Why is there Something Instead of Nothing?

by Gabe Czobel

This question is often posed as one of the most fundamental and formidable in all of philosophy, as it
would impact everything else. Philosophy typically is about things, even if only of an abstract nature. If
we could know the reason for there being things in the first place, this would establish some ground for
tackling philosophical questions about them. If we could somehow weigh the two opposites,
"something" and "nothing", and determine why contingency favours the former over the latter,
manifested by the simple fact that that is indeed the way things are, we may gain greater insight into the
nature of the former.

Philosophers through the ages have given this issue considerable attention. The 20th century German
philosopher, Martin Heidegger, looked at Nothing as what shaped Being and considered this the only
genuine philosophical question. His illustrious compatriot of the 17th century, G. W. Leibniz, asked in
his essay, On the Ultimate Origination of Things, "...why there is a world rather than nothing ..." in his
quest to some ultimate cause. As far back as the 5th c. BCE, Parmenides of Elea pondered the nature of
what exists and if it is possible for this not to be the case: "...What Is is; for it is to be,/ but nothing it is
not."

In other contexts, this question is often grandiloquently intoned as a profoundly sounding conundrum
in an attempt to bedevil the intellect, stop all argument as futile, and to imply some favoured first cause
or prime mover as inescapable.

Let's refer to the question "Why is there something instead of nothing?" by the label Q1. On the face of
it, Q1 appears to be quite sensible. Grammatically, it is simple and well formed, short, uses words that
are commonplace, and appear, at first glance, unequivocal. Semantically, it appears to belong to a
category of simple questions that aim to inquire into the reason for a straightforward, clear dichotomy.
Why did the coin come up heads instead of tails? Why is ice cold instead of hot? Why is water wet
instead of dry? And “nothing” is clearly the exclusive opposite -- the antithesis -- of “something”. But
is Q1 really sensible or is this just a linguistic deception? Does Q1 really pose a genuine problem of our
world or is it a pseudo problem? Can we really consider it to be a sensible task to apply our energies to
contemplate and try to answer this question or is it really a fool's errand in disguise?

Philosophically, Q1 appears to be a problem in metaphysics, dealing with existence and existents,

fundamental principles, and possibly causes. In order to treat it as a philosophical problem, in principle
amenable to a solution that is arrived at by pure reason, we assume that the solution would be
expressible in some language, natural or symbolic, as are all philosophical narratives. In other words,
since there is no area of philosophy that is not expressed linguistically -- that is the nature of
philosophy -- the solution to Q1, if it exists at all, should be no different. Hence, it would be prudent to
first examine Q1 itself linguistically, before seeking the metaphysical solution. Let's do just that.

It was granted above that grammatically or syntactically, there appears to be no problem with Q1. What
about semantically then, on the meaning of its words? Analysing Q1 from this perspective, we get the
following:

(i) The adverb "why" asks for a reason, cause, justification, or explanation. This is nothing but the
 common task of philosophy.

(ii) The phrase "is there" is the interrogative form of "there is", which connotes existence or a
state of affairs. In the structure of Q1, this phrase applies in equal measure to both "something"
and "nothing". That is, we can restate Q1 as Q2, "why is it the case that there is something instead
of the case that there is nothing?"

(iii) The idiom "instead of" connotes exclusive alteration, one or the other exclusively, a pure
dichotomy.

(iv) The pronoun "something" refers to at least one thing, as yet unspecified (some), an item,
entity, object, existent, but above all, it entails a form of existence inherently. No pronoun can refer
to a noun that does not exist in some fashion. Even of fictitious things, unicorns say, the commonly
held notion of unicorn exists as a distinct human mental impression, a neural brain state, even if a
material one doesn't. That is, existence does not need to be restricted only to material existence.
The same may be said of abstract concepts like civilisation, heat, value, guidance, mathematics,
hope, etc.

The crucial part of "something" in this context is "thing". So we need to ask just what qualifies as a
"thing". Strictly, consequent to grammatical usage, no noun or noun-like syntactical particle may
be excluded! In fact, we are familiar only with things in the world. That is, our world, as we know
it, is entirely composed of what we have no choice but to call "things". We know of concrete
things, as well as immaterial things such as energy, fields, space, time, events, the laws of nature
and logic, and even concepts like axiom, love, eternity, infinity, civility, activity, our
consciousness, etc. These are all, unequivocally, things and are noun-like!

(v) The noun "nothing" is then taken to refer to the polar opposite of "something". As the question
is posed, on account of the idiom "instead of", "something" and "nothing" are presented as
exclusive, diametric opposites. There are no other possible choices, a pure dichotomy. Whatever
"something" is semantically, "nothing" is not such a "something", pure and simple. And if
"nothing" is not "something", as yet unspecified, it is certainly not a reference to anything specific
at all, that may be taken to be a "thing"!

Based on this semantic analysis, the philosophical problem posed by Q1 may be restated as P1,
"Provide an explanation for the fact of the matter that there exists something as opposed to the polar
opposite that there exists nothing." Or it may be restated as P2, "Provide an explanation for the fact of
the matter that there exists something as opposed to the polar opposite," which simply leaves the polar
opposite unstated! P2 is simply hedging by not committing to a specific expression for the polar
opposite, such as "there exists nothing" for this reason. The phrase "there exists nothing" appears to be
inherently problematic. The notion of "nothing" , a non-existent, conjoined with "there exists",
blatantly grates on the mind as an incongruity. Existence is strictly attributed to things, the very
opposite of "nothing". On this view, where "nothing" is taken to be the object of "there exists", P1
certainly does not make sense. How can we talk of the existence of a non-existent?

Clearly, the noun "nothing" is the semantic part of Q1 and P1 that is being revealed to be the challenge
here. What if we view the phrase "there exists nothing" instead to mean something like "there does not
exist anything whatsoever"? Now we are looking at the notion of the absence of the existence of any
existent instead of the troubling notion of the existence of a non-existent. This seems more promising!
Maybe P1 can be salvaged as a sensible philosophical problem.
In common usage, the noun "nothing" is usually not considered problematic. That is why it is an easily
understood term and forms a largely unequivocal part of the lexicon. We can conceptualise "nothing"
in various contexts to mean the absence of something that may, under other circumstances, just be
there. To say that I have nothing in my pockets means that it is otherwise possible that my pockets
could contain change, some keys, or even lint. To say that I have nothing in my bank account usually
means that, even though I could have some money in there under other circumstances, the fact of the
matter is that, at this time, I don't. To say that two people have nothing in common usually means that,
even though they may contingently share some common interests or traits, they in fact don't. To say
that nothing is more important than health is to assert that if we consider things that are important to
humans in order of increasing value of importance, there may conceivably be something that is ordered
ahead of health, but we can't imagine what it may be. This last assertion is, of course, somewhat
subjective.

In all these cases, the term "nothing" signifies an absence of some thing or things. Something may have
been there at some time but was taken away or could be easily conceived to be taken away had it been
there. Or what is absent may conceivably have been there in some world, but according to the way
things are in this world, it is not. But above all, in all these cases, the absence is framed by a larger
context, such as my pockets, bank account, two people with attributes, important things, etc. The
contextual frame itself does not get taken away nor become absent. The frame remains to demarcate the
absence or void created by what was taken away, or conceived to be removed or absent. And the
absence usually implicitly refers to that of something fairly specific in these contexts, like objects that
may fit in my pocket, monetary value in my bank account, traits of people, or values that are important.
To say that I have nothing in my pocket precludes, by common sense, the possibility of an elephant
being in there but really not there now, and ignores the air that is in there at the time I make the
assertion. Similarly, to say that I have nothing in my bank account is usually not intended to mean that
I could have had moths in there, but now they are gone. The context precludes the likelihood of that.

But clearly, the sense of "nothing" in Q1 and P1, where it is posed as the antithesis of "something",
does not fit the above common pattern. The specific absences in the above examples exclude endless
somethings which are not taken away, as well as exclude endless somethings precluded by the context.
Also, the contextual frame itself is a something which does not get taken away. But to be the true
antithesis of "something", everything needs to be taken away, or absent, including the frame itself,
because the frame itself is something! Is this even possible or conceivable? Does it really make sense?
Once the final frame is removed, just what is the nature of that remaining "nothing", or the absence of
anything whatsoever, which P1 purports to counterpose against "something" in order to present the
problem for which P1 directs us to seek an explanation?

To make more clear this metaphysical difficulty presented by a strict semantic interpretation of P1, let's
start by drawing up a broad catalog of things in the world that we are aware of and whose removal
would lead in the direction of attaining the antithesis of "something". The first obvious entry is all the
matter in the universe, including the currently theorised dark matter. This may be followed by all
energy, including again, the theorised dark energy, although with the equivalence established by the
Special Theory of Relativity, energy and matter should really tabulate as one entry. Space and time
would appear to be next on the list. But again, Relativity would proscribe disentangling these from each
other and from matter and energy. If we could absent matter-energy and space-time, would we still be
left with the laws of the universe somehow existing independently of all that they regulate?
Conceptually, this category is still a something, although we have not the slightest clue that it can stand
on its own apart from what it normally applies to, and thus be conceived to be taken away
independently. Those who hold to some form of substance dualism may conceive that consciousness
may yet remain as a thing to be taken away even after all material substances are gone. On a solipsistic
view, which very few would comfortably live by, yet is impossible to disprove, only the self exists to
be taken away. Again, even the solipsist has no clue about the nature of what would be left and how to
talk about it. We are clearly now approaching the most utterly speculative ground about things that may
be taken away in our attempt to work toward the desired "nothing", that is, the perfect antithesis of
"something." And the catalog is still not necessarily complete. Some view moral values as objective
truths of the world, and hence things that may be taken away independently of material things. How
about some abstract yet unspecified "state of affairs", some possible world? This would also be a thing
and may be taken away. And so on and so forth.

It becomes clear that anything that may be referred to by a noun or a noun-like syntactic particle may
be taken away on the road to ultimate, unframed "nothing" where there does not exist anything
whatsoever. Hence, if we are to refer in some manner to “what” is left after the completion of this
subtraction process, we could not really use a noun-like syntactic particle, such as nouns, noun phrases,
pronouns, gerunds, etc! We would need a syntactic particle that is a ¬noun, where the symbol “¬”
stands for “not”. This shows that the word "nothing", a noun, is not really appropriate in Q1 and P1 and
may really be considered just a placeholder for lack of something syntactically suitable. This is where
P2 is superior to P1 as it leaves the alternate to “something” unstated.

In grammar, there are many syntactic particles that are not nouns, such as verbs, adjectives, adverbs,
prepositions, conjunctions, etc. Of course, none of these are at all suitable to refer to our sought for
antithesis of "something" and would not make any sense at all in Q1 or P1 in following "instead of".
Even though P1 clearly cries out as an attempt to compare two states of affairs, one where at least
something exists and the other where nothing whatsoever exists, the simple impediment to this obvious
interpretation is that any state of affairs is itself a thing and can't really represent nothing.

We now arrive at the point, on account of the above subtraction process and the unavoidable syntactic
quandary, that brings us head-on into a collision with a philosophical brick wall for two substantial
reasons:

1 - It quickly becomes apparent as we contemplate subtracting matter, energy, space, time, abstractions,
and so on, that we haven't the faintest clue if these things may be subtracted independently or if some
of the items in our catalog even have independent existence. We haven't even an inkling about the
nature of what would remain as a result of these subtractions, or even if such subtractions would be
conceivable. And the reason for our ignorance here is that we are so firmly imbedded and evolved in a
space-time fabric containing matter and energy that our minds are just not structured to be able to
contemplate what their absence could possibly be like. Of course, one could always speculate about
this but any such speculation must be admitted to be no more than that. Such speculation is also
hindered by our having access only to reasoning that is itself inherently part of this fabric and may not
be at all appropriate outside of it, if there is even some “outside” in some fashion or other. It would be
the most fundamental error in reasoning to think that, even if such subtractions were conceivable, we
could apply our standard methods of reasoning to what remained, which we would need to do if we
were to meaningfully attempt any kind of an answer to Q1.

This conceptual error is a consequence of the easy deception of language. We can so effortlessly form
the words, "take time away" and even call what is left "a-temporal", as if that term actually said
something significant. We can easily form the words, "take space away" and even call what is left "a-
spatial" as if this actually provides some insight into such an act. But is there any more to this than
sheer linguistic speculation? No one can honestly claim to provide an answer any more than to assert
that the claim, "what is north of the North Pole is a-south-like," provides us with any insight
whatsoever about an actual possibility.

But philosophy is about discovering truths about the world using reason and what we already know
with some confidence. Rampant speculation about possible domains where we are entirely clueless and
where standard reasoning may not even apply, even if such speculation is couched in grandiose
terminology, is just so much vapour.

On this view, Q1 and P1 are far too premature to address even philosophically, on account of our lack
of knowledge and space-time perspective. Due to human limitations, and possibly limitations of the
nature of the universe, they may never be addressable. But there is an even more compelling and
substantial reason for our collision with a philosophical brick wall.

2 - If we have no syntactical particles to deal with the antithesis of "something" and philosophy deals in
linguistic narratives, just how would we approach Q1, P1 or even P2? Even in P2, although the
antithesis of "something" is not made explicit, eventually one would need to say something explicit
about it in order to provide the explanation that P2 calls for. Yet, we would simply be linguistically
incapable of uttering anything about the antithesis of "something" on account of the utter absence in
syntax of anything that could engage it, let alone provide an explanation as to just why it is the less
preferred contingency. This is not to say that philosophers don't try to square this circle anyway,
usually with plenty of terminological obscurantism to paper over this inescapable impediment,
especially since philosophy, as it stands, is typically not held to the same empirical standard that
science is.

We can now see that when Q1 is examined semantically, it is not unlike such pseudo questions as,
"Why is there no snow north of the North Pole?" or "What is the area of a one-sided coin?",
syntactically correct but semantically vacuous. With its enormous flexibility, language can so easily
deceive us into thinking that we may gainfully contemplate and hold forth on the transcendental, the
ineffable, and so on because language provides a toolkit (grammar) that is virtually infinitely flexible in
structuring the available lexicon, which itself is a treasure trove of not only precisely concrete but also
nebulously sublime notions. This makes language a superb vehicle for art in captivating our emotions
and elevating our spirits, but by the same token, it lays out a dangerous minefield in bedevilling our
intellect. In taking a linguistic approach to the question, "Why is there something instead of nothing?"
we may see why the renowned Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, lamented, "Most of the
propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical."

© 2011 by Gabe Czobel