Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

By Nature and by Art

Author(s): John Dewey
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 11 (May 25, 1944), pp. 281-292
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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VOLUME XLI, No. 11 MAY 25, 1944

THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY

BY NATURE AND BY ART

I
URRENT philosophical theories of knowledge are strangely
xJ neglectfulof the implicationsand consequencesof the revolu-
tion that has taken place in the actual subject-matterand methods
of scientificknowledge. In substance,this revolutionmay be said
to be one fromknowledgethat is such "by nature" to scientific
subject-matterwhich is what it is because it is "by art." The
classic scheme,followingAristotle,held that the subject-matterof
science,as the highestgrade of knowledge,is what it is because of
certaininherentforms,essences,or natures. These indwellingand
constitutivenatures are eternal, immutable, and necessary. It
followed that in the Greek-medievalsystem all sciences, from
astronomyto biology,were concernedwith species or kinds,which
are immutablythe same and eternallyseparated fromone another
by the fixednatures formingtheirinherentessences or Being.
Otherformsof knowledge,such as were called sense-perception
and opinion,were also what they were by the nature of their in-
herentBeings; or, more strictly,by the unchangeable and incor-
rigiblepartialityor defectof Being whichmarkedthem. For over
against fixedand eternal species constitutedby inherentessential
formswere the thingsthat change; thingsthat are generatedand
perish. Alteration,modifiability, mutability,are ipso facto proof
of instabilityand inconstancy. These in turn are proof of lack
of Being in its full sense. It is because of lack, or privation,of self-
contained and self-sufficient Being that some things are variable
and transient,now one thing and now another. The lack of in-
herent natures or essences is equivalent to dependence upon cir-
cumstancesthat are external,this dependence upon what is out-
side being manifestedin theirvariability. In classic terminology,
science is concernedwith "formal causes," that is, with inherent
natures which "cause" thingsto be what they are. Sense-knowl-
edge and opinion are inferiorformsof knowledgeconcernedwith
things which by their natures are so mutable that knowledgeof
them is itself unstable and shifting-as in the case of things
touched,heard, seen,
281
282 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

It should not be necessaryto dwell upon the fact that according

to what is now science what the ancient scheme relegated to an
inferiorposition,namely,efficientand material "causes," consti-
tutes the only legitimatesubject-matterof natural science,accept-
ance of the view that essential formsor natures are its subject-
matter accounting for the sterilityof science during the period
beforethe scientificrevolutionoccurred. Accordingto the ancient
doctrine,the subject-matterof sense-knowledge and opinion on one
side, and of science on the other,are foreverseparated by a gulf
that is impassable for the reason that it is cosmological and
ontological-that is, due to the very "being" of the subjects in-
volved. In what now constitutesscience,the difference is methodo-
logical. For it is due to methodsof inquiry,not to inherentna-
tures. Potentially the subject-mattersof sense and opinion are
science in the making; they are its raw material. Increased ma-
turityof the proceduresand techniquesof inquiry will transform
their material into scientificknowledge. On the other side, there
is no subject-matterof the scientifickind which is eternallythe
same and not subject to improvementwith furtherdevelopmentin
efficacy of inquiry-procedures.
The scientificrevolution,which put science upon the road of
steady advance and ever increasing fertility,is connected with
substitutionof knowledge"by art" for that said to be "by na-
ture." The connectionis not remote nor recondite. The arts
are concernedwith production,with generation,with doing and
making. They fall, therefore,withinthe domain of things which
in the classic schemeare mutable,and of which,accordingto that
scheme,scientificknowledgeis impossible. Accordingto the pres-
ent conduct of science and according to its conclusions,science
consistsof knowledgeof orders of change. While this fact marks
a completedeparture fromthe classic view, it does not sufficeof
itselfto justify calling scientificknowledgean art, though it pro-
vides a condition without which that designation is not war-
ranted, for it completelybreaks down the grounds upon which a
fixedand impassableline was originallydrawn betweenthe subject-
mattersof scienceand of art. For it connectssciencewithchange.
The consideration that completes the ground for assimilating
science to art is the fact that assignmentof scientificstatus in
any given case rests upon facts which are experimentallypro-
duced. Science is now the product of operations deliberately
undertakenin conformitywith a plan or project that has the
propertiesof a workinghypothesis. The value or validity of the
latter is tested,as in the case of any art, by what happens in con-
sequence of the operations it instigates and directs. Moreover,
 BY NATURE AND BY ART 283

science is assimilatedto the conditionsdefiningan art by the fact

that, as in the case of any industrial art, productionof relevant
and effective consequencesdependsupon use of artificiallydesigned
appliances and apparatus as means of executionof the plan that
directsthe operationswhichare undertaken.

II
It is an old and familiarstorythat "nature" is a word of many
senses. One of its senses has been mentioned. According to it,
the nature of that which is undergoinginvestigation,say combus-
tion, electricity,or whatever,is the subject-matterof scientific
generalizations. We still use the expression"the nature" of some-
thing or other in this sense, though,I imagine, with decreasing
frequency. But when we do use it in this sense, its meaning is
radically differentfromthat possessed by the same expressionin
the classic scheme. For it no longer designates a fixed and in-
herent essence, or Being, that makes facts to be what they are.
Instead, it signifiesan order of connectedchanges,an order which
is found to be fruitfullyeffectivein understandingand dealing
with particular changes. The differenceis radical.'
Another meaning of "nature" is cosmological. The word is
used to stand for the world,for the universe,for the sum total of
facts whichactually and potentiallyare the subject of inquiryand
knowledge. With respect to this sense of "nature," ancient phi-
losophy has an importatitadvantage over the general tenor of
modernphilosophy. For while modernphilosophyis conformable
to actual scientificpracticein eliminatingan ontologicaldifference,
or a differencein kinds of Being, between the eternal and the
changing,it has, unfortunately, tended to substitutefor this dif-
ferenceone equally fixedbetween supposed subjective and objec-
tive orders of Being.2 "Unfortunately" is in fact too mild and
neutral a word. For the net effecthas been to set up a seat and
agency of knowingover against Nature as that known. Hence the
"knower" becomesin effectextra-natural. Historically,the facts
of the case are easily explainable. For while in the Greekversion
mindin bothits sensibleand its rationaloperationswas a culminat-
ing manifestationor terminal "end," of natural facts, in the.
medieval version (out of which moderntheorygrew withoutout-
1-It may be remarkedin passing that the old sense of the "nature"I of a

thing still prevails in discussion of moral and social subjects; and this fact
may explain the continued stagnation and infertilityof inquiry in these fields.
2 Virtual synonymsare ''mental " and " physical"I orders,and "Ipersonal "
and "Iimpersonal," taken as separate and opposed with reference to their in-
herent stuffs or subject-matters.
284 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

growingsome of its major tenets) soul and mind took on definitely

supernatural traits. These traits, in a more or less attenuated
form,reappear in the extra-naturalknowing "subject" of mod-
ern philosophyas that is set over against the natural world as
"object."
To completethe statementof the termsof the question under
discussion,it is necessaryto note explicitlythe sense of "nature"
and " natural" in whichtheycontrastwith" art" and " artificial."
For in the cosmologicalsense of nature,the saying of Shakespeare
holds to the effectthat natureis made betterby no mean but nature
makes that mean; in the third sense of natural (that just men-
tioned), science is definitelyand conclusivelya matterof art, not
of nature.
We most readily lay hold of the meaningof this statementby
presentingto ourselvesa pictureof an astronomicalobservatoryor
a physicallaboratory. And we have to include as part of the pic-
ture the role of collectionsof books and periodicals,which operate
in the most intimateand vital workingconnectionwith the other
means by which science is carried on. For the body of printed
matteris what enables the otherwisehighlyrestrictedmaterial of
immediateperceptionto be linked with subject-mattershaving an
indefinitely wide spatial and temporalrange. For only in fusion
with book-materialdoes what is immediatelypresent take on sci-
entificstatus, and only in fusion with the latter does the former
cease to be "theoretical" in the hypotheticalsense of that word.
For only as culturallytransmittedmaterialwithits deep and wide
scope is anchored,refreshed,and tested throughcontinuallyhere-
and-now materials provided by direct experimentalobservations
does it becomea warrantedpart of authenticscience.
A furtherqualificationhas to be added to completethe state-
ment that science with respect to both methodand conclusionsis
an art. For there is a sense in which every form of knowledge
is an affairof art. For all knowledge,even the most rudimentary
such as is attributableto low-gradeorganisms,is an expressionof
skill in selectionand arrangementof materials so as to contribute
to maintenanceof the processes and operations constitutinglife.
It is not a metaphoricalexpressionto say that at the very least all
animals know how, in virtue of organic structure and physio-
logical processesin connectionwith trans-cuticularconditions,to
do thingsof this sort. When, then,it is said that science,as dis-
tinctfromothermodes of knowledge,is an art, the word "art" is
used with a differentialproperty. The operationsof search that
constitutethe art or skill markingother modes of knowledgede-
velop into re-search.
 BY NATURE AND BY ART 285
A more concrete qualification of the art which constitutes
scientificknowledge is its dependence upon extra-organicappli-
ances and instrumentalities, themselvesartificiallydevised. The
scientificrevolutionmay be said to have been initiated when in-
vestigatorsborrowedapparatus and processesfromthe industrial
arts and used them as means of obtaining dependable scientific
data. The use of the lens was of itself almost enough to revolu-
tionize the science of astronomy. As we look back, we note that
the bulk of early knowledgewas in fact built up throughthe pur-
suit of industrial and mechanical arts. The low social status of
artisans (in which class were included sculptors,architects,paint-
ers of pictures,musicians,in fact all producerssave those work-
ing with words) was "rationalized" in the doctrine of the in-
herentlyinferiorstate of all knowledgeof this kind. At best, it
was "empirical" in the disparaging sense of that word. Funda-
mentally,the scientificrevolutionconsisted of transformationof
"empirical" into experimental. The transformation was effected,
historically,by adoption, as means of obtaining scientificknowl-
edge, of devices and processespreviouslyemployedin industryto
obtain "material" ends-in that sense of "material" whichidenti-
fies "matter" with the menial and servile. After a period in
which natural knowledgeprogressedby borrowingfrom the in-
dustrial crafts,science enteredupon a period of steady and ever-
accelerated growthby means of deliberate inventionof such ap-
pliances on its own account. In order to mark this differential
feature of the art which is science, I shall now use the word
"'technology.' 8
Because technologies,a circularrelationshipbetweenthe arts
of
of productionand science has been established. I have already
spoken of the dependence of science as now conducted upon the
use of appliances and processessuch as were once confinedto the
"utilitarian" and "practical" ends to which a subordinate and
"base" status was attributedsocially and morally. On the other
hand, before the application in a return movementof science in
the industrial arts, production was a routine affair. It was
markedby imitationand by followingestablishedmodels and pre-
cedents. Innovation and invention were accidental rather than
systematic. Application of scientific conclusions and methods
8 While a number of writers have brought forward the facts which are
involved in this view, Dr. Clarence Ayres, as far as I am aware, was the first
one explicitly to call science a mode of technology. It is probable that I
might have avoided a considerable amount of misunderstandingif I had sys-
tematically used "technology" instead of "instrumentalism" in connection
with the view I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science as
knowledge.
286 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

liberated productionfromthis state-a state justifyinguse of the

adjective "empirical" in its disparaging sense. Through incor-
poration into the arts of productionof the methodsand conclu-
sions of science,they are capable of becoming"rational" in the
honorificsense of that word. The phrase "rationalization of pro-
duction" states a fact. Indeed, it may be said that the distinc-
tion betweenscience and othertechnologiesis not intrinsic. It is
dependent upon cultural conditions that are extrinsic to both
science and industry. Were it not for the influenceexerted by
these conditions,the differencebetween them would be conven-
tional to the point of being verbal. But as long as some tech-
nologies are carried on for personal profit at the expense of
promotionof the commonwelfare,the stigma of "materialism"
will continue to be attached to industrial technologies,and the
honorificadjective "idealistic" will be monopolizedby the tech-
nology which yields knowledge-especially if that knowledge is
"pure" -that is, in the classic view, uncontaminatedby being put
to "practical" use.
III
Valuable instructionconcerninga numberof mooted problems
in the theoryof knowledgemay be derived from the underlying
principlesof the prior discussion. One of them,perhaps the most
obvious on the surface, is the fact that many classificationsand
distinctionswhich have been supposed to be inherentor intrinsic
to knowingand knowledgeare in fact due to socio-culturalcondi-
tionsof a historical,and thereforetemporaland local, sort. There
is the fact (upon which I have dwelt at length in previous writ-
ings) of the arbitrary and irrelevantnature of the sharp line
drawn in the classic philosophicaltraditionbetween "theoretical"
and "practical" knowledge. The gulf that was supposed to sepa-
rate themis in fact merelya logical corollaryof the view that the
proper subject of scientificknowledgeis eternal and immutable.
The connectionof science with change and the connectionof the
methodsof science with experimentalproductionof change have
completelyvitiatedthis doctrine. The infertilityof natural knowl-
edge before adoption of the experimentalmethod is attributable,
in large measure, to the fact that ancient and medieval science
tookthe materialof ordinaryobservation"as is"; that is, in lumps
and chunksas given "naturally" in a ready-madestate. In con-
sequence, the only treatmentto which it could be subjected was
dialectical.
What is not so obvious upon the surface is that a theoryof
knowledgebased upon the conductand conclusionsof science does
 BY NATURE AND BY ART 287

away, once and for all, with the fixeddifferencesupposed to exist

between sense-knowledgeand rational-knowledge.The sensory
aspect of knowledgeis strictlyan aspect. It is distinguishablein
intellectual analyses that are undertaken for special purposes.
But it is not, as it was long taken to be, a special kind of knowl-
edge nor yet a separate componentin knowledge. It is that aspect
of the systemof knowledge,in and by whichknowledgeextending
across an indefinitely extensivespatial and temporalrange of facts
is anchoredand focalized in that whichis here-and-now. Without
demonstratedanchorage of this sort, any system,no matter how
well organized with respect to internal consistency,is "theoreti-
cal" in the sense of being hypothetical. On the other hand, the
"rational" aspect of knowledge is constitutedby the corpus of
extantknowledgewhichhas been constitutedby priorinquiriesand
whichis so organizedas to be communicable-and hence applicable
to resultsof furtherinquiry by which the old systemis corrected
and extended.
The principle underlyingthese special mattersis that the legi-
timate subject-matterof a theoryof knowledge consists of facts
that are known at a given time, with, of course, the proviso that
the proceduresby whichthis body of knowledgehas been built up
are an integralpart of it. This view of the groundsof a competent
theoryof knowledgestands in open oppositionto that whichunder-
lies the epistemologicaltheory: the postulate, namely, that no
subject-matteris entitledto be called knowledgeuntil it has been
shownto satisfyconditionsthat are laid down prior to any case of
actual knowledgeand independentlyof any conclusionreached in
the course of the inquiries by which knowledgein the concreteis
arrived at. The completenessof the opposition between the two
postulatesmay be judged fromthe followingconsideration. Upon
the ground of the firstpostulate subject-matteris entitled to the
name of knowledgewhen it is determinedby the methodsof in-
quiry, test, verification,and systematicarrangement,or organiza-
tion,whichare factuallyemployedin the sciences. Upon the other
basis, the antecedentconditionsapply to any and everycase, good,
bad, and indifferent.Hence theyare of an entirelydifferent order
fromthe facts of actual investigation,test,and verification, which
warrant use of the name "knowledge" in its honorificsense in
actual instances.
It was then inevitable,from the standpointof logic, that the
epistemological approach culminated in the Kantian question:
How is knowledgepossible anyway (ueberhaupt) ? If the question
were put with referenceto the "possibility" of any other subject
under investigation,the existenceof the subject-matterunder in-
288 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

quiry would be the startingpoint. It suffices, for example,to show

that cancer exists for the questionas to its possibilityto be simply
the questionof the specificconditionsof an actuality. Only in the
case of knowledgeis it supposed that the question of its "possi-
bility" is one which puts actuality into total doubt until certain
universalantecedentconditionshave been laid down and shownto
be satisfied.
In the case of cancer, for example, the question of possibility
means that our knowledgeis still in a doubtfuland indeterminate
state, so that research is going on to discover the characteristic
properties, conditions, and consequences of facts whose actual
existencesets the problem. Yet strangelyenough (strangely,pro-
facts are left out of account) the
vided, that is, historical-cultural
dogmatic and contradictoryassumption that there exists knowl-
edge of the conditions of knowledge prior to and conditioning
everyspecificinstanceof knowledgearrogatedto itselfthe name of
a criticaltheoryof knowledge!
IV
I do not propose to discuss furtherthis contradiction,beyond
saying that the contradictionwill be obvious to anyone who views
the matterin termsof the facts of knowledge,instead of in terms
supplied by the historyof philosophicalsystemsviewed in isolation
fromothercultural events. I propose ratherto set forthsome of
the historical-culturalconditionswhich generated in general the
epistemologicalassumptionof prior conditionsto be satisfied;and
which, in particular, led to the "subject-object" formula about
these conditions. One of the influentialfactors consists of the
conditionsexistingwhen the scientificrevolutiontook place. It is
hardly possible to over-emphasizethe fact that these conditions
were those of revolt not merelyagainst long accepted intellectual
doctrinesbut also against customsand institutionswhich were the
carriers of these doctrines,and which gave them a support ex-
traneous to their own constituents. Because of causes which are
psychologicallyadequate, if not factually so, the word "social"
has cometo be regardedas applicable to thatwhichis institutionally
establishedand which exerts authoritybecause of this fact. The
adjective "individual" is identifiedon this basis with that which
marksa departurefromthe traditionallyand institutionallyestab-
lished, especially if the departure is of a quality involvingrevolt
and a challengeto the rightfulauthorityof traditionand custom.
These conditionswere fully and strikinglypresent at the time
of the rise of modernscience. Every book on the historyof phi-
losophy mentionsthe fact that the philosophicalliteratureof the
 BY NATURE AND BY ART 289

fifteenthand subsequent centuriesis marked by treatises,essays,

tractates,that deal with the methodsto be adopted and pursued
if scientificknowledgeis to be actually obtained. The negative
aspect of these new venturesis assault, overt or implicit,upon all
that had long been accepted as science. There was in effect,if
not openly, an assertion that currentlyaccepted subject-matter
was hardly more than a systematizedcollection of errors and
falsities. The necessity of radically new procedures of assault
upon existing "science" was uniformlytreated as an affair of
method. It was because of the methodshabituallyused and sanc-
tioned that existing"science" was stagnant,and so far removed
from its proper mark-understanding of nature. Other docu-
mentsupon rightmethodsmay not have used the words of Francis
Bacon's Novum Organum,much less endorsed its precepts. But
theywere at one with him in proclaimingthe necessityof a com-
plete break withtraditionalmethodsand in starkoppositionto the
tenetsof the Organonof Aristotle.
If the movementof protest,revolt,and innovationthat was ex-
pressed in these documentsand put in practice in the new astron-
omy and "natural philosophy" had been confinedto "science"
in its technicaland isolated aspect, therewould not have been the
crisisthat actually occurred. The facts constitutingwhat is called
"the conflictof science with religion"'-or theology-clearly and
convincinglyprove that the movementof innovation,protest,and
revoltwas not so confined. The new sciencewas treatedas morally
hereticaland as a dangerousmenace to the very foundationsof a
stable and just social order. Upon the Continent,especially, it
was treated as rebellion against divinely established authority.
In a more fundamentalway than in the ecclesiastic movement
named Protestantism,it was a protestagainst establishedfounda-
tions in morals and religion. Its opponentsmade this point clear
when its proponentsfailed to do so.
Stated in slightlydifferent
terms,the subject-objectformulation
of the conditionsto be satisfiedbefore any subject-matterhas a
right to the honorable title of "knowledge" has to be viewed in
vitally intimateconnectionwith those movementsin political and
economicinstitutionswhich popularly bear the name "individual-
ism." For, as has been already remarked,any departure from
traditionsand customs that are incorporatedin and backed by
institutionshaving firmlyestablished authority is regarded as
"individual" in a non-socialand anti-socialsense by the guardians
of old formsin churchand state. Only at a later time,when it is
possible to place eventsin a long historicperspectiveinstead of in
the short-timecrowded and broken perspective of what is im-
290 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

mediatelycontemporary, can so-called "individualism" be seen to

be as "social" in origin,content,and consequencesas are the cus-
tomsand institutionswhichare in processof modification.
In this cultural situation,the fact that philosophersas unlike
as Descartes and Berkeley both refer to the seat and agent of
knowledgeas "I" or an "ego," a personal self, has more than
casual significance. This reference is especially significant as
evidenceof the new climate of opinion just because no attemptat
justificationaccompanied it. It was taken to be such an evident
matterthat no argumentin its behalf was called for. References
and allusions of this kind are the forerunnersof the allegedly
"critical" attemptof Kant to framean account of the conditions
of knowledgein termsof a "transcendentalego," after Hume had
demonstratedthe shaky characterof the "empirical" self as the
source and agent of authenticknowledge.
If we adopt the customarycourse of isolating philosophiesin
their historical appearance which is their actuality from other
socio-culturalfacts,if we treat the historyof philosophyas some-
thing capable of being understoodin the exclusive termsof docu-
mentslabeled philosophical,we shall look at the outstandingfea-
ture of modernphilosophyas one of a conflictbetween doctrines
appealing to "sense-experience"as ultimateauthorityand theories
appealing to intuitionand reason, a conflictreaching a supposed
solution in the Kantian reconciliationof the a priori and the
a posteriori. When these philosophiesare placed in their cultural
context,theyare seen to be partnersin a commonmovement,both
schools being in revolt against traditionalscience in its methods,
premises,and conclusions,while both schoolsare engaged in search
for a new and differentseat of intellectualand moral authority.
There are indeed significantdifferencesbetween the two schools.
But when these are historicallyviewed, they appear as differences
of emphasis,one school incliningto the "conservative" phase of
cultural institutions,and the otherschool to the "progressive" or
radical phase.
While those aspects of the new science which express initiative,
invention,enterprise,and independenceof custom (on the ground
that customsare more likely to be distortingand misleadingthan
helpful in attainingscientificknowledge) are necessaryconditions
for generation of the subject-object formulation,they are far
from being its sufficientcondition. Unquestioned persistenceof
fundamental tradition controlled protest against other customs.
Medieval institutionscenteredin belief in an immaterialsoul or
spirit. This belief was no separate item. It permeated every
aspect of life. The drama of the fall, the redemption,and the
 BY NATURE AND BY ART 291

eternal destinyfor weal or woe, of the soul was all-controllingin

the accepted view of the creation and historyof the universeand
of man. Belief in the soul was so far frombeing just an intel-
lectual tenetthat poignant.emotionand the deepestand mostvivid
images of which man is capable centered about it. The church
that administeredthe concernsof the soul was in effectthe domi-
nant educational and political institutionof the period.
Secularizing movementsgradually undermined the monopoly
of authoritypossessed by the church. Although interestsof a
natural type did not supersedesupernaturalinterests,theytended
to push them out of a central into a peripheral position. But
supernaturalconcernsretained such force in moral and religious
matters that the theory of knowledge was routed through the
channels they had worn after the facts of science were wearing
a natural channel. This roundabout channel seemed, because of
the forceof habit,more"natural" than any indicatedby the facts
of science. The enormousgap betweenknowledge-facts and episte-
mological theorywhich marks modernphilosophywas instituted.
In spite of revolt and innovation,the hold of the belief in the
soul as knowingsubject upon the attitudes which controlledthe
formationof the theory of knowledgewas so firmthat it could
not be broken until the institutions,upon which the belief in its
concretevalidity depended had undergone definitedegeneration.
Revolt and innovationwere sufficient, however,to bring to ex-
plicit and emphaticstatementone aspect of the Christiandoctrine
of the soul, an aspect which was kept covert and hidden in the
dominantinstitutionalismof the Middle Ages. This aspect was
the individual or singularnature of the subject of sin, redemption,
punishment,and reward. Protestantisminsisted upon making
this aspect of the Christianpositionovert and central in religious
matters. The writerswho were concernedwith the new science
performeda similartask in the theoriesof knowledgetheypromul-
gated. The hold of the old doctrine,even upon those most in-
differentto its theologicalphases, is shown in the persistenceof
belief in an immaterialmind,consciousness,or whatever,as being
the seat and agent of knowledge. The influenceof the belief upon
the new science,even with its fundamentalrevolt and innovation,
is exhibited in identificationof the subject and agent of sound
knowledge with "individuals'" who had freed themselvesfrom
the pervertingand deadeningeffectof customand tradition. Even
today those who deny in words that mind and consciousnessare
organs of knowledge,replacingthemwith an organicbody or with
the nervous system of the organism,attribute to the latter an
isolationfromthe rest of nature (including transmittedand com-
292 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

municated culture) which is much more than reminiscentof the

lonelyisolationof the medievalsoul.
It tookmorethan the undeniablebut negativefact of the grad-
ual attenuationand decay of the importanceonce attached to the
soul as seat of knowledgeto effectan adequate elimination. The
new movementof science had to achieve, on the ground of its
own methodsand conclusions,a positive conquest of those aspects
of natural fact that deal with life and human historybefore com-
plete eliminationcould occur. Only duringthe last hundredyears
(less than that in fact) have the sciences of biology, cultural
anthropology,and history,especiallyof "origins," reached a stage
of developmentwhich places man and his works squarely within
nature. In so doing they have supplied the concreteand verified
positive facts that make possible and imperativelydemand for-
mation of a systematictheory of knowledgein which the facts
of knowledgeare specifiedor described and organized exactly as
are the facts of the scienceswhich are the relevantsubject-matter
of a theoryof knowledge. Only in this way will the facts of our
knowledge-systems and thoseof the theoryof knowledgebe brought
into harmonywith one another,and the present glaring discrep-
ancy betweenthembe done away with.
JOHN DEWEY
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

CAN WE CHOOSE BETWEEN VALUES?

V ALUE theorycan becomeveryesoteric,as it occasionallytends
to become in the technical periodicals. But there are also
certain elementary,not to say naive, aspects of human valuation
that should not be lost sight of. Above all-and this is not so
naive-an attemptmust be made to choose among the values pre-
sented by a culture. However riskyor impertinent,that effortis
necessary. Any aseptic refusal to make moral choices is to do no
morethan accept uncriticallychoicesthat othershave already made.
Some assumptionsunderlyingsuch an attemptwill be presented
here. And a preliminaryone will be the way the term "value"
itselfis being understood:values, at least so far as they particu-
larly concernethics,are the resultsof man's long-timepreferences
-preferences in the central area encompassinghis basic attitudes
of life, his deep-rootedtastes and interests,his objects of respect
and reverence.
The Biological Basis of Value Decision.-There can be little
question that the startingplace for decision about human values