Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 147937 November 11, 2004

THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE & GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Davao City, Branch 10, and MILAGROS P. MORALES, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October
24, 2000, dismissing the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioner,
The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company, and the Resolution dated April
25, 2001, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized under Philippine laws with principal
address at the Philamlife Building, United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, and with a regional
office in Davao City.

The Antecedents

On September 22, 1999, respondent Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint2 for damages and
reimbursement of insurance premiums against the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Davao City, Branch 10, docketed as Civil Case No. 27554-99. The complaint specifically
stated that the petitioner could be served with summons and other court processes through its
Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City.

Thereafter, Summons3 dated September 29, 1999, together with the complaint, was served upon
the petitioner's Davao regional office, and was received by its Insurance Service Officer, Ruthie
Babael, on November 19, 1999.4

On December 8, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss5 the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. It contended that
summons was improperly served upon its employee in its regional office at Davao City, and that
the said employee was not among those named in Section 11,6 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure upon whom service of summons may be properly made.

On December 9, 1999, the respondent filed an Amended Complaint,7 alleging that summons and
other court processes could also be served at its principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N.
Avenue, Ermita, Manila, through the president or any of its officers authorized to receive
summons.

On December 10, 1999, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss and
directing the issuance of an alias summons to be served at its main office in Manila.9

The RTC held that the improper service of summons on the petitioner is not a ground for
dismissal of the complaint considering that the case was still in its initial stage. It ruled that the
remedy was to issue an alias summons to be served at the principal office of the petitioner. It also
held that the jurisprudence cited by the petitioner was inapplicable, as it involved a case already
decided by a court which did not have jurisdiction over the defendant therein due to improper
service of summons.

On January 12, 2000, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the said order. In the
meantime, on December 14, 1999, the petitioner received an Alias Summons11 together with a
copy of the amended complaint.

On January 14, 2000, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and supplemental oral motion to strike out the amended complaint. The RTC
reiterated that it would be improper to dismiss the case at its early stage because the remedy
would be to issue an alias summons. Anent the motion to strike out the amended complaint, the
RTC held that the complaint may be amended without leave of court considering that the
respondent had not yet filed an answer thereto.

On March 2, 2000, the petitioner filed with the CA a special action for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order, assailing the Orders dated December 10, 1999 and January 14, 2000.

On October 24, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC.
The CA held that the service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the
authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC with
jurisdiction over its person. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the said decision on April 25, 2001.

Hence, this petition for review.

The petitioner avers that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person because the service of the
summons at its regional office through an insurance service officer was improper. Sec. 11, Rule
14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is strict as to the persons upon whom valid
service of summons on a corporation can be made. The petitioner argues that where summons is
improperly served, it becomes ministerial upon the trial court, on motion of the defendant, to
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Sec. 1(a),13 Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The petitioner further avers that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it upon the
service of alias summons on the amended complaint because such alias summons was
improperly issued. Sec. 5,14 Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that the previous summons must have been lost or unserved to warrant the issuance of
alias summons. The petitioner opines that the issuance of an alias summons presupposes the
existence of a previous valid summons which, however, has not been served or has been lost. It
maintains that considering that there are specific circumstances that need to exist to warrant its
issuance, the alias summons cannot be treated as a matter of nomenclature.15

The respondent, for her part, avers that the receipt of the amended complaint together with the
alias summons by the petitioner cured the defects in the first service of summons. She argues that
any procedural defect on the service of alias summons is not sufficient to warrant the dismissal
of the case.16

The Court’s Ruling

The core issues in this case are (1) whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner due to improper service of summons, and (2) whether the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as the defendant therein.

The petition is without merit.

The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss
filed by the petitioner due to lack of jurisdiction over its person. In denying the motion to
dismiss, the CA correctly relied on the ruling in Lingner & Fisher GMBH vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,17 thus:

A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully
served. It should be difficult to conceive, for example, that when a defendant personally
appears before a Court complaining that he had not been validly summoned, that the case
filed against him should be dismissed. An alias summons can be actually served on said
defendant.18

In the recent case of Teh vs. Court of Appeals,19 the petitioner therein also filed a motion to
dismiss before filing his answer as defendant in the trial court on the ground of failure to serve
the summons on him. In that case, the Court agreed with the appellate court's ruling that there
was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when the latter denied the petitioner's
motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance of an alias summons.20

We note, however, that in this case, the complaint was amended after the petitioner filed the
motion to dismiss. The trial court even acknowledged this when it rendered its order denying the
motion to dismiss and ordered the issuance of an alias summons. The Rules on Civil Procedure
provide that the amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends.21 Contrary to the
petitioner’s claim, the summons issued on the amended complaint does not become invalid. In
fact, summons on the original complaint which has already been served continues to have its
legal effect. Thus, where the defendant has already been served summons on the original
complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon him without need of another summons.
Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons for
the amended complaint must be served on him.22

In the instant case, since at the time the complaint was amended no summons had been properly
served on the petitioner and it had not yet appeared in court, new summons should have been
issued on the amended complaint.23 Hence, the CA was correct when it held that, technically, the
trial court should have ordered the issuance of an original summons, not an alias summons.24
After all, an alias summons is merely a continuation of the original summons. In this case,
however, there was no sense in issuing an alias summons on the original complaint since the
complaint had already been amended. The trial court should have instead issued a new summons
on the amended complaint.

Nonetheless, the CA deemed it necessary to treat the alias summons as a matter of nomenclature,
considering that the rationale behind the service of summons – to make certain that the
corporation would promptly and properly receive notice of the filing of an action against it – has
been served in this case. The CA held that it would be a great injustice to the respondent if the
complaint would be dismissed just because what was issued and served was an alias summons;
that she would be made to file a new complaint and thus, incur further monetary burden.25

We agree with the CA. It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an "original" or
an "alias" summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the
summons complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served
on the defendant together with the prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies
the requirements under the Rules, both as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all
the information required under the rules, and it was served on the persons authorized to receive
the summons on behalf of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila. Moreover, the second
summons was technically not an alias summons but more of a new summons on the amended
complaint. It was not a continuation of the first summons considering that it particularly referred
to the amended complaint and not to the original complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The October 24, 2000 Decision and
the April 25, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairman), and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 136426 August 6, 1999

E. B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD., petitioner,

vs.
HON. HERMINIO I. BENITO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132,
Makati City
and IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul and set aside
the Orders dated August 5, 1998 and November 20, 1998 of the public respondent Judge
Herminio I. Benito of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 132 and praying that the
public respondent court be ordered to desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 98-824.

Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office address
at 102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branch offices at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo,
Parañaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner and private
respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to
develop certain parcels of land located at Barrio Carmen, Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter
into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed
that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper
courts of Makati.

On April 3, 1998, private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and
Damages against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati allegedly
for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few
unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein.1

Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch
Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City2 but the Sheriff's Return of Service3 stated that the summons was duly served "upon
defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL
SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro
City, and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the
summons.1âwphi1.nêt

On June 9, 1998, defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss4 alleging that on
May 6, 1998, "summons intended for defendant" was served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an
employee of defendant at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City. Defendant prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee
in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be made.

Meanwhile, on June 10, 1998, plaintiff filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default5 alleging
that defendant has failed to file an Answer despite its receipt allegedly on May 5, 1998 of the
summons and the complaint, as shown in the Sheriffs Return.

On June 22, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss6 alleging that
the records show that defendant, through its branch manager, Engr. Wendell Sabulbero actually
received the summons and the complaint on May 8, 1998 as evidenced by the signature
appearing on the copy of the summons and not on May 5, 1998 as stated in the Sheriffs Return
nor on May 6, 1998 as stated in the motion to dismiss; that defendant has transferred its office
from Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro to its new office address at Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth,
Cagayan de Oro; and that the purpose of the rule is to bring home to the corporation notice of the
filing of the action.

On August 5, 1998, the trial court issued an Order7 denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as
well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. Defendant was given ten (10) days
within which to file a responsive pleading. The trial court stated that since the summons and
copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its branch manager
Wendell Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and
consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

On August 19, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Motion for Reconsideration8
alleging that Section 11, Rule 14 of the new Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary,
restricted the service of summons on persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is
very specific and clear in that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager",
"secretary" to "corporate secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director.

On August 27, 1998, plaintiff filed an Opposition to defendant's Motion for Reconsideration9
alleging that defendant's branch manager "did bring home" to the defendant-corporation the
notice of the filing of the action and by virtue of which a motion to dismiss was filed; and that it
was one (1) month after receipt of the summons and the complaint that defendant chose to file a
motion to dismiss.

On September 4, 1998, defendant, by Special Appearance, filed a Reply10 contending that the
changes in the new rules are substantial and not just general semantics.

Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Order dated November 20, 1998.11

Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its discretion
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motions to dismiss and for
reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner because the summons intended for it was improperly served. Petitioner invokes
Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Private respondent filed its Comment to the petition citing the cases Kanlaon Construction
Enterprises Co., Inc. vs. NLRC12 wherein it was held that service upon a construction
project manager is valid and in Gesulgon vs. NLRC13 which held that a corporation is
bound by the service of summons upon its assistant manager.

The only issue for resolution is whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.

When the complaint was filed by Petitioner on April 3, 1998, the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure was already in force.14

Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under

the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on
the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel. (emphasis supplied).

This provision revised the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which
provided that:

Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the

defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. (emphasis supplied).

Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served
is "restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction
expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision
Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language.

We agree with petitioner.

Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager15; a
corporation's assistant manager16; ordinary clerk of a corporation17; private secretary of
corporate executives18; retained counsel19; officials who had charge or control of the
operations of the corporation, like the assistant general manager20; or the corporation's
Chief Finance and Administrative Officer21. In these cases, these persons were
considered as "agent" within the contemplation of the old rule.22 Notably, under the new
Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.

The cases cited by private respondent are therefore not in point.

In the Kanlaon case, this Court ruled that under the NLRC Rules of Procedure,
summons on the respondent shall be served personally or by registered mail on the
party himself; if the party is represented by counsel or any other authorized
representative or agent, summons shall be served on such person. In said case,
summons was served on one Engr. Estacio who managed and supervised the
construction project in Iligan City (although the principal address of the corporation is in
Quezon City) and supervised the work of the employees. It was held that as manager,
he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal
papers served on him and to relay the same to the president or other responsible officer
of petitioner such that summons for petitioner was validly served on him as agent and
authorized representative of petitioner. Also in the Gesulgon case cited by private
respondent, the summons was received by the clerk in the office of the Assistant
Manager (at principal office address) and under Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule),
summons may be made upon the clerk who is regarded as agent within the
contemplation of the rule.

The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a
domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general
manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and
"treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme
Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:23

. . . the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to
"be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its
directors." The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of
broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word "agent" of the
corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who
precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose
very appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective
service, is an illustration of the need for this revised section with limited scope
and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated
the amendment permitting service only on the in-house counsel of the
corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from
an independent practitioner. (emphasis supplied).

Retired Justice Oscar Herrera, who is also a consultant of the Rules of Court Revision
Committee, stated that "(T)he rule must be strictly observed. Service must be made to
one named in (the) statute . . . .24

It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of Delta Motor Sales
Corporation vs. Mangosing,25 the Court held:
 A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of
the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one
who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . . .

The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive
prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be
served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person
will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words, "to
bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action." . . . .

The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the
plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served
on a domestic corporation. . . . . (emphasis supplied).

Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14
(old rule) has been held as improper.26 Even under the old rule, service upon a general
manager of a firm's branch office has been held as improper as summons should have
been served at the firm's principal office. In First Integrated Bonding & Inc. Co., Inc. vs.
Dizon,27 it was held that the service of summons on the general manager of the
insurance firm's Cebu branch was improper; default order could have been obviated
had the summons been served at the firm's principal office.

And in the case of Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et
al.28 the Court succinctly clarified that, for the guidance of the Bench and Bar, "strictest"
compliance with Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (on
Priorities in modes of service and filing) is mandated and the Court cannot rule
otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation by the 1997 Rules in order to
obviate delay in the administration of justice.

Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner
at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its
principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer
jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons.29 Before, the rule was
that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a
special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant
raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the
exercise of the jurisdiction of the court.30 This doctrine has been abandoned in the case
of La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,31 which became the basis of
the adoption of a new provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules. Section 20 now provides that "the inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance." The emplacement of this rule clearly
underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons.
Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the
defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to
the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper service of summons, the trial court
cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the trial court will consequently be null and
void.32

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the public
respondent trial court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of
Civil Case No. 98-824, and all its orders and issuances in connection therewith are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

On verifiacation

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21180 March 31, 1967

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF ANTONINA B. OSHITA. ANTONINA B.

OSHITA, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.

L. C. Delante for petitioner-appellee.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

This is an appeal by the Solicitor General from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao granting the petition of appellee, Antonina B. Oshita, for a change
of name.

On February 15, 1962, Antonina B. Oshita filed with the Court of First Instance of
Davao a petition to have her name changed from "Antonina B. Oshita" to "Antonina
Bartolome". The petition was signed by the petitioner herself and was "subscribed
and sworn to" by her before the Deputy Clerk of Court. The requirements for the
publication of the hearing of the petition were duly complied with. Asst. City
Attorney Roque M. Barnes, acting in behalf of the Solicitor General, filed a motion to
dismiss the petition upon the grounds (1) of lack of jurisdiction, in that although the
petition was subscribed and sworn to by petitioner, it was not verified in accordance
with the provisions of Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that the
petition does not state a cause of action. The petitioner-appellee filed an opposition
to the motion to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and set the
case for hearing.

As found by the lower court, the evidence has established that appellee Antonina B.
Oshita is the legitimate daughter of Kishimatsu Oshita, a Japanese citizen, now
deceased, and Buena Bartolome, a Filipino; that she was born in the City of Davao
on May 9, 1940 and has since then, up to the time of the bearing, resided in said
city; that upon reaching the age of majority, appellee elected Philippine citizenship
and took her oath of allegiance; that being already a Filipino citizen she desired to
have her family name changed from "Oshita" to "Bartolome", the latter being the
family name of her mother, and because she felt embarrassed when introduced as
one bearing a Japanese surname; that her older brother and sister, who had earlier
elected Philippine citizenship, have been using the surname "Bartolome"; and that
she has no criminal record nor a pending tax liability RBCxY.

The Assistant City Attorney of Davao City did not present any evidence in support of
his opposition to the petition, but simply reiterated his motion to dismiss. On
November 12, 1962, the trial court rendered a decision granting the petition. Hence
this appeal by the Solicitor General MhqFjO.

In his appeal, the Solicitor General insists (1) that the lower court had no jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the case because the petition was not verified as required by
Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and (2) that no sufficient reason had
been shown to justify the change of the surname of the appellee.

This appeal has no merit. It is admitted that the petition is not verified in the
manner as prescribed in Section 6 of Rule 15 of the old Rules of Court (now Section
6 of Rule 7 of the new Rules of Court), because what appears is a simple jurat by
the Deputy Clerk of Court that the petitioner had subscribed and sworn to, the
petition, before him. While it is true that under Section 2, Rule 103, it is required
that the petition for change of name be verified, nevertheless, no provision exists in
the rules which declares that such a requirement regarding verification is
jurisdictional. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply
intended to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that
the pleading is filed in good faith. The requirement regarding verification of a
pleading is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading,1the non-compliance of
which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may
order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking, or act on the
pleading although it is not verified if the attending circumstances are such that the
strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice or the law may thereby be served. This view finds support in the ruling laid
down by this Court in several decisions.

In the case of The Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Macadaeg, et al., L-14174,
October 31, 1960, the petition for certiorari was attacked as fatally defective
because it was not verified as required by the provision of Section 1 of Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court (now Section 1, Rule 65 of the new Rules of Court). In resolving
this question, this Court held:

First, respondents claim that the petition, not being verified, is fatally defective. We
do not think so. It is true that Rule 67, sec. 1, of the Rules of Court, require that the
petition for certiorari be verified, the apparent object thereof being to insure good
faith in the averments of the petition. Where, however, the material facts alleged
are a matter of record in the court below, consisting in pleadings filed or
proceedings taken therein, and the questions raised are mainly of law, a verification
as to the truth of said facts is not an absolute necessity and may be waived (42 Am.
Jur., sec. 42, p. 177), as this Court has done in this case when we gave due course
to the present petition. In fact, many authorities consider the absence of verification
a mere formal, not jurisdictional, defect, the absence of which does not of itself
justify a court in refusing to allow and act in the case (71 C.J.S., 744-745).
(Emphasis supplied).

Likewise, in the case of Tavera vs. El Hogar Filipino, Inc., et al., 98 Phil. 481, this
Court held that "lack of verification of a petition filed in a probate court for the sale
of real property belonging to the estate of a minor is not a jurisdictional defect."2In
a land registration case, notwithstanding the provision of Section 34, Act 496, which
requires that opposition to an application for registration of land should be sworn to
by oppositor, this Court held that an "unverified opposition is sufficient to confer
standing in court to oppositors."3

In the light of the rulings laid down by this Court in the decisions afore-cited, it is
clear that verification is not a jurisdictional, but a formal, requisite. While the
petition now before Us was not verified, it was, however, subscribed and sworn to
by the petitioner, and We believe that the lower court did not commit a reversible
error when it denied the motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court was not affected by the absence of the
proper verification of the petition. It may be stated here, though, that the lower
court should have required appellee to have her petition verified before setting the
case for hearing, in order to have the petition conform with the rule.

The appellant also contends that no sufficient reasons had been shown to justify the
grant by the lower court of the petition for a change of name. The appellant urges
that under Article 364 of the Civil Code legitimate children shall principally use the
surname of the father. This provision, however, is not absolute because under
Article 264 of the same Code, it is provided that legitimate children have the right
to bear the surname of the father and of the mother. Hence, if there is sufficient
reason, the change of a child's surname from that of the father, to that of the
mother, may be authorized by the court.

In the instant case, it has been shown that the petitioner-appellee is the legitimate
daughter of Buena Bartolome and Hishimatsu Oshita; that upon reaching the age of
majority she elected Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance; that
being already a Filipino citizen she desires to adopt a Filipino surname; that her
older brother and sister who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using
the surname "Bartolome"; and that she desires to have the surname "Bartolome"
instead of "Oshita", because she felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing
Japanese surname. The lower court further observed that "It cannot be denied that
there had been ill feeling among the Filipinos against the Japanese due to the last
Pacific war. Although normal relations between the Philippines and Japan have been
established the ill feelings still persist among some Filipinos especially among the
less educated who had unpleasant experience during the war." There is no showing
that the appellee was motivated by any fraudulent purpose, or that the change of
her surname will prejudice public interest. We believe that the lower court acted
correctly when it considered these circumstances as reasons sufficient to justify the
change of name as prayed for by the petitioner-appellee.

Moreover, the matter of whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is
left to the sound discretion of the court. The following, ruling of this Court is
relevant:

In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of "proper and
reasonable cause" is left to the sound discretion of the court. The evidence
presented need only be satisfactory to the Court and not all the best evidence
available.

In the present case the trial court found to its satisfaction that petitioner was in
earnest in his desire to do away with all traces of his former Chinese nationality and
henceforth to be recognized as a Filipino. Such desire is in line with the policy of our
naturalization law that applicants for naturalization should fully embrace Filipino
customs and traditions and socially mingle with Filipinos.

xxxxxxxxx
It has not been shown that petitioner has any fraudulent intent in seeking a change
of name. No criminal, civil, tax or any other, liability on his part, which he may avoid
by the change of name, has been suggested. Nothing has been presented to show
any prejudice to the Government or to any individual should the petition be
granted. In the absence of prejudice to the State or any individual, a sincere desire
to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which unduly
hamper social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for a change of
name. It is not trivial, whimsical or capricious. (Uy vs. Republic. L-22712, November
29, 1965).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to

costs. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur OBGY.

Makalintal, J., took no part vO0uJgIR6p.

Footnotes

1Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is entitled "Formal Requirements of Pleadings", and it

is under this Rule (Sec. 6) that the requirement regarding verification is provided.

2Although Section 569, Act No. 190, which is similar to Section 1, Rule 96, Old Rules
of Court, and now Section 1, Rule 95, New Rules of Court, require that such petition
should be verified.

3Miller, et al. vs. The Director of Lands, et al., L-16761, October 31, 1964, citing
Malagum vs. Pablo, 46 Phil. 19 and Nicolas vs. Director of Land, et al., L-19147-8,
December 28, 1963. .