Wong, Jason

Social Studies 10a

Nicolas Prevelakis
October 17, 2007

Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest

Behind enemy lines two years ago on a foreboding mountaintop in

Afghanistan, four Navy SEALs were confronted with a critical moral dilemma. They

had been sent behind enemy lines to kill or capture a Taliban leader who controlled

between 150 to 200 fighters. However, they had just been discovered by three

unarmed Afghan goat herders. Their discovery by these three Afghani goat herders

jeopardized the Navy SEALs’ mission, and furthermore put their lives at stake.1 With

no reliable way of guarding these goat herders, what should these Navy SEALs do?

To sympathize with these goat herders and let them go would be to risk their lives if

these goat herders were colluding with the enemy. To act in their self-interest would

be to terminate three potentially innocent lives but, if their act were discovered, bring

on domestic and international media attention which could potentially lead to criminal

charges and/or political and diplomatic consequences for their country. Therefore,

considering these circumstances, what action should the Navy SEALs take and how

would we justify that action?

In a case such as the real-life example described above, Adam Smith’s

Theory of Moral Sentiments leaves much to be desired in reconciling sympathy with

self-interest to attain justice. When attempting to apply his theories on sympathy,

self-interest, and justice, it is difficult to come to a conclusive decision on what

Smith’s prescription to the individual or to society would be. In Theory of Moral

1
This case is based on Marcus Luttrell’s book, Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of
Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of Seal Team 10. An interesting discussion on this case
in terms of army’s rules of engagement can be found in Diana West’s article for The Washington
Times titled “Killed by the
rules”http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070817/EDITORIAL04/1081
70016/1013
 Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 2 of 8

Sentiments, Smith claims that the rules of justice are the “only rules of morality which

are precise and accurate; that those of all the other virtues are loose, vague, and

indeterminate.”2 In this manner, Smith promises more than he can deliver as justice

is not necessarily as precise and accurate as he claims. Basically, Smith

overreaches in trying to define justice to fit too many different parts of his theory, and

this overuse confuses the reader’s understanding of justice and how to determine

just actions.

In the same paragraph that he describes justice as precise and accurate,

Smith explains that justice can be compared similarly to the rules of grammar3. This

relationship between the rules of justice and the rules of grammar is hard to

understand, and consequently impinges on our understanding of what he means

when he talks about justice. First of all, the comparison between justice and

grammar is confusing because Smith describes justice as “precise and accurate”,

but the rules of grammar are neither necessarily precise nor accurate—so this

comparison does not seem to fit and should not be used if we are to understand

Smith’s first claim that the rules of justice are precise. Grammar is neither

necessarily precise nor accurate because often the well-written essay can

circumvent the typical rules of grammar. Second, in many ways, one can argue that

the rules of grammar are “loose, vague, and indeterminate” according to the special

circumstances of the sentence and the paper at large. In this comparison, the rules

of justice can be concerned with both the microcosmic and macrocosmic

circumstances of the situation, just as the rules of grammar deal both with the

2
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 327 §1
3
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 327 §1 he writes “the first may be compared to
the rules of grammar… which present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to
aim at”
 Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 3 of 8

microcosmic circumstances of the sentence and the macrocosmic circumstances of

the paper at large. Therefore, if the comparison between the rules of justice and the

rules of grammar are apt, then Smith would mean to say (but doesn’t) that the rules

of justice can vary depending on the circumstance. Since there are two ways of

reading this comparison, it is hard to specifically envision what Smith sees as

justifiable actions in morally ambiguous cases where sympathy and self-interest

conflict. It is in these circumstances that we might need a guide on the theory on

moral sentiments the most.

To start from the beginning, there are two important questions that must be

ascertained in order to codify a series of principles of morals, for Smith. The first, he

asks, is “wherein does virtue consist?” Secondly he wonders how, and by what

faculties, can we come about an answer for the first question, and prefer it to others.

In other words, what is virtue, what actions are virtuous, and how do we differentiate

these actions from others, which we would distinguish as wrong or unjust actions?

To answer the first question, Smith declares that virtue exists either in propriety,

prudence, or in benevolence4. To answer the second, Smith declares that the

principle of approbation, which is “the power of the faculty of the mind which renders

certain characters agreeable or disagreeable to us”5, is accounted for in three ways

which are self-love, reason, and sentiment6. What does this all mean?

4
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 267 §4 “If the character of virtue, therefore,
cannot be ascribed indifferently to all our affections, when under proper government and
direction, it must be confined either to those which aim directly at our own private happiness, or to
those which aim directly at that of others. If virtue, therefore, does not consist in propriety, it must
consist either in prudence or in benevolence.”
5
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 314 §1
6
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 315 §2 “Self-love, reason, and sentiment,
therefore, are the three different sources which have been assigned for the principle of
approbation.”
 Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 4 of 8

Smith seems to say that components of propriety, prudence, and

benevolence all exist in virtuous action, and that by reasoning through self-love,

reason and sentiment, we come to realize how some actions are virtuous compared

to others, and why other actions are not virtuous. I would posit that through this

method, Smith can best choose an action and justify it in a case such as that of the

Navy SEALs. But Smith avoids using this method to define just actions and justify

them. This is most likely because of the imprecise nature of such reasoning.

Propriety, prudence, and benevolence, and self-love, reason, and sentiment, are all

traits of virtue that vary from circumstance to circumstance, as Smith has admitted.

Rather, Smith would prefer that justice be described as the stable entity by which

social cohesion can flourish. It is “the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice”7 and

as such, for Smith, justice should be a rigid set of principles rather than one that is

flexible and changes according to the situation.

This leads to an interesting discussion on what evidence Smith uses to

support his claim that justice is rigid and precise, rather than situational and flexible.

In the same paragraph where Smith describes justice as a pillar, he describes men

as self-centered, opportunistic animals. Thus, he posits, justice is required because

a society of opportunistic men without justice would be a society of “wild beasts”. To

support this claim he utilizes the example of a society of robbers and murderers

which he states could not exist unless they, “according to the trite observation,

abstain from robbing and murdering one another.”8 However, the foundation of this

society is not on justice, or beneficence, as Smith would argue. Even if they act

judiciously and beneficently to one another, the foundation of a society of robbers

7
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 86 §4
8
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 86 §3
 Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 5 of 8

and murderers within rests on self-interest and ambition, and the concept of justice in

this sense is different from the concept of justice in other societies. A society of

robbers and murderers would not be a society founded upon the same ideas of

justice as a peaceful state of merchants. Smith does not distinguish justice and

beneficence from these two states in this sense, because he attempts to over-

emphasize the importance of justice in keeping a society together and therefore

exaggerates the universality of justice among inherent differences such as those

between criminals and citizens.

Furthermore, his discussion of men as opportunistic animals conflicts with his

prior discussion on the importance of sympathy and men’s desire for approbation in

human society.9 The following passage emphasizes self-interest and opportunism

over sympathy and other virtues in order to make the point that it is the power of

justice that holds society together.

Men, though naturally sympathetic, feel so little for another, with whom
they have no particular connexion, in comparison of what they feel for
themselves; the misery of one, who is merely their fellow-creature, is of
so little importance to them in comparison even of a small conveniency of
their own; they have it so much in their power to hurt him, and may have
so many temptations to do so, that if this principle [of justice] did not stand
up within them in his defence, and overawe them into a respect for his
innocence, they would, like wild beasts, be at all times ready to fly upon
him; and a man would enter an assembly of men as he enters a den of
lions.10
Thus, based on this passage alone, it would appear that if Smith were to predict the

Navy SEALs’ next action, he would say that they should kill the three goat herders

and complete their mission without fear of retaliation. This passage tells us that he

9
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 9 §1 Recall his passage, “How selfish soever
man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it
except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for
the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.”
10
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 86 §4 Emphasis added.
 Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 6 of 8

would not only say that the Navy SEALs should kill the three goat herders in order to

protect their mission and potentially their lives, but also because the Navy SEALs are

opportunistic. So, in the absence of law and the unlikelihood of being caught, they

would leap upon this opportunity “like wild beasts”, for they “may have so many

temptations to do so”. But this line of reasoning conflicts with the rest of Smith’s

Theory of Moral Sentiments because throughout the rest of the book (those

passages which do not emphasize the importance of justice), he emphasizes pity,

compassion and other forms of sympathy as the foundation for human interaction.

This is Smith’s major contradiction with his own philosophy, for sympathy

would require that the men spare the goat herders because they were unarmed and

potentially innocent. If the goat herders came back armed that would be another

matter, but as of their unfortunate meeting, those three goat herders had not

apparently wronged the SEALs. Smith could even argue that without sympathy,

more instances such as the My Lai massacre in Vietnam may occur.11 In this way

sympathy would be a good thing, in that it would prevent civilian deaths in a time of

war. However, when looking at sympathy in a different light, Smith also seems to

argue that one can be too sympathetic when justice is concerned. For example,

suppose that you were a juror or a judge casting judgment on a thief. Smith would

say that since the thief were caught, disarmed, and are now at your mercy; you

might sympathize with their condition, and be less inclined to lay punishment.12 In

this situation the juror’s sympathy may be too much, and society may be cheated out

11
An article on this incident may be found on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Lai_Massacre
12
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 91 §11 we can use the example of the centinel
for comparison, “He looks upon the centinel as an unfortunate victim, who, indeed, must, and
ought to be, devoted to the safety of numbers, but whom still, in his heart, he would be glad to
save; and he is only sorry, that the interest of the many should oppose it.”
 Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 7 of 8

of the justice it should receive. Again, Smith’s conceptions of the interaction

between justice and sympathy leave much to be desired, since there seems to be no

hard and fast rule on rectifying the differences of the two concepts when they

conflict.

Smith is also wrong when he states that we should consider justice to be the

only precise virtue in our moral considerations. If justice were the only precise virtue,

then it would seem that all the other virtues would not be required because all unjust

acts would be punished, and just acts would be rewarded. But society is more

complicated than that, and thus it is not enough for Smith to say that that justice is

the one virtue that is required for harmonious social cohesion, as he does on page

86 §4 where he states:

Though Nature, therefore, exhorts mankind to acts of beneficence, by the

pleasing consciousness of deserved reward, she has not thought it
necessary to guard and enforce the practice of it by the terrors of merited
punishment in case it should be neglected. It is the ornament which
embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building, and which it
was, therefore, sufficient to recommend, but by no means necessary to
impose. Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole
edifice.
Justice cannot be the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice because there are

many pillars that uphold society, of which justice is a complex component. I say this

because there are certain instances, such as in the case of the Navy SEALs, where

justice is in doubt and there is no precise measure of justice. Who is to say whose

lives are more valuable, the American soldier’s or the unarmed goat herders? Who

is to say that if the positions were reversed, we would not feel differently about a

particular outcome in this situation? Finally, does Smith give us moral guidance, if

we have to make necessary decisions where the only options are that which are
 Wong, Jason
Of Sympathy, Justice, and Self-Interest
Page 8 of 8

distasteful in any other circumstance? How do we tell a wrong from an extreme

wrong in that case?

Ultimately, in the case of the Navy SEALs, the Leading Petty Officer decided

to spare the goat herder’s lives. The SEALs release the goat herders and in less

than an hour, a sizable Taliban force attacked them. All but the Leading Petty Officer

are killed. In the battle, approximately a hundred Taliban forces were killed or

wounded, along with sixteen additional dead Navy SEALs and Army special ops

forces whose helicopter was shot down. It seems that sympathy for the goat herders

trumped the Navy SEALs’ self-interests. These soldiers sacrificed their lives to live

up to an ideal that the innocent should be spared the violence of war as much as

possible. The actions of the soldiers are not compatible with Smith’s passage stating

his theory on animalistic instincts. The actions of the soldiers are compatible,

however, with Smith’s main theory that even in the toughest situations, human

sympathy may rein supreme. This is the message that Smith should have

continued to concentrate on, rather than over-emphasizing the importance of justice.

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from
it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the
emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.13

13
Smith, Adam Theory of Moral Sentiments Page 9 §1