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Mendoza v. CA
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of CA. 1967.
FACTS:
Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza was married to Cecilio Mendoza in Sept 1953. They lived
together as H&W until H Cecilio left for further studies in the US in July 1954. Since
then, H w/o justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and neglected her
despite repeated demands. Moreover, he has failed and refused to provide for her
maintenance and support. She is alleged to be pregnant, sickly and w/o any source
of revenue while H is now employed in a US hospital earning USD200/mo on the
average. He is also a part-owner of lands in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, assessed at
around PhP32k in 1955.
Cecilio moves for the dismissal of W’s complaint putting in issue the validity of the
marriage and that such complaint contained no allegation that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made before the filing of the suit as per Art 222 CC
w/c provides:
Art 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Art 2035.
CFI & CA dismissed the case. H now resorts to the Court.
Cecilio asks for a showing that efforts in question were made for such is a condition
precedent to the existence of the cause of action. He holds that failure of the
complaint to plead that he previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of
court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at
any stage of the case even on appeal.
ISSUE: WON compromise between the sps may be made re support and validity of
marriage
HELD: No, the case involves a claim for future support under Art 2035 CC and can
not be subject of a valid compromise. It is therefore outside the sphere of
application Art 222 upon w/c petitioner relies.
In attacking the validity of the marriage, H Cecilio seeks a non-compromisable
issue.
Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous efforts
to compromise them would be needless. Decision re dismissal of case affirmed.
Mendez vs. Eugenia [Oct. 28, 1977]
Petition for review of summary judgment of CFI Cebu
Petitioners: Zoila & Rafael Mendez and Matilde Bionson
Respondents: Maximo, Eugenia, Juana, Fortunata, Prudencia, Roman, Anecita &
Maria Bionson; and Hon. Alfredo Laya, CFI Cebu Br. 12
Facts:
• Oct. 8, 1968: Zoila & Matilde plus 10 others (I’ll refer to them as
petitioners) filed action against present respondents for partition of 2 parcels of
land located in Oslob, Cebu. Plaintiffs prayed that Zoila, Paula Benigna, Pedro,
Felisa, Amos, Toribia & Macario (all Bionson except Zoila) be declared as
rightful owners of 1/3 of each parcel of land & Matilde, Marina, Ponciano & Leon
(all Bionson) as lawful owners of 1/3 of each of said properties. They likewise
prayed for physical partition of parcels into 3 equal parts & each part be
assigned to specific declared owners.
• Respondents claim they are absolute & exclusive owners. Petitioners have
no cause of action. They asked for moral damages & for agreed monthly rental
& rental in arrears. (Petitioners were actually occupying some of lands in
dispute).
• CFI: case dismissed for failure of petitioners to prove claim on 2 parcels of
land. Decision in favor of respondents & against petitioners. Respondents’
counterclaim likewise dismissed. Became final & executory.
• Dec. 1969: respondents filed in CFI Cebu action for recovery of possession
& ownership of one of the parcels of land litigated in first case against
petitioners. Turns out that although judgment in first case awarded properties
in question to respondents, the dispositive portion of the decision failed to state
that herein petitioners should vacate premises in favor of respondents. Thus
respondents had to file another case. (Bobops judge).
• Petitioners: contested action claiming former decision has been final &
executory.
• CFI decision: in favor of Zoila et al. (then plaintiffs) & against Maximo et al.
(defendants). Portion of land in dispute w/c defendants are occupying is
awarded to plaintiffs & defendants are ordered to vacate & deliver land to
plaintiffs.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON decision in first case denied respondents claim of ownership. - NO
• Clear that private respondents were declared owners of land in ques. CFI
rightfully dismissed petition. Documentary evidence in support of defendants’
testimonial evidence show that respondents are owners. They had documentary
exhibits consisting of tax declarations & official tax receipts which speak better
than the best oral testimony a witness is capable of making.
• Dismissal of counterclaim of respondents cannot affect their rts on 2
parcels of land in ques because it only referred to moral damages, rentals &
attorney’s fees.
• Respondents are the owners & thus they have a rt to possession of land &
rt of action against holder & possessor of such in order to recover land.
2. WON respondents should exert earnest efforts to settle 2nd case
amicably. – NO
Lack of such won’t lead to dismissal of case since it’s merely a consequence of 1 st
case.
3. WON parties are members of same family. - NO
CC Art. 217 provides that only the ff are family relations:
a. bet husband & wife
b. bet parent & child
c. among other ascendants & their descendants
d. among bros & sis
Parties are collateral relatives who are not bros. & sisters.
Held: CFI decision affirmed w/costs against petitioners.
GUERRERO v. RTC
229 SCRA 274 (1994)
Facts:
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 This is a petition for review of the orders of the RTC of Ilocos Norte, made by
respondent judge Bello, Jr.
 Gaudencio Guerrero filed a complaint seeking to recover from his brother-in-law
Pedro Hernando a lot in Sarrat Cadastre, Ilocos Norte with damages.
 At the pre-trial conference, Judge Bello noted that being bros-in-law, it had to
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been exerted and that the same failed, as provided in Art. 151
and Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, ROC.
 Guerrero’s complaint did not allege such, nor did Hernando file any motion to
dismiss nor attach the complaint on the grounds of this alleged defect in his
answer.
 Respondent judge gave Guerrero 5 days to file his motion and amended
complaint with the “jurisdictional defect” being fixed.
 Guerrero moved to reconsider claiming that since brothers by affinity are no
members of the same family, he was not required to exert effort toward a
compromise. Furthermore, Hernando was precluded from raising this issue since
he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense
in his answer.
 Judge Bello denied MFR and warned that the case will be dismissed if the
amendment he sought was not complied with.
 Guerrero failed to comply and thus the case was dismissed hence this petition
Issues:
1. WON bros by affinity are considered members of the same
family contemplated in Art. 217(4) & Art. 222, New CC, as well as under
Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, ROC, requiring earnest efforts towards a
compromise before a suit between them may be instituted and
maintained
 NO. Considering that Art. 151, FC starts with the negative
word “No,” the requirement there is mandatory (Fule v. CA). That
requirement is further complemented by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, ROC which
provides as ground for a motion to dismiss “(t)hat the suit is between
members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been made.”
 Reason for this requirement: This rule is introduced because
it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort
should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed
hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close
relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers x x x A
litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a lawsuit between
strangers.
 But Art. 151 and the ROC rule cannot be applied precisely
because the enumeration of “brothers and sisters” as member of the same
family does not comprehend “sisters-in-law” nor “brothers-in-law” as held in
the case Gayon v. Gayon. Such relationship is not listed under Art. 217 of
the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Art. 150 of the Family
Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of “members of the family.”
2. WON absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest
efforts towards a compromise were exerted which efforts failed, is a
ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
 NO. The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same
family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint being assailable at
any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.
 However, the Court stated that the case is not dismissed for failure of
petitioner to comply with the court’s order to amend his complaint, as
proposed by Hernando.
 Since assailed orders do not find support in our jurisprudence but, on the
other hand, are based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the
law, petitioner could not be bound to comply with them.
Held: Petition granted. Appealed orders set aside. RTC ordered to continue with
civil case with deliberate dispatch
Hontiveros vs. RTC, Br. 25, Iloilo City [June 29, 1999]
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
Facts:
 December 3, 1990 – spouses Agusto and Maria Hontiveros (petitioners),
filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson.
 Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town
of Jamindan, Province of Capiz by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the
decision of the Intermediate Appelate Court which modified the decision of the
CoFI of Capiz, in a land registration case filed by Gregorio Hontiveros.
 Petitioners were denied of income from the land as a result of the filing of
the land registration case. Rentals lost: 1968-1987 66,000 per year; 595,000
per year after 1987.
 Answer filed by the respondent denied that they were married and it also
alleged the Gregorio Hontiveros was a widower and Ayson was single. They
alleged that the possession of the property in question had already been
transferred to the petitioners on August 7, 1985 by virtue of a writ of
possession dated July 18, 1985. Since then, the petitioners have been
receiving rentals from the tenants of the land. The answer also alleged that the
complaint failed to state a cause action since it did not allege that earnest
efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that the Agusto and
Gregorio are brothers.
 Respondent also contends that the petitioner’s claim for damages was
barred by prescription with respect to claims before 1984, that there were no
rentals due since Gregorio was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that
Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to Gregorio and
did not have any proprietary interest in the subject property.
 May 16, 1991 – petitioners filed an amended complaint to insert therein
the allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made
between the parties but the same were unsuccessful.
 Answer of the respondent: denied the earnest effort that had been made to
reach a compromise agreement but the parties were unsuccessful.
 July 19, 1995 – petitioners moved for a judgement on the pleadings on the
ground that Gregorio’s answer did not tender an issue or that it otherwise
admitted the material allegations of the complaint.
 November 23, 1995 – trial court denied petitioners’ motion and dismissed
the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by
article 51 of the FC.
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o Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same
case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)
Issues:
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to rule on the case
2. WON after denying petitioners’ motion for judgement on the pleadings, the
trial court could dismiss their complaint motu proprio for failure to comply with
Art. 151 of the Family Code.
3. WON Article 151 of the Family Code applies in this case.
Ratio
1. Yes
 Petition was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals – Supreme Court is vested with the power to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgements and orders of lower court in all cases in which only an
error or question of law is involved.
 When the appeal would involve purely questions of law or any of the other
cases specified in Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to the SC by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules
of Court.
2. No
 Baja vs. Macandong – court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without
violating the plaintiff’s right to be heard, except in the following instances:
o Plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial
o Fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time
o He fails to comply with rules or any order of the court
o Court finds that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit.
 None of these exceptions appears in this case
 The trial court found that judgement on the pleadings in inappropriate not
only for the fact that respondent in their answer specifically denied the claim of
damages against them, but also because of the rule that the party claiming
damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof – TRIAL MUST BE HELD
 It is improper for the judge to render judgement based on the pleadings
alone. Factual issues have to be resolved:
o Ayson’s participation and/or liability if any
o Nature, extent and duration of Gregorio’s possession of the
subject property
 Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was not
verified for which reason the trial court could not believe the veracity of the
allegation.
 Absence of verification required by Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction
of the court. Verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. The court could
have ordered the petitioners to verify them.
3. No
 Art 151 does not apply because the suit is not exclusively among family
members.
 Ayson is a stranger to the Hontiveros family.
 The phrase “members of the same family” refers to husband and wife,
parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sister
whether full or half blood.
 Guerrero v. RTC – brothers and sisters does not comprehend sisters-in-law
 Ayson and Maria Hontiveros are considered strangers to the Hontiveros
family for purposes of Article 151.
Siari Valley Estates, Inc. petitioner vs Filemon Lucasan, et al., respondents
August 31, 1960
CFI of Zamboanga del Norte ordered Filemon Lucasan to deliver to Siari Valley
Estates, Inc. the cattle inside his pasture or pay its value amounting to 40,000.00
and damages in another sum of 40, 000. This was affirmed by SC and became final
and executory inasmuch as a writ of execution was even issued. In carrying out the
writ though, the sheriff proceeded to levy on certain parcels of land belonging to
defendant Filemon. Such lands were sold by the sheriff at a public auction to the
corporation as the highest bidder on Jan 1956. On the same month, the sheriff
issued in favor of the SVE the final certificate of sale since Lucasan wasn’t able to
redeem the land within the one-year period. The final certificate of sale was
registered duly. SVE failed to take possession of the land despite the writ of
possession. SVE filed a motion to have the land placed under its possession.
Debtor and respondent Filemon filed an opposition alleging he was in possession of
one of the parcels of land sold at the auction, on which he had a house erected and
which he has extrajudicially constituted as family home as registered on register of
deeds on June 21, 1955. Filemon contends that since H&L constituted his family
home, it was beyond reach of judicial execution.
Upon a second motion for reconsideration, the court rendered an order allowing SVE
to take possession of all lands sold, with the exception of parcel 1 on which
Filemon’s family home was because the levy and sale made by the sheriff with
regard to parcel 1 are null and void for not being effected in accordance with
Section 14, Rule 39 in relation to Sec7 Rule 59, ROC.
WON notice of levy upon land of Filemon was valid
No. Parcel 1 is a registered land and is real property. As such, it shall be levied on in
like manner and with life effect as under an order of attachment (Sec14Rule39).
Hence, in order for a notice of levy upon it to be valid, reference to the number
of its certificate of title, volume and page in the registry book where the
title is registered (which was nonexistent, in this case) must be attached to the
description of the property itself. Such are to be filed with register of deeds together
with order of levying. (Sec7Rule59). This is to ensure that the debtor as well as a 3rd
person may be informed of the particular land or property under the custody of the
court.
WON the family home extrajudicially established by Filemon on lot and house in
question exempts from execution
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Yes. The reason why a familyt home constituted after a debt has been incurred is
not exempt from execution is to protect the creditor against a debtor who may act
in bad faith by resorting to such declaration to defeat claims against him. Money
judgment in question comes within the purview of the word debt in Article 243 (2)
of NCC (“Family home extrajudicially executed shall be exempt from execution
except for debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in registry of
property”)
Modequillo v. Breva
Petition to review the decision of CA. 1990.
FACTS:
In Jan 1988, CA held that Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally
are liable to the Salinas and Culan-Culan sps by way of compensating for the death
and damages to the victims.
Consequently, in July 1988, the sheriff levied on a 600 sq meter parcel of residential
land located in Davao del Sur registered in the name of Jose Modequillo and a 3
hectare parcel of agri’l land also in the name of Modequillo.
A motion to quash/set aside the levy of execution was filed by Modequillo alleging
that the 1st parcel of land is where the family home is built since 1969 and such is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Art 153 & 153 FC. As to
the agri’l land, it is alleged to be still part of the public land.
ISSUE: WON the Modequillo’s family home is exempt from execution
HELD: No, for the debt or liability was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident
on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the
appellate court on Jan 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the FC on Aug 3,
1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution under FC. As to
the agri’l land, the sheriff shall levy on whatever rights the petitioner may have on
the land.
Petition dismissed.
NOTES: Under FC, a family home is deemed constituted on a H&L from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially
or extrajudicially as required in the CC. If the family actually resides in the
premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before
extending credit to the sps or head of the family who owns the home.
Taneo, Jr. vs. CA [March 9, 1999]
Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision
Petitioners: Pablito Taneo, Jr., Jose Taneo, Nena Catubig & husband, Cilia Moring &
husband
Respondents: Court of Appeals & Abdon Gilig
Facts:
• Lazaro Ba-a owned a land w/c he sold to Pablo Taneo, dad of petitioners on
Sept 18, 41 by virtue of an Escritura de Venta.
• July 19, 1951: Gilig & wife filed case for recovery of prop against Pablo.
• March 7, 1964: Pablo constituted house in ques erected on land of Plutarco
Vacalares as family home but notarized only on May 2, 1965 & registered
w/Register of Deeds on June 24, 1966.
• June 24, 1964: Judgment in favor of Gilig, ordering Pablo to pay Gilig P5k
for damages.
• Nov. 22, 1965: writ of execution issued against Pablo’s properties.
• Dec.1, 1965: Notice of Levy executed wherein properties in dispute were
among those levied. One land was about 5 hec while the other was a family
home. Both are located at Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental.
• Feb. 12, 1966: lands were sold in pub bidding where Gilig was highest
bidder.
• March 2, 1966: Certificate of Sale registered w/ Register of Deeds.
• April 20, 1966: Rufino Arriola filed case vs Gilig for recovery of prop and/or
annulment of sale w/damages. RTC & CA dismissed case declaring alleged sale
executed by Gilig in favor of Arriola as null & void for being fictitious & executed
in fraud of creditors.
• Feb. 9, 1968: petitioners failed to redeem land so final deed of conveyance
was executed, definitely selling, transferring & conveying prop to Gilig.
• Oct. 13, 1973: Pablo’s application for free patent on land in ques was
approved. Such was unknown to Gilig. Patent & title were issued on Dec. 10,
1980.
• Nov. 5, 1985: petitioners filed action to declare deed of conveyance void &
quiet title over land w/ prayer for writ of prelim injunction. They alleged that:
1. They were children & heirs of Pablo Taneo & Narcisa Valaceras who died on
Feb. 12, 77 & Sept 12, 84 respectively.
2. Prop acquired thru free patent & as such, it’s inalienable & not subj to
encumbrance for payment of debt pursuant to CA No. 141.
3. They continuously, openly & peacefully possessed lands until Feb. 9, 68
when Sheriff Yasay issued deed of conveyance in favor of Gilig, including
their family home w/c was extrajudicially constituted in accordance w/law.
4. Gilig was able to obtain tax declaration & such cast doubt over their title &
ownership.
• Respondents contentions:
1. he lawfully acquired properties thru sheriff’s sale on Feb. 12, ’66.
2. sale became final as no redemption was made w/in 1 yr fr registration of
certificate of sale.
3. CA confirmed validity of sale in case, Arriola v. Gilig.
4. Lazaro Ba-a, original owner of land, sold land to Pablo Taneo on Sept. 18,
41 proven by an Escritura de Venta. Even if it was a priv land, Taneo filed
an application for free patent w/c became final only in 1979.
5. He presented counterclaim that petitioners still possessed land & thus he
has been deprived of acts of ownership & possession & prayed for payment
of rentals.
• RTC: dismissed. Declared null & void OCT & Free Patent under
Pablo Taneo’s name & directed Register of Deeds to cancel such. Likewise
declare Gilig as absolute & legal owner of land & house in ques & is entitled to
possess same & ordering petitioners vacate house & to refrain from disturbing
Gilig’s peaceful possession. Ordered petitioners to pay reasonable rental.
• CA affirmed in toto.
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• Petitioners invoke Sec. 118, CA No. 141, claiming that land under • But SC ruled in Manacop vs. CA: doesn’t mean that Art. 153 has
free patent, such as land in dispute, can’t be alienated or encumbered. Cited retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have
Oliveros vs. Porciongcola and Gonzaga vs. CA. Ratio of law: give homesteader been constituted as family home at time of their occupation prior to effectivity
or patentee every chance to preserve for himself & his family land w/c State of FC & are exempt from execution for payment of oblig incurred pre-FC
had gratuitously given to him as reward for his labor in cleaning & cultivating it. effectivity. Proper interpretation would be that all existing family residences at
the time of FC effectivity are considered family homes & are PROSPECTIVELY
Issues & Ratio: entitled to benefits accorded to family home under FC. Thus, for debts incurred
1. WON land in dispute can’t be encumbered pursuant to Sec. 118 of CA No. pre-FC effectivity, prop is not exempt fr attachment.
141-NO • Applicable law would be CC w/c required registration. CC provides for some
• Intent of the law is clear as SC has ruled in Republic vs. CA: Homestead instances when family home’s NOT EXEMPTED fr execution, forced
laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of State to land- sale/attachment & among these is for debts incurred before the declaration was
destitute citizens for their home & cultivation. State prohibits sale/encumbrance recorded in the Registry of Prop. Since money judgment/debt was
w/in 5yrs after grant of patent. Alienation is impliedly permitted after that 5-yr rendered/incurred on JAN. 24, 1964 before the house was erected on MAR. 7,
period. But such is subj to rt of repurchase by homesteader, his widow/heirs 1964 and instrument constituting it as family home was registered on JAN. 24,
w/in 5yrs. It aims to preserve & keep in family of homesteader that portion of 1966, the family home is not exempted fr execution or forced sale.
pub land State had gratuitously given to him. Rt to repurchase exists even if • Besides, constitution was violative of law since it was erected not on the
conveyance is made by his widow/heirs. land of Pablo but on land of Plutarco Vacalares. House should be constructed on
• But the prohibition in the provision does not apply to petitioners w/c a land NOT belonging to another. Shows that constitution was just an
provides that alienation/encumbrance of lands acquired under free patent or afterthought to escape execution of prop but to no avail.
homestead provisions will not be allowed from date of approval of application & Held: Petition denied for lack of merit.
for a term 5 yrs fr & after date of issuance of patent/grant except in favor of
gov’t or any of its branches, units or institutions or legally constituted banking
corporations nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of debts contracted
prior to expiration period but improvements/crops on land may be
mortgaged/pledged to qualified persons, assoc, corp. Meaning, prohibition on
alienation begins on date of approval of application and it will end 5 yrs after
the issuance of the patent (affirmed in Amper v. Presiding Judge).
• Thus, conveyance thru sheriff’s sale was not violative of law because the
judgment obligation of petitioners against Gilig arose on JUNE 24, 1964,
properties were levied & sold on FEB. 12, 1966 and final deed of conveyance
was executed on FEB. 9, 1968. But the application for free patent was approved
only on OCT. 19, 1973. Meaning, prohibition on alienation only began on OCT.
19, 1973 and lasted until Dec. 10, 1985 or 5 yrs after free patent was issued on
Dec. 10, 80, all of these took place after property was sold. In fact, when
application was approved, Pablo was no longer the lawful owner & he no longer
had rts over the prop that he could transfer to petitioners. Debts contracted
prior to the application are not covered by the prohibition.
2. WON the family home was constituted by Pablo & thus exempt fr
execution-NO
• Family home: dwelling place of a person & his family. It’s a real rt w/c is
gratuitous, inalienable & free fr attachment, constituted over dwelling place &
land on w/c it’s situated. It confers upon family the rt to enjoy prop w/c must
remain w/person constituting it & his heirs. It can’t be seized by creditors
except in special cases.
• CC Art. 224-251: Family home may be constituted judicially (by filing
petition & w/ court approval) or extrajudicially (recording of pub instrument in
proper registry of prop declaring establishment of family home).
• FC Art. 153: Registration no longer needed. Family home’s deemed
constituted on house & lot fr time it’s occupied in the family residence &
continues as long as beneficiaries actually reside therein. It’s exempt fr
execution, forced sale/attachment, except as provided & to extent of value
allowed by law.
• Petitioners claim that dad constituted home as early as 1964.