US embassy cables: Russia tries to block

Viktor Bout's extradition

guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 21.30 GMT

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Friday, 13 February 2009, 10:19

S E C R E T BANGKOK 000385
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS PTER, KCRM, TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT AND DEFENSE
MINISTER
ON VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
The US ambassador to Thailand meets the Thai prime minister to discuss concerns
that Russian supporters of the arms trafficker Viktor Bout are trying to prevent his
extradition to America. Key passages highlighted in yellow

Read related article

1. (S) Summary. During a February 12 meeting, the Ambassador raised with Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning Russian
international arms trafficker Viktor Bout and serious concerns that Bout's associates
had been able to influence testimony given by [xxxxxxxxxx]. Abhisit told the
Ambassador that he would address any "irregularities" in the case through
"appropriate channels." The Ambassador also raised USG concerns with the xxxxxxxxx
testimony during a February 13 introductory call with Defense Minister Prawit
Wongsuwan. Prawit committed to looking into the testimony in order to determine
the truth.

2. (S) Comment. Since Viktor Bout's arrest in Bangkok almost a year ago, moving
towards a successful extradition to the United States has been at the top of our
bilateral agenda here. In addition to Embassy efforts over the months, President Bush
raised it with then-Prime Minister Samak during his August 2008 visit to Bangkok.
Overall, our sense has been that while the extradition proceedings have been painfully
slow (and have required constant nurturing by our DOJ and DEA personnel every step
of the way), they are moving in the direction we want. Lately, however, there have been
disturbing indications that Bout's xxxxxxxxxx and Russian supporters have been using
money and influence in an attempt to block extradition. The most egregious example
was the false testimony of xxxxxxxxxx that Bout was in Thailand as part of government-
to-government submarine deal. Thus, we felt it was time to once again raise the matter
at the top of the government and make clear that, while we understand the judicial
process must take its course without political interference, we insist that the process
be free of corruption and undue influence. We will continue to do so in the months
ahead. We understand AG Holder may soon call the Thai AG to review the case (as
previous AG Mukasey did three times in addition to his visit to Bangkok last summer).
Combined with our efforts this week, the call will make for an important one-two
punch. End Summary and Comment.

ABHISIT PROMISES TO LOOK INTO IRREGULARITIES IN BOUT CASE

--------------------------------------------- ------------

3. (S) During a February 12 meeting at the Parliament, the Ambassador raised with
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the ongoing extradition case concerning international
arms trafficker Viktor Bout. (Note: Bout faces terrorism-related charges in federal
court in New York for conspiring to sell millions of dollars of weapons to the FARC for
use in killing Americans. He has remained in custody in Bangkok since his arrest on
March 6, 2008. End note.) The Ambassador noted that, while the U.S. and Thailand
enjoy a strong extradition relationship, our countries must ensure that the bilateral
extradition treaty worked in our most important cases, such as those involving
terrorism. In this regard, the Ambassador emphasized to Abhisit that the extradition
case against Bout is a high priority for the United States. Citing the United Nations'
sanctions against Bout, the Ambassador also noted that the extradition case is one of
global importance. Abhisit told that Ambassador that he believed that his office had
limited means to affect ongoing extradition proceedings, stating that the judicial
system was designed to afford due process to the parties and expressing an
unwillingness to be seen as "overruling" this process, or "helping one side."

4. (S) Expressing growing concern about the extradition proceedings, the Ambassador
then described evidence showing that the extradition proceedings against Bout have
become tainted as a result of the efforts by Bout's associates to bribe Thai officials. In
particular, the Ambassador detailed false testimony on Bout's behalf from xxxxxxxxxx
to the effect that Bout came to Thailand to conduct official business with the Thai
government relating to a submarine project; recorded statements by a Thai associate
of Bout that he had procured xxxxxxxxxx to testify on Bout's behalf; evidence of
bribery schemes gathered throughout the world; and a scheme to arrest and thereby
embarrass two U.S. diplomats - i.e., DEA agents assigned to the Bout investigation -
on meritless charges of participating in illegal recordings of Bout on the day of his
arrest. If the xxxxxxxxxxxx false testimony remained

unrebutted, the court could possibly deny extradition based on an erroneous

conclusion that RTG had legitimate dealings with Bout, a U.N.-sanctioned arms
trafficker.

5. (S) In light of this evidence, the Ambassador asked the Prime Minster to take steps
to ensure that the proceedings in Bout's extradition case were free from the taint of
bribery and corruption. In particular, the Ambassador suggested that testimony from
an authoritative witness from the Royal Thai Navy or the Ministry of Defense should
be offered to repudiate the xxxxxxxxxx statement and make clear that the RTG
supports the extradition request. The Ambassador also reminded the PM of the recent
case of Jamshid Ghassemi, in which the Thai authorities denied a U.S. extradition
request under apparent pressure from Iran, and stressed the importance of avoiding a
similar result here. (Note: Ghassemi is under indictment in San Diego for violations of
the Arms Export Control Act and money laundering relating to his conspiracy to
acquire accelerometers used in missile navigation. End note.) The Ambassador also
stated that Thailand's failure to ensure an extradition process in Bout that is free from
corruption and undue influence would constitute a major setback to the bilateral
relations between the U.S. and Thailand, especially in the area of law enforcement.

6. (S) After listening to the evidence provided by the Ambassador suggesting that
bribery had infected the Bout proceedings, Abhisit committed to addressing any
"irregularities" in the extradition case through the "appropriate channels." At the
conclusion of the meeting, the Prime Minister sought the identity of the individuals
involved in the bribery schemes, and the DOJ Attache, who accompanied the
Ambassador to the meeting, supplied an aide to the PM with the requested
information.

DEFENSE MINISTER COMMITS TO LOOKING INTO TESTIMONY

--------------------------------------------- -----

7. (S) During a February 13 introductory call, the Ambassador highlighted to Minister

of Defense Prawit Wongsuwan the importance the USG places on the Bout extradition
proceedings. The Ambassador noted that the USG understood that extradition cases
take time and that the USG respected the Thai judicial system, but we were concerned
about efforts by Bout to improperly influence the proceedings. Of particular concern
was the false testimony by xxxxxxxxx the Ambassador told Prawit. Thexxxxxxxxxx
testimony was not true and, as such, it was very important that the Thai Navy or the
Ministry of Defense correct this falsehood with testimony to the court. Doing so would
ensure that the proceedings were kept on track and would publicly clarify that the Thai
military was not associated with a U.N.-sanctioned arms trafficker. Prawit told the
Ambassador that he was unfamiliar with the case but that he would give priority to
looking into the issue to determine the truth regarding the testimony ofxxxxxxxxx. The
Defense Minister also committed to examining a non-paper with more details on the
testimony of xxxxxxxxxxx that the DOJ Attache provided to an aide to Prawit. JOHN

guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2010

US embassy cables: Obama urged to
phone Thai PM over Viktor Bout's
extradition
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 21.30 GMT

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Thursday, 13 August 2009, 09:18

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 001998
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER
EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2019
TAGS PTER, KCRM, TH, RS">RS, CO
SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS ON THE VIKTOR BOUT EXTRADITION CASE IN
THE WAKE OF LOWER COURT DEFEAT
REF: BANGKOK 385 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Summary
After a Thai court rejects America's request to extradite arms smuggler Viktor Bout,
the US ambassador to Bangkok suggests that President Barack Obama phone the Thai
prime minister to express his concerns. America appeals against the ruling. Key
passages highlighted in yellow
Read related article

1. (C) Summary and comment. The disappointing August 11 Thai Lower Court ruling
against the extradition of Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout, and its dubious legal
reasoning, requires a multi-pronged effort to seek a successful reversal during the
appeals process. The lead judge's foray into foreign policy, rejecting the terrorism label
and in effect embracing the FARC's activities as purely political in nature, not criminal
or acts of terrorism, has implications for Thailand. His confusion of the "dual
criminality" concept with jurisdictional issues similarly raises questions for efforts by
Thailand to extradite fugitive former PM Thaksin to face justice. The Embassy is
working with Thai authorities to file an appeal of the lower court's ruling and to press
home the implications of the court ruling were Bout to walk free. In the early
afternoon on August 13, we were assured that the notice of intention to appeal has
been filed.

2. (C) At the same time, the Embassy recommends the State Department, Attorney
General Holder, and the US Mission to the UN in New York engage the Thai
Ambassador in Washington and the Thai PermRep in New York in parallel. In addition,
the Department should seriously consider asking Belgium, which issued an arrest
warrant for Bout in 2002 for money laundering and conspiracy, Colombia, in the case
of the FARC, and African countries which have suffered greatly from Bout's arms trade
in the past to weigh in with the RTG. Finally, we recommend consideration of laying
down a marker in Moscow about Bout, looking forward to the possibility that Bout
may end up back in Russia were the appeal of the Lower Court ruling might not
succeed. End Summary and comment.

Thai Lower Court rules against Bout extradition

--------------------------------------------- --

3. (C) On August 11, the judge in the Viktor Bout extradition case ruled against U.S. and
Thai government efforts to extradite Bout to the United States. Two key elements of
his reasoning were: that the FARC in Colombia, to which Bout was conspiring to send
weapons, was a political rather than a terrorist group; and that the "dual criminality"
standard of our extradition treaty with Thailand had not been met since Bout could not
be prosecuted in Thailand on the charges which the U.S. wants him to face in the U.S.
In our view, the judge was wrong on both counts.

4. (C) After the verdict, as the Department has seen, the DCM spoke on the record to
press outside the court room and expressed disappointment and mystification over the
ruling and stated that we would fully support RTG efforts to appeal the decision. We
have continued the same themes in subsequent interactions with the press.

Engaging the Thai immediately

-----------------------------

5. (C) The Ambassador called Foreign Minister Kasit immediately after the verdict on
August 11 and expressed deep disappointment, noting that the verdict was not justified
on legal grounds and that the judge had clearly been in error on several key points. He
reminded Kasit that over the past year and a half since Bout's arrest in Bangkok, the
USG had repeatedly underlined the importance of the case, all the way up to the
Secretary of State and POTUS levels. In the short-term, the Ambassador told Kasit, we
need the Foreign Ministry to do its part in forwarding the necessary documentation to
the Attorney-General's office so that the intent to appeal can be filed in the requisite
forty-eight hours. (Note: Although the court's ruling and a new extradition law specify
that the appeal must be filed within 72 hours, the applicable extradition law sets forth
the shorter time frame, which we have followed.) Kasit assured the Ambassador that
he had already instructed his legal department to do so. The Ambassador also told
Kasit that we

BANGKOK 00001998 002 OF 004

expected Bout would remain in detention during the appeals process. The MFA's Legal
and Treaties Department faxed the Attorney General's office late evening August 11
supporting the appeal; at the request of the Office of the Attorney General, the
Embassy sent a diplomatic note to the MFA and the OAG on August 13 requesting that
the RTG appeal the lower court verdict prior to the forty-eight hour deadline (note:
the RTG was closed August 12 for a National Holiday, the Queen's Birthday.) At
approximately 1:25 p.m. on August 13, the MFA and OAG advised the Embassy that the
requisite notice of intention to appeal had been filed and received by the court.

Next steps

----------

6. (C) The Embassy's "Bout team" met August 13 to review next steps that will help us
prevail on appeal. Our immediate priority was to ensure that the notice of intent to
appeal was filed on time (within 48 hours of the verdict) and that the appeal itself is
filed within thirty days of the verdict.

7. (C) We will make clear to the RTG that we expect Bout to remain incarcerated
during the appeals process, as specified under Thai law and the August 11 court ruling.
Given that the same judge will rule on any bail motions brought by Bout (we expect
Bout's attorneys to push hard on bail), however, his custody status during the pendency
of the appeal is a genuine concern. We also intend to make clear to the Thai
government (the Ambassador is seeking to call FM Kasit, in Malaysia August 13-14 on
a working visit, and will engage the highest available MFA official in Bangkok) that we
expect this deficient ruling to receive a comprehensive and meaningful review by the
appellate court. Moreover, the Ambassador plans to tell Kasit and other senior Thai
officials that, given that the Thai government arrested Bout and sought his extradition
to the U.S., the Thai government should be as alarmed by the judge's ruling as we are.
Therefore, we would encourage the RTG to issue a public statement expressing
disappointment in the judge's decision, its intention to win on appeal, and a reiteration
of Thailand's commitment to both the struggle against international terrorism and to
its extensive law enforcement relationship with the United States. The Ambassador
intends to make similar points to newly appointed NSC Secretary General Tawee and
to key figures at the Palace. Without being counter-productively heavy-handed, we will
make clear that we see Thai executive branch reaction to the ruling as a test of the
relationship.

8. (C) At the same time, however, we believe it is important to remember that our
partners in the Royal Thai Police, the Office of the Attorney General, the Foreign
Ministry, and even the Royal Thai Navy, largely did everything we asked them to do on
the Bout case, including going the extra mile to facilitate our requests. Our posture and
actions thus should make clear that we are disappointed with the judge's ruling but not
with Thai government cooperation in the Bout case.

9. (C) That said, coming on the heels of the September 2008 Thai appellate ruling
affirming a lower court's denial of our request to extradite Iranian Jamshid Ghassemi,
who was in Thailand to procure controlled technology in violation of the Arms Export
Control Act, the question has to be asked whether we can count on the Thai courts to
do the right thing on high-profile extradition cases that will affect Thailand's relations
with third countries (we continue to have a perfect record on routine extraditions from
Thailand to the United States). Our reluctant conclusion is that we cannot.

10. (S) The Department will recall that in February of this year, after significant
indications that the Russians were trying to use bribes to influence the outcome of the
case, the Ambassador made representations to Prime Minister Abhisit (reftel) that we
expected the process to be free of inappropriate influence and Abhisit undertook to do
so. The

BANGKOK 00001998 003 OF 004

Ambassador also intervened at the same time with Defense Minister Prawit
Wongsuwan and the Royal Thai Naval Commander Khamtorn Pumhiran to insist that
false testimony by xxxxxxxxx (that Bout had been in Thailand as part of a routine naval
procurement) be rebutted. The Thai Navy subsequently issued a letter to that effect.
We will remind the Thais of their commitment to a clean process and ask that they
assure us again on the front.

What We are Doing here/What We Suggest Washington Do

--------------------------------------------- -------

11. (C) Given the above, we are undertaking the following steps here in Bangkok, most
of which should also be reflected when the Department calls in Thai Ambassador Don
Pramuwinai, a move we fully support: -- The Ambassador will immediately seek a
meeting with Foreign Minister Kasit and other appropriate senior Thai officials to
make clear that, while we appreciate the cooperation on Bout over the past year and a
half, we are disappointed and mystified by the judge's ruling, which is flawed on several
key points. -- In particular, the judge's characterization of the FARC as a legitimate
political actor would suggest that insurgent groups in southern Thailand are likewise
political in nature, perhaps outside the scope of Thailand's new counterterrorism laws.
The ruling also suggests that anyone seeking to send them arms from a third country
could not be extradited to Thailand on political grounds. -- Moreover, the judge's
misguided analysis of the "dual criminality" standard suggests that fugitives cannot be
extradited from Thailand unless a Thai court actually had jurisdiction over the alleged
crime, not whether the alleged conduct is viewed as criminal conduct under the laws of
both countries. This decision comes at the same time Thailand is pursuing extradition
of fugitive former PM Thaksin Shinawatra for abuse of power/corruption-related
charges; the judge's ruling would also seem to undermine RTG positions in their
Thaksin extradition effort. -- Therefore, we expect that the AG's office will vigorously
pursue the appeal of the ruling and that Bout will remain incarcerated during the
pendency of the appeal. -- We seek assurances that the case will be afforded a
comprehensive and meaningful appellate review, presumably handled by serious,
experienced Thai judges. (Note: Appeals are normally handled by a panel of three
judges. End Note.) -- We ask that the Thai government issue a statement making clear
its own disappointment with the judge's ruling and reiterating its commitment to the
fight against international terrorism and to the law enforcement relationship with the
U.S. -- We will continue to make our points to the press and we are pulling together a
"FARC fact sheet" for public distribution that we will send in to Washington for
comment and clearance today.

12. (C) We suggest that Washington strongly consider the following actions: -- In
addition to the Department calling in the Thai Ambassador, we recommend that
Attorney General Holder also call him in. AG Holder could point out the extensive U.S.
commitment of law enforcement resources to Thailand (DEA and other), as well as our
judicial training efforts, and that a statement from the RTG as outlined above would be
very helpful as the U.S. decides where best to commit its law enforcement resources
around the world. A senior DEA official might also wish to sit in to highlight the
massive DEA commitment to Thailand. (Note: Our DOJ Attache who has led our legal
efforts on Bout here will be in Washington on August 20-21. End Note.) -- Discussion
of a POTUS telcon to PM Abhisit has been under way for some time; they have not
spoken in the seven months both have been in office. We suggest that the call be
accelerated and that it include a serious discussion of our concerns over the
implications of the Bout verdict, as outlined above. We believe POTUS involvement
on Bout would have significant effect here. -- We suggest Washington engage the
Colombian government on

BANGKOK 00001998 004 OF 004

the implications of the Bout verdict. We suggest inquiring whether Colombia considers
the FARC to be a terrorist organization, whether it would be willing to submit a brief
in the appeals process, and also make public statements to that effect. We also suggest
exploring whether Colombia would be willing to ask Thailand for Bout's extradition
while he (hopefully) is still in detention during the appeals process. (Note: There is no
Colombian Embassy in Bangkok; the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur covers Thailand. We
understand the Thais cover Colombia from their Embassy in Lima. End note.) It would
be useful if the Government of Colombia also raised its concerns in Moscow. -- We also
suggest exploring the possibility of whether governments whose citizens have borne
the bloody results of Bout's activities over the years, such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and
Congo, would be willing to publicly express dismay/engage the Thai government on the
verdict and whether any affected government would be willing to ask for his
extradition. -- While the Bout focus is now on Thailand, this is at heart a U.S.-Russian
matter. The Department may wish to make clear to Moscow our concerns on Bout's
activities and seek assurances that they will cease. Also, we should consider asking the
Russians to prosecute Bout if, in the end, he walks here in Thailand. At the very least
perhaps we could force the Russians to publicly refuse to do so. -- The Thai ruling
seems inconsistent with several United Nations determinations on Bout's nature over
the years (see below). We suggest our USUN call in the Thai Permrep and lay out how
we view the issues in terms of Thailand's standing with the United Nations. Better yet
would be for the appropriate UN official to call in the Thai Permrep and seek an
explanation of how the verdict can be justified in light of Thailand's support of relevant
UN resolutions: - UNSCR 1521 (2003) - Liberia - UNSCR 1343 (March 2001) - Liberia -
Report of Experts Panel under 1343 - Final Monitoring Report on Angola Sanctions
(2000)

-- Finally, despite the listing by the US and EU of the FARC as a terrorist organization,
we understand that the FARC is not listed as such by the UN. A move to have the FARC
listed formally by the UN would assist the effort to keep Bout in custody. JOHN

guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2010

US embassy cables: Russian mafia
active in Thailand
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 21.30 GMT

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Friday, 04 December 2009, 08:28

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 003066
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS PREL, PHUM, PGOV, RU, TH
SUBJECT: RUSSIA LOOKS TO REINVIGORATE BILATERAL RELATIONS
WITH THAILAND, AGAIN
BANGKOK 00003066 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

Summary
Improved relations between Thailand and Russia have led to an increase in tourism but
also the presence of Russian organised crime networks, partuclarly around the resorts
of Pattaya and Phuket. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

Read related article

1. (C) Summary: The Thai-Russia bilateral relationship blossomed earlier this decade
after years of stagnation during the Cold War but has had little forward momentum
since then, despite a November 27 visit to Bangkok by Russian Deputy Prime Minister
Sobyanin and Thai pledges that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister will travel to
Russia in 2010. The resurgence earlier in the decade occurred as a result of a flurry of
high-level visits, first by then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to Russia in 2002
and a reciprocal visit by former President Vladimir Putin to Thailand in 2003. For its
part, Russia has advocated the construction of a regional energy facility in Thailand to
be supplied by Russia, aspired to become a dialogue partner for the East Asia Summit
(EAS), and expand arms exports in Southeast Asia. Thailand enjoys a rapid expansion
of Russian tourists visiting Thailand but has to deal with an unwanted side effect - the
presence of Russian organized crime networks around the popular beach destinations
of Pattaya and Phuket. The biggest headline grabber of 2008-09 has likely been the
arrest of Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout, whose extradition to the U.S. remains
under review by an Appellate Court.

2. (C) Comment: The Thai-Russia bilateral relationship saw a period of re-engagement

from 2002-03 during fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's outward-
looking administration (2001-06), with Thaksin pursuing possible arms purchases
from Russia in barter deals to boost Thai exports of agricultural products and to lessen
Thai military dependence on U.S. systems. However, since Thaksin's ouster in a
bloodless coup in 2006, Thailand has primarily been inwardly focused. For his part,
Thaksin has continued to travel regularly to Moscow, including a December 2-3 visit,
meeting quietly with Putin. With Thailand's foreign policy centered primarily on
ASEAN, the U.S., and China, there is little space for Russia to be an influential player.
Putin's continued willingness to host Thaksin in Moscow--the Russian government
refused to confirm the visit to the Thai Embassy in Moscow, even as Thaksin's brother
was announcing it to the Thai media and Thaksin's lawyer and lieutenants were
discussing freely with us--certainly will win Russia few favors with the current Thai
government.

3. (C) Comment, cont: That said, there is an interesting well-spring of enduring pro-
Russian sentiment among many Thai based on historical ties between the Siamese and
Russian royal families: King Chulalongkorn and Tsar Nicholas II exchanged reciprocal
visits in 1909-1910; and the Tsar provided what many Thai consider a critical boost to
Siam's independence in the face of British and French pressure on Siam's borders and
sovereignty. Queen Sirikit's 2007 State visit to Russia reminded many Thai of this
century-old emotional bond. Some commentators suggest a Thai reluctance to offend
Russia by extraditing Viktor Bout to the U.S., manifested in the initial August Lower
Court ruling denying the extradition request, may have been grounded in part in this
enduring sentiment. End Summary and Comment.

Thai-Russian Bilateral Re-engagement

-----------------------------------

4. (C) 2002-03 was the seminal period for the renewal of Thai-Russia relations,
Professor Kantassa Thunjitt from Thammasat University's Russian Studies Program
told us recently. Despite warm relations a century ago between Imperial Russia and
Siam, the relationship had been largely dormant during the Cold War era and
afterwards until Thaksin made an official visit to Russia in October 2002, with Putin
reciprocating in October 2003, when Thailand hosted APEC. Kantassa highlighted
Putin's audience with King Bhumibol during his visit as particularly significant.
Bangkok Post Senior Reporter Achara Ashayagachat told us recently that Thaksin had
looked to Russia to expand market opportunities. Achara also believed that Thaksin
sought to balance Thailand's relationships with both the U.S. and China through

BANGKOK 00003066 002.2 OF 005

engaging Russia, while simultaneously looking at ways to maximize profits.

5. (C) While Thaksin and Putin visits prompted a flurry of diplomatic re-engagement at
the most senior levels, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Department of European
Affairs official Wacharin Vongvivatachaya told us that Thai-Russian relations peaked
during Queen Sirikit's State visit to Russia in July 2007. During the Queen's trip, she
visited Moscow and St. Petersburg, met Putin and then First Deputy Prime Minister
Dmitry Medvedev, and was deeply impressed by the Mariinsky Ballet. As a result, the
RTG arranged for the Mariinsky to visit in December 2007 to perform for King
Bhumibol's 80th birthday. The ballet performed once during a closed session for the
King and the palace, and twice for sold out Thai audiences. Wacharin commented that
these performances had led to yearly participation of Russian opera and ballet troupes
at the annual September Bangkok International Festival of Dance, which the Queen has
attended the past two years.

6. (SBU) The latest Russian effort to reinvigorate the bilateral relationship came
November 27, with the visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Sobyanin to
Bangkok to meet with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and to convene the Fourth
Thai-Russian Joint Commission Meeting with FM Kasit. Sobyanin looked to increase
trade and investment, signaled Russia's willingness to cooperate with Thailand in
research and development in the oil and natural gas sector, and underscored Russia's
desire to cooperate with Thailand on security and culture issues, according to a
statement posted on the Thai MFA's website. As a sign of recent drift in Thai-Russian
relations, however, the Joint Commission meeting, intended to convene every two
years, came after an eight year hiatus.
7. (SBU) DPM Sobyanin also extended an invitation to Abhisit to visit Russia in early
2010, according to the MFA statement. Wacharin told us December 2 that Abhisit
plans to accept this invitation and will likely travel to Moscow in the first half of next
year, and that FM Kasit would separately travel to Moscow for the Fifth Joint
Commission Meeting.

Russia Interested in Economic Ties...

-------------------------------------

8. (SBU) After visiting Thailand for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial
Meeting in Phuket July 22-24, and having an audience with King Bhumibol Adulyadej
in Hua Hin to reaffirm Russia's historical ties with Thailand, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergey Lavrov delivered a keynote speech at Chulalongkorn University July 24 in
which he outlined Russia's key economic goals for further cooperation and integration
with the Thai economy. Lavrov highlighted Russia's eastern territories as holding
natural resources -- such as oil, gas, and coal -- that could become the means to further
engage with countries like Thailand. As such, one of Russia's critical goals was to
promote energy cooperation between Russia and Thailand; Lavrov announced Russia's
interest in developing a regional facility in Thailand for storing, processing and trading
Russian oil and gas.

9. (C) MFA official Wacharin downplayed the significance of Lavrov's proposal for a
regional oil facility in Thailand, explaining to us that it was currently only a Russian
idea. She commented that this plan was first proposed by the Russians under Thaksin's
administration; the MFA in 2008 had previously told us that then Samak government
continued to push the idea, even though the Thai state-owned energy firm PTT doubted
its economic viability. Wacharin stressed that the energy policy of Prime Minister
Abhisit Vejjajiva's government was markedly different from that of its Thaksin-
associated predecessors. She said that while the Royal Thai Government (RTG)
continued to study the proposal further, there were many technical issues that needed
to be reviewed, such as transportation costs.

BANGKOK 00003066 003.2 OF 005

...And a political voice in the region

--------------------------------------

10. (C) Watcharin said that the MFA viewed Russia as eager to become a major player
in the Asia Pacific region. Russian Embassy diplomat Andrey Dmitrichenko told us that
Russia had previously taken a more active approach in engaging ASEAN in hopes of
facilitating Russian participation in the East Asian Summit (EAS) as a dialogue partner.
However, Russia currently was now willing to wait, not pushing its case; Dmitrichenko
suggested that it was more realistic for Russia to become a dialogue partner at the
same time that the U.S. was invited to become a dialogue partner. Dmitrichenko noted
that Russia had acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2004, held an
ASEAN-Russia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, and looked forward to the second
ASEAN-Russia Summit in Vietnam, which would follow on the establishment of an
ASEAN Center in Moscow in late 2009.

11. (C) The opinions of non-official Thais we talked to about the Russian diplomatic
push was in general rather dismissive. Professor Rom Phiramontri, Director for the
Center of Russian Studies at Chulalongkorn University, commented that in general
Russia has had very little influence in Asia, particularly in Thailand. In his opinion,
Russia was attempting to gain more influence with Thailand, geographically in the
center of ASEAN, in an attempt to expand influence throughout the region, especially
economically. Professor Kantassa of Thamssat similarly told us that Russia was trying
to play a larger role in Southeast Asia, noting it has attempted to raise its status in the
region by offering itself as an alternative to the U.S. and China.
Trade, Tourism, and Organized Crime

-----------------------------------

12. (SBU) Wacharin underscored that trade and tourism were the most important
elements to the Thai-Russia bilateral relationship. For Russia, Thailand was its
number one trading partner in Southeast Asia with trade accounting for over $1 billion
annually. (Note: U.S.-Thai trade exceeds $30 billion annually. End Note.) Wacharin
stated that Russia's main exports to Thailand were rolled steel, scrap metal, fertilizers,
unprocessed minerals, synthetic rubber, diamonds, pulp, and paper. Thailand's main
exports to Russia were sugar, rice, gems, clothes, shoes, canned food, and furniture.
Thailand's premier multi-national, the CP Group, had invested in Russia by
establishing an animal food producing factory in Moscow's suburbs, Wacharin added,
though there has been little Russian investment in Thailand, mainly in small
businesses.

13. (SBU) Wacharin commented that the number of Russian tourists to Thailand had
steadily increased, to 300,000 Russians in 2008. Thailand was the number two
destination in Asia for Russian tourists, who did not need visas for short visits. The
Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) reported that as of October 2009, six direct
scheduled weekly flights are being operated between Moscow and Bangkok by Thai
Airways International and Aeroflot Russian Airlines. While traditionally the main
destination for Russian tourists was Pattaya, leading to Russia establishing a Honorary
Consul covering Pattaya, Rayong, and Chonburi on the eastern seaboard, in the past
several years Russians had started flocking to the up-market resorts on Phuket on the
Andaman coast in large numbers, where a second honorary consulate has been
established.

14. (C) Russian organized crime circles established a presence in Thailand in the 1990s
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A number of U.S. law enforcement agencies are
involved in investigating or monitoring cases involving Russian organized crime in
Thailand in cooperation with Thai partners, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the

BANGKOK 00003066 004.2 OF 005

Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(ICE). These law enforcement agencies report that criminal networks composed of
mostly Russian nationals operating in Pattaya and Phuket are responsible for the
commission of numerous crimes, including extortion, money laundering, narcotics
trafficking, real estate fraud, financial fraud, human smuggling, pandering,
counterfeiting, document fraud, cybercrime, and illegal importation of cars.

15. (SBU) While much of the Russian organized criminal activity in Thailand has
occurred quietly, three specific cases generated public awareness of the phenomenon.
In April 1998, Russian restaurant owner Konstantine Povoltski was found shot dead in
a car near one of his two restaurants in southern Pattaya. In August 2003, police
apprehended three Russian bank robbers when their speedboat ran out of fuel after
they held up the Bank of Ayudhya in South Pattaya, stole 2.4 million baht, and killed a
Thai police officer in the process. Rinat Koudaiarov was sentenced to death for the
shooting. In February 2007, two Russian women were found murdered on the beach of
Jomtien 10 km from Pattaya, amidst speculation that it had been a Russian OC-
ordered hit.

Weapons for Sale

----------------

16. (SBU) One area in which potential cooperation has not been fully realized is in
military armaments. Thaksin started pursuing possible deals for Russian weapons in
2003 in exchange for debts Russia had incurred earlier in purchasing Thai rice. In 2005
Thaksin had attempted to broker a deal with Putin in which Russia would sell a dozen
Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets to Thailand in exchange for 250,000 tons of frozen poultry
worth $500 million. In the end, however, the deal fell through; in October 2007,
Thailand signed a $1.1 billion agreement to purchase six Saab JAS-39 Gripen jets from
Sweden.

Viktor Bout

-----------

17. (C) Russian arms merchant Viktor Bout was apprehended in a joint U.S.-Thai
undercover DEA sting operation March 6, 2008 and remains in Thai custody. The U.S.
requested extradition in order to try Bout in the Southern District of New York on a
four-count indictment charging conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals and officers; acquire
and use anti-aircraft missiles; and provide material support to the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated foreign terrorist organization. The
Thai lower court ruled in favor of Bout, and against extradition, on August 11, 2009,
with the Thai judge stating that the FARC was engaged in a political cause, not
terrorism.

18. (C) Initially, the primary publicly-known Russian interest in defending Bout came
from the Russian Duma, but later, the Russian Government took a more active role in
pressing Thailand not to extradite Bout. Members of Parliament (MPs) Sergey Ivanov
and Vice Chairman of the Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky have been active in supporting
Bout from the beginning. Ivanov testified at Bout's trial as a defense witness, stating
that if Bout were to be extradited to the U.S. it would adversely affect the Thai-Russia
bilateral relationship. Zhirinovsky has picketed the Thai embassy in Moscow for Bout's
release, lobbied the Thai ambassador, disrupted the Thai Ambassador during public
speeches, and portrayed Bout as the victim of an anti-Russian witch hunt. The Thai
DCM in Moscow, and the Thai MFA's Russian desk, have acknowledged to Embassies
Moscow/Bangkok the diplomatic pressure the Russian MFA and Embassy in Bangkok
have placed on Bout's behalf.

19. (C) Professor Rom told us he thought that U.S.-Thai relations would not be
negatively affected over the long-term if the U.S.'s appeal failed and Bout was able to
return to Russia; he stressed that Thailand had already cooperated with the U.S. by
apprehending Bout at U.S. request. Professor

BANGKOK 00003066 005.2 OF 005

Kantassa admitted that Bout was a businessman who would sell weapons to anybody,
but suggested that the Thai court would take a neutral stance between the U.S. and
Russia on the extradition, a sentiment we occasionally heard from MFA contacts since
Bout's arrest (Note: the August 11 Lower Court ruling rejecting the extradition
certainly could not be characterized as "neutral"; we await the Appellate Court panel
decision).

20. (SBU) Note: this cable was coordinated with Embassy Moscow. JOHN

guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2010

US embassy cables: Bout's aircraft
found 'rusting' in UAE
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 21.30 GMT

Thursday, 07 January 2010, 07:41

C O N F I D E N T I A L DUBAI 000001
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO
NEA/ARP/BMCGOVERN
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/01/07
TAGS EAIR, ECON, PGOV, PREL, AE
SUBJECT: RAK Airport Sleepy, but with Residual Russian Connection
CLASSIFIED BY: Justin Siberell, Consul General, U.S. Consulate General, Dubai;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

Summary
The cables reveals that aircraft belonging to Viktor Bout - the alleged Russian arms
dealer extradited to the US last month - are rotting at a 'sleepy' airport in the United
Arab Emirates. Key passages highlighted in yellow.
Read related article

1. (C) Summary: The Ras Al Khaimah (RAK) Airport is attempting to reinvent itself as
a cargo transit point for the RAK Free Zone in the wake of RAK Airways suspension of
regular commercial flights in late 2008. The airport is also working to distance itself
from its reputation as a transport facilitator for clients such as international arms
trafficker Victor Bout, who used the RAK airport as a base of operations. The Wing Air
aircraft once linked to Victor Bout are grounded and effectively abandoned. Former
RAK Airport CEO Michelle Soliman conveyed continuing concerns about the airport's
reputation and client base, however, and is seeking to identify "more desirable" clients
as the airport increases its operations. End Summary.

--------------------------

Passengers Slow to Come

-------------------------

2. (SBU) Former Ras al Khaimah Airport CEO Michelle Soliman told ConGen Dubai
PolOff and Embassy Abu Dhabi OFAC Attache shortly before her December
resignation that RAK Airport's growth has been hindered by the failure of its
"national" airline, RAK Airways, which began operations in November 2007, but
stopped scheduled flights just over a year later in December 2008 as a result of the
economic downturn (Note: RAK Airways still operates a Boeing 757 on a wet-lease
basis to Hewa Bora Airlines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. End Note.).
Although Oussame El Omari, the CEO of the RAK Free Zone (RAK FZ) recently
speculated that RAK Airways would become the UAE's newest bargain airline similar
to Fly Dubai and Air Arabia, Soliman saw little prospect for RAK Airways resumption
of commercial air services given insufficient operating funds and high management
turnover, including seven CEO's in just two years.

3. (SBU) RAK Airways uncertain future is, Soliman believes, dissuading other
passenger airlines from establishing regularly scheduled flights to RAK out of concern
that the limited air rights available at RAK airport could be rescinded if RAK Airways
begins to operate again. Although a new arrival terminal opened on September 1,
2009, the only passenger flights to RAK airport are four tourism-related chartered
flights a week from Europe which began in October 2009.

---------------

Focus on Cargo

---------------

4. (U) To boost its cargo business, RAK Airport, according to Soliman, has negotiated
with RAK Customs to allow companies in the RAK FZ not to pay customs fees on goods
going directly from the free zone to the airport as long as the goods depart within 10
days. Some of the free zone companies utilizing this deal are shipping armored vehicles
to Afghanistan on cargo flights. Soliman told Poloff and OFACATT that one idea for
future expansion of the airport's cargo business with the RAK FZ would be to make
part of the airport a free zone so that goods could transfer directly.

-----------------------

The Russian Connection

-----------------------

5. (C) Soliman told OFACATT that Wing Air Services, a company publicly linked to
international arms trafficker and UN sanctions target Victor Bout, is still on the
Airport's registration list only because it is the last registered owner of the IL-76
aircraft

and Gulfstream jet now effectively abandoned at RAK Airport on their parking apron.
Soliman said Mach Avia Services was at one time identified as the agent of the IL-76,
but eventually "washed its hands of it" and claimed that Wing Air Services was
responsible for the aircraft. Soliman took EmbOffs on a tour of the airport that
included a viewing of Wing Air aircraft. The Wing Air Gulfstream was completely
gutted, apparently cannibalized for parts. Soliman said that the Russian companies
were kept on short-term lease arrangements so that they could be moved out of RAK
as soon more desirable clients could be found (Note: Soliman also pointed out as
suspect two new Bombardier CRJ jets worth USD 50 million abandoned by their
owners immediately after they arrived. Soliman said the owners are impossible to
reach, although sporadically maintenance people show up. End Note).

6. (C) OFACATT asked Soliman if she knew of any links between the Russian
maintenance facility at RAK airport, identified on the website azworldairports.com as
the Shahed/Aircess facility, and the Sharjah-based Aircess company that served as the
headquarters for Victor Bout's network until its designation by the UN in November
2005. Soliman said that as far as she knew, the facility was run by the company Mach
Avia Services, but that Mach Avia's General Manager (GM) Hussein Obeid is also the
general manager of a company called Shahed, which according to Obeid's business card
provides "Air Services". Soliman noted that Mach Avia was originally registered as the
agent for the Victor Bout linked Wing Air IL-76 when it arrived at RAK Airport in
March 2004, but later advised the airport that the plane belonged to Wing Air
Services. Abousaeda Mustafa, a Russian, informed RAK Airport that the Wing Air IL-
76 aircraft had been sold on January 14, 2009 by Libyan Arab Air Cargo to ILEX or
ELEX Ventures Limited Company (NFI). Soliman said that RAK Airport could not
confirm the validity or authenticity of the documents presented by Mustafa, and that
consequently the airport submitted them to the RAK Courts.

7. (C) Comment: Despite its lack of passenger traffic, RAK Airport is looking for
opportunities to grow, such as focusing on cargo and drawing in legitimate clients.
However, it seems that it will not be an easy road ahead as it still has to deal with
legacy issues such as the Wing Air services aircraft, a grounded RAK Airways, and
semi-abandoned jets with unreachable owners. Soliman's resignation from her post as
CEO subsequent to this visit also highlights RAK Airport's inability to keep consistent
management at the helm; Soliman is the sixth CEO to leave RAK Airport since 2006.
End Comment.

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WikiLeaks cables allege Russia bribed
Viktor Bout witnesses
Embassy cables show US diplomats believe Moscow tried to
block extradition of 'merchant of death' from Thailand

Luke Harding
guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 December 2010 21.30 GMT

larger | smaller

Alleged Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout is flanked by Thai police. US diplomats allege Russia bribed witnesses to
block his extradition to the US, according to WikiLeaks cables Photograph: KeystoneUSA-ZUMA / Rex Features

Russia tried to block the extradition of the suspected international arms trafficker
Viktor Bout from Thailand to America by bribing key witnesses, the US claims.

Diplomats in Bangkok alleged in cables released by WikiLeaks that Bout's "Russian

supporters" had paid witnesses to give false testimony during his extradition hearing.

Dubbed the "merchant of death", Bout was seized by the Thai authorities in March
2008 but only extradited to the US on 16 November this year. The US accuses him of
conspiring to sell millions of dollars of weapons to Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (Farc) rebels to kill Americans. The Kremlin strongly opposed his
extradition.

The Russian businessman, accused of running arms-trafficking networks around the

world, maintains he is innocent in a case that turned into an undignified tug-of-war
between Washington and Moscow.

In a cable written on 13 February 2009, US diplomats said that in the year after Bout's
arrest, extradition proceedings in Thailand were "going in the way we want" – albeit at
a "painfully slow" pace.

More recently, however, the case had taken a worryingly wrong turn: "There have been
disturbing indications that Bout's ... and Russian supporters have been using money
and influence in an attempt to block extradition," the diplomats reported.

Bout's claim was that he had flown to Thailand on official government business.
American agents posing as Farc rebels arrested him in a sting operation in a Bangkok
hotel after he allegedly agreed to sell them millions of dollars of weapons.

On 12 February 2009, the US ambassador in Bangkok, Eric John, raised his concerns
about the case in a meeting with Thailand's prime minister, Abhisit Vejjajiva. He
warned that the extraditions proceedings had become "tainted as a result of the efforts
by Bout's associates to bribe Thai officials".

John said the Americans had uncovered several examples of influence and corruption.
These included the false testimony by a witness, an attempt to procure the personal
secretary of the crown prince of Thailand to testify on Bout's behalf, and "evidence of
bribery schemes gathered throughout the world".

Abhisit gave a noncommittal response, promising to examine any irregularities. In

August 2009, the judge ruled Bout could not be extradited in a stunning setback to the
US embassy and its "Bout team".

The ruling – appealed against by the US – prompted John to write a cable urging US
President Barack Obama to telephone Abhisit and initiate "a serious discussion of our
concerns over the implications of the Bout verdict".

"We believe Potus [president of the US] involvement on Bout would have a significant
effect here," he pleaded.

The ambassador suggested a gambit to shame Moscow if Bout was freed to go back to
Russia. "We should consider asking the Russians to prosecute Bout if, in the end, he
walks here in Thailand. At the very least perhaps we could force the Russians to
publicly refuse to do so."

Other cables reveal that Bout's fleet of aircraft – allegedly used to deliver arms to
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Congo – are currently rusting at an airstrip in the United
Arab Emirates. On 7 January 2010, the US consulate reported several of his Soviet
cargo planes were stuck at the "sleepy" Ras al-Khaimah (RAK) airport.

"The airport is also working to distance itself from its reputation as a transport
facilitator for clients such as international arms trafficker Viktor Bout, who used the
RAK airport as a base of operations. The Wing Air aircraft once linked to Viktor Bout
are grounded and effectively abandoned," it said.

Another cable chronicled the unstoppable rise in Russia's international arms sales – up
from $6.7bn (£4.3m) in 2006 to at least $8bn in 2007. It said Moscow exported large
quantities of weapons to, among others, Iran, Syria and Venezuela, and was prepared
to entertain the "grandiose regional visions" of Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez.

The then US ambassador in Moscow, William Burns, admitted that Russia was
unwilling to establish "an expert-level dialogue on arms sales" with Washington and
was "deeply cynical" about any US attempts to curb Russian arms exports.

"Russia attaches importance to the volume of the arms export trade, to the diplomatic
doors that weapon sales open, to the ill-gotten gains that these sales reap for corrupt
senior officials and to the lever it provides the Russian government in stymieing
American interests."

On this topic the US had few instruments of persuasion, Burns added: "Russian
officialdom and the public have little, if any, moral compunction about the arms trade,
seeing it instead as a welcome symbol of Russia's resurgent power and strength in the
world."

guardian.co.uk © Guardian News and Media Limited 2010