h r o u g h .................. _......6
9 . Dvision concentrationfor the breatthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 0 . T h ep u r s u i t . . . . . . . . . .-..---............ 8
I t . Basicformsof maneuver .
a. Frontalattack ,,.................,..,8
b- Doubleenveloprncnt \ritl frontalattack
12. T h cm o i o r i z er di f l er e g i m e (nBr M P a q u i p p e .d. ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n
l l Principlcwcaponsh the motorizcdrifle regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . I 2
a . T h em e d i u nt a n kT 5 4 1 5 5 1 .6.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -........... 12
b . 2 3 m mS P A AG u nZ S L2l 3 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --............ 13
c. ATGM launchervehicleAT-3 . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . 13
d. l22mm howitzerD-30 , - - . . . . . . . . . . . . - I3

PO e. SAM SA-9 Gaskin

t4. Themotorized riflebattalion (BMP+quipp€d)
. . . -. . . . . . . . . . -. . . . I3
.........-
1 5 .P r i n c i pwl ee a p o ni nst h em o t o r i z er idf l cb a t t d i o n. . . - - . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 1 4
t4

r . 7 3 m mR c c o ei s s G uS n P C - g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b . M a n p a cAkT G MS e tS a g g (eAr T - 3 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . - t5
c- l20mmmortar ....-.........-...-- 15
1 6 .T h cm o t o r i z er d i f l ec o m p n n( yB M P € q u i p p e.d. .). . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . , . . 18
t 1 Principle weaponsof thc BMP and/or BTR€quippedmororizcd rifle
c o m p a n r e. -s. . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . , , . , , . . . . 19
a. 7.62nrm g€neral purposc machinegun, Kalashnikov (PK) .........Ie
b. 7.62nrmlight rnaclincgun,Kalashnikov (RPK)
c. 7.62mmmod€rntedrinc Kalashnikov (AKM) l9

18.

I9

ro tx
 Page
Figure 20. P c r s o nCaB l Rp r o t e c t i 8v e e:u ........-..,...... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
a. ShMmask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
b. St*lS mask. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 23
c. OP.f proiectiv€coat-overall. . - . . . - . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . - . . , . . . . . . . 23
d . I n d i v i d udael c o n t a m i n aktiito,InP P. . . . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , , . - . . . 2 1
21. Sunner and winter licld uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 24
22. F i e l dC o m b apta c ka n da c c o u t r e m e n. .t.s. . . . . . - - - - . . . - - - - - - . . - - - . . u
23. R-ll3 vehicularrldio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2s
24. R-123vehicularradtowith intercomunit . . . . . . . . - - . . , . . . . . . . , . . - . . . 26
25. R - 1 2 6m a n p a cr ka d i o ... -............. -...25
26. Th€ R-105ard Rlo? railios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
21. Reprcsentativc radionet ofa motorizedrifle company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
28. S o l d i eena t i nign t h cf i € l d .. ....... . .. ..... .29
D . hcliminary w€aponstraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
30. Trdningin firing from an APC . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . .32
3 1 . A n t i t a ntkr a i n i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - _ . . . . . .- . . . 3 3 , 3 4
A T C M( S a g S ct ar )i n i n g . - -...... -...... -...3s
33. SA-7(SAM) tnining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
34. Snip€r training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
35. Political indoctination session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3?
36. C B Rt r a i n i n g ..............,............ - 3E
37. Ch€micslrecormaissance personncl preparhgfor an op€ration . .. . . - . . -. 38
38. Traffic regulator
39. Physical fitnesstraining
. . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . 39
.,. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. .,. 39
rifl€ squad . . . . . . . . . . . - . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 43
I
40. Thc BTR-equipped
4 t . Exiting the BMP . . . . . . - . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 44
42. BMPSsupportinSsquadsby lre . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Tank'borneinfantry in t]€ attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 45
44. Squadon a night reconnaissance mission . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 46
45. S q u a ad s s a ul il nt c ..... -...... -.. -,...... -46
46. A t t a c k i nf gr o ma p o s i t i oinn c f o s ceo n t a c -t . . . . . . . - - . , . . - - - . . . . . . - - . 4 7
4 7 .SquadG)negotiatinga mircfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
48. The squaddef€nsive positionprcparedwith engineer support . . .. . . .. . ..52
49. Th€ MDK-2 ditching machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
50. The squadffte plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . 53
5 1 .Themotorized rifleplatoon(BMP€quipped) ... .... . .. . ... . .. . . .. . ..55
52. Th€motorized rifl€platoonattackinS bchindl,nks -...-..- - -.- -..-...56
5 3 .M o t o r i z eddf l ep l a t o ofno r m a t i o (nms o u n t e d.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 58
54. Motorizedrifl€ platoonforrnations(disnounted) . .. . . .. . .. . . .,. . .. . . - 59
5 5 .The platoon def€nsiveposition . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A reinforced motorized rifle company as the adidce guard of the
b a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 65
5 7 .Thc company commanderof a reinforced motorized riflc company con.
ductingreconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
58. Organizationof a battalion march h anticipation of a meeting engagement66
59. A n S A - 7 g u m € r
in firiru p o s i t i o n
............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 8

I
,"r'!
paSe

Fisure
6 0 . C B Ru n i tc o n d u c t i d ne g c o n t a m i n adt iuorni n a ghar. ................ .68
61. A feinforcedmotorizedriflc battalionconductinga meetingengaSem€nt. 71
62. Thereinforced motodzed rifl€battalion in the defens€........... -.... 76
63. The rnotorizedrillc cornpanystrongpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6 4 . G T - Sa n dG T S Mv e h i c l e .s- - . - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - --... -. 84
65. Motorizedrifl€ companyconnanderconductingreconnaissance with sub-
o r d i n a taen da t t a c h ec do n m . n d e r s. . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - 8 s
6 6 . T a n k tso w i n ign f a n t r y ..................... 86
5 7 . T a n l ( - b o ri n e f a n t rayt t a c k i ni ngw i n t e r. . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6 8 . M o t o r i z er idf l et r o o p isn a w i n t edr e f e n s ipvoes i t i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. 87
6 9 . M o t o r i z er idf l et r o o p tsf a i n i ni gn t } I ed e s e r .t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,89
70. Reinforced motorized riflebattalion attacking i. the descri -.... -...... 90
71. Reinforced motorizedrifle bathlion attackingin forest€dswampyterain . e2
72.76rnm m o u n t a gi nu n M , 1966............ .............. 94
7 3 . M o t o r i z cr d
i f i et r o o ptsr a i n h g i n t h em o u n l a i n .s. . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . es
74. Motonzed rinecompany attacking in mountainoN terrain ..........-.. 96
75. Themururvedrinecompan)in dc defense in mounruuusrerrm ...... 98
7 6 . E x e r c i s" D
e n e p a1' 9 6 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - -.... -.... -.... - 99
77- K'61 and PTStrackedamphibious cericrs unloadingassaulttroops . . . . . r01
78. A reinforced motorized ifle battrtionforcinga waterbarrier .... -..... 102
79. Reinforcedmotodzedrifle battrlion defending a riverbanl . ... . ..... . 704
8 0 . C o m b a t - i n d ttiaecst i c e a xl c r c i s.e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . -... -..... 106,10?
fso 81. The rcinforcedmolorizcdrifle companyin the attackin a builfup arca 108
82.Mi4 Hound .. -.... lll
8 3 . M i - 6H o o k ... --.... 111
8,4M . i - 8H i p .......... 111
8 5 . M i - 1 0H a r k e ....... 111
8 6 . M i 1 2H o m e r ................. -......... 1r1
8 7 . M i - lH a r e ---..--.. rt2
8 8 . M i - 2H o p l i t e .......112
89. Mi-24Hind A . . _. . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . _. I 13
90. Helicoptcr mockuptrainingdevice .......... 1i4
9 1 . t R s i g h t i nsgy s . c mm, o d eNi S P - 2 . . - - . . - . . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - 116
9 2 . S o v i emt o d ePl P N - l2R s i g h t i nsgy s t e m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 116
93. Comrnande I Rr 'ps c r i l e l e s c m
o pocd cTl K N - 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rr1
9 4 - C h a r a c t e r i sotfiscosm ei l l u m i n a t i d oe n v i c c .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.. 11?
9 5 . M o t o r i z er idf l ec o m p a ni n y a n i g h at t t a c k. . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - . 1 1 8
96. Possible chxnges in lhe night defensive system of a motorned rifle
b a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

xl
 INTRODUCTION

Sovictwritershavecontinuallyemphasizcd thefrcl that the nextwarmustbe won by

forcesin bcingand that full mobilizationof a nation'srcsources will nol be possiblc.
Small,profcssionrl armiesareseenasanachronisms, andthe policyof mainlainingsucha
forcc, "bankrupt." Consequentlythc Soviets€mphasizeblitzkrieg offensivcswith
tank-hcaryforcessupponedbylargcamountsofartillery,whichwouldbe ablcto achieve
the requircdiirc supeliorityat selectcd
points.
This study examinesthe organization,trainjng, tactics and equipmcntof the
BMP-equipped motorizedrifle companywithin th€ contcxt of Sovietoffensiveand
defensiveconceprs.ln an effort to presenta rcalisticportrayal,weaknesses a! w€ll aj
strenglhs areportrayedthroudout tlc study.
fte study beginswilh a brief examination of thc hunzn elernent.Th€ first chapier
des€ribespersonncland training. Sovict offensivedd defensiveconceptsarc then
describcd. The link betweenthcscconc€plsandtheMR companyis chapterlhree,which
descnbes the molorjzedrifle resimentand thc MR batblion. Chaptersfour and five
describe the organization, equipmentand trainingof lhc MR company,andsetthestage
for a closelook ar eachof its subordinale clcmcnts,the squadandplatoon(chaptensix
,nd seven).Chaptercight lies logetherthe preccdingscvcnchaptersby d€scribing the
motorizedrifle companyin combat.Cfiaptcrninc dcscribes ihe MR companyop€rating
urderspecialcombrtconditions. Thehistoricalda1lin thischapterareprovidedprimarily
for two rcasons: fust, to showthat the typcsof opcrations describedhavebeenpracticed
for many ycarsby the Sovietsand arc an importml nsp€ctof curent Sovietdocline;
s€condto illustratctlle sedng impactthat WorldWarll continues to haveon theSoviet
military.
Althoughthereis a sectionon heliborneopcralions in chaptcrninc,tacticdlair support
of groundopcrationsis not discussed. Sovicturutsbelowdivisionlevelhaveno dircct
orgadcradiocommunications with supportingancrafl,rnd representatives oftacticalair
forc€sarerarcly,ifever,sentto battalionandcompany.

x tt l
 CHAPTER1. PERSONNEL
AND TRAINING
1. General
The pcrsonnel makeup of rhe motorized rifie company
typifics rhe human elementin tie Soviet gound lbrccs
(fieLre I). Th. rypicd muro[,ed rllc conpan) i.
conrposedprimdily of conscripts,carccr cniistcd nren
and office.s constituting a srnal perccnlagc01 th€ total
strength.Nomally, the majorily ofofficers are members
of thc Comnunisr Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)or
the Young Coinnunist League (Komsomol). Most en-
iisled men arc Party or Konsomol membe6 or belongto
a subsidiary organization. All evidencethe advrntagcs
and disadvantages of Sovict political and military sys-
tems. These systemsinvolvc continuous,but not neces-
sarily effective, political indoctrinalioni comprehensive.
b u r u n e t e n l \ i m p l " T e l r e d . p r e - . n J u c L i ornr " i n i . r gp r n
gramsi and gener.lty adequatcactive duty training. On
balance,soldien shrpcd by these systemsappearto be
polirically reliableand capableof performingeffectively,
although with limited initiatjve at battalion level and
Figure 1. Vaded ethnic structure ofthe Soviet Army.
2. PoliticalTrainingand Control
Thc company is ihc lowcsi cchclon at which a political
officer functions. The politicJl officer, whose cliain of
command is s€pafateand €xtends to the Main Political
Directorateof the Ministry ofDefense,is responsiblefor
political hdoctrination and for ensuringloyalty to the
civilian leadership.He conducts poiilical lraining, pri-
marily in the form of lectufes. and monitors company
actilities for indicationsof dissent.Th€ arnountof time
i devoted to polirical training is inordinate and not as
effective as suggestedin officiai statcments.Only career
enlistedand officer personnel,who havea vcstcdintcresl
in the mi1itary, appear to react favorably to the
indoctrination- Conscdpts are generally unenilusiasric
dd, to somedegree,irntated by the training.
r. r.e-rnoudron r rarntnq
Theoretically, the eniisted personneiof the motorizcd
ritlc company reccivcnilitary training prior to entenng
service.The 1967 law governingnilitary servicein rhe
USSR requirespre-induction training for all malesand
o r e { n b e , a ( o m p r e h e n s r vceo u r s eo t i n s l r u r . u o-r- u p
to 140 hou6 ofclassroomwork -in addition to training
with weaponsand equiprnent.'The pros.am, beginning
in the ninlh gade. is unevenlyconductedin schoolsand
traini g ccnteB throughout the USSR (Figurc 2).
Aflcr 1967, fie USSRreemphasized pre-inductiontfain
ing to compensarefor the rcduction ofconscript se.vice
from three to two yea6. It appeaB,however,that thc
requirementis not uniformly appliedro all individuals,
probably becauseof a lack offacilities in somearcas.As
jt now operates, the program provides most Sovicl
youths with rudimentary military skills, bu1 cannot
. o n p l e r e l y c o m p e n \ a r et o r d r c d u c r o n o l o 1 e y e J r I n
activeduty training time.
Specialisttraining. commencingal agc 17, is the respon
sibility of the AI'Union Volunlary Sociely for Coopera'
tion with tlre Army, Avialion 8nd Fleel (DOSAAF) and
ofthe vocarionaischoolsysicm(Fisure 3).
Figure2. Pre-induction
trainingfacilityat a
secondaryschool,
 (

Figure4. Youngofiicersat a commissionang

school.
(
5. ConscriptTraining.
Prior to cnrctmentof lhe 1967lawon universal military
traininS,fie nujority of conscdptsweretraincdby the
Figure3.A DOSAAFtraining facilityfor specialists. units to which they werc assigned. Sincethc!, x, d,
4. Ofiice.Training effort to compcnsatefor thc reducedtenn ofservicc,rhe
Soriclshaveexpandedtherr facilibeslor tiainingcon-
Mort commrsroneLl ,'fficeIs
arcobraiqed iom cornm6- scnptsprior to assignm€nr. Currcnlly,incrcasingnum,
sioningschools(Figure4), but a smallpercentage comes bcn uf conscriDrs. nordblyspe.ialisrrrnd non.comnis.
from univcrsity.lev€l res€ € offic€r trainingprograns sioncd ofnce|s,receiveup 1o six monthsof tmining
and from drre!t conmi\s,ons. The commissiuning beforcassignment 10a unit-
schoolscomparcto the U.S. Military Academyand Datagapsprecludcdefinitiveevaluation of the individual
producecomparably trainedofficers.Subsequent educ!- soldierproducedby the trainingpmglams.Personnel in
lional opportunitiesfor offic€rs include advanced rnotoriTcdnne companies probablyperformsatisfacto-
courses,mjd.carcerschoolinginvolflng threc to five nly. considedng thc relativelylow skill lcvelsinvolvcd
yetrrsat a militaryacadeny,rnd r two-yearcouneat the and the emphasis on lepetitionin training.Conscriprs
Military Academy of the cereral St3ff. In 8encral, sering in morc complexassignnents arclikely to vary
Sovietofficersare reliableandequipped to functionin a considerablyin then effectiv€ncss. Specialistssuffer
contemporary battlcfieldenyironmcnt, but areprobably som€whatfrom aII extensive dcpendence on simulaton
sonewhatinlibited, padicularlyst the lowcr command and l-romscvereconstrainlsgovemingthe usc of full
l€vels,by the poiilicalsystem.Equallyimportant,most calibcr,live anmunition. Thc expansionof specialist
Soviet officers hdve not had tle benefirof warrinre training lacilitics,however,is expectedgradualy to
experiencc. A type of Sovietofliccr'scareerpattcrnis providecons.riph with an adequarebaseof skill for
includedin appcndixII. individualassignm€nil.
 CHAPTEF2. OFFENSIVEAND DEFENSIVE
CONCEPTS

Sectionl. MOVEMENTTO CONTACT

6. Genelal crosscountry. Troops ale trarned to bc rcady 1br action

at any time. If possible,the marchis conductcdat night
Soviet doctrinc stressesthat the ofl-ensivcis the decisive
or under conditions of limited visibility. The speed at
forn of conbal; that the main purposc of offensive
which the march is conducted is dependcnton many
combat is the complete destrucrion ol tlle enemy s
facto^ : encmy, lerfain, weathcr. makcup of the colum,
forces. To scl the stagefor successfuloftcnslveaction,
condition of v€hicles,the levcl of driver training, etc.
the Sovietsstresslhc use of diversionaryunits (agents,
(Figure 6).
parachutistsand heliborne infantry) deep in tlte encmy
,. Average spccds ibr vehiculal lrafiic by day are
rea Jers and the achievementol surprisethtough thc
3040 knttu and by night and dunng other conditions
usc of deceptionmeasures, the intensity and mobiljty ot
of limited visibility 20-30 km/tu. For foot movement
l'iepowcr. a1o 'afid lrFs ol advance Sufces i5
averasespecdsare 4 km/hr and bctween 5'7 knthr on
achieled by tnc rapid concentrrtion of supefio. forces
skis.
wiih massive air and artille.y support to disruPl,
c. The inrcrval between vehiclcs is 1550 merers
penetratc,and ultimately rout opposingforces(FiSure5).
during road movementmd 50-100metersdunng tacticd
Air and ariilcry interdiction would occur thtoughout
cross-country movem€nl. Both the interval md the
ihe depth of the eremy's defensivcposilion. Ifnuclcat
spccd of l}e vehjclc, are in(ted'ed lvhcn crosing a
chenricalwcapons are not used, conventionalartilcry
contaminatedeea or when under air dttrck.
would be used in grealcr quantitiesin order to .chieve
d Control measures along rhe route of advance
dre desiredfirc superiority. Soviet forces are trained to
nrclude initial start points and casily recognizablecon-
go rapidly lion a nonnuclearto a nuclearenvironmcnt,
tlol or phase lines. Thc number and spacingof these
and Soviel writcn stres the essenlial arld critical
control measuresis dcpendentupon the lcngtl of the
ifansition bctwcen these modesof conbat. Despitelhis
march. dre condition of thc ioads and tlt weather.
ernphasison offensiveoperalions,thc Sovjelsrealizethat
c. ln a motorized march, halts of up to one hour
in son1esituationstheir forceswill haveto go over 1o the
occur evcry three-four houis. ln foot mdches,
defensive,but stress that the primary purpose of ihe
io'minute hdts are made elery 50 minutes. During fie
defenseis to prepare for the resumption of offensive
second hJlf of a motorized Inlch, a long halt of
operdtionsassoon as possible.
iwo four hours is held. Such Longhalts arc not held at
nidt (so as to make maximunr use of Lhc hours of
7. The March
drkncss), nor are ilrcy made during foot marches tlhich
a. The Sovictsdescrjbea much asan organizedlroop can be coveredin a 24-hour period- Durine slort hdlls,
movementconductedin column fomations on roads,or

armsteamin the attack.

Fioure5. Combined
column dist ncesbetwcenvehiclesin column fomation ,l. All-around sccurity is providcd on the march in
are not changed;men snd vehiclesmaintain the proper order to ensureuninterruptedmovement,to prevent
marchintervals.Duringlonghrlts, vehiclcsaredisperscd surpriseaatack,to keepenemyreconnissance unitsfroh
andcamouflaged. observingthe main body and to crcare fie most
, To asrnt thc conrnandorin organizingthe rnarch, favorableconditions for deploymentof the rnain body
the Sovietsdividethe marchinto two distinctelemcnts, in a mectingengagement. Advancc,Ilank, andrearguard
thc movementorganizationand march security. units ensure all-around securitydurinS rhe march.In
& Movcrnent orSanizltion is formulated to ensure addition, stationary flank outposts arc often used to
high speed, rapid combat deployment, and effective occupy critical tcrain until the mainbody haspass€d.
control. Tank and artillery are usually towards the
front, and antiaircraftweaponsaredistributedthrough-

<= \l-

\ri G -v=- -\r--

<.r_____1
\fi- Y;-

Iq

2, FoMard doi.chmsnl

Figure6. Basicorderofmarchofa Sovietformation

anticipating
a meetingengagement.
 Sectionll. THE OFFENSE

L The rwo rnethods mentioned in Soviet tactical 10. The Breakthrough

writings for acconplishingthe trrnsilion to thc otttnsive d. The classic breakltuough operatior is a frortal
ar€ a) fiom the march and b) from a posilion occupied d * ! u l r r B ar . r " w r l l - D r c o " r cddc i c n s i \ co o ' i . i o r . .d s i n g d
in direct contact with the enemy- The rluee types of largc amount of artilcry and mancuvcr clemcnls on a
oflcnsivc action are the meetingengagement,the break- narrow front (Figure8). The breakLuoushmay alsooccur
though, and the pursuii. against a hasly defense.Against each rype of defense,
the Sovi€ts envision swift and deep envelopment,ihe
9. The MeetingEngagemeni bypassing of stubborn pockets of resistDce, decisive
The mecting cngagcmcntj i.c., fte colision of two meeting engage ents with advancingcncmy reserves,
opposing forces, b stressedmore heavily in Soviet continuation ()1-th€ dttack, and the subsequentdestruc-
nr ,,rJ wi'irCs Mar ]|.) orher lorm ai o er.rve tion of enemy strong points by second echelon uniis.
action. Becauseof the fluid nature of modenr var, the Breakthroughs may now be accomplished r,n shor!
Soviels bclicvc that thc meeringereagemenrwill occur pedods of tine due to nuclearslrikcs and the increased
more often than any other type of combat action. lethaliiy of conventional wcapons. Succcssfullycon-
Meetingengagcmcnls arc characicrizedby action ro seize ducted meetingengagcments arld breakthroughsresultjn
and naintain ihc initialive; the developnrentof combat lhe pursuil and ultimate destruction of the enemy's
on a wide lront with ffeedom of naneuver md the
presenceof open flanksi rupid depioymcnt of troops, ,. These Soviet-To-NATO fo.ce ratios aie reflected in
chjefly lrom columnsj nrobile, high speedcombat, and Soviel doctrine as being necessaryto achicvcI brerk-
often incomplete intelligence on enemy lbrccs. The through againsta preparedposition:
Sovietsbelieve that it is both possiblcrnd nccessaryio 3-5:1
( i p ! r e m e e | | n ge n g r g c m c n r sD. r r r h r o u g l v a ' ' " u s Infantry .+-5:1
"nr
inteltigencegrthering rncans thcy will be preparedfor, Artillery 6-8:1
and wil aggessive]yseekout, suchengagements (Figur€ c. A Soyict divisionconcentratesils forcesto achieve
7). the desiredcombat ratios for thc bredkthroughagainsta
prepareddefenseasshoM in Figure9.

W
#-.ffi
,-\ Mororizedril e companyin rhe dere.se

Figure7. Deplovmenr
ol un ls lrom the ineol marcninroa meeLing
engagement.

a
 /r IET
1, Sovi€r first €ch.lon lorc.. achi.ving 6 br6Ekthrcughlnd holdlng the 3houlde6 op€. tor tuther p€nd.Etion
an l srplohlrbn by ..cond 6h6lon 1orc..,

2. S€cond eh.lon forc.! srploiting $e p€n€tnijon.

Figure8. Thebr€akthrough.

. o
 E )-e"'ffflJ,T3:ff-i-":,".x?'i" | |
-E.'1*.r*-e^r^"L -r.'-
.^-,.-- - J",.,t**,"",
p,-1,:^'^*-"^*"i' I )oEA i
_p....-r.',13":)R*--+::"-*,{i,r*
-*-AJJ"i[hT^.^| |
-
J--.,-,#;-"i:L
E C O M P A NA\ n A C r
- --r'\-'.
-aOr\rACr
---\J- . ---l"\- . --\J
J
. r---aL . --\J-
IJ
. ---l'\L.
I \
--l'-L --
I
-_F. D v sto\ 7o\r
E---\J-
o'A''oN
E (

I FigureL Divisionconcentrationforthe breakthrough.

Il. Pu6uitOperations
Pursuitoperatioosarc hiShlymobilein natur€andare
best conductedon a wide front alongparullclroutes.
They involvebotl frontal attacksand envelopment to
cut off anddestroyeneDyforccs,Pu6uit opcrations are
mademorc effectiveby the useof tacticalhcliborneand
airborneforces,which occupyand d€fendlocationsin
th€ enernyt rearand otherwisedjsorganizeand delayhis
retrogrademovcment.The Sovietsstressthat the puFuit
is to begin imrnediatcly upon the initiativc of the
commander who dircoversthe retreat(Figure10).

12. B$ic Formi ol Maneuvsr

"i{aneuver" is definedin SovietmiliLaryliteraturc asOe (EY
movementofa forceinto a favonblcpositionin rclation l. Wfthd6$n! .n mylq6
to the enemy,from which it can launchan effective 2, Puding Sovi.n lorc6
attack.Thc Soviclsmentiontwo b sic formsof maneu- 3. Helibdn. r.nding in o@ht @r
4, Approachine on.ny r@P.s
ver, the frontal attackand thc cnvelopment, but favor
th€ latter,which may be shallowor deep,depending on Figurc10. Th6 pursuit.
the size of th€ unit executingit (Figure 1I ). Shouldthe
enemy no! have an assailablellanl, a frontal attack
wouldbe used.A frontalassault mayoccuron a wideor
narrow front wilh or without heaty luc support.
Tankheary sccondechelonforcesattempt to exploit
sny rupturein the enemy'sposition.Underfavorable
conditions,howcver,the Sovietswould altcmpt an
envclopment, possibly in conjunction vith a front.l A. FBONTATA'TACK
attack to pin down encmy forces. Enveloprnentis lhe
prefenedmcthod of mancuverin the mcctingengag€-
mentandis usedfrom platoonlcvclup.

S. OOUBLE
ENVETOPMENT
WIIH FRONTAL
ATTACK

!9!c
A n e n v e l o p m e n t n 6 y b e s i n g l e o r d o u b l € , 6 h a l lhom
w.oyr6d1e3e0pb. s
accompanisd by! lronral.lrackd€ion.dto "lit"enemy forc.s.

Figure11. Basicforms
of maneuver,
 SectionI ll. T H E D E F E N S E
13. General
Defcnsivc opcrations occuf when offeosive operations
are nol expcdicnt or when econony offorce is desirablc
in one areain ordcr to attack in anothcr. Therefofe,the
Soviets try to limit defensiveoperations to areas of
secondaryimportance-The purposeof th€ defenseis to
inflict maximum damage on tlMttacker. to firmly hold
the defendedarc!, ard to creatcfavorableconditions for
thc rcsumptionof thc offcnsive.
14. DefeneiveConcepri
a. Stabilit)). Thc Soviets definc this lerm as th€
abiljty oI thc defend€rs to rcpcl attacks, to prevcnt
cncny airborne acrivilies in the rear a.eas, and 10
destroyany pen€hation! ofthe defensivepositions.
,. Seclrry. Combrt sccunly forces provide early
warning, prevent cncmy reconnaissanceof the main
dafensive posidon. Iorce the enemy to deploy pre-
maturely, inflicl mcximum casu.lties, and coordinate
long-rangc fircs on cncmy formations.
c. Use of Kcr Tenain. By ptope]ly preparing kcy
tenain which dominatesthc inain arcnucsof approach.
the defendcr may offsct some oI the altackeis advan-
ragcs.Onc aspecl of lhe proper use of key lerrarn is a
Iire plan and obstacleplan which restrict the attacker's
lrccdom of m.rn€uverwhile maxirnizingthe defendcis.
Thc altacker is canrlized into preparedkilling grounds
for fires of l types (includins nucleao.
tl. Dispcrsiott. To allow for maximum protcction
from nuclearand ch€micalweapons,the Sovictsdcfcnd
on a wide front and in Ircat dcptl
e. A aroutld Del€rxe At$ough onented primarily
towards thc dircction of enemy advece, Soviet units
a
prcparcallernateand sopplementary posjlionsandpre-
pare!o rcpcl attack from rny directjon.This includes
the constructionof platoonandcompanystrongpoints,
d€€plyecheloned positions, and cxlensivebarrierand
fire ptaming.
t Dek,Ee in Depth. This presents tllc atlackerwith
a seriesof preparcdplatoonrnd companystrongpoints
which absofbdrc attackeis momentumand provide
timc for resefl/es
to counterattack.
s. Anntat* Defense.Afl€r stabilityand protection
from weaponsof mnssdeslruction.a strongrntitank
defenseis the most imporrant chaGclcnsticof the
dcfcnse.Antibnk weaponsarc libcrallyuUocaied down
10 low levels,while antitankfcscrvcsaremaintaincdrl
rcgimcnlallevelandabove.lncrcasin8 emphasis hasbeen
placedin Sovietwritingson the importanceol ATGMS.
h. &otdnated li|es. Fires are coordinated to
destroy the attackcrwhnc approachin8 th€ defended
area,in front of lhe lbrward edgeof thc bartledea
(FEBA), on the flank, and in preparedkiling zones
within the defcndcdaJea,Inclodedin thcscfire plds are
artillery, antitank,and small arms fires. Excludedar€
nucl€arstrikes,which Sovietwritersmaintainshouldbe
primarilydirectedagainstthc enemy'snuclearweapons,
major enemy re\ewesand commJndpusr\.
i- Mobile Counterattack l-or&s. The Soviets con-
sider the countcrrttackto bc the d€cisivephaseof
delensivecombat.SovietconrnrandcIs requireall unils
flom battalionand up 1()hunch countcraltrcks. Thesc
counterattackwill incfcas€in s€veriiyas tlle depthof
th€enemys.lientincreases.
 SectionlV, WITHDRAWAL

15. Genehl prcss tlle withdrawing forces, the coveringforce with-

Withdrawalopcrationsare conduc.cdfor purposesof draws in a leap.frogmanner,renderingDutual firc
regroupirg,occupyingmorefavorablcterrdn, or dueto support.Withdrawalof the mainbody is donewithout
positions.
cncmy pressu.€.Thc mftsion of a withdrawingunit is to delayingin intefmediate
preservcits integrity, to conduct an orderly withdrawal d. Actions of the Rear Guard. Prior to withdrawing
to a designatedarca, and to b€ ready to execua€ at thc d€signated time, thc rcar guard commandcr
occupies defense positions usualy located behind fiIst
off€nsive mission!. The Sovicts rccognize the com-
plicatednatureof this operationandprefcrto withdraw cchelondefens€forces.Subscqucnt def€nsive positions
aJe designatedfor thc rcar guard, which conducts
on multiplc rcu1eswithout occupyingintermcdiatc
phascLines. Wh€never possible, ambushesand crectsbaniersas it withdrawsto sub-
the Sovietswi withdraw
sequentpositions.The rear guardmovcsto subs€quent
at night of during other conditions of timited visibility.
positionsin a leap.frogmaoner,renderingmulual sup-
port, ard aggcssively defendingeachposilion.
15. Conductol rhe withdr6wal
e. Establishmentof Nel' DefensiyePositions-Pnol
a- Orsanizationof Fuces. The grouping of forces to arrival in the rcwl]. d€si$atcd area of defense,
for a with&awsl hcludes coredngforces,the rcar guard reconnaissance groupsareformcd.Thcsegroupsconduct
and the mainbody. Flanksecuritydetachments arealso a thoroughsurveyofthc ncw area,determine the areato
establishedwhennecessary. be occupiedby eachunit, designrterpproachroutcsto
b. Diseryagenent ftom Contact. Normally, the thern,mark off any minedor contrminaiedarcas,and
Sovietsleavcone-thirdof theirforcesin contactin order test the water in th€ area.As thc main body approaches
to deceivcthc enemymd delayhis advance. thc meaits subordinate elem€niiarcmct by guidesfrotn
c. Method of tlt,rdrawl Unengaged clemcnts the reconnaissancegroups and ar€ taken to ften
(reserveand secondechclonforccs) are withdrawn lirst, designatedareas,
follow€d by artilery and lirst echetonforces.Covering I Secudtyis organizcdassoonas the lcadelements
forces depart rudd€nlyand as a rule simultancously.closeon thc ncw defensive areas,andengineering work is
Thcy usually depai aft€r the main body has pastcd irnmediatcly bcgun.
positionsoccupiedby the fearguard.Shouldthc cncmy

l0
 3 . H I G H E RU N I T S
CHAPTER
17. General
The molorized.ifle companyis the mmeuver elementof
the nrotodzed rifle brttriion. Ar it is reintbrcedby bollr
b ! r r a l r o na n d r c g i j n c n rl o m o s ro p c a r i o n s .d , c o r g " n i -
zation and equipment of the motorized dfle regiment
md barmlion will be discussedin this chapter.
18. The Motorized Bifle Regimenl
a Thougir capableofindependent action, the motoF
ized rifle fegimeni normally opcrates as parr of a
division. Thc diyision cornmanderalocatcs addiiionai
supporl to thc rcgiments lts requiled. Regimentd rrt -
lery may be reinfofced with units ffom the divjsion\
rrtillery dnd rocket brttalions, forming a regimental
anillery group (RAG). Becausehe does not poss€ss
organic nuclear weapons, ihe reginrental comnandef
requestsnucleartire suppoft from division.Tllc rcgimcnt
may also be ren orccd with additional antiai.craft,
aniilank, cngineer,signd, n€dical, chemicil, and supply
,. Th€ BMP-cquippedmotonzed rfie regiment is
orsanizedi]s shown in Figure 12. Someofthe regiment\
principlc wcaponsare shown in Flgure 13.
!aI!
a rifleregiment(BMP-equipped).
Figure12. Themotorized
tl
19. Th€ Motorized Rille Battalion
d. The motorjzed rifle batlalion usually operates
under the dircct control of the regimenralcomm,nder.
When us€das thc division reserve,it operatesunder the
divisionconmandcr. The baltalion may also participate
in helibornc and ship-to-shofeoperations.
,. Becauseit is reiativcly "light" nr terms of certain
organic combat and support elemcnls, rhc battalion is
reinforced when attacking or defending in the flrsl
echelon oI the rcgnnent, or whcn conductingindepen-
denl opcrations. Fof example. in addition to his own
orgmic unils, lhe battaljon commandermay control r
tank battalion, r 122-mn howitzer battalisn, the regi-
mental antitank guided missile battery, an antiancraft
missile md ulilery battery, .an cngineer platoon, a
chemicdl plaioon and administrativeand logistics sup-
port troops. The baltrlion conma dci reinforces his
ofganic motorized rifle companiesas requned with his
attachedor suppodingunits.
a fie Bwrquippcd motorized rifle battalon is
organized ar shown in Figure 14. Principle battllion
wcaponsare shorvnin Figure 15.
 r-62

a. The mediumtank T54/55/62.

Figure13. Principleweaponsin the motorizedrifteregiment.

 til

c. ATGMlauncher
vehicleAT-3.

d. 122mmhowitzerD-30. e. SAIMSA S Gaskin.

13
 MOTORI2EO

C O M M I J N I C AOTN S
MAINTENANCE

!9rq
For a lsr ol th€ n!mbers 6nd iypes ol perconne.nd equpmenr ar baxalion,sse lS) SovrerGo!nd Forces
r u ' d eI L J ' D
O r g a n ? d n oG . D l l l 0 O2 . 7 5d a r e oJ u r . 1 9 7 , , .

Figure14. Themotorized
riflebattalion
IBMP-equipped).

. t. Jf*'
IF

Figure15. Principleweaponsin the motorizedrifle battalion.

l4
 :,,'!'

b. lManpackATGlvlSet Sagger(AT-3).

i c. 120mm
mortar.

I
 CHAPTER4. THE MOTORIZEORIFLECOMPANY

Sectionl. General

20. Tlc motorizcdiflc companicsoI the mobnzed
nfle battalionare organized on the tridngularconcePt
with threemotorized nfle platoons, €achcomposed of a
platoonheadquaners ed three rifle squads.
21. The organizalionand equipmentfound in motor-
ued nne compnnieslaries.dependin8
on lhe rypecarricr
they hav€ and the numb€r of troops available.Thc
BMPaquippcdmotorizedrifle companyhasone more
man tlan the BTR€quippedconrpanyand doesnot
hive r m3chinetsun serrion (two PK machincSun
detachments), whcrcasthe latter does.The company
headquarlenof the BTRaquippedcompanyis smaller
than the BMP-€quipped h€adquarten.Squadstrength
vanesfron 6-11 men, althoughwe believethc desired
standard is 8 mcn in the BMP€quippedunits. Squad
armament also varics, with the BMP+quippedsquads
bcing morc hcavily armcd. Moreover,within the BMP-
equipp€dcompanies, tholc squadsposs€ssing
the initial
modelBMP-Iwil havcone RPK light machinegunand
oneAKM pcr squadin lieu of the two PK machincguns
found in the later model ot the BMP.

Section ll. MtsstoNs

22. a. Thc missionsof de motoriTedriflc comprn) in n]anderwould be under the baitalioncommdrderwho
the offcnscareto peletratethecncmydefe es,develop commandrthe advance guafd.(2) Acting$ flankor rear
the a(ack, neutGlizedefendingcneny troopsby llre detachmenton a tacticalmarch.In this situationthe
and in hand'to-hddcombator to takethemprisoner, company'sattachments areapproximately doubled,and
destroy or caplue eoemy equipmenr andwcapons, serze th€ companycommanderiakes his oral€lsfrom the
and consolidatcdefensivepositions,repulsecounter- comnander of the division'sllank or rear guard.
attacks,andpursuea withdrawingcnemy. (3) Conducting a reconnaissance in force (usually sent
,- Other missiomwhich may be givento the riflc out by division).(4) Providingsecurity during halts.
comprnyinclude:(1.)opcratine as an advancesecurity (5) Participating in tactical airmobile operations.
d€tachment within an adv,nceguard(usuay scnl out (6) Acting as an assaultgroup in an attack against
by regim€nt).A typicaladvance detachment consistsof forti{ied positions.(7) Operatingas thc reglm€ntal
a mototizedriflc companyreinforccdby a tankplatoon,
chemicalreconnaissance t€am.anengincersquad,andan c. The compmy wiu be rcinJorcedas rcquircdlor
drrlank squad.In ds siruationthe companycom-

Sectionlll. ORGANIZATION

23. The organizationand maj{xitcns of equipnentof plus rine enlistcdmen (thc first serscant,messcngcr/
the BMP.cquipped motoriz€driflc companyareshown companyclerk, nredic,communications specialist,a
in Figures16.18. three-manSA-7 Team, and the BMP crerv members
d. The companyheadquartcrs coflsistsof the com- (driverard sunner).
panycommander, politicalofficer,and tcchnicalofficer ,. The nfle platoon consislsof a plaroonhcad-
quartersandttucc riflesquads.
 MOTOFIZ€D
HEADOUAFIEBS

EOUIPMENT
25(15t
62€Ot
7.@mms.ip.r rill.. SVO 3
7.62mm GProchinegun, PKM 20 t2l
Anftanl gr6n.d€l.unch6r,RPG-7 9
SAM,{SA-7,GFAttlg.ip6rockl 3
Armorod pe@.nd @rier,aMP-A 10 tot
1
R,t13/B-123 t0
4,r26
NOTES
1, Fisu6 in par€.rhesc repre*nr rh€ dilt.Gnc$ in nomb.6 ol peMnnd, equipmentand *apons tound in lhd
ATR.equipp€d moroizedine comFny.

2. The aTR'equippedmotorizedrill€ conFny hds 3 machin.gonseciionconsistinsot rive enlistedperconn61,

(BPK)sndl0rgT8-50/€0/152.mored peGonnelcaderslln lieuotlho AN|Pl.
9x7.62mmlisht machineguns

Figure16. Ths motorizedriflecompany{BMP equipped).

t8
,l

a. 7.62mmgeneralpurposemachinegun, b. 7.62mmlightmachinegun, (RPK).

Kalashnikov
(PK).
Kalashnikov

c. 7.62mmmodernized
rifleKalashnikov
{AKM). d. Anti-tankgrenade (RPG,7)
launcher

ft

e. 7.62mmsemiautomatic
sniperrifle, f. 9mm pistol,lvlakarov
{PM).
(SVD).
Dragunov

FigurelT.PrincipleweaponsoftheBl!,lPand/orBTBequippedmotorizedriflecompanies.

rl 19
 a. BTR50. b. BTRM.

d, BMP,
c. BTR 152.

Figure18. APC'Sfoundin motorizedriflecompanies.

Section lV. EOUIPMENT

have it. The BTR-60P8has a lurcr nounting one

APCSstill found wirhin the Soviet ground forccs 14.5runKPVTand one 7.62nm PKT machinegun. Thc
includethe BTR-50, 60 and 152 series,dnd thc BMP vchicleusuay carrics500 roundsof l4.5nlnrand2000
witi modifications. Th€ BTR-152,the standardSovict roundsof 7.62mrnammudrior.ThelrrestSovietAPCis
A?C during thc 1950s and erly 1960s, is an .he BMP which was tust identificdin 1967. h is an
annoredwheelednon-rnphibioustruck withoul ovcr- anphibioustrackedAPC armedwith a 73Jnmsmoolh.
head cover, and is usualy armed with a 7.62nm borc gun,a Sagger AT-3 missilclaunche!.anda co-axial
machinegun.Thc BTR'152Kaswellaslatternodclshas 7.62mmmachincgun. A lalermodelofrhe BMPha! two
overheadarmor cover. The BTR-50Pscricswith an ibrwardluing porls designed to accommodate rhePKM
amphibiou5capabiljt).htfoduced during llrc middle machin€gun. thus eonsiderably incrcasingdlc squad\
l95os, was the lilsl SovietstandardtrackedA.PC.Ire firepower.The BMPcafiiesforty roundsof HEAT and
BTR'sOPKversionwith ovcrhcrd cover became$c HE ammunition lor the 73rn'n gur and five Sagger
standardvehicle for motorized riflc units in tank missilcs, includingonemountedon thc launchcr.
divisions.Like tbe BTRj52, il is armedwitha 7.62mm
SGMB machinegun.The BTR'60Pscriesarrphibious 25. IndividualandcreBservedW.apons
eiShtwheeled APC wasintroducedin 196l as.rreplacc- a. 9m pttol, ItIakznv
fPn4l.This pistolis carricd
ment for the BTR-i52V. Althoughdr€originalmodclof by the officers in the cornprny headquarrers,
APC
the BTR-60lackedoverheadcover,subsequcnt models drive6.and by SA-7 and RPC-?gunne$.
Th€ PM is a

20
 small,somiautomatic pistol with an eight round nuga. naredblastshieldat the rearof the tubeand the thick
zine. lt is the most widcly issucdpistol in thc Sovict heat shield rround the center.The optical sight is
markedfor ranges fron 200 to 500metersat intervalsof
b. 7.62nm modentized assaub nfle, KaJathnikov 100 meters.The RPG'7cu be equipp€d with the NSP-2
(AKtrl) The AK is capableof both seniautonaticand infrured night sightiDgdevices.TheRPG-7Vhasa folding
full automaticfire. The improv€dmodel,designated the
AI<M, is lighterthan its predecessor, hasa greatersight g. 3A 7 'GRAIL". Thc SA-7 is an hfrared-homing,
radius,is fitted with a straidter stock, and has an shorr-range,surface-to-airguided missile,It is shoulder-
improveddetachable bayonet-knife.TIle AKM is litted fired and is usedagainstlow flying aircraft.
for the NSP-2 infrared night sight system. A folding h. Gre de' The Sovi€t company usesa variety of
stock version,lhe AKMS, has also appeared. hand senades(Figurc 19). Both th€ F-l and RG42
c. 7.6hnnt l,ight Machine Gun, Kalash ikov anti-personnel hand Irenadesdate from WorldWar ll,
/RPr). Foundwithin the BTR€quipped rifle squad,the whjle the RKG-3M artitanl hand grenademd rhe
RPK is ess€ntiallyan AKM assaultrifle with a longer ROD.santi-personncl handgrcnadcarepostwarnodels.
heavierbarrel,a bipod,anda differentshoulderstock.It The RGD-s is more compactthan the earliermodels.
has two magazines, a 75 round drum and a 4o-round Thc RKG-3Mis tlle strndardWarsswPactantirank hand
curvedbox. but it canaho usethe 3o-roundAK/AKM Stenade. It hasa IIEAT warhead dnda stlbilizingdroSue
chute which ensuresthe prop€r angl€of impact for the
d. 7.62nm Ceneral-Purpose Machi egunl shapedchage.
(PKll). E^ch of the Soviet rifl€ squadrequipped with
the latesr modcl BMP has two PKM rnachincguns- This 26. Engineer Equipment
weaponhasan cffcctiverangcof 1000meten andis an
Each soldier has an entrenching tool. Whcn extensive
improvedversionof thePK general purposemachinegun.
fortificationwork mustbc donc,shovch,pick maatocks,
Ihe PKM uses2s-roundsectionsof non-djsintegrating
and other tools from th€ engineercompanyin the
metalic feed belts. The PKS model h mountedon a
motorizednfle regimentareissu€d.
tripod.lt doesnot usethesameamrnunition asthc AKM
andRPK.
27. Chemical, BiolosicalandNuolsarEquipment
e. 7.62mrnSnipetRiJIe,Dasunor (SVD). Thercarc
tllroc sniper rifles per motorized rifle company. The In sddition 10 tlle BMP\ CBR filtration system,the
Dragunov is a 8asopcratcdscmiautomatic wcapolwitl 0 Sovictsoldierhasindividualcquipmcntto cnablehim 10
detachable box magazinc.A combination flash sup- survivein a CBR environment.Eachmanha' onc of
pressorandcompcnsator helpsreducefie muzzlejump threestandardprotectivemaskslthe ShMhelrnettype
ard flash. Thc AKM dctachablchife bayonet also fits mask,th€ communicationmask,or the ShMSspecialpro-
the Dragunov.Thc PSO'I optical sight on rhe Dragunov tective rnask(Figure 20), Thesemaskl provideexcellent
is a four-powcr tclcscopcwith an integralrangefinder, a protection agai$t curr€nt NATO chemicalagerts,bio,
batt€ry'powered reticle illumination syst€m, and an logical agents,and large radioactivefalout parti€les.
infraredr€connaissance aid, Each individual is also issucd lhc OP.l protcctive
f. The RPG-7 Antitank &enade Launcher. The coarcoverrl with glovesand anjndividualanti-chemical
RPC-7which replacedthe eadierrnodelsRPG-I and kit for treatingnerveagent,cyanide,and toxic smoke
RPG-2,can be feloaded.It is the squad\ antiiank casualties- Atrophirc is used as un mtidole for newe
weapon.Thc launchcris diithguishable from the eurlier agentpoisoning; sodiumthiosulfatcandrinyl nitratcfor
modelsby the presence of two hand grips, the large cyanide poisoning. Antiradiationpillsafe alsoinctuded.

2l
 b. RG-42.

C. RKG-3M,

d. RGD-s.
Figure19. Handgrenades.

22
 a. Shl, mask. b. Shl,,lSmask.

rt

d. lndividualdecontaminationkit, IPP

c. OP-1protectivecoat-overall.

Fioure20. PerconalCBRprotectave
gear'
2 8 . S u m m e ta n dW i n t e rF i e l dU n i f o r m s
Sum er Nnd wmtcr ficld unifornrs and accout.ements
a[e sholvn nr Figurc l1 rnd 12. Each man is also issuedr
.amouilagc cate. Spcciai canrouflagesui6 are issuedas
rc.luircd Ior wint€r 3rd sunnner opcrations and i)r

Fioure21.Summerandwinterfielduniforms Figure22. Fieldcombatpackandacco!trements.

24
I
t4f

29. SisnalEquipment dismounted, the plaroonlcaderhasan R-l26 (Fisure25)

radio which ha! limit€drangcandfrequencycoveragc.
4. The motorirednfle companyis wel supplicdwilh
d. The company commmdcr'sAPC containsan
radio sets. Theseradioc are ruggedand moisture-proof
R-ll3 or R-123, an R-126,md an R-105or R-107
dnd arc desiped for easeof operationud naintcnance.
radio. The R-107 is probrbly drc replacement for the
Adcquateoverlapin frcquencies is providedfor com-
R-l05, R-l08, rnd R{09 family of tansceivers. It exists
municationsamonginfantry, armor,and aJtillery.
b. EachsquadAPChaseitheran R-113(Figure23) in both the vehicularand nranpackconfigurations. The
or Rl23 radio (Figure24), the latter beingthc most R-105andR'10?ar€shownin Figurc26.
modern,with a grcater frequencyband. When dis- e. The.eis no organicprovhionwithin tle moiorized
mountcd,the squadleaderhasno ndio. rine companyfor wirc communicatjons. l-ayingof land
linesis pcrfomed by battalion.Other organic equipmcnt
c. Each platoon lcadcr has a vehiculai-mounlcd
R-ll3 or R 123 radiosct which,likc thoscin hissquad used by the company for signrling, are whistles, flags,
bugles, flar€s,traccrammunition, md panels.
APCS, monitors the company commard nct. Whcn

Figure23. R-1l3vehicularradio.

25
 t

Fioure24. R-123vehiculartadiowith intercomunit.

Figure25. R-126manpackradio.

26
 R 105 R 107
Figure26. The R-105and R-107radios.

SectionV. COMMAND AND CONTBOL

30. a. The Soviets regard conmrnd lts the exerciseof his platoonleadersis routinelor thedeiiveryofcombat
constant and effec.ive control. Thc rnotorized nfle ordersand for supeNisionof preparatio!for combat.
companycommanderis responsiblefor the ope tions of Wirecommunications areprimarilyusedin the defcnse.
his unit. To assisthim he has a politicdl officer and a Companymessengen are usedin both the offenscand
technicalofficer. Tle former aidsin the political training
md indoctrination of the company, while the latter ,. Rzdioneis(Fisurc27).
arsistsin adninistrative, maintenanceand supply mar- (1) The companyconrnmd net, when esrrb-
tels. Thc scnior platoon leader is thc company con- Lished,goesfronr the conpanycommander downto rhe
nander's secondin com,'nand. squad leadersduring nou.ted operations.This net
,. There re no platoon sergeuts. The senior squad udizesthc Rl13 or R 123radio.
leaderis the phtoon lerder'snext in command. (2) Du.ing mounted opcrations,the company
a The squad leader, usudlly an 18 or 19 yearold commandermaintainscomnunicationswirh barbrio!
conscipt sergeant,directly commandshis squad.There throughthe R-ll3/R-123 dnd/ofthe R-107radio.when
afe no fre teamieaders. dismounted, the R 126 radio is used,althoughii hasa
very short range.
31. Control (Jr Auachedor .rppo||rngunirr usc orLanr.
u. The primary means of conrrol of the motodzed radios.Commdnders of attachcdunitsar€normaly with
rifle cornpanyis radio, although personalcontact, wirc, urc company comnande. in both ihe athck dnd the
ncssengcr,.nd a variety ofother nethods are rlso used.
PeNonalcontact betweenthe company conxnanderand

27
 F1t3/r23

COMPANYCOMMANDER

BATTALIONCOMMANDEF

NOTES
1, The raciicalcommandnetotan MR unit is contot€d sl the highesttevetpossibte.When lhe companyis houfr€o rn N
APC s lheremay be no companynet p€r se.

2. Fegadlessotwherherornotrhereisacompanynel.rado ft'oned,andlsedprim..itvbvlhe
barralioncommanderand his immedialesubordinaleand arsched unn commandeB ptatoonand squad edoe6 wolro
pnm6rilyreceiveinstructionsand would lransmiri.iiequenity.

Figure27. Representative
radjoner ol a motorizedriflecompany-

SectionVl. ADMINISTRATION
AND SUPPLY

32. Adminittration ,. Ammudtion resupplyir accoDplishedby the

At company level, adDinistrationis minimal. Thc battalion,whichdclivcrsan'nnunitonto designated com.
conrpanycommanderis assistedin his adnrinisrrativepanyanrmunition poinrs.Platoonpcnonnclpick up th€
tasksby the politicat officcr, tcchnicalofficer, first platoon\ amnrunition-
sergeantmd the companyclerk. Forn$ and reports e. The Sovietsoldiercarriesore{wo days rutions.
which are mdntain€d at companylevel include &c Usudly,combatunits receivetwo hot nreals(prcparcd
companypersonnelbook (which containsa recordo[ by battalion)per day (Figurc28). Dry rationsarcissued
pcrtincntfactspertrininglo r soldicr'scivilandmilitury tor thc otherrne3ls.Breadis bakedat divisionbak€ies.
lifc), duty roste|s,the dany strengthrcport, and the
trainingschedulc. 34. llledical
Tle Sovierscaregorizcwounds ls Ighl. serious.u'
3:1.Supply critical. Only basictreatmenti-srenderedal conrpany
a Normally highcr units, using their organic trans- level.Ambulatorycas€s areexpcctcdto ma.kcthcir way
portalion,dclivcrsupplies
to subordinaleunils,although on foot to the batldion aid station.Stretchercasesare
thc laltcr may collectsupptiesin somesituations.The carricd to thc aid station for subsequcnr evacuarion.
motorizedrifle companyhasno organicserviccpc6on. Senouslyand critically woundedpersonnel are evacu-
nel, and tlrcrcforedep€ndson battrlion tor resupply. ated by lhe baltalionambulanceand orher lvailable
Thc company technical officcr works closely with his vefucles. Normalyhigherunitsprovidetansportfor thc
counterpartat baltaLion. evacuation of casudties.The cnticallywoundedmaybe
.vacuatedby helicopter.

2a
35. Recovefyand Repan capacity of thc REC. whether reinfo.ced or not, is
Soviot recovery and repair policy places emphasison Limited task rcquirjng nore than 30,60 nlinulcs wil
r o u t e ! l e r r ; r g s u l l r d r d r m r g e dv e f u ! l e rJ n d e q u r p m e D l nomally noi bc ttempted. Vehicles requiring this
do not impede dte rdvance. lf the drivcr/mcchanicsat unounr ']1 llmc or more to repair nray bc towed away,
company cannot repair rheir vehiclesin t0-15 minutes, or moved off the route for evacuation or rcpair by
the l€chnical deputy notifies the battalion technicat regimcnt or division. First echeloncompanicswhic.hlose
deputy who coordinatesihe baualion repair and evacu. a cert in percentageof rheir mcn and equipmentwoutd
ation Sroup(REG). The battalion REG, consistingof tbc be replaced by second cchclon units, reiirrmed and
supply and mainrcn cc platoon, may be reinforced
w r h r r e p : r i rr c f l m I r o m r c g r r n e n tB. e ( r u s cr h c r c p a j r

Iil',''
{j,ir
I ii,i

Figur€28. Soldierseating in rhe field.

29
 CHAPTER5. IV]OTORIZED
RIFLE COIVIPANY
TBAINING

Sectionl. INTBODUCTION

36. Genetal in complcnly. However,"rggressors"1n theseexercises

usesoviet rather thm NATO tdctics.
d. There is a wide variaiion of trainins effectileness
wjthin the Soviet AJmy's approlinutely 170 divisions. /,. i\.losreriercisesiiclud€ aspectsof CBR lraining.
Frequenlly, men will welr then protec|]veclothing and
The Soviel military prcss does,however, indicate what
inask for long teriods ol tjme. cvcrr duing rhc
should be taught and how it siould be llusht. It sas
conducr of strenousphysicalexercise.
discusses botb good and bad €ramlles of trainnrg.With
regnrd to snrall unit tactics, some of the conclusions
37. New TacticalManual
which we have drawn fron th€ Soviet lress arc as
During the 1963-1973teriod, the Sovietsprobably uscd
,. Soviet mililary writings reflect olficial doclrine. ! sinslc marual for tactical rcthods at thc batlalion
Sovlet nilitary litcraturc is wcighted in favor of ihe level. In late 1973 a rellaccnent wirs ro b€ published.
offensivc. Delinsivc opcralions rcceive less altenrion. lmphrsis in the Dewverslonn lrobdbly on the offenslle
and retrosradcopcrationsrrc inlicqucntly discusscd. and ,jso actiuly in close contlct with ll1e defender,and
c. Mosr arricles stress the imponance of initldtivc xt ihereaftcr on dcfcnsive operations and thc naJch.
rI lelels of conrmand.and rhe n€ed to eliminrte stereo- Emphasis is placed on norc skjllfu y portrdying the
t y p c d u n i n r a g i n a t i vr rea i n i n g . aclions ol probablc cnennesand on the use ofclcclrificd
d. lncreased€mphasisis being placed on ihe rrainilg tdcLical lrxining nc1ds. Conrbatunder stccial condilions
of junior officers and NCOS. possibly r€flecting the i s , l s o c m p h a s i z c d .
problms brought about by thc dccrcascdtinc ofactive
dury service md fie difficulty of retainiig trained 38. The CompanySchedule
NCOS.Alfiough l.1rcNCO is Fcquently descrlbedrs "the The conpany lr.rining schcdulcrs drawn up rvcckly by
olliccr\ rcliablc dcputy," thcrc are few rclerencesio lhe conpantr conmnder under the supcrvisionof thc
NCO'Siniriadng or piannmgiraining. batialion chief of staff. Tlt ob.jectiveof th€ scheduleis
, . T h e e . r s r d e . p r e - Jd s c u r ! , n g : r J s I n - u n . ro reflect rhe coune ofthe trainingprocessby providing
pmy lririning. These aids rrnge from smdl oplical for a logicalp.ogressionofclasscs.The scheduleincludes
d e { e r " ' \ e . \ . g h r p r .| | " . , l J r . 1 9d r r i r . . \ e r . i F s the fo owing:
!o weli establishedtraining areascompletewith a variety a. Trai'ringgoals-
ofelectric ly run targets,city mock-ups.etc. ,. The ropicsand tines lbr trrinnrg classes.
I wir\'1 rlF 1^r'rlFd Ife.^TpJ,r. r o i r' r ' s . .. Typesofpoiiticd inlnnnirlion scssions.
mosr often conducted by plaimns utiljzing the county d Specidlisttrai rlg.
lair method. '.selfrrairing" to be con-
Platoon lcxdcrs dcvise the
& Trajnjngis norrnally planned and superviscdby the ducted by cach ol their platoo! ntnrbea wilhin thc
next higher corlnnrnder. The b.trralion commandcr tnnc aliocatedby tbe comprny conmnndcr. Thc hannrg
supcrviscscompany trnining, thc company comrnandcr of scrgeanrsln ihe techniq es ofconn:rnd is conduclcd
his platoons, etc. Tacticd trdning exercisesare con- whcn they are free from cl$ses with th€ir squads.Nol
r o l l e d b ) r h e. e r i n ra L h o r i \ L . i r g d F b r l F ds . F 1 " 4 u s . included ivithin the company tranrnrgschcdulcarc thc
Thcsc cxercrsesare umtired and evaluaredby officen of denilcd plans for seflicing equipment during special
the next higher unlt. Unit prcparationlbr an exercrseis maintenmcc Periods.
normally detailed and, lvhen done prcperly, progresses

Sectionll. WEAPONS
AND EOUIPIVIENT
TRAINING

39 General Machine gunne$ and RPC gunncrs mav riso receive

NCOS.At C crew members.and ATCM olcralors receive prior trrlning. Upon assignmenrto a unit. conscriptl
six months ofspecialisLlraining prior ro unit assignrnenl. receiveaboui onc nontlr ofbasic training-

40. PreliminaryWeaponsTtainins
a. During ihis phase,training is desiSn€dto srve the
soldier a thorough undersiandingof his weapon. Thc
nomenclature, functioning, asscmbly and disassembly,
and carc and cleaningofthe weaponplecedemdkrnan'
ship training. Firing positions, sighl alignmeni, rangc
eslimation, trigs€r squccze. and extensivc dry-firing
exercisesafe closely supcrvisedby NCOSand otlicers
Uve fire is conducted after the basic prhciples have
beenmastefed(Figure 29).
,. The gorl of markrnanship trahjng is ro devclop instruction. Teclbiques vary according to the type of
thc soldier's ability to fire acculalely and undef condi A?C used.A nunber ofstrtions provide trainingaccord-
Figure29. Preliminaryweaponstraining.
Figure30. Trainingin firing from an APC.
32
I
o
tions of poor visibility. He is lrxincd 1o fire when
nounled in an A?C and in tl1e dismountedrcLeaswell.
c. Aficr mastcring t]rc basics, the individual is iaught
to tuc at stationary and moving l3igcls on known
disiance ranses. He is then taken to more advanced
rangeswhere he musl rapidly engagemoving,stationary,
and surprisetargetsat unknown ranges-Having success
fully completcd this siage, the soldier is ready to fire
from molkup A?Cs.
d. Training in firing liom APCS is nornJlly con-
ducted by phloon, ulilizing the counly fair nefiod of
ing to specidty Gifleman, machine gunner, RPG, and
SA 7 gunnet, mounting and dismountingfrom the A?C,
and dryfidne exerciseswithin the vehicular mockup
(Figure 30). Thc training progrcsscs from station-ary
mockups to mockups mounted on a rocking ftarnc which
simulatesthe movemenrof APCS.The men are trained
to fire through the firing ports and, in the older model
APCS,over the sides of the vehicle while the vehicle is
stationary and on the move- Antitank grenadiersand
SA-7 gunnersmay fife from the halt or on the move at
1ow speedswhen the ground is farrly level. APC drivers
are trained to provide a slablc platform tbr lhose1iring.
c. Riflemcn also rcccive instruction on the coordi
nated use of infartry weapons lire againsl allacking
aircrrfl- A varicty of aircrdft haining aids arc uscd 10
teach rapid idcniificalion ol thc air largc! and to hclp
the rifleman anticipatcaircraft mancuvcrs.
4 1 . R P Ka n d P ( M T r a i n i n g
Machinegun trainingfollows much the sane sequcnccas
rifle trdning. Wren the gumer progressesto tuing from
inside ihe APC. he is rlughr how lo conrpensatefor
vehicLar movement. He also practices dismounlcd
$sault tue. holding his weapon at hip lcvel and firing
42. Antitank Traininq
d. Thc SoviersbeLievethat il tukes disciplincd,wel-
trained, and psychologcrly prepdred troops to engage
Figure31. Antitanktraining.
armor successfully.Antitank training attenpls to build
both confidence and proficiency in combating armor
and is usualty done in a county fair manner.Different
shlions teach characleristicsof tanks and arnrored
vchiclcs. and conduct practical exerciseswith antitdk
grenades,RPC'Sand mines(Fisur€ 3l ).
b. RPG gunnersarc lraincd to lirc ai stationary and
moving tank silhouelles which measureapproximatcly
threeby five mclcls.
 e ATCM (Sagger) gunnersusullly conducttraining
on m elcctricsimulatormountedin I ZlL,l57 var. Real
missilesarc rarcly fired. The SagScrcannotbe fir€d
effectivclyduring darkness because of the problemof
dcpthperceptionand the facl tlut fte effectivelangeof
the infrffcd sightingdeviceis 350400 rctcrs.Thisdoes
not givetlc gunncrcnoud tine to guidethe missileto
its targct (Figure 32). Tlrc Saggermay, however,be
eff€ctivclyfrcd at nightwrth illuniralion. SaggeropeF
ators are caJefully selectedand reportedly fire up to
2300 simulatedfoundsto qualify as a gunner,Afi€r
qualifying,Saggergunnersmay tuc 5060 simulated
roundra weekto maintainproficiency.
tt:|. SA-7T.ainins
4 SA-7 gunnersare trainedon a simulatorwhere
paramclcrsof movinStargets(rangc,cou6e, fli8hr
Figure32. ATGM {Sagger)training.
velocity, altjtudc, and boundary of launch zone) are
visualy dispjaycd. Both target trackrng and r ssilc
launching are simulated-For dctcrmining thc rypc and
idcntity ofair targels,silhoucttcsarc used.
,. Havhg learned how !o rccogrize targ€ts. rhe
gunncr trairs wiih models placcd al diffefent dhtances
lnd courseangles.Ifthe trrgctl silhouetteis equalto or
lcss than the dialneler oI thc small cifcle on the front
sighl thc target is outside the launch zone. When the
targel ovc ills $e cncle, the missilccan be fired. Moving
l!rgel eliccrs arc sho$n rtuuughthc u\e of nro!rng
ta.gel simulalon. After the gunncr first learns how to
track low vclocity targets on a horizonlrl counc, he is
trainedto track spinningand diing targets.
 c Cunne6 lre warned ,bout bcing ioo slow in
dctcrmining the novcmenl ol passagcol the targetsal]d
also about bcnrg ioo abrupt when guidingthe missilcon
to the iargel Aiter pressingtlle iire switeh, thcre is !
. h n , r J . l J ) b c l u r e' l , e m r r \ e r [ c s r l r d u r c J J r .
d Very littlc t known about t}e conrrol ano
employmeni of tlrc sA.7s. coordination and employ-
ment depend upon th€ mission, telrain. enemy, and
F i g u r e3 . SA 7 (SAM) training.
44. SniperTrainins
For snipetS,thc Sovietst-avornrenwho possess ercellcnl
vision and hcadng, good menrory, and qLrickreactions.
Trlining lbr snipersis conducted periodicrlly a d l sts
liom one and a half to tvo months. Sniper targcls
mcntn)nedby the Sovicl military pressincludc officels,
observers,:rnlitank ,nd reooiucssnfle crcws, machinc
gunncrs! crews of disablcd tanks, and low'flying hcli
copters. Initialy, the Soviet sniper conccntrates on
targctsvirich are holding up attackingunits (Figure 34)-
36
Figure34. Snipertraining.
45. BIVIP
Training
BMPcrcwI]ternbers rec.i!esi\ nror!hstrainingnr special
trainirg units prior 1o rcponingto their u it. Training
rl
includcsBMP cquip rcnt, 1ac1ics, poliiicalnrstrLrction.
CBRwarlrre.rivcr crossings. ard physicaltruhing.Oniy
tlre BjUP eommanderi! crosrtmined.Tlc BMP is
presenlcd10 traineesas a fast. lrmorcd. all-tcraii
tmnsport€fand a obile bascol iirc 1br diynounted
infant.y. Dismountingand remountingthe vchiclearc
doneal t shorthalt or on thc move.Thelehiclcslovsro
approxnutclyfivc krn/hourandbolh rcardoorsrno urc
commandcr's halch ale opcned.Thc comnrander eits
rhougi rc top of the BMP, while the sqLradexrts
througfidre reafdoors.ThetsIlPlhenfolows thcsquad
al a dislanccof 400-500neters. and may nole by
boundswith other BMP'S.usingfirc and nrovenent.
Nornnlly the BMPengages h ir STOP,F'IREandMOVI
paatcrn.Finng thc nraingun on the moveis inrccurale
due 10 the lack of a gun slabililer.Whenahesquadis
readyto renrounlthc vehicle.rhc platoonlcadernotifies
the BMPS10 com€ ltrward. Tle Btr{Pdrivessiowly
firough dle skirmishli]tc pickingup thesquadrDembers.
Mounlinganddismounling aheBMPin thisnanncrtakes
approxnnat€ly l0 s€conds.
46. BTRTraining rlained in their separxLespecirllies, progressinSfronr
BTR tratring at comp,nylevelis similarto BMPtrain- fixed mockups 1{) moving nockups and nndly to the
ing.T]rccountyfair methodof insructionis BTR.
enrployed
with individualc.ew and squadnrembediint beins

TRAINING
Sectionlll. MORAL-POLITICAL

personalnutter, but tlrc obligation of a mcmber of thc

The primary reasonslbr the heary enphasison what thc CPSU-"
Sovietsterm "moral-poliUcd" training are to maintain ,. crmpr, re'rel pdtirrca]rdeologrfr'l Irnrng is
party control over the Armed Forcesand to preparethe chiefly intended to do the fo owin8:
popuhce foi mod€rn wa!. As Marshal Sokolovski (i) To pronrote solidarity around thc commumst
pariy and drc Sovict governrncnl.
Tne prepration of tbe popularionin fte norali (2) To nrculcate personnel with hatrcd for drc
politi!:t aspeclnasdecisiveinportancein presenl
enemiesof tl1cussR.
day condilions. sincethe .pplicationol neansof
nass ilestruclidnin vr inposcs very lnEh, (3) To erstlre undersiandingol propcr security
previouslyu.hcrd of demmdson thc political-
mor.l m,t€-upof th€population. (4) To inform soldieNofrcccnt CPSUmd sovern
Suchtmining is an importrnl parl of the overallcfforl to ment activitiesas well ar intenational evenls.
preparefor CBR warfrre. Thc ideologic prcparationof (5) To heighrcnthc disciplinemd political aware,
Lhetroops at companylcvel is the prirnary responsibility nessof companymembers.
oftie deputy comnranderlbr political :rffrirs. a. In addition, thc conpany politic,l officer trains
his assistantswithin thc phtoons and sections,helps
organize compctitio betw€en units. and aids in the
48. The Deputy Commanderfor PoliticalAffats displaysin thc hnin roorn (every uni. has such a room
which combinesthe functions ofa readinsroom,liblary,
The deputy comnander for poljtical affairs, wHie
utiljzing his own separatechain ofcommand (he reports
to thc batralion political officer), is responsibleto rhe
conpany commandertor the orSanizalionmd statusof
party-polilical work in rhe unit. He is aided by ofticers
dnd enlisied party or Komsonrol nrembers in cach
platoon (Figure 35).

49. ldeolosicaland Politi6l Traininq

d. Ai thc company lcvc1daily idcolorjcal and politi-
cal trainirg is tied in with nriljlary trainnrg.In addition
to regularpolitical classes,ofticers and efltist€dparty or
KOMSOMOL members must often spend Lheir "free"
tinre incre:rsingtheir polilical rwareness.As one Soviet
sourcc nrdicared, "polirical sclf+ducation is nor a

Figure35. Politicalindoctrinationsession.

37
 TRAINING
SectionlV. CHEMICAL.BIOLOGICALAND RADIOLOGICAL

50. CBa Orientation radiologicalinstruments,and the dulies of a squad

r. Motorizedrifle companies aJeassigned a teamof assigned asa CBRreconnaissancc unit.
speciallytrained'chcmicalobserver signalers"
€onsisting d. Company CBR trainingabo includesthe follow-
of an NCOanal$ree or four men.Theleamis equipped mg:
10 det€ctand markcontaminated arcasand to givetne (l) CBRroutercconnaissance.
chcmicalor radiological alert. (2) Rcconnaissance in a CBRcontaminated alca.
,. Individual training stressesthe use of protective (3) Procedurestor eslablishingchenicalobserva-
rnasks,dothing, and CW and radiologicaldetec.ion
equipment(Figure16)- e. Somca5pectof CBRtrainingis normalyinclud€d
c. Trahingposlershavedctailedinformationon {irst in Qcrical (FiguIc37).
excrcis€s
aid against CW sgents, the operation of chcmical and

Figure37. Chemicalr€connaissance personnel

Figure36. CBRtraining prepanngror an operalon.

SectionV. LAND NAVIGATION

51, lnrtrument3 ard 1r100,000 distinguish oine diffcrent types of

knd navigationinstruments large fron coinpasscs highway bridgesand givc rheir load capacinesin lons,
and
highly detail€dtopographical roadway width, length. and heighr abovewaler lcvel in
mapsto directionalryro
driving aids for the A?Cs. Drectionrl S/ros provide an
m€ters. Fording points on rive6 are shown with width
azimuthLoenablcthe dnverto hold 3 fi\ed couNein a and depth in mel€rs, sr€am velocity in meters/second
givendirection. and typc of botlon (sandy,viscuous,or roclf).
,. Sovict military map! are tightly controled. Maps
52. MaF with a nrililary grid and gcographiccomer valuesare
4. Sovict military maps are rich in dctail. For usually classified SECRET or TOP SECRET .nd are
cxample,Sovietmapswith scalesof l:25,000,l:50,000 hand-receiptedto units.

38
 c. Thc Sovieis rely on traffic legulators(Ofganicto
regimentand division) to guide their fonnations(FiSure
38). Traffic regulaiorsfiont boih regin€nr ,nd division
mole witi reconnaissance elenrentsor advancegual.l
unils to mark roules and dilect the rdvdncingcolu'nns r1
criiical points alorg the route. Melhods of tr nsporta-
tion used by lrdflic rcgulatds lncludc moto.cycl€s,
jeeps,light trucks dnd APCS-

53. Trainins
We cannot determinchow ruch land navigationtraining
is conducred al the compdny lcvcl. Duc to the secunly
cLassificalionsof nriiitary maps it is quilc possiblethat
liule map Lrrining is conducted and lhat nap rcading
skillshale sL!ffercdaccordingly. Figure38. Traffic regulator.

SectionVl. PHYSIcALTBAINING

54. Exerciseand CompetitiveSports

a. Ttc.soldiers' rrrining day nornrally begins with
about 30 minutes of cdisthenics (Fjsufe 39). Troops
receive about 150 hours of physicai lfaining per year.
Monthly physic fitness training schedulesoutline the
type of cnlisthenics ior cach day.
b. Cornpetiriveathletics play an impo({nt pan in
ihc company conditioning prcgram and are integr{ted
wilh physical training. The conrpanycommander,aided
by his sporis organizer and pady and KOMSOMOL
organizriions, is rcsponsible lbr scejng thal everyone
participates ]n sporis rctililles as laid dorvn by thc
Military Sports Conrplex of the Anned Forces (MSC).
MSC standards of achievement are nrclud€d in the
w€ekly rraining schedulc. Edch soldicr musi nccl the
standardsset for his agegroup.

Figure39. Physical
fitnesstraining.
39
 SectionVll. JUNIOROFFICERAND NCOTRAINING

57. lmpactot the PoliticalSystem

Considcrable emphasis har been placedby dr€ Soviel in subordinates
a. l,ack ol confidence extendsup ihc
military press on officer and NCO leadetihip at thc chain of commandand is a by.product of thc Soviet
company level. An analysisof many of these articlcs political system which stress€sful rcsponsibility and
seemsto indicate that nmy jonior officers do not punishmentof thos€who male mistakes.Junior officers
properly utilize drcir NCG, thlt is, th€y "assumeleader- arc often forc€dto acccptrerdy-madc solutions.Senior
ship in everytldnglareeor smdl, oommandindividual commandcrs, fearing nistakes, oudine thcir
soldiers,suggestready-made decisionsto the serSeanrsubordinates' assignmcnts
in detailandleavelittle to the
and attemptto do everythingthemselves." The NCO initiativ€ of thc junior.
appers to be u!€d primadly as a trainer and sup€rvisor ,. Open pr€ssarticlesdescribedeficiencres in judor
ralher than asa leadcr. lcadership and urge that posirive acrion be tak€n ro

56. TheNcO e The responsibility of company gnde officers to

Upon arivd in his assigned unil, the NCO,normally train thorougl y their NCOSis sttcssed.Praponhchiki
18-19ycan old, has rcceivedsix monthsof specialirt (wrrant officers) aiso help,in this training and have
training. His leadcrshiptraining supposedlycommences appfently providedsomestability at the companylevel.
with practicalwork in his assignedunit. In redity,
how€vcr,platoon lcadersoften give detailedorden to 58. JuniorOfiice6
th€ squadmcmbersand usethe squadleaderto ensure To improvcjunior officertraining,two to four daysper l
th-atthe ordcrsrre carricdout. Theconscriptsergcant's monfi are ser asrdefor plaloon-a ofn".r
"o.pany I
problemsarc compoundcdby the fact that he is oI the
sameagc and educationas many of his squadmembers
and. thoughhe hash?d si\ monttu training,is inexpe- thcmesfo' the$ scssjons.
liifii tl
[H;:"1i"#:'"'i"T,*:l"ff'il*"ll;
Ofticersarcalsoajlocatcddme I
rienced,cspecially in leadershipfundamentals. for individudstudyeachwcek.
I
II
I
Ii
II
I
II
I
I
I
II
I
I
II
40
"lII
I
I
 SectionVlll. TACTICALTRAINING

59. G6n6ml m. SquadTacticalTrainins

d. Company.level trainingbuildsup to battalionlcvcl
andhigherej(ercises.
Thatis,intensiv€individual,squad,
and platoontraininSunderthc Suidance of thecompany
commandcr preced€scompanylcvel exercises,whichare
normaly under .he supcrvisionof the battalion com-
The squad normaly rrains as part of thc platoon-
Trainingcentersupoo individualweapons,squadtlctics,
Arc mounting and dismomting proc€dures,defensc
agaiist CBR attack and lraining under specill condi-

,. Excrcises ar€dgidlycontroledby the next highcr 51. PlatoonTacticalTrainins

echelon,and requirehigl y detailedand lcngthyprior Battledrillsarethe mainforrnof ractical
rrainingfof the
preparationfor successful complction.The lengthand platoonrnd company.Actionsof the soldicrs,squadand
frcqucncy of companycxcrcisesvarieswidely, bul platoonandhow thcy fit into the overallconp ny plan
usuallythcy do nol go for moretha oncday. are stressed.Phtoon lzcticai t.ahiry is .lso aimed at
c Livefire is usedh sometacticalexefcises. Training tcachingthe platoon leaderto handlc v.rriousattached
aids consisting of portable targets of thc pop-up rnd unils. Plaloonmountedanddisinounledfonnationsare
ltationary type rcFesentingmen and cquipmenlIIr€ covercdbcfore the platoor conductsconlpanylevel
utilized.Thesclids maybe usedin a varictyoloffensive
anddefensivc conligurationsto givcthc Sovietsmallunit
leadcrtrai ing in rungeestimalion,tcmin apprecirtion, 62. companyTadicalTrainins
targetanalysisandbattledrills.Sometrainingareasusc
consoleswhich control movingtargets,someof which 4. Training at thc cotnpdnylevelcombincssquadand
havctlrc ability to simulatcrctum fire. platoon trainingin fulf ling companyobjcctives aspart
d Prcvalcnt tactical themes in the military press ul $e ballalion. Coordinaled hrc and mrneuvcr, in
concern thc the co.duct of a march, the mceting conjunction with attached armor, chemical,
enginccr and
engaSemenl, andrttackinga defensive position.Delcnsc .artilleryunits,areinr€nsified in companyballledrils.
and retrogmdeoperationsreceivelessattention.CBR ,. For training conducted underspecialcondilions,
training md the overcomnrgof engine€robstaclesis
includedin mosttacticaltrainingexerciscs.

4t
 RIFLESOUAD
CHAPTER6. THE IV]OTORIZED

Sectionl. GENEBAL

53. Massion ,. The squad leader is anned with the AKN'Iassautt

The rine squ d h dre infantrv\ basic taclical unil. I1 rifle: the lwo machinegunncrscdrry the PKM mrchine
(lhe machine gunncr in the BTR and in thc crrlicr
accomplishesits missi.rns by iire and movcmcnt .rs gun
opposcdto fire 8nd nraneu!er.Thereare no firc rcanrsin nrodel BMPrquippcd units ue armedwilh thc RPK lighr
drc squad nrough ir normrll) fiBhts as part of rhe m.c[ne gun); the anlilan] Eenldier is.nncd Nith botlr
mororiTed rifle plaloon, tne squrd may be given inde- drc R?C-7 and the PM pislol, and the four itlerDcn have
pendentmissions.The squad: the AK,\I assaultdfle. Squad membersarc also armed
d. Conduclsreconnaissance and combal patrols. wiUr grenades-
,. Acts as poirt, ltrrlk or rear secLlnty during ! r. The approximalc baric load for each squad mem-

( l ) S q u r dl e a d e r l 2 0 r o u n d s( A K N I )
.. Prolidessecufity for forccs at a hall-
(2) Two PKM mrchine sunneu 2,000 ri,unds.
d. Acts rs thc compmy rcserve.
divided anrongsquadmenbers.
(3) RPc-7 sunnef onc RtC.7 huncher, onc
64. Orqanization
pistol with 16 rounds.and fou| RPG-7rcunds.
d. Bolh tilc BltP-cquipped und BTR.equippedrifle (4) Four AKM rillcncn each with 120 rounds
squadshale n $sault strength of ci-qhlmcn: r squad (AKM). plus some of fie nachine gun ammunition-One
leader. two mrcNne gunncrs(onc nachine sunner and rineman mi-qhtcary four additional rounds of RPC-7
an extm AK[l rii]eman in the BTR-equippeddnd €lrli€r
model BluP-equ'ppedsquads),onc antitanl grenadier.
and four rinemen.Tlvo ofthe four rillcncn arc assislanl 65. Tactics
machjne Sunners.and a thifd riilcman is an assislunt
R P G - 7g u n n e r ( F i s u r c , 1 0 ) . nere has been no fadical chimgein Soviersquadlactics
despile noticeableimprovcmentsin weaponr! and A?C

'1r I'
d#
Figure40. The BTR-equipped
riflesquad.

t 43
 a
dcsign. Capabilitics of the squad have, howcver, mcnmaybc mountedon tanks(Figure43). In suchcascs
improvedas a rcsultofthc introductionofthe BMP,the they dismount in thc last conccaledposition befor€ the
issueof two PKM machinegunsper squad,ed the enemyFEBA.
improved CBR protectivc gear.Whcreverpoltible, the
squad\ril assault sndfight fromi1svehjcle,dbmounling 56. Leadelship
orily whcn forced 10 do so. The dismountpoint js Thc Sovietsquadlc der,nonn,ily an l8 or 19 yearold
dictatcd by the tcrrain and the enemyantitank defcnses conscript sergcant with sb( months of active duty
andrnaybe up to 1000metersfrom theenemyposition. training,is rcsponsible lor the training,conduct,and
When it must attack on foot, the squadoccupicsa contrololhis squad.H€hasno fire teamleadeGlo rssist
frontageof 4060 mete6 with 6'8 meteB beaweenmen. him. His abiliry to leadis turtherhamper€d by the fact
Soviet infanhymen are trained to exit from the BMP that whcn he is dismounted, he hasno radio contncl
duringa short hslt or whiic movingat a rcducedsPecd \rith cither his APC or his platoonlcader-lle has no
(Figure 4l). The BMP fires its main gun at lhc halt, or method to coordinateartillery support or the firc
(far lessaccurately)on the movc.The mainmissionof thc supportfrom his own troop crrriet, althoughhe can
BMPcrcw after the squaddismountsis to supportthe indicatetargctsfor thelatterby usingtracers. To control
squadby fire, particularly .gainst enemytanksand other his squadin a disnountedassaultthe squadlcader
armorcdvehiclcs.In most cases,thc BMPwil remrin normrlly placeshims€lfin thc centerand dightly,nead
400-500metersbehindils dismountcd squad(Figure42). of thc assault
line.Hissssistantis thc APCgunncr.
Should their APCSbecomeinoperative,Sovietinfantry

r::i i:r,'. I

Figure41. Exitingthe BMP.

M
ri

Figure42. B[IPs supportingsquadsby fire. Figure€. Tank born€infantryin the attack.

\f TO CONTACT
Sectionll. ITIOVEMENT

67. General squad to overcomc, it defendi and holds its position so

During the rnovemcntto contact,the motonzedriile 'a4er url]ls can maneuvcr.
squadmry bc assigned a marchsecurityor ieco rais- e Dudng the punuit, the squrd moves npidly to
sece mission.Normally,however,it noves as part of maintain coniact. Ma\imum use is mrde of t]le APC, as
the platoon in the platoon'scolurn fonnation. rhe squadclbls muunredand rucs ftom lie caffier.
d The squad designatedas rear sccurity in thc march
58. MarchSecutity fo ows behind the unit it is protecting !t a distunce of
primariiy .oughly 200 meters.
a Vehicleand foot marchcsarcconduct€d
at dghl or dunngotherconditionsoflimited visibility. On
a march,tlle squadmay be givena Poinl, flank, or rear 69. Re@nnai$ancePatrol
s€curitymission.D€pcnding upon the terain rnd condi- a. A reconnaissmcepatrol js usualy composcdof a
tions of visibilty, the squadcrrrier is separatedfrom its reinforccdsquador a platoon(Figure44).
unit by up to 200 metersby day md approximately 50 ,. A squad in this role is often reinforced wi r
meteis at night or in forests. If disnounled, tlrc squad chemicrl and cngineertroops. If dismounted.the patrol
leadersendsout two-manpatrolsio thefront andflank leaderreceivesa ndio and possiblya radio operator.
to act as local sccurity along the line of movcment. r- The squad is assigneda specific obj€ctivc aru/or
Theseelements operateat a distance of up to 100meters route inst€ad of a zone and operatesaway fron ils
by day and 30 mete$ at niahi or in forests. W}rcn parent unit al a distanc€ of rpproximately €ighr
dismounted during daylight hours, the squad lcader kilomel€rs duing the day and three kilom€lersat night.
controlshismcn by arrnandhandsignals. (Thesc distances aIe shortened wher the squad is
,. Thc squadattackssn I goups ofthe enemy,nd dismounted)- The squad accomplishesits mission by
aakesprisoncn or attempts to desroy the enemy dnd means of observatjonand mrneuvcr, but may engag€
continue the rnarch. If drc enemyis too strong lbr ihe in limired combar ir necersary.r(ludrnts reconndissancc

45
 ,(\

by fire. The patrolJeadergiveseachsquadmemberan

ob!€rvation mission. Sp€cific individuals are rnade
rcsponsiblefor front, flanl, redr and overhead
obscrvation. patrolis alsofrequently
The recoonaissance
usedto captureprisonersfor intelligence exploitatior.
d. Normaly the squadleaderpersonally reconnoitc$
lhe obiectivc. He employsthe squadto protcct himself
or to ensurethc completionof the missionby combar.
Rcconnaissance patroh normally maintain radio silence-
lf enemycontac! occuls,however,the squadleaderrhay
brcakradiorilenceand reporrenemystrength, locauon,
andactivity. Figure44. Squadon a night reconnaissance
mission.

Sectionll l. FORIVlATIONS

70. MountedFormations colurnJ facililating movementand control. This forma-

Mountedsquads movein variousplaroon
formarions(see
Chapter7).
71. Dismounted Fo.mations
4. Dismounled, the squads have only two the Line and has one of his PKM macline gunners
fotmations-- colunn and line.
b. Whendismounted.the squadnomaly movesin
tion is also uied in rcstrict€d lenain and during
conditions of limitcdvisibility.
a The skimish lne is th€ prescribed€ombat forma,
don lt hasa frontageof 5060 met.6, with 6-8 mcters
betwccnindividuals. The souadl€aderis in thecentcrof rq
on
eithcr sidc,thus cnsuringtight control (Figurc45).

l6s.l

50-60m

!!!
(O Squadleader
P Machinesunnet
Pf RPG.Tgunnel
A Riflehan{AKM)

Figurerl5.Squadassauhline.
46
\t
SectionlV, OFFENSIVEACTION

72. General
during the attack; missions for t]rc squad machinc
An attack may bc launchcd fron thc ma.ch or wh€n ir gunncrs!APC gumcr, grenrdier and aulomatic riflcmcn
contact with thc cncmy. In thc lattcr case,thc squad during the attack;conbat formation to bc uscd;tlre time
moves as part of the plaioo to an initial posilion from of attack, signals, ,nd dcsignaiion of a second-in-
which it launchesthe attack. The depth of ihe attack
dependson ihc naturc of the defenses,and tlle terrain. A ,. Due 1o his scanty training and short term ol
squadis assignedan attrck sector. scrvicc, thc Sovict squad Ieader does not function in
batlle in thc as manv of his NATO
T3 Troop L€adinsProcedores counterparts. ln practicc, it is tl€ platoon leader v,ho
a Thc squad leader is taughl to issue r complete usually issu€sthe squad ordcn. lt is the squadleader's
order. In his oider, the squrd leader includes enerny responsibility to execule these orders whcn thc plaaoon
infornalion, to include locationsof penonnel,weapons, leadercmnot overseethe squddt dclions.
and obstaclcs;the platoon ob.jectiveand dircction of
further attack: thc squad direction of ailack rnd 74. Conductof the Auack
mission:missionsof adjaccntsquads;ihe number of tlie ,. When rttacking from a posilion of closecontact,
tank (it tanks are attachcd to th€ platoon) which win rhe squad waits h ttr€ assault trench until its assigned
attack in front of thc squad; locations of passages tmk crosses the lrench, then folows it in the attack
through enemy obstacles,and the procedures10 bc uscd (Fisurc a6).
for negotiatingthemi proceduresfor tucs prior to and

\t

Figure46. Attackingfrom a positionin closecontact-

47
 ,. When attackingmounted from the march,thc r€peatsthe objectiveof the assault,rcdistribut€sammu-
squadassumcs its positionwithin one of the platoon nition, and marks (by use of tracen) targersto bc
formationsG€e Chapter7). Movernentof thc squ,rd altackedby APCandartilery firc.
from thc departureposition to the assaultpositionis
normally conduct€dunder cover of artilery f]Jc. If 75. Conductof ihe Assautr
forced to dismount, the squrd does so in dcfilade or On the platoonleader\signal,thesquadleadcrgiv€sthe
whil€ on the movc under cover of smokc,al a distance command."PRIjPAREFOR THE ASSAULT."Squad
of 500.1000metersfrom the encmypositions.Phasc membeFchecktheir wcapons,fix bayonctsand fcady
Iinesarc usedto aid the platoonleaderin controland their h"nd gr€nades. Then the squadleadergivcsthe
fire supporrcoordination. commarrd"lnto the assadtFORWARDI"The squad,
c. On foot, the squadfires on tlle move.On opcn firingon tie move,attempt!to advance rapidly
gound andwhilc underenemyfirc, the squadmovcsby a NeSotiathga Minefield.Thc methodchosenby
boundsh goups of two-thee men undercoveringfirc. the Soviet squd to crossa minc field depcndsupon rhe
Although covq is used, speedin thc rttack is stresscd. naturc of the cnemy\ defensg,tlre rerrain snd weathcr,
The squadleadercontroh rhe {ircsof his macfuneeunt and tank support.thc squadmay attackmount€dor
2.nd antitank genadier. By concentrating the fires of dismounted,dlthoughwhen attackingpositionswith
thesc wcaponsand by the use of traccn, the squad antitanl defcnses, it will usually0ttackdismounted. Fig-
leader indicatesto his supportingA?C and platoon ure47 illustrates fourmcthodsofdismountcd atrackwith
leaderparticularstrongpoirts which ,re hinderinghis thc squadcarriersuppoflingthe attackby tue. Examplc
advancc.Artilery forwad observers (FOt allachedto oncshos thc squlda acUng
lhrouehr narrowopening
the platoonand/orcompanymay thencal in supporting in thc mine neld without tank support. When
attacking
fircs on thesetarSets.lf the squadcomcsunder enemy with a tank,espccially in dccpsnow,thc squadasa rule
,rtillery or mortar fue, it advancesrapidly out of the attack behindthetank in a column
oftwos followingin
the tank'stracks(example2). In thc thhd €xrmpletwo
d Use of SupportingFifcs. The squadadvanccs rifl€ squadsnttaokin a columnof twos
bchinda tank.
underthe covcrof suppoiingartillcryJnd mortarfirc. When the breach
in the min€ field is suflicientlv widc,
Soviet tactical doctrine emphasizcsspeedin the attack the squad
attack on line behinda taok utilizineits ful
and statcsthat casualtiessuffcrcd from fuendly adllcry tue power to thc front (example4).
Shodd the cneny
are or y a fraction of tlrc casualtiesincurrcd by antitnnl defenscsbe strong, fte infantry mav pr€cede
infantrymon who jag b€hind in the attack. Thc driver the tank, whichwirh th€
A?Cs,wouldsupportby fire.
moveshis vehicleby boundsfrom onecoveredposition b.
Assaultof tle Objective.Whenthesquadis within
to another,attemptingto mdntain a stcadygun plal- 20-30metersof thc enemyposition,it movesinto the
fom for the gumer.Th€ gunnersupportstheattacking final assaultandattemptsto destroy encmyin
the close
squad by fire and att€mpts to kccp the squadleadcr in conbat. Upon discoveringa weak point in the encmy
pocition, lh€ squadprcssesforward.
e, Mutual Support. During t}le cou6e of thc attack,
c Consolidation. ff the assaultis repulsedby the
the squadlcadcrwatchesthe proSres!of adiacentsquads
enemy, the squadconsolidatesnnd digsin. The squad
and takcs advantageof their progrcss,nd fue to move
leader,reor$nizcs his squad,attemptsto neutralize
his own squad forward. If the adjacentsquadsare held
enemyfire and, in cooperationwith adjacentunits,
up, he helpsth€mwitl hissquad'sfire.
i Thc assaultposition. The squadoccupiesan assault
position closc to the en€my. The squad lcader then

4A
\\!

@
o oaoa
aoao
aoao
aoa
@
@ oaoa aoao oo
@ aoao .o a @@
@ @@
-- xr;) PE
EJ 66 d66b A
(9 666 66 @@
>.
t

ilt
oa
ao
oa
ao ttlll
tttll
llll
llll
tlr
tllL
lll
.< l- I )->-\ \
V6
eA9(,u)(.re.L,
I
O to a o.-.
O PT
KO Sqlad ead€r
A
:-----

it Figure47. Squad(s)
negotiating
a minefield.

49
 't

76. Battlefor Ra!€rvePositionrof rhe Deteffe squadwould alsobc given! radioandposibly a ndio
a. Majntainingthe Momentum.Whenth€ enemy's operator.Raids arc lupporl€d by artillery firc. TIc
forwardpositionshavebccnoverrun,the battlc for the .ssault €lement altack the obiective dir€cdy and
rescrvepositionsbegins.The squadattemptsto exploit capturesprisoners.The sec|.lalyelcmentprovidesfire
existingfo.tifications,nd lo hil the enemyfrom the supportfor the assault
€lcment.
flanks and rcar- Ernphasisis placcd on naintaining the (4) Due to thc cornplexity of a raid and the
momentumof the attack. degrec of leadershipcaled for, the patrol leader
,. RepellinSEnemy Counterattacks. During rhjr probabfy i5 a career NCO, prapotxhchik, ot tunior
phaseof thc battle, the squad is alert for en€my officef. He is normaly in the assaultelement of the
countcrattacks. It engagesa counleradackby tue andby paror_
assaultas pa( of thc platoon.when adjacentunitsare (5) A juniur commander. whensilen tJlemi\sron
counterattacked, the squadassisls
wili lire, bul docsnot to conducta raid, organizes continuolsobservation of
dackenils advance. Soviettacticrldoctrinestresscsthat rhe objective aJer, makesan cstimatc of the situation
thc best defcNe against a slowdown in racrical andissueshis order,which includesthc followhg:
monlenlumis 3n advance in anysector. (a) Enemydeploy,nent.
(b) MissioDandnethod of cxecution.
77. Pu6uit (c) Compositionand tasksof patrolelements.
(d) Referencepoints.
Thc squad'sAPCis caledforwardby th€ platoonleader. (e) Proccduresfor the movcandactionsduring
Thc squadrenrounlsxnd puNucslhe enenry.byplssing the attack.
individualstrong points- Thescwil be attackcdby (l) Withdrawal procedurcsand actions to be
s€cond echebn (reserve)forces designatedfor this
purpose.Retrealingcnemy forccsarc engaged by tie
followed h caseof an unexpectedencounterwith thc
I
(g) Pfocedures for requesting artilery and
mortarfre.
78. R.id andAlnbu3h (h.) Procedurefor cdualty evacuation.
Other forms of offensivccombat conductedby the (i) Patrolleadeisposi.ionwithin the patrol.
squdd,eitler reirforcedor as part of the platoon,arc C) Signalsfor control.
raidsandambushes. (k) Second-in{ommand.
a. the Raid (6) Upon completionof the mission,the assault
(l) A laid is usuallycarriedout on foot and elcment withdraws filst, followed by the security
consistsof a concealcd approachto an objectiveand a clemenl(s)and finrlly the obstaclc-clearing clement.
sudden attack to captureprisoners,documents,or Shouldthe 3ctiviticsof the assaultgroupbe djscovered,
equipmcnt.Whenever possiblcthe raid is conductedat jt withdrawsundcr€overof the securitygroupandcalls
night or underothcr conditio oflimted visibility. for artillery and mortar fire iI needed.
(2) Prcparations for the raid and ambush aJe ,. TheAmbush-
conductedin d€tajlandsecrecy. Sortiesby smrllgoups (l) Soviet writings define rn ambushas fte
miy be madeto gatherroute andobstaclcinforrnation, carefullyconccaled disposinonoI a unit ar a previously
while reheaBrlssre held in rcar arcas- desiSnared posjlionfor rhepurposeof makin8a surprhc
(3) the raid elcrnenth usui ly organized into an attack on the €nemy in ord€r 10 captureprisoners,
obstaclcclearinSgroup,an assault goup rnd a security documents, weapons, and military equipment.
gloup-Thc obslacleclearinggor.lpconsistsof attached Ambushesare set up along the enemy'sprobable
sappers(combatengine€6)who clearandmark a path movement routes, along corununication and rcsupply
throughobstacles andremainat thegapto act as guides,lines,trafficcontrolpoints,etc.
The security group may consist of additional nflem€n (2) A squadgivenan ambushmissionmay consist
attach€dto the squadfor the mission.A rcinforced of assoult, secuity, and observation clements andmight

50
\\'i

be reinforcedwith additionalpersonnel md cquipment. proceduresshould the palrol be discoveled,and

(3) Upon ardvingat the ambushlocations,the obslacles to bc cstablished.
patrol leadcrorganucsobserlationand a ocatestasks, (4) Usingpfe-a(ang€d signals,observenwarnthe
patrol leadcrof the cnemyl approach.The enemyis
(a) Referencepoints allowedto enter the cenler of thc patrcls'scctor,at
(b) Enemyinformation which time th€ ,mbushcomnrcnces. Upon complelion
(c) Posittunsof the patrol nembersand th€il of the mission,the patrolreturnsto its deployment
area
or conducrs othernrissions.
(d) Procedures fof opcring fire, taking (s) the ambushparrolleaderwouldprobablybe
prisoners,scizingdocumcnts andequipment, opcrational n NCO.pmpotthcllik, ot junior officer.

SectionV. DEFENSIVEACTION

79. General recessed pits for ammunition,anda latrinc(Figure48)-

Thesquadgoeson thc defensive rs pan ofthe platoonin lf rhe squadis nor h conracrwilh the encnry.cnSineel
hold andcreate equipment such as the MDK.2 dirch digger from
ordcr to repulscan rttack, inflict loss€s,
favorableconditionsfor resuming dreattrck.Defense at regjment(Figufe 49) may be usedto dig the squad
lhc squad lcvcl stressesanti-CBR and antitank
Theemplacemenl fo. the APCcouldbe prcparedby usc
fll of explosives or othcr engineer cquipnent.If a ditching
80- TroopLeadinsProcedures machincis not rvailable, squadutilizesL\es, shovcls,
the
Althoughthe squadleaderm y issuedetailedinstruc. crowbrn,andentrenching tools10prcparetic position.
dd firing positionsandan emplace-
tions to his squadafter reccivingrhe plaioonleader's lndividudlfoxloles
ordcr, usurly the platoonlcaderissues thc orderto aI ment for ihe A?C are dug first- A squad trench
personnel.Tlle squad lcader supe iscs to ensurc connecthg the individual positions is t]€n constructed.
witn thc order. An obscfteris postcdto Revetmcnts are used to reinforce tbe tench systemif
cornpliance
the soil is unstabl€. The squad defensive positionis
prevcntsurpriseithc platoon,squadand rdjacentunit
missionsare cxplainedlcontact is establishedwith esrabtishedrccording ro the pdnciples outlined in
adjac€nrsquadrith€ lenain in the assigned s€ctoris Chapter2.
studiedand cachman assigned a mission:fieldr of iitc ,. AI or part of tlle rifle squadmayrct asa pirtoon
the and
are clcired: prim.ry and alternntefiring positions,slil securityclementto delayanddisorgaDize enemy
approach. Normaly the security
trenchcsand connectingtrenchcsare dug. Reference to give warning of bis
day and 200
points,the areaof obscrvation, the principalsectorof elemcntis locarcdabout 600 mctersby
from t]rc platoon position.The
firc and secondary s€ctorswhich overlflpthe fieldsof metersby night away
squad le dcr/securitycoDnandcr places a senlinei
fire ofadjacentsquads, aredesignated.
forwrd of the securitypositionat a djrtanceof 100
81. TheSquadDef.nsivePontion meten by day and 50 mciers at night. Whcnthe enemy
approachcs, the mcn commcn€e firing and atlempt to
a. Thc motorizedrifle squ,d dcfendsaspaft of dre delay the eneny advancewithout prolongedcombai.
phloon and occupiesa frontageof 50'60 merers(in The securityelementwilhdrawson orderoflhc outpost
nuclearconditionsup to 150m€te$).Thcsquadengages commmdcror according to a preananged plan.
th€ enemyforwardof, andon ftc llmks of, thc ptatoon c. Positionsare estrblished on key tcrrainto block
position.The positionhaswcaponspils for the machine likely encnrylvcnuesof approlch while givingthe squad
gun crews and the antitank grenadier,covercddit m -\imumcovcrandconcealent.
tuenches which hold up to four people.nvo to threc
it
 i

KEY

1. cove@dtningposition. 7. M6chineo0nriins posirion.

8. Ahehai. machinesunnrino posirion
rninsposilio..
3. Machinesun 9. F i.s po.irionlot squd APC.
4. Ahernare
machinesu.posnion. 10.Ldine-
12. Ahemate nrino position for 3quad APc.

Figure€. The squaddelensivepositionpreparedwith engineersuppon.

d Pioper dispersionin thc defcnseallowsfor protec-

tion from weaponsof massdestruction. In a nucl€ar
environrnent the squad frontag€ is increascd to 150
1
e. All-round defense is assued by prcparation of
primary,alternate, andsupplemcntary positionr.
t Antitank defens€is providcd by the BMP with its
73mm gun and Saggernissjles and by tle squad
grenadier.A squadt AIC may be in the rniddle of the
defensivc position,on aflank,or up to 50 metcrsbchind
the position.Shouldthe squadb€ situatcdalorga good
armor avenue of approac:h,drc squad could receive
additionalsupportfrom the battahontanlitankplatoon.
The platoon lcader would position and control any
ttachedantitank wcapons.
& Coordinated fires ar€ planncd by inte ocking
squad fucs wilh thc fires of adjacent units arrd by
coveringall gapsin the squad'ssector of fiie with
concentratcdfrontal, flanlong, and oblique fires. Squad
fires are also supplcmentedby artillery and mortar
concentations, which cover dead space and likely
enemyavenues of approach. A squadis tssigned both a
sectorof fire and a linal protcctiveline, Squadleaders
preparea firing card which containsthe following data:
(l) TIc squadpositionandits assigned sectorof
fire.
(2) Referercepoints and the distancesto thcm.
Figure4g.The MDK-2 ditching machine.
a
 (3) l,ocarion of each squad weapon (includins secton of fir€ oeft or deht boundaryindicated)in ftont
tho6eon the APC)andits sectorof tue. of the squad.
(4) The positions of adjac€nt squadsand then (s) the platoon and squad sectors of concen'
trated fiie (Figue 5O).

f>-'

i@
iE&

- /,,-a
t Y\ 2NDsoo
|
tsTsoD I ___ l \."o
f_+6on "oo
KEY
1. Feferencepoint 1 ocks.
2. Ref@ncepoint2-bush6.
3. Squadnr€ concenrranon 1.
4, Befeencepoinr3 bddge.
5. Sq@d nre concenrrarion 2.
6. Fstersnc.point4looll.
7. Refe€n@poinrSlddmound.
& RefeEne pointGsump.
9. neieE nce point 7-hjll.
10, Reierencepoint&pond:
I 1. The prihary dn6ction ol fre trom one of
schnanking squads m6chi.equnsare

Figure50. Thesquad{ireplan.
82. Conductof the D.l.ns! squad wil distribute its strcngth to combat thc new
a The lirst en€myelementto probe squaddefenses threat whil€ continuhg to cover its odginal scctor of
may be reconnaissance. The plaloon lcaderis author?id fue. Should €nemy tanks overrun thc squadposition,
to fuc on enemyreconnaissance patrolsand,ifordered, squsd m€mbersattempt to destroy them from the rcar
tlrc men fire fron then altemate positions so as to with antitank genades.
deceivethe encmy.
D. DefensivefFes increas€in intcnsity as the enemy 83. lvhhdrawal
approachesthe FEBA. Shouldthe €nemyas$ult include The squad may wilhdraw on ordcn from the platoon
tank, antitarl< weaponsengagcthem, whil€ the other Ieader.The withdrawalbcginswith tle riflcm€nwho
squrd membersconcenfare on the acconpanying movc undercoverof the squad'smachinegunsand of
infantry. An effort is made to separatcenemy tanks the APC. They Mthdraw individualy or in goups,
frorn thcir infantry suppon. dcpendingupon the terrainand thc enemysituation.
a Thoughtllc squadmemben attempt to destroy Simultaneouswi$drawal of thc entire squadnormally
enomy p€nefations irto th€ gapsbetw€cnsquds, they takesplaccundercoverof firc froln supportingunitsor
nrelntain their positions and conc€ntrt€ on their undcrconditionsof limitcdiisibility.
assignedscctor of fte, If attacked from a flanL, the

54
a
 I
j

CHAPTER7. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLE PLATOON

Sectionl. INTRODUCTION

84. Mi$ions 45. Organization

The motodzed rifle platoon accomplishesits primarv
missions a3 part of the company by meansof fir€'
naneuver and closecombat.lt nay bo gtuena varietv of
a. Recomaissance andcombatPatrols.
,. Advanceparty, point, mobile, or statiotury flank
security,or rearSuardin a marchsecuntyrnission-
a Secudtyelernentduringhatts
d. Battalionreserve.
a. Both the BTR and BMP equippedmotorized rifle
platoonscontain one officer ard 30 erristedmen (Figure
sr).
,. ln addition to the squadal'nanent discr^sedin
chaptcr 7, eachplatoon slsohason€ 7 62nm sniperdfle
(Drasunov).

RIFLE
MOTORIZED

EOUIPMENT
6
18
7.62mmsniperdfie,svD l
7-62mmGPmachinesln,PKM 6i0)
Anniank s@mdelauncher,RPG'7 3
ArmoredpeEonnel€nier. BMP A 3 (0)

a 1 r 3 / F2 3 3
F 126

1. Figurcstn parenthesesreprAe rhe diffecnces tn numbersol weaponsand equipmenrtound in rhe BTR

equipp€dmoiorizedrifleplatoon.

2. In lieuol rhe BMP,the B tB.equippedMR plaloonhasthreeollhe BTF 50/60or 152seies oiAPC'S-

3. In |te! ol the P(M, the BTR equippedMR platoonhas3 RPKlighl machineguns

Figure 51. The motori?edrifleplatoon{BlMP_equ

ipped).
 fq

46. Tactics 87. Leadership

d. The phloon usually aftacks on tnr€ as pari ot.the The plaroon lcader. usualt) 2t or 22 ),cars old. n
c o m o r J o r J f r o r r r r g eo r p r o t 0 0 n c r c r . . t - n c m ) res!onsibtefor thc trrining, conrrol, a d disciptineofhis
defenscs and Drajn pennitring, ihe platoon attacks platoon. He has no heldquarrcrspersonnelro assisrhinr
mounted in its APCS. Such employDrerlloceurs norl and carricshis own radrc whcr disnrou ted. Tnc senror
o f i c n d u r i n gl h e n o b j l e p h a s eos f o p e r a o n s s u c h a s t h e squad lcader js normally designatcd ihe scco,d_ln.
meetingengagementjexploirarjon oI a nuclcarstrrKc,or
.ommand. The pldtd)n lcadcr €xercisescontrol bl radto
drdng lhe pursuit- Againsta strcng defense,the
ltatoon and visual signlls. tlc ako uscs individLraldflcmen as
rtlacks dismounted and. upon penctrating rl,e enejn)
nessengcrs.His control ovc. his assignedand attachcd
pontrons, remounts its APCS 10 cxptoj! the brcak
unirs is llmired by his commuricarions, parricuhrly
through drd conducrpursuit operations_
during the disnounted rliack when his sqLladlciders
b. In the defcnse.rhc ptaroon teadern ornra1l) ptaces
l a c kr a d i o s .
aI tnree squadson ljne. tn boih lhe offcns€and defense,
thc platoon leadcrreceivcsattactmeits (Figure 52).

Figure52. The motorizedrifteplatoonattackingbehindtanks.

S e c t i o nl l . M O V E M E N TT O C O N T A C T

88. ceneral 89. Advance, Flank, and Hear t\4archSecrrity

Detach-
During thc movemenrro conract,the irororized riflc
p l a t o o lr o r n J l ) r r o \ e .a . o - r r u f r h c , , , 1 r p a nL) d. c .or. rilcJ rine pt" Lon ma\ be -..rgr r r. d
mrrch column. The plaloon may be assiErcdmarch J c v r l . e . t a J r k e
or rear SLrrJ w | ,h, .5.ur 01
securrlymissions or givcna reconnaissancc mjssior. preventiDgpererntion by ground .econnaissdncc
and/or

56
{t\r
t
prot€cting th€ column agaiist a sudden enemy auack.
Plaloons glven such a mission tnay be reinforced with
antilank wcapons, Inor1als, cngincc$ and chcnicat
troops, dependinBupor ihe missior and the enenry
situltion. A platoon assigncdas lhc rdvancc gurrd ol a
column movins on a nuh ans of advancewould be
given nue support then on a secondafyaxis ofadvance.
,. Advdce and rear nrarch security elenrentsleador
follow the force which they are protecting at a djstance
of up to one and one half kilometers.The flank march
security elenrent tu)ves on a lire with the head of rhe
column at a distanceofup to one kjlomerer to lhe flank.
During coDditions of limited visibiiity, these disraDces
aJe reduced. All types of march secuity elementsa.e
d r , p a r c h ebd) . h ec o l p " n ) g j \ e nd s . c u r i r ) r n i ) ) i o n .
c. The reinforced platoon execuling a security mis-
sion artempts to dcslroy snra enelny unils by firc and
ag8resive auack. Should this not be possible, ihe
platoon occupiesa falorable posjtion and resistsstub-
bornly in m effort to give the protectedcolunm tine to
at
91. Mounted Formations
d. Motorized rifle plaloon formationsusedduring the
approach narch and cornbat arc thc colum , wedge,
inverled wcdgc, cchclon (right or lcfl), dnd tllc linc. fte
platoon l€aderllaces himself whcre he crn bcst control
his squadsmd effects chngcs in lbrmation by lisudl
signJls.His choicc of iblmation dcpendsupon condi-
tions of visibility, the rerain and thc €nemy situalion.
securityand control (Figure s3).
,. Ille platoon column formatbn is used during lhe
m a l h , i n c o n d , i u r . u l r i f l | | c dr . \ i b i l i r ! s. h " r p J . i n g
$rough confining terain, ,nd during dre pursuil.
Alihough it providcs only minimun fircpower and
securily io the front, the colunn folmation allows tbr
rapid movement, naximum control rnd pcrnirs rapid
deploymcnt to other fornatlons.
c. The plutoon wcdge is used lrior to contact or
during the battle for the enemy\ rescffc positionswhen dre file for negotiatingminefields and for rapid cross-
thc plaroon leader wrnts to maintain maximum control county movement.
while dcployed. Ir providescxcclent tirepower to thc
front and to eachflank.
deploy and enier ihe brtlle u dcr nrole favorable
Patrol
90. SeparateBeconnaissance
d. The motorized rifle platoon may bc uscd to
conduct a reconmissancepatrol up to five kilometers
ahcad of the puent unit if dismounted or up to 15
kilometers if mounlcd. These distancesarc dccrcascd
during conditions of rcduced visibillly. The ptdloc,n
accomplishesits missionsby means of observdllonand
maneuver,but may engagein linrjted conbal il neccs-
sary.
,. Thc plaloon may be re brccd wiih a vadety of
suppor! to rnclude antitmk wcapo s, moftars or arllL-
lcry, and chemicdl md cnsincerpeAonnel. Reinforcnrs
weapons usurlly move a5 part of rhe platoont rnajn
body with t}rc platoon ieader.Conmandersof attached
units also move with the plaloon leader.The melhod of
o p e r a r i o li ' $ " d m e 1 \ L h f l o f d r P. q u J d e - o n n d . ' \ 1 n L e
patrol-
S e c t i o nl l l . FORMATIONS
d. Thc invefted wcdge lormation prolidcs thc samc
advantage as tbe wedge ard is often adopled with the
intention of execuling ! dorlble envelopnent of the
objecrive.
e. Echelon fornrations (right or lefo provide
mL\imum tuepowcr 1() tne dght oefO lront and ar€
oflen uscd on t}tc cxposcd llank ol r ldrgcr ibrmation.
They arc dilficult to control wilhoul good visual
/. ftc lnrc ibnnrtion provldcs mrrijmun] firepowcr
and secudty to fie front, but is diificult lor the platoon
leaderto control unlesshe has good visual contact-It is
usedin crossjngopen ground and in the assauli.
92. DismouhtedFormations
d. Dismounted fomations are similar to mounted
lbrmations. The linc forrnation is uscdh ihc assaulland
,. Disnounted plaroon attack is likely to occur whelr
the enemy position is contiruous and unbroken. with
57
 emplacedengineerobstaclcs weil covercdby are. Dis-
mountcdattackis lcsslikely in a CBRenvjronmenr
ufe54).
(Fis-
G
!t!E
e In thc dismountedassautt.sqnadsoccupyfronf
agesof about 50 mererswith six-eighrnercrs berwecn
a
tl
squadmembers,and 20 met€rsbetwcensquads.Thc LI
piatoon attack frontagc is roushty 200 lnercrs.m a
conventiondenvironmcntinrcrvalsbclwe€nindividual WE!!E
soldiefsin extendedLincarercducedto four-sa x,ctoa
in ordcr to increasethe d€nsiryof fire. In dismounrcd ll
assaults,t}Ie platoon A?Cs fo ow tieir squadsat a LI
drslanccof from 400 ro 500 rnete6,depending on rhe
terrain,and supportthenrwirh fire. A?Csarc nornuly
spaccdup io 100metcrsaparr.
d. The piatoonno.rndlyatrackson line(mounreoor
dismounted). Squadtuc andrndeuvcris rafc.Normaly
the platoonicaderis posjrionedro ihe rearofhis center
squad.

!]G!I
a)
tl
I I
!1!!

I
0
0
Figure53. Motorizedrifleplatoonformations(mounted).

58
 I

G UNE

------*0
0=-,0o-_--*0--loom
(ATTACHEDTANKSI
F€ 5+60m +l
14L
lr
t: '..--i
lli
+ i._,..
CRDsot6\ / 'IsJ.,sT
souat\
I
UPTO20Om

l.--'-n.-'*'-n
WEDGE

+
/rND sartr^"1

{INVERTEDWEDGEI

t
/rNDaotaDl
3FDSOUAD

ECHELON

+
RIGHT

/ isr soult\ 3FDSOUAD

+
/ rNDsouaD-\

t
/ 3RDdiu;;\
t
. ISTSOUAD'

SOUADIN THEASSAULT
50 60 METEBS _-l

o o o r)
SOUAD
o o
LEAOER

Nol6 KEY
1. tnmounted
8nddasmoo.ted rhssquad.ndplatoon
fomations, l6deB wouldposirion
themselvB
inrhebesttootioft ro
2 APC'Susuallyfollowthensquadsandsupponrhembyire ar s distlnceof betw€en300-500met66-

Ll .cpc
Figure54. lvlotorizedrifleplatoonformations(dismountedl.

59
 SectionlV. OFFENSIVEACTION

93. General (l) Missionsot &e company,platoonalrd

A motDrizcdriflc plaloon i! ihc attack h normilly
assigncd an immcdiateand a secondaryobjeclive.The (2) Ref€rcDc€ poinls on rvhichthe plrtoon will
imnediate objective might be the penonnel and guide ns fo rrd movement.
weapons locited in the e emy'sfffwud dcfenlcs. (3) Thc missiorsofclch squrdin the platoonand
how theyareto be accomplished-
94. TroopLeadingProcedures (4) Tasks to be pcrformcd by lttached and
supportingwcapons,rnethodand types of hre, and
a Troop lcadingprocedurcs arc considerablyabbre- sequence of displaccment forwad.
viatedwhen altackingf.om the maJch.Whcnattacking (5) Attackformations.
an organized dcfensc,howcver,Sovietdoctdnespccilie! (6) Prucedurcs ro be tolluwedn o\crronung
that thepreparations be thoroughanddetaned.
,. From the company commander'sorder, thc (7) hcation of thc arsaultlinc md the besl
platoonleadcrnotesthefollowingi approach€s to it.
(l) The objcctivesand dircctionof the platoons (8) Int€rmediate firingpositions.
(9) Method of coordinationwitl armor in the
(2) Attachmentslo the platoon dnd supporting
tiresavailabie. (10) Locanonsof arlilleryard mortartargets.
(3) Theencmysituation. ( I I ) Stepsto be takento rcpelcounlerattocls.
(a) fte company\ mission,targcls,and objec- (12) Signalsto be uscdin rcquesting, shiflinSor
liftingsupporting luesandibr liaisonandreporting.
(5) Misionsof adjacertunits- (13) Supplyandevacuation routcs.
(6) Iandmnks (code-names for localteaturet. (14) Hislocrtionin the attack.
(7) Command andcontrolinstructions. (15) Designation oIa second-in-corumand.
(8) Timcof the attack. ,. Afrer the pla(ounle3,lertordcrhar beengi!en.
(9) Locationof thc compnnycommandcrund his the squadleaders prcparethcir nen.
deputies.
c. fime pcrmironB.a phlsiLal re'ronnJisqnces 96. Conductof th€ Attack
conductedio tlEt the platoon leadcrand his squad
a. whcn the attacksignulis giver,thc platoo!leavcs
lcadedmaystudythe enemypositionsh detail.
d The platoonleaderthen check thc statusofhis ils depa(ule posilion usingavailablecovcr and conceat-
mcnt. When no hidden approachexists,the platoon
equipmenrand that of his attachnentsand studicsdre
lire supportplanprovidedby the companycommander. deploys into [n€ formationand movesto lhe firing
position, trom whichit opentnre.
He arrangesfor coordinationwithin the platoon and
with adjacentplatoons.The companycommander wilh ,. When advarcnrgon an ob.jective250 to 300
his greatefcommunications capabiiityprobablycoordi meters away, the squadscovcr the firs. 150 to 200
weapons. meters at a fast walk.The dflcmencoverthe remaining
natcsthe firesofattach€dandsuPporting
a Tfuoughoutthe attrck, the platoonleadcrstudies 100 rneters on the double.
c. Thc platoon leadercloselycontrolsthc atlach-
the tcrrain 10 find rpproachesto the enemy firing
eneine€rs go fotwrrd with thc rine
positions,to implementobservalion andcamoulla8e, io ments. Combat
pick the most suitableposilionsfor weapons,and to squads,and conrmanders attachedelcmentsarewith
of
sclectthc bestattackroules, thc platoonlcaderfor coordination.
d. Up to thc assaultline, thc platoonmay usefire
95. orders and movement.witl lwo squadsadvancing under tne
coverof the third. The emphasis, howevcr,is on speed.
a. Thc platoonleadcr'soral ordefmight includethc c. Bclore rerchinS tie assaultlinc, thc platoon
following: leadcr,on thc lastfiringposition,mayassign missions to

60
fiDi

the squadsandindicatctheirihrectionofmovementand 98. Battle for B6ervo PoliiionsoI rhe Oelenseano

thel targetsafter the forcmostenemyfiring points have
beentakcn.Ammunitionmayalsobe redirtdbuted. a. Action for enemyrcserveposition!develops into
t Usingtracermmunition and flares,the plaloon an unevenadvance of unitsconducteddirectlyfrom t}le
command€r signatsto thetanksandsupporting weapons assaultand without any consolidation on the objcctive-
for the dcstruction of enemy weapons.He maintains FiIe and maneuver with particularcrnphni!
is strcssed,
radio communications with the companycotnmander on envclopment.Wlrcn th€ enemy\ antita* means
andgivessituationfeportsto him- havebeenneutralized, the platoo! leadercals foMard
his APCSin ord€rto regaintlle necessary mobility.Units
97. Condustof the A33ault puFue a witldrawing cnemy without awaiting orden.
a. Squad teclniques for the aslault, participation Complete consolidation on thc objective is normaly
with tanks,thc utilizationof artilcry, and the exploita- madeonly at night,whenthc platoonhasbcenaisigned
tion ofwcak pointsapplylo thc platoon. a missionof scizingan isolatcdpoint or whcnthe assault
,. As soonasthe artillcryshiftsits fires,thc platoon has been stoppedby thc enemy. Othcrwise,only r
movesro the objecrive.within 25 to 30 mcten of the momcntary regroupinglnd realigning is accomplished
objective, the soldiers throw hand genades .nd, duing the attack.
shouting"OOH-RAH!1."assaultthc positions ,. During this phase,the platoonleaderis alertfor
.. After taking thc loremost strong points, the counterattacks.The phloon attcmpts to dcstroy a
platoon continuesthe attack and assaultssucceedingcounte.attacking forceandcontinuethc pursuit.Should
strongpoints.I}te assaultis supportedby mortarand this not be fcasible,the platoondefendsand providcs
arti ery fires which areshifted so asto precedeat.acking the companywith a baic of fire for mancuveragainstthe
tanls by 100 to 200 metcrsandassaulting riflemcnby countenttacking forcc.
200 to 400 metels.The momenrumof the attackis
mainraincd by leavingthe destruction ofsrubbornpoints 99. RaidsandAmbushes
of resistance to lbllowingunits. Thc squad techniquesfor thc raid ,nd and thc ambush
d lf thc eneny succccdsitr haltinS the assault,the apply to the
Platoon.
platoonsurvivorsdefendon the mostforwardposition
they havereachcd.Thisbecomes thc newlineofassault.
Airerregroupin8 andprepatalory firesaledelivercdlhe

V. DEFENSIVE
Section AcTloN

100. General ,. The platoonmay def€ndan arcaon the mainline

d. The motorizedrifle platoondelendsaspart of the
comprny and usualy occupiesa strong point with a
frontageol about 150 m€ters(up to 300 metcrsin
nu€learconditions)with all threesquadson line. The
plaloon\ strongpoint hascquadrrcnchcs.finng posi.
tions(mainandalternate)for annoredpersonnel carncrs
andattached weapons, a command andobscrvation post,
a dug'outand a communicalion trenchto the rear(Fig-
ure 55).
of rcsislenceor to the rear of it within the compMy
defensivearca.Theplatoon'smnsionin the defcnse is to
prevent tank from breaking through into the reservc
positionsof the defendedareaand to destroyenemy
infantrymcn before thcy reach the main Iine of resis.
tcnce. Infantry which achievesa breakthroughis
destroycdby fre and counterattack.The platoon
wrthdmw) on orderof thecornpanJ commandcr.
 I

3FO
soD
,-No)^ d
soD\ ---:
r0
ii

,z-,ffi IE!
A Platoohle6der'scommandpo5l
Anriiank gEmde buncher
@
-
c:l Ahehate pGilion lor APC I Seciorol xe.ch wnh comm!.icalionsr.e.ch
o
Fere@ncepoi.t lror arrilbry ins)
Ahemare posirion tor tanl

m
/)
Y

Figule55. The platoondefensiveposition.

tl\
!

101. Troop LeadingProcsdur€, 102. ThePlatoonDetonsivo

Position
4. Aftcr rcceiving the company comnedcr's order. d. The platoon defensivepositionencompasses the
the platoonlcaderbeginswork oo his assienedarca. lfh€ samcfeatufes asthesquadpositions.
i! going into the defensc when in contct with the ,. The plaloo may bc dctailedby the battalion
encrnyj the platoon lcrdcr organizesrudimenlary posi. commrnder10l]ct in aI| outpostsecurityrole.In sucha
tnxs. He assignssquad tasksand orguniz€slhe fire plsn; roie, the platoon would bc augnrented with mritank
hc dcvelops a plan 1br rcpeiljng enemy attacks and gJns or rank'. ri'rtrrs. rird chcmicaldnd engrneel
mcthods ofprotecdon againslCBR weapons.Should thc elenrentsand would have the nrissionof preventirg
mosl suitable line of dcfcnse be localed tblwafd ol surpriseattackson lhc FEBA ind of thrvartingenenly
occupicd positioos, the plstoon may arternpt a rapid reconnaissance. In outpost support, the platoon is
seizurcof this lire wilh lhc permissionol the comp ny assigned a posilionup ro lwo kilometersin fronl ofthc
FEBAand occupies a frontagcof about50OmeteB.Thc
D. lf he is nor in closecontlct with the enemy, dr platoonoccupiesa strcngpoinl locatedwithin muiull
platoon leader cals his squad leldcrs and AIC ddvcrs firc-supportrange ol the strcng poinls of adjacent
and discussest]Ic platoon strong point with then. Thc plaloons, protectcdby obstacles, and supportcdby
rcnuining personnclrcmain in conccalcdpositions.Aflcr morlar and arlillery fire from rhc variouszores of
missionshale been assign€d,the squadleaden bring thc defe sc. lhe outpost lbrcc attenrptsto desrroyor
rcst of their men forwafd. caplure the enemy- Upon the appfoachof sizcablc
c The phloon l€ader studics the enemyt strcnglh groupsof the enemy,outpostpe.sonnel inflict darnage
and activity and the terrain. His lerrain m,lysir includes and try to force Lhcmlo deploy-The plaloonlcader
the grcund in the vicinily of his dcfendedarer. His firc detcrminesthe encmy strengthand dncction(s)of
phn i" derr ed and includesl rncthod ol colering gaps attack and reports thc sittlalion to the batl lion
in coordination wiLh adjacentunits and also the signals connander-The platoonh withdrawnupon ordersof
for conlro ing fire. lhe commander whoestablishcd the outpost.
A The platoon leadcfs order to his squadl€adersand c. The platon lcadcr,like the squadlexder,hasno
atlachmentsincludesthc following:
(1) The squadl primrry ud sccondary aress
Gecto6) of fire; prinlry and secondarylocalions aDd
arcas of fire for the APCsi phloon areasfor conccn. 103. Conducto{ the D€f€nse
trated fires: designationof w€lpons to cover the gaps a. Memben of thc platoon conduct conlinuous
with adjacent unils: procedures lor occupying dre obs€rvation. Pervlnnellake coverin dugouts,shelters
posilionsand the schcdulcior complctingengireerwork and on the bottomsof tr€nchcsfrom enemyartillery
and camouflasemersurcs. fire, and u€ ready to resumepositionsto repel fte
(2) Misstuns ibr alrachcd uniis, to include
altack. If someof thc platoon's\reaponsare put oul
primary and altcrnate locations and rreas of fire fof of nclion,the platoonlcrderattemptsio reslorchisfire
tanks and anti-tank guns. plan by reiocatingwcapons andassigning supplementary
(3) Procedurcs for dcstroying eneny t{nks and iire tasks-
inianlry in front of the foNard dcfensesisienalsfor ,. An encny rcconnaissance in force or rllacks by
CBR contaminrtion and cnenry air attack and proce. enemylcadclen€ntsareengaged by fi.e from dcsignatcd
durcsfor repeling them. weaponsin the thcarcncdscclof.After the attackhas
(a) Sequencc of rest for personnel, thc alert
been repeled, tiose wcaponsthat revealedtheir posi.
signal,and the method ofobtajning rations. tionshaveiheir tuing positionschangcd.
(5) A skcich map of the platoon strong poinl is . c. Wlen &c atlack coninrences, the plaloor lcadcr
submittedto the companycommander. signalshis personnelto man thcir positions.Adllery,

lf
tank and urtitank weaponsf'r€ is increasedasthe enemy
approacheslhe FEBA, with th€ maximumiires dnected
at lank! and AFG. It€ plaroon sniper attemptsto pick
off enemy officers, snip€n, observers,8nd machine
gunrrers.
d. lf th€ ercmy infantry attacks on foot, efforts are
made to cut them off froh supporti4 lrmor ard
dertroy th€m. Tanlc which succ€€din pen€kating the
forward defensesare take! undei fire by th€ company
recond echelon(t€sefl€) atrtit n& weeponsand artillery
firing in the diiect fire rolc.
e If the compary or battalion hunches a counter-
attrck, the platoon may furnish fire support or joifl th€
cou[terattackingf orce.
64
104. Withdnwal
when maling a wilh&as,al, the platoon leadeiindicates
to his squadr and attachmcnls lhe dircction of thc
withdrswal, the intermedirte phnselines, ord€r of th€
withdrawal, security nsxrures, and thc signd for the
start of th€ withdrawal. The platool withdmwsrapiauy,
but when forced, defends a $rcc€ssionoI delayinS
positionsa3p8rt of the corhpany.Methodofwithdrawd
depends upon the enemy situstion, th€ terain, and
weather.lf the platoon cannotwithdraw simultarcously,
It does so by squads,with the platoon l€ad6r
accomPrnying lhe lasl squd.
a
dn!
CHAPTER8. THE MOTOBIZEDRIFLECOMPANYIN COIMBAT

TO CONTACT
Sectionl. IVIOVEMENT

105. General depth of r€connaissancc rcsporNibility is 50 kiloneters

Thjs chapter examin€slhe actiors ofrhe moto.ized rifle the regimentmd 100 kilomcrcrsfor rhe division.
company in offersive and def€nsivecombat. ,. -. rL .y "u lic a\rgneJ mrrcn mi5.ior, rhe
motorized rille company is rcinlorced with amror,
106. Missions artilery, enginccrand chemicalunits. Ihc companymay
,]so receivern rtiaircraft sectioniion) t-hcregiment-
During a taclical nurch. the motorized rill€ company
nuy be assignedany ofdre folowing nrissions: 107. Actions of the CompanyCommander
d. Ax thc advanccguafd ofa motorized dfle battalion
(Figure 56). The company conrm,uderis responsibl€for a. Th€ conpany conrmander receives drc ftarch
thc secudty of the batalion main body. The company o r d - ' I ' o n f i " b : r | r r u r . u r , r , a i r d e ' - n Ja f , , i m p a n i e ,
operates fivc to tcn kilomete$ ahead of lhe unit ii is hlrr 11 b rer,,nnar,)rncP e rior ru gurls Jn recor|llai-
pro&cring- An advancedetachment.usudly a reinforc€d sance,lhe conrpany com'nanderissucsa wrrning ordel
platoon, is sent from oDeto one and one-hrlf *ilometers to his platoon leadefs.ftis ordcr dcscnbesthe nrarch
Jlead ofthe co pmy. Flank securilyclcmcntsmay also conditions,its length, personnelprcparation,equipment,
units delailedas nrarchsecurity,thcn augmentrtion.and
,. A-sa forurrd detucnncni for ! regiJncntdllacticdl the time and place for lhc issunnceof rhe march order.
march. The conpany pcrfornrsr spccificlaclical rnission ,. men time permits, thc conpxny conrmander
indep€ndentof thc march unils. It may bc assigncdtlrc takes his piatoon leaderso a rcconnaissdnce to check
nission oI sccuringa critical terrair laalure dominating trdtficability, the m rch stalt poinl, obsttcies and olher
factors that may affecl th€ march (Figure 57)
.! tllc arca through which thc rcgirnent wifl move.
c. As r parl oL thc mdn body of a 1ac1ic!lmarch .. ln nakrrg hjs cstimate of the situation, lhe
unit. In tiis orse the company may bc caled upon to compdny commander studies enemy activilies rnd the
furnbh flank secudty forc€s or the r€ar guard eiencnr. probable dJne of contaci- He anirLyzcsthe terain and
d. To act as an ad'hoc reconnaissance considersthe w€ather. He outlines procedurcsfor ihc
group for the
comt any formarion and rneasuresfor sccudty. He then
r e & r, e n o r d i \ i . i o . ' . A r e c o r l " i s { 1 . p . u u p i . a
lemporary tactical unit (usually a reirforced comprny) completesrnarchcalculationsrviz.;
fo.m€d to conduct a specilicrcconnaissance mission.Ac-(l) Tlle length oI the march.
cording ro Soviel doctrine, reconnaissance groups are(2) Toral time for rhc naJch.
frequently employed on the march, duriDg d meeting (3) Tle averagespccdand thc spccdson portions
engagemenland in the deiense.They are assignedaDaxis
o1 advrnce and m objective.The disranccthey operrte (4) fte tincs 1br passjngthc start and control
from the main combat force is dctcnnined by their points, and thc lime 1br securiiy dnd reconnarssance
n i s ' r , n a n J . u n p r ' i r u n . a n d b y I n c r - r ' r i . t l - e r , T a l el€m€ntsto bc in assignedar€as.

-C *C+C -<-fo- -<+uE_ -<+uu -+i-!-o- ,+r|+ *(:l

lt) {2) 13) {51 (6) {71 (8) l9l

!!Y

2 Chemicalwarfaredelachmenl
i e c o m p a n y . 10. Disiancesoi parrolvehicles
3 C o m m a n d el sr t m o r o r i z er d from the main
body 128)would vary dependingupon
rhe enemv,wearher,l€iiain rnd oiher laclors.
5. Fnsrmororizedrlleplatoon. Oisrancesb€tweenother vehlcieswouldbe
6. Secondmororizedrlteplaloon.
7. Th rd motorzed ilepbroon

^l Figure56. A reinforced
motorized.ifle guardof the battalion.
companyasthe advance

65
 (5) 'Ihe place,titne, and duration of halts for thc
s€curityelementsand for the nuin body (if dcsignated
by the highu commander).
d llaving compl€tedhis study of the highercom-
mandeisor;anirationlbr fie nrach{FjBU,e58) aniihis
own estimate,the companycommanderformulatesa
marchpianwhichincludesthe followingl
(l) The order of marchand the distributionof
personnel andweapons.
(2) the composition and tasks of the elements
dctailed for march security and rcconnaisssceand the
times for them to passthe stait point and the control

(3) The probableareaof contact with the en€my

andthemethodot deploymint.
(4) Th€ procedure for control of subordinare

e. Normally tanks lttached to thc companyare

Figur€t. The compenycommanderof a rcinforc€d located ncar thc head of rhe mdch colunn to allow
motorizedriflecompanyconducting tltem to bring fire quickiy to bear in a meeting
teconnaiasance. engagement, to coverthc deploymentof the company
andto cngagethc enemyt€fore he candcploy. Attached (
uaillery and mortar units movc behind tne infantry in
lhe cenler of the main body. Attached air defense

<-.cr
oFa-l |-- '1 tr> l- 2556METE6S --
BETryIE\ VEHICLES -
+@+c <"+qr <;o- Gn <"oo- <\0/ €t-o <h'o-o<1'o! ( -o; <t -
I '2 3 4 5 tt

KEY

1. Feconnabs.ncedtDl.
2. Advancep3 yconsBlinoot lhe lsr moio.izeditlecomDanv,s isnkplaroo..an anll€rv batery,
3 plat@n of A/T gons,one engine. squ6dand chemic.lreonn8isncepeMnnd,
3. Themotoiled itle balralionltatl, sisn.lplaroon.andengi.eerpkloon lhinus onesquadl.
4. Anrirankb€nery.
5. Tankcomp.ny (min6one phroo.l.

7, Anilbry bnalion (minuson. banery),

8. S6condmotorizedJl6coh@nv (min!.on€ platoonL
9- Thnd moroized ritl. company.
10. F6ar*wicss of th. hororir€drille b.tr8lion.

12. Marchllanl *cu.iry detachm6nr(moroi2edrille plaroonl.om rhe s.cond nobnzed ille comp8ny).

of a battalionmarchin anticipationof a meetingengagement.

Figure58. Organization
a
weaponsare distributedalong the column,ready to four hoursof movernent. Thcsepointsareto be crosscd
cngage aerirlr3rScrs
on rhe muveor durinshalls. b) lhc heador railoia rulurmal a designareJ Lime.
I Aftcr completing his eslimalc
rcconnaissance, of (3) Halts. Halts nay bc designated depending
the situationandmarchpian,the companycommandel uponthe missionandt}lc lcngthofthe maJch.
issueshis ordcr to the platoon lead€rs.The ordcl (4) Road suidcsand murk€$. Road suidesand
includes: routc rnarkersare utilizcd at key points ,long thc march
(l) lnformationaboulthc cncmyandthe possible routc.Normallyhigherhcrdquartendispatches guidesto
areaof contactwith him. mark the route for the company.
(2) Thc company rnbsion and the movcmcnt
109. AstionsDurirs ihe March
(3) Informationabout adja€€ntunits and recon- d, Air attack. The company normrly continuesthe
march during tl}c attack,incr€rsingits spccdand the
(4) the compositionand missionof the march distancebetwccnvehicles.Designatcd pcrsonnel engage
securitypatfol and the timc for passingthe start and low flying ancraft.SA-7gunngrsfirc whjlevehjclesare
moving(Figure59),spccdandtefrainpermilling.
(5) Thc compositionof thc column,movcmcnt ,. Artilleryait,rck.Shouldthe companycomeundcr
speed,locationsof halts,and thc operational proccdure artillery fire, it rapidly movesout of thc irnpact area.
in caseof an cncountefu,ith thc cnemy. Distarcesbetweenvehiclcsarc increased, and drivcrs
(6) ft€ organization of observation, signals,and rcmainalen for clatelsalongthe roulc. The company
comrnanderanticipatesan €nemy tank-infantry assault
(7) Aclionsto be talcn on sjgnaisfor encmyair fouowingthc a ilery fire.
raid waming,.nd CBR contamination. c Nudear attack.
(8) Hislocarionandthat ofhis deputics. (l) In ordcr to minimizethe cficct of ao enemy
& Pnor to the march, thc companycoinrnander nucl€arexplosion,ihc companypasses ttuoughd€fiies
inspects unit rcadiness,functioningof equipment,avail. l|nd over bndgeswilhoul stoppinglnd at increased
ability of mmunition and fucl, and the prescnccof spccds-lf the companyis warned on lhc march of
person:lprot€ctiveequipment. imrninentnuclealattack,immcdiatestepsaretukcnto
dispcrse the column,takingadvantaSe ofterain leaiurcs
108. Comm.ndandConirol that provide protectionfrom the effecls of nuclcar
'. During thc march, tlle company commandcris detonation.Protectior mask and clothirg de pul on
usually locatcd ncar the head of the column wher€ h€ andpenonnelliein thebotbm of drcnAPCS.
car mnle a rapid estimateof the situation and quickly (2) Shouldthc companybe takcnund€rnuclear
deployhis unit. attack,the companycommander's prioriticsareto assess
,. Methodsof communicationduring the march are the siutation, restore control, conduct rescuc and
nessengcr,visual signals,and p€rsoml contact bctween cvacuationoperations,rcgrouphis platooosand con
cornmandcn. As a rule,radiosilenceis enlorccdexcept
(3) Ground ,tnd helicoplcr rcconnaissance (if
c- Controlmeasures includc: availablc)is conductedto learn the exlent ol damag€
(1) Initi, point. The startingline for tle movc. and contamination.Shoulddamagcbe extensive, the
ment is designated by onc or more initial points, 10 battalion secondechelon0eserve)unit replacesthc
provide all elementswith a checkpointftom which they damaged one.
can start thc march according to a prearanged timc- (4) Rcscucand evacuatjon teamsare formedby
iabl€. When it reaclrcsthe initial point, the conpany is battalion and consist of enginecr,mcdicaland CBR
ill its propermarchorder. penonncl.The tasksof th€seteamsincludetreatm€ntof
(2) Control pointsand/orphaselines.Thesccon- casualties. roule rle!rancc.and radialron monitoring.
trol measuresarc assignedby regimentfor evcry two lo Radiation doscratcsaremainlainedon all pelsorJl€|.We
 --

*.TT"!," dos, r!,csa,e <0 ,adsin a r4.hour

::ll*:
psrooor lU0 c ' o s s " da h j g hs p e e d rA . J r e ,l e d i n g a c o n , I n r n a r e o
r a d so v e r! p e r i o do f r e r d a y s , , , u , e . :re
or p a 1 € l p c r s o n j e ld e . e n r ! m m a t r n n
s d r c t d o c t r i n e s l r e s s c jl h e _ r sc u n d u c r e odn
,_"-p rro, rr ,) ,r c c u r n i n B . i eo t c n s i r e i m p o r r a n f eo l mm e am .
o v € o r d u r i n gs h o . l h a l r ,
i n a D o s r - \ r r i i e su a L o n r F , B U , eo 0 r . r u m p t e r e
r u r v l r r n S , u n i las r e g j v e nm s s i o r s oecunrr'ffauon b a.conpri.hed
q L i r . k l ) .q r r e m p r ra r e ,, _,rr_
m a d e l o b y p a s s h o r s p o r s . .t t s o n , o e c o n r ! m i n a r i npno L l l r d u n n g " g r " n , u t
r h , r i s n ; r j F a y b t ct h c y t o n 8h d l t so r i n r e \ r

rll d \

Figure59. An SA-7 gunnerin firing position.

Figurem. CBRunhconducring
decontaminarrcn
duringa halt.
qt
110. T6rminaiionof the March
a Thc march t€rminat€sin the occupationof an
ass€mbly rrca, a meetingengagement,or movement into
an altack. In occupyinga conccntrationarea, the
companyleavesthe routeof marchwithout haltingand
occupiesa designated area as pan of a batlalion or
rcginental perimeter. lftncdiate steps are tal(en to
eslablishsecuritypositionscovering
avenuesof approach
into the area.Thc companyesrablkhes defe0sivcposi-
tions and coordinates with adjacentunits.Patrolsare
sentout to coverareasnot coveredby obsenationor
fue. The companycommander supervises
the establish-
mcnt of tlrc companypositions,establishes at del€nsc
measures, drangcsfor r€-supplyof the company,and
awaitsordcn from the battalion conmandcr.
,. lf the march terminatesin a meetinSengaSement,
the motorircd rifle company operatesas oudined in
sectiorlI-
c. Whenthe motorizcdrifle companymovesinto the
attackofa defensivc position,tle companydeploysinto
combatformationfrom the marchcolumnwell behind
ihe ltue of contact(S€eSectionIII).

Sectionll. THE MEETINGENGAGEMENT

111.G€n.ral structurcs}Ii! forcc in accordnncevith the missiongivcn

The meetingengagement is I type of offensivcaction by tfie regimentalcommandef.In his marchorder to
that the Sovietsexpect to occur frcqucndy. 11 is subordinateand attachedcomma.ders,tln battalion
cl'aracterizedby its dynamicnature,uncertainty, sudden commandcr places emphasis on the importancc of
charges in t]rc situation, an intensive stugglc to scize scizing the initiative, destroying thc cncmy forces,and
and maintain the initiative, the developmentof combat continuingthe march.
activities or a wide front and by the €xistence of c. Company planning for the meeting cngaScment
exposcdfl.nks. Only miror ncelingcngagem€nts would will depetrdupon its missionas pan of the battalion.
be fought by the companyindependent of its parent The organizrtion for combat and planningdone by thc
unir. NormJly, thc battalionis the smdlEslunit to companycommandcr is in accordancewilh thc assigncd
conductthe meetingcngagcrrent, The meetingengagc. missioD.The companymay provideflank securityfor
ment may be dividcd into four pbases:planning, the colunmor maneuver a5partofthe mainbodyin the
reconnaissance, deploymcntandmaneuver,.nd termina. meetingcngagement. Whenthe comp.nyoperates ar the
battrlion (or regimental) advanceguard, the company
conflarder plans for iniiial contact with the enemy
112. Planning for the MeetingEngagement column by keepinghis ur t alert to any eventuality.
group of the regimenror
a. If hc hasdecided10 conducta marchin erpecta. Operatingasthe reconnaissance
lion of a meetiDgengagcmcnt, division,t]rc reinforced company opensthc sccondstage
the fegimentdlcom.
mandcrdcfinesthe folowing: of the mee ting cngagement.
(l) The plan of operationson encountering thc
113. The Reconnai$.nce Phaie
(2) The organ"ation of ttrc march formalion and a The initial stagcof the me€titrgeigagcmcntoccurs
thedistributionof weapors. whcn the regimental or battalion reconn:dssance and
(3) fte task ofthe forwarddetachment and the securiry elcmcnrsmeer the enemy'sreconnaissance
marchsecu.itytroops- units. This phasehsts flom initial contact until the main
(4) the tasksofsubordinate el€mcnls. body entersthc battle.Its dumtionwill dcpendon the
(5) fte movenentroutcs.line of depariurc,and compositionof the much securityclemenlsand their
the controllircs. distancefrom the main body and on the time nccdcdby
,. The battalion conmander also males dctailcd the mainbody io advance anddeploy.
plans for the conduci of a meetingcngagement and

69
 ,. Uponencountering thc enemyl forwardunits,thc c. Whenthc motorizedrifle companyrcceivesthe
rcinforc€d motorized riflc company, acting a! the order, it attack in line, usuallybehindan attachedtank
r€gimcntalreconnairlance 8roup,rcPoras enemycolltact, platoon(9and abreastof otherrnotorizcdri{lc elemcnts
Th€ companycstablishcs the composition and diection of the main body. An effort is nade to attack tlrc flank
6f the cnemycolumn,attempt!to penctratethc main or rcar of the encmy force and to dcstroy it or force it
body and locateenemychemicrlandnuclearwcapons, to withdraw. Speed in the attack b str$sed, and
and observesthe approachof cnemyrcserves. rinener remain mounaedwhen feasiblc.nd fight from
c. The motorizedrifle companyactingasth€ advance their caJrlers. Enemyforcesarc destroyedor bypassed
guard of the tattalion att€mpts to destroy enemy and rnopped up by second echelon forces of the
reconnarssimce and secudtyelementsandcontinues the rcgimert or by thc secondechelon(re!€rvo)of the
march.Should it encountera superiorenemyforce, tlrc battalion. Should it be necessaryto dismount in the
advancc gurrdcompanytalesup d€fensiv€ Positionsand attack, infantrymenmovebehindthc attachedtanls and
d€fends, inflicting casualties on the cnemy and geining arc supported in the attack by thcir APCs.When the
time for the main body to dcploy. enemyhasbeend€feat€d, the APCSarc caLled forward,
the troops remountand opcrati-or$continue-
114. Deployment andManeurcrPhale d, ff superiorenemyforcesnakc it impossibleto
attack, the battalion commandcrattempts to hold the
d. Thc meetingengagemcntusualy developdrapidly.
enemy to establishfavorableconditionsfor the deploy-
Normsllypositionednearthc lrcadof the column,the
rnent of th€ regirnent.
battalion commander mak€s a rapid cstimate of th€
siruation, assrgnstasks to th€ attsched artillery unit
115. TethinaiionPhale
comnander, d€velops a maneuvff plan for the main
body andissuesa sho( opentions order (Figurc 6 | ). Thc meetingengagemcnt tcrminatcswhcn thc enemy
,- Attached artilery takcs up firing Positions and force has been destro,€d, forced to withdraw, or whcn
immediately opens fue in suppon of thc advancc guard the Soviets have been forced onto the defcnsive,In thc
and lhe marn body. Attached tanks, followed by evenl of tlic formcr, the battalioncontinues its march;in
motorized riflc unitr mounted in th€k APCS,quickly thecaseofenernywithdrawal,a pursuitbegins.
d€ployand attack the mainbody of rhe enemyforce.

70
 ,-: -.,,,,=-rts,{ -
''' ^;;,,**-;itt""'lI
K-- -
'\.'1\.,.---*6,' t#$tJ /
'.\ \"'-d
..
"

i4l {31

KEY
1. Motonzed nne banalion, reinforced with ranks and artirlory, actins as the sdvance guad of the @gimenr.
2. Seond snillery bttalion
3. Third motufted .ifle compahy.
4. Fi6rrankcompanyll-
5. Badalaon conmander,fnEtMFB,
6. Second mororiz€d dfle company.
7. Fi6r mobrized ifie company wnh an anached rank plaloon acrinq as rhe advanc€suard.

Figure61. A reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionconductinga meetingengagement.

71
 oPERATIONS
Sectionlll. BREAKTHROUGH

116. Genoral tanl compames andup to a plaloonof combatcngincers

z. Tle breakthroughis an attackplannedagainsta (sappersr.
hasty or preparedd€fense.It may be Iaurchedby ,. Compadesattackingaspart of the battalion'sfust
mouotedor dismountcd troops,from th€mdch or when echelon would be more heavily reinforced than the
in contact with enemyforces. secondechelon(reservc)cornpany.A companyin the
,. Attackinga dcfensivepositionfrom the maJch first echelonmaybe reinlorcedwith an artilery battery,
provides the attacker \rith security against nuclear one or two tank platoons,a mortar platoonand the
strikes,minimizesroop exposurcto cnemy fue and battalion antitank platoon.
createsthe opportunityfor surprise,
c. An attack whenin contact with thc enemyusu:illy 119. Attaci Fronla$sandFormations
occurswhen troops go over to the attack from thc a Norrnaly, the companyattacksmounted willl aI
defensc,when the defensescannot bc neutralized,and thrce platooff abrcaston a frontageof about 500
whcre tcrrain pr€cludes an attack from the line of mctersduringconvenuonal opcrationsand 800 meters
march.Tlis type of attackfacilitatescoordinationand dunngnuclcarconditions. .
planning.tlowever,it neccssitates dispersalto reduce b. lf attackin8from the march,the companydeploys
enemyweaponseffectssnd requiresspecialeflorts to from a column into an approachmarch fomation and
finaly into a combat formr.ion when the cnemy offcrs
d. Sometimesforces may attack frorD the line of
naJch in tlle main attack sectorand from a position in
120. Attackinsa Prepared P$irion lrom $e March
e. In both modes of attrck the motonzedrifle
d. Ceneral
companyhasbasicallyihe samemission,combatforma-
Beforc tle anall is launchcdan aJscmblyarea is
tion, fire supportplan,and operationl procedures. The
occupiedbricfly. Companies arc separatcd
by up to one
rwo modesol atrackdrffcr rn rhe nrerhodof orSani-/a.
and one-hrlf kilometers from each other as protection
tion and thc proceduresfor movinSforcesto the FEBA.
againstnuclearweapons.
r17. Mirsion ,. Troop bading Procedures.
(l) Tl1ecompanycornmander specifiestle loca-
a The company's mission is expressedin teflns oI tions of his platoonsand attachedunits. organizcs air
the destfuctionof a specificenernygroupingand/orthe obserurtiooand esrablishes proceduresfor engrging
scizurcof i groundobjecrive or lue. A companyi! enemyaifcraft,issuesinrtructionsfor pfcparingpcnon-
assignedan immcdiateobjectiveand a diraction of nel and w€apons,and rcplenishes the company'ssup-
furfter attack. plies.He thcn gocson ! groundrcconnaissanc€ with the
b. Thc depth of the companynission is d€termincd battalioncommander.During this reconnaissance, the
by the type ofw€aponsus€d(nuclcaror non-nuclear) to companycommanderrecciveshis rnission,studiesthe
neuhalizeenemydefenses, thc operationdconc€pt,thc deploymcntof encmyweapons,dctermines procedures
compositionandeffectivcn€$of fri€ndlyforces,terrain, for neutralizing them,studicsapproaches to thc enemy
and weathcr.The depth of thc nission is usualy greatcr defenses,the gound in the forward area lnd tbe
undcrnuclearconditions. immediatercar,dccides platoonmissions, andselects the
exacl locationsfor prssages throuShobstacles.
118.Attadrmenrs
(2) when allocatingcombdtmissions,the corn-
d. Allocadon of supporting weaponsto a battalion panycommanderassigns hB plaioonsan obiecrivcand
dependson tlle mission,the availability of suppodng a-\is for further advancc, tlre locations for pa$ag€s
wcapons,and tle tcrrain. A motoriz€drifle battalion through obstacles,and thc procedurefor negotiating
attacking in the fi|st €chelonof the r€gimcnt may be thcm. He assignstasks during the attack and the
r€inforcedwith up to one artillcry baltalion, oneor two movementsequenceto his attach€delements.when
I
organizing coordhation, the company comrnander (2) Artilcry and morta$ fire on the enemy
specifiesthc proccdurc for the company mov€ to the posrtionsin $e forwarddeiendedareasand the imme-
Ii$e of dcparturc (or tlrc locationsfor disnounting for diate rear and thcn shift their fires to deeptargetswhen
an attack on foot) md th€ methods of firing while the atracking troops are withio 200 meters of the
moving into the attack and negotiating obstacles;he risk-distarc€line.
coordinatesthe activities of thc platoons and attached (3) fte conpany commander obsefles the
sLrbunibin thc dcstructionol personneland weapdns in progressof his units and assigns tasksto Uc artillcry and
d!€ enemy strong points; h€ giv€sth€ signalsfor targcl morta6. Fte support of the attack consistsof thc
identification and for rcquestiry, switchingand ceasinS successive neutralization and destructionof the enemy
fires. by concentratedarullery and aii stritcs (if available)to
(3) If hc is umble to take his platoon and the complete depth of fte mission and, for an attack
atlachedleadcrswith hiin on a groundreconnflissancc. using conventionalweapons,by a barragcin dcpth or
the compmy conxnandcr analyzesthe terrain from a succcssivc concentrations of fire to a depth ot tour
mapor terrainmodel.Usualy.dueto the lack of time, kilometcrs.
platoonleadersreccivctheir missionsin ter s of map (4) TJnk support each other with fire and,
prccededby tank equippedwith minc.clcaring ittach-
c. Command andContlol. ments, negotiatethe ninefields in front of thc FEBA.
(l) In the asembty arca, the company com- Attacking infmtry fo ows the 1an16throuShthe gaps,
mander exercisescommand and control by p€rsona.l firing on the movcagainstcncmy personnel and wea-
contact and by ncssenger.Radios are used only for
.eceivingwarningsignals. (5.) Aficr rcgotiating obstacl€sin front of the
(2) On leaving the asscmblyarea, the compary FEBA, anacking squads and platoons deploy into
conmandcr moves at the head of thc colurnn and extendcdline and advancewhile firing on thc movc to
conuolssubodinateunits from hn APC usingcstab' tleir objectives. Whenmountedin AICS,thc plaloons
lishcd signals.RadioconmHications de usedonly aftcr dcployinto extend€d lineformationaller obstaclcs have
the startof preparatory fires. beennegotiated. The companycorllrlandersupportsfus
(3) Aftcr deploymentinto platooncolumns,tllc attackingclcments with firesfrom attached md support-
company commander moves to the main &\is and ing artilleryandmorta6.The destructionofanycncmy
controls the deploymentof his unit into combat femaining in the rearoI t]rcattackingsub'elements is left
formationandthe attack. to the secondcchclon(rescrve) units ol the battdionor
(4) In the assault,tfie company commander regiment.
usuallycontrolshis subordinates from an APC.Duringa (6) Shouldthe tanh be held up by obstacles or
di$nountcdattack he movesin the extendedlinc of barrierr, thcy support the attacking infantry with frre.
APCSbchindthe attackingirfartry, andfor a mountcd The infantry and attachedengin€ersclear the barriers
attack, he positionshis APC 200-300rncten bchind the and supportthe advanccof the tank!.
attackinSplatoons.Shouldthe companyattackon foot (7) When he seesthat his units have taken the
and the companycommander abo be dismouoted, h€ encmyt forward positions the company commandcr
would us€ .n additionrl R-126 radio to maintain issuesnew ordcn to his platoons by radio. Efforts are
conrmunicationswith the battalion commandcr,as well madeto maintainthe attack nomentum.
aswith his platoons. (8) Two najor facton .xploitation of the
4 Conductof the Attack. rcsultsof nuclearstrikesand the seizureor dcstrucdon
(l) Duringthe deploymentinto platooncolumns of enemynuclearweapons - dominatethe battlcin the
and rhe combat formation, the company commandcr deplhs of the enemy defenses. Devastated areasand
amplifiesthe platoon missionsby radio. Thc platoon obstacles arebypassed or negotiatcd iluoughlanesmade
leadersdo thc samcfor their squads.Unitsgo directly by attachcdcngincers. Strongpoin.sbehind$e FEBA
into thc attackwithouthalting.
 (

are attackcdliom the marchby unitsadvancing und€r 121. AttackWhenIn ConractWirhThe Enemy
covcring fires from anillery. mortars,tek, and AlCs. a Unils noving up to attack through forcesin
(9) The battalioncommander commitshissecond contlct occupyan asscmblyareawhich providescon-
echelonGcscrve) companyafter the initialobjective has cealmentand covcr againstdamagccausedby nuclear
bccn taken. This companyis committedin a sector andconventronal wiapons.Usualy the asscmbly ar€ais
whereenemyrcsistanc€ is weakestor whercthe great€st occupicdat night.
successhas bccn attained.The mirsior may be the
furtherdevelopment of the atlackin depthor an attack ,. Conlpanies dismounlat r desgnatcdlocationrnd
on theflanl or rearofan enemystrongpoint holdingup pfoceedby concealed routesto attackpositions.A?Cs
t]rc advance. ln hisorderto thesecondechclon(reserv€) afe lcft in cov€redareasready to move forward to
commander,thc battalion commsnderindicatesth€ supportth€ atiack.
€ncmyand frcindly positions,rhe line of deployment, c. Companics in the battaiion'sfirst echclonoccupy
objcclivcs,the dircctio. of thc subsequent attack,.md the fi|st trcnch systen, while the sccond echclon
coordinationwith &e fiIst echclorcompanies. During (reservc) element occupies the sccond and thnd
its entry into battle, the secondechelor (rcscwe)is trenchcs.Tank units atlachedto the battalion
occupy
supported by artilleryandmonartirc. an assembly arcaprior to dle startof the attack.whjle
e. EnenryCounterattacks.
tank unitsalrcadypositionedin the defenscgo into the
(1) Minor counterattacksre repulscdby fir€
attack from those positions.A coordinationline is
while moving, nd major counterattackarc engrged
assigned to lants for a changcofformation.ltsdistance
with conccntrat€d lucs from thehllt.
from thc encmyFEBAis dchrminedby thc terrain,but
(2) llhcn the counterattlck force has been
it is usualy fron one to two kiiometers. (
sighted.thc company cormandcr issuesordcrs (o
d Thc companycommanderobsefles&e resultsof
repulseir. Srlbunilsoc(up) hasr)posirion(antlorgaruzc
prcpautoryfires,assigns rnissions
for the destruction of
fire plam, whiJc attach€dcngine€6sct up antitank
survivinsor new tngets, and lcporls to the battalion
commander on tllc company's rcadiness to attack.
(3) Whcnthe enemyis within range.the subunits
e. Tanksrnovefrom theirasscmbly areason rcceipt
cngagethem witl fires fron all wc.rpons.lf a nuclear
of a signal.As they approach theljneofdcparture,thcy
slrike was dcliveredon tre countcrartackforcc, the
deploy into platoon columns,rnd then into combat
companyrcncwsthe attackimnredialely afterthc slrike
fomation, movingat highspccd.As th€ tanl$ lpproach
andcomplcles ihe dcstruction of the en€my. the liiendly trenches, the companycommand€f givesthe
/. ThcPunuit. order "PREPARETO ATTACK." Afier the tankshave
(1) When thc enemywithdraws,the motorized passcd, "INTO
h€ orders TtlE
rifle companystlrts pursuitopentions.For morespccd ATTACK - FORWARDI"Personnel leavcthe trenches
and momentumand to creatc bexer conditionsfor and follow the tants in the atlack. Arcs follow their
m,rneuver, thc companyformsinto platooncolurnns and squads md give firc support. Whe. thc enemy's
continuesihc puFuil in approach nrarchformation. resistance hss beenbroken,AlCs arc remountcdand
(2) If theenemyorganizes rcsistanceby hdividual i}Ie attack into the deplhsis swifdy developcd.
units on advantagcous lines to coverhis witndrawd, I W}lcna nuclcaror chcmicalstrike againstencmy
subunitsby-pass themto reachthe flanls andrearofthe positionsin thc irnmediatcareahasbeenlaunchcd,rhe
cncmy\ mainbody,cuning offhis routeolwithdrawcl. cornpanyin this zoneusuallyattack in APCS.

74
a
 SectionlV. DEFENSIVEOPERATIONS

122. Genelal hrcs, the rcgimcnul conronder double! thc width :lnd
Sovietdoctrincmakesro cleardistinctionbetweenstatic increases the dcpth of hn brttalion-defended areas.In
'Ihe ,ddition, U-stHped apertures and shieldsare built at
and mobilc defense. sizeand compositionof the
unit involvcd dererni.es the dcgrce of mobility rcgular intcrvals
10 decr€are the blastcffcctsof enemy
employed.Thc largerthe unit, the grcaicr is the degree
of mobilily and flexibility p€rmitted.There is littlc e. A arcutld Dcfe se. Allaroond dcfcnsewithin lhe
Ilexibility at battalion lcvel ind below. A company battalion positionis p.ovidedby thc conslructionof
defendingas part of the first echelonbattrlion is rigidly alternate and supplementary firing positions,the em-
placementof barriersthroudout thc defendedarea,thc
hcld ro delend an assigncdposition.No appreciablc
reserve is held at thjs level.The conrpanystrongpoint close coordination and integation of lues witlt
a seriesof in(erlockingtrench
canonly be properlydnalyzedwithin thc frameworkof neighbofinSunits lnd
position. systems which cnsctlrc shifting of troopsfrom onearca
thebattaliondcfensive

123. TheBattlion Defensive Position I. D"k't:c in Deplh. Lr(h baltaliondclcnsive areais

preparedwith thrcc or four trerich lincs with connecting
Thcbaitrliondcfcnsivc area(Figlrre62) is up to two and communicationstrenches. The disbnce between
on€-halfkilomel€rswide (fivc lilom€ten h nuclcar trenchesis dctcrminedby the range of direct-lire
conditions)and up to rwo andone-halfkilometers deep. weapons and thc gJound.Depending on tllc missionand
The areaconsistsof platoonmd companystrongpoints the natureof thc tcrrain,*re brttalioncommander mry
and is part of the re8imentaldcfcnsivesector.The deployhis companies on tinc,with onecompanyup.md
battaliont defcnsivcposinotr i5 organircd accordingto two back,or with two companies forwardandonein the
the pinciplesoutlincdin dtaptertwo. rear. In the lattcr case,the first two ircnchesof the
baltrlion defens€areaare occrlpicdby two .ifle com-
124. Applicitioo of Defensive Principl$ In The Aatta. paniessideby side.Thc first lrench is the FEtsA.The
lion Defendsd Area sscondtrcn€hjs dugal a distance ofapproximately500
a. Stabint!. The stability of the battalior defended metersto thc rcar of the fint tfench,so that elem€nts
arer derivesfrom thc positioning in depth of its riflc defendingit can supporttroopsh thc tust trenchand
compmies;the selectionof tcrrain,exploitationof thc covcr thc arca betweenth€ two trcnchcsby fire. The
ground,concealmcn! of flring positionsandobstaclcs, a secondtrenchmay alsobe usedfor launchingcounter-
coordinatedfirc plan, and control of a$igncd and attacks-The two forwardcornpanies ffe reinforcedwilh
antitankBUnsand arc usuallyassigned tanks,mortars,
,. Se.?rnry.A systemof securityoutpostsis estrb- a{tillery,enginccrand chemicaltroops.The thid dfle
lisltcd to preventenemy rcconnaissnce of the main companyoccupiesthe third rrcnch,locatedabout1000
defensiv€ sector. A company may serve within this mclcIs from the secondtrench.This trench may be uscd
systema5 an oulpost,an outpostsuPPort,or as the for the posilioningof supportwcaponsas well :rs for
securitycompmyofan outpostbattalion. launchingcounteraltacks- Communicalions henchesare
c. Utilizatiotl oJ Teftain. By tying in his iire support constructed so that for eachplatoonthcrcis at leastone
and banier planswith ihe positionsof his deployed conrrecting tJlefiIst trenchwith thc sccond,andfof each
compani€sand platoon, th€ battalion cornmandcr companyat leastonecommunications trenchconnecting
cxploits defensivealpects of thc terrain in his lssigned thc sccondtrcnch with the third. Dufiuny positionsand
area.Gapswhich cannot be coveredby dircct fue arc extensive obstacles supplcment these trench systcms
mincd (other engineerobstaclcsmay also be con- duoughoutthe battaliondefensivcarca.The battalion
structed)andcoveledby indftcctfire wc pons. reserve,usuallya reinforcedplat{}on.is locatedat a
d. Dispetsion.To providehis forceswiih protection dislance of up io lwo kilomete6from thc FEBA.
ryainst nucl€ar atlack, s well as massed conv€ntional
 t
I-l t%)
,
I
I
7 f
T

I i'r"
I POS|TTON E

6 .l j-* e
{
t\
('
I

qo@i
Y.'.+r-c /
\i""2--'
BNRESERVE
i O N E P LITS T M R
I
CO&ONETKPLTI

KEY
El ant"nr'in"". il
11 Monarb€nery. 7m
l-\, company.o.n$de/soP.

@
l$-$1 n'insri.. ranrc[nrhisekmpl.,rhesymbol
.6pl@nr5 "tplan^.d bnt counr.ran8ck p@itionsl.
10@ l50o 2000mele6

Figure62. Th€ reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionin the delense.

76
I
 g. Antitank Defense. Extcnsiv€employmentof anti. strong point!, their pdrn!ry and secondaryareasof frc;
tenk min€sand engineerinSobstacl€scoveredby tues of main Jnd alternat€ firing positions for tanls, APCS,
organic and attach€dartitanl weaponsProvidethe antitank and antiakcraft weapons,atd machine8uos,as
battalion with an in'depth antitanl defensivesystem. wel as then main and secondaryarcs of firc; the fire
h. Coofiinated F,'er. The battalion's defensivefire concentration sectorsof cachplatoon;obstacles, field
planconsists of the positioding,use,andcoordhationol dcfenses and shelters; and tlle location of the company
cll weaponsm lhe defendcd area.Thefire planorganizcs
zonesof high density fue in front of the FEBA, on the d Subsequenttasksar€ assignedto the platoons for
nanks and in the rear of the defense.The itre plan is reconnaissance, pmtectionagainstCBR weapons,and
insepafablylinlcd wirh fie barrier plan. logistics.
i. Mobik Auntetuttack Forces. The bsttalion has a
limitcd count€rattack forcc, usudly one reinforced 126. Comm€ndAnd Control
pletoon.Majorcounterattacks arelaunched by regimcdt In the defens.,the companycommander cortrols his
and division,while forward battalionsdefendthef areas. organic and rttached units from a commandtnd
obs€rvationpost. He normally brs two such post', a
125. CompanyT.oop LeadingProcedures primary and an .lternate. These posts arc chooento
a. Aftcr receiving the battalion defcnsc order, the piovide the bcst obserystior of thc batde area, a
companycommandcrcompleteshis plan andissucshis concealedlocation,and to facilitat€control of sub-
order from a point on thc ground from which the ordinatcunils. As a rule, the comtnanders of attached
dcfcnse and enemy avenues of approach can b€ and supporting artillery unit! are located with the
sufley€d. If trc plrtoon and attached leadcrs cannot company conrmander, while antitank sectioo leaders
assembl€at onc location, the order is given in thcir remain with their units.
respective strongpoint locations.
(l) To thc platoons:supportingweaponsand 127- Orsanization of tho Companysdong Points
Inissions: areas of conccntrated fu€ and tasks for a. The companystrong point is organizcdaccording
s€curirgthe flank. boundarics andgapsi to the sameprinciples!s the battalion\ aJeaof defens€.
(2) To Ihc supponinSartilcry: areasol con. ,- The motorized rinc conpany occupiesa strong
centrated firc; point up to 500 metcrsin width (1000 metersunder
(3) To dre antitank weapons:l,liin and altemate nucled conditions)and 250 meten in depth (500 mcters
fire positions,main and secondaryareasof fire, and thc unde. nuclear conditions). Normaly, all three platoons
procedurcfor openinganddeliveringfue; defendon line,(Fisure63).Whcndeployed"two up and
(4) Taslcsfor subuDitsin engagingenemyaircnft; one back", two rifle platoonsusualy occupythe first
(5) th€ methodof engireerprcparation:where, main tench, while the third platoon occupiesthe s€cond
*hen, and how to preparefield foftifications, sh€lters, main trench. A s€condarytrench localed 50 to 100
obstacles,and alsomeasures for camouflage; metersbehind eachmain trefth is occupiedby the third
(6) The time for completionof thc fire plan. squadof cachplatoon,lhe PlatoonconmandPost,and
any attachcdantitank weapons.Eachplaloon in the first
,. Aftcr issuinghis order, the companycomnandcr main trench has a cotununications trench leadhg back
planscoordination, payingattention to thc coordination to the second rnain trench where the main company
of the company fire plan with ihe artill€ry, othcr cornrnandpost is located. Each companylns a similar
wcapons, andadjacent uniti. communicationstrcnch to the third main trench where
c, The company commandergives a skctch of his the third rnotorized rifle compary and thc battalion
defensiyestrong point to the battalion command€r.The conmand post are locatcd.The comPanystong point is
following are usually shown on th€ skctch: reference normaly cenlered on tlrc platoon in tlt€ sccond mairl
poinh anddjstances to them;enemypositions;platoon trench.The w€aponsof the companyare placedso that

77
 tiey covcr the cntire companyfront and have inter- (1) One motorizedrifle platoonis designatedthe
lockingfire with adjaccntunils. main suppo( platoonand i! stationedbehindthe two
c Antilark and anti nucled faclorsarc tlle prinlary forward s€curily platooru.thc conrpanycommandcr
considerltions in thc companydefense plan.Theplanis remainswith this platoon, which may act asa rescrve.
organized for atl-lroundantitanl defcnsein the critical (2) Tle two foNard platoonsact as the outpost
se0torof the tcrruinnecessary for stabilizationof the line. The companyoommandef coordinatesthc tuesof
compai) sronts poinr. Thc anriranl dcfcnse i5 a theseplatoonswith units on the llanks.
coordinatedbari€r and {irc systen conrislingof the (3) Ficld securitypostsmannedby rcinforccd
antilankrocketlounchers of eachplatoonand attached riflc squadsare placcdforwrrd of tlle outpostIine to
antitanl gunsandtanks. provid€early wardng.
d. Antiaircnft and CBRdefenscplansarc organizcd (4) The conrpanyactingasa sccurityforcewith-
in accordrncewith the battalionplan- Thc company
comrunder assignsthc nission of cngaginglow-flying
aircraft 1o pcrsonnelmanning automatic wcapons. 128. ConduclOf TheDefense
Prrticuiarstressis placedon maintaining antidrcraftand a. Th€ missionof repeling enemyrcconnaisanceand
chcmical/radiologicllalcrl. supportingoutpostsis hrndledby specialydcsknated
d. Changcslo terrain fealuresarc measrrred, and weuponsfiring from then dtemate positions.Surprise
refercncepointsenicredo lhe platoonand company closcran8elucs repclsmallcnemyforlesandreconnais-
nre plans.lf naturalrcfer€ncepointsee lacking,the sanccunits. L€rg€encmy forccsde eng'aged by machine
companyconrmander establishes artificialones which guns,long rangcmtitanl weaponsand rttachcdtanks,
are conccalcdfrom cnemyobsenation.Thoselaatur€s aI of which lue from their riternate positions.Sone
of
within rhc companystrongpoint which miShrserveas tlesepositionsmaybc locatedIorwardof thc FEBA.
good rcferencepoinrs for th€ encmyafe dcstroyediI D. During thc enemyartillcry prcparation,company
fcasible. personrcl remain under covcr, with or y rnachine
I Belweencompanics.therc are inlcrv.ls varying gunnc and observcrs remainingat their posts.When
accordingto the terrain. The companycommander enemy artillcry fircs shilt to engagetargets in thc
enrurcsthat coordinationis madc with units on the brtlalion rear area,company pe$onnel in the foNard
Ilanksto coverintcn,alsbetweenunitswith fire,patrols, positionoccupytheir stationsand meet the assaulting
enemyvith file. As tlle encmyapproaches the FEBA,
& Time permiuing, dummy fortifications and the intcnsity of fire is increasedto break up the assault.
observationpostsare employedthroughoutthe com- r. Should the encmy pcnetratcr oompanystrong
prny strongpoint in order to misleadthe en€myas to poinl, personnel
continueto def€ndtheir assi$cdarers
thelocationsofthe companypositions. and attempt to dcstroy lhe p€netration by fire. The
i. Thc company may bc given dr€ mission of battalion second
echelon€ompany(reseryc)or tle
providings€curityforwardofth€ FEBAasan outpostof reserve is committedaginst thebreakthrough.
a5 a securitycompanyof a battalio. detailedas an d. Should the cnemy arsaultbe repclled, the com.
outpost.Thc outpostforce is assigned a sccuritysector, pany
commandcrconcentnteshis firc on the encmy
a defensivcposition and a reconnaisMnce ,onc. The
attacking the adjacenlconpany. Whentimc permits,he
reinforcedcompanyreceiv€sa secudtysectorof oneand redistributeshis llring positions,
shifts key weapon
onc'half to two kilometersin width and conducts locations,ordcrsthc repair of trcnchesand
obstacles,
reconnaissance patrolsto d depthof fivekilomcten.The
rcplenishesammunition ard prepar€sfor further enemy
companycommanderassigns reinforccdplatoonstheir
attacks.
sectors,dcsignates the oulpost line of rcsislanc€ and
indicalesthe stuongpointsofthe defensc.

78
 POINT}

rr."o,^'..
fi-$THBEETREES
{J
o o O BOULOEBS
oo

2ND PLT-
@
lSTPLT 2ND MTF
5THMTF RIFLECO
BIFLECO
:noerr\ 1, 50--61
2ND FLT

Q1-r
0
wooDs

KEY
a i c.mp6nyob*wationpost{onehorizontal
_ platoon
linedenotesa obseruarion
oos0
(::j
16-6.1 Mixedminerierdlanipe.so.netandanrnankl

@ Foinrorcod
shehe.

-"q Secrorofrrenchwirh commu.icarionsr.ench

ffil Buildhq

Figure63. The motorizedriflecompanystrongpoint.

79
 SectionV. WITHDRAWAL

129. G€neral ,. The companies(ninus dcsignatedplatoons)of the

d. A with&awalmay be cmployedto occupymore
favorabledefensivcpositionsor to consolidatetho
defense. Thc withdrawalof forcesin contactnomally
consisrsof two stages:disengaScmcnt and retftcmcnt.
,. The withdrawal order specifics t}te route(s) of
withdrawal,formation,and intefmediatcdelayingposi
tions. Whencverpossible,disengagement tates place
suddenlyat night or during othef conditions of limitcd
visibility and on ordcr of higherheadquarten.
fiIst echelonbattalion withdraw on order through the
positionsoccupicdby tlle baitalionof lhe regimcnial
secondechelon.Thc secondcchelonbattalionbecomcs
the covering force for th€ regiment after the detach-
mentsleft in $e forward ,Jea withdraw throughit.
c. Under cover provided by the secondechelon
baltalion,thc reinforccdplatoonsrejoin thcir compa.
nies, and thc fint echelon brttalion(s) comrlencesrle

131. R.tirement
l3). Disensasemont a. buring thc reliemenr,a mororizedrifle company
a The disengagemcntof the main body of the may be asipcd r rear.llank. or adlanccguardmission.
bathlion is covercdby designated platoons, In such a rol€ it would be r€inforcedwith a ilery,
fi t-echelon
rcinforcedwith tank, adllery, mortars,lnd engineers. dtitank weapons, tank, andengincers.
The covering force, consistingof ihese platoons, and b. Duringany withdEwal,a "scorchcdearth"policy
norrnally led by the battalion command€r,remainsin is stricdyfolowed; people,livestockrnd equipmentare
positionand scckrto preventthe enemyflom lcarning evacunted,roads,bridges,conmunicationslincs and
of the withdrawalby continuingoperations. Shouldthe otherinstallations andsupplicsaredcstroyed.Obstaclcs
enemy attack, the higher cornmand may mount a includingbooby tr.ps and minesar€ usedto delaythe
counterattack or nuclear strike before the
disengaging
main body. Dsengagemcnt occursunderprotectionol
the coveringforces,artillery fif€s, andsmoke.

80
 Vl. RELIEFlN PLACE
secrion

132. Generll 134. command

The relief of the companyis normally accomplishcdat The commanderof the companybeingrelievedcxcrcises
ni8ht. In ord€r to acquainthinsclf with lhc dispositions control until the relief is completed.Should lhc enemy
and d€f€ns€plan of the co'npany he is to rclicvc, lhe attack whilc lhe relief is in process, the rclieving
cornmander of the relieving company analyses lhc company. undcl tlle command of the outgoing com-
defens€swith his platoon leadcrs and mcssengcn.H€ marder, assjstsin rep€llingthe attack.
receivcsthe availableinformation about the enemyand
his dtpositions and studiesthe systemof outposts, 135. Conductof the Rolief
def€nseinstallatioff, obstaclcsand passagcs,distribution At the appointedtime lhe companycommsnderwho is
of liring points,roads,comrnunications, security, and raldng ov€r the defensebrings up his companyto the
the p.otection of the flanks aod limitirg pohts. In r€lief areaby conc€alcdroutes.The relief is carriedout
coordination with th€ outSoingcompafly conunander, succ€ssivelyby platoons. Cuid€s from the unit to be
he plansthc relicf. reli€v€drn€et their rcplacementsat designatedlocations
and lead them to their d€fensiy€positions. The com-
133. Actioff of the OutgoingCemmander manderof the outroingcomparytums over0 skctchof
The companycornmandethandingovcr the defense th€ def€ns€s,defensivc installations, permancnt com-
indicatesthe fo owing to hi' subotdinates: municationsfacilities, and rcserveammunition on hand.
a. Procedures for transferring the d€f€ns€. The platoonsof the outgoingcotnpany,havingtumed
D. Asscmblyarea(s)aficr thc relicf: over their strong points, asemble in designatedarcas.
c. Deception mearures The outgoitrg company withdraws aftcr thc new com-
d D€signation ofguides pany has occupi€dtlrc dcfenses,after a ch€ckhas been
e. Designation of l@ations for traffic conhol posts. nade on the functioning of cortununicationsandliaison
t The time for starting and completing the transfer. Mth supporling artillery, and after the outpostshavc
& The procedures to be followed in the event of an been posted. After thc relief, the n€w company
enemyattackwhil€the reliefis in Process. maintains th€ sameroutinc and lev€l of actiyitics that

8l
^l CHAPTEB
9 . T H EM O T O B I Z E D
OPERATINU
B I F L EC O M P A N Y
G N D E BS P E C I A C
Section1. GENERAL
136. lntroduction
Ile Soviet aptroach to the conduct of combrt opcrr-
tions in specialenviro nenls is to cnploy regular units
wilh few TO&ti modificatiols. Thc notorized rifle
company is expected to operat€ undef various condi-
lions of lerrain ,nd wcrtncr. Therefore,Soviet docifine
UNDEBEXTREIV]E
Sectionll. OPERATIONS WEATHER
CONDITIONS
137. Operationsin Snow and ExtremeCold
The desreeof snow and cold can havea nrajoreffect on
operations.Fof example,ir is difficult ro move or lool
when snow cover reachcsa depth ol15-20 ccnlnncicrs
dnd irnpossiblc to movc (unaidcd) whcn lt rerches a
depth of 40 cenumeten. Althoush whe€ledlehiclesand
tanks cdn normJly ope.ale i! snow 1040 centimeten
deep, dccp snow covcr conplicrles mrneuver, thereby
incfcasing the lactical nnportancc of roads and arcas
.t with insigailicant accumulationsof snow. Deep snow
also nrakesodenration and canrouflagcdifticull, while
imp.oving visibility by day and niglt in clear weatlrer
(although snotvblindnessbeconresa real problen). Deep
snow dso reducesthe effectivenessof high explosile
she s, mines,:rnd nonpersistenipoison gff, whilc iJr-
crcasing lhc thcrnal radiation cffccl from nuclcar
extlosions. Lxtreme cold jncreasesthc imporrance of
shcltcr, hindcrs thc construction of dcfcnses,makes
rivcrs and srvampspassable,(ice 60 centimete^ dnck
wili hold a medium tank), rest.ictsair sutport, decreases
the rangc of bulcis and sh€lls,und rcduccsthc abiliiy to
lielr rfhen err nuffs and crps ,lre wom.
138. HistoricalPe|spective
Durnrg World Wa! lI, the Sovietsprefered to cary oul
major offensives in winter becausetheir troops were
equippcd and traincd lbr it. Casualiicsfrom ihc cold
were the exception in the Soviel tumy. Soldiers with
liostbite were severelypunished.A typicd expcdienl lbr
prcparinglanesthrough forestscoveredwith deep snow
was to ofganizerclays of about 1.000 nren, moving ien
abreasl,to namp down thc snorv.
83
L ONDITIONS
coversa nrmber of operationsconductcdundcr specid
conditions in whch details of tactics, proccdures.
tecl]niqu€s, materiel dnd training nuy difter fronr
normrl operations.This chpter describespeculiaritiesof
cmployment of the motorlzed dfle company in slccidl
139. Doctrine
Sovicr doctrine stressesthat the wilter is no obstacleto
a well trained unit- The coEecl evdLlaliondd exploila-
lion ol the specid winter leatures and adoption of
nccessarycounlerneasurcs,such as spccialcdlouflage,
warning, mainienanc€,and supply measurcs,pcrmits the
assjgnmentof the sdre missions as in the sunxner,
alihough ai reduc€d raics oI specd. Offensile rnd
defensiveliontages and depths arc oftcn grcaterin the
winter. Doctnne st.essesthat long wintef nights, snow-
falls, blizzards, fogs and st.ong frosts can be used to
achievesurprise.and afford the opportunity for rnajor
successes by bold and carefully preparedforces. Opcra-
tions to wear out Lhe cnemy by denynlg him shcltcr,
desiroying supplics and instrlations and cuiiing con-
mrlnications,Je of pariicular importancc. Dccp infill.a-
tion raidsare carriedou! by speciallytraincd troops.
140. Equipmentand Training
d. The motorized rifle company receives spccial
e q u i D m c n ar n d l a n i n s r o c d | y o u r w i n r c o o c r - i o r J .
The company is issuedprotective goggles,specirl cloth
ing, footwear. waaning tents.skis.specialiubficanis, and
hcating and lighiing cquipncni. To incrcasethe cross-
co ntry capabiiity of velxcles,chains ar€ used, APCS
carry extra sandbags,while lanks carry woodenbeams.
Trcadway bridgcs md mats arc prcpared.and entrench-
ing tools issued.Cr€w-servedweaponsatached to the
company ar€ equilped wirh ski/sled mounts. ski facks
are constructcd on ihc sidcs of A?C\. Weaponslre
cledned, g.eascd, and prcprrcd lbr liring al low
 ,. Some unitr which habituallyoperatein winter
climates havcthe mcdiumcaterpillartractor,GT-S(CAZ
4?) of theinrproved cat€rpilhrtractorCT.SM(GAZ-?l)
in lieu of APCS.Tlese vchiclesrre not armored,bul
thcir very low groundprcssuremalcs them idealfor
marshyor arcticrcgions(Fis re 64). Thescvehicles havc
b€enusedas reconnaissance vehiclesandprimemovers
for l2onun mortan ind anti.tankguns.Thereis also!
hcaly caleryillartractor,GT-T with twicethe payload
of the GT-SM,and which h usedby thc Sovietsfor I
variely of rolcs. The chassisof the GT-T forms the basis
for the ncw arnloredartillerytracto4APc,the M1970.
.. Trainingfor winleroperations is intcnsive.
Drivers
arc trainedin the operatioD andmainlenance ofvchiclcs
underwinle. conditions. Penonnelaretaught10moveas
ski-drawnand tank'borncinfartry, and to lir€ while
movingon skis. Thcy arc truincdin crossingtrenches
wilh rhc help of skj polcs.and in c'awlin8rnd running
on skis.Menaretaughthowto prevenlfrostbite.to care
and cleanthcir cquipment.andcamouflag€ lechniques.

:l]

Figure64. GT-Sand GT-SMvehicles.

141. Offsnse (2) Determiningtrafficabiliiyand the cap bility

a As a rule, thc deciSon-malin8proccssrcmainstlrc oI mountedanddismounted operationsin snowandicy
samein winter.However, in hisestimate
of &e situation
the company cornmanderconsidc.sa number of (3) Organizing specia.l
reconnaissance
to locateicc
peculiaritics
commonto rvinteroperations. Amongtlesc holes, snow banksand othefobslacles.
(4) Prcparir8for the clearingof routes.Open
(l) Preparing andcamouilaging warmingsheltcrs terrain is favoredin ile attackbccause the soowis less
for personnelandequipmentin the assembly area. deep than in wooils,
ravines,depressions,
etc.

84
.!

(5) Furnishing p(ieclion iionl ihe cold and prorec on). Altach€d trnks would pre.ede thc inlanll-v
supplyinghoi food and drink. and eachrank would tow one oI moresqurds(liigure66)
A?Cs wouldfollowat a distanceof tlp 1050 nreten behind
(6) i-rranging for rrpid bartlefield evacurtionirnd
protcction from rhe cold fo[ casualties.Higlcr hcrd- Lhc nt-anrD and suptort by l-rrc.By alta.king in sucha
quartersmay provide dog sled telns and hclicopierstor maDner,si ultaneousarnval ofunks and iJnanlty at rhe
assaultline is assurcd.Ai the assault line. the towcd
,. Reconnaissmcc rcceiv€sadded crnphasis (Figure inlanlrymcn rcleasethe ropes or crbles. lbrm m assault
rerm xssignedro 1e Linemd aiiack h coordinationwith the tdks. Attachcd
65). Frequently.rhe reconnaissance
bartalion 1s augrnenredby pcrsonnel fl(nn each of the crew-seryedwcapons arc mounled on deds a d rdved
firsr echclon attack oompanics.Up lo a platoon fronl
cach ot th€sc companies may be assigncda combat e- When thc snow is dcc!, ih€ infantry mly aftack
reconnaissancenission. Helicopten often assist by nrountedon ranks(Figur€ 67). Squadlcadcrs,posjrioned
transporiing deep patrols and by augnenting ll.rnk behind the tank turels, rnainlain communicationswith
the tark commnders o|cr ihe tank intefconD- At th€
proper time the squdd lcadcr notilles rhe tank conr
nranderto slow down and ordcrs his squad to jump off
r,rre, d k . t t . . q u a d, 1 . c 1r r o \ e ' b F h i l J r h Ft : r t .
I During rhe battle behind the FEBA, ski troops and
ianks attack stft g poinis liom thc flanks and rear.
J p p u r . J b ) I n u | I J\ l n d o r i i l e ) . R * u n l r . s r f p r s
conductcdby dcsignatedsquadsor platoons.
r! s. Thc pursuii nray be conductedby lroops |tou tcd
in AtCs; horvcvcr, in deep snow. the cornlNny corn-
mander mdy scnd }ns APCS by road and mount lxs
infaniry on attach€d lanl$ and codtinue the pul$rir.
W l . e nr I e ' e - r e 1 " r " . d . . L h .t r s u r . o . t e e n e r , !r , ; n .
lank-borneinfantry might be at an rvciagc speedol8-12

142. Defense
a. The depth of snow and ihe cold affect defensive
Figure65. Motorizedrifle companycommander posiiions (Figure 68). The FEBA is s€lectedclose to
conductingreconnaissancewith nalural wintef obstacles-Ir deep snow, ice is used !o
subordinateand attachedcommanders. ibrm slippcrybanksin liont ol the delensesand to build
r b o \ e B r ' ' L n .r . r f h . . i n $ " r n p \ d I e , . .D L r i l C p u -
c. The motodzedrjfle conrpanymay atlack on a
longed opefations.special snow-clearjngoperationsare
frontageof up to 1000 mererswith all threephtoons
However, organized !o keep mirefields and odrer obstacles
abrcirsranda rcinlorccdsquadin feserve. due
to thc fact that wintcr opcrarions
makemaneuvef nror€
,. ln deep snow lionlagcs may be increas€d.The
difficult (espeoialyin deepsnow), res€rv€s are olicn
largcrthanundcrnornal operatingconditions.A batta- motorized riflc company nray be assignedr fronmgc ol
up to 1.000 meters,rnd plaioons up to 500 n1elen.wi$r
Lionoperatingin deepsnow.may attackin one€chelon
grps up to 300 mereN betweencompanicsand up ro 200
andmainrainup 1oa conrpany in reservc.
nretersbetweenplatoons.
d ln nonnuclcalcondiiions,the motofized rifle
.. in organizinga defensiv€positior in ure snorv,tne
companyoften attacksdismounted and on skis(du.ing
. u r r p - r ) 1 ' r ' r . n J L r h l e . e r r sI p r c p l n . i o n ' i n
nuclear conditionsthey would remain nounlcd lbr
addition to lhc nolmal ones:
?
85
 (l) To aid thc construclionof dcfensivepo$uons, (4) Wulningsh€trers
_ u€ construcrcd.
thc atrongcstdelenscs !re placedalongroadsandin ureas d.- Engineerruppurt
wiLh lighr snow cover. Poputited rrcrs and fur€sts (^ ro the companyis increa!€d.
ombatcngineeause explusi\echnrges tu corarrucr
provideshclterandareofrenused$ strongpoints.
trenchesand shelters.AlCs usenaruralcovcror Lrcncnes
(2) nanks arc srrengrhencd to counrerski-borne ar-econsrructcd
for rhem.TaJ*saredugrn wir}l rhc.id
altack. The secondcchetonlrcservelcompan)anq/ur
or tiutldozcr a(achmenlr. Tank and ApCs are
Oe ballaUonrese.vc may bc suppljedwirh skis. camouflagedwith winter camouflagesets.
(3) Atlached tanks and artillcry areprovidedwith
.
specral equlpmenl to improve their cross_conntry
mobility.

Figure66.Tankstowing
infanry.

Figu1667. Tank bolne infantryattackingin winter.

 Figure6a. Motorizedrifletroopsin a winte.defensiveposition.

143. Operations
in the DesertandExtremeHeat riencein dcsertoperations.The 6th Currds Tant Anny
D€se( operationsmay be chancterizedby tlrc lack of in prticular encountered JI of drc problemsof desert
movcment in Mongolia. Today, desert warfare
dcvclopedroad networks,difficulty of movemcnlin
najor feature of thc tnining programs
sand,salt marshes and sanddunes,Linitedamountsof techniquesare a
Frequentwinds in those military districtscncompassing desertregions.
waterand fuel, andhigh temperatures.
These include thc Turkestan,Centrul Asian, Transbaikal
andduststormsinterferewith movementandadversely
Far East nilitry districts as wel as the Mongolian
affect comunications capabiiitiesand equipm€nt.At and
night, t}te abiasiveeffect of dust on equipment,dif- People'sRepublic.
ficulty in orientalionand crmouliageJnd a nurnberof
olher factors exert a substanlinlinfluenceon dle actions 145. Doctrine
of personnel and t]rc use of equipment in r dcse.t a. Sovict offensive doctrine for desert operations
envi.onment.The desertalsoposesproblensfor CBR stressesreconnaissancc on a broad front, on nrultiple
defense. In a sandydesertregion,the levelof radiation
axesand in gear dep$. tlc cKisrence of latgeSapsir
h a radioactivecloud is frequentlytwo three times the encrny'sdefenseenablesreconnaissance tcamsto
higher thar in soil havingplant cover.Strongdust clouds
conduct deep pencirationmitsions.Us€ is rnade of
may bringsecondary contamination, to menandequip-
helicoptcrsto transportreconnaissance penonncl.As a
ncnt. Duc io .he extuemeheat dudng the day t.oops flrlc, units attack on a wider ftont and have deeper
can safely wear their insulrted CBR protcctive clothing
objcctives than in other types of terrain. Moreover
aoronly 15-20minutcs. attention is given to ensuretbal attackingrcgimenisand
battalions can operate independerdy. A large part of
144. HinoricalPerspective availableartilery, engineer,and chemicaltroops are
During the 1945 Manchudan Campaign against th€ attrched to ihem- Auxiliary communicationnctworks
Japancsc,illc Sovict Army gaincd coNiderablc expc- may be sct up to maintain communicationswitl wid€iy
dispersed units.
87
 ,. For a dcfense in thedesert,stong secondechelons r47. Offense
and reserves are crcatedand disposedin geater depth In thc desert,the motorizedrifle companyusua[y
thanundcrnormalcondilioDs. The battalionfrontageis altacks in one cchelon. A batlalion usLlrlly deploys in
the samc as under normal conditions,except when companycolumnsat a distanceof 12-15km from the
occupyinS a secondary avcnueof approach. In the later FEBAandcompanics deployinlo platooncolumnsat a
case,the companiesand platoonswould defcndon a distanccof thr€eto five kilomcters-Depcndingupon the
widerfrontage. statc of the dcfenses,the companyattacks either
mounted or dismountedbehindattachedamor, and
146. Trainins pressesthc attack rapidly (Figure70).
Trrining corcentrrteson basiccombatskills,landnavi-
gation(using dnection.i ryros ai well ar mapsand 148. Delense
other cquipneno in desert terrain and spccialired The motori/edril'lc companyon lhe dcfenseoccupies
mdntenance procedures (Figurc69). Physical trainingis the samefrortagc as during normal operations,except
also st.cssed. Enginecr, chemical, artillery, tanl, and whcn posted along a secondaryenemy avenueof
infantry forcesconductspecinlized aswell ascombincd approach. Normally the defensc is organizedin one
armsilaining.Coordinated hclibomeandgroundassault echelon. In organizing the defensive positions d
operations in thc deserthavebcenreportcdin thc Soviet reinforcingthe wallsof foxioles.ltenches.communica
press. dons trenchesand slrclters,usc is made of sandbags,
mats,and fascines. Shcltersand dugoutsareusuallyofa
light type. Siocksof arununition,waterand fuel arc
built up. Weaponsandvchiclesarc regularlychcck€dand

ir

Figure69. [4otorizedri{letroopstrainingin the desert.

88
 LEVELSANDY l'

taEs€RvEl
<t+_do:
/,i,

*aorii 7gq14r,
. -.RTFIECO

$ooE'

/n
6
/++-\
j
6 vo".r,"a,tn"
in rhe.ttaci "o.pany,
ei.torc.d bvranks, \e/
fi-t;--1 antp.e.nel min6neld
A uotoiz"arrn.cmp.ny inrheatt cr
--a---a- P.sgE lhreuqh.n aniiperionnelminetuld
<-t|-rro' Motoizeddn. comp.nyin m€rchcol|)mn
-=- l22Dm halEsr

A oberyadon pon

FigureTO.Reinforcedmotorizedriflebanalionattackingin rhe desen.

90
"lt
AND SWAMPS
lN FORESTS
Sectionlll. OPERATIONS
149. General
ln lightly wooded areasoperationsre conduclcd in a
normal manner- Howevef. thictly wooded arcas
considemblyhrder thc conduct of tactical operatio's.
Decausepiatoons,companies,and battalions must often
operate independently in such t€rrain. the Soviets
believ€ that decisiv€nessand boldnessare pa(icululy
irnporiant. Op€rating in heavily fofesred and swampy
terrain is characterizedby tle fo owing:
d. Difficulties in observltion,onentdtion, and adjust-
b. Compleniy of coinmnndand control.
l]. Magnficd baricr cffccts r€sulting ftom the
cmploymcnt of nuclearwcapons.
d. Difiiculty in usingwire'guidedATGNIS.
e. Abundanceofnatural obsracles.
I Possibility of fofest fues.
a. Concealnrentfrom aerialobservation.
l. Greal rcLiancc on smdll unil leadership md
initialivc.
2 To overcome the problerns of lighting in foresled or
swanrpy terain. speci trrining is required. P.oblem!
may also be overcomeby proper use of tefrain, since
excellenrcover and concealmentexist for the dtlackcr as
as lveli as the delender.
150. HistoricalPenpective
Dunng World War ll, thc Soviers conducted Duny
successfuloperalions ngxinst thc Gcrrnansir forested,
swamly terrain. The Soviels favorcd forcsts for
approach nurches and assembly areas. oulskiJts of
woods wcre uscd as ailack positions.Artillery and lanks
moved ihrough forcsted areasconsideredimpassibleby
ihc Germans-Such an operation occurrcd in June 1944
in a tracklessforest erst of Lvov. Although the German
pmzer division commanden in the dreaconsidcrcdrhe
foresl impcnctrablefor Soviettanks, a Sovietiank corps,
aided by engineerswho lxid corduroy foads acrossthe
swanrps, successfuly lassed thrcugh thc arca. The
Soeietswcrc also adcpt at choosingand forlifying forcsr
positions which cost the Ccrn ns healy casualties.
Imporiant appfoaoh routes w€re blockcd by machine
guns and aniitanl rveaponsechelonedin depth. Butke6
we.e p(nected by mincficlds and snipers.Bunkersand
dcfcnse instalations wer€ so well camouflagcd that tlr€y
were rarely spotled.
91
151. Doctrine
In order to maintain rilpid .ates of advancc,Soviel
doctrine stresscsthe bypassingofheavily forcsteda.eas-
However, when such tcrdn must be negotialed, rhe
Sovietsitfess thc usc of motonzed rifle rroops as fint
echelon fo.ccs, wiih tank units lo owing. Regimental
m d b d I J , u 1 g i o L p : . r e i n i o r c - d$ i r h : r n i ] l e r ye. n s i n c c r : .
and chemicaitroops opeute on independentaxes.Tanks
in motorized rifle regirnentsarc attached to battalions
for closesupport. ln nucleu ope.ations,use is rnadeof
tre€ blow-down in areas that will not inhibit future
operrtions- In the defcnse,cnphl]Sisis placedon swift
counteraitacks, oltcn by smdl] forces. Defenscsarc
orgrnizedin depth and to provide all-aroundsecuriiy.
152. Ofiense
a. During thc approach march and auack in heavily
wooded or swrmpy lerrain, e motorized riflc conr
pmy attacks as pdrt ol the battalion (Figure 71). It
normally enploys the wedge fornrtion at shortened
intcffals and distllnces,and under covcr ol two-nan
combatpalrols. Thcsepalrols, maintainingvisuaicontact
with their parent udt, t*e up positions to thc front,
flank and rear of thc compaiy. MtI his usualreinforce-
menl ,nd support when leadingthe attack, the company
conmander usesautomatic fire to comb the woods. lf
m FO rs assigned,he moves with the company conr-
mander in the lorward platoon ard adjusts atillery fire
by dncct obsc ation.
,. Tllc company comnmder ules plldselines to aid
in coordinaiion and control. Visual marken and the
dtections to iniabitcd arcasare placedon roads,lanes,
and in clearings. Platoon lcrders use azimutlrs and
pre-arrangedcodcs1br designatingthen posilions.
c. Closc suppod tank and antitank guns normally
folow and supporl the infintry. A tank platoon may be
liagmcntcd, with one tank moving with each platoon.
Attrched oombat engineersare given missionsof cstab-
lishing passagesthroughfo.ests,roadblock, and swampy
d. Prior to the attack, the battdlion commander
attachcsmost of thc availablcartillcry, mortaJs,trnks,
a n . I u n \ w c r p u n , .a n d e n g i n e e rr\u L L ed f l e ( o m p a n j e r .
Ihc cornpanv cotunrndcrs usualy maintain a smdll
rcscflc. In an atlack on an cncmy dcploycdin a wooded
area, tuing positions located on the edgeof the woods
are the first to be alsaulted.To aid initially in navigation Designatedrifle units consolidate and defend seized
and control, the companycommmder designates a roadjunctionsand lancs.Suchjunctionsmay be scized
guideplatoon,andplatoonleadcnassigna guidcsquad. by helibome forces movinSaheadof ihe main attack.
ln the depth of a forest,the companyarcmpb both The attacking troops continue forward, destroyingor
shalowanddeepcnvelopmcnts of lhe enemypositions. roulingth€ cnemyforcesuntil the objectivcsaretaken.
Fu[ fire support is utilizcd. Tanls and antitanl guns Companyand battalion rcseflesarcmaintainedto defeat
cngagecnemy weaponslocatcd on roads and lane!. en€mycounlerattack.

1STMOTORIZEO
RIFTE

(EY
<-F-6 Motoizedille plaroontn DErchcolumn @ D.f6.siv€ po3iio n

J- uorori.earirreco.panvinlrr€anack Morodzeditle companv,reinlorcedby b.ts,

_010.
@ ,".-.on*0".",,
6
ffi Bulding

Figure71.Reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionattackingin forestedswampyterrain.

92
r53. Delcms rangc.As time permits,attachedengineers construct
a. The defenseof a battrlionin a forcstis basedon a obs.aclcs in the path of probablc €nemy advancc.
systemof fir€s of fortificd companystrongpoints,a Antitank guns are kept well forward in or between
systemof natural,nd camouflagcd artificialobstacles, platoon positions 1o support the company. Monds ale
ambushes, and counterattacks. Dcpending on the situa. posilioncd in clearings to the rcarof the lorward unitsso
tion, the FEBA is either organted in front of thc forest that then fucs can be brought to beareffectively on thc
or scvcralhundrednetcrs insidethe foresi.ln thelattel attackingenemyforces.
ca!€,outposts,scrcening detachmcnts and sA-7gunncrs e As the enemy attack develops,weaponsare
ar€ deploycdalongthe edgeof the woods.Thc batta- brought to bear to disorganizc, disruptand halt bis
lion's secondecheloncompany(rcscrve)is normaly advancc bcforehe reaches the conpanyposition.Should
deployed ncar roads, lanes or openings.Though the enemypenetntethe position,a stubborndefense is
organizedfor perineter dcfens€,it is also prepared to maintained until countcrattacking forces can cngage
counteraltack anlr/hcrein $e batlalion\ defensive area. him. Companysnipcn conc€ntrat€on officc$, machine
Someartilery may be attacfied to compeies and uscd Sunners! weaponscrcws,andsnipers.In forests,hand-to'
primarilyfor diect fire. Tanks,rntitank weapons, and hnnd conbat is commonduc t6 the restrictedfield5of
sef-propclled artillery conduct counterakck with the fire andpoor visibility.
rcservesor are ritachcd to the first echcloncomeaniesto
rcinforce th€ir antitank capability. 194.
,. Normaly, a company defensiveposirion in Tle conplexjtiesof fighting in swmpy and forest€d
forcstcd areasconsistsol a preparedand camouflaged areaswould posedefinit€ problemsfor dle Soviet small
strong point near or at thc edgeof th€ forest. Tarlksand unit lerder,particuhrlyin the arcasoI maprerd$g and
APCSa.e positioned near roads or fire lancs with the cxercisinginitiative.
missionof engaging encmytzn[s andA]fs at ma-\imum

S€ctionlV. OPERATIONS
lN MOUNTAINS

155. eneral (3) Fluchrations in weather.

4 AlthouSh spccialized mountain hfantry toops (4) wea. and tcar on equipmcnt,incrcased fuel
may exist in thc Sovi€t Amy, all motorizedrifle toops consumption, andlogisticalrequicments.
are expectedto be able to opcratein the mountains. (5) Reduccdratesofadvance.
During such operations,ihey may leavemuch of thcir (6) Slidcsandtloods.
armor andhcavyequipmentbehinduniil a brcalttuough (7) Dfficulty in bypassing zoncso[ chemicaland
has bcen achievedor until a widc valley or plateau has mdioactive contamination.
b€€n rcached. At such timcs, normal offensive and
defensive operations would be conducted. Prior to 156. HistoricalPl6pective
corducting mountain operationsttroops would receive DuringWorldWar ll, the SovietA[ny gaincdvalrable
specidequipmentand,timc permitting,additionaltrain- experiencein mountajnoperationsin tlrc Transcaucasus,
mg. Far East,and EasternEurope.Someof thcseoperations
6. Cumbat uperationsin mountainousleoain ale involved the usc of parachutiststo seizeard hold key
banp€redby: mountainpasses,road junctions,airfieldsand supply
(1) Thenumberandconditionof roa&. installations.Mountain training techniquesandexercrses
(2) Thc screening effect of mountains on ar€ conducted today, particularly in the Transcaucasus
electronicequipment. region.
157. Docarine (evenwhensurrounded).nd vigoruuscounterartacks
by
ln mountainous terrain, offensiveswill often bc con- sccondcchelonandreserve
forcesaredso strcssed.
ducted when troops ar€ in contact,sincet]rc terain
158. EqoipmentandT6inins
limih the posribility of rapid deploynent frorn the
march. I}le oflcosive is launchedby regimentaland/or Specialequipment,nd tlainingb necessary for conduc!
battaliongoups operatingon severalarcs (mainlyn ing mountainopcrations.Suchequipmentrangesfrom
vall€ys,alongroadsandddges).Heliborneandairbome blocks,spades andtowingcablcsfor tra€kcdvehicles to
forcesareusedto seizcdcep objectives. Communication 76rnm mounlainguns,other light artiLlcrypieces,and
betwecnseprratcdunits is accomplished by statlcand l60rnm mortars u lieu of heavierreginrcntaland
mobile communications means,to includethe useof divisional artilery (Figure 72). Additional radiosand
spccinlly equipp€d helicopters. Extensive use is dso sp€cillly equippedcornmunications hclicoptcnnre dlso
madc of combat engincerswho are attacheddown to used. Special clothing aid rations are also issu€d.
platoun lcvel. A delensein a mounrainousarea is B€causethe soldicrt encr$/ rcquiremcnt will be in-
organizedto cover possibleaxes of attack, particularly cr€as€d4,000-5,000calories.p€r day,hiShcalorie,light
those which may be used by armof. Phtoon and wcight foods not rcquiringlcngtly cookingor lnrge
corDpanystrong points arc mutually supportingand expenditureof watcl areadvocatcd. CBR equipmentis
providefor atl-arounddefense. Patrollingis coDducted also increased;soldiersreceivea secondchemicalde-
b€tweengapsin the d€fenscsand in the flank dnd rcar contaminationkit. Personnelare lrainedto ovcrconrc
areasto prevent flmldng movcmcnts.Sovict doctrin€ variousobstacles, to firc underdifficult wealhercondi.
shessesthc useof nuclearand ch€micalwcaponsin thc tions to orient lh€mselves,especiaUywhcn vjsibility is
defense,particulay againsttroopc in n"Jrow val€ys, UmiLcd. and to u* naturalcover(l-igulc73).Driversarc
gorgcs,and passcs. Tenacious dcfenseof strongpoints tau€htfo ascendand desccndsteepgndcsand to ford

Figure72. gun,M1966.
76mmmountain
94
'l
t-
T destroying nuclear delivery means, seizing critical
) narfowvalleyor canyonthe company,-! a rule attacks
Figure73. lrotorized rifletroopstraining
inthemountains.
159- Offense
d. Becauseof the Limited routes availablein
mountainousterrain,battilions oftcn attack indepen
dently, in separalezoncs, moving in one or two
echelons.They xre rssigncdmissionsextendingover a
longer period than usual,and rcc€iveattachments
howirzcrs,lighi arti ery, mortnn, tanls, chemical,and
engineerunils. Amounts and types of attrchmcnts
dcpendprimarily uponthe importanceof the battarion
mission.
,. The motorizedrifle companymaybe employedto
(1) Maintdin conlact with a preparedenemy
defensive posiiion.
(2) Act as m envelopinsforce of a battalion or
regrment.
(3) Conductheliborneopennons.
.. The motorizedrifle comprny missionin mountain-
ousrenrn moslofrenmcnLioncd b\ dreSo\ierpres,i" a
flanking or envelopncnt opcntion. ln such a rolc, tlre
companymay be given any of the folowing tasks:
heighrs. crosiings.roadjuncrions.and nrounlairpas{s
in the€n€myrear areasandon his flmks, andretaining
rhemuntillink up wirf lhemainforces. Tle e,rmpany is
reinfofced with lisht aftilery, mortar!, engin€ersand
other subunits and is supportedby th€ artillery of the
d Normaly thc motorized.rifl€companyattacks
nountcdin personnel carnen.JIdmovesalongroads(Fig-
ure 74)- tf the initial assaultbecomes impossible dueto
enemyfire or tlrc inabitity of tlrc vchiclesto dcploy, thc
troops dismountand atlempt lo outfiank the eneny
positions, whilc tllc tanls support by firc. Artack
frontagesand fornations depend on ihe terain. ln a
on a 100-300meterf.ontage.On a mountainplateauor
broad valleylhe frontagemay incre$eto 1,000meters
or mofe-Any of the formationsdescnbed in chapters 7
and 8 may be used.The conpany commandermay
e. Attachedtank opcratcunconventionally in the
nountdns. AlLtmughthcy may precedethe infantry in
the attrck, thcy arcoftcnusedin stationarypositionsto
supporlallackinginfantrymenby fire. A tmk platoon
may be fragmcnlcd,with onetank accompanying erch
of th€ nnto.ized rine company's platoonsin attacking
an obj€ctivefrom differen.dircctions.
I Becausethe tcnain in mountainousar€asis often
suited for rmbushes,the compdnycommaldcriakes
precautionsto avoid being caughl by enemy forces
of enlrenchedin flankrg positions.Flank securityele'
mentsaredispatched whenthe companyis canalized.
& Thc motorizcd rillc company may move by
helicopterto seizeand defend a key position until
link-up is achieved.In sucha situation,the company's
APCScome folward with th€ link-up force.
95
 p $
'P>d
3ROPIT

n... \
ii;lj \
i:l

,i1-i.wooos

ii{:,2 125 o 125

i:,l#t'L 250 375

.010. jy?i:,:'L:#"",atoon.ieioror.edby,snks. -*''+t companv

whbianks
rn
l""""i'ili"l1'."
,/--f-1 Moroiz€ddnepraroonin th6srhck

Figu.e74. Motorizedriflecompany
attackrngjn mounlainousteffain.
rm. Defense
a The usurl defensive principles appti€d by the
Soviets are not significardy rnodified in mountainous
terrain. A stabledefensecanbc organizedin a shon time
in tenain possessing
rivers,vafl€ys,gorgcs,a number of
heights, ridges and irnpassablesecton. Troops are
normalty d€ployedalongroads,valleys,on flat mountain
tops aIId on forward and rev€ne slopes, To protect
personneland equipment,ravines,trenches,nanow and
deep gorges,tumels and passageways
ar€ uled (Figur€
7s).
,. The battalion d€f€nsi\€ sector is organizedinto
companyand platoon strongpoints which coveravenues
of approach.and ar€ organizedto provide afl-around
secudty. Att€ntion is focusedon av€nuesof approach
for taDis. At such points, antita ( ard anti,infarhy
w€apons are coric€ntrated, Min€fields, rock inpedi-
m€nts, and other obstaclesare inst lled. Duc ro the
97
lerain's inhbiting €ffecis or radio communicatioff,
wide useof wne is made.
c. Artillery, mortan, antitank, tank, engheer, ard
chemical defense u ts ar€ normaly attached to a
motorized rifle compsny occupyiry a forward def€nsive
position. Attached mortars and anil€ry are nonnaly
placed on reverseslop€s.Fire plansprovidc covengeof
defiles, roadjunctioN and streamffossings.Significance
is attached to the secudty ard prctection of gaps
between strong pohts and at junctiorN. A combit
security detachment(nornaly a squad) md listening
postsfrom the platoonsffe dispatchedto coy€rgapr
d CBR weaponsnay b€ employedby higher head-
quaners to block the en€myadvanceor in conjunction
liith a counterattack.
Although some tark fron the regirnentl t Jlk
".
battalion ar€ normaly alotted to the fust €chelon
battalions, shong counterattack forces de nahtained
by 'egimenl and division.Batlalons and compdies
maintainsmaler rese e forces,
 a
0
KEY

(1) Fi6t Dolo zedrilreptaloon.

t2l Secondmolo 2edrifieptaioon.

i3) Thirdmotorizedrirteptatoonl).

Feserye{onesquadfom 3rd ptaroon,.

t
I Anrilanksrcnadelauncher.

i Plaloonleader'scoomand and obseruaiionposi

i Companycommandelscommanda.d obseryaiion

FiE nntituntminus.
]' Fougassesorexptosives.

A APC

Fisure
75.Themotorized
rifiecompanyjn the defense;n
mountainous
terrain.

98
t

SectionV. WATERBARRIEROPERATIONS

161. General ,. SinceWorldWarII, the Sovictshaveconnnuedto

place grearenphasis(]4 dl dspe.rsu, riter cro:sine
The significanceof a nver as a nililary obstaclcdcpcnds
upon a trunber of frctors, suchas the width, dcptl, and operations. Exercises"D epr" conductedir 1967,
speed of the curenti thc avaihbility of fords and
"Moldau" (1969), "Odcr-Neissc"(1969), "Dvina"
(1970),"Brotherhoodin Anns" (1970), "Jus" (1971)
bridges;the tralficability oI the dver va ey, banks and
bedi weathefi and the nature of th€ defenses.The
and "Shield" in 1972 aI emphasized offensiveopcla-
Soviets classify fivers as narrow (up to 66 nreten), tions, and all invoived thc crossingof large water
medium (up to 333 mete6), md wide (nor€ than 333 obstacles (Figure 76).
rnete6)- Rivers are classifledby depdr as sha ow (up to
onc and si\-tenths inet€rs).deep (up to five mete$) and
very deep (norc illan fivc mcters). Current is classified
as dow (up to one-halfmeterper second),modcratc(up
to one meter per second)or very swift (nore than onc
and eighttenths metels pe. second). Soviet military
authod wriic that within the luropean theater of
operations,riversup to 100 mctcrs wide are encountered
every 35 to 60 kiloneters, watcr obstaclesbetwe€n 100
and 300 nreters wide ar€ found every 100 to 150
kilom€ters, and every 250 to 300 kilomet€rs wrter
bafriers greater than 300 neters in width wi be
) cncountered. Soviel equipmcnt, training, and doctrine
for dyer cfossing operations reflect World War II
e \ p c r i c n c ca, n d r h e i lc u r r e n rJ f f e rc i v ed o c t r i n c .

162. HistoricalPelspective
a During World WaJII, the Cennanswerc repeatedly
surprisedby tbe speed witn which Soviet units crossed
water obstacles.Cfossingthe Dncpr River in 1943, t}le
I
Germanswere able to use only scven existing bridges.
one float bndge md one improviscdfcrry in a sector300
I miles long. Following closcly bchind lhe Geflnans,tne
Sovi€tsdroppedseveralthousandparachutistsov€I a 200
mile long zone in order 1o cstablishbridgeheads.Soon
thereafterthey built 57 bddges,9 foot bridgesand other
river crossing facilitics for an average of one crossing
elery 4 rniles of river (Thc Germansavefased1 crossing
per 33 nilet. The rapidity rvith which the Soviels
crossedthe Dnepr and other rivcrs, swampsand lakes
placed tremendous prcssureon the retreating German
forces. The Soviets, usudlly crossingwater barri€m at
down cr du\k, used ilrc cover of darkness to the
Figure76. Exercise"Dnepr" 1967.

99
163. Doctrin. occupicdand fortfied in orderto prcvcnlsurpdscand
a Soviet doctrine strcsscs the forcing of water to subjcct attackcf to flanling fire. Th€ dcfense
obstadesfrom the march on a broad front- Should the concentratcs panicularlyon suitablecrossingareasfor
sttack from the mrJchfail, thc waterbarricrwouldbc enemyforces.Antitankguns,tanks,andmtitanj(guided
crossedaftcr a shod pcriodof prepararion. Thc Sovietsmissilcsare movedcloseto thc bank to destroycncmy
believethat successin suchoperaiions depends uponthe armorattemptingto c(xs. Nuclearandchemicaland/or
folowing: convcntional artilery,air andmisrilestrikesareplanned
(l) Reconnaissaftc, to ircludc the oppositeside on the approachesto, the wat€r obstacle and on
of thewatcrobstacle. significant crossingsitcs.
(2) Plannine,bascdupon rcconnaissance reporls
and conductcdw€[ bcfore troops reach the eater 164. Equipment andTr.ining
d, The BMP+quipped and BTR€quippcdmotorized
(3) D€struction of cnerDyforccs on both banks. rille companics(exceptfor thosewith drc BTR 152)
(4) Rapidily n lhc arracl. ro includetic seizure have an amphibiouscapabilitywhich doesnot need
of undamagcdcrossings,crossingon a broad front, aod augmcntation. The SovietAriny possesses a numberof
dcvelopmentof the offensiveon the far bank. racked amphjbianswhich would be u$d in moving
(5) Proper orSaniz-rtionof the assaultforces,and BTR-I52s and attached non-amphibious equipmcnt
the timely uscof crossingcquipment. (suchas artillery,morlars,etc.)acrolsthe waterobsta-
(6) Successful overcomingof obstacles, bot}l in cle. Thc 10 ton K6l (GPT) witl a cargocapacityin
the water and on the banks. exccssof Iive tons andthe 20 ton PTSwith a capacityin
(7) Covcng€of thc crossingsitesand troops fron excessof l0 tons aft id€ally suited for transporting
enemyair strikes, non-amphibiousequipmcnl (Figure 77). Medium tanks
,- Thc Sovietsalsostrcssthe useof tacticalh€libornc attachcdto the motodzedrifle compmyhavesnorkeling
forcesto achievesurprisc,to seizekcy terrain,andaid deviccsfor crossing waterobstaclcs up to 5.5 meten in
ih€ mainrttack. depth.If the wateri! too dcep,tankscrosson bridgcsor
c- While CBR and/or conventiond strikes wil be feri€s erectcdby the regimentalor divisionenginecrs.
planned agrirst enemy forc€s, the Soviets avoid the ,. The purposeof r'ver crossingtrainingis to train
concentrationof their forcesby attackingon a broad unitsto crossa watcrobstacle underdifficultconditions,
lront with minimumdelayin approaching and crorsing without slowingtlle attackand to rvoid concentration
the water obstacle.Battalion crossingsectorsarechosen of troops. Motorizedrine battalions are nained to cross
so that nol mor€ thrn one battalion could be destroyed water obstaclesfrom lhc march. Soldicn are taught to
by a medium yicld nuclearburst. The battalion acthg lis follow thc orders of thc crossinScommandant(usually
the advancegunrdof tle regitnentwould us€two to the engirccrunit commandet.DriversaretauShthow to
thJee company.size crossingpoints. the number of preparcthcir vehiclesfor crossinS operations,and how
crossing points might bc increased by succeeding to ncgotiatewater obstaclesby fording andwhcn afloat.
Tanl drivers are trained in snorkeling operarionsand
d ln the dcfenseof a watcr obstacle,the Soviet! driving over hastily erectedbridgesand only after thcy
normally organizethcir main defenseon their sideof the havepracticedunderwaterdrivingarc they considered
obstacle.Should defenseof a bridgeheadbe necessary, fuly trained. BMPShave bcen noted firing their main
the Sovi€ts would defend on both bank. Islatrdsar€ armamcntduringa watcr crossinS-

100
tr,t

Figure77. K-61andPTStrackedamphibious
carrierc
unloading
assauhtroops.

165- Offense thc attackcrsand 1o conccalthc locationsof thc crossing

d. The molodzed dfle comprny usuJly c.ossesr
rl nve s pari ofa battalion, which may operaleaspad of
thc rcgimenlalrnain body or as an advanceguard(Figu.e the
d- Should d1e near bank be securedby other forces,
moiorized rifle company c(xses f.onr ic march as
78). ln thc lattcr case the company could aci ai the pan of ihe bdltdion. Movement lo the crossingsite is
fomard detachmentof the advanceguardmd be lasked normally in colLlmn to aid control md rnovement.
to €nsurethe unhindefedadvanceofthe battalion to the Approaches to the water obstacle ue nrarked by
engineen. and control points are estabLislied to govern
,. Acting as the forward detachnrentof ihe advance the nrovement and prevent congestion. JLlst prior n)
guard, the notorizcd riflc conpany would havc attached clearing the last covered and conceal€d arer, the APCS
tank, artillcry. AAA, chcmical,and engineerunits. Using deploy on a broad front with approximately 75 meters
js
its A?Cs and attachcd tracked amphibians(to nrovethe between vehicles.Conditionspermittjng, this inteNal
artil€ry acfoss),the motorized rifle cotrpany would be m " i r l a r n e di n e n r c i n gd r c w o . c rr n d d u r i n gr h e . ' o s s r g .
able to reach the river and cross it quickly undef the The crossingof thc company bcgi s on oidcr of the
supportingfires of the tanks and arli €ry. By scizingthc battalio! commander with vehicles crossing simulta
oplosite shore. the company would ensure the sxle neously on a bfoad ffont. Firing may be conductedfronr
crossingby thc battalion'smain forces. APCSduring thc crossing.
c. Should the motorized riflc company encounier e. Tanks moving wnh fie molotu€d illc company
resistanceon the near bank. it altacks rnornted (il move inland to establishth€ beachhead.The company
possible)in an effort ro seizethe nearbank quiokly and may either be ordered to organizethe beachheadand
r " J e r y L h e e n e m \ f e " p p o r r u n i r y r o o r g a j l i . ca ' r protect it from enemycounleraltackwhile other moto.
effectivedcfcnsc,or to destroy existingcfossingsites.If izcd riflc units cross, or may conrinue to move forward
ihc strcngth of the cncmy defenseprohibits a mounted to pursue the withdrawing enemy. Tdnk md other
attack, the conrpary dismounh under covcr of arlillcry dncct-tuc wcapons initiauy rcmaning on lhe near bank
and rank fire and assaultsthe enemy posilions. Upon during the crossing. increase thei. flres on largelson the
seizureof the nearbank. rvailablcfirc is dnccted against far bank. The artillery slifrs i|S fires behind the FEBA.
e n e r n )p o r i r i o n so n r h e f a " b a n k . o c o \ e r r h e f l o s c i n g . whne Lhc AAA unit covers ihc crossing againsr lorv-lcvcl
Smoke is lypicaly uscd to rcduce dre vulnenbility of

t0r
 ,--

i.:q,h?+P
\ \
7*t,t1,

ISTMTS
RIFLECO

@il

$I
A APc <r+--Od lMotorized ite company

Mod zed,iite( o-p6ny, ,einro( ed wirh

-- Antitankgun +Oa 4 O
\ r a n k si ,n r h e a n a c k

li?All .oun"*""o,
$o"o liiEd
",',o,,u".
u i,"a unr,ranripersonner
minerierd
"n,i
@ e
V Helibornerandins
@
Figufe78. A reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionrorcrnga warer
barrier

to2
 t A dismountcdmororizcdriile companymay bc off oncefte tanJ(hasemergedfrom rhewater,rherank
landcdby helicopterto scizckcy rerrainto assrsrLnc carnot engagein sustained combatunril de-sealinBhas
crossinSof tfie main body and to fonn a biocking tlten place- a proces lhat takesabout 20 mmures.
position to cul off vithdrawing eftrny forces or ro Bccause of th€vulncrabilities prcscnredby deepfording,
prcvcnt cncmy rcscrvcslrom counrcrallacking. whcn the Sovietspreferto transfertheirtanksto the opposire
sufficientrsrault forceshave crossedover the warer bark by ferry.
obstacleand moveclto exploit the crossing, the pcrson-
ncl cadcrs of thc helibornc unit are brought forward 166. D€r€nse
andrhecompanyremountsllndcontinuesrheattack.
a. Thc motorizedrifle companycommllnderorga
& Expansionand improvementof crossingsitesare nies his dcfcnseon
left to higherhcadquarrers. rhebarisola LarefulreLonnaissan,Je
Bridgcsin lar8cnumbcrsand of the
terrain,the mturc of the riverbanl6,and closc
types ee ivailable for rransporting non-amphibious
coordination with adjacerrunits. The FEBA is described
vehicles.
by thc baltalion command€r.The river bank oppositeis
i. Wehavenoledseveral vulnerabilities
duringSoviet bmught underconcentrated lre at tbe poinrssuitable
rivc! cfossingopcrations.txact uossingsitesmay be
for a crossingwhil€ the entireriverbank is coveredby
prematurely revcalcdby Sovictrecoflnaissancc personncl flanling machhegun fire.
Attempts by the cneny !o
dlus enabling the dcfcndcr ro take effective reconnotter,to bring
up or launchrivcr-crossinSmaterial
countermeasures. snorkelslre wlnerableto hostilefirc and equipment,ro cstablisha
crossingor actuallyto
and may be damugcdprior to the crossinS. Moreover, effect! crossing, aretakenunderfirc (Figurc79).
once the tanl is sealedfor a riv€r crossin8 cannor ,. At night, conrbatoutpostsandobservarion posls
fight, since the turrel is locked and the main gun tube are s€nt forward to
the river banks to detect enemy
blockcd.Althouti the snork€lmay be quickly blown

103
 Yu: *.t-S 1SJMTSJIFLE COWITHATANK
PLI 6 2 A(TILLE&Y.
PECEJ @
w

nrrrico a, y i'^'. . i
6rt wooDs.,- a..t,_.-,.\;r,1-,., ,
- '--'-
;;&, 7
sworup ,

lful';*.r
I . :|..'-)1 i,.-';lt.
. -'.' j(9r,'ri.-,l:,1'

rld '
-^5-:
s9ltri,^199 '
,,ri ,
'
tu__

o
____a\_i_
.,r i.'1itl. *-"i
_ _ _ ___/.'\_

ry'+ii,$ri,t*iiiN
KEY

,"s_, Artilleryb3ifaqeldesignared
"A", "8"
Combarvehiclewith anrnankmi$iles

e Self popel ed anti-aircraiigun %2 entv,y

"on""m,"tton
Fl{;l rnt puoonn"r
.rn"tieu
(9loPA
tu - --\,
Baitationboundary

I Headquanerc,
iid mororizedrifle baltalion
ffi euro'nn
/n
\92

Anillerybanallonin fnins posilions

Figure79. Beinforcedmotorizedriflebattaliondefendinga riverbank.

104
2t
SectionVl. COMBATlN BUILT-UPABEAS
167. Genefal
a. Combat in built-up areaspresentsproblemsrequiF
ing stccirl techniques.A built up arca nray quickly bc
strongly loditicd becauscof its conc.ete, slone, brick
and stccl structuresi widespreadundcrgrouod plssages
and shelters: ll1e abund nce of inflammable materials;
rnd the prcsenceof great numbcrsof civilianswho flr y
D. The Sovicts classify cities as being large (thosc
with population over 100,000 and a circunrferenccof
about 50 kilometers) av€ragcsize (havinga population
of 50,000 and a ctucumfercnceof about 50 kilorneteF).
or snull (having! population smallcr thrn 50,000).The
forces neededto lake a city dependupon the city's sirc,
but would be greatcr than in other comparablcopcra
.. Sovict open sourcelitcruture makesit clc:lJthat
Sovicl plannersunderstrnd the level of urbanizalion in
WestcrDEuropet that one or 1wo largc cities wil be
encounteredevery 200 to 300 squarc kilomcters and
?t th-atoperationsto over.rn a city can be erPcctedevery
40 to 60 kilometen ofadvance.
d. The Sovietsbelicvc urban combat to be charac!€F
ized by increaseddifficultics in command and control
(and thereforc r need for gealer independenceby
subordimte comndders), restrictions on n nuever.
observalion and fields of tue, and fragmentafon of a
battlc into numerousactions fought by combined arms
168. Hhtoriel Perspective
a. To commcnorate thc detef'nined standsnade by
Sovici forces at Moscow, l,eningrad, Kicv, Odesss,
Volgograd (fornrerly Stating.ad),Scvastopol.Minsk and
Novorussisk, these citics have bcen design ted "llcro
Cites." The lcrocity and rnrgnitudc of thesc strugles is
difficuh to compr€hend. The Soviets suffcred somc
600,000 carualtiesat Slaljngradalone.
,. ln thc off€nsivc tie Soviclsfought a gr€atnumber
ol battlcs in built-up areas.According to Soviet {igures,
from Decembcr l94l 10 Februrry 1942 during thc
counter-oflensiveai Moscow,60 citieswcre liberated.In
Januaryand Fcbruary 1945, the Germanswerc forced lo
yield 300 cities to the Soliet AJmy.
7
105
169. Doctrin€
a. Soviet doctdne, strcssingas i! does high r!te! ol
rdvance, seescombal i! buill-up as ufldcsirabl€.This
doctrine stress€sthat, whenevcr possible.cities wlll be
by-p3ss€d.lf Dis is not possibl€,the city is to be seized
rapidly fron] the march, oftcn with thc aid of
airbonre and/or heliborne aisaulL troops. An efiort is
nude to destroy enenry forces beforc they can forti8
the aIea. Should rapid seizure liom th€ march provc
inpossible, thc city wodd b€ blockaded. Nucleaf
wcapons would not likcly be uscd on a city through
which Sovict forceswanGd to pass.
,. In thc defenscof u lafgc town or cily tie Sovicts
are mindlul of thc cllccls of nuclearwcaponsand brse
their defcnse on prcventing by-passingof the arcr.
Heavily augm€ntcdplatoon and conrpany stfongpoinls
form the heart ofthe defensewithin the city, whilc lrrge
tank forces initiatly opcrate outsidc the built-up areato
countcraltack enemy tbrces allenrpting to bypass th€
city.
e In both the offcnse and dcfense. irontlges arc
considerablyreduced,and reseflc! naintrincd at !srious
levels.Control of suppoding wcrpons is dccentralizcd,
with some tanks and artillery attachcd ro infanky
platoons and even squads. Up to 50 pcrcenl of a
division's drlillery mry be assignedin this maoncr fd
utiliz€d in a dtect-fire ro1e. Olher tank and artillely
uni$ 'nainlain thcir integrity and tuIfil normal nlssrons.
Lngincc. and chenical personnelarc alluched lo com-
paniesand platoons-
1 7 0 . E q u i p m e nat n d T r a i n i n s
a Prior to rhe attack of a built-up rrcr, riflemcn
recejvc extru ammunition, Srenides,laddcrs. ropcs,rnd
othcr implcnrcnts for assaulting buildings. Flarne-
ttuowen, smokeand signalingdeviccs{e also used.
D. Cornpany officcn are taugbt how 1() manage
assaultgroupsand attachcdweapons;rifienten aJetaught
how to throw hand grenadcs on the run through
windows and doots, hand-to-handcombal, and obslacle-
ncgoliating lcchniques.Demolition training is dlso gjven.
A?C drivcrs are taught how 10 drive in narrow streets
and dcal with obstacles.Platoon,company and battalion
excrciscsare conducted in speciallrrining lfeas (Figurc
80).
Figure80.Combat-in'citiestactical
exercise.

106
 ffiMffi -:,-:

\ I

ffi
:ff
#--b, s -rol ro
\
*"'-
/
(""---

--9. o

l0
I
,*a:i
n,
LrI Ii ll Il
* f
3FDSOD

KEY
O ranr
C apc
--=a Pa$aqelhrousha hixeddinefietd (ant'
lzmm hDwil2er loalo.l
--_T--
-& Recoitte$r e
* oocrwitruuirainss
Figure81.The reinfofcedmotorizedriftecompany
in the attackin a buitt_uparea.

I08
 171. Offenre pointi buildnrgslocaied at slrcel intcrs€clionsor on
a. ln planningan altack on a buill up arca,Sovicl squares aregivcnljrst pdority. In eachsiror8point.fire
officersdorvnto companylevelstudy large-scale naps is organized in sevcraitien. with most wcaponslocated
andphotosof the area.Information is alsogleded front on thc lower floorsandin balements. Slructurcswhich
thc localpopulace andrccomaissance. Thednectonlnd intcrferewith fieldsoffire areleveled.
width of streetsandunderground passages,the locations ,. Tllc defensivebatile within the builtup area
of ncjor adminhlralivc buildingr.communkurro'r ccn. usuallybrcaksup into scparateengagemenls lbr indi-
1en,utility buildings.train stationsandotherobjectivcs vidudl platoon and companystrongpoints wldch mLlst
whoseseizurcwouldlssht in the capturcof tlle city arc often fidl independcndy. Consequ€ntly. rhe company
studicdin detail(Figure8l). rr nomrll' rcLnlorccdwith tlnls. urilc'y. cngineers.
,- Bccause of fragmcntadon ofa battlefor a built-up and combat engineers, to includeflanrethrovcrs.ftc
area.motodzedrifle companicsar€ lugmentedwilh company commrnder nor ally retains reinforced
artillery,tanks,cngineen,chenicd, and flamethrowcr
unitsto form assrullgroups. c. Sirongponrtsare organized lbr al-arcunddefense
.. Attack frontrgcs are reduccd and a reservc and mutud firc supportwirh adiaccntstrong points.
mainlain€d at mosllevcls.Althoughattackfrontages and Whenfeaiible. strongpoin(sarejuinedby communicz.
formalionswould depcndupon the densiryandnarurc
of thc buildingsl|nd thc strengthof the dcfcnses, lhe d. Antjtank and dtipclsonnel obsilclcsare estab
motorizcdrifie corupunyusuallyattacksdhmountedin lishedin the strcets,in intcrvalsbetweenslrontpoints,
onecchclonon a flonlagcof200'300melers.A squadis and on approach€s to baricadcs,which arc covcredby
nonnallyretaincdin rcscrveat companylevcl;aphloon flankingand crosslue. Fla ctluowersandmachineguo
positionsare established within the barricades, which
d. Thc depth of objcctiycsis alsorcducedin urban hrvc embrasures to permit firing along slrccts and
fidting. The objectiveof a reinforccdmotorizedrillc squarcs.Tank! md howitzen are attached!o platoons
comPanymight be to scizepart of a larg€bunding,a for mbushesor to buttressstrongpoints.Theirliring
separatebuildingor sevcralsmall buildingswithin an positionsarepreparedin bascmenls or groundfloo$ of
enemyslrongpoint. buildingsor behind stonc walls rn which embmruresarc
e. Artilery attach€dto companiesand platoonsis madcfor firingnndobservation.
usedto providedirectfire support.Aitachedtanksmd a Antiaircrdftwcaponslrom regimentand division
antitankweapons op€rrlcin thc maintrafficdlencs rnd Iurnish air d€fensc,consistnrg of antiaircrutlm,rchine'
helpsealoffareasunderaltackby drecompany- gunsand SA.?smountedon ih€ roofs of ligh buildings
t Withh the conrpanyzonc of operation,buildings and antiancraftgunsand nissilcsspreadthroughoutthe
areclearcdsystematicJly. Trnls nay leadtheassaullin city in locrlions which pcrmit firing in .iI dircctions.
wedg€formalion.with one t rl in the middleof thc Antiaircraltobservation postsafe alsosct up on high
roadand two behindon cachside,with infantrymcnon buildingsprovidingall'aroundobseflation.
both sidcsof the streetmd tuing at buildingson th€ t Passas€s and dfiv€ways,constructedwilhin city
oppositcside.the BMPaddsvaluabi€ fire supportto tlre blocks,and existingunderground tunneh are usedlbr
dismountedinfantrymen.Whcn cncmy resistlnccis the mrncuverof small unils- Obslaclcsare placedin
brokcn,the companyeitherprepareslo repelcounteF unusedunderground passirgcs,
andtheircxitsSuarded.
attacksor continues the rdva ce.
& Frequentsortiesand raidson thc cncmypositions
172. Delense areconsidcrcd asimportant$ thc defense of thc strong
point iiself.
r. The motorizedrifle company'ray defenda snal
buih.up areaor a groupof buitdingswithtn a cily. One
of morebuildingsare uscdfor the creationof a strong

l
109
r73. Vulnerabilities advance for a shortpcriodoftimc. Moreovcr, thehighly
Urban combat,with its fughammunitioncxpenditurc individualisticnaturc of city warfare may initially 1ax
ratcsand long-duratlon combat,may poscconsid€rablc conpany dnd battalion grade officersand NCOS not
problems to a logistics systcm gearedto high rates of accustorncd lo exercisinginitiativc.

SectionVll. HELIBORNEOPEBATIONS

174. General (6) ln logistical and cornmandand control roles.

Tllcrc are curcntly severalhelicoplerregimcntsin thc (7) Deliveryofponlon bridgingequipment.
Soeietordef of battle.From one to threercgimentsare d Heliborncforcesmay be committed15-50kilo-
subordinated to a tacticalair army,andsomcregiments mctelsalead of advancin8gound troops in orderto
s€cn tailored to move onc reinforcedmotodzedriflc s€izekey objectives.Due to the difficulty, howcver,of
battalionin a varietyof combatopcrations. In wanine, suppressingair def€nscsin depthandthe desirabilityof
at least one helicopterregirnentmight be assigned to opcratingunder their own suirportinganillery, the
eachSovietfront. Sovietswill oftcn conductheliborneopcrations10-15
knometers forward of thc FEBA. As Soviet helibome
I 75. HiitoricalPsrrpective cxperience,doctrine,andequipmenldcvclop,they may
Ovcr the past lcw years, the Soviet militrry prcssha! opcratedeeper bchindenemylines,with tacticdaif and
publish€d'nany articl€son helibom€opcratioru.These armedhelicopters supplyingsuppressive
fires.
aJticlesdcscribethe US cxperiencc in Vietnam,nd the 177. Equipmeot andTraining
US "tri-Cap" experimcnt. Significantly, thc aiicles arc
,. Typcs oI Soviethclicoptelsarc shownin figures
positivc towardsthe use of helicopteFand generally
82-89.The mostreccntlyd€velopcd Sovi€thelicopteris
glossover the problemsand lin tations of heliborne
the Ml-24 (HIND-A), t}le nost hcavily armedhelicopter
in theworld.
,. Soviethclicoptersare more ruggedand simpler in
176. UtilizationandMissions
dcsignt}tan thcir westernequivalents, havcgoodheary
a. Helicoptermissionsde designedto complementlifi/ruge capabilily,andsomcal-wcathercepability.
Soviet conceptsfor the useof motorized riflc and tank e Thosc motorized rille units rcquircd 10 train
divisionsin achicvinghiShratcs of advance. peIsonnelin hcliborne operationsnormally practicc on
,. We do not know whctherthe Sovietswill acccpl mockups.Bccause the Sovietsaretaughrto beproiicient
thc conceptof largcsoalehelibomc;perations.Curently in fifing their individu, weaponsfrom transports
thcir low h€licopterinventodeswon't allow it, and (whethcrtrucks,APCor helicoptcrs), tiesemockupsare
their tactical employment does not refl€ct a multi located on tuillg rang€sor in otlrcr comba! tmining
missionuscofla.geheliborneelemcnls. arcas.Heliropter rnockupsarc strtiunary or m({ing
c. 'Ih€ typesof missionsmost often mentioncdby gondolas. Fromthcsethesoldiercanfire hb wcaponand
ihe Sovietsforhelibomeopcrations arc: on dnmountins, asraulta n€a6y objective(Fislre 90).
(l) S€izing k€y tenain, particula y during river Soviet open source publications have mcntioned heli-
crorsings andmountainanddescrtoperations. copter training involving soldiersfiring |Iom HIP hcii-
(2) Aiding anphibiousforcesin thc seizureof a copteNat
Sroundtargclsp.ior to landing.The Sovieis
beachlpad. considcr4{ hoursin winter and 24 hoursin summer
(3) Prev€nting llle movcmentof encmyres€rves.sufflcient to dcvelop the nccessaryskills in loadiry
(4) lnserting and withdrrwiry raid and reconnars. combatequipmentand cargoes in helicopters.In addi-
tion, platoonleadersdriU their mcn in embarkingand
(5) Exploitutionof ruclearstrikes. disernbarking iiom helicoptcrs-

lt0
 Figure83. Mi-6 Hook.

Figure82. Mi'4 Hound.

...*.''.'/.

Figure85. Mi 10 Harke.
Figure84. Mi-8Hip

Figure86. lvli-12Homer

111
.-],P|.;..

Figure87. Mi 1 Hare.

Figure88. Mi-2 Hoplite.

112
 TII
'v purH
tz ru! 68ern6u
\
 Figure90. Helicoprermockuptrainingdevice.

178. Ofianse 179. Defense

a. Tlr€molorizednflc comprnynorrnallyoperutes ds a. ln the dcfense.
the hclibornecompany'smssionis
px't of a b,rtihonrn hcliborreoperdrun'. Onc...asion to hold iis position,dclayLhecnemy.andintucr rosses
it may operateindepcndently. Thehelicopters arrivein uponhim, thercbylurtherirgrhc accomplishnent ofthc
thc departurearenwhereequipmentand personnct arc
loaded.After landingthc force in the LZs, thc heli- b- The company's dcfenseis bascdon plaroonstrong
coptersreturnto a safearcr,prcparcfor a secondlift or points and confornrswjth rire defcnsivcpdnciplcs
rclum to theirbasearea. outlinedin previouschaplers.Sincetherewouldbc oily
,. TIle actioff of the force in rhe objcchvcarc!, a limited numbcrof mineswjth rhe company.fiey are
duringthc attack,lnd duringthe rcoqantarionp}-xse plilcedonly on the mosl likely avenuesol approach.
follow normalSovictgroundforcedoctrine. Helicoptersrnaybe usedio enrplaceantilankmines.
.. The bdttaiion!ornnrlldcrnornrrU)r Jrnlan\J a Oncelink-up hrs beenachieved, the unit nounrs
rcinforcednflc plaioonin rcservc. Thc rescrleivouldbe its APCSandcontinues the attack.
gven a concenkrtionpoint uponlandirgandlvouldbe
heldin fcrdincssto mectunforescen contingencies-

I I4
 SectionVIll- NIGHTOPERATIONS

r80. General D. Nght training usualy involves weapons firing,

d. DrJknesshclps 10 conce preprrations for conl movement training. logistics supporl. and prepdation
bat, 10 achicvc surprise and 1(r seize objectives with for offensive operations at dawn. Ni8ht rrainng takes
minimunr losscs.Drkncss also n.rkcs i1 ]nore difficult place infrequently at lorver level (brtr ion and iowet
for the cnemy to identily targcislor nuclearslrikes. and on a small scalc,in spite of a varicty ofexcelcn1
,. NighL operallonsposeproblens for the attackerin night vrsion aids. Although the reason lbr this discrcp-
thc areN ol conlrol rnd weaponsenployment. Because ancy bctwccn doctrine and actual practiceis untnown,
of restrictcd obscrvaiion, targct idcntification, ground rhe folowing may be contributing factorsr
orientatin, and coordindlion with neighboringunits are (l) Reduction in seffice ironr three years 10 two,
colnplicated- Successful night operations thereforc ihereby increasingthe dilficuiry in adequaiclyrraininga
' c r t J r e r r a i n e du o o p . . n e r i c u l o u p
\ repara,ion
of n:en conscnptin night operaiions.
Jrd materiel pdor to commitment, and rhorough (2) The night doctrine itself nray bc unrealistic,
and staied mo.e ar a goai rrther than an achicvedno.m.
.. Ni911 operaLionsarc cha cterized by increascd
reconnaissrnce, grerler conlrol, mor€ detailedcoordinx- 183. Equipmentand Trainins
lion. and tlie extensive use of equipment sucb ds a. Generally.active IR dcvicesde found on irmored
llghiing vehicles,and passivesystemsare incorporared
d A night attack may be an exlension of daylight inlo sonc. Types of survci ance,trrget acquisition,and
o p e r d r i o n \i r r r d p r r u m J i n l a ' n n ^ n e n r u m o r s e i , , e nighl obscrvarion (STANO) devices arc ilustrated in
ob.jectives whch codd not b€ taken dunns daylighl. Thc F i g u r e s9 1 - 9 1 .
Sovi€tsstressthat the t.dnsition fron d,tytighl 1o nighl ,. Nighi observation devicesarc primdrily used in
operationsshould be done without interuption, so thrl company and platoon operations.STANO deviceswil
Itre encmy ir dcnicd thc opporiunily lo reorganizc. play an inportant rolc in offensive ope|ations and in
defensiveoperationsout to lbout one kilomcler beyond
181. Historiel Pe6pective the FLBA.
Durnrg World War Il, fie Soviets used darknessand a nlc Soviet motorized rjllc compnny in a night
othcr conditions of limited visibility for troop attack couid usc a variety of iilunrinationdevices.Flares,
jlumination bombs, artillery flaresand specirl illumina-
movcmcnt, aitack preparation,constfuction of foriifica-
tions rnd rcsupply. Night operationsconsistedofrecon- tion deviceslbr trnks and A?Cshavebccn mentionedin
n{issance,raids. and aliacks in strength of up to a opcn sources.Chiracte.isticsofsomc Sovie1 illLlmination
regimeni. Niglrt rttacks on r largerscrle wcrc cxceptions dcviccsare shownir Fisure 94.
rnd were usually undertakenwhen Sovietunits friled to d. Most night combat training jr conducleo a.
take rn importanl objcctire in a dayligit attack. platoon, company and battalion level. Frmiliarization
wirh STANO equipment is accomplislied at squad
182. Doctrine level, and exercisesof increasingcomplexity conducted
up through battalon level. Ernlhrsis is placed on
d. Cu(enl SovieL doctrinc cmphasizesthat opera
planning night operationsdudng daylight so tlul recon-
tions at night and during othe. conditions of limitcd
naissance, planning,and rehearsals may bc cotnpleted.
visibility are to be considercd nonnal conditions of prcss
e. The Soviet militrry has b€en critic of ihc
combat which conlributc to high rat€s of adlance, ody non-combat night
fact fiat on somc exefcises,
achicvcmcnt ol surprise and reduclion in losscs.Unit
t.rining is conducted,i.e., reorganization,mahtenance,
objectivesar€ as deepas during daylight opcrations.
prcparationsfo. a daylight attack, etc.

115
 Figure9l.lR sightingsystem,modelNSP-2.

Figure92. SovietmodelPPN-2lR sightingsystem.

116
I

Figure93. Commander'slR peritelescope

modelTKN-3.

Avg illuminance Radiusof

Designalion Range Period illuminance

26-mmillum cartridge Up to 200 m 7 seconds 120 m

30-mmillum cartridge U p t o 5 0 0m 9 seconds 200m
50 mm illum cartridge 8 0 0 ' r 2 0 0m 300 m
120-mmillum 100 - 5300m 40 seconds Up ro 600 m
mortar cartridge
Air droppedflares NA 6 minutes Ovcr1,500m

Figur€94. Charactennicsofsome illuminationdevices.

It7
184. Offeffe illuminatedlape to aid in mLltualjdentificationand
a. Ge erul. The mototizedrifle companymay attack control.The compmycommandcr assicns eachplaloon
indepcndcnrlyl night,but normallyit attacksasparl of irs own color. A pocket flasl ilht fast€ned on the
the battaliondismounted, in oneechelon.In orderto iid individual's back identifies his unit. white arm bmds
commandand control the altrck is made withoul (black in winter on white unif{rms) oo personnel and
complicaledmancuvcr- The comFny is nomally rein' whitc luninous cncles, squares or dianloods on the sides
lorcedwrth armor.id'jle'y ,nLl/ormnrtars. enginccr,of APCSand tanksprovidefor rccognition ofonc\ unit.
andchemical units(Figure 95)- Movem€nt routcs ,nd passases tluough mineficlds are
b. Trpes of Night Attact Tbe night attack nay bc marked.
supportcd or ur$upporled, illuminated or non. (3) Ihe companycomm.rnder formrialcsa night
iltuminatcd.Normdly it \yill be launchedaftcr an vhion dcvice and illumhltion plan. Within tllc company,
anillery prcparadon md wi]l involveextensiveusc of illumination b cdrried out by rocket and iuuninxring
illuminationto cxposcenemypositions. flar€s uscd by designated teams. Sign l flares and lracer
c. Prcpafation hr Niglx Cotnbat. Due to the in. amrnunition nre used for target identificaLion md
creasedco cxlty of night operations,the conrpany coordination, and to mark phise lines lcached by the
comnrandcrlakcs a numbe. of nreasures to cnsurc platoons. Night vision equipmenl used during tie
conlrol of his unit andaccomplishment of his mission. approach rd berween pcriuJs ,,f lunlm!riun i5 prc-
(l) To xid in navieation,he desiSnates a lcad planncd.
platoon for lhc conpmy. Withi. eachplatoona lend (4) thc conpmy conmanderand platoonleaders
squadis dcsignatcd by tlle platoon leader,a5 wcll .s check for propcrfunctioninSof nightvisiondevices.nd
individuals who monitorthe directionofmovemcntand the inlernal and externalvehicularlightingsystensitr
rcpon any dcviationfron the assigned dtcction to the the assernbly rea prior to thc attack.
(5) Thc cornpanycornnanderstudicsrhe terrain
(2) In additionto th€ uscof radioandmessengers. in detail, .eco.noiters,sclectsplatoon zon€sfor thc
use b madeof a larictv of o&er signaldevicesand advance, designates platoonobjcctivcs, rssignsrcfcrcncc

Figure95. lvlotorizedriflecompanyin a night attack.

ll8
I
points identifiable at nighr, inslrucis guidcsand coordi (2) Du.ing the night battle, the conpany com-
nateswith attachedand supportingunils. mander is ded to the possibility of enemy counter
d Al1ack Formationsand Objcctivcs. attack, particularly dudng the consolidation phaseand
(l) Ifenemy resistance is light. thc motorizcd ril1c the batile beyond ihe FEBA. Reconnaissanceand
comprny nray attack mounted or on the back of secuity, especidllyon the fldtrks, is emphdsized.When
attached tanks. Mor€ common. however, wiil be ihe attackedby supefiof enemy forcesdurins consolidation,
dismounted atiack. The company normally attacks on the company attempts to d€stroythe enemy by firc and
line $ith no.eseNe wlrile the battalion usualy maintains subsequentlyby attack on the flanks and rear.Should a
a company in reseNe. The attack frontages for tlle counterattack be launched dudng the pursuit, thc
company afe generally the same ai during daylight motorizcd nne company dcfcals it from the maJch,
operationsand dependprimarily upon lhe nature ofdre thereby ensudng a high rate of advancc.Duing both
terfain and wheiher of not nuciear weaponsare used. tyles of counterattrck, intensive nighl iilunination is
Fof the cotnpany attack over very rugged terrarn rn
non-nuclearconditions, fie frontageis slightly reduced
I Trunsition ffom Night to Day OperatioN. The
(400 to s00 mcicrs). overriding pdnciple in th€ transirion from night to day
(2) ln hilly and woodcd tcrain whcn nuclcar operalionsb continuity oI the offensive-Before dawn,
weapons aJe not used, the depth ol tnc comprny ddditional tasks are ,llocated to the attacking com-
objectivenormrly is fronr one to one and one-hrlf km. panies,arnmunition is rcplenisltd. and measufestakcn
In nore favorable terruin md wilh the use of nuclerr to protecl th€ lroops from enemy use of nuclcar
weapons,thc dcp$ is incrcascd. wcapons.The ballalion reserve,ifnot connitted during
c- Conduct of thc Arlack the right is pfepared for comnritment to maintain the
I (1) Pnor 10 the assault,the comprny atiempts 10 momcntum ol thc atlack. Rcconnaissancc
c a p r u r rn r J e \ l r i ) e n e T ) u u r p u : r J. n J ' F . o n n J r s $ n c .Anliancrall defense dnd cdnoufl€e
is intcnsified.

clenrents by surprise, without opening fire. Obstxcles increasedwith the approachof daylight. Pu|suit begins
rcconnoitcredby dayiighl are destroyedby specialunits prior to dayiight with additional instructions io con-
iusi bclbrc il}c assault.Thc company bcginsthe assault paniesand platoonsbeingissuedduring the nurch.
rt a prcdcsi$atcd tnne, usualy prcccded by adillery
and lnortar fire- Platoonsnonnally assaultofl iine. The 185. Defense
assault forces move forward without stopping, over
rundng their objeclives and vigorously developingthe a. Gencral. Thc dcfcnder nay have an advantagc,
artack in depth- The direction of the attack is because he has had lhe oppoftunity lo organizelns
pcriodicaly rnalked during the course of the battle by position, to preparetue plans,and lo cstablishbarners
aircraft, artilery. and rnorars utilizing illundnating alons iikely avenuesof approach.fte defend€rknows
his location while the attacker may experienceorienta-
amnunirion- To achieve greater coordination and
tion problen1s.The defender, howevef. is hindered by
mutual suppot, the attacled tanks nonnally attack
the frct that darknessrcducestie effeclivenessof ainred
within the combal formations of the platoons.However
if the enemy\ rntitank means have been effectively fire ds weli ar observrtion rrd reconnaissrnce.When
possible, unit begins its defensive phnning and
suppressed and if there is nrtensiveground ilumination, "
ihc ianks attack slightly ahcad of the nfmtry. After the organization during daytight.
,- T1l€ Chdngeoler fron1 Duy to Night Defense.Two
enemy defenseshave been olercome, personnelcarriers
rrc calcd forward to support ihc pursuit or to take parl major considerations in lhe chmgcovcr from day to
night delense are secu.jty xnd illumination. Listening
h the reorganizationof the company's new defensive
posilions. Should lhc assault tuil, thc company con- posts are organizcd and obscrvation of th€ enemy's
h I n l e r \ r r e J s , , l h a l , l e p o 5 s i b i L l )o f s u r f r i s e
solidates on the most forward posilion reached. T]le a f r r v j r e .
is reduccd. Wiihin thc platoons,additional observersare
company withdraws fronr this posjtion only on order of
detailed to keep obstaclesand concealedapproachcs
the batl.lion corrmander.

119
 under observation. Patrollbgis increased. Weapons are (2) The company'snighl visiondevicesare uscd
preparedduring daylightfor nighl fuing and drta arc extensively, with primaryand alternrtepositionsbeing
compiledfor propcr use of all wcrpons.Crew-servcddesignatcd for every weaponwith m inJrarcddevice.
weaponswhose positions were exposedduring daylight Coordinationbetwecninfraredspotlightand illumina-
are trmsfenedto altematepositions.Light dd sound tion posts,andproccdures to b€ folowcd for individual
signahare established and signalproccduresfor thc and group target detcction are established.Roving
controlof fifes disseminated. Tracerrouddsand shella. ilumination posts,dummygun positionsind simulated
flarcsand other meansof illumination areissucd. infrar€d sighb ar€ eslablishedin orde. to mislcad the
.: Forwird DefensePosturc. In the night dcfcnse, enemyasto the actualprovisionsfor night defense.
tanks,antitankguns,and rhe batialionrcserve(s€cond e. Organizationof thc Defense
echelon)are normdly movedcloserto tlrc FEBA to (l) Organization of tne night defensivcposition
incrcaic the density of fire in front of the FEBA. may bc done underdiffcrentcircumstances; the com-
Mcther the entire battalion r€servei5 mov€d forward pany may or may not be ableto prepaftits def€nse
dcpcndsupon the situation. The cornmandermost weigh duringdaylighthours.If the companymustprepareits
the dangerof pr€scntingr better iarSetfor eremy defenses duringa periodof poor visibility,the task is
nuclear flres apinst the necessityto hav€ adequalc rnoredifficult. In sucha situation,emphnsis is placedon
combat powcr forward to repel attack. Basically,thc stepp€d-upreconnaiss.rncc, us€of illumination andnight
batialioncommander must decidewh€therto position vision means,andon continousobservalion.The defense
his sccondechelonGeserve) in a counterattack posture is organizcdaccordingto the principlcsoullined in
or for fum retenrionof terrdn behindthc FEBA. If he chaptcr2. Frontages and dcpthsof defendingplatoons
dccideson ihc former,the sccond€chelonGescnc)is and compdnicsar€ approxima.ely the same as during
moved forward prior to darknessinro a concentation daylight operanons.The battalion second cchelon
area favombl€for launchingcountcrattacks. Countcr. (resewc)however,is normdllyup closerto the forward
attrck routesarc preparedduringdaylighthoun. lfhe
dccideson the lattcr, the battulion cornmanderpositions (2) \lhen the companyhasorganizcdits defensivc
his secondechelon(rescrvc)on favorableterrain astride position during daylighl houn, prepaJrtion cent€rson
thc arcaofpossibleenemypenetration. the transition from day ao nidt combal. Daylighl
d. I umination preparation alows for the improvement of theoccupied
(1.) The company corcmander prepares his position and for chmgcs in thc defensivealignment
ilunination plan in accordance with guidance from the (Figurc96).
battalion conmander.Th€ plan includesmea.sules 10: (3) Tte cotnpany commander'sinstructions,
(a) Iluminateth€ sector. issuedto his subordinatesin the form of an operations
O) Blindthe attackingenemy. orderor separate instructions, encompass the following:
(c) ht€rrnine rnutualrecognition signals. (a.) Analysisof possibleenemynight actions,
(d) ldcntiry friendly positionsas well astarget (b) Cornpletiontime for the night dcfcnsive
idcntificationandcontrolof fires.
To accomplish thesetask, illuminationpostsareestab. (c) Designaiionof rccomaissance, raid and
lished within the company perim€ter. Thcrc are
nomally three two-rnar posts pff company, although (d) Method of employmcnt of night vision
this numbcr increasesin forcsted and mountainous devices andi umination.
icrrain.Thesepostsarelocaledfrom 4060 metenapart (e) D€signation of nightreference points.
and all so situated as to provide full illumination (0 hocedurcs for preparingweaponsfor night
coveragewhcn ordered by tlrc superior conmander. operations,and n€cessary chang€sin the fire plan.
Incendiary and tlE rouds may be uscd to start frcs (g) Measuresto conbat fires within the defen-
forwardof th€ FEBAandb€hindthc attackirgtmopsin
orderto silhoucttethem.

t20
I o
/ o,.
.7
^) lX
t F
POSTTTON

#o),",",*1.*'"" c
to

=.)Y fl
\ J / {PLUS
I T A N K P_Tt
LTT

\ .il

:\\ i,,cII
'<-{o) :e-^\ \ te Y.
*\( {

lsl$l \z-*l---A
,r'. 113JP.,-.,
--1
i

i;--;'z
$)V/-"**#'''
9/
JiJ$
//
rPLUs
I TANKPIn *,
14- lttttt*r^"_
)az
JV {

{
h{'i*q
-', +l
\;ro^ /
J
1
^
':\=/----16) -

du""'
r€\
-\Q!-,/rmt rarx etr

-Y / >tt'o itTtoN
"ot't'o"
IMINUSlSTPLTI

l S T P L T / 3 F DC O

{!!
€ APC

A
O
r nockevlbrepGr
A ."n",'on"'o
oo.'

d I commsndob.ryarcn Post
<-9 neconneisnceputot ,\ {ro be occupied
Oeiensiveposilion

\@
u,sr""insp".r
-o< Combarvehaclewith anlitant misilB

Figure96. Possiblechang€sin the night de{ensivesvstemof a motorizedriflebattal'on

7 t21
 (h) Protective neasures a8ainst weapons of
(i) Recognition,control and warningsignals.
0) camouflaseproc€dures.
(k) Irgistic support.proccdurcs.
(l) Procedurcs for changing fron a nighl
dcfcnscto daylight operations.
i Conduct of the Defense.Enemy patrol activity,
pariicularlyrecomaissance, h expectedto precedethc
mah attack. Th*e forcesare engagedin such a way as
to mask the nature of the defeosiveposition. Onty a
poriion of the availableweaponsare usedto rcpel enemy
probes,wfine the entne defensivesysterDis broughtto a
ful state of rcadiness.Thc coordinatcd use of night
vision devices and ilumination provides increased
surveillanceand obseNationof the batde area.Efforts
aremadeto captureindividualen€mypatfolmembels it
o.der to leam the enemyplan of attack.As the main
enemy force launchesits attack, supportingfires are
concentratedto break up the attack. Nght visiondevices
and illumination rnak€it possibleto engageener.y tanks
and infantry at rangesin excessof 400 .neters. At a
rangeof approxirnatcly150 mctcrs,cvcry cffort js made
t22
to separateenemy infanty from tanks. In order to
silhouettethe attackers,fires are startedbehindthen
by an ,rrd artillery strikes. Every effort is rnade to
destroy the atlacker bcfore hc penetratesthe defensiv€
position. Should tlrc enemyeffect a penetration,flaflk-
ing positions are held tenaciouslyand a strong effort is
rnadeto prcvent the enernyfrom enlargingthe penetra-
tion. Counterattacks are laun€hed by battalion or
regimentin mcordancewith thc ovcral defenseplan. In
accordancewith the conpbntics of night fighting, the
counterattackis norrnaly launchedin on€ echelonwith
a shalow objcctive- Upon climhation of the pen€tra-
tion, consolidationtakes place and efforts are madeto
repclthc cxpcctcdcncmycountenttack.
& Trdisition frorn Night to Day DefensiveOpera-
tions. The companycorrunandcrplansfor the transition
from night to day defenseand carricsout the n€cessary
adjustnentsin his positionsprior to dayLighi.Casualties
are evacuated,,rnrnunition rcplcnished,and personnel
fed duringdarkness.To counterthe dangerof the €nemy
enploying nuclear st.ikes prior to rcsuminghis atiack,
camouflageand deception measuresare employed and
protectivemeasures taken.
 APPENDIX
I LISTOF SYIVEOLS

a -i- rr$ols.re numerousand desc prive.r

G UNITS

,<---{-- Mobrized dfle platoon in m8'ch column

-- tcommand tevet'sdpndted bv ho'izonrrt b3r3J

-ra /b aftde laun.her

Mororized fle platoon in rh. anrck
3
O + O v.r-""d '€nroreo ovd.G
/.-*--\nth.ihi.| "r,".ompa.v
-r grned missile

+a rL-n6e --j- *'e ptaloonn rhed€f.ns6

"--""0

- --.r.d anrianc,arr
sun Fe.onnaisance panol {trofi a lank or
motorized rifle unnl

+ - drbwnh anin.nk missiles

--ilra gi-,wiu€,

IICTq DNECTIONOF FIRE "+-+O- Tank company on the m.rch

)'--'""

- --r .rerion of fte

MORTAA/ARTILLERY/AAA
_ _ _ l_qiory dnecrion o, tue

!tiicLEs
ffi!- Adirerybararionon th€ maEh
-l ^'.'
-C ..o-."g o".

o
An lerybatalion in finngposilio.

I
u r"e sa*,ete,ence usea*as SovietArmedForcesM ta'v symbotstU), otA ociober 1970.
'Th€ Sov€rs use four differentsvmbolstor APCS For
simplcitv rhis paiicuar svmbol is used rh.oushourrhe study, and
des'gnates
an APCwirhan amphibious capabrlIy

123
 APPENDIX
I LISTOF SYMEOLS

Delensiveposirio.wirh tush m64soianred

/,T\
\!v
Secrorot a tench wilh a comh!.i.ations
'jlr-"1',"
-*{Ir- AAA baueryon rhe march
rench

lo- o o ol Anri peEonnelminetield

4{fu Arti|ank baueryon rhe march
faJ-..-

BARRAGE/CONCENIRATIONS 15 . o--l Mired minefieldiami.p.rennel and .nri rankt

Passe $rough an rEa

_-__Y_
o I P a s a q et h r o u s h
d m i r d dm i n e f i e l d
% l------
. ola
{Jdipeenne and anrr6nkr

SOUNDARIE.
tanko.motoi?ed lle tte
A@* ot con.€nrrated

-r
-L Bete.encepoinr lor adillery tne

ru' --\-r
Comm.nd/Ob6eruarionposls Resimenrar
boundary

d_-----f-f
A DivGionboundary

MISCELLANEOUS
Pldtoonleaderscommandposr

6 "*.."_..-*,
cdmmandposl
Codpanycommander's

r comm€ndposl
Batrelioncommander's

A
STRUCTURES/OBSTACLES

88888ts889Bu,rd,ns
s
*---r
- t-rr\

@l
t24
 Appendixll. A TYPE OF CAREERPATTERN lN BASICCOMBATDUTY lN PEACETIME

SOVIETOFFICERPERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT_GROUND
FORCES

Position Timcrn
Asslgnment Rank
(Yeas) Agc

Plalooncommand€r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 LT/SRLT 2t-25

Deputy CompanyCornmrndcr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 SRLT 25-28
C o m p a nCyo r n r n a n d. e
. .r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 CPT 28-32
DeputyB.ttalionComrnandcr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 MAJ
Battalion Commrnder..., . , , , , , . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , .4 LTC 35-39
DeputyR€Simentd Commandcr or
Regimcntal chiefof sraff. . .. . . .,. . ... ... . . .. .3 LTC 3942
Regimental Commander .. . . . .. . . .. . -, -. .. . . . . . .5 coL 4247
TOTAL 25

Polsible Schooling;

CPT/MAJ.. . - . J r A d v a n c eCdo u r s e
MAJ/LTC.. ...Sr Advance Cdo u n e
CPT/MAJ/LTC ... Branch Acadcmy
COL/MAJ-GEN . . MilitaryAcadcmyof
thc Ccncnl Staff

Minimum Timein-Grde Requirementsfor Promotion to Next Grade:

LT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Years
sRLT.................................3Yean
CPT....... -...,............... -.......4 Years
MAJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . .4 Years
LTC ... -. -. -................ -,........5 years
Minimum lime-in-glad€ requiremenb for thc rank of
COL and aboveare not cstablished.

Maximum Age for Active Military Servicoby Rank:

U e u t c n a n. t. s. - . . . - . . . , . . . , . . , . - . - . - - - - - . . . . 4 0
C a p t a i n. s. . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . - . - - . . . - . . . . . . 4 0
M a j o r.s. . , . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -..............45
L i e u t e n aCnot l o n e l-s. . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . - - . . . . . . 4 5
C o l o n e l. s- . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . -......50
Generakto
L i e u t c n acnetn e r a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . - . . . . . . 5 5
Colon€lGenenlsard abov€ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60
Mavjmum agesmay be exlcndcd in individunl cascsby
orderofthe CouncilofMinistersot $e U.S.S.X

Source: DIA lnte igence Study (C) "Soviet Offic€r

PersonnelManagement GroundForces"(U) July 1974
 Appendixlll. OFFICEBAGE LIM|TAT|ONS{

MILITARY ACTIVEDUTY tst Class RESERVE

R-ANK 2nd Class 3rd Class
New Old New Old New Old New Old
lnw l-aw l,aw I-aw Law l,aw Law hw
Junior Lt and Lt 40 30 40 40 4s 50 50 55
SeniorLt 40 35 45 45 50 55 55 60

Captain 40 40 45 50 50 55 55 60
Major 4s 40 45 50 50 55 55 60
Lr Colonel 45 45 50 50 55 55 60 60

Colonel 50 45 55 50 None 55 60 60

Major Generar 55 55 60 Non€ None 65

Lt G€neral 55 60 60 60 None None 65 65

S€niorc€ftrals 60 60 None 60 Nonc None

andMarsbrls
LIMITS NOT ESTABLISHED
Services

+SOURCE: Vyacheslsv
P. Artemie', "Soyie,trlititoy Satice Obtiganos," Infantry, Septect | 19681D.42.

127
o
DISTRIBUTION

DOD AND JOINI AGENCIES 8597 DtA/DlR lcl AIR FORCE

8615 DIA/DIN-2C
A0l0 AFS COL 1J122 DIA/DIR58 EOI6 AFIS/INC
B13t DLA/DS4B4 (LrB)(5) EIO? AF/RDXTR.W
DIF NACLIJiR A(;CY 8187 D I A / D I R! F 3 AIO8 AF/RDXTR{
A065 N T DtrF UNIVI]RSITY 8825 DIA/DIR4C3 D046 ?602ArG/rNXE
At04 OASD INI 8362 DTA/DIRIBl [054 AF/INAKB
Al15 OASD ISA 8363 DTA/DIRIB2 [100 TAi{ (9THT|S/LDD)(3)
8364 DIA/DIR.IB3 E2OO AAC
A175 "i:! :1'"s !s63 DIA/DIR-IB5(PENT)(2) tr303 AIj/INAP
A300 JCS ts575 DIA/DIR-I E4O8 AFWL
4315 JCS/S,ACA(2) 85?6 DIA/DIR1,\ E411 ASD/FTD/DTID
,t325 JCS/J3 8582 DIA/DTR1C E429 SAMSO0ND)
A335 rcs/J4 8734 DIA/DTR5E E436 AIIWC (SUR)
4340 tcs/J-sl!flLsEc l]711 DrA/DIN-IBl E451 AUL/LSI
A033 ASSTTO D}:}SECDEF 8855 USDAOAUSTRIA E500 TECITTNCCtrN/TINXL
A100 osD 8856 USDAOBELCIUM E4l0 ADTC
A096 NEACI 8859 USDAOBULGARIA
DIA GR? .TN]ICC 8862 USDAOCANADA U & S COMMA.\DS
,{361 USLO S CLANT B87l USDAOCZECHOSI-OV,{.(IA
4362 USDOCOLANDSOtrAST ]]412 USDAODT'IIMAR( c00s ctNcAD
A363 USNI1RSHA}L !876 IJSD,\OENCLAND
A368 USR]\'ClNATO 8878 USDAOFINLAND HOO5 USCINCI]UR
A835 US T'IL LN TISNGF:R BII79 USDAOFRANCI.] II010 soTFtriJ 3)

o A9t6 B88O
8882
8886
8893
USDAOGI:RIIIANY
USDAOGREECL
USDAO
USDAO
HUNGARY
ITALY
1t101
EOO?

]5]5
usAFE49?RTG(tRC)
SILKPURSE

FICDURLANT
ts040 DI /SC2 (DI0)(2) B9O8 USDAONETHERLANDS J5I? CIINAVSUR|LANT
!055 DIA/DT4B 8912 USDAONORWAY ,,99I TITCLANT
0080 DrA/SWS B9I'1 USDAOPOLAND
B t3 2 D I A / D f li E9I8 USDAOIORTUGAL K005 ctNcP c
BI34 DIA/DD2 B9I9 USDAOROII NIA K020 cotltusTDc
BI59 D I A / D TI A 1 I]93] USDAOTURXEY (1OO PACAF548 RTC
ts162 DIA/DT1A2 ts934 USDAOUSSR K300 rrAc(coDErc-L)
8169 DIA/DT2D A939 USDAOYUGOSLAVIA (5OO CINCPACFLT
8485 DII/IS K515 CONSEVtrNTHFLT
0545 DIA/DI (650 COIINAVSURFTAC
8565 DIA/DIR-IFI Dl]33 K619 FLTCORGRUI
STRATANALSUPICRU
8566 DIA/DIR.IF2 D150 CrrC0NT) (2)
B5?I DIA/DIR4GI DJ59 LO4O SAC544THARTW
NAVAIRDEVCEN
B5?3 DIA/DIR4EI D2O2 NAV1VARCOL
B5?4 DIA/DIR4C5 D2I7 NOOs USRtrDCOM
NA1NWNCEN
8579 DI /DIB 2B2 D249 NAVICSCOL
8580 DIA/DIR1C3(0t0) D280 0?{98D OTHDR
858I DIA/DIR,]B D492 NAVSCOLEOII
8583 DIA/DIR.1D DsO? CONIINI]WARCOM 1055 crA/cRs/ADD/SR(14)
!584 Dr /DrR 184{20) D900 NFOI0 ?085 STATtr(5)
B59t DIA/DIR-IIt D91\ O?-009F ?090 NsA (5)
8585 DLA/DIR.IE D972 0P-009lrIP
8586 DIA/DIR.4DI NAVPHIISCOL RI45 ACDA
DO32
!593 DIA/DIR1C2 D496 DrR SSPO
8594 DrI/DrR 1r (2) D8l4 1 2N D SO3O FRDLI} OFCONG

t29