Professional Documents
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the Air Force at Warner Robins Air Logistics Center ("Agency"). Grievant is a
("Union"). The rights and obligations vis-a-vis Grievant and the Agency are governed
by the Master Labor Agreement ("MLA"), which was introduced at the arbitration
hearing as JX 1. Air Force Regulations 40-630 and 40-750 also govern and were
Sometime during the week beginning July 24, 1994 (the precise date is
unclear, as is discussed more fully below), Grievant called in and asked to be placed
on sick leave. During the latter part of the work week beginning August 1, 1994,
Grievant. The Supervisor was aware that Grievant worked at Peach Auto Painting
and Collision ("Peach Auto"), when not working at the Agency, and the Supervisor
work at the Agency. Grievant indicated that he had a doctor's certificate to be out for
two weeks. When Grievant returned to work on August 8, 1994, the Supervisor
interviewed Grievant about working at Peach Auto when Grievant supposedly was
too ill to work at the Agency. Grievant replied that he had only to sit at a desk on his
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job at Peach Auto.
The Supervisor informed Grievant that the Supervisor had recorded Grievant
as being AWOL (JX 3, p 14, Memo for Record dated August 8, 1994) on Agency
attendance records (JX 3, p 11). By Memorandum dated August 18, 1994, the
August 4 and 5, 1994 (JX 3, p 12). Grievant replied, with the assistance of a Union
representative, in a writing dated September 21, 1994 (see JX 3, p 9, ¶ 2), but the
reply was not submitted into evidence at the arbitration hearing and so is not before
the Arbitrator.
By Memorandum dated October 13, 1994 (JX 3, p 9), the Agency notified
Grievant that he was being suspended for 10 days, beginning October 17, 1994, and
ending October 26, 1994, for unauthorized absence on August 4 and 5, 1994.
Grievant responded by filing AFMC Form 913, Standard Grievance Record (see JX
3, pp 5-6), claiming reliance on Article 24 of the MLA, covering Sick Leave (JX 1,
pp 101-104), AFR 40-630, and any and all governing Regulations (JX 3, p 6). Acting
pursuant to Article 6, §6.07 of the MLA, by letter dated October 19, 1994 (JX 3, pp
(JX 3, pp 7-8), which recites that a Step 2 meeting was held November 1, 1994 (see
MLA, Article 6, §6.07.b; JX 1, p 28). Again acting pursuant to Article 6, §6.07 of the
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MLA (see JX 1, pp 28-29), by letter dated November 15, 1994, the Union appealed
(JX 3, p 2). The Agency rendered a final denial of the grievance, by letter dated
December 6, 1994 (JX 3, p 1). The Union requested arbitration under MLA, Article 7
(JX 1, pp 32-39).
Difficulties Encountered
The facts of the matter are unclear. Consider, for example, the issue as to the
date Grievant called in and asked to be placed on sick leave. The record contains the
following evidence:
1. In JX 3 on p 3, in the Union's letter of October 19, 1994, the Union asserts that
Grievant called in on July 24, 1994.
2. In JX 3 on p 7, the Agency asserts that the date was July 28, 1994.
3. Again, in JX 3 on p 12, the Agency asserts that Grievant called in on July 28,
1994.
4. In JX 3 on p 15, the Supervisor asserts that the date was July 28, 1994.
5. At the hearing held on July 14, 1995, Grievant testified that he called in on
July 26, 1994.
In the face of such conflicting evidence, the Arbitrator's task becomes difficult, if not
impossible.
narrow interpretation to the issue presented by the parties at the arbitration hearing as
JX 2:
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Was the 10 day suspension of Mr. William R. Willis for unauthorized absence
am 4 and 5 August 1994 issued for just cause? If not what should the remedy
be?
Preliminary Observations
4), at the hearing, he testified that he had no accumulated sick leave. The Agency
makes this point on the first page of its brief. AFR 40-630, Chapter 4, §4-1, a copy of
after initially having sought sick leave. The Agency's time records reflect that
Grievant was classified as being on LWOP during the first part of his absence (JX 3,
p 11). The Union makes no complaint over Grievant's initial classification as having
LWOP status. The import of these remarks is that, in so far as Grievant's absence on
August 4 and 5, 1994 is concerned, the most Grievant could hope to gain through
Grievant's Allegations
During the course of the telephone conversation which took place on August
4, 1994, Grievant informed the Supervisor that Grievant had a doctor's certificate
excusing Grievant from work for two weeks. The Supervisor requested a copy of the
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doctor's certificate. According to the Union's brief, "The grievant complied with the
supervisor's request and promptly sent it to him." See generally the first page of the
Union's brief; (JX 3, p 16) It is a fair inference from representations made by the
Union during the grievance procedure, that Grievant sent the doctor's certificate (JX
following night, Mr. Willis sent the excuse to Mr. Walker by a co-worker.").
The Union alleges that "Mr. Walker refused to accept the doctor's certificate."
Union brief, second page. This allegation overlooks the fact that the doctor's
certificate (JX 3, p 16) is facially invalid. AFR 40-630, Chapter 3, §3-4.b (JX 5),
When measured against this governing standard, it is clear that this doctor's
certificate does not pass muster. For example, among its many defects is a lack of any
procedure, Grievant sought to supplement the original doctor's certificate (JX 3, p 16)
with a copy of the doctor's bill (JX 3, p 18), which purports to contain a diagnosis.
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However, the handwritten "diagnosis" is illegible, and neither at the hearing nor in
post-hearing brief did Grievant provide any insight into the doctor's diagnosis. At the
hearing, Grievant introduced another doctor's certificate (UX 8) dated June 23, 1995,
having even more defects than the original certificate (JX 3, p 16), among them being
a lack of diagnosis.
On the second page of Grievant's brief, Grievant further alleges that the
Supervisor "failed to process the grievant through the base medical facility, or seek
Grievant's position, the Union quotes AFR 40-630, Chapter 3, §3-4.b (JX 5), which
First, the quoted language is precatory, not mandatory; it does not compel the
Agency to consult with the installation's medical officer. Perhaps more importantly,
the Agency has sought Grievant's permission to contact Grievant's physician, in order
incongruous for Grievant to assert that the Agency "failed to Process the grievant
through the base medical facility, or seek any competent medical advice or opinion
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concerning the matter," while at the same denying the Agency access to his medical
himself.
40-630, Chapter 4, §4-1, a copy of which is attached to the Agency's brief and which
[LWOP] must not be confused with absence without leave (AWOL) which is
charged for unauthorized absence or absence for which the employee's leave
request was denied or unjustified.
The quoted language certainly indicates that the Agency was acting within the scope
absence for which the employee's leave request was denied or unjustified."
Grievant fails to address adequately AFR 40-630, Chapter 3, §3-4.h (JX 5),
As a general rule, sick leave is not approved for a period of absence during
which an employee engages in outside employment. Exception is made when
the nature of the employee's illness or disability and the nature of the outside
employment make it clearly evident that the employee is still incapacitated for
the regular job even though engaging in outside employment. However, before
engaging in outside employment during a period of sick leave, the employee
must notify the leave approving official of the nature of the employment and
furnish acceptable evidence that they are still incapacitated for duty. …
At most, on the third page of Grievant's brief, Grievant asserts that he "was
never informed by anyone as to outside work." The record does not support such an
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assertion; in particular, Grievant did not so testify. Moreover, even assuming that
Grievant were entitled to some sort of individualized notice about the terms of the
MLA (and the record reveals no such entitlement), as between these parties, it would
Grievant did not obtain prior permission to engage in outside employment or obtain a
medical clearance before doing so. Grievant simply decided on his own to take off
The Union attached three unsworn statements and copies of what are alleged
to be business cards of Agency employees who engage in work outside the Agency.
These materials were not adduced at the hearing and have no foundation. Even if they
were received into evidence, they would have no probative value. The Agency never
has taken the position that employees may not have outside interests; all that is
required is that they pursue those interests at appropriate times so as not to interfere
Grievant has not addressed the issue of whether, if he was AWOL August 4
and 5, 1994, the Agency acted within the scope of its authority in suspending him for
10 days, pursuant to AFR 40-750; see JX 4, p 23, ¶ 4. Therefore, the Arbitrator need
not address the issue. In suspending Grievant for 10 days, the Agency took into
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account a prior disciplinary action against Grievant (JX 4, p 23; JX 3, p 12, ¶ 3), as it
is authorized to do.
Conclusion
Following attendance at the hearing held July 14, 1995 (no transcript was
made), review of exhibits and notes of the hearing, and study of the parties' briefs, the
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