Operation:Paperstorm Scribd-Release

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

05DUSHANBE1921 2005-12-02 10:10 2010-12-12 21:09 SECRET Embassy
Dushanbe
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the ori
ginal cable is not available.
S E C R E T DUSHANBE 001921
SIPDIS
STATE FOR P, EUR/CACEN, EUR/RUS, SA, S/P
NSC FOR MERKEL
EO 12958 DECL: 12/2/2015
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, MARR, RS, TI
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RAHMONOV: HIS VIEWS ON RUSSIA
REF: STATE 214783
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard E. Hoagland, Ambassador, EXEC, Embassy Dushanbe. REASON:
1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) The Ambassador met with President Emomali Rahmonov on December 1 for two a
nd a half hours. We report the meeting in three cables. This is two of three. Th
e other two cover Rahmonov’s views on (1) the U.S.-Tajikistan bilateral relationsh
ip and Tajik politics, and (2) Uzbekistan.
¶2. (S) SUMMARY: President Rahmonov judges that new Russian Ambassador Ramazan Abd
ulatipov is “not very diplomatic, but not a bad guy.” Though Rahmonov has to work cl
osely with Russia he made clear he keeps both eyes wide open. He alleged that he
kicked the Russian Border Guards out of Tajikistan because they were plotting w
ith former Presidential Guards Commander Gaffor Mirzoyev to overthrow him. Altho
ugh some of what Rahmonov said may have been calculated for U.S. consumption, mu
ch of it has a ring of truth.” END SUMMARY.
¶3. (S) President Rahmonov expressed gratitude for the State Department’s non-paper
about U.S.-Russia consultations (reftel), and said that Tajikistan will do every
thing possible to promote good relations in the region between Russia and the Un
ited States. He said Russia has natural historic, cultural, and security interes
ts in the region and will always be a major force that cannot be ignored, but it
is important for the international community to moderate Russia’s worst instincts
and help it become a positive force. It is especially important for Russia and
the United states to develop common positions in the region, including in Afghan
istan, to promote sustainable stability and prosperity.
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR “NOT A BAD GUY,” JUST NOT VERY DIPLOMATIC
¶4. (C) Rahmonov, abandoning his notes as he usually does, paused and smiled. “You k
now, (Russian political-appointee Ambassador) Ramazan (Abdulatipov) is not reall
y a bad guy, even though he complains to me about you all the time. He’s a politic
ian, philosopher, and intellectual. Because he’s from Dagestan, we have very inter
esting discussions about the history of Russia’s Muslims and Persian culture. But
he’s just not a diplomat. He doesn’t understand nuances and niceties. He’s certainly n
o Peshkov! (NOTE: Previous Russian Ambassador Maksim Peshkov. END NOTE.) But he’s
open and friendly with me personally. He understands Russia creates a lot of pro
blems here, and knows it’s his job to try to solve them.”
¶5. (S) Rahmonov added, “Actually, It’s the Russian special services who cause trouble
here, and I’ve told Ramazan it’s his job to keep them under control. And it’s not jus
t here, it’s coming from the Kremlin, and some of it comes from the top. We can ne
ver forget that Putin himself is a ‘chekist’ (career intelligence officer) at heart.”
WHY RAHMONOV KICKED OUT THE RUSSIAN BORDER GUARDS
¶6. (S) Rahmonov said, “I want to tell you a secret why I insisted that the Russian
Border Guards had to leave Tajikistan. You know they’re part of the KGB. I had cr
edible information they and (jailed General Gaffor) Mirzoyev were plotting a cou
p against me. That’s why I pushed Mirzoyev out of the Presidential Guard, disbande
d the Presidential Guard, and told Putin forcefully his Border Guards had to go.
This had been building for a long time, and I had frequently discussed it with
Putin, but he wouldn’t do anything about it. Only after I moved
against Mirzoyev did Putin finally understand that their game was up. To make am
ends, he agreed that his Border Guards would leave. You know who helped me with
this? (Federal Service on Control of Narcotics Chairman Victor) Cherkesov. He wa
s here at that time studying our Drug Control Agency, and he realized that the R
ussian Border Guards were more involved in trafficking heroin than in stopping i
t. He went to Putin on my behalf.”
¶7. (S) Having warmed to this issue, Rahmonov said, “This constant propaganda in the
Russian media about how Tajikistan is failing to control its borders now that t
he Russians have left - you know where that comes from? From the Russian general
s who want to come back here with their mafia buddies. Look what they got here -
they put in two-year tours, and then went back to Moscow and bought Mercedes 60
0s and elite apartments. You think they did that on their salaries? Why do you t
hink the generals lined up in Moscow all the way across Red Square and paid enor
mous bribes to be assigned here - just so they could do their patriotic duty?”
¶8. (S) “And another thing,” Rahmonov continued heatedly, “why do you think I got rid of
the 50 Russian generals who used to be advisers in our Ministry of Defense. The
y never did anything for us. They never helped us build a professional military,
never gave us any military-technical assistance, because they wanted to keep us
weak so their buddies could play games and make fortunes dealing drugs. I got f
ed up, said thanks but now it’s time for you to go home. That’s one reason they even
tually came up with the plot to overthrow me.”
¶9. (S) COMMENT: Rahmonov seldom misses a chance in extended conversations with th
e Ambassador to assert Tajikistan’s independence from Russia and occasional unhapp
iness with their friendship-of-convenience. His revelation of why he asked the R
ussian Border Guards to leave Tajikistan is an amplified version of what he told
us last year. Although it may be highly edited and spun for our consumption, we
note a coincidence of timing. The Mirzoyev drama played out at the end of Janua
ry 2004. By the end of February 2004, Russian Ambassador Peshkov confided to us
that the Russian Border Guards would leave Tajikistan. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND
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