Professional Documents
Culture Documents
and
March 8, 2002
unit, job performance, disorderly conduct, and abusive language arising out
(I) On or about June 22, 1998 I instructed [PJF] to apply some pesticide
to a group of plants. On 7/7/98 I asked [PJF] if he had applied the
pesticide as instructed. He said he had not.
2
(III) Upon assigning some work to [PJF] at approximately 10:00am on
7/28/98 he became agitated and began shouting at me. He asked why I
didn’t assign the work to someone else. When I explained to him I
wanted him to do the work he began shouting even more. Other
employees and volunteers were working in the greenhouse and could
not help but witness [PJF]’s disruptive behavior. One volunteer
remarked to me later that they were frightened of [PJF]’s behavior and
were unsure if they wanted to continue to volunteer for us due to
[PJF]’s behavior.
September 29, 1999, Ms. Henry’s1 deposition was taken in the case of [PJF]
intervention of this lawsuit is one of the reasons for the delay in scheduling
3
an arbitration hearing. The district court granted summary judgment against
Grievant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, [PJF] v City of Fort Wayne,
deposition, on the ground that Grievant could have called her in person.
The arbitrator overruled the objection on the grounds that both parties
were represented by counsel at the deposition, at which the City had the
opportunity to cross-examine her, and the City could have impeached her
through other witnesses. Hill & Sinicropi, Evidence in Arbitration (BNA 2nd
which is quoted extensively because she had no axe to grind, her self-
provides insight onto the obvious antagonism between Grievant and his
Q. … The date that Mr. [PJF] was written up for was … July 8th of
1998. Does that sound about right?
A. Yeah, yes.
4
The other days during the week I was working in the parks with Larry
Walter’s crews.
That Tuesday, I had called in because I was running a
temperature. I didn’t feel good, and that Wednesday I came into work,
even though I felt the same way I did on the Tuesday.
And I was working 6:00 to 2:00 that day, and [PJF] and myself
are the only ones in the greenhouse at the time. …
A. It was … probably 6:15 or so that I got out into the east range to
start the watering for the day. …
The chrysanthemums were in, and I went out to the east range
to mist them. I had just worked that Sunday, and I was told the Friday
before I needed to make sure they were misted every so often during
the day. They go into a type of shock if they don’t get it.
A. I’m sure Marilyn did. I’m sure a few people told me to make sure I
didn’t forget to do it on Sunday.
A. Marilyn Setser. …
A. I went in to mist the mums, not knowing that they are only
supposed to be misted … the first four days that we get them in. I
didn’t bother to ask either if we were still doing it or not. I just went
ahead and started doing it.
And I was in the middle of a bench, and … I heard something
and turned around, and [PJF] walked in, and he just basically said,
“What are you doing?”
And it was like, “Ahh, I’m misting the mums, obviously.”
And he is like, “Why?”
I said, “Because I’m supposed to,” and then I … got really
upset just because it was like – what? I’m not supposed to be doing
this? And … I was in a bad mood in the first place. I had gotten into
5
an argument with my boyfriend before I came to work, and … I was
like, why are you, you know, like questioning what I’m doing? You
know, I thought I was doing what I was supposed to be doing. I
basically just threw the hose down, cried, and left – clocked out and
left.
A. Yeah, I was.
A. I was just upset about the whole incident, and that I made such an
ass of myself really. I was still running a one hundred five fever, and I
felt like crap.
Q. After you found out that [PJF] got the write-up, did you talk to Mr.
Force again?
6
A. Yeah. Andy … didn’t tell me that day, but later in the week he had
told me he was going … [to] write up a reprimand, but he said it
wasn’t specifically for the incident between us, that there was a couple
other things that had happened that day, and he was just going to lump
them altogether in this reprimand because … I told him … there’s no
reason to do that because … this was just a misunderstanding. It
wasn’t something that needed to be taken to that level.
Q. So then you found out later that [PJF] did get written up
specifically for this incident?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. … If you look under the detail section, do you remember what you
told Mr. Force was stated wrong?
7
A. “[PJF]’s outburst was so disruptive that Suzanne felt she couldn’t
work the rest of the day and went home.”
Q. … And were you in tears when you talked to Andy that afternoon?
Later in her deposition, Ms. Henry testified about the nature of the
A. (Witness nods.)
Q. By who?
A. By Lynda, specifically.
8
A. Just because they didn’t want to deal with him anymore. Figured if
somebody said something, then it was just another thing that he could
use against them. Deposition of Suzanne Henry (UX 9) @ 19-20.
A. Yes. …
its brief suggests that it should be discounted in light of the “so called code
Smelting and Refining Co, 48 LA 1187 (Leonard Arb 1967). Whatever code
may have existed in heavy industrial operations decades ago would seem to
have little relevance in today’s urban garden settings. The arbitrator finds the
markedly from that of the two participants, who also were the only
the testimony of the only witnesses also tends to undermine the other
9
charges against Grievant. However, because Grievant’s own testimony about
the other charges was little more credible than the Supervisor’s version of
the second incident, it does not seem reasonable to dismiss them all.
pre-deprivation hearing this day.” Thus, Grievant’s problems at work are not
10
commendations for his work (UX 6, UX 10), even an earlier one from his
evident.
Grievant’s job description; another part is, “Works in harmony with fellow
workers and maintains good relations with park [PJF]rons” (JX 8). In a letter
including the 4 at issue here, which Grievant filed in 1998 alone, the
job performance:
equally unsure whether they were filed in 1998, even though the subjects of
the letters were “[PJF] grievances heard January 13, 1999” and “[PJF]
11
Grievances”, respectively, and all 10 grievance numbers began with the
matters by the year in which they are filed. Grievant himself has served as a
Union steward and surely knows how grievances are numbered. Thus,
On or about June 22, 1998, the Supervisor told Grievant to apply the
They discussed the fact that protective gloves must be worn when handling
plants treated with Marathon, because the chemical can cause a reaction in
people. A fellow employee, Sharon Zettle, later told Grievant that she was
better for the intended purpose, and determined not to apply it until just
Marathon as directed, and Grievant answered that he had not. Grievant did
12
not mention that he had sprayed Orthene instead. Reasonably believing that
Grievant had done nothing, the Supervisor wrote up a reprimand (CX 1), on
9-98.” The Supervisor then inspected the plants at issue and found no trace
although the fact apparently came out at the pre-deprivation hearing (JX 7).
and left the choice of the specific agent up to him, that Orthene was better
suited to the task,2 that the Supervisor never got back to him as to the
927 (Nelson Arb 1981) and Hill & Sinicropi, Management Rights (BNA
requirements:
13
(1) The employer must demonstrate that the instructions were clear
and that the grievant understood the directives;
While sound, the Union’s argument is insufficient to carry the day, for a
number of reasons.
First, the City’s POLICY AND PROCEDURE 6.14 (JX 2) does not
the narrow concept for which the Union argues, it is broader, as is the
insubordination as:
2
Concededly, Grievant has a well founded argument on this point, but the issue is not whether Grievant is
better informed than the Supervisor, who had his own reasons, but whether Grievant disobeyed a direct
instruction.
14
1. A willful disregard of an employer’s instructions, esp. behavior
that gives the employer cause to terminate a worker’s employment. 2.
An act of disobedience to proper authority; esp., a refusal to obey an
order that a superior officer is authorized to give.
insubordination.
Given Grievant’s demonstrated preference for his own judgment over that of
his supervisors, it is not difficult to conclude that his actions were intended
Finally, Grievant’s conduct arguably passes the strict test posed by the
to protect plants for the upcoming flower show. The only issue is whether
the Supervisor specifically directed him to use Marathon, and that issue has
a former Union steward, he surely understood the penalty for failing to carry
out instructions. Indeed, the 7th Circuit described him in these words:
15
[PJF] is no shrinking violet. Over the course of his 20-year career with
the City of Fort Wayne Parks and Recreation Department, [PJF] has
filed numerous lawsuits and administrative agency complaints against
his employer. Not surprisingly, he is not particularly popular with his
supervisors. 241 F3d @ 599.
Having played the game long and hard, Grievant certainly knows the rules.
of the incident of July 28, 1998, beyond what he had recorded in the
walked into the greenhouse, the Supervisor told Grievant to work on the
The usual altercation resulted, with Grievant informing the Supervisor that
technically correct Grievant may be, this is a labor forum, not a scientific
one. The issue is not the proper priority of work tasks but rather timely
16
The F-Word Incident (IV)
displeasure was the federal lawsuit mentioned above. Inasmuch as the 7th
plants in the greenhouse. The application was duly noted on the Written
appears that the Supervisor did not see UX 1 or even know which particular
insecticide was applied, until later. According to EPA rules, after spraying,
only specially trained employees may enter the greenhouse for 24 hours, and
for only limited purposes. In practical effect, the greenhouse is shut down
for the duration of the reentry period, which varies with the particular
17
employee had not yet been trained.
employee to enter the greenhouse before the reentry period expired. Grievant
cautioned her not to, as it was against EPA rules. Grievant threatened to call
The Supervisor challenged Grievant to go ahead and call and wrote Grievant
(CX 7).
18
According to the Supervisor, it was not so much Grievant’s use of
reprimand itself (CX 7). While Grievant did admit to some intemperate
involved, complete with application chart (UX 1), but again, chemicals are
not the issue. Foul language and Grievant’s refusal to tone it down in public
are.
PROCEDURE 6.14, ¶¶ A.5 and B.4 make abundantly clear that the list of
obligation to do so. For these reasons, the fourth and final incident must be
19
The Deference To Be Afforded The Hearing Officer’s Decision
nevertheless upheld the full 5-day suspension that the Supervisor imposed.
The arbitrator agrees that the second reprimand was without just cause, on
20
AND PROCEDURE nor the CBA expressly spells out the interplay between
the two.
because the CBA does not call for any deference to be afforded to the
hearing officer’s decision but rather calls for the arbitrator to “make
hear all matters in dispute, de novo without deference to the hearing officer’s
decision. That being the case, the arbitrator departs from that earlier
1996), the arbitrator was confronted with a situation in which the grievant was
charged with 4 offenses and assessed a single penalty for all 4, only one of
which charges the arbitrator upheld. Because the charges were not made in the
alternative (i.e., because the grievant was not told that any one of the charges
21
would merit the full penalty), the arbitrator substantially reduced the penalty.
He did not do so pro rata (i.e., he did not simply reduce the penalty by ¾),
because the charges were not of equal gravity. Rather, he assessed a penalty
In the instant case, the arbitrator is faced with a similar situation. When
the Supervisor prepared reprimands for the first two incidents, CXs 1 and 4, he
City’s manager of labor relations, the 4 reprimands were combined into the
5-day suspension was imposed. The combined reprimand does not inform
union’s strategy. A grievant has the right to know not only the offenses with
which he is charged, but also the consequences of each offense. The Union’s
grievance to arbitration if it knows that it must refute each and every charge in
3
Read “just cause” when no governmental action is involved. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works
(ABA/BNA 5th ed 1997) @ 918-920 and 1999 Supp @ 145-146.
22
order to obtain meaningful relief. For these reasons, both Grievant and the
In the instant case, the hearing officer effectively threw out a highly
exaggerated charge (II), yet sustained the entire penalty. This arbitrator does
not find such an approach at all equitable. For that reason, he modifies the
penalty imposed upon Grievant. Although the arbitrator has doubts about the
Grievant’s overall innocence. The arbitrator thus limits himself to holding the
City to the Supervisor’s recommended penalty for the first two offenses, a 3-
day suspension. Because Grievant did in fact apply a pesticide to the show
plants and the plants did not suffer, it seems reasonable to treat the two
offenses as having equal gravity. Under that theory, Grievant unjustly was
ones about the scope of the arbitration. Beyond peradventure, four incidents
gave rise to a single 5-day suspension, which is the subject of this arbitration.
The case was presented to both the pre-deprivation hearing officer (JX 7) and
4
The City cites Ford Motor and Auto Workers, 1 ALAA ¶ 67,274 (Shulman Arb 1945) and Huron Forge
& Machine Co, 75 LA 83 (Roumell Arb 1980) in support of the Supervisor’s putative objectivity. In the
former, the management accuser and grievant did not even know each other, and the latter concerns the
23
to the arbitrator on that basis. Whether the matter be viewed as four separate
especially not at this late date. This matter has stretched over five (5) calendar
will remain tolerable for the good of all concerned. All procedural objections
Award
PART and DENIED IN PART. Grievant is awarded back pay and any lost
weighing of the testimony of neutral witnesses against that of those who have a stake in the outcome.
Neither is apposite.
24