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James S. Cooper
I Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas 77058
16. Abstract
18. D i s t r i b u t i o n Statement
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
Section Page
SUMMARY .................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ................................. 1
DESIGN STANDARDIZATION .......................... 2
Computerized Control Station ........................ 2
O v e r p r e s s u r e Problems ........................... 11
Fluids .................................... 14
iii
Section Page
AUTOMATION ................................ 14
iv
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FIGURES
Figure Page
1 Acceptance checkout equipment (ACE) control room ......... 2
9 Flexible hoses
10 Ha r dli ne s
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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT
GROUND-SUPPORT EQU IPMENT
By James S. Cooper
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
The responsibility for ground-support equipment (GSE) and site readiness was
assigned to a n organization within the pol lo Spacecraft P r o g r a m Office. This orga-
nization exercised GSE management control over the 'two prime spacecraft contractors,
Management responsibility encompassed providing total capability for vehicle test and
checkout a t the factories, development centers, and launch sites, and ensuring opera-
tionally ready facilities and support equipment for each site/facility/vehicle combina-
tion.
Several aspects of the GSE program a r e examined in this report. Each aspect
w a s important to the development of the total program and could m e r i t presentation
as a s e p a r a t e report; however, a more effective presentation results from combining
them into a single report. The discussion of the Apollo GSE program experience is
followed by recommendations f o r u s e in future programs. These recommendations
are not linked to specific problems; instead, the recommendations are based on gen-
eral p r a c t i c e s that evolved and proved to be useful during the Apollo P r o g r a m .
A s a n aid to the r e a d e r , where necessary the original units of measure have been
converted to the equivalent value i n the SystGme International d'Unit6s (SI). The SI
units are written f i r s t , and the original units a r e written parenthetically thereafter.
DESIGN STANDARDIZATION
2
possible because the networks a t the various test sites were similar. This standard-
ization, coupled with test requirements and procedural similarity, permitted a close
correlation of test data f r o m the factory to the launch pad. Thus, the probability of
detection of any spacecraft systems degradation during preflight testing was enhanced.
During manufacturing, the cable types were terminated in 61- and 62-pin con-
nectors. In a single A-size drawing (21.6 by 28 centimeters (8. 5 by 11 inches)), the
variations of a specific cable type were documented. Dash numbers were assigned to
specify different lengths and connector types (figs. 2 and 3). The u s e of standard
cable types resulted in a significant reduction i n cable fabrication time and cost.
Without this standardized design, i t would have been difficult to deliver the electrical
GSE cables (approximately 25 000 of all types) in time to support Apollo testing.
3
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DES I GN INADEQUACIES
7
Cryogenic Simplification
The design Of the cryogenic servicing system was influenced by weight r e s t r i c -
tions on the mobile service structure. These restrictions, i n addition to a remote-
control requirement, led to the development of a system that used stowage tanks,
pumping units, and vacuum- jacketed lines to convey liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen
f r o m the ground to the spacecraft (91-meter (300-foot) level). However, the heat leak
over this distance w a s greater than had been anticipated; therefore, a hydrogen
subcooler w a s installed. This improvement provided, at best, a marginal tra nsfer
system.
Use of the portable-tank concept resolved the heat-leak problem and enabled
the removal of stowage tanks, transfer units, hydrogen subcooler, and vacuum-
jacketed lines. Use of this concept also permitted local control at the spacecraft
level.
Checkout Requirements
Six factory test stands were planned to support separate command module and
service module checkouts. Subsequent analysis verified the feasibility of performing
these checkouts in a mated configuration using integrated stands. Consequently, the
number of test stands required was reduced to four (fig. 8).
Flexible Hoses
During initial site activation,
hardlines could not be routed to the GSE
because location was not defined. Hard-
lines were routed to bulkhead interfaces,
and flexible hoses were used to connect
bulkhead interface, GSE, and spacecraft
fittings (fig. 9). The use of hoses in
this manner resulted in the following
problems.
3 . The u s e of incorrectly
pressure-rated hoses created safety
hazards.
Figure 8. - Integrated checkout
station. 4. The interchange of incompat-
ible hoses among fluid sources created
system contamination and hazardous
conditions.
Because of these problems, many hoses were replaced with hardlines (fig. lo).
9
(a) Flexible hose at console. (b) Flexible hose routing.
10
Electrical Connectors
Many testing hours were lost because of improper procedures i n the mating and
demating of electrical connectors. To avoid this problem, a mate and demate connec-
tor checklist was implemented. Connections required for specific tests were con-
trolled by installing plastic connector locks that w e r e verified by quality control.
9 Electrical Problem s
1,
A spacecraft system/GSE assessment revealed that current and voltage levels
in excess of spacecraft specification limits could result if electrical GSE was improp-
erly adjusted o r operated o r if a GSE control component failed. Results of analysis
indicated that such a condition would overstress spacecraft components and could go
undetected in subsequent tests. Voltage- and current-limiting devices (such as c i r -
cuit breakers, fuses, diodes, and r e s i s t o r s ) were added to c o r r e c t this condition.
During the conceptual stages of the Apollo GSE design, direct current (dc) was
selected a s the type of primary power source to be used f o r control and monitor func-
tions. This selection was influenced by three important factors that greatly simpli-
fied the detailed design of the GSE end items. F i r s t , many commercially available
electrical components were designed to use 28 volts dc. Second, dc control signals
did not require the complex routing, grounding, and shielding techniques that were
required by alternating-current (ac) control signals. Third, and most important, the
GSE dc control system w a s more compatible with the spacecraft because the primary
Spacecraft power source was also dc.
11
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SPECIAL TESTEQUIPMENT
The need for factory test equipment that could be produced expeditiously and
without formal GSE controls resulted i n the fabrication of special test equipment.
The equipment was factory built, and good commercial standards and available
off-the-shelf components were used. Special test equipment was used on an interim
basis to fulfill the need for GSE created by expanded test requirements. The hard-
ware was approved as "one of a kind, '' and no s p a r e s were provided. Some special
test equipment was built to GSE documentation standards and was identified later as
GSE f o r u s e on subsequent vehicles.
13
CLEANLINESS AND ENVl RONMENTAL CONTROL
T o achieve reliable performance of the Apollo system, all operations that involved
vehicle buildup, testing, and shipping had to be performed in a cleanroom environment.
The GSE fluid- systems cleanliness was controlled by a specification that defined allow-
able contamination levels.
FI uids
The spacecraft fluid-systems
design specification required that the
system be free of particles l a r g e r than
100 mic rome ters. The fluid-servicing
GSE w a s designed and maintained to
exceed this stringent cleanliness re quire-
ment. Particulate contamination was
a constant problem because of the neces-
sity of using flexible hose s, which con-
taminated the fluid, and the inability to
perform in-place cleaning because of
syste m design. The contamination prob-
l e m was minimized by installing filters
at the vehicle interface.
AUTOMATION
Figure 13. - Cleanroom garments.
13ec aus e of de iiiandi ng A poll o
schedules, spacecraft test activities
had to be accomplished expeditiously within the accuracy ranges necessary to ensure
maximum safety and mission s u c c e ss, Spacecraft subsystems w e r e verified simul-
taneously and i n parallel with some manufacturing operations. Many checkout and
servicing operations were automated to reduce test time and to meet required
schedules.
14
Automated Checkout
The electrical checkout and fluid- servicing functions f m the Apollo spacecraft
subsystems w e r e commanded and monitored from a remotely located computerized
control room (fig. 1). Within this control room, computer routines were used to apply
spacecraft subsystem test stimuli. Related spacecraft responses were displayed on
subsystem consoles and monitored for out-of-tolerance conditions. Subroutines were
used f o r fault isolation t e s t s during troubleshooting operations. The automation of
factory test and launch control sequences was instrumental in achieving a well coor-
dinated and expeditious spacecraft checkout and launch operation (ref. 1).
Automated Servicing
Safety and operational considerations dictated that the fluid- servicing equipment
be designed for both local and remote operation. Control panels for local operation
are shown i n figures 14 and 15.
15
sampling of fluids. By rescheduling tasks during nonhazardous operations and by
changing some of the requirements, most of the servicing w a s accomplished locally,
and the parameters were displayed both locally and remotely in the computerized
control room.
The increase i n acceptance checkout equipment (ACE) control room displays
progressed to the point where the memory capacity of the ACE computer had very
little growth potential. This limitation i n ACE memory would result in data being
provided to the test operators on a delayed basis by posttest data reduction, which
would be especially unfeasible when data analysis from one test was required before
the s t a r t of the next test. In 1968, the ACE memory capacity was increased by
24 000 memory bits to permit planned operations and allow f o r future growth in ACE
control room displays.
3. Category A-3: Equipment in this category was designed for multiple appli-
cations. Modifications to the original designs were necessary for specific u s e s . The
using contractor had total responsibility for the hardware.
16
site readiness was assessed by the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC)
(formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC)) i n monthly management review
meetings. When launch, vehicle, and test schedules changed, specific "need dates"
for GSE end items changed. These changes were reflected in the GSE production
plans and delivery schedules.
After initial site activation, site readiness for follow-on vehicles was determined
in an MSC and contractor review meeting conducted just before vehicle arrival for test
o r launch. This effort included a physical inspection of the s i t e s and associated GSE.
A l l pertinent documentation, such as modification-installation status reports, open
engineering o r d e r s , quality and reliability control records, and interface control docu-
ment revisions, was reviewed in detail for open work,
Contractor proposals for GSE overhauls were based on usage, age, o r failure
history. These proposals were evaluated to determine the extent of overhaul. The
following considerations were included.
4. Availability of spares
Recommendation s
The following material is presented primarily as recommendations for use in
future programs.
17
be accomplished. Standardization of calibration data and some computer programs
permitted a close correlation of test data from the factory to the launch pad.
Ground- support equipment was standardized to reduce the number of different units,
to reduce the ground- support-equipment manufacturing time, and to reduce the
ground-support-equipment and spacecraft test time. Portability was a primary con-
sideration when fluid-servicing and test hardware were standardized.
18
other equipment (such as diagnostic test tools, special manufacturing devices, and
workstends). Class 2 equipment would require minimum configuration control a t the
using site; changes could be authorized by the resident manager.
19
Maintenance and overhaul. - Preventive maintenance should be performed on a
periodic basis. All contractors and vendors should be required to deliver preventive
maintenance procedures and age/life component-replacement data with the end items.
Initial procurement of these data is more economical than obtaining them l a t e r . When
possible, overhauls should be performed in conjunction with major modifications.
Concl usion s
Overall, the Apollo ground-support equipment performed satisfactorily. t
RE FERENCE
BOOK