a Swiss Army Guide To Guerrilla Worfare And Underground Operations Intraduction by Col. Wendell Fertig, U.S.A.-Ret. ited by Capt. R. K. Brown, USARTOTAL RESISTANCE Major H. von Dach Bern, Swiss Army Translated by: Hans Lienhard Special Warfare Language Facility John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Ft. Bragg, North Carolina Edited by: Capiain Robert K. Brown, USAR Introduction by: Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, USA-Ret. FALADIN eee press one nt CONTENTS Acknowiedgments i Notes of the Central Committee, Swiss Neacommissioned ‘Officer's Association Introduction Foreword D Significant Guerrilla Operations of Past and Present PART [. ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF GUERRILLA WARFARE “TP Burpose of Guerilla Warfare eT UL Organization of Guecrilla Warfare a Fomution of Crore. aie Foghat: (oe Cera Cais 2 soy of oe 1v Hol a Ey Sh HGR Eaitnet wal Opie ‘Apia Your Gusila Detachment 15 en of Poult Unis «.. Mepeian-my Ope ne a PART II. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE CIVILIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT cmutlitiansBS SEESAERSOR SPRBESER SGR8RRER Ef Resistance to the Last Let us assume the follewing: Switzer.one has bocome a battle: field. Superior enemy forees hare invaded tne count:y. Here and there our troops have heen cverran. However, many have stecesded in evading the znemy. ‘They are still in possession of their weascns and equipment, They wan: t fight, resist to the lest. But how? Or: The enemy has occupied a sity. The population is under is rule, What does che worser, the enployee, the selfemaloved do such a case What does the teacher. the newspaper editor, the doctor, the state employee do? What about housewives, ailzoad employees. postal emplayees, and policemen? What do the soldiers do? What do the civilians do? Will some throw away their weapans since they believe eon tinued resistanoe is Zatile? Will othore wait for the futero, placing their faith im God, or will hey cooperate with the enemy? So many questions—but where are the enswors? One thing is certain. The enemy will show no mercy. Tae enemy will snuff out one life, dozens, hundreds or thousands wishout any qualms if this would ferther his sims. The captured soldier will face deportation, forced labor or deats. But 30 will the worker, the exe ployee, the self-employed, aad the housewife The enemy will not make any distizction between soldie:s aad ns, Experiences of the recent pest have proved that annihila- ‘of the conque-ed may be exzected sooner or later. Sometimes, is process is only delayed. ‘The office, the noncomraissioned officer, the teaeter, the editor— idual who, at one time or another, has made any deroya: ‘ks about the ideology of the enemy, who. before the war, sto2€ up for democracy and liberty and vocally opposed dictatorship and despotism—all these wil lead the degoriation and liquidation ist. This we must understand! What then must ke done when the enemy is in che country? What has to be done in view of the certainty that danger and death will threaten each citizen, male o: female, regardless of whether 4¢ wants to play an active or passive rol each We believe it is better to evecy Swiss woman or man must resist. We beiieve chat the enemy carnot he allowed te feel a: ease for even ore minute in the con- querec territory. We belie re have to infliet damage upon him, fight him whereser and whenever we have the opportunity! By speaking this way we have clearly and explicitly indicated the pur- pose of his boa In case of war, resistance will come primarily through the Army. Its our duty 1 make-sure with our might that the Army is and remains ready for war. We want this point urderstood very clearly. However, we want te show our people a way to cesist in ease pars of the Army are dispersed, split up or eneizcled. This is in cave prisozers s1cceed) in escaping oF portions of the civilian popula tion fall under enemy rule. We want to demonstra that in the worst situation resistance is 20 « but that it is a primary duty. We feel this book will raske this resistance effective, that it will prevent bloodshed and loss of .ife because of lack of necessary know- how and ability. haps or might say that -t is wrong and unwise to discuss these things publicly, to write about them and to inform a potential cenemny of what ~o intend to do sactld he attack us, We do not be- lieve in this consep:. On the contrary, we believe that, because of our ‘open-y demonstrated will to resist to the last, the enemy will have ‘one more factor to consider when evaluating the ‘pros’ and ‘cons? of 2 plamed “Operation Switzerland.” We publish this book with this in snind and hope that it will find thousand. ¢f readers, The Centra! Commitiee of the Swiss Noncommussioned Officers AssociationSEESAREGSE SEESERES BERERRES E: INTRODUCTION BY WENDELL W. FERTIG, COLONEL USA - RET. ie eather ida ww als Fite Mart Bh eae Jot fe He ar nd da ets Be ea a a To commen: on this bock is cifficult unless it is considered as a test book or Field Manual devoted to the specialized problems of Civitian Resistance ord their solution, ‘The illustrations are superb and the text explicit. It is a how-to-dosit manual in a fiekd that Aas been iomg neglected; i.e. mhat courses 0° action are opem to civilians who reside in an arca occupied by a foreign aggressor. In case of enemy occupation, it is general'y assumed that tke civilians will resist, How such resistance is to be implimented or sustained is left up to the individual who is usualy at a complete loss as to what 10 do. Witt the publication of TOTAL RESISTANCE this is 0 Jorger the case as this book spells out the when, where and bow of developing and orgarizing guerrilla bands, « civilian resistance move~ ‘ment and an underground. Specific comments seem to be in order as there is mo sustained story to review. ‘The first of these camments touches a lace dear to my heart. Among all the famous resistance efforts tabulated the guerrill. warfare in che Philippin2s goes unmentioned. Yet this was a resistence that sprang from the people and was carried on for five months tehind the Japanese lines before receiving recognition or help from the Allies, From this experience came the basis for the ccancept and policy of the U.S. Special Forces. A resstance that can be arganized amd sustained carly in the ‘occupation fnas the best chance of surviv.ng. It must be organized before th: enemy can institute the block control system. in cites, and while some unrestricted movement is possible in the country areas. Further it must be remembered that the most succesful guercilla movements Eave always been based on creas that are isolated by ‘errain, oor roads and bad weather. Operations within a city are iffcult, The Watsew uprising was an exception and this was pos- sible because of ghetto conditions that will not be found in other cities. Evem there, the real effectiveness of the uprising was destroyed when it was tricked into prematare attacks on the Germans, while the Russians awaited the mutual destruction of both acversaries. Secrecy is imperative. It is almost impossibic 10 maintain” but cften cen te beiter achieved through the use of misleading rumors than through tigh: security. To provide the enemy with several stories, all of which require interpretation and decision, will often provide the time needed to carry out an operation: Jn my cemmand in the Philippines, I found that the only way to bbreak out of an ambush action was 0 provide indigenous personnel ‘wich limited ammunition. A guerrll: with an empty rifle will retreat readily, while one with an adecuate supply of ammunition will stay two long and risk ezpivre. ‘Medicines are frequently the best means of financing any type cf resistance. ‘The individual items are easily carried. As an example, thirty atabrine tablets would take a courier further tha. thirty thous- and Japanese occupation pesos, and with much less risk of discovery. Tn preparation “or issuing currency of your own, the adequa supply of paper and ink sre very important. The enemy will actemapt to comirol the supplies of these items, thus negacing any possibility ‘of providing an alternate system of currency. ne need that is mos: important and which is mentioned bat not stressed, is the need of an organization within the Prisoner of War cot Concentration Carips. ‘The basic crganization should be pro- vided before the samender takes place. The lack of this planning ‘was responsible for uncounted deaths in BOW camps in the Philip- Fires, Divide and rule by the enzmy lead to the break: down of all ‘commend authority and the prisoners were at the -narey of the Japa- nese guards. In Singapere, the Aust-alian troops ensered the POW camp with a table of organization and commané. They were able to present a united front toward cheis captors and fared bette: cham the American POW's who cid not have such an organization. ‘These comments do mot lessen the impact of this fine manual which is the first ever published that not only describes the practicesRELR OFERERRS RHBRRE ea Bs eRe ‘of the Communists but offers “nethodls for opposing their oppr: ‘ule, It's interesting to no:e that the Swiss Noncommissioned “Officers Association is able to point where the dangers lay ard hew «hey may be met. In all of ths, its well to be present if such a restsane ackiewed, These are: 1. A. loyal people whe will support the effort a: sreat sk to themselves. . Favoraie terrain, and orgonization to fit particular texrain needs. A possible safe haven, Good connmunications (radio, telephone, ete.) ‘An adequate supply of food to support the units. Support from an ouside cower (most important) The final paragraphs of the bock bear repeating here. “If two (—and this is always the case ideology is involved (religion is part of it) guerra wer Fre ancl resistance will inevicably break out in te final phase, “The military expert who urdervalues or ever disregards guerri la warfare makes a mistake since hz does nat take inte consideretion the strength of heer “The last, and admittedly, riost eruct battle will be fough: by civilians. It wil be conducted ander the fear of deportation, of execution, anc coreentration camps. “We must and will win this battle since each Swiss mele and femal: in particular believe in the innermost part of their hearts— even if they are too shy and soker in everyday life to aulmit or even speak about it—in che old, and yet very up-to-date saying: at six basie principles whic: must Death rather than slavery!” Wendell W. Fertig Cojone] USA - Ret. Introduction ‘The author is fully anare of the fact that he kas touched upon a dificult and anplessant subject, Nevertheless, in the age cf :o:al warfare where aot oaly material but also ideological factors ate at imperative fo discuss these problems, 1y be assured that in case of a war, large arecs—if not lerritory will be temporarily lost :o the enemy. The Array may be large.y neutzalized even though sizecble units should eon- tinue to fight for an extended period im the A.pine regions, However, the majority of the soldiers as well as the masses of the civilian pooulace will survive the campaign. Now comes the question—siould these sucvivors become loyal subjects of the new rulers, waiting for saivat.on and liberation from the outside, or should the figh: be contirued in a new manner with all available Tt may be assumed tha: with the well known love for freedom of the population on che one hand and the proven ruthlessness of the potential enemy on the other, clashes between the occupation forces ard the conquered will sconer ot later become insvitable. ‘Thus it ray not he entirely useless to write about the atmosphere, tactics ard techniques of uertilla warfare as far as these can be rezon- stracted from the experienoes of past wars from the Spanish guerillas fighting against Nepoleon to the French Maquis of World War Il. The AuthorEe SSGSAERRRE RESSREPS BSISSREA ‘The Most Important Guerrilla Actions of the Past and the Present ‘The actions in tke Vendée during the French revolution ‘The Spanish guerzllas fighting, against Nepoleon ‘The uprising in Tyrol against Napoleon Guerrilla operations in Gentral Germany against Napoleon (raid- rng parties) Greek liberation operations aga.nst the Tu Guerilla opera:ions during the Franco-Prussian War of Acatvian “Pacifiestion operations” in Bosnia Activities of Belgian insurgents cf 194 German Army caval:y raids behind French lines during 1914 Serbian insurgent operations during World War I Larweence's desert o2erations against the Turks during World War 1 Activities of resistance fighters in the occupied Rubr area after ‘World War | Schlageter) Ati-bo.shevist cperations in the Baltic coustries after World ar 1 ‘The civil riots (actions of the corps of volunteers) in Germeany after World War [ E “White” ané “Red” partisan actions d ion (especially the campaign: in Bash war in the Grar-Ch byssinian guerrilla 0 War Republic guerrille operations during Communist Cainese guerrilla. oper ernment and! against the Japanese ‘exile organization operat ons during the Second World ng the Russian revolu- Ko.ichak | erations during the Ialign-Abyssinian Astivities of the French resistance movement during World War I (Mequis, uprising of the Intericr French Forees and the Guerrillas and Parsisans) Opecations of the Dutch, Belgian and Norwegian resistance movements during Word War It Activities of the Polish underground movement during the Second Wo-ld War Warsaw uprising led by Genera) Bor) Soviet and Yugoslav partisan operations duriag World War IL British guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines Italian partisan operations against the Germans ancl Neo-Fascists ‘The start of Werwelf operations in Germany Comemanist ELAS-insuretions in Greece aftr the Second Work Operations of the illegal Irish Repablican Army Operations of the Algeria and Tunisian resisance movement ‘gninst the French Mau-Mau operatiors in Kenya against the British North Korean partisan actions against United Nations troops Resistance moveraent agaiast the British in Malaya Vietmich opera:ions against the French (especially du initial staze} AntiCommunist riots in East Berlin AntiCommanist rexelution in Hungary Anti-Commun'st riots ia Poland BOK-Movement on Cyprus, 1g theLB S28SReH P54 08R 8 Part 1 Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare 1. Purpose of Guerrilla Warfare A. General ‘The purpose of guerrilla warfare is to continue resistance in those paris of the country cecupied by the enemy, or to continue the fight after the defeat of the regular army. Guerrilla detachments cause Zear snd confusion behind enemy lines; force the enemy to initiate complicated socurity measures thus wasting his strength: and inflicts losses on both personnel and ate ‘The cccnstant unrest so that no invader may move about alone and un- armed. Service and occupation troops of the enemy will huve to take fon extra security measures in addition te theic numerous cther tasks. a state of ire occupied territory must be pushed The final phase will be a general, cpen insurrection whose sim will be te force the enemy from the country. 3. Specie targa: . Transportation routes (reads and railroad lines) 2. Communications net (telephone lines above end be'ow ground, telephone and racio stati |. Powor net |. Vital industrial plants Reepaie shops atid slepots Gouriers, messengers and liaison officers €. Characteristics of Guerrilla Warjare Opposing forces during conventional war are supplied by the factories, warehouses and supply depots; guerrilla units, however, live on the wa Every guerrilla warfare unit commander has an incomparably lacger amount of independence and. freedom ef action that. he would have on the same level of command during « conventional war. 1U1. Organization of Guerrilla Warfare 1. Formation of Guerrilla Units Guerrilla units require a nucleus of experienced txcaps which will seve as instructors and leaders. The enemy tadtics of “leaping over” the front by air mobile units or “over-running” the frost by armored units wil: tndoubtedly leave many Swiss army units intact. ‘These, in turn, of trained, experienced Sgyees ND Line > ® In our army, the majority of the participants in guerrilla war- fare will consist of scaltered portions of the army o: of auxiliary services, It is imperative to bring them togecher as well as to reoruit ian popula Dispersed) Batallion or Regimental staf will , local militia, auxiliary Defense persenael, police, and eivilian voluntoers. Where no staff personnel are prevent, alert affcers of NCO's will assume commard and ereats an organization, Higher headquerte:s—in ease such a headquarter: still exists and maintains communica ” lly stragglers as ces, Civil Nir Guerrilla warface ear ne cn secondary fronts. Witnout the supgcrt of the eiviliar. population, guerilla wa-fare will fail in the long run Guerrilla operaticns will not be ini since the enemy will always 2¢ stronger there and the civilian popula- tion will be less willing to support GW. operations. Ina ‘enemy regula ‘ont Fine troops normally do not oppress the Fopulation. Bebind the front, the civilian population, aroused by toe terror invoked by pclitical and police organizations which fellow the front fine troops, will become willing to engage in and suport guerrille operations. ‘The enemy will hardly commit his strongest Gghting units for and occupation duties or against initial guerrilla opera- i. Ratner, he will utilize second-rate troops which wil. partially ‘compensate for your weaknesses, ‘You must distinguish between: a. Mobive guerzills anits belonging to the army or composed ‘of ariny elerems; b. Local, stationary elemen:s of the civilian resistance move- ment ‘The idea behind euerrlle worfare is o conduct lccal resistance ‘operations in the entire occupied territory by the civilian resistance movement (especially sabotage ard counter.propagande). At the sme time, it is necessary t9 create certain liberated areas held by mobile guerrilla units, However, these areas are not to be held rigidly. They will be changed continually in accerdenee with the foremost rule of guerrilla warfare whicn states that ‘no terrain is held! permanently.” ‘As a rule, liberated areas ean only be held for several weeks 3 er be waged near front lines—only