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We believe the potential for growth in our industry is extremely promising. Today, only about
one-third of the world's population enjoys the benefits of motor transport, while the remaining
two-thirds do not have access to the convenience of automotive transport. Huge growth is in
store for our industry in the emerging economies. Therefore, tremendous potential exists for
quantitative expansion.

In addition, there is also room for qualitative growth, for adding value and improving the quality
of the driving experience. Along with continuing initiatives to improve conventional vehicle
functions, two major opportunities, already emerging, are intelligent transportation systems, ITS,
and in-vehicle mobile terminals. ITS will route traffic more smoothly, reduce the risk of
accidents, and make cars more fun to drive. Mobile terminals will bring a major leap forward in
the types of information drivers and passengers can access on the road.

In view of this growth potential, we will continue to place emphasis on maintaining our position
as a leading automobile manufacturer.


      c   

Toyota Motor Corporation was Japan's largest car company and the world's third largest by the
year 2000. The company was producing almost five million units annually in the late 1990s and
controlled 9.8 percent of the global market for automobiles. Although its profits declined
substantially during the global economic downturn of the early 1990s, Toyota responded by
cutting costs and moving production to overseas markets. The company represented one of the
true success stories in the history of manufacturing, its growth and success reflective of Japan's
astonishing resurgence following World War II.


  


   
 !

In 1933 a Japanese man named Kiichiro Toyoda traveled to the United States, where he visited a
number of automobile production plants. Upon his return to Japan, the young man established an
automobile division within his father's loom factory and in May 1935 produced his first
prototype vehicle. General Motors and Ford already were operating assembly plants in Japan, but
U.S. preeminence in the worldwide automotive industry did not deter Toyoda.

Since Japan had very few natural resources, the company had every incentive to develop engines
and vehicles that were highly fuel efficient. In 1939, the company established a research center
to begin work on battery-powered vehicles. This was followed in 1940 by the establishment of
the Toyoda Science Research Center (the nucleus of the Toyota Central Research and
Development Laboratories, Inc.) and the Toyoda Works (later Aichi Steel Works, Ltd.). The next
year Toyoda Machine Works, Ltd. was founded for the production of both machine tools and
auto parts.

As Japan became embroiled in World War II, the procurement of basic materials for automobile
manufacturing became more and more difficult. At one point Toyoda was manufacturing trucks
with no radiator grills, brakes only on the rear wheels, wooden seats, and a single headlight.
Pushing toward the limits of resource conservation as the course of the war began to cripple
Japan's economy, the company started piecing together usable parts from wrecked or worn-out
trucks in order to build 'recycled' vehicles.

When the war ended in August 1945 most of Japan's industrial facilities had been wrecked, and
the Toyoda (or Toyota as it became known after the war) production plants had suffered
extensively. The company had 3,000 employees but no working facilities, and the economic
situation in Japan was chaotic. But the Japanese tradition of dedication and perseverance proved
to be Toyota's most powerful tool in the difficult task of reconstruction.


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Just as the Japanese motor industry as a whole was beginning to recover, there was mounting
concern that American and European auto manufacturers would overwhelm the Japanese market
with their economic and technical superiority. Japan's automakers knew that they could no
longer count on government protection in the form of high import duties or other barriers as they
had before the war.

Since American manufacturers were concentrating their efforts on medium-sized and larger cars,
Toyota's executives thought that by focusing on small cars the company could avoid a head-on
market confrontation. Kiichiro Toyoda likened the postwar situation in Japan to that in England.
'The British motorcar industry,' he said, 'also faces many difficulties, but its fate will be largely
determined by how strongly American automakers feel they should concentrate on small cars.' It
was January 1947 when Toyota engineers completed their first prototype for a small car: its
chassis was of the backbone type (never used before in Japan), its front suspension relied
primarily on coil springs, and its maximum speed was 54 miles per hour. After two years of
difficulties the company seemed headed for success.
This was not to be accomplished as easily as expected, however. Two years later, in 1949,
Toyota suffered its first and only serious conflict between labor and management. Nearly four
years had passed since the end of the war, but Japan's economy was still in poor shape: goods
and materials of all kinds were in short supply, inflation was rampant, and people in the cities
were forced to trade their clothing and home furnishings for rice or potatoes to survive. That year
the Japanese government took measures to control runaway inflation in ways that severely
reduced consumer purchasing power and worsened the already severely depressed domestic
automotive market. Japanese auto manufacturers found themselves unable to raise the funds
needed to support their recovery efforts, for the new governmental policy had discontinued all
financing from city banks and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

Under these conditions the company's financial situation deteriorated rapidly. In some months,
for example, the company produced vehicles worth a total of ¥350 million while income from
sales reached only ¥250 million. In the absence of credit sources to bridge the imbalance, Toyota
soon was facing a severe liquidity crisis. In large part because of wartime regulations and
controls, Toyota had come to place strong emphasis on the production end of the business, so
that in the early postwar years not enough attention had been paid to the proper balance between
production and sales. The Japanese economy at that time was suffering from a severe depression,
and because the Toyota dealers were unable to sell cars in sufficient quantities, these dealers had
no choice but to pay Toyota in long-term promissory notes as inventories kept accumulating.

Finally, Toyota was unable to meet its regular payroll. Delayed payments were followed by
actual salary reductions and then by plans for large-scale layoffs--until April 1949, when the
Toyota Labor Union went on strike. Negotiations between labor and management dragged on
with the union leaders bitterly opposed to any layoffs. As a result, Toyota was compelled to
reduce both production and overhead. Workers staged demonstrations to press their demands,
and all the while Toyota kept falling further into debt, until the company finally found itself on
the verge of bankruptcy.

Production dropped to 992 vehicles in March 1949, to 619 in April, and to 304 in May. Crucial
restructuring efforts included a proposal to incorporate Toyota's sales division as a separate
company, leading eventually to the formation of Toyota Motor Sales Company Ltd. in April
1950. Toyota Motor Sales Company handled all domestic and worldwide marketing of Toyota's
automotive products until July 1982, when it merged with Toyota Motor Company.

In the meantime, discussions between labor and management finally focused on whether to admit
failure, declare bankruptcy, and dissolve the company, or to agree on the dismissal of some
employees and embark upon a rebuilding program. In the end management and labor agreed to
reduce the total workforce from 8,000 to 6,000 employees, primarily by asking for voluntary
resignations. At the management level, President Kiichiro Toyoda and all of his executive staff
resigned. Kiichiro, Toyota's founder and a pioneer of the Japanese automotive industry, died less
than two years later.

Not long after the strike was settled in 1950, two of the company's new executives, Eiji Toyoda
(now chairman of Toyota Motor Corporation) and Shoichi Saito (later chairman of Toyota Motor
Company), visited the United States. Seeking new ideas for Toyota's anticipated growth, they
toured Ford Motor Company's factories and observed the latest automobile production
technology. One especially useful idea they brought home from their visit to Ford resulted in
Toyota's suggestion system, in which every employee was encouraged to make suggestions for
improvements of any kind. On their return to Japan, however, the two men inaugurated an even
more vital policy that remained in force at Toyota through the 1990s: the continuing commitment
to invest in only the most modern production facilities as the key to advances in productivity and
quality. Toyota moved quickly and aggressively in the 1950s, making capital investments in new
equipment for all of the company's production facilities. Not surprisingly, the company began to
benefit from the increased efficiency almost immediately.

Along with improvements in its production facilities, Toyota also worked to develop a more
comprehensive line of vehicles to contribute toward the growing motorization of Japanese
society. During 1951, for example, Toyota introduced the first four-wheel-drive Land Cruiser.
Moreover, as the domestic demand for taxis rapidly increased, production of passenger cars also
rose quickly, from 50 units per month to 250 units per month by 1953.

In production control, Toyota introduced the 'Kanban' (or 'synchronized delivery') system during
1954. The idea was derived from the supermarket system, where 'consumers' (those in the later
production stages) took 'products' (parts) from the stock shelves, and the 'storekeepers' (those in
the earlier production stages) replenished the stock to the degree that it was depleted. The
Kanban system became the basis for Toyota's entire production system.

By the early 1950s, just as Toyota had anticipated, the Japanese market was crowded with
vehicles from the United States and Europe. It soon became apparent that to be competitive at
home and abroad, Toyota would not only have to make additional investments in manufacturing
facilities and equipment, but also undertake a major new research and development effort. This
was the reasoning behind Toyota's decision in 1958 to build a full-scale research center for the
development of new automobiles (which also was to become Japan's first factory devoted
entirely to passenger-car production). Toyota also began to offer a more complete line of
products. Beginning with the Crown model, introduced in 1955, Toyota quickly expanded its
passenger-car line to include the 1,000-cubic-centimeter Corona, then added the Toyo-Ace
(Japan's first cab-over truck) and a large-sized diesel truck.

Throughout these years Toyota also was working hard on another important, if less conventional,
approach to adapting itself to the rapid motorization of Japan, brought about by a remarkable
increase in national income. When, for example, Toyota Motor Sales was capitalized at ¥1
billion, 40 percent of that amount (¥400 million) was immediately invested to establish an
automobile driving school in an effort to help citizens acquire driver's licenses. Through this and
similar efforts, Toyota made a major contribution to Japan's growing motorization in the years
following 1965, a trend that was to lead to a mass domestic market for automobiles.

In 1955, ten years after its defeat in World War II, Japan became a member of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); but automobiles remained one of Japan's least
competitive industries in the international arena. Toyota, foreseeing the coming age of large-
scale international trade and capital liberalization in Japan, decided to focus on lowering its
production costs and developing even more sophisticated cars, while at the same time attempting
to achieve the highest possible level of quality in production. This was a joint effort conducted
with Toyota's many independent parts suppliers and one that proved so successful that ten years
later, in 1965, Toyota was awarded the coveted Deming Prize for its quality-control
achievements. That was also the year that the Japanese government liberalized imports of foreign
passenger cars. Now Toyota was ready to compete with its overseas competitors--both in price
and quality.

In subsequent years Japan's gross national product expanded rapidly, contributing to the
impressive growth in auto sales to the Japanese public. The Toyota Corolla, which went on sale
in 1966, quickly became Japan's most popular family car and led the market for autos of its
compact size. Toyota continued to make major investments in new plants and equipment to
prepare for what it believed would be a higher market demand. In 1971 the government removed
controls on capital investment. In the wake of this move, several Japanese automakers formed
joint ventures or affiliations with U.S. automakers.

Two years later, the 1973 Middle East War erupted and the world's economy was shaken by the
first international oil crisis. Japan, wholly dependent upon imports for its oil supply, was
especially affected. The rate of inflation increased and demand for automobiles fell drastically.
Yet, in the face of the overall pessimism that gripped the industry and the nation, Toyota's
chairman Eiji Toyoda proposed a highly aggressive corporate strategy. His conviction was that
the automobile, far from being a "luxury," had become and would remain a necessity for people
at all levels of society. As a result, Toyota decided to move forward by expanding the company's
operations.

The 1973 oil crisis and its aftermath were valuable lessons for Toyota. The crisis demonstrated
the necessity for a flexible production system that could easily be adapted to changes in
consumer preferences. For example, Toyota did away with facilities designed exclusively for the
production of specific models and shifted instead to general-purpose facilities that could be
operated according to changes in market demand for the company's various models.

 
" 

 &

In December 1970 the U.S. Congress passed the Muskie Act, which set limits on automobile
engine emissions. In the United States the enforcement of this law was eventually postponed, but
in Japan even stricter laws were promulgated during the same time with no postponement of
enforcement deadlines. When the Muskie Act was first proposed, automakers all over the world
were opposed to it. They argued that it would actually prohibit the use of all internal combustion
engines currently used, and they requested that the enforcement of the law be postponed until
new technology, able to meet the law's requirements, could be developed.

Notwithstanding these developments, Toyota moved forward on its own to develop a new
generation of cleaner and more fuel-efficient engines. After studying all the feasible alternatives-
-including catalytic systems, rarefied combustion, rotary engines, gas turbine and battery-
powered cars--Toyota settled on the catalytic converter as the most flexible and most promising
and succeeded in producing automobiles that conformed to the world's toughest emissions-
control standards. (Meanwhile, imported cars were given a three-year grace period to conform to
Japan's strict emissions-control standards.)

#  ' " (

In 1980 Japan's aggregate automobile production was actually better than that of the United
States. In the same year, Toyota ranked second only to General Motors in total number of cars
produced. Although Toyota made efforts over the years to improve the international cooperation
between automakers, in such ways as procuring parts and materials from overseas manufacturers,
Japan's successes in the world auto market nonetheless resulted in the Japanese automobile
industry becoming a target of criticism.
Shoichiro Toyoda, president of Toyota during the middle and late 1980s, possessed a solid
understanding of American culture. Toyoda reportedly believed that Toyota's future success
depended in part on the way it handled public relations with the United States, a nation that he
perceived to be extremely bitter about losing trade battles with Japanese industry. By means of
intense advertising and controlled public relations under Toyoda's direction, Toyota tried to
elevate the principle of free competition in the minds of the American people. At the same time,
Toyoda carefully committed his company to greater international cooperation in both
technological and managerial areas.

In 1984, for example, Toyota entered into a joint manufacturing venture with American giant
General Motors called New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI). This state-of-the-art
facility allowed Toyota to begin production in the United States cautiously at a time of
increasing protectionism, as well as learn about American labor practices. At the same time, it
provided General Motors with insight into Japanese production methods and management styles.
The plant was slated to build up to 50,000 vehicles a year. In the fall of 1985, moreover, Toyota
announced that it would build an $800,000 production facility near Lexington, Kentucky. The
plant, which was expected to begin assembling 200,000 cars per year by 1988, created
approximately 3,000 jobs.

By the end of the 1980s, Toyota's position as a powerful, exceptionally well-run car company
was nearly unassailable. After a decade of prodigious growth, the company stood atop the
Japanese automobile industry and ranked number three worldwide, a position it had held since
1978 and strengthened in the ensuing years. By the beginning of the 1990s, Toyota commanded
an overwhelming 43 percent of the Japanese car market, and in the United States it sold, for the
first time, more than one million cars and trucks. Aside from these two mainstay markets, Toyota
was solidifying its global operations, particularly in Southeast Asia, and carving new markets in
Latin America, where the burgeoning demand for cars promised much growth. Toyota also
spearheaded the Japanese automobile industry's foray into the luxury car market, leading the way
with its Lexus LS400 luxury sedan, which by the mid-1990s was outselling market veterans
BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Jaguar.

Despite these favorable developments, all of which pointed toward further growth and
underscored the car company's vitality, Toyota's management continued to strive for
improvements. In 1990, for example, when the company was posting enviable financial results
and its manufacturing processes provided a model for other companies to follow, Shoichiro
Toyoda eliminated two layers of middle management, effected substantial cuts in the company's
executive staff, and reorganized Toyota's product development. With the highest operating
margin of any carmaker in the world, Toyota was a formidable competitor.

Toyota had little control over external forces, however, and as the 1990s progressed, a global
economic downturn brought the prolific growth of Japan's largest car manufacturer to a halt. The
recession stifled economic growth throughout the world, while a rising yen made Japanese
products relatively more expensive in overseas markets. Toyota's profits declined for four
consecutive years between 1991 and 1994, falling to the lowest level in more than a decade.
Midway through Toyota's net income slide, the company gained new leadership when Totsuro
Toyoda succeeded his brother in September 1992. Under Totsuro Toyoda's stewardship, a cost-
cutting program was enacted that reduced expense account budgets 50 percent, limited travel
expenditures, and eliminated white-collar overtime. Toyoda also continued the trend toward
moving production to less expensive overseas markets by ordering the construction or expansion
of six assembly plants in Great Britain, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, and Japan.

As Toyota's profit decline continued, however, the mounting losses persuaded Toyoda to
intensify his cost-cutting measures. Design changes in the company's vehicles coupled with
reductions in manufacturing and distribution costs saved Toyota ¥150 billion in 1993, and
another ¥100 billion in savings was expected to be realized in 1994. That same year, the fourth
consecutive year of negative net income growth, Toyota recorded ¥125.8 billion in consolidated
net income, a little more than a quarter of the total posted in 1990, when the company earned
¥441.3 billion.

„)"' $


„* $ 

When Hiroshi Okuda was promoted to company president in 1995 his chief ambition was to
revitalize Toyota's standing in the global marketplace. In June he unveiled Toyota's New Global
Business Plan, which placed renewed focus on innovation and international expansion. Okuda's
targets were clearly defined: to raise production to six million vehicles a year; to increase
Toyota's international market share to 10 percent; and to increase its share of the domestic
market to 40 percent. He believed the first two goals would be achieved through the construction
of new manufacturing plants in foreign markets, along with an increased emphasis on the
"localization" of parts production. The purpose of localization was to reduce the time and
expense involved with shipping components across great distances, enabling Toyota to increase
its overall automobile production and devote greater resources to research and development. By
widening the scope of operations in Toyota's overseas locations, Okuda envisioned a more
streamlined, cost-effective manufacturing process. Furthermore, the stimulation of local
economies was an effective public relations tool, enhancing the value of the Toyota brand name
in foreign markets.

Okuda wasted no time putting his vision into practice. In 1995 Toyota announced its intention to
set up a manufacturing operation in Indiana, in the hope of becoming a major participant in
North America's highly competitive large truck market. In 1997 the company opened new plants
in Canada and India, and in December it announced plans to build a second European plant in
Valenciennes, France, to begin production of a new line of cars specifically designed for the
European consumer. The year 1997 also saw increased production in Toyota's Thailand
operations, with a total output of 240,000 vehicles. In 1998 the company also raised its export
levels from the Thailand plants to 20,000 units, with most of the vehicles destined for the
Australian and New Zealand markets. That same year, the company opened a new operation in
Brazil, and in 1999 it began construction of a transmission production plant in the Walbrzych
Special Economic Zone in Poland, which would begin exporting the parts to Toyota's
manufacturing centers in France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom by 2002.

One of the most promising automobile markets to open up in the late 1990s was in China. By
March 1998 Toyota already had stakes in four Chinese parts manufacturing plants, one of them a
wholly owned subsidiary. The company took a more significant step in November 1998, when it
established the Sichuan Toyota Motor Co., Ltd., Toyota's first vehicle production plant in China.
A joint venture with the Sichuan Station Wagon Factory and Toyota Tsusho Corp., the new plant
was scheduled to begin manufacturing coaster-class buses by 2001.

Okuda also assumed an aggressive approach to Toyota's role in the domestic market. In late 1996
he made drastic cuts to Toyota's vehicle prices in Japan, a move that incensed the competition. In
August 1998 Toyota extended its hold over the domestic market with the purchase of a majority
stake in Daihatsu. The company also implemented a number of environmental initiatives during
this period, both at home and abroad. In July 1999 it inaugurated an initiative that aimed to
eliminate all landfill waste by 2003, and in 2000 it introduced stricter environmental regulations
in its U.S. manufacturing plants, which actually went beyond the current EPA standards.

One of the most radical innovations to arise from Okuda's revolution was the Prius, Toyota's first
hybrid car. Launched in October 1997, the Prius combined a highly efficient gas engine with a
self-regenerating electric motor, reducing carbon dioxide emissions by half. Although initial
estimates showed that production would have to surpass 200,000 vehicles a year for the Prius to
turn a profit, by March 1998 demand was already surpassing supply, and the future of the eco-car
on the domestic market looked promising. Prius finally hit the U.S. and European markets in late
2000, amid increased fuel prices and mounting concerns over global warming.

Although a weakened euro caused Toyota to suffer losses in Europe toward the end of the 1990s,
the new operation in France, scheduled to begin production in 2001 at a rate of 150,000 vehicles
a year, was expected to reverse this trend. The company also experienced strong sales in the
United States and Japan during this time, and in 2000 Toyota's total worldwide production
exceeded five million vehicles for the first time ever.

  %
 
 Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.; Toyota Motor Thailand Company
Limited; Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd. (51%); New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (U.S.A.;
50%); Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (U.S.A.); Hino Motors, Ltd.

  c
 
 Ford Motor Company; General Motors Corporation; Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd.


   

+, # 

Toyota Egypt is the sole distributor for Toyota Motor Corporation products. It is a multinational
company established in 1979 aiming to provide the Egyptian consumer with first class services.
Toyota Egypt¶s first priority has always been to achieve the highest levels of customer
satisfaction and to live up to customers¶ expectations.

Toyota Egypt¶s headquarters is located in the Industrial Zone in Abbassia. It is a 3S facility,

Sales, Service and Spare parts. Toyota Egypt is a free zone company that mainly caters to the
needs of fleet owners, such as petroleum and tourism companies as well as embassies and other
types of business. Toyota Egypt sells in foreign currency and has two affiliated companies:
Toyota Automotive Industries Egypt S.A.E. and Toyota Misr S.A.E. Toyota Automotive
Industries Egypt S.A.E. is dedicated to the service centers.
The main full service center is located in the industrial Zone in Abbassia and there is another
service under construction in Giza. As for Toyota Misr, it sells passenger cars, commercial
vehicles, and Toyota genuine spare parts, all in Egyptian Pound and it is planning to expand and
have a series of branches all over Egypt. Toyota Egypt Headquarters is a 3S facility: Sales,
Service, and Spare parts. It is built on an area of 9000 square meters containing one of the
biggest showrooms in Egypt where it is possible to display 30 of the latest Toyota models at the
same time.The building also includes a central warehouse for Toyota genuine spare parts which
contains all items covering the needs of all Toyota models

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Toyota seeks to create a more prosperous society through automotive manufacturing.

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Toyota aims to achieve long-term, stable growth economy, the local communities it serves, and
its stakeholders.
FDI:

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1

Evaluating The Impact of FDI:

Yp We cannot ignore the fact that the FDI is a major contributor to global growth and
development, spreading the benefits of capital, technology, management expertise,
jobs, and wealth to just about every corner of the world. MNEs can offer the
following in host countries
Yp 1- INVESTMENT: links to local companies-increased productivity-improved
efficiency and capital formation
Yp 2- HUMAN RESOURCES: training-employment and managerial skills
Yp 3- TECHNOLOGY: R&D-industrial upgrading and new capital equipment
Yp 4- TRADE: export expansion and lower cost imports
Yp 5- ENVIRONMENT: access to clean technologies-pollution abatement skills and
companywide standards.
Yp However, FDI activities still attract controversy. Many countries that have opened
their markets to FDI have seen how MNE investment can impede the progress of
domestic companies

THE Question of Cause-and-Effect Relationship:

Yp It is hard to determine whether the actions of MNEs cause societal conditions. The effects
of an MNE¶s activities may be simultaneously positive for one national objective and
negative for another. It may result in a win-win, win-lose, or lose-lose situation for both
countries involved.
Yp Opponents of FDI(MNE) persist in trying to link MNE activities to political corruption,
environmental debasement, and social deprivation.
Balance of Payments Effects:

Why do countries want capital inflows? Because such inflows give them the foreign exchange
they need to import goods and services and to pay off foreign debt. However FDI brings both
capital inflows and capital outflows. Therefore, countries are very concerned about the
possibility that their net balance of payments may be negative

Although we have to admit that FDI has a positive effect on the balance of payment in the host
country on the long run. And also provides more use of production factors + the use of
unemployed resources and upgrading of resources quality. $
Yp Host countries may lose if investments by MNEs:
Yp 1-replace local companies
Yp 2-take the best resources
Yp 3-destroy local entrepreneurship
Yp 4-decrease local R&D undertakings.
c 
The Egyptian Business Environment:

There are new improvements in the Egyptian business environment such as:
Yp 1-Cuts in taxes and tariffs (cutting tariff rate to
Yp 9.1%)
Yp 2-Renewing privatization program
Yp 3-Restructuring of the banking sector
Yp 4-Egypt has the largest number of internet service
Yp providers.

There are also few problems in the Egyptian business environment such as:

Yp 1-High levels of bureaucracy and corruption

Yp 2-Government policy has tended to be unpredictable
and non-transparent.
Yp 3-There is a clear shortage in the human skills.

   
The customs and tariffs in Egypt are high that¶s why imported cars such as Toyota maybe cheap
in some arab countries while in Egypt its expensive. most of those cars are cars with more than
1600cc engines also the options and features in the car may vary in prices. So some Toyota cars
are not sold in Egypt such as camry and lexus because of their powerful engines and features that
are because of the high customs and taxes you pay for the car per year.

 

The income level in Egypt isn¶t that high so that¶s why some of Toyota cars may not be
affordable to some Egyptians in the segment C but the fuel consumption of the car is low so the
operating expenses are affordable.
Spare parts and maintenance in Egypt for Japanese cars is much more affordable and found than
any other car in Egypt but their main competitor in Egypt now is Chinese cars but they are not
reliable such as Japanese ones.
This shows that the Egyptian economy is lacking the competitive advantage of creating and
producing cars its own country to foreign direct investors.
We made a questionnaire in order to gather more information concerning Toyota¶s political,
economical, and cultural forces in Egypt and how it affects the business:

Questionnaire

Please give us 5 minutes of your time to answer the following questions concerning the your
buying behavior in the political, economical, and cultural view:

Name:

Age:

Gender:

Profession:

1)p What is the most important luxury feature to have in car in your opinion?

a) A.C
b Sound System
c) Cruise Control
d) Parking Sensors
e) Other

2)p What type of car you prefer in Egypt?

a) 4*4
b) Hatchback
c) Sedan
d) Other

3)p How many cars do you have at home?

a) 1
b) 2
c) 3
d) more

4)p Do you think high tariffs in Egypt and taxes have affects your decision on which cars to buy?

a)p Yes
b)p No
c)p Don¶t know
5)p Does the engine size effect your decision when buying a car?

a)p Yes
b)p No
c)p No difference

6)p The increasing price of fuel effects your buying decision?

a)p Yes
b)p No

7)p Would you ever buy a car that was produced in Egypt?

a)p Yes
b)p No
c)p Maybe
Here are the answers we got and the pie charts:

Q1) What is the most important luxury feature to have in car in your opinion?

air
conditioning
sound system

cruise control

parking
sensors


Q2) what type of car you prefer in Egypt?


4x4 
hatchback


sedan

other



Q3) How many cars do you have at home?

1 car
2 cars
3 cars
more
Q4) Do you think high tariffs in Egypt and taxes have affects your decision on which cars to
buy?

yes
no
don͛t know

Q5) Does the engine size effect your decision when buying a car?

yes
no
don͛t know

Q6) The increasing price of fuel effects your buying decision?

yes
no
Q7) Would you ever buy a car that was produced in Egypt?

yes

no

maybe