People, Profit, and Politics

People, Profit, and Politics

STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION
Ma. G lenda S. Lope

Glenda Lopezz Wui
Teresa S. E
eresa ncarnacion Tadem
Encarnacion
Editors
Published in cooperation with the

United Nations Development Programme-Philippine Office
Third World Studies Center

College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City
Ma. Glenda S. Lopez Wui is assistant professor at the Faculty of Education,
University of the Philippines (UP)-Open University, and formerly university
researcher and deputy director of the UP Third World Studies Center (TWSC).
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem is associate professor at the Department of Political
Science, UP Diliman, and director of the UP TWSC. Sharon Quinsaat is university
researcher at the UP TWSC. Joel F. Ariate Jr. is university research associate at the
UP TWSC. Ronald C. Molmisa is a fellow and formerly university research associate
at the UP TWSC.
Third World Studies Center

College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
Palma Hall Basement
P.O. Box 210
Diliman, Quezon City 1101
Philippines
Phones: +63 2 981 8500 ext. 2442
Telefax: +63 2 920 5428
Mobile: +63 926 710 2926
Email: uptwsc@ gmail.com
URL: http://www.upd.edu.ph/~twsc
© 2006 by the UP Third World Studies Center

All rights reserved. No copies can be made in part or in whole without prior written
permission from the publisher.
Published 2006
ISBN 971-91246-4-4
The UP Third World Studies Center gratefully acknowledges the financial support
given by the United Nations Development Programme-Philippine Office in the
research for and publication of this book.
Printed in the Philippines by CORASIA Inc.

Contents
List of Acronyms vii
Foreword
Walden Bello xv
Preface xvii
Introduction
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem 1
Mobilizing against Vegetable Importation

Sharon M. Quinsaat 19
Protests and Perceived Threats in the Hog Industry

Joel F. Ariate Jr. 73
Confronting the Challenges in the Garment Industry

Ma. Glenda S. Lopez Wui 111
Balancing Consumer and Corporate Interests

in the Telecommunications Industry
Ronald C. Molmisa 155
Conclusion: Palliatives for “Globalization with a Human Face”

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem 197
Index 229
v
vi People, Profit, and Politics
Introduction vii
List of Acronyms
ACEF Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund

AFMA Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
ALERT Alliance of Legislators against Regressive Taxes
ALMAGATE Alyansa ng Manggagawa sa Garment at Textile
(Garment and Textile Workers’ Alliance)
ALU-TUCP Associated Labor Unions of the Trade Union Congress of
the Philippines
AoA Agreement on Agriculture
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APIT-TAKO Alyansa Dagiti Pesante iti Taeng Kordilyera
(Alliance of Peasants in the Cordillera Homeland)
APL Alliance of Progressive Labor
ASAP Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BAI Bureau of Animal Industry
BAS Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
BAYAN Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(New Patriotic Movement)
BFFI Benguet Farmers’ Federation Incorporated
BLES Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics
BMP Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(Philippines Workers Solidarity)
BoC Bureau of Customs
BoT Bureau of Telecommunications
BPI Bureau of Plant Industry
CAR Cordillera Administrative Region
vii
viii People, Profit, and Politics
CEGP College Editors Guild of the Philippines

CEPT Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CICT Commission on Information and Communications
Technology
CMTS cellular mobile telephone system
COCAFM Congressional Oversight Committee on Agriculture and
Fisheries Modernization
CPA Cordillera Peoples Alliance
CPU Computer Professionals Union
CSOs civil-society organizations
CTITC Clothing and Textile Industry Tripartite Council
CURE Connectivity Unlimited Resources Inc.
DA Department of Agriculture
DICT Department of Information and Communication
Technology
DOLE Department of Labor and Employment
DOST Department of Science and Technology
DOTC Department of Transportation and Communications
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
EO executive order
EPZ export processing zone
EVAT expanded value-added tax
FFW Federation of Free Workers
FLAG Free Legal Assistance Group
FMA Foundation for Media Alternatives
FMD foot-and-mouth disease
FTA Fair Trade Alliance
GARTEX Garment, Textile and Allied Industries Labor Council
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GATT-UR GATT-Uruguay Round
GDP gross domestic product
GSM global system for mobile communications
GTEB Garment and Textile Export Board
HR House Resolution
ILO International Labor Organization
IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
List of Acronyms ix
INGO international nongovernment organization

IPRA Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
ISM industrial, scientific and medical
ITECC Information Technology and Electronic Commerce
Council
ITGLWF International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’
Federation
ITU International Telecommunication Union
KMP Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(Peasant Movement of the Philippines)
KMU Kilusang Mayo Uno
(May First Movement)
KPD Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya
(Movement for National Democracy)
LDC Livestock Development Council
LGU local government unit
MAV minimum access volume
MFA Multi-Fiber Arrangement
MFN most-favored nation
MHDAP Meat and Hog Dealers Association of the Philippines
MMS multimedia messaging system
MOP margins of preference
MTPDP Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan
MTPO Municipal Telephone Projects Office
NCL National Confederation of Labor
NCRFW National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
NEDA National Economic and Development Authority
NFHFI National Federation of Hog Farmers Inc.
NFHR National Federation of Hog Raisers
NGO nongovernment organization
NHRGI National Hog Raisers Group Inc.
NMIC National Meat Inspection Commission
NSCB National Statistical Coordination Board
NSO National Statistics Office
NTC National Telecommunications Commission
NTDC National Telecommunications Development Committee
x People, Profit, and Politics
NTDP National Telecommunications Development Plan

NUSP National Union of Students of the Philippines
PABI Philippine Association of Broiler Integrators
Pag-IBIG Pagtutulungan sa Kinabukasan: Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya
at Gobyerno
(Helping Each Other for the Future: You, the Bank, the
Industry and the Government)
PAHRI Philippine Association of Hog Raisers Inc.
PAMPI Philippine Association of Meat Processors Inc.
PAPTELCO Philippine Association of Private Telephone Companies
Inc.
PBOs private business organizations
PCGG Philippine Commission on Good Government
PCTA Philippine Cable Television Association Inc.
PCTO Philippine Chamber of Telecommunication Operators
PETEF Philippine Electronics and Telecommunications
Federation Inc.
PEZA Philippine Economic Zone Authority
PIDS Philippine Institute for Development Studies
PISO Philippine Internet Services Organization
PLDT Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
PLDTi Philippine League for Democratic Telecommunications
Inc.
PPI Philippine Peasant Institute
PSTN public switched telephone network
PTEs public telecommunication entities
PTI permit to import
PUMALAG Pambansang Ugnayan ng Mamamayan Laban sa
Liberalisasyon ng Agrikultura (National
Network of Citizens against Agricultural Liberalization)
QR quantitative restriction
RA Republic Act
SAC Social Action Center
SAI Social Accountability International
SAS Service Area Scheme
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
List of Acronyms xi
SIM Subscriber Identity Module

SMS Short Message System
SNR Stop the New Round Coalition-Philippines
SOAP Slaughterhouse Operators Association of the Philippines
SSS Social Security System
SwIN Swine Information Network
TELOF Telecommunications Office
TESDA Technical Eduction and Skills Development Authority
TRM tariff-related matters
TRP Tariff Reform Program
TUCP Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
TUGP Telecommunication Users Group of the Philippines
UNFAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organizations
VAS value-added service
VoIP voice over Internet protocol
WB World Bank
WRAP Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production
WSIS World Summit on the Information Society
WTO World Trade Organization
Foreword
Walden Bello
P
eople, Profit, and Politics is an excellent collection of studies that
looks at how civil-society organizations in economic sectors subjected
to trade liberalization and deregulation have mobilized to defend
their interests within a liberal democratic state. The picture that emerges
is both reassuring and disconcerting.
Reassuring in that civil-society organizations can easily establish
political spaces or beachheads from which to exert pressure on key political
actors in the executive or in parliament. Reassuring, too, in that there is a
great space for coalition building with many other interest groups facing
the challenge of globalization.
But disconcerting in that no amount of skilled mobilizing and coalition
building appears to have been able to save key groups, such as the Benguet
vegetable producers and textile and garment workers, from massive
dislocation brought about by cheap imports or capital flight. Active lobbying
by hog raisers appear to have mainly bought them time, not eliminate the
threat of ruinous competition from cheap imports.
The picture of the Philippine state that emerges is one that allows
significant space for pressure groups opposed to liberalization, to the point
where key actors within both the bureaucracy and parliament can, in fact,
be mobilized as allies. And yet, when push comes to shove, liberalization
wins out. What emerges is a resilient state that can entertain opposition,
but where the ideology of neoliberalism so permeates the bureaucracy and
the legislature that it can override the coalitions and coalition formations
xiii
xiv People, Profit, and Politics
that the threatened sectors can put together. While there certainly is a
domestic pro-liberalization lobby, and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are important pressure
groups, it seems to be the case that the adoption of trade liberalization
policies owes more to ideological belief among key policymakers and elected
officials than to the organized political clout of these actors.
Thus what we have, at least in the case of economic policies, is a perfect
example of what Gramsci termed “consensus,” in this case, neoliberal
consensus, as the driver of policy. What this seems to indicate is that for
producers, the key to winning the battle is not a superior organizing
capability but drawing up an alternative paradigm that is more convincing
than neoliberalism. This will be no easy task. As many have pointed out,
the overwhelming empirical evidence after 25 years of accelerated
liberalization, both in the Philippines and globally, shows that it has been
accompanied by growing poverty, inequality, and stagnation, even as state-
led protected systems such as Korea and China have progressed by leaps
and bounds. Despite this, neoliberalism remains as entrenched as ever in
the higher rungs of the economic bureaucracies of the Philippine state.
This is, of course, just one lesson that one draws from the case studies
of this book. There are other dimensions of the state-civil society relationship
in the Philippines that are illuminated here. The authors and editors are
to be congratulated for bringing out an indispensable guide to the topic.
Walden Bello
Professor of Sociology
Diliman, Quezon City
Philippines
Introduction xv
Preface
T
he idea for this book was conceived way back in 2003 when the
then-director of the Third World Studies Center (TWSC), Miriam
Coronel Ferrer, invited the case authors for a brainstorming session
to prepare a research proposal on the topic “state-civil society relations in
the context of globalization.” The research project would be a fitting follow-
up to the just completed TWSC research on “Philippine Civil Society and
the Globalization Discourse” (which was subsequently published as a book),
and the Center’s previous researches examining the potential of Philippine
civil society as agent of democratization. It was also pointed out in the
session that a research on the topic is significant because at that time no
study has been conducted yet on the nature of interaction between the
state and civil-society actors in an environment shaped by globalization.
Existing studies only deal with the broad effects of economic globalization
on different sectors of the Philippine economy. The writers decided to
focus the study on sectors perceived to be widely affected by globalization:
the vegetable, hog, garment, and telecommunications. A research proposal
was then submitted to the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), which agreed to fund the conduct of the research in 2004, and
the publication of the output in 2005.
This project would not have been possible without the assistance of
various individuals and institutions. We like to thank the UNDP for the
financial assistance, and its program manager for governance unit,
Emmanuel Buendia, for his support of TWSC researches. The Social Sciences
and Philosophy Research Foundation (SSPRF) was also on hand to manage
the research and publication funds.
xv
xvi People, Profit, and Politics
During the research phase, we like to express our gratitude to a number

of individuals who helped us complete this stage of the project. Our thanks
go to Virgilio Salentes, secretariat head of UNDP’s Governance Portfolio,
whose office approved our research proposal for funding.
We are indebted to our project consultants whose comments and
criticisms helped sharpen the analyses and overall quality of the case
studies. Aside from commenting on the drafts of the cases, they also
helped refine some conceptual and methodological aspects of the project,
like improving the research questions, interview guide, and selection of
respondents. The consultants are: Riza Bernabe for the vegetable
industry, Teodoro Mendoza for the hog industry; Rosalinda Pineda-
Ofreneo for the garment industry, and Alan Alegre for the
telecommunications industry. Some of the case studies were also shown
to the following for additional reviews: William Padojinog, Erwin
Alampay, Florian Alburo, and Rowena Boquiren.
We were also fortunate to have with us two very reliable research
assistants, Zuraida Mae Cabilo and Sarah Jane Domingo, who were always
available for us even on short notice despite the demands of their graduate
studies.
For the publication phase of the project, we like to thank the staff of
UNDP’s Project Management Office for facilitating the release of our
publication funds.
Our thanks go to the reviewers of the book manuscript, Jose Magadia
and Cielito Habito, for sharing with us their expertise on Philippine civil
society and economy, respectively. They helped clarify crucial points in
the manuscript that would have been overlooked if it were not for their
comments.
We also thank the book’s editorial consultant and supervisor, Laura
Samson, and her team (Jocelyn de Jesus, Nestor De Guzman, Veni Ilowa,
and Dezh David) for making our manuscript measure up to publication
standards. The ever reliable staff of the TWSC—Caring Francisco, Bien
Lacsamana, Tess Lubang, and Erning Francisco—were always on hand to
assist us in all the stages of the project.
Preface xvii
Lastly, we express our heartfelt gratitude to all the respondents of the

case studies for taking the time off from their busy schedules to
accommodate our requests for interviews and for sending us feedback on
the drafts of the case studies.
Ma. Glenda S. Lopez Wui

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
February 2006
Introduction
T
his research project on state-civil society relations in the context
of globalization analyzes the relations between the Philippine state
and selected civil-society actors in the context of globalization.
It focuses on four sectors: the Benguet vegetable, hog, garment, and
telecommunications industries. These sectors are widely known to have
been affected by economic liberalization—negatively in the case of the
first three, and positively in the case of the telecommunications industry.
The project investigates two interrelated aspects of state-civil society
relations: 1) how civil-society actors engage with official state agencies
through various formal and informal strategies of dialogue, negotiation,
and bargaining; and 2) the extent to which civil-society actors have
been able to influence governmental policy making.
These concerns come in light of studies showing the importance of
the role of a strong and effective civil society as one of the major factors
in furthering development and democracy. While this study does not
assume that a strong civil society is automatically beneficial to
development, it is predicated on the view that civil-society participation
and inputs can make a positive contribution to the policy-making
process.
In the academic literature, for example, it is generally accepted that
there is some kind of relationship between economic development and the
kinds of participatory democracy signaled by the proactive role of civil
society. Some analysts claim that there is a strong association between the
1
2 People, Profit, and Politics
two; others assert that they exhibit a positive linear relationship, while still
others claim this relationship is indeed causal (see Przeworski et al. 2000
for a comprehensive discussion; Sen 2000; Bensabat-Kleinberg and Clark
2000).
These academic claims are also substantiated in the policy statements
of major international development agencies. There is a near-universal
acceptance by agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, bilateral donors, and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) that democratic forms of policy making and civil-society
participation are integral to effective decision making. Above all, each of
these agencies now subscribes to the notion that stakeholders and
beneficiaries should participate in all stages of the policy and project cycle.
The UNDP, for example, has long been explicit on this point: it suggests
that stakeholder participation and the role of civil society are crucial in
shaping the political and governance contexts in which policy is made and
implemented (UNDP 1993). The creation, in 2000, of the UNDP Bureau
for Resources and Strategic Partnerships to coordinate and nurture UNDP’s
working relationships with civil-society organizations, among others, adds
institutional weight to the participatory approach. Finally, the UNDP book
Partners in Human Development: UNDP and Civil Society Organizations
(2003) suggests important ways to operationalize the partnership among
the international community, states, and civil society.
Beyond these general statements of principle about state-civil society
relations and participatory approaches to development and good
governance, what is needed is a much more empirically grounded research
that can reveal not simply the presence (or absence) of civil-society actors
in policy dialogue but precisely how civil-society actors negotiate and bargain
to open up greater political and policy space and the substance of the
policy outcomes of such engagement. The need, therefore, is for an
assessment of state-civil society relations both as a means (the context in
which policy is negotiated, shaped, and set) and as an end (the
implementation, monitoring, and adaptation of more effective policy).
That the Philippines provides the setting for the study, particularly in
Introduction 3
looking at the dynamics of state-civil society engagement in a time of

democracy, is also significant, even crucial. As pointed out by Cielito Habito
(2005)
This is the country that has been acknowledged to have among the most, if not
the most, vibrant civil society movements around the globe, and especially
within the Asia-Pacific region. It is also a country wherein a relatively wide
variety of avenues for civil society engagement with the state have been
made available, especially after the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship
with the EDSA People Power Revolution. Thus, a similar study focused on
another country probably would not have been [as] rich and substantive.
Habito, however, notes that “this uniqueness in the Philippine situation

could also be its handicap in the sense that it may limit the study’s potential
audience, as the wide applicability of its observations and findings may be
open to question”:
One may argue that the vibrancy of Philippine civil society and the wide
variety in modes of state-civil society engagement opportunities present in
the country in a way make it a standard to which others may aspire, and a
kind of yardstick with which other countries’ situations and experiences
may be assessed. (Habito 2005)
Defining Civil Society

Civil society is generally identified with the “private” sphere of the
capitalist market, which is to be distinguished from the “public” domain
of the state (Colas 2002, 14). It consists of non-state actors and these
include the private sector. Civil-society players or organizations (CSOs)
are considered part of social movements comprising amorphous and fluid
groups in which the bonds are common grievances or conviction, and
shared goals for societal and policy change (rather than structures). They
connect people with causes through developing communities of interests
around shared conditions (Clark 2003, 4). Their relevance is seen in the
light of non-state actors as “crucial determinants of state policies, whether
domestic or foreign.” Of importance is that the real change is in the breadth
of the social interests represented by CSOs, which has witnessed a move

toward democratization that is both domestic and international (Uvin 2000,
17-18).
CSOs can be categorized. One category of CSO is engaged in voluntary
organizing, which is primarily devoted to promoting policy change through
public education, direct lobbying, policy research, and so on. Distinction,
however, is made between a profit CSO and a nonprofit one. The former
includes chambers of commerce and producers’ associations. The latter
performs its tasks out of a sense of the general interests, e.g., environmental
organizations (Uvin 2000, 12). Nonprofit CSOs are also defined as
nongovernment organizations (NGOs), which are considered as key players
in social movements
that do grassroots support and advocacy work. They are intermediary
organizations in contrast to membership groups with relatively defined social
constitutions. They, therefore, do not directly represent the grassroots
constituencies they attempt to serve. (Fox and Brown 1998, 21)
Some would consider this a second category of nonprofit CSOs—

the voluntary organizations that seek to promote change, also referred
to as intermediary organizations or grassroots support organizations
(Uvin 2000, 11-12). A subcategory here is the so-called international
NGOs (INGOs), which refers to organizations that are located in one
or more rich countries and seek to promote social and economic change
in Third World countries (Uvin 2000, 12). A third category of nonprofit
CSOs is people’s organizations (POs)—NGOs whose members belong
to the same community they are serving. They also generally consist of
member organizations composed of people seeking to advance their
own community interests, e.g., peasant associations (Uvin 2000, 11).
What also emerges here is the phenomenon of CSO networks in which
there is no single organization or center for decision making and often
not even any formal process. In this situation, cooperation is
nonhierarchical, informal, and often temporary and issue-specific (Uvin
2000, 12).
Introduction 5
Defining Globalization
The other important concern of this research is globalization, which is
“the rapidly expanding process through which societies are connecting to
each other through markets and new technology” (Grugel 2004, 29-30).
Social-movement scholars have pointed out that globalization is not a new
phenomenon. While “the world economy had interlocking trade and
investment patterns as early as the 19th century,” what distinguishes today’s
global economy is its neoliberal character, which structures contemporary
transnational content (Ayres 2002, 191). Proponents of neoliberalism argue
that there should be no government intervention with market forces for
economic growth to occur. This is because the neoliberal economic theory
asserts that “the law of free markets is sufficient regulation for an economy
seeking to find sustainable income flows and thus distributes revenues to
the most needy segments of society” (Peters 2000, 6). The view is that
premium must be placed on trade liberalization and the unfettered entry
of foreign investments into any country. Second, globalization with its
emphasis on a free-market economy and privatization seeks to minimize
the role of the state. By doing so, it hopes to put an end to the inefficiency
and corruption that has plagued state-dominated economies as epitomized
by capitalist authoritarian states as well as socialist authoritarian states.
Another tenet of globalization is trade liberalization and the opening up
of the economy to foreign investors.
Critics, however, have pointed out that such a setup does not create a
political opportunity for long-term development. Investors, for example,
can easily fly out of the host country when the latter ceases to provide
them optimum environment for capital accumulation. Moreover, emphasis
on export would give less attention to the development of a domestic mass
following for local products. Although the emphasis on export could create
more employment for the local workforce because of bigger markets abroad,
problems nonetheless arise if importing countries begin to tap other sources
offering better-quality goods at lower prices. The other critique concerns
the class bias of globalization—that is, against the poor. This is because
globalization has intensified economic, social, and political inequalities by
privileging the private over the public sphere and by marginalizing the
actual, as well as the potential, importance of the commons (Thomas 1997,
6). As noted by its critics, globalization has resulted in the rich countries
growing richer and the poor countries becoming poorer; within the country
itself, the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. Such a
reality has been a major criticism of the neoliberal development policy
whereby “20 years of liberalization of the world economy has not led to
the generous trickle-down that they have predicted, either in absolute or
in relative terms” (Wilkin 1997, 28). These inequalities are further
perpetuated because globalization allows the private sector, e.g.,
multinational corporations (MNCs), to have unfettered access to the
markets of a developing country. Because of this, there is a real likelihood
that there will be a contraction of wealth that is heavily skewed in favor of
the wealthiest sections of developing countries (Serrano 2001, 9). And
lastly, creating a favorable environment for foreign investors is often
translated to the repression of workers’ wages.
Besides the class bias of globalization, the other issue is concerned
with the quality of life that this economic phenomenon is promoting.
Critics argue that globalization has brought about a rapid development
that threatens the quality of life, and the absence of gender equality despite
the growth in the number of working women (Peters 2000). This stage of
capitalism is also accused of degrading the environment (Callinicos 2001,
116). It also does not help much that the agents of globalization such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO) have accelerated globalization
without social control. The perpetuation of undemocratic WTO rules and
procedures, which have marginalized the majority of the world’s people
who must live with the instability and social degradation (Tabb 2001,
191). Related to this is the critique of the loss of state control of the economy.
The market-based solution, for example, is seen in the bigger context of
globalization’s integrating a national economy into the world’s globalized
free markets. This thus brings about a situation whereby states are left to
have very little control of their economies as seen during the Asian financial
crisis (Peters 2000).
Introduction 7
State-Civil Society Engagement

in a Period of Globalization
Taking into consideration the pros and cons of globalization, this
research looks into how this economic phenomenon has affected state-
civil society engagement in the Philippines. Although there are existing
studies on the broad effects of economic globalization on different sectors
of the Philippine economy, to date no research has focused on the nature
of interaction that takes place between the state and civil-society actors
within an environment shaped by globalization. Further, little analysis has
been undertaken on the implications of this engagement for development
policy outcomes and raising the standards of governance (including
transparency, accountability, and responsiveness). The research, therefore,
attempts to fill these gaps. A systematic study on how civil-society groups
engage the state could yield valuable lessons—both for the civil-society
community in its advocacy and for the government in its policy-making
responsibilities, and for both state and civil society in their development
partnership. This would include the identification of the circumstances
under which broader and more effective participation in the decision-
making process is achieved, as well as when it is not. It would also help to
clarify areas for possible reforms, especially in relation to the developmental
outcomes arising from economic liberalization in specific sectors.
Such an engagement is also defined by the manner in which members
of civil society situate themselves. There are NGOs, for example, that are
promoters of neoliberalism. That is, they work with “large sums from the
World Bank, the US Agency for International Development (USAID),
and other international and state funding agencies on a ‘subcontracted’
basis to undermine national comprehensive welfare institutions” (Petras
2003, 141). There are NGOs, however, that are considered reformists as
they “receive middle-range funding from private social democratic
foundations and progressive local or regional governments to fund
ameliorative projects and to correct the excesses of the free market. The
reformists try to ‘reform’ the WTO, IMF and World Bank and regulate
capital” (Petras 2003, 142). And lastly, there are radical NGOs, which
believe that basic structural changes from below, e.g., redistribution of

power, property and income, are necessary to achieve sustained development
and social justice (Petras 2003, 143). In all these, the interaction between
social movements of civil society and the institutions of global governance
is still mediated through the structure of the state. The interesting question
in this context, therefore, “is not so much if state sovereignty is disappearing
in the face of globalization, but rather how is the relationship between
state and civil society being shaped internationally under the pressures of
globalization” (Colas 2002, 139).
Moreover, the engagement is also determined by the manner in
which the global process has shaped both domestic and transnational
mobilization of civil society. This is because global processes produce
similar responses by movements in different contexts by structuring
common transnational threats or opportunities. Second, global pressures
have also produced similar opportunity structures for collective action
in different national contexts (Smith and Johnston 2002, 3).
“Transnational actors become more relevant as they organize to address
grievances of global character and to take advantage of parallel state-
level organized groups like Amnesty International … [Transnational
actors] can readily advance a common political strategy that targets
multiple national governments” (Smith and Johnston 2002, 3). Third,
cross-national movements have also been identified as due to the
diffusion processes whereby there emerge globally defined targets or
sources of grievances brought about by the structural affinity among
states. A proponent of this is Marco Giugni who points out that
transnational diffusion is also a crucial process for explaining common
ideologies and tactics across differing national movements (Smith and
Johnston 2002, 3).
Globalization also brings with it an expanded array of political
institutions that create both opportunity and constraints for activity. Not
only do global institutions have distinguished effects on activists’ political
strategies and opportunities; they also shape the ways that social movement
actors relate to each other (Smith and Johnston 2002, 9). A phenomenon
Introduction 9
that has also emerged are global civil societies, which operate at the
international level. Because of this, “many studies of transnational
associations and political contention implicitly or explicitly argue that global
processes are creating an expanded web of interdependence among states,
thereby nesting national institutions within a broader, global framework of
interest and obligations” (Smith and Johnston 2002, 7).
Propositions on Civil Society-State Engagement
In determining the role which civil society would like the state to play
in an era of globalization, a number of proposals have been put forward.
There are those who argue that governments should not divest themselves
wholly of the provision of essential services such as health and education.
By maintaining a strong presence in civil society, government can still
exercise some influence over the vagaries attendant to a free-market
economy (Peters 2000). There is also a need to create conditions for markets
that empower the impoverished and in the process respond to local
demands. Furthermore, “governments should be encouraged to take a more
active role in the regulation of markets as a means of ensuring that those
who are most vulnerable to fluctuations in financial markets, particularly
those who are living in poverty, can be assured of some means of protection
by a state committed to principles of equity, democracy, and sustainability”
(Peters 2000, 6-7).
Civil Society and State Engagement

and the Specific Sectors
Another dimension introduced by this study in state-civil society

relations in a time of globalization is the empirical focus. In highlighting
four sectors—the Benguet vegetable, hog, garment, and
telecommunications industries—which have been both positively and
negatively affected by economic liberalization, the research is predicated
on the assumption that some form of state-civil society engagement is
both necessary and desirable if the new context for policy making—
globalization—is to be “managed” or “governed” in ways that minimize
its downside effects and maximize its developmental potential. In the

Philippine context, there are built-in mechanisms and venues in the
three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judiciary)
where civil-society actors can formally engage the state to negotiate
policy reforms that address specific concerns. Civil-society groups can
engage Congress in the enactment of laws; they can also engage the
executive branch in the implementation and enforcement of the laws
and the formulation of other programs and policies. They can also
appeal to the judiciary for the interpretation of laws and redress of
grievances. Likewise, summits, dialogues, and other fora as well as
tripartite and multisectoral councils have been made available to civil-
society actors where they can sit and conduct dialogue with state actors.
These are all part of the general drive to enhance the transparency of
governmental decision making. It is also the case that, beyond these formal
channels, much of the quality of state-civil society relations is determined
informally through flexible policy networks that are also present in processes
of lobbying, bargaining, policy shaping, policy setting, and policy change.
The research seeks to understand the precise nature of these formal and
informal state-civil society relations along a spectrum of engagement,
ranging from inclusion through accommodation to exclusion, and seeks
to account for these different modalities.
A third dimension of the research examines the specificities of policy
outcomes through an analysis of these four sectors. The rationale for
choosing them is twofold. First, each of these sectors of the Philippine
economy, with the exception of the telecommunications industry, has
confronted difficulties in the last few years and these problems are widely
attributed to liberalization policies associated with the globalization process.
The research establishes whether this understanding is well founded and
how it determines the forms and means of intervention civil-society actors
utilize in their engagement with the government. Second, the effectiveness
of these modes of intervention and how the state responds to the processes
of dialogue, negotiation, and bargaining are also assessed to account for
substantive policy changes or, alternatively, policy disagreement or policy
Introduction 11
inertia.
Theoretical Perspectives on
State-Civil Society Relations
There are three major approaches in viewing and explaining state-

civil society relations: liberal-oppositional, liberal-relational, and
Marxist-relational (Ku 2002). This research has a bias toward the liberal-
relational approach. The liberal-relational approach views civil society
“as being necessarily intertwined with the state. Much liberal theory
believes that civil society may effectively defend itself against an
encroaching government only through legal and political institutions”
(Ku 2002, 534-35). If in the liberal-relational approach the state is
necessary to ensure the rights of individuals in a civil society and of the
civil society itself, the Marxist-relational approach considers the state
as a referee among contending egoistic interests in civil society. “In this
theory, state intervention is legitimate if it is to remedy injustices and
inequalities within civil society, and if it is to protect the universal
interest of the people” (Ku 2002, 532). As for the liberal-oppositional
approach, it views civil society “as a realm outside and in opposition to
the state. Believing that the state is necessarily coercive and oppressive,
it favors a highly autonomous civil sphere outside the state. It advocates
the self-management of the sphere, through self-help bodies, informal
networks and social movements” (Ku 2002, 534). These two approaches
have their own explanatory power; however, given the current
developments in state-civil society relations in the case studies of the
industries covered in the context of globalization mentioned above, the
liberal-relational approach is deemed to capture much of the ongoing
dynamics in the sectors being studied. This is because in the liberal-
relational approach, civil society in this research “exists at the
intersection where the various elements of society come together to
protect and nurture the individual and where the individual operates
to provide those same protections and liberating opportunities for
others” (O’Connell 2000, 474). These “various elements” refer to the
community; the business sector; the voluntary, nonprofit, independent

sector; and even, in part, the government (Hearn 2001, 342).
Theoretical Framework of
Political Opportunity Structures
These perspectives, however, may not fully capture state-civil society

relations when a new element is introduced: globalization. Will
globalization weaken the intertwined relationship of the state and the civil
society, and thereby also reduce the democratizing potential of such relation
to the detriment of the people who have to suffer the effect of
undemocratically crafted socioeconomic policies? Or, is it also possible
that economic liberalization, the main economic regime that underpins
globalization, will result “in the transfer of economic decision making and
power to market forces and social actors, therefore potentially empowering
civil society” (Kamrava and O Mora 1998, 896-97)?
To examine these questions, the study also draws heavily from the
framework of resource mobilization in explaining the emergence of social
movements in terms of the capability of movement entrepreneurs to
mobilize resources toward the attainment of identified collective objectives.
In addressing the questions posed in the research, the theory of political
opportunity structure (POS) was used as the framework of the study. The
concept of POS is part of the resource mobilization theories conceived to
analyze social movements. This theory is based on the assumption that
aspects within the political milieu determine the emergence of strategies
utilized by civil society in engaging the state as well as the outcomes of the
engagement. While previous theories emphasize internal characteristics
and resources of movements that could affect mobilization and realization
of objectives, the bias of the political opportunity model is toward external
factors or conditions; in this case, the broader political system that structures
the opportunities for collective action. Succinctly, a social movement’s
political environment influences the kind of approach and the result of
protest. The POS framework, however, also points to the importance of
movements to create and mobilize resources at their disposal to advance
Introduction 13
their agenda. Thus, the concept of political opportunity structures is applied

in examining how a specific political environment determines the outcome
of the actions of civil-society actors in each of these respective sectors of the
study and how these actors are also able to take advantage of opportunities
that are external to them.
Changes in political opportunity structures are also monitored as
these may either encourage or discourage social movements, and when
or how struggles would lead to actual reforms. Political opportunity
structures include the opening up of access to power, shifts in ruling
alignments brought about by cleavages within and among elites, and
the availability of influential allies (Tarrow 1994). Also, political
opportunity structures are not confined to the state. In an environment
where the state does not have monopoly of trade policy making and
governance, it is likewise imperative to look at intergovernmental and
supranational institutions. Furthermore, political opportunity
structures, according to Tarrow (1994), are “consistent but not
necessarily formal or permanent dimensions of the political
environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective
action by affecting their expectations for success or failure” (85).
By privileging the structure of political opportunity, the fortunes of
movements in terms of mobilization and policy influence can be explained
largely by the nature of political institutions within the challenged polity
and the movement’s preferences in approach anchored in this environment
(Meyer 2003). In simple terms, therefore, the political context,
conceptualized broadly, produces opportunities for actions, responsiveness
to change, and policy influence. Corollary to this is the idea that movements
decide on goals and strategies based on political circumstances instead of
organizational dispositions. Therefore, political opportunity structure is
largely used to explain three main aspects of social movements: their
emergence, preference in tactics or strategies, and the degree to which they
achieve their objectives (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 27).
Furthermore, in looking into political opportunity structures, Giugni
(1998) identifies two salient features central to this model: the system of
alliances and oppositions, which movements can use as a political resource

for their success, given that they are considered as powerless challengers;
and the structure of the state.
The Case Studies
These theoretical perspectives were applied to the four case studies

presented. Sharon M. Quinsaat’s case study, “Mobilizing against Vegetable
Importation,” looks into the mobilization of the civil society in cooperation
with government to end the importation of cheaper vegetables, which has
brought about the demise of the already underdeveloped Benguet vegetable
industry. It looks into how civil society explored the different channels
opened under a democracy to penetrate the hostile policy environment in
advocating for reforms to save the industry. A similar situation is also found
in Ma. Glenda S. Lopez Wui’s “Confronting the Challenges in the Garment
Industry.” Like the vegetable industry, the garment industry also suffers
from the adverse effects of cheaper importation of garments. Unlike the
vegetable industry, though, it is export-oriented and is not geared toward
the domestic market. Furthermore, it enjoyed its heyday as a leading export
industry and continues to be one of the major export earners of the country.
However, its export earnings are threatened by the expiration of the Multi-
Fiber Arrangement and the removal of the assured quota for its products.
Members of the industry, i.e., the garment factory owners and laborers,
together with members of civil-society groups have launched an advocacy
campaign for policy reforms to prevent the industry from further demise.
Joel F. Ariate Jr.’s “Protests and Perceived Threats in the Hog Industry”
depicts the hog industry as suffering the same fate of the Benguet
vegetable and garment industries with regard to the loss of profit as
brought about by cheaper imports. Like the Benguet vegetable industry,
it primarily serves the domestic market. Unlike the other two industries,
however, the hog industry’s profit continues to increase and has not
experienced the bankruptcy of any of its major players. Despite these,
however, the hog industry owners are not taking any chances and have
launched a series of campaigns and lobbying with regard to policy
Introduction 15
reforms to be undertaken by the government to secure their profits. As

in the Benguet vegetable and garment industries, however, there are
also certain international treaties and agreements that have bound the
Philippine state to abide by the entry of cheaper imports. The last case
study, “Balancing Consumer and Corporate Interests in the
Telecommunications Industry” by Ronald C. Molmisa, highlights a
different experience of state-civil society engagement in a period of
globalization. This is because the telecommunications industry—unlike
the Benguet vegetable, garment, and hog industries—has generally
benefited from the liberalization of the industry with the emergence of
telecommunication companies as epitomized by the cellphone and
Internet phenomena in the country. The bone of contention now lies
on the power of the regulatory state to prevent any form of monopoly
and to come out with policies that will benefit most the industry players
and the consumers.
Data Gathering
For this research, a preliminary review of the literature was undertaken,

focusing on conceptualizing globalization, state-civil society relations, and
processes of policy transfer. Data and information were taken from document
collection of key policy statements, plans of action, and implementation
reports. The researchers conducted interviews/focus group discussions
(FGDs) with the subject/civil-society organizations being studied; with
officials of concerned government institutions/offices and their attached
agencies; and with business groups, NGOs, and people’s organizations.
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Introduction 17
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Mobilizing against
Vegetable Importation
Sharon M. Quinsaat
G
uided by the theory of comparative advantage, the Philippines
liberalized trade in agriculture through the ratification of various
international accords such as the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade-Uruguay Round (GATT-UR) and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations Free Trade Area (AFTA) as a means of spurring growth in
the sector through increased productivity and access to foreign markets.
However, in a country where agriculture remains economically important,1
in spite of government’s traditional bias against the sector, the opening up
of the domestic market to foreign agricultural commodities was regarded
as a guaranteed recipe for failure. Central to the opposition to trade
liberalization is the removal of quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports
and decrease in tariff rates of imported goods, which facilitate the incursion
of cheaper, often subsidized, goods, displacing Filipino farmers’ sizeable
share in local markets.
Amid protestations against the merits of free trade in agriculture
was guarded optimism for the vegetable industry. With its growth
potential in exports, vegetables ostensibly offer economic opportunities
to Filipino farmers. Economists have championed vegetables to be
among the “gainers” from trade liberalization as agricultural production
and trade shift from traditional to high-value crops, owing to the
country’s favorable climate, which makes it possible to produce different
kinds of vegetables all year round.2
19
In 1999, massive importation of government-subsidized Australian

and Chinese produce, particularly semitemperate vegetables, placed the
province of Benguet in a crisis with long-term consequences. With more
than half of the population highly dependent on vegetable farming, the
prognosis was that Benguet had a very dismal chance of recovery. The
sector was considered to be an unforeseen casualty of agricultural trade
liberalization, as it boasts of monopoly of such commodity in the domestic
market.
To some extent, the unintended but laudable outcome of the crisis
was the unprecedented mobilization of civil society and the local
government to end the bane of importation, at least for vegetables. The
stirrings at the local level became a springboard for more concerted actions
at the national level, which some have characterized as “a paradigm shift
from victims waiting helplessly for government action to empowered
farmers taking the initiative” (Ordoñez 2003). Although civil society elicited
only temporary solutions and modest policy reforms from government,
the experience of the Benguet vegetable sector presents a unique opportunity
to examine the underlying dynamics of a process by which civil society
relates to the state in an environment conditioned by globalization.
Taking the case of the Benguet vegetable industry from October 2002
to September 2004, this study endeavors to answer the main question:
“How is the relationship between the state and civil society in addressing
the impact of trade liberalization, a by-product of government’s submission
to market forces?” More specifically, the study aims to: 1) examine the
factors underlying the mobilization, strategies, and outcomes of civil-society
groups in engaging the state, with specific focus on the political environment
that facilitated or impeded such causes; 2) assess the extent of the influence
of civil-society groups in pressing for government action on the Benguet
vegetable crisis; and 3) determine the lessons that such success or failure
indicates in terms of the viability of state-civil society engagement in
addressing the impact of trade liberalization.
This paper argues that despite the opening up of channels for
citizen’s participation in government due largely to the democratization
Mobilizing against Vegetable Importation 21
processes after Martial Law, the neoliberal ideology strongly and

faithfully espoused by the Philippine government has created a hostile
political environment for civil society advocating reforms in trade
policies that are deemed threatening to the full realization of its
economic orthodoxy. However, civil society was able to seize important
opportunities for mobilization and policy influence: access to channels
in the political system, either mandated by law or superficially created
by government officials in their attempt to respond to the problem of
the industry; presence of influential allies, especially the elite; a
politically charged atmosphere owing to the approaching national
elections; and persistent and sympathetic media treatment of the
problem building an impression of urgency.
Contours of the V egetable Sector in

Vegetable
Benguet in the Era of Trade Liberalization
Trade
The province of Benguet located in the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR) has dominated the local production and trade of
semitemperate vegetables,3 earning the moniker “Salad Bowl of the
Philippines.” Prior to the development of the vegetable industry, however,
most of Benguet agriculture was devoted to the production of rice, camote
(sweet potato), and gabi (taro) for local consumption. Although the
Spaniards introduced the production of cabbage and potato in the mid-
1800s, farming was limited, small-scale, and household-oriented until the
late 1920s. The Americans further developed vegetable production during
their colonial rule due largely to the mining boom and growth of logging
companies in the area. Two important factors ushered in commercial interest
in semitemperate vegetables in Benguet: the presence of Japanese and
Chinese nationals who had knowledge of the technology for vegetable
farming, and the construction and opening of the Halsema Road, which
enabled the growth and expansion of production and trade (Reyes-Boquiren
1989; Lewis 1992). From this time on, the vegetable industry has
increasingly become substantially important to the economy of Benguet.4
However, the Philippine vegetable industry, in general, has by and

large been backward and subsistence-based, suffering for decades from
limited and erratic production, low demand, weak infrastructure, and lack
of government support. In actuality, there is no explicit government policy
regarding the development of vegetable farming. As a matter of fact,
vegetable production through the years has been “accorded less attention
and support by the government” (Lantican 1998, 52). Vegetables are
included under the “high value crops”5 category, wherein the chief policy
instruments for its development are the Republic Act (RA) 7900 or the
High Value Crops Development Act of 1995 and the Gintong Ani for the
High-Value Commercial Crops program of the Department of Agriculture.
Vegetable farming in Benguet is capital intensive and at times involves
“an elusive interplay of skill, fortitude and luck” (Lewis 1992, 118). First,
there are production-related factors which are beyond the control of the
farmers. One alarming trend related to low volume of production is the
decreasing area planted to vegetables due mainly to declining fertility of
the land (owing to long years of use) and soil erosion, and land use and/or
crop conversion, such as the shift to planting of ornamental plants (Aquino
2003). Next, in the case of cost of production, farm inputs alone require a
substantial amount of capital. Machinery, seeds, and chemicals are often
imported.6 Benguet farmers have been importing American, Japanese, and
European hybrid seeds since the 1960s, which produce quality cauliflower,
broccoli, carrots, potatoes, and cabbages (Cabreza and Caluza 2002).
Because of inadequate farm extension and other support services from the
government, farmers resort to, and are at the mercy of, abusive informal
moneylenders.7
Production forms only half of the farmers’ expenditures. Farmers have
to wrestle with high transport costs, which usually take a large share of
total costs in postharvest, especially for highland vegetables. Poor farm-to-
market roads, inadequate storage, and inferior market information system
result in under- and/or over-supply and spoilage.8 Price fluctuations are
also a common problem of farmers, regardless of the type of crop. Due to
limited access to reliable market information and a multilayered marketing
channel, farmers are reliant on traders who dictate the farmgate prices of
their produce, which are usually low.9 High costs of packaging their produce,
high rental of stalls and stands, low quality of products, limited research
and development, lack of modern/appropriate marketing technology and
varieties, and weak (or lack of ) producer organizations that could effectively
market the vegetables directly to the consumers are also challenges that
farmers deal with (Aquino 2003). Adding to these supply-side factors is
the declining share of vegetables in household food expenditures.10
Due to its geographic location, the province of Benguet is also
vulnerable to natural disasters. In July 2001, one of the worst tropical
storms to hit the Philippines—Feria (Utor)—struck Northern Luzon,
destroying infrastructure and devastating rice and vegetable farms. Trade
was disrupted in Benguet, as the province was temporarily isolated due to
landslides and floods, which rendered major routes impassable. The
calamity created a shortage in the supply of semitemperate vegetables,
inducing traders and retailers to seek alternative sources to meet the
demands of the markets and consumers. This opened a Pandora’s box, as
what started as an emergency or stopgap scheme developed into a recurrent
then finally permanent practice.
Not fully recovered from Feria’s rampage, Benguet faced another
outpouring—this time, of cheap and high-quality imported vegetables.
Since 2001, farmers in Benguet have been articulating that the scourge of
cheap imports has become the main threat to their livelihood, if not to
their very chance of survival. Indeed, from the last quarter of 2001 to
2002, the farmers of CAR, especially Benguet, suffered, as the country
imported about USD 6.4 million (PHP 328.7 million) worth of fresh/
chilled vegetables as compared to USD 5.8 million (PHP 295 million) the
previous year, according to figures from the National Statistics Office
(NSO). In general, imports grew by 3 percent on volume and 10 percent
on value. Notable is the 1,925 percent growth in quantity for carrots, 102
percent for head lettuce, 97 percent for cauliflowers and headed broccoli,
and 94 percent for cabbage, from 2001 to 2002; all of which are also
produced locally (table 1). Data provided by the NSO and the Philippine
Table 1. Volume (in kilograms) and percentage growth from previous year 24
of selected imported semitemperate vegetables, 1998-2003
Commodity (fresh/chilled) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Total vegetable imports 144,639,221 191,494,671 1,924,244,095 227,941,098 180,256,455

(32%) (905%) (-88%) (-21%)
Cabbage (in-quota) 5,410 236,930 1,451 35,742 69,422 83,210
(4,279%) (-99%) (2,363%) (94%) (20%)
Cabbage lettuce (head lettuce) 27,944 118,349 150,983 84,917 171,186 165,980
(324%) (28%) (-44%) (102%) (-3%)
Carrot 6,178 18,404 57,175 31,956 646,966 1,346,560
(198%) (211%) (-44%) (1,925%) (108%)
Celery other than celeriac 22,215 7,933 17,410 24,105 5,511 1,750
(-64%) (119%) (38%) (-77%) (-68%)
Cauliflower and headed broccoli 153,992 112,301 6,725,781 309,590 609,724 270,560
(-27%) (5,889%) (-95%) (97%) (-56%)
Lettuce 302,105 309,884 691,172 369,197 215,393 139,640
(3%) (123%) (-47%) (-42%) (-35%)

Mushroom 36,530 53,864 43,701 78,894 61,586 154,400
(47%) (-19%) (81%) (-22%) (151%)
Seed potato 244,134 472,888 1,131,466 756,483 1,169,954
(94%) (139%) (-33%) (55%)
Potato, other than seed potato
(in-quota) 21,513 285,911 609,084 1,514,195 812,897
(1,229%) (113%) (149%) (-46%)
(out-quota) 0 0 0 0 1,118,186
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS).

Table 2. Annual average farmgate price of

selected vegetables in Benguet, 1998-2003
Commodity 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Cabbage 15.17 10.63 7.71 4.78 7.9 8.39

Carrots 18.13 17.28 16.26 10.87 10.46 17.42
Cauliflower – – 32.49 13.9 20.66 21.56
White potato 14.7 16.1 12.69 15.44 11.33 13
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics.
Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) show a 152 percent increase in

the average volume of imported fresh vegetables from 40,419 metric tons
in 1991-1994 to 101,659 metric tons in 1995-2001.11
The entry of cheap imported vegetables caused the province of
Benguet to incur heavy losses with an estimate of PHP 2 billion in
failed transactions between July and August 2002 alone (Requejo 2002).
In a study conducted by Tagarino and Siano (2003), about 80 percent
of 608 farmers in Benguet and Mountain Province ascribe their losses
to imported vegetables. The most conspicuous outcome of the flood of
imports was depressed farmgate price (table 2). Being a major market
of cheap vegetable imports, Manila may serve as a benchmark in the
pricing system. With a highly layered marketing system dominated by
monopoly traders, prices of cheap imports may be used as leverage to
further depress farmgate prices (Morilla 2003). Most farmers have been
inclined to sell their cash crops at a loss to Metro Manila markets to
cope with the crisis.12
Price alone, however, does not capture the effects of cheap vegetable
imports. Equally important are the often-overlooked impact on the psyche
and morale of farmers, and on family and community relations. Eighty-
eight percent of the respondents have registered extreme discouragement
to continue vegetable farming (Tagarino and Siano 2003) and
acknowledged the exigency of engaging the state.
Key Elements Affecting State-Civil Society Relations

In the policy process, civil society, particularly stakeholders, engages
the state or vice versa in setting the agenda, influencing the formulation
and adoption of a policy, and monitoring and assessing the implementation
of policy in terms of achieving its objectives. However, there are certain
factors that may impinge on the likelihood of this interaction, courses of
action, and purported outcomes, specifically in terms of policy reforms.
For this particular case study, these are divergences among the parties
involved at the rudimentary level of problem identification and
interpretation, intricacies of the policy in question, and a mixture of civil
society players with disparate tactics and interests.
Pinpointing the Problem: Variances in Analysis
Recognition and understanding of the problem is a critical first step in

state-civil society engagement. It identifies who should be engaged and
what the prospects and setbacks are and determines the effectiveness of the
techniques to be employed. Likewise, it delineates the parameters for
interaction, offers a clear-cut focus, and sets the elements of a strategy.
With regard to the Benguet vegetable industry, there were three
predominant interpretations of the situation, mainly centering on the causes
of its ailing performance in the domestic market: smuggling, tariff
reduction, and absence of safety nets. Those who saw the problem as a
result of aggressive reduction of tariff rates were polarized into those who
considered this policy as directed by the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and those who thought that it was a unilateral action by the government.
Smuggling: The proverbial culprit

Since majority of the total volume of fresh/chilled imports originated
from China (Macabasco 2003), a country still in the process of acceding
to the WTO in 2001 at the same time forging a free trade agreement with
member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
smuggling was easily identified as the nemesis. However, the relationship
between agricultural trade liberalization and smuggling is incongruous.
When a commodity is protected with high tariffs and quota restrictions,

the importation of such becomes costly, making smuggling an economical
recourse; thus the belief that the old problem of smuggling is not, in any
way, a function of free trade. Furthermore, unlike importation, which is
authorized through government laws and policies, smuggling is a criminal
offense, often linked to poor enforcement of customs regulations and
corrupt practices of government officials.13
There are two kinds of smuggling: outright, which does not require
documentation such as import permits; and technical, which takes place
through undervaluation, underdeclaration of the volume shipped,
misclassification, and diversion of cargo (Francia 2004). Technical
smuggling is the main way in which goods are brought into the country.
But it cannot exist without the collusion of unscrupulous traders and
corrupt government personnel and officials (Bacalla 2004). This was often
the case for vegetables. Smuggled vegetables pose a much bigger threat
than legally imported produce as they imperil not only the source of income
of farmers, but the health of consumers as well.14
Stakeholders in Benguet, particularly traders and farmers, widely
believed that smuggling was their biggest enemy. As a result, the different
line agencies directly involved in importation procedures were the identified
venues of engagement: the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI), mandated to
enforce the Plant Quarantine Law through the issuance of import permits
on plants and small animals likely to become pests, and the inspection and
treatment of imported agricultural commodities among others; and the
Bureau of Customs (BoC), the principal institution tasked to enforce tariff
and customs laws.
To some groups, however, smuggling was a flawed analysis, thereby
targeting the wrong agencies. The Alyansa Dagiti Pesante iti Taeng
Kordilyera (Alliance of Peasants in the Cordillera Homeland [APIT
TAKO]), a sectoral organization of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance
(CPA), has referred to smuggling as a smoke screen of a much larger
issue which the government does not intend to confront head-on
(Bagyan and Gimenez 2004). By shifting the blame on smuggling
instead of legal importation, the problem is relegated to the level of

policy implementation rather than policymaking. This becomes
problematic because the tragedy experienced by the Benguet vegetable
industry now becomes a symptom of the Philippines’ perpetual
development problem, graft and corruption, instead of its economic
ideology, neoliberalism.
Tariff reduction: Diktat of the WTO

In line with market access commitments under the Agreement on
Agriculture (AoA) of the GATT, the Philippines has agreed to remove
import quotas and other QRs and to replace these with corresponding
tariff rates, which will be reduced at a predetermined schedule.15 This is
codified in RA 8178 or the Agricultural Tarrification Act of 1995.16 The
initial bound tariffs for most of sensitive agricultural products fall within
50 to 100 percent in 1995 and 1996. These rates are then reduced to 10 to
50 percent by 2003 and 2004. For vegetables, the Philippines offered to
bind tariff at 40 percent.
Hence, the influx of imported vegetables was just the most recent
repercussion of unbridled trade liberalization, under the directive of the
WTO to scale down tariffs of various agricultural commodities through
modification of the Most Favored Nation (MFN)17 tariff rates. Expedients
in the form of safety nets and executive orders that temporarily increase
tariffs are futile. Because of government’s accession to a rules-based trading
organization, tariffs will eventually be scaled down no matter what (Bagyan
and Gimenez 2004; Gobrin 2004). Since vegetable importation is a direct
outcome of policy, then the most fitting and constructive tactic is to petition
for the restoration of quantitative restrictions through legislation. The
legislative branch, therefore, not the executive, is the venue for engagement,
for the reason that the Congress has the exclusive rights on tax-related
matters, as stipulated in the Philippine Constitution. But a comprehensive
reinstatement of quantitative import restrictions would be impossible
without a repeal of RA 8178, which in effect means withdrawal of
membership from the WTO.
Tariff reduction: Solo act

As opposed to the analysis that the vegetable crisis was WTO’s sole
responsibility, some civil-society groups have continuously asserted that
the Philippine government prefers to set and apply a much lower tariff
rate independently (table 3). A 40-percent tariff on vegetables does not
breach commitments on tariff schedules presented to the multilateral trade
body. However, the Philippines has been unilaterally reducing tariffs on
agricultural products, arguing that such move is only an act of compliance
to the WTO. In effect, the WTO has become the government’s scapegoat
for its own faults and inaction. The government’s rhetoric that it has been
completely emasculated by the trade body is a myth (Villanueva 2004).
What it fails to publicly disclose is the fact that the country’s economic
managers promote tariff reduction, not because they abide by the rules
and procedures of the WTO for threat of retribution, but because they
themselves are steadfast in their belief that this would spur economic growth.
A review of major episodes of trade policy reform in the Philippines
strengthens this assertion. Each administration has its legacy of unilateral
trade liberalization, commencing with Marcos’s Tariff Reform Program
(TRP) I, an integral component of the structural adjustment loan program
extended by the World Bank in the early 1980s, which reduced the level
and dispersion of tariff rates from a range of zero to 100 percent in 1980
to a range of 10 to 50 percent, and removed the quantitative restrictions
beginning in 1981 and ending in 1985. This became the antecedent of
subsequent policies and programs—Aquino’s TRP II, which decreased the
tariff range to within a 3 to 30 percent tariff range by 1995; TRP III,
which was the first major step by the Ramos government in adopting a
uniform 5 percent tariff by 2005 based on the liberalization targets of the
1993-1998 Medium Term Philippine Development Plan; and TRP IV
during the Estrada administration, which adjusted the tariff structure
toward a standardized tariff rate of 5 percent by the year 2004, except for
a few sensitive agricultural and manufactured items. For her part, President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued in 2003 Executive Orders 241 and 246,
respectively, to modify the tariff structure such that the tariff rates on
Table 3. MFN tariff rates of selected imported vegetables, 1995-2003, under GATT-UR 30
Commodity 1995a 1999b 2000 2001c 2002 2003ad 2003be 2004f 2005
Potato
In-quota 40 45 45 45 40 35 40 40
Out-quota 60 60 60 50 40 40 40
Cabbage
In-quota 40 30 30
Out-quota 100 60 60 60 50 40
Cabbage lettuce (head lettuce) 40 15 10 10 7 7 25 25 25
Carrot 40 15 10 10 7 7 25 40 40
Cauliflower and headed broccoli 40 15 10 10 7 7 25 25 25
Witloof chicory 40 10 7 3 3 3 20 20 20
Turnip 40 15 10 10 7 7 20 20 20
Peas 40 15 10 10 7 7 20 20 20
Beans 40 15 10 10 7 7 20 20 20
Asparagus 40 15 10 10 7 7 10 10
Celery 40 15 10 10 7 7 20
Mushrooms 40 15 10 10 7 7 10 10
Source: Tariff Commission of the Philippines.

a
1995 – commitments/bound tariffs submitted to the WTO
b
1999-2000 – Executive Order (EO) 313 (March 29, 1996) and EO 486 (June 11, 1998) of Ramos
c
2001-2002 – EO 334 (January 3, 2001) of Estrada
d
2003a – EO 164 (January 10, 2003) of Arroyo
e
2003b – EO 197 (April 16, 2003) of Arroyo
f
2004-2005 – EO 264 (December 30, 2003) of Arroyo
products that are not locally produced are as low as possible while the
tariff rates on products that are locally produced are adjusted upward (see
Aldaba 2005).
Given this analysis, the strategy is to pressure the executive to increase
tariff rates as a short-term response, while maximizing the potentials of
Congress in advocating for policies and laws intended to protect small
farmers from the onslaught of further trade liberalization, such as safety
nets, coupled with a recalibration of the tariff program for agriculture.
Safety nets: The missing link

If programs and projects to offset the adverse effects of trade
liberalization were implemented in the first place, then the vegetable crisis
should have been avoided. This was the sentiment of majority of civil-
society groups and even local officials in Benguet. Within the WTO,
member-states can institute safety nets to cushion the blow of the AoA:
increase in tariffs up to the bound rates; imposition of safeguards against
unfair trade, if the situation so warrants; and delivery of competitive
enhancement measures to make local agriculture become more efficient.
The Philippine state is replete with protective instruments against unjust
foreign competition and trade practices, as three important measures were
legislated, albeit at a snail’s pace, in light of the country’s membership in
the WTO: the Countervailing Act of 1999 (RA 8751), which strengthens
the procedures for the enforcement of countervailing duties on imported
subsidized products; the Anti-Dumping Act of 1999 (RA 8752), which
provides the rules for the imposition of a duty for products entering the
country at an export price less than their normal value in the ordinary
course of trade; and the Safeguard Measures Act of 2000 (RA 8800), wherein
government can levy a higher tariff on imports of agricultural commodities
once they violate a certain volume of price, protecting local farmers growing
the same products.
In connection with transforming the vegetable industry in order to
compete with the onslaught of imports and maintain its foothold in
the domestic market, government is also obliged to provide the necessary
support, such as the Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund

(ACEF) stipulated under RA 8178—a trust out of the proceeds of the
minimum access volume (MAV)18 importations intended for farmers/
fisherfolks and agribusiness enterprises. However, although many see
the ACEF as a potential solution, it is actually ridden with loopholes
and bureaucratic impediments. What is paradoxical is the fact that
ACEF draws its funding from in-quota tariff revenues earned via the
importation of MAVs, necessitating further importation to sustain it.
In addition, to access the funds, farmers’ organizations must meet
stringent requirements, contradicting ACEF’s objective of protecting
vulnerable and marginalized producers (Aquino 1998). In spite of the
imperfection of policies on safety nets, lobbying for the provision of
such is still indispensable.
These analyses of the difficulties faced by the Benguet vegetable sector
under agricultural trade liberalization have led to civil society’s three-
pronged strategy in its engagement with the state: 1) pushing for
investigation of smuggling activities, with the main goal of identifying
and meting out punishment to all the actors involved, especially government
officials; 2) petitioning for the increase of tariffs of vegetables up to the
GATT-consistent bound rate of 40 percent; and 3) lobbying for the
competitiveness enhancement of the Benguet vegetable industry, not only
through easy access to ACEF, but also through the provision of the long-
overdue assistance in production, post-production, and marketing aspects.
Complex and Unpopular Policy Terrain
There are unique features of the trade policy environment that have
provided civil society, in the past and at present, challenges in advancing
its advocacies through engagement with the state, especially in relation to
the institution of protective mechanisms for vulnerable and weak sectors.
To begin with, the predominance of the neoliberal ideology among
crucial policymakers is a powerful obstacle to the acceptance of an alternative
framework for trade and industrial policy. This tenet is not only tenaciously
adhered to but also nurtured by like-minded academic experts, think-tanks
and consultancy firms working closely with government. As such, the

program of liberalization, privatization, and deregulation was
indoctrinated and carried out with much fervor, especially during the
Ramos administration, when neoliberalism came into fashion and
reached a critical mass “not as a result of an intellectual coup but of a
gradual takeover of the strategic heights of the technocracy by these
free market-oriented policy makers coming from the academe,
government, and business” (Bello et al. 2004, 92). As a spawn of
doctrinaire economics, trade by design is a policy domain where only a
handful of actors have monopoly in decision making, mostly technocrats
appointed by a president who seeks legitimacy and consolidated power
of his or her economic doctrine. While some interest groups are able to
permeate the arena, these are mostly the privileged and powerful, such
as the landlord-controlled sugar industry lobbyists.
Moreover, the transnational character of economic policy making has
created a state of affairs where the Philippine government is more
accountable to the institutions of global governance, such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the WTO, along with the
states that exercise hegemony within and over these establishments, than
to its citizens. Relationships with these players in the global trade regime
are bestowed with so much importance, either by intention or by sheer
mendicancy of the government, such that responsibility to its public is
often compromised.
On another aspect, but equally important to civil-society actors, despite
the uproar that trade liberalization has created from the structural
adjustment programs in the 1980s to the WTO accession in the 1990s,
public knowledge and appreciation of trade-related issues is extremely low.
Compared to other economic issues, such as tax and foreign debt, trade
lacks the popularity that could propel it to the public agenda, and hopefully,
the media, government, and electoral agenda. Therefore, civil society has
to contend with the difficult task of educating the public on the intricacies
of trade, in an attempt to widen the debate, as well as gain the necessary
support for its advocacies.
Blurring of Civil Society
It is important to note that with the advent of globalization, some

obscurities on who civil society is have surfaced. This is particularly relevant
in the case of the Benguet vegetable sector. As the negative impact of trade
liberalization began and continues to take its toll on the agricultural sector,
multisectoral formations confronting these issues have mushroomed.
Campaign coalitions, which are generally initiated by civil society in its
strictest sense, have expanded to include even interest groups and industry
stakeholders like businessmen and traders. This phenomenon can be
explained by the fact that trade liberalization is jeopardizing the existence
of local industries, which means all players—from producers to business
owners—are put at risk (Frago, Quinsaat, and Viajar 2004).
Hence, in examining how civil-society actors engaged the state in
responding to the problems besetting the Benguet vegetable sector in the
context of trade liberalization, it is useful to classify who were involved in
the issue (table 4). Civil society in this study consisted of: 1) those who
were directly affected by the problem and may entirely benefit or suffer
from the outcomes of the engagement in terms of policy response—the
stakeholders (farmers’/peasant organizations and traders groups), and 2)
those who claimed to speak in behalf of the affected sectors and took on
supportive roles in the advocacy effort (political blocs, nongovernment
organizations [NGOs], coalitions, and the church). In this case, civil society
comprised advocates for the producers.
It is also crucial to emphasize that some civil-society groups, especially
those that are nonstakeholders, are not inclined to take on commodity-
specific engagement of the state. Instead, they tackle issues concerning
agricultural trade liberalization or even the Philippine economic framework
in its entirety; thus, on some occasions, these groups are actually advocating
for policy reforms that would benefit the whole industry, and not exclusively
the vegetable sector. Actually, these groups have been involved in the long-
standing movement against trade liberalization in the Philippines. For
instance, the Philippine Peasant Institute (PPI) was at the forefront of the
campaign to defer ratification of the GATT-UR, through the alliance Pabi-
Table 4. Civil-society actors involved in the issues

of the Benguet vegetable industry
Type of civil-society group Organization
Stakeholders Farmers’/Peasant Organizations

Benguet Farmers Federation Inc.
Alyansa Dagiti Pesante iti Taeng Kordilyera
Traders’ Organizations
Benguet Vegetables Distributors’ Cooperative, Inc.
Early Bird Traders’ Association
La Trinidad Vegetable Trading Post Association
Bagsakan Traders’ Association
La Trinidad Booth Holders Association
Political blocs Akbayan

Bayan Muna
Kilusan Para sa Pambansang Demokrasya
NGO Philippine Peasant Institute
Multisectoral coalitions Alyansa Agrikultura

Fair Trade Alliance
Stop the New Round Coalition
Church Social Action Center
GATT,19 in 1994. Later on, some of the forerunners of Pabi-GATT founded

the Stop the New Round Coalition-Philippines (SNR).20 On the other
hand, political blocs like Bayan Muna (People First) and Kilusan para sa
Pambansang Demokrasya (Movement for National Democracy [KPD])
have linked the opposition to trade liberalization to contemporary
anticapitalist struggles. Concomitantly, these groups have had a history of
government interaction, which has transformed over the years from
antagonistic to critical collaboration to as far as entry into the mainstream
arena of Philippine policymaking. Hence, they have tested the bounds of
engagement and have built working relations with official state agencies
and individuals.
The Engagement Process
Maximizing the Local Gateway
With revenues coming in trickles and the La Trinidad Trading Post at

a standstill, the local government realized that it could not afford to languish
and wait for national government to take action. The situation prompted
local officials to take action and signaled an opportunity for farmers, traders,
and other civil-society actors to engage the local government. Local officials
are themselves farmers and traders or are engaged in agricultural production
and trade with their family, kinship, network ties, and patron-client bonds;
thus foreshadowing at least responsiveness of the public servants to the
demands of their social relations. A partnership was immediately forged
among the three stakeholders—local government, traders, and farmers—
to investigate and curb the prevalence of importation in Metro Manila,
and to formulate a comprehensive development blueprint for the local
vegetable industry to guarantee its competitiveness in the domestic market
and shield it from import surges.
At the outset, since most of the information presented by the media
revealed dubious import permits and extremely low price of imported
vegetables, smuggling was quickly identified as the cause. In July 2002,
the La Trinidad Anti-Smuggling Task Force was created through an
administrative order issued by the municipal government. Actions of the
task force revolved around monitoring and research of smuggling activities
in Metro Manila and crafting of policy proposals, which were mainly
directed to national state agencies with the endorsement of the local
government officials. Since the nature of their work entailed constant
interaction with retailers and knowledge of the market situation, the traders,
led by the Benguet Vegetables Distributors’ Cooperative, took the driver’s
seat and steered the anti-smuggling drive (Fongwan 2004; Kim 2004).
However, the provincial government through the leadership of
Governor Raul Molintas, a self-proclaimed anti-GATT advocate, and Board
Member Johnny Uy, chairman of the Provincial Board Committee of
Agriculture, recognized from the start that smuggling was just the tip of
the iceberg. The Provincial Board created the Benguet Vegetable

Commission in early 2003, tasked primarily to study the impact of
importation and recommend remedies by which the provincial government
could endorse policies and other alternative courses of action. In light of
the country’s looming full implementation of the GATT by 2005, the
commission would also identify development-related projects to enhance
the status of the local vegetable industry (Molintas 2004; Uy 2004; Sales
2003b). However, the commission was an interagency project, with no
seat allotted for NGOs. In the process, the provincial government also
initiated the establishment of the Benguet Farmers’ Federation Inc. (BFFI).
The BFFI, the tangible outcome of the National Vegetable Summit in
2003, was composed of 80,000 farmers from the thirteen towns of Benguet
(Sales 2003c). The main objective for organizing was to address problems
at the production level. To collectively deal with importation was merely
secondary (Andiso 2004). Since its formation, the federation has been
working closely with the provincial government, earning representation in
the Benguet Vegetable Council, which replaced the old Benguet Vegetable
Commission following its expiration at the end of 2003. Through the
Council, the BFFI became party to a development plan of the vegetable
industry in Benguet, and strengthened its partnership with the Department
of Agriculture (DA)–Regional Field Unit–Cordillera Administrative Region
in crop programming and with the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) Baguio-Benguet in its market-matching projects (Usman 2004;
Santiago 2004).
The debilitating impact of vegetable imports in Benguet also prompted
other civil-society groups in the area to strategize. For their part, they were
also caught up with the vegetable crisis primarily because the industry is
part of their larger campaign against agricultural trade liberalization. A
federation of peasant political organizations originally focused on defense
of resources and land reform, APIT-TAKO dealt with the issue of vegetable
importation in 2002, when the crisis was at its peak. The group admitted
that a key constraint to its involvement in the issue was the absence of
organization of its constituents—the vegetable farmers. Although
organizations instrumental to the foundation of the APIT-TAKO have

been organizing farmers at the barangay (local village), municipal, and
provincial levels since the early 1980s, most of these were not sustained. In
addition, a large number of farmers’ cooperatives in Benguet, particularly
in the vegetable-producing towns of Atok, Buguias, and La Trinidad, were
established mainly to access loans and credits (Bagyan and Gimenez 2004;
Cosalan, Tobias, and Yano 2004). As a result, the group undertook parallel
organizing, building new peasant communities and politically reorienting
existing cooperatives.
APIT-TAKO conducted massive education campaign on the impact
of trade liberalization particularly in the two most affected provinces—
Benguet and Mountain Province. In May 2003, APIT-TAKO organized
the Cordillera chapter of the Pambansang Ugnayan ng Mamamayan
Laban sa Liberalisasyon ng Agrikultura (National Network of Citizens
Against Agricultural Liberalization [PUMALAG]), and launched a
petition in the Cordillera region urging Congress to rescind RA 8178.
In all its actions, APIT-TAKO forged a working relationship with the
local government. However, cooperation was limited to the issue of
legal importation and to select officials, namely Uy, the only Benguet
politician who was a founding member of PUMALAG, and La Trinidad
Councilors John Kim and Wasing Sacla. The group singled out the
three officials because of their unwavering stand against trade
liberalization, often publicly disclosed. Although consultations were
mostly initiated by APIT-TAKO, they were very productive in terms
of arriving at a negotiated position. For example, on APIT-TAKO’s
proposal to lobby for the repeal of RA 8178, the officials found this to
some extent excessive, especially since they were still concentrating their
energies on pressing the national government for safety nets. But with
sustained dialogue, both parties agreed to advocate for increase in tariff
rates of vegetables.
Meanwhile, guided by the theology of liberation, the Vicariate of
Baguio-Benguet through the Social Action Center (SAC) also took a
proactive stance in its involvement in agricultural issues. SAC’s treatment
of the vegetable crisis and globalization was within the indigenous peoples’
framework, arguing that Benguet farmers should not be regarded as ordinary
peasants but as indigenous peoples. The issue then boils down to the
question of land. Essentially, SAC is not concerned about the incursion of
imported vegetables in the country. Rather, it is alarmed by the policies
and programs that the government has fashioned to mitigate its impact on
and enhance the competitiveness of the industry—agricultural
modernization through the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act
(AFMA). Specifically, SAC is opposed to crop programming or zoning
being introduced to vegetable farmers to sustain the supply and meet the
high-quality standards of the consumers, the principal deficiency being
leveled against vegetable farmers.21
Through the basic ecclesial communities, SAC also organized their
own farmers’ groups; educated them on GATT, AFMA, and the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act (IPRA); and built their capacity to engage government
at the grassroots level. After which, a farmers’ congress was held where
recommendations were put forward, targeting the only branch of
government where laws such as GATT can be revoked, where policies such
as IPRA, albeit inadequate, can be strengthened, and where new legislative
measures can be introduced to protect farmers as indigenous peoples—the
Philippine Congress. On the other hand, SAC and the farmers’ groups
realize that the local officials, through the Provincial Board, can also enact
policies for the benefit of the farmers. But most of their engagement with
the local government and the line agencies in the province was to support
and expedite the awarding of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles and
Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles, in view of the DA’s move toward crop
programming.
Ultimately, though, civil society understood the limited capacity of
the local government to respond to the problems of the vegetable industry.
Local governments are also victims of the systemic adoption of the neoliberal
ideology. Their hands are also tied to the whims of the national government
(Cosalan, Tobias, and Yano 2004). The bottom line, therefore, was to elevate
the issue and engagement to the national level.
Struggling for Space at the National Level
Realizing that technical expertise and public support, besides political

influence, were crucial to engage the national government, the farmers,
traders, and local officials of Benguet elicited the assistance of the Fair
Trade Alliance (FTA),22 through its convenor, former senator Wigberto
Tañada, and the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement
of the Philippines [KMP]), through its chairperson, Rafael Mariano
(Molintas 2004; Uy 2004). FTA was instrumental in the preparation of
position papers, particularly on the trigger price23 for vegetables. The alliance
also facilitated its participation in consultations with various agencies and
institutions. On the other hand, KMP pledged support for rallies and
demonstrations. To strengthen their advocacy for the industry, the farmers
and traders also undertook parallel networking, cultivated strong
partnership with political blocs like Akbayan and Bayan Muna and NGOs
such as PPI, and formalized membership in coalitions like the FTA and
Alyansa Agrikultura (Agriculture Alliance). But in most of the engagement
at the national level, it was a collaboration between the local government
and the other stakeholders—traders and farmers—with national civil society
playing a more supportive rather than leadership role. Engagement with
different agencies was synchronized and concerted, with the end view of
extracting the most response from the national government.
Department of Agriculture
Interaction with the DA was based on three lobbying points:
1) investigation of permits to import (PTI) issued by the Bureau of Plant
Industry (BPI), 2) increase in tariff rates of imported vegetables, and
3) provision of safety nets for the industry. But the course of their
engagement traversed three leaderships, each offering them different
opportunities and priorities for action.
In October 2002, at the height of importation, Agriculture Secretary
Leonardo Montemayor ordered the immediate implementation of RA
8800, which intends to protect local agricultural products against import
surges in view of the reported entry of vegetables from foreign sources,
and at the same time actively support the initiatives of the local vegetable
industry led by the Benguet vegetable industry stakeholders (DA 2002).
Montemayor, known for his knowledge and understanding of the concerns
of small farmers as a former peasant representative in Congress, was
immediately identified as a possible ally in the bureaucracy. However, later
that year, Luis Lorenzo took over the post. The change in leadership at the
height of importation dampened the spirits of civil society. The farmers
had reservations in engaging an agribusiness magnate. In an attempt to
appease the disgruntled, Lorenzo pledged to focus on core programs in
favor of small farmers and fisherfolk. He immediately conducted
consultations with vegetable farmers and officials from Benguet regarding
DA’s proposal to the Tariff Commission to apply the maximum bound
rate of 40 percent to vegetable imports and to include twenty vegetable
products under the sensitive list of commodities (Mendoza 2004). In
addition, under his administration, the DA expedited the Benguet Cold
Chain Project, expected to address postharvest losses and the quality of
Benguet vegetables. However, in July 2004, Lorenzo resigned and was
replaced by Arthur Yap, a move that anti-smuggling groups found adverse
due to Yap’s suspected involvement in technical smuggling (Mendoza 2004).
Yap’s reputation preceded him and this became a major deterrent for civil
society’s engagement with the DA.
Although civil society found Montemayor and Lorenzo sympathetic
to their concerns and recommendations, they saw a staunch supporter
through Undersecretary Ernesto Ordoñez due to his instantaneous response
to the problem of importation (Alangdeo 2004; Kim 2004). Ordoñez was
active in bridging the gap between the agency and civil society. His initial
approach, however, was to engage in battle through the media (Fongwan
2004). In any case, Ordoñez became their key person in influencing
decisions in the DA.
The BPI, in contrast, was very different. Civil society was at odds with
its head, Blo Umpar Adiong, from the start. Adiong had been blamed for
the unabated importation of vegetables, due to a series of defective import
clearances that were unearthed by the traders. But what aggravated Adiong’s
unfavorable position was his alleged defiance of the president’s oral

moratorium on the issuance of import permits to save the Benguet vegetable
industry (Cabreza 2003b). This, compounded with BPI’s failure to obtain
the commitment of importers to support Benguet farmers,24 was sufficient
for the stakeholders to cast doubt on the capability and sincerity of the
BPI to address the problems of the industry. In light of the president’s
decision to reorganize the BPI, Adiong handed in his resignation (Philippine
Daily Inquirer, November 21, 2003).
Bureau of Customs
The stakeholders understood that anomalous import permits did not
complete the smuggling equation. The BoC, the agency supposed to be
on top of monitoring the importation of goods among other things, was
the core of much of the engagement of the traders’ groups led by the Benguet
Vegetable Distributors’ Cooperative, backed by Councilor John Kim. The
BoC did not deny the incidence of smuggling, but downplayed the extent
of revenue losses, which the traders found insulting to the Benguet
stakeholders (Alangdeo 2004). At the start of the engagement, the BoC,
where corruption is an open secret, was very hostile to civil society.
However, with Ordoñez endorsing their actions, the traders were able to
penetrate the agency (Kim 2004; Alangdeo 2004), but were limited to the
acquisition of documents in order to study the magnitude of the problem.
As their engagement persisted, the traders’ participation in the
antismuggling operations of the agency was institutionalized in 2003
through various memoranda stating that examination of refrigerated
shipments of fruits and vegetables should be conducted in the presence of
a representative from the La Trinidad Trading Post Association, along with
other concerned organizations. Likewise, they were witness to the
condemnation of seized container vans and actual destruction of confiscated
vegetables.
Of note were other parallel initiatives of the traders to control
smuggling. Following the creation of an ad hoc interagency body, Task
Force Blue Collar,25 to investigate and monitor points of entry of smuggled
goods, the Early Bird Traders Association, La Trinidad Vegetable Trading

Post Association, Bagsakan Traders Association, and La Trinidad Booth
Holders Association founded the La Trinidad Vegetable Supreme Council.
Instead of waiting for the government to identify the location of the
smuggled goods, the traders went to Manila and identified the areas
themselves. The traders personally got documents on import requirements
from the DA and brought these to the BoC, thus avoiding critical delays.
They also conducted antismuggling inspections in Metro Manila markets,
warehouses, and port areas.
There was actually a superfluity of antismuggling projects initiated
separately by government, civil society, and business or founded as joint
undertakings of the three sectors. As smuggling became almost ubiquitous,
from vegetables to cellular phones, the president constituted the National
Anti-Smuggling Task Force, part of the three anti-smuggling agencies
together with the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Anti-Smuggling and
the Anti-Smuggling Intelligence and Investigation Center (ASIIC). The
Benguet stakeholders were represented in each of these projects, clearly
indicating the government’s openness toward civil society participation in
subduing smuggling activities. But with no law enforcement power, their
role was confined to monitoring and inspections.
Department of Trade and Industry

Surprisingly, although the DTI is the chief agency in charge of
international trade negotiations, the Benguet vegetable stakeholders found
it secondary, if not totally unnecessary, to tap the agency for assistance.
The traders and farmers had the impression that the DTI could only be
utilized in the promotion of their products (Alangdeo 2004; Andiso 2004).
Nevertheless, since the vegetable crisis coincided with the Fifth Ministerial
Conference of the WTO, FTA and the SNR took the issue as part of their
lobbying strategy in opposing further WTO- and trade-related
liberalization. DTI Secretary Manuel “Mar” Roxas III, however, a supporter
of consumer-oriented globalization, was opposed to an increase in tariff
rates.
Fortunately, with the national elections fast approaching, civil society

discovered the best way to engage the DTI—the secretary’s political
aspirations. Civil society, along with the local officials, tried to win over
Roxas by insinuating that the support of the Cordillera voting public would
be dependent on his stance on further trade liberalization in agriculture,
especially vegetables. Thus in the end, he capitulated and supported the
actions of civil society. However, although Roxas was seemingly receptive
to the concerns of the civil-society groups in the end, the DTI as an
institution, which could have taken a more proactive role on trade issues,
has somehow relinquished its role and has been reduced to a mere marketing
arm.
Tariff Commission
The Tariff Commission conducted two public hearings26 in view of
the petition filed by the DA, along with food crops manufacturers and
importers, local government officials of Benguet and Mountain Province,
and farmers led by the Bad-ayan Buguias Development Multipurpose
Cooperative, to increase up to the maximum bound levels the tariff rates
on certain vegetables and root crops.
During the public hearings, the challengers27 fought for the existing
7-percent tariff rate. Armed with statistics from various sources, one of
which from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS), the parties against
the petition argued that contrary to popular opinion, the volume of legally
imported vegetables was in fact declining, which naturally made smuggling
the real problem. Thus, inept customs implementation, rather than low
tariffs, was the issue that must be resolved. The importers further contended
that higher tariffs would only provide greater incentive to smuggle. Unable
to make a precise distinction between legally imported and smuggled
vegetables, and demonstrate that the former was indeed the cause of the
domestic vegetable industry’s bankruptcy, the DA’s argument for a tariff
rate increase did not hold water. The Tariff Commission struck down the
proposal and recommended to the cabinet and the interagency Tariff-
Related Matters (TRM) to maintain the status quo at 7 percent.
Office of the President

Since the vegetable crisis began in late 2001, the local officials and
traders in Benguet had been flooding the Office of the President with
letters, petitions, and resolutions, first asking the president to stop
importation then eventually appealing to enhance the competitiveness of
the industry. It was not until 2003 that the Office of the President through
the Presidential Management Staff initiated formal meetings with the
stakeholders from the major vegetable- producing and -trading towns of
Atok, Buguias, Kapangan, and Kibungan to probe into the industry’s plight
(Sales 2003a). These resulted in the drafting of various recommendations
involving production, post-production, marketing, and importation to
enhance the productivity of vegetable farmers in Benguet (Sales 2003d;
Molintas 2004). On the occasion of the 103rd founding anniversary of
the province, the president herself visited Benguet, convened the BFFI,
and pledged to stop the issuances of permits by BPI, along with a promise
of an assistance package for production, postharvest, and transport facilities.
These formal and informal engagements bore immediate results, as the
president issued Executive Order 197 to raise tariff rates of imported
vegetables from 7 percent to 25 percent.
Legislature
The media hype over the Benguet vegetable industry’s imminent demise
due to trade liberalization resulted in the filing of three separate resolutions
in the Twelfth Congress—House Resolution (HR) 834 by Imee Marcos,
HR 879 by Satur Ocampo, and HR 894 by Oscar Gozos—to conduct an
inquiry into the importation and alleged smuggling of vegetables. The
relentless lobbying of like-minded legislators, mainly from party-list groups
such as Representatives Loretta Rosales of Akbayan and Satur Ocampo of
Bayan Muna, in tandem with a privilege speech delivered by Benguet solon
Samuel Dangwa underscoring the impact of vegetable importation on the
livelihood of the farmers, gave the problems of the vegetable industry ample
space in the legislative arena. In the Senate as well, Senator Manuel Villar
introduced two resolutions, Senate Resolution (SR) 464 and SR 258,
directing the appropriate Senate committees to conduct an inquiry into

the influx of imported and smuggled vegetables, with the main objective
of reviewing the GATT provision lifting quantitative restrictions on
vegetables. A related resolution was also introduced by Senator Rodolfo
Biazon to look into the impact of the implementation of the country’s
commitments to the WTO under the GATT.
Congressional hearings were held through the House Special
Committee on Globalization and the Congressional Oversight Committee
on Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization (COCAFM), each attended
by civil society. However, like the public hearings in the Tariff Commission,
the differentiation between legal and illegal importation and their attendant
impact was once again the point of contention. If it was any consolation,
though, the lack of government support in production and market
intervention was highlighted in the inquiries. COCAFM, through its chair,
Senator Ramon Magsaysay Jr., carried on continued dialogues and
organized a field visit to Benguet. Though no straightforward resolution
was laid out, civil society was able to obtain the assurance of the senators,
through Magsaysay’s influence, regarding the farmers’ utilization of the
ACEF.
In sum, civil-society groups were comprehensive in their approach of
engaging the state. With well-defined analysis of the problem, they were
able to properly identify the government institutions where pressure should
be applied, thus avoiding needless efforts and misuse of resources. In the
course of the engagement, the relationship between government and civil
society underwent various arrangements—from largely collaborative at the
local level to critical and hostile at the national level. On the whole, though,
civil society was able to elicit only minimal response from the government.
Analysis and Assessment
Political Opportunities
By and large, civil-society groups strategically exploited favorable

political opportunities to engage government and brought their
organizational strengths to bear on a somewhat vulnerable environment.

In the policy arena, the engagement process was made possible on the
whole by institutional openings, presence of influential allies, electoral
instability and, to a certain extent, persistent and sympathetic media
coverage. It is important to point out, however, that the opportunities
for mobilization and engagement seized by the civil-society groups in
this study were actually an offshoot of the indefatigable campaign
against unbridled trade liberalization. As mentioned earlier, civil society
has assiduously labored for reforms in the economic development
framework championed by various institutions of the state. In effect,
the Benguet vegetable industry stakeholders benefited from the changes
in the political opportunity structure given birth to by a larger
movement.
Access to political institutions

Notwithstanding the creation of avenues for citizen participation
in governance, unequal degrees of openness were rendered by official
state agencies to civil society for very different reasons. Nonetheless,
most of the interaction that took place was attributed largely to
institutional openings for mobilization and policy influence. The local
government’s accommodating posture toward civil-society
participation—especially the farmers and traders—was a natural
response, given that it benefits much from the industry. Thus, receptivity
by local government was generally driven by economic urgencies. The
local government perceives all players in the Benguet vegetable industry
as partners to the development of its predominantly rural economy.
Moreover, indifference by the local officials to the concerns of their
constituents, mainly within their kinship and patron-client network,
is tantamount to political suicide.
At the national level, the perspective of the bureaucracy with respect
to civil society participation differed from one unit to another. As the
principal agency of the Philippine government responsible for the
promotion of agricultural development, the Department of Agriculture is
theoretically the institution where small farmers could automatically gain

access and support. The case study demonstrated that it was, indeed, the
case. In fact, DA has been responsive to civil society’s clamor for
democratizing the trade policymaking process.28 In contrast, having purely
police-authority function over the ports, the Bureau of Customs has not
conventionally enjoyed attention from civil society. In addition, due to
endemic and deeply ingrained corruption in the institution, the BoC was
apprehensive and suspicious of groups gaining access and making inroads
into their operations.
On the other hand, through the inquiries, the Philippine Congress
became a platform for grievances of various groups with legislators acting
as arbitrators. This third-party function of the legislative, in the pretext of
aiding legislation, provided an opening for civil society into the legislature.
Furthermore, the party-list system offered a doorway for the marginalized
and underrepresented to take part in the policymaking process. However,
there are institutional problems in the legislature that make openness of
the Congress a matter of contention. One is the very low awareness of
policymakers on international trade—the treaties, the jargon and, ironically,
even the commitments made by the Philippine government; two, the non-
attendance of representatives to committee hearings on trade and tariff-
related matters, which clearly confirms their lack of knowledge and
also highlights their lack of interest; three, the legislative mill which
tests the resilience and dexterity of civil-society groups; and finally, the
parochial disposition of the Congress as an institution, in which an
issue that does not deliver votes is bound to be overlooked (Villanueva
2004). In addition, although the legislature has the power to make
laws and to, theoretically, lay down the legal blueprint for the policies
and programs that the executive is mandated to implement, in terms
of policy directions in trade, it is the decision of the executive that still
holds. In fact, more often than not, the legislature becomes a mere
rubber stamp for economic programs and policies that have already
been firmed up by the line agencies, especially the National Economic
and Development Agency (NEDA).
Therefore, caution should be applied in portraying the

institutionalization of civil society participation through ironclad canons
as an immediate political opportunity, which could set in motion interaction
with the state. In the case of the Benguet vegetable industry,
institutionalization has only secured the minimum requirement of
providing the staple ingredient of every democracy—spaces for
participation—but not policy influence. While the law may appear
sufficient, even socially progressive, equally important is the openness of
the politico-administrative environment to civil society participation in
policy making (Brillantes 1997). The problem with the main agencies tasked
to craft Philippine trade policy, especially on tariff-setting—the NEDA,
the Tariff Commission, the interagency TRM, and the DTI—is that a
facade of openness to consultation is projected. But in actuality, these
institutions are insulated from popular pressure; they merely allow sufficient
access to give the illusion of democratic practice. Government, particularly
the Ramos administration, instituted protective instruments to shield these
organizations from external influence and particularistic interests, and from
the conflicts, setbacks, and media assault produced by open consultation.
Thus, trade policy making and implementation have been basically
“technocratic” (Aquino 1998, 33), with apolitical managers posing a barrier
between civil society and the elite planning agencies. The Tariff Commission
is a case in point. While it may seem that civil society can rely on
consultations with the commission for redress of grievances on tariff-related
matters, in truth, public hearings are purely fact-finding in nature to
accommodate complaints. The commission may unilaterally set tariffs even
without consultations. Related to this, naturally, is the opacity of these
agencies in formulating policies. As they are supposedly protected from
public pressure, clandestine practices are customary, thereby watering down
the likelihood of participation and influence.29
Presence of influential allies

If the trade policymaking arena is exclusively controlled by the
executive department, which is elusive to political participation by
dissident groups, how then was civil society able to permeate the state?
In the case of the Benguet vegetable industry, the presence of influential
allies, particularly the elite, became vital. In situations where
opportunities are not favorable or hostile, such as the insulated trade
policymaking and implementation bodies, allies may be useful for
prying open these institutions and ensuring that inputs of civil society
are not merely noted but incorporated. Hence, these allies, who
commiserate with or support the objectives of civil society, usually have
the political influence and resources that movements lack—and in some
cases, moral authority—which are particularly important during formal
policy deliberations.
A close look at the engagement process discussed earlier would
evidently suggest that powerful allies consisted both of officials at the
local (Fongwan, Kim, Molintas, Sacla, and Uy) and at the national
levels (Montemayor, Ordoñez, Rosales, and Ocampo) levels; and
important figures in Philippine civil society (Tañada, Mariano, and
the church as an institution). Although the former are part of the state
apparatus and members of the polity, most of them can be considered
as institutional activists.30 They assured civil society of open channels
for dialogue and facilitated interaction with well-disposed key
individuals. Some of the allies are party to the engagement process as
well, which implies that the persona of the leader determines how a
government agency is responsive to civil society. Certainly, they have
their own motivations and self-interests (e.g., to further their political
careers) in supporting the organization and advocacy of civil society
involved in the concerns of the Benguet vegetable industry. Hence, for
civil society, seizing such opportunities could be tantamount to allowing
themselves to be used, wittingly or unwittingly, by certain narrowly
motivated parties or sectors with self-serving interests. Nonetheless,
civil society seized the opportunities posed by their individual desires
and they were pivotal in terms of influencing the outcome of
engagement. Furthermore, it is important to note the high degree of
trust and confidence afforded to officials at the local level, something
that may hardly transpire at the national. Trust is not necessarily sine
qua non in state-civil society engagement, but farmers and traders
counted on their personal relations with all their key allies, as patrons
and friends. Thus, instinctively, the stakeholders singled them out as
supporters, subscribing to their analyses and positions of the issue.
Electoral instability
The national elections were contributory to the moderate success of
state-civil society engagement in the vegetable industry. It was a coincidence
that civil society engaged the state at the time when cleavages within the
political elite were prominent, but not solidly frozen, thereby creating a
highly volatile situation for the electorate. This unpredictability encouraged
political elites to compete for electoral support and to accommodate diverse
concerns, in which civil society significantly benefited. Although
fragmentation of elite alignments is often associated with political parties,
in a country where the party system is generally weak, the shift in the
support base of individuals makes them more or less acquiescent to the
demands of civil society.
Why Arroyo took a year since the deluge of imports reached
incalculable proportions to respond to the crisis, which incidentally
was also a year prior to the national elections, could be explained by
this precariousness, especially after Molintas’s pronouncement of a
victory for her opponent, Panfilo Lacson, in Benguet. This was also
the case with Roxas in his effort to cajole the Benguet voters with his
populist image and with the local government officials as the political
costs of inaction in a predominantly rural economy would be
insurmountable. Local politicians are generally more likely to
accommodate civil society than their national counterparts because of
the more volatile nature of local elections.
Concomitantly, civil society has gained knowledge of the game of
traditional politics, employing quid pro quo and realpolitik in its
negotiation for tariff reduction and safety nets. Electoral support was
extremely used as a leverage. Strategy-wise, this facilitated the
engagement process. Furthermore, there were advantages in capturing

the political opportunities offered by electoral instability. For example,
although discussions on economic issues, such as trade liberalization,
have traditionally remained at the margins during elections, given the
candidate-centered campaigns, civil society was able to push vegetable
importation as a major electoral concern for the voting public in
Cordillera.
Favorable media coverage

The media coverage of the impact of trade liberalization on the Benguet
vegetable industry was high for the whole year of 2002, as the inundation
of cheap imports and the predicted collapse of the industry surfaced
practically every day in the major broadsheets. Besides the news reports,
editorials and opinion sections discussed the problem, most of which
acknowledged the need to institute mechanisms to enhance the
competitiveness of the industry and protect the agricultural sector in general
from the ramifications of liberalized trade. Some newspaper columnists
even engaged the public in sustained debate, running a series of think-
pieces on the future of Philippine agriculture, with the Benguet vegetable
industry as a case in point.
Although news coverage achieved balanced reporting as data fed
by government sources (i.e., underscoring the persistence of smuggling)
were often presented with competing views (i.e., emphasizing the
problem as a result of WTO-mandated trade liberalization), mainly
from spokespersons of civil society organizations, overall, the slant was
sympathetic to the plight of the Benguet vegetable farmers. This media
access increased the political opportunity for civil society, as it likewise
became entangled with the struggle over meanings in its attempt to
influence public policy.
At the time of engagement, the Arroyo administration was absorbed
with the grand design of projecting an image of populism in anticipation
of the elections; thus, when the vegetable issue moved into the headlines,
the government institutions opened their doors. In the experience of civil-
society groups involved in the issue of the vegetable industry, public

sentiment in their favor became an instrument of pressure, which hastened
the engagement process as well as educated the populace on the implications
of agricultural trade liberalization.
Strategies
Civil society utilized a range of tactics, which can be roughly classified

according to the degree to which such approach targets the exact government
institutions and individuals involved in the vegetable industry (direct and
indirect) and the level to which these submit to rules and procedures of
engagement established by law (formal and informal). Mainly, civil society
action fall within the broad categorizations: formal and direct, informal
and direct, and informal and indirect.
Formal and direct engagement was employed merely to take advantage
of the conventional and institutional mechanisms for direct participation
and policy influence. For instance, at the local government level, this can
be seen in BFFI’s membership in the Benguet Vegetable Council. By the
same token, civil-society groups participated in the consultations at the
DA, DTI, and Office of the President; and in hearings held by Congress
and the Tariff Commission. At the level of policy implementation, by
virtue of administrative orders and memorandums, civil society was
included in the official anti-smuggling operations of BoC and other ad
hoc bodies. Basically, the logic was to work within the official gateways
established by laws and procedures, in fulfillment of democratic goals and
objectives.
However, the formal process draws attention to the vulnerability
of civil society. The study has undoubtedly shown that the Achilles’
heel of civil society in the formal battleground of policy engagement
comes from its inadequate organizational resources, mainly proper
information to corroborate its positions. In policy engagement,
information becomes a powerful weapon in various ways. First, only
through accurate data can one formulate a clear analysis of and position
on the issue. Articulated positions without basis or evidence can likewise
compromise public support. While it may seem prosaic, civil society,

in some cases, has the tendency to ignore the importance of data and
information. This obviously affects the outcome of its engagement
because without proper evidence, civil society can only bank on banners
and rhetoric as a strategy (Villanueva 2004). With neoliberalism
cemented in the bureaucracy, civil society cannot merely debate with
government at the level of economic ideologies.31
Informal and direct strategies of engagement were used to access hostile
institutions, through the support of influential allies. Central to this is
building working relations with the heads of concerned agencies through
informal meetings and creating rapport with their staff. This method was
profoundly used by civil society, as the formal process was, for the most
part, cursory and undertaken only to comply with the statutes and to
placate the demand for political participation.
A high level of expertise has been achieved by civil society in informal
and indirect tactics, which revolved mostly on influencing the media agenda.
With the media capitalizing on the issue, civil society also utilized this
unofficial opening for policy engagement. Indeed, media advocacy became
a huge component of civil society’s strategy, which consisted of bombarding
the public with statements, consciously using sound bites (such as marijuana
for vegetables) and farmers’ anecdotes to give the effects of importation a
human face, and even building good relationships with the press, to get
their message across and, more significantly, to arouse public outrage for
government’s inaction and lack of support for civil society.32 McCarthy,
Smith, and Zald (1996) rationalize the necessity of shaping public opinion
to collective action.
An essential task… is to frame social problems and injustices in a way that
convinces a wide and diverse audience of the necessity for and utility of
collective attempts to redress them…While movements’ ultimate targets
are typically policymakers, movements must mobilize people and resources
within the wider society in order to influence this authoritative elite. These
third parties include both the mass public and reference elites, the people
with whom the authoritative elite interacts and consults. (291)
Outcomes
Based on the tactical objectives laid down earlier, the dismissal of a

public official involved in smuggling activities, increase in tariff rates from
7 to 25 percent, and provision of a competitive-enhancement package for
the Benguet vegetable industry demonstrate the presence and extent of
state-civil society engagement. Judging from these accomplished goals, it
can be construed that the relations between state and civil society in
addressing the impact of trade liberalization on the sector has been
successful. However, a more circumspect analysis reveals that not all policy
actions should be taken at face value.
The smuggling scourge continues, so long as corruption is systemic.
Although there has been a decline in the illegal importation of vegetables
since the active involvement of traders’ organizations in the monitoring of
Customs procedures (Kim 2004), no official implicated in smuggling
activities has been convicted.33 Despite the fact that Arroyo took political
action on the matter by relieving Adiong of his duty, smuggling remains
the norm in a bureaucracy that is accustomed to corruption, especially
with loopholes in the Tariff and Customs Code and tolerance for such
practices. For this reason, civil society is persevering in its lobby to expedite
the passage of the Anti-Smuggling Bill, which provides for systematic
solutions and stiffer penalties—both fine and imprisonment—for outright
and technical smuggling, and for the creation of a special body against
smuggling composed of heads of relevant government enforcement agencies
and private sector who will be appointed by the president.34
With regard to the tariff rates increase, although civil society emerged
victorious due to an executive order issued by the president to increase the
rates of duty of imported semitemperate vegetables from 7 percent to
20-25 percent, the fact is every EO has a shelf life. In effect, this would
imply the need for a new round of engagement once the order expires.
From another angle, though, continuous engagement could contribute to
the consolidation and sustained action of movements, which are at least
unified on the issue of tariffs. But at the level of policy influence, EOs only
serve as transitory measures with very short-term impact. The possibility
of lengthening the period of the EO is still indeterminate, given the full

implementation of GATT-UR by 2005, continued application of the
AFTA-CEPT, and ongoing negotiations on bilateral trade agreements.
This scenario makes the competitive enhancement package all the more
important. The Benguet Cold Chain System project was finally installed
in the first quarter of 2004.35 In addition, the government approved a
PHP 25.19 million loan from the ACEF for a project in Benguet that
would modernize and ensure year-round production of cut flowers, cut-
foliage, and high-value vegetable products, thereby boosting chances of
Cordillera-grown crops to compete with imported farm commodities.36
But while the accomplishment in this aspect is commendable, once more,
these forms of government support were long overdue, such that it took a
near-bankruptcy of the sector for them to be even deemed as necessary.
Cynicism on the policy “victories” of the engagement is, however,
balanced by encouraging results on other dimensions, which can be
interpreted as both inadvertent and intentional. These spillover effects are
manifest in three aspects: industry, civil society, and political opportunity.
The most evident of which is the state’s recognition of the vegetable sector
as an industry. Indeed, vegetables have been historically at the periphery in
terms of agricultural development, compared to other crops. At this point,
there is a clear appreciation of its importance economically and politically.
The players—farmers, traders, local governments, etc.—have now taken
the cudgels of upholding its survival in the global market; a concrete
manifestation is a national consultative summit, which started in 2003, to
formulate a development blueprint for the sector. Whereas the interests of
the vegetable industry were overlooked in the previous trade agreements
that the Philippine government entered into, this was not the case any
longer as vegetables are not included in the Early Harvest Program between
the Philippines and China signed in April 27, 2005, even though raw and
unprocessed agricultural products are covered by the agreement (Go 2005),
as a result of the political muscle flexed by industry participants. Second,
civil society in the process contributed to the strengthening of the grassroots
through political organizing and raising social awareness, in order to hold
government accountable and responsive to community needs. It

consolidated and expanded its base, thereby ensuring power both in
numbers and political influence. Moreover, despite differences in
interests and tactics, the relationship among the civil-society actors was
collaborative, based on mutual needs and common goals, and their
actions were complementary and, in most of cases, dependent on each
other. Finally, civil society in this study has also created or expanded
opportunities for others. 37 Having benefited immensely from the
opportunities produced by the burgeoning movement against aggressive
liberalization, the Benguet stakeholders and other civil society
organizations have also exposed and gauged the points of weaknesses
within the political system that can be arrested by groups of similar
interests and objectives, or by their challengers.
Conclusion
This study has shown that the strategies, processes, and outcomes of
civil society in its engagement with the state rest upon external factors,
which are neither constant nor permanent, and that the changes could
facilitate, hinder, or totally obstruct collective action. In the case of the
civil society players in the Benguet vegetable sector, they were unduly
optimistic and more or less responsive to changes in political opportunity
structures. However, while there are changes in the political opportunity
structures which civil society can take advantage of, there are stable structures
in Philippine polity—submission of the state to market forces—that
frustrate consequential and long-term actions of civil society.
Dryzek (1996) suggests that for movement groups to engage effectively
with the state, the aims of the movement groups should be in some way
matched with imperatives such as economic growth, legitimacy, or security,
which are sought by all governments regardless of political leanings to
ensure stability. If there is little or no connection between movement goals
and state imperatives, inclusion in state fora presents risks of cooptation.
The Philippine government has been in an uphill battle in its fulfillment
of economic development, but unfortunately, the course it has taken is
contradictory to what civil society judges as the right path. While it seeks
growth through the doctrine of laissez-faire, civil society, on the other hand,
pushes for state regulation of the market, which implies strong faith in the
ability of the state to effectively manage the market. However, alongside
this confidence in the state’s regulatory functions is an equally strong distrust
of its governance role, based on its failure to implement and enforce policies
and laws, which have led to the pervasiveness of smuggling activities. Hence,
civil society is ostensibly ambivalent on the state’s position in the scope of
problems confronting the vegetable industry.
This underpins the assertion put forward earlier regarding openness
of the state as a function of policy in question. It is axiomatic why there
was a plethora of government-civil society partnerships against smuggling,
while civil society continues to be hammered or repudiated in its lobby for
tariff rates increase. Anticorruption has been a major plank of
administrations following the transition to democracy, in which the
antismuggling project in tandem with civil society fits perfectly. On the
other hand, the increase in tariff rates of imported agricultural produce,
which civil-society groups in this study are advocating, threatens the
foundation of the Philippine government’s economic paradigm of
neoliberalism, of which the President is a strong advocate. Reinstatement
of protective measures for agriculture, which in effect means reversal of
trade liberalization, would be a silent but open admission of Macapagal
Arroyo’s oversight on economic planning, a step which she is not enthusiastic
about. Hence, the government’s accommodation of civil-society groups
was more symbolic than substantive, as illustrated in the perfunctory
consultative processes on tariff setting with negligible influence of civil
society on policy outcomes.
In spite of this, characterizing the relations between state and civil
society in this study cannot be reduced to simplistic dichotomies of
“partnership” or “opposition.” Both state and civil society are
intertwined in complex forms of interaction in which antagonism and
cooperation often occur simultaneously. Difficulties abound in engaging
state agencies that perform the roles of policy advocates and regulators.
This is especially the case with agencies involved in promoting business

confidence and supporting capital accumulation, which more often
than not, are in conflict with social movements because of the former’s
extensive political influence in the polity and their agenda reflective of
the interests of corporations (Stearns and Almeida 2004). In such a
condition, the relationship between the state and civil society is
antagonistic; the token accommodation of the state is merely to manage
conflict.
In contrast, the engagement of civil society with the local government
has undoubtedly shown much potential. Hostility, suspicion, and
mistrust—which often characterize state-civil society relations at the local
level on controversial globalization-related issues such as mining and dam
building—were stymied. What transpired was what Stearns and Almeida
(2004, 479) refer to as “state-social movement coalition.”38 The impetus
for state and social movement actors in forging such coalition diverges,
but in the case of the problems of the Benguet vegetable industry, it was
the seriousness of the local economic situation that prompted the political
demand making. The probability of civil society forming an alliance with
local government is greatest when the cause of civil-society groups has
a widespread, direct, and negative effect on the locality (Stearns and
Almeida 2004). In any case, a certain “state-society synergy” (Evans in
Magadia 2003, 11) existed between the local government of Benguet
and civil-society organizations. Although they each enjoyed distinct
capacities and power that the others do not have or only partially possess,
they were “able to enhance, and not challenge, oppose or cancel out,
each other’s efforts” (Magadia 2003, 11). However, this seemingly
synergistic relationship was forged merely to collectively muddle
through the ordeal brought about by trade liberalization. Rather than
engage in the politics of resistance, local government and civil society
embraced coping strategies that somehow legitimized the economic
development track pursued by the Philippine state.
In sum, engaging the state in the era of globalization poses more
challenges for civil society organizations compared to the past.
Agricultural trade liberalization is a huge component of the neoliberal

agenda, which has been the guiding principle of past and present
administrations—unequivocally expressed in their development plans
and also supported by a large number of intended beneficiaries, the
consumers, and a few local industries profiting from cheap agricultural
imports. Hence, given its marginal status, dissident groups wrestling
to influence trade policy are dismissed as protectionist ideologues keen
on reverting the country to a planned economy where the state plays a
big role. Their relations with the state on trade-related matters such as
importation remain confined to issue-specific and moderate reforms
that are meant only to pacify the uproar and not to comprehensively
address the problem.
Acknowledgment
I thank Liza Gobrin, Linda Gobrin, and Pablo Rosales for their
generous assistance and support in the conduct of the fieldwork for this
study. I am also grateful to Alfredo Alangdeo and John Kim for sharing
their records on their engagement with various agencies, majority of which
were hard to obtain elsewhere. Mars Mendoza helped correct factual errors
on the earlier draft of this paper.
Notes
1. In 2004, agriculture accounted for about 20 percent of total gross domestic
product (GDP), contributing 0.96 percentage point to total GDP growth
(National Statistical Coordination Board 2005). Estimated at 11.37 million,
the sector’s share to total employment is 36 percent (BLES 2005).
2. According to Lantican (1998), the Philippines has a comparative advantage in
the production of select fresh vegetables and vegetable seeds. From 1999 to 2002,
exports averaged 24 million kilograms. Primary exports were shallots, asparagus,
and fresh or dried manioc/cassava (Ibon 2003; Guzman 2000). Foreign exchange
earnings in 1995 and 1996 posted very encouraging records for both volume
(51,107 tons in 1995 and 39,060 in 1996) and value (USD 34 million in 1995
and USD 35 million in 1996). Fresh/chilled vegetables accounted for the bulk.
However, due to limited production, the cultivation of vegetables has been largely
meant for local consumption. Only less than 1 percent of the total supply of
vegetables is exported.
3. Semitemperate vegetables include broccoli, cabbage, carrot, cauliflower, celery,
lettuce, mushroom, and potato.
4. Vegetable farmers in Benguet supply from 20 to 25 percent of the total vegetable
needs of the Philippines (Ilagan 2003). The province accounts for 67 percent of
the volume of production of white potato, 64 percent of cabbage, and 75 percent
of carrots for the whole country in 2000 (PIDS 2004). Northern Benguet towns
produce 20 tons of carrots and 50 tons of potatoes a day (Dumlao 2002). In
terms of employment, in the rural areas, 60 percent of Benguet’s 322,000 farmers
get their livelihood from vegetable farming (Alcantara 2001; Cabreza 2002a),
representing up to 40,000 farm families (Cabreza 2002a).
5. The “high value crops” development framework is a market-/private sector-led
strategy, with minimal subsidies to vegetable growers, under a liberalized trade
policy. It further necessitates the adoption of modern technology in production
(Lantican 1998; Aquino 2003) and rationalization of resources to maximize
agricultural productivity by virtue of Republic Act 8435 or the Agriculture and
Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997.
6. Actually, Lewis (1992) claims, “the Benguet vegetable farmers became entangled
in the world market economy not primarily as producers for a global market,
but rather as consumers of agricultural supplies produced in the metropolitan
states” (143-44), dominated by Hoescht and Bayer (German), Shell (Anglo-
Dutch), and Union Carbide (American).
7. In Cordillera, many vegetable farmers source their capital from a landholder or
trader, usually a close friend or relative. Some own the land they till, while others
work as tenants or rent the land for cultivation. Farmers buy inputs either from
traders or middlemen in trading posts, and sell their produce to the same trader.
The trader would naturally get half of the farmer’s earnings (Ibon 2003).
8. Thirty to 50 percent of vegetables are registered as postharvest losses (Ibon 2003).
9. For example, in 2000, while the farmgate price of carrots was pegged at
PHP 16.33 per kilo in Benguet, its retail price in its primary market, Manila, is
PHP 43.70 per kilo (PIDS 2004).
10. Domestic demand and consumption of vegetables in lowland areas has been
decreasing by 40 to 60 percent since 1999 (Ibon 2003).
11. Potato is the leading vegetable imported, with 13 percent.
12. Retailers were forced to sell their commodities at much lower prices than their
imported counterparts. Normally, during typhoons in early July, prices of vegetables
Protests and Perceived Threats
in the Hog Industry
Joel F. Ariate Jr.
P
ig-waste management and disposal, controlling foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD) and other zoonotic diseases (i.e., animal diseases
that can be transmitted to humans), food safety concerns, and the
issue of social equity are the pressing concerns that the Philippine hog
industry must address at present, according to a recent study made for the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organizations (UNFAO) (Costales
and Delgado 2002). The issue of social equity best sums up the
interrelatedness of these concerns:
The survival of the smallholders in pig production depends primarily
on political decisions to finally enforce zoning ordinances, effluent
standards, and environmental pollution regulations, and only to a lesser
extent on the engagement in international trade agreements, or on
domestic market developments influencing the scaling up of production
systems to the disadvantage of smallholders. (Costales and Delgado
2002)
However, civil-society actors in the hog industry are only

tangentially concerned with these issues. These actors are mainly the
hog industry players themselves. As such, the civil-society actors in the
hog industry have focused primarily on one issue: for them not to suffer
a “profit squeeze.”
73
As articulated by more vociferous and visible civil-society actors in

the industry, this concern has been expressed as a fight against smuggling
of other meat products, a fight against any increase on meat imports, a
fight for greater importation of corn, and a fight against low farmgate
prices. To justify these “fights,” the big and organized industry players
cum civil-society actors have advanced loftier causes. These advocates
claim to represent the more than three million backyard hog raisers
that produce more than 70 percent of the country’s total hog inventory.
If the smuggling and importation of meat goes unchecked, hog raisers
will be selling their livestock at a loss. If nothing is done about the
perennially low supply of corn, thus meriting its high market price,
then the Filipino consumers cannot ask for a lower price of pork since
corn constitutes 50-60 percent of hog feeds. Either the millions of hog
raisers suffer irrecoverable financial losses or the millions of consumers
lose pork in their food basket. Economic gain or food security: these
are the two main issues that underpin the so-called fights of civil-society
actors in the hog industry. And these are often waged against the state
and occasionally against players from other industries that are also
engaged in providing food for the Filipinos.
Where is globalization in all these? In the hog industry, the polysyllabic
word globalization has been reduced to three two-syllable words: tariff,
import, quota. These trade issues are what basically draw civil-society actors
in the industry to engage the state, specifically its legislative and executive
branches, the branches that determine how much tariff to impose on what
commodities and how much of which commodities to import. However,
prevailing international trade agreements structure the state’s engagement
with civil-society actors in the hog industry.
Even the civil-society actors in the hog industry apparently understand
the state’s predicament. For example, in 2003, tariffs on imported processed
meat have been reduced to 0-5 percent as an effect of the 1992 Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area and Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Agreement; for whatever protest
there was it did not go beyond the level of a pip. “This is in spite of the
Protests and Perceived Threats in the Hog Industry 75
possibility that increased importation of canned meat products and other

processed meat could result in weaker demand for domestically produced
meat, once domestic processors find themselves losing market share to
competing imports” (Habito 2002). In 2009, lower tariff rates will take
effect on all meat products, posing a more direct threat to the hog industry
and yet at the moment, no civil-society actor in the hog industry is making
any significant move on this issue.
This situation foreshadows the kind of engagement the state and civil-
society actors in the hog industry had and will have in the context of
globalization. It is and will be a selective engagement on issues that civil-
society actors believe they can still maneuver the government to accept
their own terms. Moreover, since these civil-society actors are industry
players themselves, issues of economic viability more than issues of social
equity will be the focus of their engagement with the state. Hog-industry
players have the financial and organizational advantage over the other small
and un- or semi-organized industry actors to wage campaigns on some
issues that involve the state’s intervention. However, international trade
agreements had and will vitiate the engagement of the state and civil-society
actors.
This chapter will look into two interrelated aspects of state-civil society
relations in the Philippine hog industry in the context of globalization.
The first aspect deals with how civil-society actors have engaged official
state agencies through various formal and informal strategies of dialogue,
negotiation, and bargaining on specific issues or concerns. The second
will look into the extent civil-society actors have been able to influence
governmental policy making. However, with international trade agreements
already in place, and since “it is one thing to argue that NGOs are affecting
the political process [and] … quite a different matter to argue that civil
society is actually shaping the policies that emerge from the process”
(Silliman and Noble 1998, 302), this second aspect will not be an
enumeration of policy transfers. Rather, it will be a look into the state’s
responses to specific demands from the hog industry cum civil-society
actors.
Pigging Out on Pork

The Philippine hog industry’s growth in the last two decades is mainly
driven by domestic factors, namely, the more than 2 percent annual
population growth rate and the emergence of urban areas. It was, and still
is, a demand-driven growth. A weakening in demand caused by importation
and smuggling of low-priced meat is the most immediate threat to the hog
industry’s profitability.
Production
In an in-depth study conducted for the United Nations Food and

Agricultural Organization (UNFAO), Delgado and Narrod (2002)
conclude that the almost unhampered growth of the Philippine hog industry
in the past two decades (table 1 and figure 1) is related to two interrelated
phenomena: the continuing high population growth rates and rapid
urbanization.
Robust growth in the demand for meat in the last two decades in the
Philippines has been propelled mainly by continued high population growth
rates, at about 2.3 [percent] per annum and the rapid rise of urbanization,
particularly in the provinces around the National Capital Region (Metro
Manila), covering the regions of Central Luzon and Southern Luzon. There
are also major urban centers in the south, Metro Cebu in the Visayas islands,
and Metro Davao in the southern island of Mindanao. Demand growth for
meat has been impressive, even with modest and often interrupted
improvements in per capita incomes. (Delgado and Narrod 2002)
In 1980 the average pork consumption per person was 9.17 kilogram;
now the average hovers around the 18 kilogram per person mark, an increase
of about 85 percent (table 1). Because of market demand, hog production
continues to grow, though at times the industry’s growth rate seems to
taper off then bounce back again (figures 1 and 2). A cursory glance at
figure 2 will reveal that commercial hog producers seem to have experienced
a bumpier growth than backyard or small-scale hog raisers. The Bureau of
Agricultural Statistics (BAS) defines backyard or small-scale livestock farms
Table 1. Pork supply and utilization in the Philippines, 1980-2002
Supply (in metric tons) Per capita utilization of

Year pork as food
Production Imports Total (kilogram per person)
1980 448,000.00 1,000.00 449,000.00 9.17

1981 548,000.00 6,000.00 554,000.00 11.03
1982 523,000.00 3,000.00 526,000.00 10.23
1983 564,000.00 2,000.00 566,000.00 10.74
1984 590,000.00 50.00 590,050.00 10.92
1985 508,000.00 1,000.00 509,000.00 9.20
1986 589,000.00 1,000.00 590,000.00 10.41
1987 641,000.00 1,000.00 642,000.00 11.05
1988 713,000.00 3,000.00 716,000.00 12.04
1989 804,000.00 4,000.00 808,000.00 13.31
1990 824,545.01 1,177.01 825,722.02 13.26
1991 845,189.00 741.47 845,930.47 13.29
1992 845,256.46 793.38 846,049.84 13.00
1993 880,944.91 418.47 881,363.38 13.31
1994 921,760.63 695.37 922,456.00 13.28
1995 969,862.46 2183.42 972,045.88 14.00
1996 1,035,808.19 6072.96 1,041,881.15 14.72
1997 1,085,544.33 10,369.22 1,095,913.55 15.13
1998 1,123,747.85 12,592.88 1,136,340.73 15.36
1999 – – – 15.91
2000 1,212,536.00 32,338.00 1,244,874.00 16.09
2001 1,265,888.00 22,022.00 1,287,910.00 16.33
2002 1,332,347.00 25,636.00 1,357,983.00 16.88
as farms holding not more than twenty heads of adult-equivalent animals.

Is this the mere workings of the domestic market or could this be attributed
to the state’s trade regime? This will be discussed later in the paper.
Since 1998, the Philippines has been producing more than 10

million pigs a year. At present, the country’s hog inventory stands at
12.5 million; nearly 80 percent of this number comes from backyard
or small-scale hog raisers. The industry’s workforce is estimated at four
to five million workers (the backyard hog raisers alone number around
four million workers).
Despite the continuing increase in production, the price of hog in
the market—farmgate, wholesale, or retail price—also continues to go
up (figure 3). This implies a rather stable market that could not be
easily deterred by a simple price increase. The Department of Science
and Technology’s Swine Information Network argues that “the
preference of Filipino consumers for fresh warm or chilled pork over
frozen pork gives the local industry market assurance of its products”
(Swine Information Network 2003). It must be also pointed out that
pork accounts for about 60 percent of the country’s total meat demand
and has consistently dominated other livestock industries in terms of
volume and value of production.
Hogs remain the largest source of meat in the country’s livestock
industry, making up about three-quarters of Philippine livestock production
with a PHP 92.67 billion value of production in 2003. As of 2004, hogs
represent 15.14 percent of the total value of agricultural production based
on current value.
However, the Philippines’ undeterred population growth and its
continuing urbanization—the prime drivers of pork consumption—may
in the end trigger the hog industry’s downturn. Hogs and people will
compete for land and water. As more areas become urbanized, lands
previously allotted to hog farming will give way to the people’s housing
requirements and health concerns. With limited area for hog production,
the government might strongly consider pork importation. It will be then
that the domestic hog industry will fully feel the brunt of the liberalized
trading environment. Thus, unless new technologies and policies are enacted
with this scenario in mind, the domestic hog industry might be enjoying a
false sense of confidence on the Filipinos’ love for pork.
Figure 3. Average price of hog in the Philippines, 1980-2004
300.00
250.00
200.00
Prices in
150.00
100.00
50.00
0.00
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004
Year
Farmgate Price Wholesale Price Retail Price
Industry Structure and Stakeholders
Habito (2002) identifies seven major stakeholders in the domestic hog

industry: the hog farmers (both commercial and backyard), the farm
workers, the feed millers (both large—and usually organized—integrators,
and the smaller and usually independent feed millers), the consumers, the
government, the nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and the country’s
trading partners in the international market. The meat processors,
slaughterhouse operators, and the hog and meat dealers can be added to
this list.
The hog farmers, in their attempt to make their business profitable,
would like to have a sure and inexpensive access to inputs necessary in
growing hogs, like feeds, biomedical supplies, capital, and labor. A secure
and steady growing market must also complement the hog farmers’ low
production cost if maximum profit is to be gained. The same sentiment
will be true among farm workers. The farm workers are expected to be
strong allies of the hog farmers since the former depend on the latter for
their job and income security.
As the provider of one of the most basic production components, the
feed millers’ interest is expected to be closely aligned with the hog farmers’.
And like the hog farmers, the feed millers’ main interest is to secure a
sufficient and stable supply of raw materials coupled with an ever-expanding
market, i.e., the hog farmers.
Habito’s (2002) inclusion of the country’s international trading partners
as one of the key stakeholders in the hog industry is quite telling of the
issues that the industry faces owing to globalization:
Figuring prominently in the landscape are the country’s trading partners,
who normally want to ensure easy access to the domestic market, in
order to maximize their own citizens’ sales, and therefore incomes,
obtained from the trading relationship. At the same time, they would
prefer to restrict access to their own domestic markets by their foreign
trading partners, for the sake of protecting the economic interests of
their domestic citizens. While distant, these particular stakeholders can
prove to be more powerful and influential than those who are within
the country itself.
Given the dynamics of the domestic hog industry, it will not be

hard for some foreign traders to exert their influence on the domestic
hog industry. For instance, most of the commercial hog farmers and
feed millers look favorably on corn and soya imports, the same way
meat processors support meat imports. This does not mean, however,
that they all are in the same boat. Hog farmers and feed millers strongly
oppose any increase in meat importation since this will lower the price
of pork in the market. The meat processors’ usual retort: they will not
go for the imported meat if the domestic supply of pork is adequate
and reasonably priced.
More than asking for an adequate supply and reasonable price, hog
and meat dealers and slaughterhouse operators are also after a high price
of pork since their income rests on processing hogs and preparing pork for
consumption. However, in a limited locale, having a high supply of hog
usually causes a dip in retail price. To remedy the situation, hog and meat
dealers must rely on their initiative and business acumen to create a situation
in which profit could be realized. The most common way to achieve this is
to link areas with a high supply of hog to those with low hog production
yet with a high number of pork consumers—thus the flow of hogs from
rural and peri-urban areas into the city.
The government and the NGOs (the civil-society actors) are supposed
to mediate the interaction of the previously mentioned stakeholders as
they also continuously engage each other on issues concerning the industry.
This is not, however, to imply that they are on an equal footing. In most
issues confronting the industry, the power to decide and to enforce those
decisions rests on the government. The civil-society actors can only try to
influence this decision the best way they could.
The consumers ideally should benefit from the action of all these
stakeholders, that is, they are able to obtain quality pork products at a low
price.
Globalization and the Hog Industry

If the Philippine hog industry is driven by domestic factors like
population growth and urbanization, what issues confronting the industry
could be clearly attributed to globalization or to its reigning economic
form, trade liberalization? Current literature argues that in the current
liberalized trade regime, the local livestock industry as a whole is at risk
because of the rapid increase in meat and meat products importation (Bello
2003; Mendoza 2003; Obanil 2003; Yabut-Bernardino 2002; The
Philippine Star, October 27, 2002). These studies, however, must be taken
with a bit of skepticism despite their engaging polemical tone that lash out
on trade liberalization. These studies give undue emphasis on the dramatic
increase in meat importation but do not correlate this with the continuously
increasing total domestic hog production, the price of hog and pork that
does not taper off, and the continuing penchant of Filipinos for pork as
seen in per-capita pork consumption (table 1 and figures 1 and 2).
An Industry in Peril?
In two industry situationers made by the Swine Information Network

(2003) of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) and the
Livestock Development Council (2002) of the Department of Agriculture
(DA), only one issue rooted in trade liberalization was identified: the threat
of meat imports. Left unmentioned, however, was the twin evil of meat
importation: the smuggling of meat products. Yet, even if the discussion is
limited to pork importation, the situation is disturbing if taken from the
point of view of the hog raisers:
In terms of carcass weight equivalent, total pork imports grew by 76 percent
annually from 1995 to 2000. (Note: The year 1995 was a watershed as the
quantitative restriction on pork imports was lifted.) The highest advance
was posted in 1996 when the FMD outbreak bloated pork imports by more
than 250 percent from only 2,000 tons (carcass equivalent) in 1995 to
7,000 tons in 1996. Imports further went up in later years following the
lifting of import restrictions. Tariff on pork products is 30 percent at in-
quota volume and 60 percent at out-quota volume in 2001, down from 30
percent and 100 percent in 1995. Tariffs will converge at 30 percent in
2004.
From 1990 to 1994 (pre-GATT period) the average growth rate of
total hog imports was -7 percent. This increased to 134 percent during the
post-GATT period of 1995 to 2000. The major sources of frozen pork
(carcasses/half carcasses, hams, shoulders and cuts) were Denmark, Canada,
United States, Korea and Australia. This means that, strategically, the swine
industry must address the threat of imports. (Livestock Development Council
2002)
In the presence of all these low-priced meat imports, a shift in

consumption pattern may occur where pork from domestic farms will be
less preferred by consumers owing to its relatively high retail price compared
to low-priced beef, buffalo meat, and poultry meat imports.
Another development in hog production also endangers the viability
of domestic hog farmers. This is the “establishment of large-scale (1,000
to 120,000 sow level) integrated pig farms by foreign investors in free port
zone[s] using imported breeder stocks, technology, and other production
inputs, [which in effect] is an indirect importation of pork with minimal

or no tariff at all” (Swine Information Network 2003). Are these
developments which are perceived to be detrimental to the local hog
industry already taking their toll?
To effectively answer this question, it is necessary to properly sketch
the trade policies underpinning the domestic hog industry.
Trade Policies
Since the inception of Tariff and Customs Code in 1957, the local
hog industry has experienced varying degrees of trade protection from
the government. Using the tariff imposed on products in direct market
competition with pork, i.e., imported pork, live hogs, and processed
meat, it is reasonable to argue that from 1957 to 1986, the local hog
industry was minimally protected. Then, an increasing degree of trade
protection was instituted from 1986 to 1995. However, this protection
has steadily gone down and would soon reach a very minimal level due
to the country’s WTO commitments ratified in 1995 (table 2) (Habito
2002).
Tariff rates on imported pork, hog, and processed meat have shown
steep climbs and sudden dips. However, regardless of the tariff
protection, domestic hog production and pork consumption have grown
steadily. In 1980, domestic production stood at 448,000 metric tons,
at present 1.3 million tons; in 1980, the average annual pork
consumption of a Filipino was 9.17 kilos; now, around 17 kilos a year
(see table 1). Though this cannot be considered as an incontrovertible
proof, the growth in domestic hog production and pork consumption
supports the view that the domestic demand has been strong enough
to beat the previous threats of meat and hog imports (and smuggling).
Whether this will still be true after 2009 remains subject to inferences
and the usual economic projections. In making these projections, two
particular trade agreements must be strongly considered: the ASEAN
Free Trade Area-Common Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT)
and the country’s commitments to the WTO.
Table 2. Tariff protection for the hog industry
Year Percent of tariff imposed on products in

direct market competition with pork
Pork Live hogs Processed meat
1957-1972 15 0 0 (corned beef only)

1972-1980 10 10 100
1980-1986 5 – –
1986-1991 20 – –
1991-1993 30 30 (except breeding –
animals which were
levied a 3 percent tariff )
1993-1994 50 – –
1994-1995 40 – –
1995-1997 30 (MAV in-quota) 40-60 (depending on –
weight)
100 (MAV out-quota) –
1997-2004 30 (MAV in-quota)
60 (MAV out-quota) 35-45 0-5
2004 30 (MAV in- and
out-quota)
2009 0-5
Sources: Habito 2002; Yabut-Natividad 2002.
AFTA-CEPT
By 2010, the six original member-countries of the ASEAN—Brunei
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—
will be levying a 0-5 percent tariff rate on most commodities being traded
among them as part of their Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
scheme (ASEAN Secretariat 2002, 1). Newer members like Vietnam, Laos,
Myanmar, and Cambodia will follow suit not later than 2015. This is in
line with the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which
the ASEAN agreed upon in 1992. The AFTA aims to “eliminate tariff
barriers among the Southeast Asian countries with a view to integrating
the ASEAN economies into a single production base and creating a regional
market of 500 million people. The agreement on the CEPT scheme of the
ASEAN Free Trade Area requires that tariff rates levied on a wide range of
products traded within the region be reduced to no more than 5 percent.
Quantitative restrictions and other nontariff barriers are to be eliminated”
(ASEAN Secretariat 2002, 1). AFTA-CEPT covers manufactured and
agricultural products. However, the lowering of tariff rates on tradable
commodities will not be done in one blow.
The CEPT is the mechanism by which tariffs on goods traded within the
ASEAN region, which meet a 40 [percent] ASEAN content requirement,
will be reduced to 0-5% by the year 2002/2003 (2006 for Vietnam, 2008
for Laos and Myanmar, and 2010 for Cambodia). The tariff reductions are
moving ahead on both the “fast” and “normal” tracks. Tariffs on goods in
the fast track were largely reduced to 0-5% by 2000. Tariffs on goods in the
normal track will be reduced to this level by 2002, or 2003 for a small number
of products. Currently, about 81% of ASEAN’s tariff lines are covered by either
the fast or the normal track. (Unites States-ASEAN Business Council 2005)
Besides the “fast” and “normal” tracks in tariff reductions there are
also three ways of including or excluding a tradable commodity in the
CEPT scheme. A tradable commodity can be put in the temporary exclusion
list, classified as a sensitive agricultural product, or be generally excluded
from the whole scheme. Products under the temporary exclusion list are
those that comprised the bulk of an ASEAN country’s tradable commodities
and whose tariffs will be lowered to 0-5 percent by 2003. Those listed as
sensitive agricultural products are commodities produced by ASEAN
member-countries that they want to delay inclusion in the AFTA. “A small
number of sensitive agricultural products will be extended a deadline of
the year 2010 for their integration into the CEPT scheme. In an agreement
that has yet to be fully spelled out, the process of tariff reduction on these
products will begin between 2000 and 2005, apparently depending on the
country and the product” (Unites States–ASEAN Business Council 2005).
An ASEAN member-country has an option also to totally exclude some
commodities from the CEPT. This exclusion is usually availed by member-
countries for reasons of “national security, protection of human, animal or
plant life and health, and of artistic, historic, and archeological value”
(ASEAN Secretariat 2002, 2). However, Habito explains that “those
products in the Exclusion List were to remain subject to the previously
existing ASEAN Preferential Tariff Agreement (ASEAN-PTA) which
provided for Margins of Preference (MOP) or progressively increasing tariff
discounts on the tariff rates imposed on other ASEAN members” (2002).
With the Philippines classifying fresh pork and poultry meat as sensitive
agricultural products, tariff reductions on these commodities will not
happen until 2009. Thus, the full impact of the AFTA-CEPT on the
domestic hog raisers is still to be felt.
WTO
In ratifying the GATT-Uruguay Round Treaty in 1994, which includes
the Agreement on Agriculture, the Philippines was expected to comply
with the following:
1) Increase market access and transparency through tariff

binding and tariff reduction and replacing quantitative
import restrictions with tariffs.
2) Reduce and eliminate trade-distorting export subsidies
and domestic support subsidies.
3) Harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary standards to avoid
using these as discriminatory measures against imports.
All these requirements were supposed to integrate fully for the very
first time the Philippine agricultural trade into a global and multilateral
trading system. Except on the issue of agricultural subsidies—with the
government hardly providing any to domestic agricultural producers—
the Philippines has assiduously complied with the two other terms,
particularly on the issue of market access.
Market access commitments involve 1) the removal or conversion into tariffs
of all quotas; 2) the introduction of minimum access volumes (MAV), which
allow for the importation of a certain quantity of imports at lower tariff
rates; 3) a ceiling for tariff rates (tariff bindings); and 4) tariff reductions.
The Philippines has more than complied with its WTO commitments on
tariff bindings and tariff reductions. With EO 288, tariffs on nonsensitive
agricultural products averaged 14.1 [percent] in 1996, and reduced to 4.8
[percent] in 2003. Note that the 1996 actual average tariff was lower than
the 43 [percent] average in 1995 base rate committed to the WTO. Clearly,
the actual average tariff reductions from 1996 to 2003 would be much
lower than the average tariff reductions committed to the WTO, which
should have been higher than actual prevailing tariff levels. (dela Cruz,
Paderon, and Bautista 2004, 9)
Though considered sensitive agricultural commodities, pork and

poultry meat, corn, and other feed grains have been subjected to MAVs.
Previously, these commodities were protected from imported products
through quantitative restriction. However, as Habito (2002) noted,
“notwithstanding all this, the Philippines has consistently imported less
pork and poultry meat than what the MAV stipulates, since its ratification
of the WTO agreement.” This means that the threat of imports to the
domestic hog industry has not yet fully materialized. The local swine
industry can be in direr straits than where it is now.
What remains unstated in all the predictions of doom concerning the
local hog industry are the benefits that accrue from the current liberalized
trade regime. As mentioned above, corn and other feed grains were also
placed under the MAV rule. About 80 percent of the capital input of hog
raisers goes to corn and other feed grains. Placing these production inputs
under MAV means their steady and relatively cheaper supply (compared
to the locally sourced corn, which has been perennially in low supply) (see
table 3). Increased corn importation, however, will adversely affect local
corn growers.
Thus, unless the government make certain initiatives to increase
domestic corn production and link it directly with the needs of the local
hog industry, the players in the local swine industry can always claim to be
pummeled by meat imports (legal or smuggled) as they in turn trample on
barely subsisting corn farmers. This will lead to the absurd scenario for
armchair economists: watching which industry will go first to the pits.
Table 3. Corn supply and utilization, 1978-2002 (in thousand metric tons)
Year Beginning Production Imports Gross Exports Seeds Feeds and Processing Net food disposable Ending
stock supply Wastes stock
Total Per capita
Kg./Yr. Grms./day
1978 277.00 3073.00 106.00 3456.00 0.00 64.00 1848.00 155.00 1005.00 21.95 60.12 384.00
1979 384.00 3056.00 35.00 3475.00 0.00 64.00 1994.00 153.00 1006.00 21.39 58.59 258.00
1980 258.00 3050.00 250.00 3558.00 0.00 64.00 2118.00 152.00 1005.00 20.80 56.99 219.00
1981 219.00 3296.00 253.00 3768.00 0.08 66.00 2313.00 164.00 988.92 19.96 54.69 236.00
1982 236.00 3404.00 341.00 3981.00 0.01 68.00 2485.00 170.00 993.99 19.57 53.63 264.00
1983 264.00 3134.00 528.00 3926.00 0.03 63.00 2436.00 156.00 951.97 18.29 50.10 319.00
1984 319.00 3250.00 182.00 3751.00 0.11 64.00 2393.00 162.00 949.89 17.80 48.78 182.00
1985 182.00 3863.00 281.00 4326.00 0.27 70.00 2631.00 194.00 999.73 18.29 50.10 431.00
1986 431.00 4091.00 0.20 4522.20 0.14 72.00 3036.00 205.00 968.06 17.29 47.36 241.00
1987 241.00 4278.00 56.00 4575.00 0.24 74.00 3039.00 214.00 1017.76 17.74 48.62 230.00
Protests and Perceived Threats in the Hog Industry
1988 230.00 4428.00 25.00 4683.00 0.07 75.00 3067.00 221.00 1026.93 17.49 47.91 293.00
1989 293.00 4522.00 173.00 4988.00 0.08 74.00 3195.00 231.00 1349.72 22.46 61.53 138.20
1990 138.20 4854.00 345.50 5337.70 0.09 76.00 3434.00 244.00 982.11 15.97 43.77 601.50
1991 601.50 4655.00 0.32 5256.82 20.07 71.79 3365.05 247.12 1093.49 17.39 47.65 459.30
89
Table 3, cont. 90
Year Beginning Production Imports Gross Exports Seeds Feeds and Processing Net food disposable Ending
stock supply wastes stock
Total Per capita
Kg./Yr. Grms./day
1992 459.30 4618.90 0.60 5078.80 0.00 66.63 3002.29 616.16 1156.73 18.00 49.32 237.00
1993 237.00 4797.90 0.65 5035.55 0.02 62.99 3118.64 640.04 1009.47 15.43 42.27 204.40
1994 204.40 4519.30 0.89 4724.59 0.04 60.12 2937.55 602.87 907.41 13.22 36.23 216.60
1995 216.60 4128.52 208.02 4553.14 0.07 53.85 2683.54 550.74 1075.45 15.73 43.11 189.50
1996 189.50 4151.30 405.44 4746.24 0.02 54.71 2698.35 553.78 1178.98 16.85 46.18 260.40
1997 260.40 4332.42 307.59 4900.41 0.02 54.52 2816.07 577.94 1129.15 15.78 43.24 322.70
1998 322.70 3823.18 462.12 4608.00 0.17 47.08 2485.07 510.01 1094.97 14.97 41.01 470.70
1999 470.70 4584.59 149.46 5204.75 0.08 52.84 2979.98 611.58 1322.36 17.69 48.47 237.90
2000 237.90 4511.10 446.43 5195.43 0.25 50.21 2932.22 601.78 1421.28 18.58 50.90 189.70
2001 189.70 4525.01 171.77 4886.48 0.15 49.73 2941.26 603.64 1114.31 14.30 39.18 177.40
2002* 177.40 4319.26 278.24 4774.90 0.36 47.91 2807.52 576.19 1109.92 13.96 38.25 233.00

*Preliminary data
Globalization and the Civil-Society Actors

in the Hog Industry
In the 1990s, with the advent of trade liberalization-induced
globalization and its perceived negative impact on the domestic hog
industry, hog farmers (mostly commercial hog raisers—i.e., with more
than twenty heads of hogs in their farms) and feed millers have proved to
be the most organized and influential stakeholders in the industry. They
have learned to flex their muscle as civil-society actors lobbying for
protection of the hog industry.
Setting the Stage for State-Civil Society Relations

in the Context of Globalization
Two factors intersect to serve as the grid for the state-civil society
relations in the domestic hog industry sector in the context of globalization.
The first factor is the willingness of the post-Marcos Philippine state to
engage civil-society actors in designing its policies and in implementing its
programs, thus conferring on its actions a constant veneer of democratic
legitimacy. The second is the presence of strong organizational and business
networks in the hog industry and their prior experience in building
cooperatives even before the restoration of democratic space after Marcos’s
authoritarian rule.
Laws of engagement
The 1987 Constitution, in its declaration of principles and state
policies, affirmed that the “State shall encourage non-governmental,
community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of
the nation.” Article 13 of the constitution contains the role and rights of
people’s organization. The framers of that constitution perceived people’s
organizations as being those that enable the people “to pursue and protect,
within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests
and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.” Given that role, section
16 of article 13 of the constitution stipulates that “the right of the people
and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels

of social, political, and economic decision making shall not be abridged.
The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms.” Corollary to this provision is section 14 of article 10 of the
constitution. This section considers nongovernment organizations, together
with local government officials and regional heads of departments and
other government offices, as key actors in the regional development councils
which the president shall create. These regional development councils are
part of “administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the
units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and
development of the units in the region.” For Magadia “these many
provisions in the basic law of the land set a precedent in the Philippine
constitutional history, which for the first time explicitly opened spaces for
nongovernment participation in regular politics” (2003, 31).
Echoing the 1987 Constitution’s normative pronouncement on people’s
organizations and NGOs is Republic Act 8435, or the Agriculture and
Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) of 1997, which can be considered
the key policy of the Philippine government relating to globalization and
the agricultural sector as a whole. As patently stated in its full title: “An Act
Prescribing Urgent Related Measures to Modernize the Agriculture and
Fisheries Sectors of the Country in Order to Enhance Their Profitability,
and Prepare Said Sectors for the Challenges of Globalization Through an
Adequate, Focused and Rational Delivery of Necessary Support Services,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” (emphasis added).
On its list of objectives, Section 3 of AFMA specifically mentions the
role of civil-society actors in the agricultural sector:
d) To encourage horizontal and vertical integration, consolidation, and
expansion of agriculture and fisheries activities, group functions, and other
services through the organization of cooperatives, farmers’ and fisherfolk’s
associations, corporations, nucleus estates, and consolidated farms and to
enable these entities to benefit from economies of scale, afford them a stronger
negotiating position, pursue more focused, efficient, and appropriate research
and development efforts and enable them to hire professional managers;
e) To promote people empowerment by strengthening people’s

organizations, cooperatives, and NGOs and by establishing and improving
mechanisms and resources for their participation in government decision
making and implementation;
Regarding civil society, these particular objectives indicate that the

state is cognizant of two things: 1) civil-society actors will play a key role
in the state’s effort to modernize agriculture, and 2) it is the state which
will set the rules on how this touted partnership will proceed and where
they will occur in the body politic based on its understanding of
globalization. It must be noted, however, that globalization, the context of
this engagement between the government and the civil-society in the field
of agriculture, was never defined anywhere in the AFMA. If the context of
the engagement was not defined, then it is expected that the putative
engagement would be marred by contestation and confusion rather than
cooperation, more so if the civil-society actors are organizationally prepared
to contest the state.
Industry players as civil-society actors

The ability of hog farmers to vigorously respond to challenges
confronting the industry can be traced to the presence of long established
business associations (e.g., the Philippine Association of Hog Raisers Inc.
[PAHRI], the National Federation of Hog Farmers Inc. [NFHFI], and the
National Federation of Hog Raisers [NFHR]) and cooperatives (e.g.,
Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Iloilo Hog Farmers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Soro-Soro Ibaba Development Cooperative) that provides
an organizational structure to the industry.
Civil-society actors in the hog industry have not limited themselves to
lobbying members of the legislative and executive branches of the
government through formal dialogues, letter-writing campaigns, and
attendance in hearings and sectoral consultations. They fully appreciate
the power of the media, thus they have aired their concerns over time
through press releases. In addition, to prove that they are also willing to
pour the necessary resources, they even place full-page ads on the nation’s
leading dailies to present their side to the public (see, for example, Limcoma
Multipurpose Cooperative’s full-page ad on the November 20, 2002, issue
of the Philippine Daily Inquirer).
The emergence of the Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines
(ASAP) in 2001, with majority of its members being feed millers’ and hog
raisers’ associations and cooperatives, civil-society actors in the industry
have shown their ability in coalition building, which would enable them
to launch a more confrontational posture against the state. The meat and
hog dealers also organized themselves in 2004, and the Meat and Hog
Dealers Association of the Philippines (MHDAP) was formed. MHDAP,
together with the Slaughterhouse Operators Association of the Philippines
(SOAP), would figure prominently in a meat holiday in March 2004.
Despite acts of alliance building, civil-society actors in the hog industry
also contend among themselves. This must not be viewed, however, as
petty intramurals, all noise, and smoke and mirrors. “Contentious politics
in a fragile democracy can have contradictory results. By its ability to
mobilize and empower disadvantaged sectors, it can enhance democratic
governance by enforcing more transparent and accountable ruling
procedures. On the other hand, by overwhelming political institutions
with oftentimes difficult demands and bypassing institutional frameworks
of claim-making and governance, contentious political actions can put
under severe stress the minimum conditions of consensus and
accommodation necessary for democratic contestation” (Rivera 2002, 472).
Grappling with Globalization
Two particular cases highlight the preliminary engagement of the local

hog industry players cum civil-society actors with the state on trade
liberalization issues: the enactment of EO 470 in 1991 and the Senate
ratification of GATT-WTO provisions on MAV.
EO 470
When the Aquino administration enacted tariff reforms in 1990 “to
address the traditional bias of macroeconomic policies against agriculture
while protecting industry and manufacturing” (Habito 2002), the hog

industry players cum civil-society actors were able to secure favorable
measures that shielded the industry from foreign competition (table 2).
EO 470 … increased tariff rates on hogs and pork meat, from the previous
10 and 20 percent, respectively, to 30 percent for both. Instrumental to this
concession was the strong lobbying by the hog grower associations in the
country. These organizations came out with full-page newspaper
advertisements during the deliberations on EO 413 [the original executive
order where EO 470 was based], warning that the executive order was going
to “sound the death knell” of the domestic hog farming industry. They also
lobbied Congress against the general direction of trade liberalization. These
and other lobbies prompted the five-year phase-in that was eventually
provided in EO 470. (Habito 2002)
MAV rule
At the Senate’s deliberation on the WTO Agreement in 1994, the
Philippine Association of Broiler Integrators (PABI) and the National
Federation of Hog Farmers (NFHF) discovered that the MAVs committed
for pork and poultry meat, along with sugar, were much higher than what
would have been intended by the Department of Agriculture. PABI and
NFHF argued that the MAV for pork and poultry meat, given the levels of
domestic production capacity and projected demand, were about twice
what they should have been. The Philippine government blamed the “error”
“on unreliable production statistics available at the time the original
submissions were made to the WTO secretariat in 1991” (Habito 2002).
Efforts were made to make “technical corrections” on the quantity
of pork, poultry meat, and sugar that should be subjected to MAV.
The WTO accepted the correction on sugar but rejected those for pork
and poultry meat. “Not a few attributed the difference in these outcomes
to the fact that the United States had no commercial interest in, and
therefore did not resist, the correction for sugar. On the other hand,
the United States had a close interest in increased access to the Philippine
market for US pork and poultry products, and thus resisted the technical
corrections being proposed by the Philippine government for these

products” (Habito 2002).
When the Department of Agriculture (DA) tried to compensate for
this error by awarding the MAV allocations to local hog and poultry
producers, which in effect gave them the chance to decide how much pork
and poultry meat products to import, the US vehemently objected again.
In the face of the US protest, the DA wavered in its resolve to provide even
a modicum of protection to domestic hog and poultry producers. The DA
eventually agreed to award MAV allocations to nonproducers if the local
hog and poultry producers were unable to avail themselves of the quota.
This is just like saying that if the domestic hog and poultry producers are
unwilling to act to its own detriment—i.e., fully utilizing the amount of
import, which will not be, or just minimally subjected to tariff thus in
direct competition with what they produce—then others can do it for
them. “Thus, in this view, it was the US position that ultimately mattered
in the outcome of the negotiations” (Habito 2002).
State and Inter-Civil Society Dynamics in the Hog Industry
For the past decade (1995-2005), three interrelated issues have

brought the state and the civil-society actors in the hog industry
together: zoonotic diseases in the hog industry (FMD in particular),
importation (and smuggling) of meat products, and the prices of hogs
and pork in the market.
In justifying their objection to meat importation, especially from
countries that are not FMD-free, hog raisers would repeatedly point to the
1995 FMD outbreak in the country. The outbreak was said to have been
caused either by the importation of cattle from Hong Kong (Manila Times,
August 5, 1995) or by the 2,000 metric tons of frozen carabeef from India
(Flores 1995, 9; Agriscope 1996, 21). The industry suffered around PHP 2
billion in losses due to the FMD. The meat processors who rely on the
low-priced imported supply of meat for their profits understandably oppose
this stand. They argued that if the domestic producers could meet their
demand and the locally produced meat is priced competitively vis-à-vis
the imported supply, then they could do away with the imports. The hog
raisers countered that they could not lower farmgate prices since they were
already selling with a very thin profit margin, if not at a loss. If, however,
the government would do something to lower their cost of production,
then they could sell the hogs at a lower price. In particular, the hog raisers
suggested, the government should lower its tariff on corn and soybeans,
primary components of hog feeds. This stance pits the hog-industry players
with the civil-society advocates of the corn farmers. Thus, in spite of all
the posturing, a virtual stalemate ensues, which also serves as a very uneasy
status quo.
Foot-and-mouth disease
Foot-and-mouth disease’s deadly rampage started in August 1994. By
December of that year an FMD epidemic was already raging in Bulacan.
A month later, the disease had reached Mountain Province, Pangasinan,
Baguio City, Quezon, Batangas, Laguna, and Ilocos Sur (Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 10, 1995). Reports started to surface that some hogs
already infected with FMD were still being butchered and sold in the
market and at a much lower price than FMD-free pork.
If the issue of FMD outbreak was at first treated as something confined
to a particular locale, the news of traffic in FMD-infected pork forced the
government to face the issue from the vantage point of the national
administration. In January 19, 1995, the National Meat Inspection
Commission (NMIC) warned parents not to feed their children with the
meat of animals afflicted with FMD, saying that the children were more
liable to catch the disease than the adults were. However, they qualified
their statement by saying that FMD was not fatal to both humans and
animals (Manila Chronicle, August 15, 1995).
Despite this warning from NMIC, only in February 8, 1995, did the
DA finally acknowledge the FMD epidemic by issuing Administrative
Order (AO) 3, prohibiting and penalizing the shipment of animals and
animal products from regions 1, 2, 3, 4, Metro Manila, and the Cordillera
Administrative Region (CAR).
Instead of acting decisively on the FMD outbreak, the DA, through

Jesus Alcantara, senior agriculturist of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI),
blamed the outbreak on “the failure of the local government officials to
immediately act on the problem” (Alcantara quoted in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 10, 1995). Add to this the fact that there was only one
local biotechnological company specializing in FMD vaccines, the Riverdale
Biological Laboratories. Riverdale Biological Laboratories deployed twenty-
seven veterinarians in Luzon and Mindanao and conducted its treatment
and control program for free (Manila Chronicle, January 22, 1995; Manila
Chronicle, August 15, 1995).
By February 1995, BAI was still waiting for imported FDM vaccines,
which were expected to arrive in March or April 1995. This scarcity forced
the hog growers to buy expensive antibiotics and commercial disinfectants.
Some unscrupulous biomedical suppliers even sold them fake FMD vaccine,
which was priced at PHP 1,900 a vial (The Philippine Star, February 8,
1995).
More than six months after the FMD outbreak, the BAI was still waiting
for the 300,000 doses of imported FMD vaccine and the release of PHP
15-16 million allotted by President Fidel Ramos to FMD-afflicted areas.
Then-President Ramos issued EO 251 approving the release of around
PHP 20 million to stop the spread of the disease. However, controlling
FMD was not only a matter of resources, but also of vigilant policing of
hog and pork traffic. Victor Atienza, chief of the animal health division of
BAI, blamed the local government units (LGUs) for the continuing spread
of FMD. He said that the LGUs were not enforcing the quarantine on a
twenty-four-hour basis (Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 5, 1995).
Then the situation got more desperate. In June 1995 it was reported
that in Pampanga, due to lax monitoring of the FMD-afflicted animals,
the meat of FMD-infected animals has found its way to the longaniza
makers and public markets of Pampanga and Bataan. The attempt to cash
in on FMD-laced meat was a result of the inability of local governments to
buy FMD vaccines that made the spread of FMD seem uncontrollable. In
San Fernando, Pampanga, for example, 3,000 heads of swine died from
FMD since the local government only had PHP 300,000 for FMD vaccines,
an amount good only for around sixty heads of animals (Manila Times,
June 29, 1995). With the public paranoid about contracting FMD from
pork, the retail price of pork went down by as much as PHP 5 by July
1995.
A year after the outbreak of FMD, industry players cum civil-society
actors led by the National Hog Raisers Group Inc. (NHRGI) claimed that
the annual household consumption of pork in the country had gone down
by 75 percent due to fears of FMD. Loretta Galang, NHRGI president,
said that this decline in pork consumption translated into a PHP 2 billion
loss for the hog industry. Thus, she made an appeal to the public and the
government to save the industry. Galang appealed to the public to “take a
sober look at the FMD situation and save the multibillion-peso industry
from the peril of being wiped out by unfounded fears” (Galang quoted in
The Philippine Star, August 4, 1995). She issued this appeal in view of the
official assessment of the departments of health, agriculture, and science
and technology, saying that FMD was not a public-health hazard since it
was extremely rare for humans to suffer FMD fatally.
She also urged the government to launch a massive information
campaign aimed at reassuring the public that most of their fears of FMD
were baseless. To compliment this effort, Galang also called on the
government to “deploy meat inspection agents in at least the largest markets
in the country to strengthen confidence in the quality of meat products
sold in the market” (Galang quoted in The Philippine Star, August 4, 1995).
In strengthening the consumers’ confidence in locally sourced pork products
at the height of the FMD outbreak, the industry players had indeed only
the government to turn to. As Galang explained, “It’s hard for the private
sector to convince consumers that it’s safe to eat pork, because they might
have the misimpression that we’re only doing it in order to cope up [sic]
with huge losses we incurred from the FMD scare” (Galang quoted in
Agriscope 1996, 21).
As hog industry players cum civil-society actors pleaded for government
support, they could also not refrain from criticizing the government not
only for its ineptitude but also for corruption. Galang accused LGU officials
of withholding the fund allotted to combat FMD and diverting this fund
for their own personal and political purposes (Manila Times, August 5,
1995). She said that the government earmarked PHP 300 million for the
implementation of measures against FMD; however, only the measly sum
of PHP 20 million had been released to the industry. Carlito Calimlim,
general manager of the United Swine Producers Association, also scored
the LGUs for failing to deploy veterinarians and meat inspectors who could
have checked the spread of FMD (Manila Times, August 5, 1995).
By August 1995, BAI admitted that it would take at least three years
to neutralize FMD. Only after a year did the hog raisers start recouping
their losses. By August 1996, the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics reported
that retail prices of pork, chicken, and a number of basic commodities
continued to soar in Metro Manila and key provincial markets. The BAS
reported that pork is PHP 94-105 per kilo, up from PHP 85-98 by end of
January 1996 (Manila Times, April 27, 1996).
Importation and smuggling of meat products

The issue of meat imports is related to the issue of FMD in the sense
that when FMD was starting to taper off, Galang called on the government
to bring to an end the importation of carabeef to prevent the recurrence of
FMD outbreak in the country (Agriscope 1996, 21). The same line of
reasoning would be reiterated over the years. In 2004, almost eight years
after the FMD epidemic, Albert Lim, president of the National Federation
of Hog Farmers Inc. (NFHFI) and the Negros Occidental Hog Raisers
Association, made a similar demand. He called for a stop to carabeef
importation from India, saying that it would endanger the hog industry
and other livestock since India was an FMD-contaminated country with
not a single zone classified as FMD-free by the Office International des
Epizooties (Visayan Daily Star, February 21, 2004).
A related line of reasoning employed by the domestic hog-industry
players doubling as civil-society actors was to treat smuggling and excessive
importation of meat, specifically carabeef, as related issues that would
ultimately lead to the collapse of the local hog industry on which around
4.25 million individuals depended for their livelihood (The Philippine Star,
November 17 and November 24, 2002; Manila Times, November 26,
2002). In November 1998, the National Federation of Hog Farmers, Inc.
(NFHFI), a nonstock, nonprofit umbrella organization of autonomous
associations, with a total individual membership of more than two thousand
hog farmers, issued a letter to then-President Joseph Estrada on the use of
carabeef by fast-food chains. They also informed the president about the
imported carabeef flooding the local meat market (Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 12, 1999).
Three years later and under a new administration, Nemesio Co,
national chairman of the National Federation of Hog Raisers (NFHR), in
an October 2002 letter to then-DA Secretary Edgardo Angara, was still
making an appeal to the government to act on the issue. He said that
importation and smuggling had resulted in lower demand for locally
produced pork which, in turn, led to record-low levels of farmgate prices
of hogs. In particular, he blamed this situation on dumping of processed
meat and carabeef (The Philippine Star, October 27, 2002). Co said that
they felt “so helpless, cheated, and violated that imported carabeef, which
is supposed to be for the exclusive use of meat processors, [is] being dumped
in the country in volumes heavens know how large; they have even gone to
the legitimate trade routes of the wet markets, supermarkets, and canteens.
Even their packages, which are supposed to be burned, are being sold at
junkshops in violation of the rules on quarantine procedures” (Co quoted
in The Philippine Star, November 24, 2002).
To prod the government to act on their behalf, some industry players
even argued that in not helping them, the government must not also expect
any reciprocal gesture from their part. An example of this tact is a statement
from Albert Lim Jr., NFHFI senior vice chairman. He said, “The downside
of this unwanted scenario is the program of creating one million jobs is
being tremendously compromised because our business is losing to
smuggling and dumping. So, instead of expanding our operations and
hiring more people, we cannot do that anymore. Some people are destined
to lose their jobs if the government cannot check the rampant illegal
activities of some traders” (Lim quoted in The Philippine Star, November
24, 2002).
However, no decisive action was seen from the government. Besides
writing to Angara, Co also wrote to Sen. Ramon Magsaysay and Rep.
Alfredo Marañon, chairmen of the agriculture committee at the upper
and lower houses of Congress, respectively. He appealed for assistance
“to create legislation to regulate the excessive entry of meat importations
coming into the Philippines” (Co quoted in Manila Times, November
26, 2002).
It was in the midst of these unheeded appeals from the two largest
organizations of hog raisers, i.e., the NFHFI and the NFHR, that the
Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines (ASAP) was formed.
ASAP was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on January 6, 2003, with Nicanor Briones of Limcoma
Multipurpose Cooperative, the largest agricultural cooperative in the
Philippines, as chairman. In its engagement with the government, ASAP
would employ a more sustained and sometimes confrontational stance.
Exactly a month later, it would already be leading a meat blockade in
Metro Manila.
In the same week that ASAP registered with SEC, it issued a press
statement saying that in protest of the government’s failure to stop illegal
meat importation and smuggling, it intended to stop supplying pork to
the metropolis for about a week. A rally with “a parade of pigs along
Mendiola Street near Malacañang and throwing of eggs on the road as a
sign of protest was also planned to coincide with the meat holiday” (Briones
quoted in The Philippine Star, January 10, 2003).
The pork stoppage occurred on February 6-8, 2003, spearheaded by
ASAP and “supported by the NFHFI–Nemesio Co wing (where Albert
Lim is president), some members of the NFHFI–Gabby Uy wing, also
some members of PAHRI [Philippine Association of Hog Raisers Inc.]
and several independent raisers/associations in Bulacan, Tarlac, and Rizal
[e.g., Livestock Association of Pandi]” (Locsin 2003).
However, the meat holiday eventually fizzled out without any

immediate and serious positive response from the government. Then-DA
Secretary Luis Lorenzo merely countered ASAP’s claim of smuggling by
saying that 125 container vans of smuggled meat and vegetables were confiscated
and some officials of the NMIC and the Bureau of Animal Industry had been
reshuffled. For her part, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ordered the
Bureau of Customs to phase out bonded warehouses; she also called on
Congress to declare smuggling a heinous crime punishable by death.
With one of its more combative stances over, ASAP would also even
engage perceived power brokers close to the president to petition the
removal from their post of certain government officials who they deemed
to be favoring interests detrimental to the hog industry. An example of
this case would be their effort to have the president’s husband, Mike Arroyo,
help them secure the removal of DA Undersecretary Cesar Drilon. They
thought Drilon heavily favored meat importers and meat processors and
this is because he was on the take (Briones 2004). They also alleged that he
was involved in technical smuggling. Mike Arroyo, however, refused to
meet with the group.
Prices of hogs and pork

In the first quarter of 2004, two major issues animated the civil-society
actors in the hog industry: the increasing importation of carabeef from
India, an FMD-contaminated country (aggravated by rampant meat
smuggling), and the high farmgate prices of hogs. The high farmgate price
of hogs, as claimed by the hog raisers, was due to the high cost of production,
especially the cost of feeds. The meat and hog dealers said that this high
farmgate price made their enterprise unviable.
As early as January 2004, there were already rumors of a meat holiday.
Thus on January 23, 2004, the industry stakeholders meet with President
Arroyo and managed to come into an agreement “to adopt a voluntary
price hike moratorium at two levels, the farmgate price at PHP 82 a kilo
of live weight and the retail price at PHP 125 a kilo for liempo” (Department
of Agriculture 2004).
Luis P. Lorenzo Jr., then-DA secretary, considered the moratorium a

major breakthrough as this is the first time that the different groups sat
down and thoroughly discussed problems affecting the different levels of
the pork-supply chain. This would prove, however, to be merely a stop-
gap measure.
Things came to a head in March 2004. On March 4, 2004, MHDAP
and SOAP called for a three-day meat strike in Metro Manila (Inquirer
News Service, March 4, 2004; Today, March 4, 2004). The threat of a
meat strike was considered serious enough by Malacañang that it appealed
to MHDAP to call off the meat holiday. MHDAP and SOAP still went on
with its meat strike. Though not entirely successful in paralyzing the supply
of pork in the metropolis, they got the government’s attention and
compelled the concerned agencies to act on the problem (The Philippine
Star, March 6, 2004).
On March 9, 2004, to prevent a similar situation in the future, the
DA discussed a marketing tie-up with the SOAP and the NFHF. Lorenzo
said the arrangement would enable slaughterhouse operators to purchase
directly the live weight hogs from the farms. In the current trade setup,
dealers directly purchase the live-weight hogs from the farms and bring
them to the abattoirs, which charge PHP 50 for every head. The dealers
then deliver the dressed meat to the market. The MHDAP admitted that
each member of the group earned a daily average of PHP 5,000 from the
transaction (dela Cruz 2004).
To address the issue of high production cost, President Arroyo
announced on March 10, 2004, that she would authorize the duty-free
importation of 350,000 tons of corn up to the end of 2004 and an unlimited
amount of soybeans for the next six months to ease domestic pork shortage
(Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 11, 2004; The Philippine Star, March
10, 2004). This seemed to be win-win solution, at least for the hog-industry
players (to the consternation, of course, of those in the corn industry).
What was curious, however, was the declaration of a domestic pork shortage
by the president. In so doing, she also allowed a duty-free importation of
10,000 tons of pork.
A PHP 1,700 feed subsidy was also given on March 30, 2004, to
around 98,000 backyard hog raisers affected by the high cost of feed. The
subsidy was given to hog raisers in Batangas, Rizal, Pampanga, Bulacan,
Ilocos, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Iloilo, Aklan, Antique, and
Capiz (Manila Bulletin, March 30, 2004; Today, March 31, 2004).
As before, this situation pitted one group in the local swine industry
against the other. MHDAP was up against ASAP and the SOAP (The
Philippine Star, March 6, 2004). ASAP, the National Federation of Hog
Farmers Inc. (NFHI), and the National Federation of Hog Farmers of the
Philippines (NFHFP) were feuding with the Philippine Association of
Meat Processors (PAMPI) (Manila Times, April 5, 2004; Philippine Daily
Inquirer, February 23, 2004; Manila Times, April 23, 2004). ASAP and
NFHI accused PAMPI of making false claims that there was a meat shortage
in order to justify their demand for an increase in meat imports. For their
part, the meat processors argued that they were providing cheap protein
source to Filipino consumers since the imported meat cost less than the
locally sourced ones. ASAP and NFHI alleged that the importation, in
particular, of carabeef from India endangered the local swine industry since
India was not an FMD-free country. They also added that since the local
market was being flooded with meat imports (legal and smuggled), the
hog raisers were also being forced to cut down on production in order to
stabilize the farmgate price of hogs. When it undertook that step, it was
accused in turn by the MHDAP of creating a shortage to jack up the price
of hogs (Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 7, 2004). When the news of
“hot meat” started appearing in the news, ASAP in turn accused the pig
buyers of floating this news in order to scare consumers away (Manila
Times, April 23, 2004). This “disinformation campaign” brought down
hogs prices (Today, April 22, 2004).
The government responded to this situation by bringing together in a
dialogue the different civil-society actors in the local swine industry (The
Philippine Star, March 6, 2004) and coming up with new tariff measures
aimed at lowering the production cost of hog raising, in particular lowering
the tariff on corn and soybeans, primary components of livestock feeds
(Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 11, 2004; The Philippine Star, March
10, 2004). Backyard hog raisers comprising about 77 percent of all hog
raisers were also given feed discounts (Today, March 31, 2004). The
government also imposed stricter measures in importing meat and livestock
to protect the country from animal diseases.
PAMPI resented this measure. The meat processors maintain that it
was uncalled for and would merely make the importation process longer,
thus eating up more of their time and resources (BusinessWorld, June 22,
2004; Manila Times, April 5, 2004). To appease the meat processors, the
Bureau of Customs was studying the possibility of lowering the tariff on
pork imports (Today, July 8, 2004), which the hog raisers, in turn, would
surely oppose (Today, April 20, 2004).
Conclusion
Without the claim of representing a certain constituency that is
supposed to be at a disadvantage in the current trade regime, i.e., the
estimated four million backyard hog raisers, nothing separates the civil-
society actors in the hog industry from profit-fixated interest groups that
lobby the government for advantageous deals. This is not, however, to
disparage what civil-society actors from the business sectors can accomplish.
As O’Connell points out, “The business sector is another undervalued
partner in civil society. Many businesses are not renowned for civility and
social conscience, but those that accept and fulfill social responsibility
contribute significantly to the quality of community and civil society”
(2000, 473).
That the civil-society actors in the local hog industry are market players
themselves prefigures the issues that will serve as the milieu for state-civil
society relations in the context of globalization. The state-civil society
engagements in the hog industry have focused on issues that concern the
industry actors’ economic viability. This sentiment is true both for the hog
raisers (both small-scale and commercial) and for the hog dealers. The
strongest indicator of this condition is how the issue of prices (farmgate
and retail) predominates the state-civil society engagements; both the
necessity to recoup the expenses in raising and dealing hogs, and that profit
must also be realized. Though the pronouncements of civil-society actors
in the hog industry continuously reiterate the crisis they are in, the
continuously increasing volume of production, domestic consumption,
and retail price cast doubt on this claim.
If the articulated condition seems to differ from what is actually
happening in the market, this could be largely explained by the situation
in which large industry players double as civil-society actors. Large industry
players are more susceptible to fluctuations in volume and price of trade
commodities. And being large businesses they could easily engage the state,
formally or informally, since they could utilize the organizational resources
of the business organizations that they independently belong to.
Viewed, however, from another perspective, this organizational and
financial advantage of industry players constituting themselves as civil-
society actors exposes the inequality among actors in the hog industry. As
Friedman notes, “Where societies are significantly unequal, civil society
will be a realm of inequality since some will command greater resources to
organise than others, and most citizens will probably find participation in
civil society associations beyond their means. A central error of the ‘civil
society as virtue’ paradigm is to confuse the site of action with those who
act in it, the players with the playing field” (2003, 10).
For its part, the state, notwithstanding it’s avowal of partiality
toward civil-society actors, can only do so much in the current
multilateral and global trade regimes. Globalization—or its avatar, trade
liberalization—has a dual effect on state-civil society relations.
Globalization unleashes new economic problems at the domestic level
that forces the state and the civil-society actors to engage each other.
This engagement, however, hardly results in a mutually acceptable
solution since areas for possible compromise or for calibrated response
have been pushed to the margins by the very onslaught of globalization.
Others, however, take the opposite view. They argue that it is the
“traditional political groups…now joined by commercial and civil-
society groups in creating push and pull factors that inhibit state action
on a number of policy areas, particularly on economic reform. The

issue of a ‘meat crisis’ in the Philippines in early April 2004 illustrates
how these groups seem to force the government into certain policy
tracks that may be contradictory to its commitments to economic
liberalization” (Kraft 2003, 142). This comment is rather symptomatic
of the neoliberal focus on democratic governance that is “less concerned
with issues of sovereignty and power than with creating efficient
institutional structures to facilitate the operation of the market” (Reid
201, 788).
Moreover, this assessment gave too much weight to what commercial
interests qua civil-society actors can accomplish. The telling example
concerning the hog industry is not the “pig holiday” but the issue of
technical correction on MAV. Civil-society actors in the hog industry were
able to prod the government on their behalf to correct the error on the
assigned MAV on meat imports. Still, the government’s attempt to secure
protection for the hog industry was effectively shot down by one of its
most influential trading partners, the US. Then globalization, at least in
this case, can be said to undermine the stability of democratic states if the
“stability of democratic regimes is at least partly a function of the degree to
which autonomous associations are allowed to influence the state” (Silliman
and Noble 1998, 306-7).
To fully realize the democratizing potential of civil-society actors in
the hog industry and their indispensable role in crafting socioeconomic
policies, it is also necessary to have a state that can still decisively respond
to civil-society actors and their competing claims. Unfortunately, the state’s
capacity to engage the civil-society actors is being undermined by trade
agreements previously entered into by the government, and other governing
mechanisms of the globalized trade regime.
References
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Asia: A free trade area. Jakarta: ASEAN Secratariat.
Bello, Walden. 2003. Multilateral punishment: The Philippines in the WTO, 1995-
2003. Manila: Stop the New Round Coalition and Focus on the Global
South.
Briones, Nicanor. 2004. Interview by Joel F. Ariate Jr. Tape recording.
November 3.
Costales, Achilles C., and Christopher L. Delgado. 2002. Synthesis of changes
impacting on participation of smallholders in the growing meat market in
the Philippines. In Delgado and Narrod 2002, Annex 3. http://www.fao.org/
WAIRDOCS/LEAD/X6115E/X6115E00.HTM.
dela Cruz, Joseph Leland, Marissa Paderon, and Germelino Bautista. 2004. Trade
liberalization and agricultural policy in the Philippines. In Trade liberalization,
agriculture and small farm households in the Philippines: Proactive responses to
the threats and opportunities of globalization, 6-13. Silang, Cavite: International
Institute of Rural Reconstruction.
dela Cruz, Roderick T. 2004. DA to reduce influence of local meat dealers. March
9. http://www.globalpinoy.com/news/business/03092004/busi4.htm.
Delgado, Christopher L., and Clare A. Narrod. 2002. Impact of changing
market forces and policies on structural change in the livestock industries
of selected fast-growing developing countries. Final research report of
Phase I - Project on livestock industrialization, trade and social-health-
environment impacts in developing countries. International Food Policy
Research Institute and Food and Agricultural Organization of the United
Nations. http://www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/LEAD/X6115E/X6115E00.
HTM.
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price moratorium. http://www.da.gov.ph/news2004/jan/jan23a.html.
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industry! Filipino Magazin, August 28, 9-10.
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agenda. Politikon 30 (1): 3-25.
Habito, Cielito F. 2002. Impact of international market forces, trade policies,
and sectoral liberalization policies on the Philippines hogs and poultry sector.
In Delgado and Narrod 2002, Annex 4. http://www.fao.org/WAIRDOCS/
LEAD/X6115E/X6115E00.HTM.
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war on terror. Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 18 (1-2):
133-52.
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hogsit3.html.
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Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
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and Views (1st quarter). www.ppi.org.ph/publications/fnv/current_issues/
livestock_industry.htm.
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News and Views (2nd quarter). http://www.ppi.org.ph/publications/fnv/
current_issues/fnv_3.htm.
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and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 29 (3): 471-478.
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neoliberalism: EDSAII. Third World Quarterly 22 (5): 777–93.
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post-Marcos Philippines. Contemporary Southeast Asia 24 (3): 466-83.
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the Philippine state, ed. G. Sidney Silliman and Lela Garner Noble, 280-312.
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afta.asp (accessed June 20, 2005).
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in the Philippines. International South Group Network (ISGN). http://
www.isgnweb.org/pub/02-002.htm.
Confronting the Challenges in the Garment Industry 111
Confronting the Challenges

in the Garment Industry
Ma. Glenda S. Lopez Wui
A
s an economic phenomenon, globalization is often defined as the
“radical transformation of the economic environment at the local,
regional and global levels through the promotion of an open
international economy characterized by an overwhelming increase in
trade, investment and financial flows” (Frago, Quinsaat, and Viajar
2004). As the globalized arrangement is characterized by an increasing
reduction of barriers in trade and investment, governments in
developing countries take advantage of this by creating a domestic
environment favorable to foreign investments while encouraging local
industries to become more export oriented to take advantage of the
opening of markets abroad. However, critics point out that such setup
is not at all conducive to long-term development. Foreign investors
can easily fly out of the host country when the latter ceases to provide
them the optimum environment for capital accumulation. Moreover,
emphasis on export would give less attention to the development of a
domestic market for local products. Although the emphasis on export
could create more employment for the local workforce because of bigger
markets abroad, problems nonetheless arise if importing countries begin
to tap other sources offering better-quality and -priced goods. This
problem is what the local garment industry is currently facing with the
emergence of countries (especially China) that produce garments more
111
efficiently. Likewise, the possibility of losing more markets is being

feared with the impending expiration of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement
(MFA) and the ascension of the garment trade to the rules of the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
The garment industry experienced growth in the past three decades
because of the MFA as its quota system gave garment manufacturers in
the country assured markets for their products abroad. Through the
MFA, garments became a major dollar earner for the country. In January
2005, however, the agreement expired and the trade in garments will
subsequently be governed by the rules of the WTO. Under the WTO,
Filipino manufacturers will have to compete with other producers from
all over the world for markets. Given the high cost of producing
garments in the country, many are not very optimistic about the ability
of the industry to survive the competition. It is said that more than
half of the roughly 320,000 workers (Garment and Textile Export Board)
employed by the garment industry will be adversely affected by the
expiration of the MFA. Of the total number of garment workers, around
75 percent are women.
The problem faced by the industry is compounded by the fact that it
does not have a strong domestic market to speak of. During the 1980s, the
domestic market consumed at least one-third of the country’s total garments
production.1 However, this share eventually dwindled over the years because
of imported products entering the country both through legal and illegal
means. Analysts point to government’s drastic reduction of tariffs and its
inability to curb smuggling as reasons why foreign products dominate the
local market at the expense of our producers. Tariff rates for garment
products coming from Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) countries
are placed at 5 percent, while those from outside ASEAN are placed at 15
percent (Dela Cuesta 2005). Considering the high cost of producing
garments in the country, local producers cannot compete with the imported
products given these tariff rates.2
As to the problem of smuggling, one study conducted in 2000
concluded that almost half of the volume of imported textiles and garments
enter the country illegally.3 Another problem threatening the garment

industry is the prevalence of ukay-ukay or the trade in secondhand clothing.
These secondhand clothes are from Western consumers who want to get
rid of unwanted clothes via donations to charitable institutions in
developing countries. However, only a small portion of the goods end up
in charitable institutions or used in relief operations; the “lion’s share is
sold to used clothes dealers and exported to developing countries, where it
is sold off at market prices” (International Textile, Garment and Leather
Workers’ Fedearation).
This case study aims to examine how civil-society groups engage the
state to advance the interest of the local garment industry and its workers
in the context of globalization. Specifically, the paper will examine initiatives
of civil-society organizations that were put up in connection with the
expiration of the MFA and current problems besetting the garment industry.
The paper also attempts to analyze the resources and means of intervention
utilized by the civil-society groups in their interaction as well as assess
their success not only in affecting policy change but in shaping the discourse
for their agenda. The factors that shaped the outcome of the interaction
will also be examined by the paper.
The first part of the paper provides a situationer on the garment
industry. The second part discusses the perceived effects of globalization
on the industry, while the last part analyzes state-civil society interaction
on issues concerning the industry. For a more empirically grounded analysis,
the study made use of available data and information on the subject from
previous studies, documents, and statistical data on the industry, as well as
Internet sources. Interviews with key informants from civil-society groups
(mostly trade unions) and government were also conducted.
Garment Industry Situationer
The International Context
The growth of the garment industry in the Philippines can be

understood against the backdrop of what is happening at the global level,
in particular, the internationalization of the division of labor.
In the global production of garments and textiles, it is noted that

“change is taking place in the location of world production of textile and
clothing” (Field cited in Pineda-Ofreneo 1989, 7). An increasing quantity
of textiles and garments are manufactured in the Third World “with the
relocation of labor-intensive operations to areas where manpower is cheap,
abundant and preferably docile.”
Pineda-Ofreneo (1989) noted that this global restructuring has two
implications: the exploitation of cheap labor in less developed countries
for the manufacture of clothing exports to the advanced capitalist
nations, “which extract the most profits from the undertaking,” and
the “increasing pressure in the industrial countries to limit imports
especially those coming from third world producers in order to protect
domestic industry and employment” (Field cited in Pineda-Ofreneo
1989, 7).
In the late 1970s when there was a boom in textile and garments
production in developing countries, textile and clothing industries in the
US and Western Europe suffered job losses. The jobs in these countries
went to developing countries like the Philippines where the major push
for export and employment was dictated by outside economies. This can
be explained by the logic of the global market economy:
In the system of internationalization of production dominated by the
transnational corporations based in the United States, Japan and Western
Europe, the role of the developing economies is to be “1) the geographical
site of labor-intensive manufacturing for worldwide markets, 2) the supplier
of low-priced consumer products, and 3) the source of cheap labor.”
Three main factors have made this possible: 1) the virtually inexhaustible
worldwide reservoir of potential labor found mostly in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, where workers earn wages roughly 10-20 percent only of
those of their counterparts in the advanced industrial states; 2) the
development of modern transport and communication technology which
makes possible the relocation and control of operations over wide
geographical distances; and 3) “job fragmentation” or the breaking down of
complex operations into simple units so that even unskilled workers can
perform them (Frobel et al., as quoted in Pineda-Ofreneo 1989, 8).
Transnational companies (TNCs) are the facilitators of the

globalization of production or the internationalization of the division
of labor. TNCs are said to have put in 80 percent of foreign direct
investment and employ around 27 million workers in several export
processing zones (EPZs) in developing countries (Gills 2002, 111).
Since the 1970s, governments in Asia have been competing for the
favors of transnational capital. As a result, there has been an increase in
EPZs and free-trade zones in which “social and environmental standards
are lowered while social subsidies to capital are increased, for example
through offering financial and other investment incentives by the host
governments. The general historical outcome of this process has been
an increase in the rate of exploitation of labor” (Gills 2002, 110).
Since women make up 70 percent of workers in EPZs in Asia (as well
as in the Philippines), they are therefore mostly the victims of
exploitation.
Although the intensification of the export manufacturing sector
generates much-needed jobs in developing countries, it also involves
intense competition to attract foreign investments. This in turn results
in the tendency toward “increase in the level of labor exploitation, via
lower wages and longer working hours, with very little job security.”
Moreover, because of the facility of its transfer, capital tends to move
away in countries with improved working conditions to less developed
economies. This in turn “creates a tendency toward increase in a
downward pressure on wages, as expressed in the race-to-the-bottom
syndrome” (Gills 2002, 112). Gills summarizes the effects of
globalization of production on Asian women:
In global factories, the capital-labor relations for Asian women are
becoming more exploitative and oppressive in the process of globalization
of production. The flip side of the race to the bottom is the corporations’
incessant search for ever-cheaper labor. As a consequence of these two
processes, the labor conditions of many women in contemporary Asia
are coming to resemble those of an earlier era of industrialization in the
West, characterized by sweatshops, that is, high levels of exploitation.
Development of the Local Garment Industry
The garment industry in the Philippines “started as a basically sub-

contracting re-exporting industry where raw materials are shipped from
abroad for processing (cutting, embroidery, sewing etc.) and then re-
exported. Part of the production process goes into the factory but the bulk
is sub-contracted to cottage-type producers” (Philippine Trade and
Development cited in Pineda-Ofreneo 1989, 1).
The export-oriented embroidery manufacturing was introduced in the
Philippines in the late nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century
during the US colonial rule, women and children laborers from the
traditional garment-producing areas of Rizal, Bulacan, Cavite, and Batangas
were already producing embroidered garments. “By 1919, embroidery had
grown to be one of the most successful industries promoted by the
Americans in the Philippines, and by 1930, embroidered articles has become
one of the country’s top ten exports” (Pineda-Ofreneo 1989, 1).
Before the 1960s and the popularization of RTW or ready-to-wear
clothes, garments were largely produced for the domestic market and done
mainly by household-based tailors and dressmakers (Ofreneo et al., 1996).
But in the 1970s, the garment industry started to venture into large-scale
export. It was during this period when the industry began to experience
unprecedented growth. From 1972 to 1980, the export of garments from
the Philippines grew an average of 30 percent per year. This prompted the
World Bank (WB) to hail the garment industry in its 1979 World Mission
Report as “the most dynamic industry in the Philippines.” The WB likewise
regarded garments as “the cornerstone of the remarkable growth in non-
traditional exports witnessed through the 1970s” (cited in Ofreneo et al.
1996, 39).
In the early 1980s, however, the industry experienced a slump due to
the political uncertainties. Because local garments manufacturers are highly
dependent on imported fabrics, the foreign-exchange crunch reduced
production by an average of 12.2 percent from 1981 to 1985. About 95
percent of our garment industry’s fabric and textile requirements are
imported because the price of local textiles is relatively higher than the
prevailing world price (Austria 1994, 10).4 The second half of the 1980s,
however, saw the recovery of the garment industry (Cororaton 1997, 8).
Since then, the industry consistently posted growth, becoming the country’s
second-top dollar earner next to electronics.
To compete in the international market, the government enacted several
laws for the industry.5 With the incentives provided by government for
garment manufacturers and the relatively low labor cost, foreign companies
(especially those from the US) were encouraged to set up business in the
country. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of foreign-owned
garment corporations had set up operations in the Philippines. But while
the garment industry was able to participate in the international trade, it
was still unable to take advantage of the growing market opportunities
unlike the other major exporters like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea.
With this lost opportunity of becoming a major garments exporter, the
Philippines had to contend with a more protectionist environment enforced
by the United States (the country’s major export market) and the European
communities (Austria 1994, 12-13), as exemplified in the MFA.
From 1974 to December 2004, the MFA governed the Philippine
garments exportation. Under the MFA, importing countries set quotas on
the entry of textiles and garments into their countries. Generally, the terms
and conditions regarding the application of quotas are embodied in a
Bilateral Textile Agreement between importing and exporting countries.
Although quotas are set for our garment exports, it was under the Agreement
that we were assured of markets for our products. Hence, it was during the
MFA years that our garment industry experienced growth and expansion
(Hutchison 2001). However, with the abolition of the MFA and the
ascension of the garments trade to WTO rules, the Philippines is up against
countries offering lower costs and faster deliveries of products to buyers
(Austria 1994, 10).6
The Garment Industry in the Era of Globalization

This section discusses the opinions of key informants on the effects of
globalization on the garment industry. Globalization here refers to the
period starting when the industry underwent accelerated trade, particularly

evident during the MFA years. The responses are categorized under
economic, political, and social dimensions.7
Economic and Political Dimensions
According to the respondents from civil-society groups, one of the

main problems facing the industry is the government’s unbridled support
for trade liberalization (Velez 2005; Mendoza 2005; Arellano 2004; Caños
2004; Aniesgado 2004; Honculada 2004). In particular, they criticized
the government’s policy of readily lowering the tariffs for imports without
regard for its effects on the local industry. The proponents of trade
liberalization believe that hastening the reduction of tariffs and allowing
imported products easy access to our market will force our industries to
compete and be more efficient. However, this did not happen to the garment
industry at all.
Some respondents emphasized that instead of prioritizing trade
liberalization, government should first focus on developing our local
industries (Arellano 2004; Honculada 2004; Mendoza 2005). Government
should realize that without adequate support, our local industries cannot
develop, much less compete with imported products. As the Fair Trade
Alliance (FTA) put it, “our industrial and agricultural producers are asked
to be globally competitive, price- and quality-wise, even if they suffer serious
handicaps—poor and expensive infrastructures, inaccessible formal credit,
high cost of power and utilities, unfriendly bureaucracy, unstable currency,
and a generally difficult economic environment” (Fair Trade Alliance 2003,
16).
With tariff reduction, our domestic market has been flooded with
imported products, which are usually sold at lower prices. Because of
high production costs, local manufacturers simply cannot lower their
selling price to match that of imported goods. Although the presence
of cheap imported products may benefit the consumers in the short
term, this will not be good for the economy in the long term. Companies
are forced to close shop because of decline in sales and losses, thereby
resulting in the retrenchment of workers. With this, a greater portion

of the population are left with no purchasing power. Aside from products
legitimately entering the country, our local garments face stiff
competition from garments smuggled into the country (Honculada
2004; Adviento 2004; Arellano 2004). The inability of government to
put a stop to smuggling further compounds the problems of the garment
industry.
One analyst gave the following reasons why our market is flooded with
cheap imports: “the trade liberalization commitments of the Philippines
to the IMF (International Monetary Fund), WTO, and AFTA (ASEAN
Free Trade Area); the inability of the customs and police to apprehend big-
time smugglers; and the failure of the government, mainly the Tariff
Commission, to stop foreign dumping of their excess products” (Ofreneo
2003, 42). Government’s inability to act on the problems encountered by
the garment industry has resulted in factory closures and relocation to
cheaper sites in Asia and the Carribean, or downsizing the Philippine
operations since the late 1990s (Ofreneo 2003, 42).8
Social Dimension
In examining the social effects of globalization, it can be seen that the

phenomenon has been both beneficial and detrimental to the garment
industry. The discussion in this section mainly focuses on the labor issues
and possibilities for civil-society networking afforded by the globalized
environment.
Labor problems
Although some of the problems encountered by the workers were there
even before the so-called era of globalization, the respondents perceive
that these have currently intensified (Castro 2004; Caños 2004; Aniesgado
2004). Most garment workers receive wages way below the required living
standard even as they work for long hours to meet quota requirements.
Contractualization has also become rampant (National Commission on
the Role of Filipino Women 2003). Some of the respondents from the
labor groups believe that corporations resort to contractualization to skirt

laws on security of tenure and workers’ benefits (Caños 2004; Aniesgado
2004).9 Companies have also engaged in labor flexibilization, “which entails
the unbridled use of labor subcontracting and hiring of casual, part-time,
temporary and contract workers” (Viajar 1997, 156). While Ofreneo (2003)
wrote that flexibilization “comes in the form of multi-skilling, allowing
companies to maximize the utilization of talents of these workers through
multi-skilling and related HRM (human resource management) programs.
The complaint of unions and many workers is that such multi-skilling
exercise leads to work intensification without any corresponding increases
in compensation” (47).
The prevalence of subcontracting in the garment industry has also
led to the increase in the number of subcontracted workers.10 In the
Philippines, a substantial number of subcontracted workers do their
work at home. The latter are also known as homeworkers. In the garment
industry, women make up most of the workers in the informal sector.
As informal workers, they work without secure contracts, worker
benefits, or social security/protection (Lund and Nicholson 2003, 15).
Social security covers the core contingencies of health care, incapacity
for work due to illness, disability through work, unemployment,
maternity, child maintenance, invalidity, old age, and death of a
breadwinner (Lund and Nicholson 2003, 17).
According to Teresa Soriano, director of the Department of Labor and
Employment-Institute of Labor Studies (DOLE-ILS), because of the desire
of company owners to save on costs in order to face up to the intense
global competition, they are wont to save on labor cost so that they could
invest in other elements of production. Soriano (2004) elaborated:
As competition becomes more heated because of globalization, companies must
apply cost-cutting measures in order to survive. Of the four elements of
production (materials, machines, manpower, and time) it is always manpower
and time to produce (which is also related to manpower), which has to be
sacrificed since the cost of materials and machines are production inputs which
are non-negotiable.
Table 1. Cases of occupational injuries in textile and garment

establishments employing 20 and over, 2002
Total With lost workdays
number of
cases (fatal, Total Nonfatal Total
nonfatal, (fatal Fatal (without
and without and Total Permanent Temporary lost
lost workdays) nonfatal) (nonfatal) incapacity incapacity workdays)
Manufacture
of textiles 1,923 879 3 876 31 845 1,044
Manufacture
of wearing
apparel 2,757 960 2 958 0 958 1,797
Source: Department of Labor and Employment–Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics.
Expenses for occupational safety and health are also often sacrificed in
favor of other production expenses (Adviento 2004). Costs for the protection
of employees are considered as additional expense and not investment.
However, it is ironic that employers do not realize that a safe and healthy
working environment can contribute to productivity as “accidents, diseases,
or death in the workplace can be very costly and can cause serious
repercussions on the overall performance of the company” (Soriano 2004).
The latest data from the Department of Labor and Employment-Bureau
of Labor and Employment Statistics (DOLE-BLES) show the extent in
which occupational safety is sacrificed by some employers (table 1). The
actual figure for occupational injuries and fatality could be more than the
figures shown below because of underreporting.
With regard to the wages of the workers, one respondent said that
employers often cite intense global competition as the reason why companies
cannot comply with the rates mandated by labor laws (Casaña 2004).
Other respondents added that employers often tell their workers that they
should not complain because workers in China, for example, receive a lower
minimum wage than they do. However, the respondents pointed out that
the Philippines should not be compared with China. Even though Chinese
workers receive lower minimum wage than the Filipinos, the social welfare
incentives provided by their government (e.g., health care, children’s
education) more than make up for the wage difference (Caños 2004;
Aniesgado 2004).
Garment workers also face job insecurity due to possibility of more
closures of factories and capital and investment flight with the expiration
of the MFA, and the inability of companies to survive stiff global
competition.11 Moreover, the use of computer-aided technologies such as
in embroidery contribute to job insecurity as some companies have begun
to retrench workers whose input can be replaced by machines (NCRFW
2003). 12
The respondents also bewailed the discrimination experienced by women
in the garment industry (Caños 2004; Aniesgado 2004). According to a
study conducted by United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), Solidarity Center, and Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
(TUCP) Anti-Sweatshop Project (2002), women experience the following
forms of discrimination in some export processing zones: preference for
single over married women, pregnant women having miscarriages because
they are not moved to assignments appropriate to their condition, not
being allowed to go back to work after giving birth, and sexual harassment.
International solidarity campaigns

One positive factor singled out by the respondents is that
globalization has enabled them to network with other organizations
based abroad (Castro 2004; Adviento 2004; Casaña 2004). Their
networking with other international organizations helped them to learn
from the campaigns taken by other groups abroad and eventually apply
these to the local situation. These campaigns usually center on the
social responsibility of the corporations, particularly their responsibilities
toward their workers. An example of these campaigns is the Clean
Clothes Campaign.13
Local chapters of international organizations have also been put up in
the Philippines. With this, workers in the garment industry have been
benefiting from the advice and expertise of the international organizations

on how to conduct their advocacies. For example, the International Textile,
Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF) has a local chapter
in the Philippines.14
Moreover, because of international networking, trade unions in the
country can report to multinational companies violations committed by
local contractors for possible sanctions. A multinational company usually
has a corporate code of conduct, a written statement of principles, labor
practices, a corporate environment, which the MNC has adopted in its
outsourcing operations overseas. “The MNC commits that its contractors,
sub-contractors and suppliers will comply with the MNC code on pain of
reduction or withdrawal of orders” (USAID, Solidarity Center, and TUCP
Anti-Sweatshop Project 2002, 30).15
Civil-society groups are not the only ones making use of the
campaigns; government has likewise made use of these to instill social
responsibility among local manufacturers. For instance, the Garment
and Textile Export Board (GTEB) provided incentives to garment
companies that were able to secure certification from the Worldwide
Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP) and the Social Accountability
International (SAI). Such incentives usually take the form of allocating
quota for export. WRAP and SAI issue certifications of compliance to
companies that follow international workplace norms as set out in the
International Labor Organization (ILO) convention and the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production;
Social Accountability International).
Agreements forged through the efforts of international institutions
have also been very useful in setting the directions of the country’s laws
with regard to the protection of workers. Employers are obliged by the
country’s labor laws, in accordance with international labor standards to
protect their workers and provide them with healthy working conditions.
The industry and the government are also “obliged to observe international
labor conventions such as those mandated by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and WTO.” Violations of the principles stipulated in

ILO labor conventions could mean for the Philippines “being shut out of
its biggest export markets where trade unions are influential.” In addition,
foreign governments or corporations “could impose sanctions if they
discover that the exported products are the result of infractions of
international labor standards” (Manila Times, July 12, 2003).
Examining State-Civil Society Relations

Several theories have been formulated as to the role of the state in the
context of globalization. There are those which espouse that the state has
become irrelevant as global institutions are the ones setting directions on
how a state manages its boundaries. However, there are those which say
that the state is more relevant than ever, especially in the context of the
perceived bias of international institutions and rules to favor the more
powerful and richer countries at the expense of the poorer ones. The role
of states (especially the developing ones) is more relevant than ever to
enable them to assert their interests in the international arena.
The paper adopts the framework that the state is still very relevant in
the context of globalization. The relevance of the state is also emphasized
by the fact that civil-society groups direct their campaigns to the former in
finding solutions to the problems they encounter in the present context. It
is worth noting that in civil-society campaigns to combat the ill effects of
globalization, workers and capitalists have joined forces in urging
government to undertake appropriate actions to ensure the survival of the
garment industry. On some issues, however, workers and capitalists still
remain at odds. Issues pertaining to the workers’ welfare have remained
the bone of contention between the two parties.
Labor groups’ engagement of the state is not new. Labor groups became
particularly involved in several antigovernment mobilizations during the
Marcos regime; well-known among these mobilizations is the welgang bayan
(people’s strike). After President Corazon Aquino’s ascension to power, one
of her first acts was to institutionalize labor relations in recognition of the
labor movement’s contribution to the downfall of the dictatorship. During
Aquino’s first months in office, in May 1986 and again in May 1987,
government sponsored the National Tripartite Conference that gathered
representatives from major labor organizations, the management sector,
and government experts (Magadia 2003, 67-68). By the time Aquino left
the presidency, several tripartite representations have been instituted, for
example, in the National Labor Relations Commission, the National Wages
and Productivity Commission, the Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration, and the Regional Wage and Productivity Boards (Magadia
2003, 82). It is mainly through these agencies that labor groups formally
engage the executive branch. Labor groups also engaged the judiciary
through the filing of cases against employers. With the party-list system,
their engagement in the legislative arena is realized through their party-list
representatives. Along with their utilization of the formal venues are the
informal engagements that they launch from time to time (usually through
rallies and pickets) to get their grievances across government.
Recently, various labor groups came together to complete the priority
labor agenda for the first one hundred days of President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. The consultation among the labor groups produced the 2004
document “Towards a Joint Policy Agenda for Labor: Managing the Social
Impact of Globalization through Stronger State Adherence to Decent Work.”
The document has been presented to various policymakers as well as
members of the labor movement. The policy proposals mentioned in the
document are meant to address the various problems and disadvantages
encountered by workers in the context of globalization.
The paper focuses on initiatives conducted starting in 2003 up to 2004
to address the implication of the impending expiration of the MFA and
other problems besetting the garment industry. These are the: 1) “Labor
Forum Beyond MFA Phaseout” alliance; 2) Bukluran ng Manggagawang
Pilipino (Solidarity of Filipino Workers [BMP])-Alyansa ng Manggagawa
sa Garment at Textile (Alliance of Garment and Textile Workers [Almagate])
dialogue with the Garment and Textile Export Board; 3) Garments, Textile,
and Allied Industries Labor Council (GARTEX Labor Council) spearheaded
by the Fair Trade Alliance; and 4) National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women (NCRFW) consultations on safety nets for women garment

and textile workers. The first three were initiated by civil-society groups,
while the last one was initiated by a government agency but with active
participation from civil-society groups. The civil-society initiatives were
also chosen because of their members’ formal engagement of government.
Labor groups identified with the national democratic movement or
the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist strain of the Philippine Left are conspicuously
absent in the campaigns. These groups’ formal engagement of government
is currently limited to the legislature through their allied party-list
representatives from Bayan Muna (People First), Anakpawis (Toiling
Masses), and Gabriela Women’s Party. They also mostly utilize informal
means of engagement in the forms of “picket-protests and email barrage to
concerned government agencies and institutions.” Because of ideological
differences, these groups are not comfortable working with those groups
earlier identified. Hence, to deal with the problems of garment and textile
workers, they have formed the alliance Solidarity of Labor for Rights and
Welfare or SOLAR, and the Kababaihan Laban sa Kontraktwalisasyon
(Women Against Contractualization) with like-minded organizations.16
The earlier part of this section discusses the agenda of the campaigns,
while the latter part examines the civil-society groups’ engagement of the
state. The respondents interviewed for the study were all part of either one
of the campaigns. One can see that the issues being addressed by the
campaigns were related to the perceived problems of the industry as a
result of globalization.
The information provided in this section was mostly culled from
position papers prepared by the four groups whose campaigns are the subject
matter of the paper. One will see that although the issues discussed were
provided by those from the garment industry, some of these are also
applicable to other industries.
Market access and trade facilitation

One important concern in the agenda of the civil-society campaigns is
reforming the Bureau of Customs. Because of corruption in the bureau,
smuggled garments easily enter the country. In addition, manufacturers

find it hard to get imported raw materials out of customs because of
unscrupulous officials who ask for bribes to facilitate the release of the
materials. This causes delay in the manufacturing of the garment products—
a situation detrimental to the manufacturers. Importers are very strict about
deadlines, such that local manufacturers can face sanctions if they fail to
deliver on time. So as to facilitate the immediate release of raw materials,
manufacturers are forced to give bribes to customs officials. Among other
things, the computerization of the transactions in the bureau has been
proposed to avoid personal transactions, which could deter the incidences
of corruption and bribery.
Moreover, civil-society organizations urge government to utilize the
antidumping measures sanctioned by the WTO. According to WTO,
dumping occurs when “a company exports a product at a price lower than
the price it normally charges in its own home market.” The WTO agreement
“allows governments to act against dumping where there is genuine
(‘material’) injury to the competing domestic industry. In order to do this
the government has to be able to show that dumping is taking place,
calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the export price is
compared to the exporter’s home market price), and show that the dumping
is causing injury or threatening to do so” (World Trade Organization).
Besides the WTO mechanism, the Tariff Commission should also
implement RA 8752 or the Anti-Dumping Duty Act to address the
dumping of foreign products into the country. Government should also be
able to act on the prevalence of ukay-ukay or the sale of secondhand clothing
in the country.17
To sustain the local garment industry, civil-society groups have been
urging government to embark on a campaign to urge consumers to buy
Filipino products. Compared with other developed and industrializing
economies (such as Brazil, Malaysia, and China) where governments have
been “waving their national flags, asking their domestic consumers to
support their domestic producers” (Fair Trade Alliance 2003, 10) to survive
in the globalized setup, such a campaign is not assiduously pursued in our
country. The Garment and Textile Labor Council of the Philippines

(GARTEX) also reiterated that it is important for the industry’s survival to
develop a local market base (Dela Cruz 2004). All the respondents also
believe that instilling a sense of nationalism among our consumers by urging
them to patronize our local products can go a long way in saving our
domestic industry.
The development of the textile industry is another concern of civil-
society groups. The ability of local garment producers to compete in the
world market is largely hampered by the lack of a textile industry that
would be the source of raw materials for the garment products. Because of
this, about 95 percent of the materials needed for manufacturing garments
are imported. Government should therefore put in more resources for
research and the development of textiles in the Philippines.
Employment
The government needs to make a full accounting and registration of
contractors and subcontractors in the garment industry. In general,
subcontracting, which has become prevalent in the Philippines, is defined
as “an industrial or commercial practice whereby the party placing the
contract (parent firm, principal enterprise or company) requests another
enterprise or establishment (subcontractor) to manufacture or process parts
of the whole of a product or products that it sells as its own” (International
Labor Office, as cited in Pineda-Ofreneo 1989, 9).18 With the registration,
the workers employed by the contractors and subcontractors will be fully
accounted for and the employers might be monitored on whether they
give the lawful wages and benefits to the workers.
Moreover, government should be able to enforce stricter penalties for
pseudo cooperatives that take advantage of the workers’ hard-earned money.
Cases abound where pseudo-cooperatives collect contributions from
unsuspecting members only to be discovered later that the operators have
run off with the workers’ money.
There is also need for more government support for worker-owned
and -managed enterprises. Some workers who lost their jobs after the closure
of their factories have put up their own small garment businesses. TESDA
should also take an active role in giving business training for the workers’
enterprises. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) should also be able to assist
the entry of workers’ enterprises in special economic zones. In addition to
establishing the enterprises, government should also be able to help the
workers market their products. As a start, government could direct its
offices to buy uniforms for their workers from these workers’ enterprises.
The campaigns likewise cover the issue of social protection and safety
nets for displaced workers. There should be post-employment programs
for counseling, skills training, livelihood and entrepreneurship, and
cooperatives. Government could also take on a more active role in job
searching and matching for the displaced workers.19
Wage and social protection for the workers

There is also need to review the decades-old labor code of the country.
One area where the code could be improved is its provisions on union
organizing, particularly on the difficulty to form unions in factories. The
slow resolution of cases in the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) is
another problem area identified by the campaigns. The long duration of
the cases’ resolution deprives the workers of benefits due them.
Regarding wage and occupational and safety measures for the workers,
the campaigns ask government to penalize employers for their Social Security
System (SSS) arrears. Although employers collect contributions from their
workers, some do not actually remit these to SSS. The organizations also
demand that government require companies to put up bonds for separation
and money claims for the workers. This is in response to cases in which
workers are left with unpaid wages and benefits because owners illegally
closed the companies. To provide protection for informal or subcontracted
workers, one of the recommendations of the labor groups is to expand the
coverage of Pag-IBIG and PhilHealth to this sector in addition to the already
mandated SSS coverage.20
It was also suggested that instead of unions doing their own separate
bargaining negotiations, this could be done on an industry basis. Workers
in the garment industry could negotiate as one in the bargaining table as is
the practice in other countries. This way, the specific needs of the workers
in the industry might be better addressed. For example, due to the prevalent
subcontracting arrangement in the industry, it is estimated that majority
of the garment workers belong to the informal sector who are mostly not
unionized and therefore vulnerable to abuse. When the negotiation is done
on an industry basis, the welfare of these workers will also be given attention.
Moreover, some company owners pay their workers on a per-output basis.
However, as one respondent pointed out, there are no existing laws governing
the payment of salaries based on outputs; hence, such arrangement is also
susceptible to abuse (Mendoza 2005).21
The workers’ need for occupational health and safety measures should
also be addressed. Several studies have shown that company owners have
been remiss in providing occupational health and safety measures in the
workplace. In economic zones, decent and affordable housing should be
provided to workers in the area. Age- and sex-based hiring should also be
penalized.
As for workers who are out of employment, government should
“facilitate post-employment programs as well as complementing
mechanisms that would give the workers easy access to financial and technical
support.” The programs may be “job-career counseling, socio-economic
venture, skills training and re-training, entrepreneurship programs,
cooperatives and social enterprises” (Labor Forum Beyond MFA n.d.).
GTEB and institutional-related reforms

With the abolition of the MFA, it is mandated that the Garment and
Textile Export Board will also be abolished since the latter was primarily
formed to allocate quotas to local contractors. In the advent of the abolition
of GTEB, the labor groups suggested that a new office be put up to deal
with the garment industry. This office should be tripartite in nature
(composed of government, employer, and union representatives); it can
focus on market and trade facilitation, formulation of the industry

development plan, and ensuring labor and social compliance of companies
in the industry. The Garment and Textile Industry Tripartite Council (which
created the GTEB) should be reconvened for the purpose of creating the
office.
The Quick Response Teams (QRT) of the DOLE should also be
strengthened to include representatives from the Garment and Textile
Industry Tripartite Consultative Body (GTITCB). The agency could be an
important source of information on the problems and issues of the garment
and textile industries. QRT is a “strategy to monitor industry closures and
retrenchment due to the adverse effects of globalization and economic crises
and to provide immediate and integrated package of assistance to displaced
workers including their dependents” (NCRFW 2003).
Civil-Society Initiatives
This section discusses the three civil-society initiatives—BMP-

Almagate, Labor Forum Beyond MFA, and the GARTEX Labor Council—
that have been formed to address the impending expiration of the Multi-
Fiber Arrangement and problems besetting the garment industry. The BMP-
Almagate initiative started in early 2004 when the BMP held rallies at the
offices of the GTEB, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and
DOLE to air the workers’ grievances in the workplace and the illegal closure
of factories. The impetus for the protest actions of the BMP and its alliance
is the closure of Novelty Philippines in September 2003 that displaced
about 2,500 workers. Owners of Novelty Philippines suddenly closed the
factory and left the country, leaving the workers with unpaid salaries and
benefits. According to Chodie Navea (2005), organizer of BMP’s public-
sector workers, their organization made an assessment of the situation in
the garment industry after the Novelty closure. BMP decided to do
something about the situation since besides Novelty, other factories have
shut down operations. According to a BMP study, several factories have
shut down operations or reduced the working time of their workers due to
liquidity problems (table 2).
Table 2. Garment firms experiencing problems in 2003-2004
Establishment Location No. of Status

workers
Wintertex Laguna 1,400 2 months temporary shutdown

Solid Mills Parañaque 1,200 Shutdown (October 2003)
Meritlux Laguna 600 3-day rotation
Asiatex Laguna 200 10-days-per-month work
Prima Apparel Laguna 500 100 workers retrenched
Sang-Woo Phils Laguna 517 Rotation
Supreme Baby Wear Mandaluyong 200 65 workers retrenched, 4-day
rotation
Yam Venture Laguna 400 3-day rotation
First Quality Rizal 100+ Temporary shutdown (September
2003)
Karayom Parañaque 700 Shutdown
A. Bylson Las Piñas 100+ Shutdown
Manila Bay Spinning Marikina 1,200 Partial rotation
Fairland Manila 115 Overtime work without pay
SB Sales Valenzuela 37 3-day work
Palmphil Garment Laguna 570 200 workers retrenched
Phil Pacific Parañaque 300 200 workers retrenched
Source: Espinola [2005?].
BMP’s assessment led to the holding of pickets at the offices of the

GTEB, DTI, and DOLE, which are the government agencies concerned
with the garment industry. In the pickets, the workers asked government
officials to act on the case of the displaced workers of Novelty as well as
those of other factories. They also asked government to lay down a
comprehensive plan to save the garment industry in the face of the various
problems it is experiencing. Because of the pickets, the GTEB was forced
to hold dialogues with representatives of BMP and unions affiliated with
them. In the dialogues, the workers aired their concerns on issues affecting
the workers and the industry.
Meanwhile, the Labor Forum Beyond MFA was formed in early 2003
through the efforts of the International Textile, Garment and Leather
Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF) Philippines to examine problems
experienced by the garment industry in view of the expiration of the MFA
and to prepare the workers for the quota phaseout. According to Annie
Adviento, coordinator of ITGLWF Philippines, even before the actual date
of MFA’s expiration, the difficulty of competing in the international market
is already being felt by the local garment industry as there are a number of
factories already shutting down operations. Because ITGLWF is a federation
of workers in the garment industry, its members deem it necessary that
they be at the forefront in addressing problems encountered by the workers
in the sector, especially with regard to the pending expiration of the MFA
(2005).
Prior to its initiative in the Philippines, ITGLWF sponsored an
international conference involving its affiliates in countries to be affected
by the MFA phaseout. In the said conference, a plan of action was
drawn whereby the ITGLWF national offices will initiate consultations
with the trade unions in the garment sector. ITGLWF also assessed
that although trade unions are aware and apprehensive about the effects
of the phaseout on the workers, nothing substantial is being done about
the situation.
In early 2003, ITGLWF Philippines initiated dialogues with its member
organizations as well as other labor organizations on what should be done
to prepare the workers for the quota phaseout. There were twenty
organizations which initially participated in the dialogues. The important
objectives of the dialogues are for the labor organizations to engage in
collective action and assess the efforts of employers and government in
connection with the quota phaseout. The initiative was eventually named
Labor Forum Beyond MFA. In the dialogues, the forum formulated the
eight-point labor agenda. The agenda was later presented to government
representatives from the GTEB, DTI, and DOLE. The GTEB eventually
took the role of organizing the succeeding dialogues among the
representatives of labor, management, and concerned government agencies.
In these dialogues, the labor sector was represented not only by Labor
Forum Beyond MFA but also by BMP-Almagate and GARTEX.
The presentation of the eight-point action plan was very timely because
the GTEB at the time was preparing the industry transformation plan. In
the GTEB fora, management representatives were also able to air their
concerns about the impending MFA phaseout. They expressed that about
70 percent of the 320,000 registered workers will be adversely affected by
the quota phaseout. Adviento said that the actual number of workers to be
affected is much more as it is estimated that informal workers in the industry
easily fall in the 300,000-range.
The Garment, Textile and Allied Industries Labor Council is
spearheaded by the Fair Trade Alliance and is made up of eighteen
labor federations. Formed in November 2004, the council was put up
to address the issues faced by the garment and textile industries,
including those attendant to the expiration of the MFA. More
important, GARTEX is envisioned to take an active role in the
preservation and creation of jobs in the industry (Fair Trade Allianc e).
According to GARTEX lead convenor Angelito Mendoza (2005), the
alliance was also formed to answer the need of putting up an industry-
wide alliance in the absence of an industry-wide union. This way, the
alliance will be able to tackle the problems peculiar to the industry,
particularly the workers’. To drum up interest for its campaigns,
GARTEX has conducted several dialogues on issues besetting the
garment and textile industries with prominent media coverage. In these
dialogues, government representatives were often invited. GARTEX also
actively participated in government-initiated consultations on issues
related to garment and textile.
Two important things should be noted regarding these initiatives. First,
women are widely represented in these campaigns as they comprise a
substantial membership in the groups and federations that put up the
initiatives. Second, the media have been very helpful in making the
government, including the public, take notice of the issues raised by the
labor groups. Many of the fora conducted by the labor groups were covered
by the media. In addition, the series of exposés on garment factories

operating as sweatshops brought to the attention of government and the
public the exploitation garment workers are subjected to. One prominent
exposés is the Anvil garment factory in which the workers were given drugs
to stay awake for forty-eight hours straight (Lalata and del Puerto 2003).
Media coverage of the rallies staged by labor groups also helped in getting
the government’s attention.
Assessing the State-Civil Society Engagement
The respondents were pleased with the willingness of government to

dialogue with them. After initiating their engagement with government,
the latter took on the role of organizing the succeeding dialogues. They
said that although much still has to be done about the problem, the
dialogues led to the revival and reestablishment of the Clothing and Textile
Industry Tripartite Council (CTITC). Although a tripartite council existed
in the 1980s, this was not active at all.22 With the abolition of the GTEB,
a lot of groups from the labor and management sectors pushed for the
organization of a government office focusing on the garment and textile
industries. Hence, the organization of the CTITC was very much
welcomed.
The mandate of the CTITC includes the following:
(It) shall act as an advisory and consultative body to the DOLE and DTI,
labor sector and management sector in terms of policies and programs
affecting the clothing and textile industry. As such, it shall endeavor to arrive
at a consensus on matters brought to the body for consideration, deliberation
and/or resolution.
The CTITC shall likewise act as a clearinghouse and documentation
center for issues of common interest to government, labor and management
by incorporating its discussion in the regular agenda. (Memorandum of
Agreement re CTITC, March 2005)
The CTITC comprises representatives from government, labor, and

management sectors. The two government representatives are from DOLE
and DTI. The labor sector is represented by six representatives from Alyansa
ng mga Manggagawa sa Garment at Textile (Almagate), Associated Labor

Unions of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (ALU-TUCP),
Federation of Free Workers (FFW-LACC), Philippine Transport and General
Workers Association - Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (PTGWO-
TUCP), Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL), and National Confederation
of Labor (NCL). The respondents expressed satisfaction with the council’s
labor composition as the different unions in the garment and textile
industries were represented.23 It also helps that employers form part of the
CTITC. This way, employers will become aware of the grievances aired by
the workers in the council. The ITGLWF was selected by the civil-society
groups to act as secretariat for the labor sector.
Besides having a venue for tripartite dialogues regarding issues
confronting the garment and textile industries, the CTITC can also be
utilized by the labor groups for the advancement of their legislative
agenda. An example of legislation that needs to be enacted is that
requiring companies to put up a trust fund for their employees. This
will address the problem of employers leaving the workers with unpaid
salaries and benefits when they close shop. Another is the need to
rationalize through legislation the wages of workers who are paid on a
per-output basis. The CTITC will also coordinate the efforts of different
government agencies acting on the problems concerning the workers
and the industries. Adviento said that another important output of the
interaction, besides the CTITC, is the putting up of the Quick Response
Teams, which were established to assist displaced workers or those who
are victims of violations.
The engagement that transpired so far between the labor groups and
the government can be said to be marked by high political catalysis.
According to Magadia (2003), political catalysis is the “process of
accelerating state-society interaction as both state actors and societal actors
send signals of willingness to engage each other in the development of
policy.” However, it remains to be seen if this kind of relationship between
the state and civil-society groups can be sustained throughout the
interaction. The CTITC, which is the main body tasked to oversee solutions
to the problems of the industry and facilitate government engagement

with civil-society groups was formed only in April 2005. Given the
various problems that need to be addressed in the industry, it is still
too early to tell if CTITC will be able to deliver. There are nagging
issues to address—for example, the corruption in the Bureau of
Customs, smuggling, nonremittance and nonpayment of SSS benefits—
but government has yet to act effectively on these problems. A number
of the respondents said that although these problems have been brought
to the attention of government in the past, nothing significant has
been done about them.
Even though the success of the interaction between civil-society and
the state cannot be entirely ascertained at this time, what can be said is
that the actions of civil-society groups forced government to act on the
situation. The respondents perceive that government is not doing anything
substantial about the situation even though ten years ago it had been fully
aware that the MFA was going to expire.
Overall, civil-society groups managed the interaction with government
because of their capability to mobilize the internal and external resources
available to them. Using the framework of resource mobilization and
political opportunity structure, the next section discusses in detail how the
civil-society groups made use of the resources available to them to advance
their agenda.
Internal resources
STRATEGIES. In engaging government, civil-society groups utilized both
the formal and informal means of intervention in their campaigns. It was
earlier shown how the labor groups made use of the formal venues in
engaging government. Formal venues are the dialogues and fora organized
by government with the NGOs.
One feature of a good strategy is its being able to discern the correct
venue to engage government to get the most out of the interaction (Wui
and Lopez 1997). In the case at hand, it can be said that civil-society
groups were able to choose the correct venue—which is the executive branch,
in particular the GTEB—because before the labor groups initiated the

interaction concrete policies for the garment and textile industries in the
context of MFA’s expiration are yet to be drawn up. In engaging the GTEB,
therefore, civil-society groups are able to influence government policy
directions for the industries.
Alongside the formal means, civil-society groups have also been using
informal means of intervention in their advocacy vis-a-vis government.
Holding of rallies and pickets are resorted to by labor groups (as shown in
the case of BMP) to call the attention of government to their issues. These
informal means proved effective in some cases as shown in the example of
BMP. Their rallies and pickets led the GTEB to hold a series of dialogues
with the group.
The media have been used extensively by civil-society groups in
their campaigns. The respondents said that the media have been
effective in making the government aware of issues confronting the
industry. Likewise, the media coverage of the rallies and fora conducted
by labor groups helped in getting the attention of the authorities.
Examples of fora covered by the media are those conducted by GARTEX
on the implications of the expiration of the MFA as well as other
problems besetting the industry.
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE. The technical capability of the labor groups
can be seen in their being able to detail the problems besetting the garment
and textile industries as well as suggesting recommendations on how these
might be addressed. These detailed problems and suggested
recommendations are partly discussed in the earlier part of the paper. It is
worth noting that in the dialogues, labor groups came prepared with well-
researched presentations. Because of this, the labor groups were able to
communicate their agenda to government. The technical capability of the
people behind the civil-society campaigns is likewise shown in the various
public fora they organized. One proof of their technical capability is the
fact that the media find these fora worth covering. Also, in various feature
articles done on the expiration of the MFA and the state of the garment
and textile industries in general, the opinions of the representatives of the
labor groups were sought. This extensive media coverage in turn helped
bring the problematic state of the garment industry to the consciousness

of government and the public.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY. The capability of the labor groups to
organize themselves is evident in the initiatives they have put up. In the
case of BMP and Almagate, at a time when factories were being shut down
in succession, they started mobilizing their member-organizations for the
holding of rallies and pickets to get government attention regarding the
plight of the workers and the industry. ITGLWF and GARTEX also
organized their members in their respective federations for the holding of
dialogues and fora about issues confronting the garment industry. Because
of these actions, government made available several fora for civil-society
engagement.
The labor groups negotiated with government as one sector, thereby
strengthening their position and enabling them to realize some important
items on their agenda. Foremost of these is the reactivation of the CTITC,
wherein they were subsequently given seats in the council. After their
appointments to the CTITC, labor groups have continued to organize
themselves and consult each other about the agenda they would push in
the body.
External opportunities
Besides the resources internal to their organizations, the civil-society
organizations were able to take advantage of the opportunities presented
by their external environment.
INSTITUTIONAL OPENINGS. These are made possible particularly by the
expanding space for democratic and consultative processes evident in post-
EDSA governments. In the case at hand, labor groups made use of the
openings provided by DOLE, DTI, and GTEB to advance their agenda.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that these openings also became possible
because of the actions of the civil-society groups. As discussed in the case
study, through the pickets and rallies they staged in front of the government
offices and their initiatives to seek dialogues with the officials, government
made available more venues for the interaction.
It is worth noting that civil-society groups’ engagement with the GTEB

also opened up opportunities for dialogues with other government agencies.
One respondent said that when they were taking up the issue of corruption
in the Bureau of Customs, the GTEB invited representatives from the said
office to the dialogues. When GTEB was taking up the issue of the failure
of management to remit Social Security System (SSS) contributions or the
livelihood training for displaced garment workers, it invited SSS and the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) to the
conferences (Adviento 2004).
KEY ALLIES. Ranking government officials are considered allies of the
labor groups, in particular the secretaries and officials of the DTI, DOLE,
and GTEB. The respondents from labor groups said that the government
officials were very accommodating, even spearheading a number of dialogues
with them. In particular, a committee was put up in the GTEB, primarily
tasked to facilitate dialogues with the labor groups.
Although labor groups have locked horns with their employers on
several issues, prominent businessmen in the garment sector who attended
the dialogues to air their concerns about the survival of the industry can
also be considered allies of the labor sector. The presence of these
businessmen certainly helped in pressuring and stepping up the actions of
government. Members of the academe have also helped in the campaigns
of the labor groups. Their researches on the implications of the expiration
of the MFA, which have bolstered the assertions of the labor groups, have
been presented in various fora.
KEY EVENTS. Civil-society groups launched their campaigns against the
backdrop of the impending expiration of the MFA and the closures of
garment factories. With the realization of the implication of the agreement’s
expiration and the factory closures happening in succession, government
has to dialogue with labor groups clamoring for actions on the problems.
As mentioned in the earlier part of the paper, many doubt the ability of
the garment industry to compete against cheaper and more efficient
production sites in a quota-less regime with the expiration of the MFA;
hence, the fate of workers numbering by the hundreds of thousands hang
in the balance.
INTERNATIONAL LINKAGE . Respondents from the labor groups

acknowledged that their networking with international organizations has
been very helpful in their campaigns. They often meet with these groups
in order to learn how their agenda can be further advanced. For instance,
they learn from the experiences of labor groups abroad that it would help
if they negotiate as one sector vis-à-vis the government and employers. In
view of this, local labor groups have been pushing for the realization of an
industry-wide labor organization in the garment and textile sectors.24
In this case study, the benefit of having an international linkage is
manifested in the support extended by the International Textile, Garment
and Leather Workers’ Federation to the labor groups. The ITGLWF’s national
chapter in the Philippines spearheaded several dialogues with government
offices, particularly the GTEB. It actively organized several labor groups
and was a key instrument in the formation of the Labor Forum Beyond
MFA. The ITGLWF is now acting as the secretariat of the labor sector in
the CTITC; hence it has been actively meeting with the labor groups for
the presentation of a consolidated labor position in the CTITC.
Conclusion
The discussion shows how civil-society groups were able to meaningfully
engage government because of their utilization of resources and
opportunities available to them both internally and externally. Although a
lot still needs to be done, one of their important achievements is the putting
up of the Clothing and Textile Industry Tripartite Council, an office entirely
devoted to the garment and textile industries. If it were not for the actions
of civil-society groups, government may not have acted on the need for a
body that would rationalize and set policy directions for the industries.25
Nonetheless, since the CTITC was formed only in April 2005, it remains
to be seen whether or not it will be able to address the long list of problems
voiced out by the civil-society groups. Although the industry has inherited
problems from the past, these have been compounded in the era of
globalization.
The problems of the garment industry in the context of globalization

are myriad. It is of utmost importance that government lay down a
comprehensive plan on how to confront the problems and resuscitate the
industry. A lot of factories are closing down and government cannot expect
that new businesses will be put up without any action on its part. As
articulated by the Fair Trade Alliance (2003), government should realize
that local industries in general cannot be globally competitive, price- and
quality-wise, “if they continue to suffer from poor and expensive
infrastructures, inaccessible formal credit, high cost of power and utilities,
unfriendly bureaucracy, unstable currency, and a generally difficult economic
environment.” Our inability to stand up against foreign competition is
evident even in our own domestic market. As it is now, foreign garments
flood our market and, sadly, these are patronized by domestic consumers
because of their better price and quality.
Despite the doomsday scenario played up by some who insist that the
Philippine garment industry should just be allowed to die a natural death,
others remain hopeful. As articulated by the labor groups, something could
still be done about the industry as long as government has the political will
to implement the needed remedies. Some of these reforms are the curbing
of corruption in the Bureau of Customs, solving the problem of smuggling
and ukay-ukay, and utilizing the antidumping measures allowed by the
WTO in order to stem the unbridled entry of garments into the country.
In the meantime government should embark on a campaign for local
consumers to patronize our garments. As both the labor groups and
manufacturers have suggested, government could start by directing its offices
to buy their employees’ uniforms from local manufacturers. Government
should also put in place a systematic plan of developing our textile industry.
Despite the fact that our garment export has increased over the years, it
has remained import dependent. The inability of government to put in
more resources for research and development of the textile industry has
been pinpointed as a major cause of the problem.26
Moreover, government’s rehabilitation plan for the industry should
not leave out the welfare of the workers as globalization has made their
plight more complex if not more difficult. Globalization has the effect of
putting downward pressure on the wages and benefits of the workers because
of the desire of government to make the domestic environment competitive
and attractive to foreign investments. It is said that the minimum wage is
pegged only at an amount barely enough to cover the daily cost of living
for a family of six (Angeles 2003), because of pressures from capitalists
including those operating transnational corporations (TNC). Government
usually accedes to the demands to prevent the capitalists, especially TNCs,
from transferring to production sites where the minimum wage is lower.
Also, the state is being overly concerned with maintaining a favorable
business climate for international capital, which has led to restrictions on
the activities of labor unions, as exemplified in the “no union, no strike”
policy in export processing zones supposedly to realize industrial peace.
But, as Angeles (2003) pointed out, “genuine industrial peace through
better labor-management cooperation can only take place when working
and living standards are improved.” Hence, rather than being overly fixated
on the activities of unions, government and management should devote
more efforts to the improvement of such standards.
Moreover, the globalization of production has been increasingly
characterized by the flexibilization of labor manifested in part-time,
temporary, casual, and subcontracted work. The feminization of labor forms
part of the flexibilization, which means that women are increasingly forced
out of the formal labor sector and are subjected to the disadvantages of
informal employment. Although government still needs to enforce
compliance among companies to observe the lawful entitlements of workers
in the formal sector, it should also be able to focus on the needs of those in
the informal sector. After all, the latter make up a substantial portion of
those working in the garment industry. Besides the fundamental
requirement of protecting their human and labor rights, other
recommendations of the labor groups for those in the informal sector is
their inclusion in PhilHealth and Pag-IBIG coverage.
The effect of the footloose nature of capital due to globalization is seen
in the recent closures of garment factories in the country, as companies
move to production sites more conducive to profit accumulation. The

sudden closures of factories has left hundreds of workers with unpaid wages
and benefits. Most of these owners have left the country and can no longer
be compelled to pay the workers’ entitlements. To address this problem,
government should thus implement the suggestion of the labor groups
that companies be required to put up a trust fund for the workers in the
event of sudden closure. A comprehensive assistance package for workers
who are suddenly unemployed should also be put in place. This assistance
can be in the forms of skills training, providing capital to start a business,
and, later, product marketing. 27
In the face of the garment industry’s gargantuan problems, however,
what can provide a glimmer of hope is the ever-activist stance of the labor
sector. As shown in the study, their capability to organize and bring their
concerns to government’s attention has led the latter to act on their issues.
However, as earlier noted, those identified with the national democratic
movement are conspicuously absent in the initiatives discussed in the paper.
It cannot be denied that the unity of labor groups can go a long way for
the advancement of the workers’ agenda, especially in the legislative arena
with the party-list representation. As it is now, because of ideological
differences, some party-list representatives are expected to support only
the agenda of labor groups with whom they share the same ideological
thinking. Labor groups that do not adhere to the same political thinking
cannot expect support from differently minded party-list representatives.
It is also worth noting that as women are the ones mostly affected by
the problems of the industry, they have also been at the forefront of the
campaigns. As noted earlier, women comprise substantial membership in
groups that are in the forefront of the campaigns. Labor organizations are
also increasingly giving attention to the plight of informal workers. There
have been efforts to organize the latter as part of the strategy of labor
organizations to answer the needs of workers in the globalized setup (Viajar
2004). In addition, their concerns are widely articulated in various labor
groups’ campaigns. Finally, the globalized setting has afforded the workers
to take advantage of international networking. The expertise and assistance
of these international organizations have made possible the realization of

some of the local labor groups’ advocacies.
Notes
1. This was pointed out by Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo in her review of my paper.
2. According to Angelito Mendoza, lead convenor of the Garments, Textile and Allied
Industries Labor Council or GARTEX Labor Council, the tariff rates for imported
garments should be placed at 30 percent so as to provide protection for our local
producers. The biggest threat to our local producers are those coming from China
whose products mostly cater to mass consumers.
3. The extent of smuggling is described thus: “the volume of smuggled yarn, fabrics
and garments was placed at 151,000 metric tons, or 51 percent of the estimated
300,000 metric tons imported into the country (based on a per capita consumption
of four kilograms for an estimated total population of 75 million)” (Bacalla 2004).
4. Ideally, there should be a close association between the garment and textile industries
as our local textile industry should be the source of materials for garment production.
Although in other countries the linkage between the two industries is well-established
(especially in the case of successful garments exporters like China and South Korea),
this is not the case in the Philippines (Austria 1994, 10).
5. In the early 1960s, the garment industry started to experience growth through the
enactment of the Embroidery Act (RA 3137) in 1961. Companies registered under
the Act “were allowed to import raw materials free of duties and taxes” (Austria
1994, 12). Other important legislation that led to the growth of the garments
export are: The Exports Incentive Act (RA 6135) in 1970, Act creating the Export
Processing Zones (RA 5499 and PD 66) in 1972, and Executive Order 537 creating
the Garment and Textile Export Board (GTEB) in 1979 (Pineda-Ofreneo 1989).
The GTEB was in charge of integrating and rationalizing government policies and
procedures governing the Philippine garment industry (GTEB). However, the
main bulk of the work of GTEB was the allocation of the MFA quota to contractors.
Hence, with the abrogation of the MFA, the GTEB was also abolished.
6. However, some studies contend that the country will gain from the MFA phaseout
as it will “increase the market access of the country in the world market, particularly
in the industrialized countries” with the abolition of the quota restrictions (Austria
1996, 29). The country could focus on products where it has comparative advantage.
Moreover, our workers’ skills for detailed embroidery is another area where our
garments industry could be globally competitive (Austria 1996, 20). Donald Dee,
president of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), said our
current strengths are washed-out denims and high-end T-shirts.
7. In the discussion, it would be helpful to use a study conducted by the Third World
Studies Center (TWSC) in framing the opinions of the respondents. The TWSC
study examined the perspectives and positions of a particular segment of civil-
society groups in the Philippines that have been critical or wary of globalization. A
portion of the study examined how the groups define globalization. The
characterizations given by the respondents of the study were grouped under the
following categories: economic, political, social, technological, and cultural (Frago,
Quinsaat, and Viajar 2004).
Among the responses characterizing globalization that were grouped under the
economic category are: neoliberalism, global capitalism, openness, interdependence,
competition among developing and developed countries, and imperialism. Under
the political dimension, responses—such as mutual imposition of treaties,
conventions and instruments by member nations of international bodies;
marginalization of Southern countries; abdication of state responsibilities; and
neocolonialism—were found. For the social aspect, the research elicited the following
responses: threat to the poor and workers, solidarity of civil-society groups, and
threat to informal sectors. Under the technological dimension, the responses include
advancement in technology; and worldwide spread of knowledge, ideas, and
information. Homogenization, cultural aggression by the West/the US,
counterdiversity, and cultural interchanges were found in the cultural dimension.
For this study, the economic, political, and social categories will be used to
understand how globalization has affected the garment industry. In the ensuing
discussion, however, the economic and political dimensions are combined to
accommodate overlaps in the responses of the respondents.
8. The data of GTEB, however, show that despite the closures there is net increase in
the number of factories setting up operation in the Philippines. Donald Dee,
president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, nonetheless said that these
newly opened factories will not stay long in the country as the owners are just
assessing the situation in China before they finally move their operations there.
9. Describing the present composition of companies, Ofreneo wrote that they usually
maintain a “shrinking force of regular workers and an expanding army of irregulars,
variedly called by union organizers as casuals, contractuals, 5-5 workers” (2003,
46). However, Cielito Habito in his written review of this book’s manuscript pointed
out the benefits of subcontracting. He wrote, subcontracting “has been instrumental
in other countries in the promotion and development of the small and medium
enterprise (SME) sector by promoting the development of synergistic partnerships

between SMEs and large enterprises (e.g., the automobile industry in Japan).
Ultimately, an enlivened SME sector resulting from these synergies that originate in
subcontracting leads to further expansion in employment opportunities and workers’
choices.”
10. Subcontracted worker is a general term used to cover a range of contractual
arrangements for workers who are not permanent, formal economy workers (Lund
and Nicholson 2003, 60).
11. It is estimated that about half of the total number of garment workers would be
seriously affected by the expiration of the MFA (Dela Cruz 2004).
12. According to Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo, home-based workers are the most
affected by computer-aided embroidery which took out jobs from communities
toward factories. However, even factory workers today are threatened by the
presence of these computer-aided technologies. This was pointed out in her
written review of my paper.
13. Clean Clothes Campaign was formed to “improve working conditions and
to empower workers in the global garment industry, in order to end the
oppression, exploitation and abuse of workers in this industry, most of whom
are women.” It does this by: “1) putting pressure on companies to take
responsibility to ensure that their garments are produced in decent working
conditions; 2) supporting workers, trade unions, and NGOs in producer
countries; 3) raising awareness among consumers by providing accurate
information about working conditions in the global garment and sportswear
industry, in order to mobilize citizens to use their power as consumers; and
4) exploring legal possibilities for improving working conditions, and
lobbying for legislation to promote good working conditions and for laws
that would compel governments and companies to become ethical consumers”
(Clean Clothes Campaign).
14. Among the aims of the ITGLWF are to: “assist unions in developing countries in
organizing workers and educating their members to play an active role in their
union” and “lobby intergovernmental organizations and other relevant institutions
to ensure that the interests of workers in the sectors are taken into account in
decisions made at the international level” (International Textile, Garment and Leather
Workers’ Federation).
15. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), most of the principles
contained in corporate codes pertain to occupational safety and health (25
percent), nondiscrimination (25 percent), child labor (45 percent), wages (40
percent), forced labor (20 percent), and freedom of association (15 percent).
However, according to the paper’s reviewer, Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo,
the monitoring of codes of conduct is problematic as workers, even if
organized, feel obliged to lie to save their jobs. This conclusion is further
discussed in Lund and Nicholson (2003).
16. E-mail response of Roy Velez of the Kilusang Mayo Uno to my inquiry dated
August 1, 2005.
17. In some countries in South Africa, the trade of secondhand clothing has led to
the collapse of their garment industries (International Textile, Garment and Leather
Workers’ Federation).
18. Hutchison (2001) identified the following factors why subcontracting is
widely practiced in the Philippines. “First, the nature of the sewing technology
utilized in the industry—there is no integrated production line. After cutting
the garment’s pattern, one worker can finish the whole work with the use of
a sewing machine. Sewing machines can also be easily installed at home or
in production areas utilizing limited space… Second, sub-contracting is
practiced to reduce labor costs and/or to prevent the intervention of unions.
Workers in small sub-contracting arrangements receive lower wages than
those working in large factories. In addition, because regular workers are
spared from rendering long hours of work to meet quotas and deadlines,
manufacturers are therefore able to prevent possible complaints and demands
coming from unions.”
19. A number of the respondents nonetheless said that government should do serious
housekeeping to improve the economy and make more jobs available for the
workforce. Retraining the garment workers for other jobs is useless if alternative
jobs are not available.
20. Some informal workers already avail themselves of PhilHealth benefits as indigents
or paying members. However, information about and access to PhilHealth benefits
are still extremely limited. This was pointed out by Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo in her
review of my paper.
In the Philippines, a substantial number of subcontracted workers do their work
at home. The latter are also known as homeworkers. In the garment industry, women
make up most of the workers in the informal sector. As informal workers, they work
without secure contracts, worker benefits, or social security/protection (Lund and
Nicholson 2003, 15). Social security covers the core contingencies of: health care,
incapacity for work due to illness, disability through work, unemployment, maternity,
child maintenance, invalidity, old age, and death of a breadwinner (Lund and
Nicholson 2003, 17).

21. Although the Bureau of Working Conditions conducts time and motion studies
to determine salaries of workers who are paid based on piece-rates, this is only
done upon the request of the firms. If the owner does not initiate any such
request, then no study will be conducted (Soriano 2004).
22. This was pointed out by Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo, Angelito Mendoza, and
Teresa Soriano.
23. Because they did not participate at all in dialogues with government, labor groups
identified with the national democratic movement are not represented in the Clothing
and Textile Industry Tripartite Council.
24. However, a number of the respondents admitted that the different political
persuasions of the labor groups may deter the formation of an industry-wide
union.
25. According to the civil-society respondents, prior to their conduct of rallies and
dialogues, government has not made policy pronouncements on its plans for the
garment industry in the advent of MFA expiration.
26. According to Angelito Mendoza (2004), the Multi-Fiber Arrangement is also to be
blamed for the underdevelopment of the textile industry as foreign companies
contracting out jobs to local producers prefer the use of imported textiles for
their garments.
27. Aside from providing financial support as capital for the workers to start a
business, government should also help the workers market their products.
The case of Karayom workers illustrates government’s lack of comprehensive
support for the workers. Karayom Garments Manufacturing, located in
Parañaque, Metro Manila, was illegally closed in January 2003 without the
necessary formal application for closure with a thirty-day notice. The
company, which was owned by Yusuf Suveyky, an American, produces solely
for export to the US (Salidumay).
When workers from the Karayom garment factory found themselves jobless (with
unpaid salaries and benefits) after their employer suddenly left the country,
government gave the workers funds that they could use to start a business. But
because the funds were limited, the workers were reduced to sewing and selling
rugs. The income they earn from this venture is hardly enough to meet their daily
needs and that of their families. One respondent pointed out that government
support should have been more sufficient and comprehensive. Since the workers
knew how to make sportswear and swimwear, government should have given them
bigger financial support to enable them to buy the raw materials for the products.
Government should not end with the extension of financial support; it should also
help in the marketing and promotion of the products sewn by the workers. It
should help launch campaign with the public to buy the “unbranded” products
that are as good as the more expensive branded imported products (Arellano 2004).
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Balancing Consumer and
Corporate Interests in the
Telecommunications Industry
Ronald C. Molmisa
A
s countries throughout the globe attempt to become economically
competitive, the Philippine government embarked on reforms to
open up the telecommunications industry in early 1990s. There
was a realization that the poor telecommunications infrastructure has been
dragging the economy down (Shooshan and Temin 1999, 2). Overall,
liberalization has affected the local industry in three ways—global
operations, regional and multilateral agreements, and new global services
(International Telecommunications Union 2002, 4). Almost all major
telecommunication companies (telcos) in the country have strategic foreign
partners and investors. Economic policymakers ascribed the country’s
telecommunications sector improvement and competitiveness in the world
market to its participation in regional trading arrangements under the
auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (AFTA), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), among others, which
provide policy assistance in addressing local industrial issues. Advancement
in information and communication technology introduced new services
in the market like mobile phone roaming, global satellite systems, and
third-generation (3G) services that industry players enhance and maximize.
155
The main problem, however, is that the sector was liberalized even before
the basic need for telecommunication service was satisfied. This brought
serious issues, which industry players, especially the telcos, have to contend
with.
This paper is an exploratory research on state-civil society relations in
the Philippine telecommunications industry. It aims to accomplish three
things:
1)to describe and analyze the dynamics and means of intervention
used by civil society organizations (CSOs) in engaging the state in
the context of liberalization.
2)to explain the factors that accounted for CSOs’ success in terms of
policy outcomes. By looking at political opportunity structures,
this paper explores how civil society organizations are able to
maximize available internal and external resources and how these
translate to their success or failure (Kitschelt 1986).
3)to provide recommendations on how to strengthen state-civil society
relations in the industry.
In order to accomplish the above-mentioned objectives, this paper
is organized in three sections. The first part provides the structure of
the industry before and after its liberalization, the current regulatory
framework, and a discussion of the evolution of telecommunication
policies in the country vis-à-vis the story of the monopoly of the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). The next
section delves into the state-civil society relations in the industry.
Apparently, the weaknesses of the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) as an industry regulator reflect the vulnerability
of the state in the face of liberalization. The lack of active civil society
organizations in the industry augurs well for the strong involvement of
the business sector in engaging the state in policy debates and
discussions. The experiences of TxtPower and the Philippine Internet
Services Organization (PISO) are discussed to demonstrate how civil-
society groups operate amid political opportunities and constraints. The
Balancing Consumer and Corporate Interests in the Telecommunications Industry 157
third section synthesizes the discussions and offers recommendations on

how to increase civil society participation and how to make it more effective.
Primary data gathering for this study was carried out through semistructured
key informant interviews with industry stakeholders and actors. Secondary
data were culled from print media articles, Internet-based sources, academic
studies on the industry, and government sources including notes on public
forum and consultations, agency reports, memorandums, and other
issuances from August 2004 to January 2006.
Telecommunications Industry Overview

For more than seventy years, the telecommunications sector was
governed by the private sector under a virtual monopoly structure. With
the lack of competition and limited capital, the industry hardly grew. This
condition was once criticized by former Singapore Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew who once commented that “99 percent of Filipinos are waiting
for a phone line, while the other one percent are waiting for a dial tone”
(cited in Cabanda 2002). This dismal condition can be summarized as
follows (Patalinghug 2004):
1) Only 16 percent of the total land area are being serviced.

2) Only half a million installed lines were utilized.
3) Poor quality of service of the major telecommunication
company.
4) Unbalanced distribution of service between rural and
urban areas.
5) Outdated infrastructure and inadequate interconnection
of telecommunication facilities.
Liberalization of the industry introduced significant benefits not only

to the public but also to small market players. It engendered an exciting
multi-operator environment characterized by competition,1 mergers,
strategies, and counter-strategies of key players (Alonzo and San Pedro
1997). Although PLDT is still a market giant to contend with, it no longer

possesses the same market clout it enjoyed before liberalization. Prior to
deregulation, PLDT owned at least 85 percent of the country’s
telecommunications infrastructure. It has exercised virtual monopoly over
local, national, and overseas calls because it owns the country’s only
telecommunications backbone facilities (Serafica 1998).
Foreign technology, financing, and expertise were made accessible,
leading to improved services and more foreign direct investment, mainly
due to foreign partnerships with local companies. Foreign partners of local
companies include First Pacific Group of Hong Kong (a major shareholder
of PLDT), Singapore Telecoms and Deutsche Telekom (Globe), New
Telecom (Digitel), Korea Telecoms (partner of Capwire), Shinawatra of
Thailand (Islacom), Cable and Wireless (Eastern Telecoms), Millicom
(Extel-com), Nynex (ICC), Comsat USA (Philcom), and Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone Corp. (Smartcom). In 1999, foreign direct investments
(FDI) in the industry increased by over 480 percent to PHP 524.7 billion
from PHP 90.2 billion in 1992 (National Economic and Development
Authority [NEDA] 2001). The service sector, which comprises about 48
percent of the country’s total GDP, increased by 3.23 percent in 2004
mainly due to the telecommunications sector.2 A study reveals that the
investments in the telecommunications sector salvaged the ailing economy
of the country during the early period of liberalization in 1994-1997
(Abrenica 1999). At present, the telecom industry serves as one of the
country’s vibrant economic sectors. Table 1 shows the current structure of
the sector.
Government requirements for industry players during the early years
of deregulation caused the upward trend in the telephone density and
mobile phone subscription. Landline telephone density (number of
lines per 100 people) improved from the meager 2.01 in 1995 to 9.05
in 2000 (table 2). Although the figures nosedived from 2001 to 2003,
positive growth was registered in 2004 when subscription of fixed line
telephones grew by 4.52 percent, with 6.53 million installed lines rolled
out by PLDT and 1.5 million by Innove Communications Inc., a wholly
owned subsidiary of Globe Telecoms Inc. (Bautista 2004).
Table 1. Telecom industry structure
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Local exchange carrier service 77 74 73 73 73

Inter-carrier carrier service 11 14 14 14 14
International gateway facility 11 11 11 11 11
Radio mobile
• Cellular mobile telephone
Subscriber 7a 7b 7c
• Public trunk repeater service 11 11 11 10
Radio paging service 11 11 11 8
Value-added service
With networks
• Coastal 12 12 12 13 18
• Broadband 19 19 19 19
Without networks 156 186 186 249 292
Sources: National Telecommunications Commission Reports, NEDA, and other sources.
a
BayanTel and Digitel are not yet operational
b
BayanTel and Digitel are not yet operational
c
Only BayanTel is not yet operational
Table 2. Philippine telephone density index (1998-2003)
Year Installed lines Subscribed lines

(million) (percent)
1998 9.08 3.44

1999 9.12 3.87
2000 9.05 4.01
2001 8.88 4.26
2002 8.70 4.17
2003 8.09 4.07
2004 8.03 4.52
Source: NTC 2002-2004 Annual Reports.

The DOTC released in December 1992 Department Order 92-269,

formally opening the mobile phone industry to new market players.
Afterward, the most influential business groups started to occupy the entire
sector. New competing telcos realized they have no chance in competing
against PLDT in the landline market, thus they went into newer markets
including the cellular phone business. A PLDT subsidiary, the Pilipino
Telephone Company (Piltel), was the first company to be granted authority
to deliver cellular mobile telephone service in 1991. Express
Telecommunications Co. (Extelcom) also launched its service in the same
year. Three years later, Smart Communications (Smart), Isla
Communications Inc., and Globe Telecoms joined the competition.
Since 2000, cellular and mobile telecommunication services (CMTS)
have been exhibiting phenomenal growth (table 3). A total of 2.85 million
mobile subscriptions were registered in 1999, which increased by 126
percent in 2000. The entry of SunCellular, the GSM brand of Gokongwei-
owned Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel), in March
2003 further increased the number of subscribers. In the same year, there
were already 22.5 million mobile phone subscribers under the six major
CMTS players. Mobile phone subscription grew to 33.40 million in 2004,
a 48.54 percent increase from the 2003 figure (Bautista 2004). It was
predicted that before year 2005 ends, half of the 84 million Filipinos will
have access to cell phones. This is because although 55 percent of the total
cities and municipalities have fixed-line services, people still choose to utilize
mobile phones due to its affordability.3 There was a maximum utilization
of short messages service (SMS) or “texting” in many parts of the country.
The mobile company Sony-Ericsson even dubbed the Philippines as the
texting capital of the world because of the 175 million average number of
text messages being sent by 33 million Filipinos daily. Not surprisingly,
the country’s two largest mobile phone companies have benefited immensely
from the popularity of texting. In 2002, Globe Telecoms registered a net
income 59 percent higher than that of the previous year, while the net
income of Smart Communications, a unit of PLDT, skyrocketed by 51
percent in the first nine months of the same year.
Table 3. Mobile phone subscription (1992-2004)
Year Subscription Percent increase
1992 56,004
1993 102, 400 83.00
1994 171, 903 68.00
1995 493, 862 187.00
1996 959,024 94.00
1997 1343,620 40.00
1998 1,733,652 29.00
1999 2,849,880 64.30
2000 6,454,359 126.00
2001 12,159,163 88.80
2002 15,383,001 26.50
2003 22,509,560 46.33
2004 33,400,000 48.54
Source: National Telecommunications Commission 2002-2005.

Annual Reports.
Institutional Framework
The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)

used to be the sole executive agency tasked to formulate, plan, program,
coordinate, implement, regulate, and administer the country’s
telecommunication policies. Until recently, Executive Order (EO) 269,
issued by President Macapagal Arroyo in January 2004, established the
Commission on Information and Communication Technology (CICT)
which functions as the primary ICT policy, planning, coordinating,
implementing, regulating, and administrative entity of the executive.4 The
NEDA assists the CICT by providing assessment and policy guidance on
infrastructure development in the ICT sector.
The DOTC has two attached agencies: the Telecommunications Office
(Telof ) and National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). On one
hand, the Telof is one of the four sectoral offices of the DOTC tasked to
provide basic communication services in almost all the localities in the
country. It was called the Bureau of Telecommunications when it was
established under EO 94 approved in 1947. Its name was changed to
Telecommunications Office when EO 125 called for the comprehensive
reorganization of the government in 1987.
On the other hand, the NTC is a quasi-judicial office that acts as the
regulatory arm of the DOTC and was authorized to be the principal overseer
of the provisions of RA 7925 or the Philippine Telecommunications Act
of 1995. The NTC was created in 1979 pursuant to President Marcos’s
EO 546. It was later attached to the DOTC in 1987. The NTC is mandated
to regulate the entry of qualified service providers and to adopt a pricing
policy that would generate sufficient returns. It establishes rates and tariffs
that provide for the economic viability of telecom entities and a fair return
on their investment, considering the prevailing cost of capital in the
domestic and international markets. In principle, the NTC does not
interfere as far as market and pricing issues among telecom players are
concerned. The commission allows them, on their own initiative, to
negotiate and enter into interconnection agreement subject to technical,
commercial, and operational rules (Heceta 2004). In cases of refusal to
negotiate or failed negotiation, the commission, upon the complaint of
any interested party or upon its own initiative, intervenes and assumes
jurisdiction and sets the terms and conditions it may find appropriate for
the case. In case of mediation, the NTC, on its own initiative at any stage
of negotiation, can intervene and mediate between parties. Any agreement
reached by parties should be submitted to the commission for approval
within ten days from the execution of the agreement. Insofar as its quasi-
judicial functions were concerned, the orders and decisions of the NTC
were final, except when appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Legal Framework
Understanding the failure of the government to demonopolize the

industry during the pre-liberalization period must be anchored on the
story of the seventy-year reign of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone

Company. The company was nurtured and pampered by two
administrations.5 Marcos’s protectionist regime stalled the necessary policies
to revitalize the telecom sector. It is widely known that Marcos and his
associates benefited immensely from the ownership and control of some
of the country’s telecommunication companies including PLDT. During
the Martial Law years, presidential decrees and other executive issuances
consciously groomed the PLDT to be a natural monopoly. It operated in
a market of limited competition, leading to telephone shortage and higher
service rates (Hudson 1997). The company had the first pick of profitable
service areas and cities while smaller operators, mostly members of the
Philippine Association of Private Telephone Companies (PAPTELCO),
were relegated to service less profitable areas (Obien 1998, 40). To further
eliminate competition, PLDT acquired the smaller players including the
second-largest telephone provider, Republic Telephone Co. (Retelco), which
was ordered to merge with the firm in 1981. To raise the equity of PLDT,
Marcos signed the institution of PLDT’s subscriber investment plan where
all PLDT clients buy preferred shares in the company so that they can
theoretically become owners. At present, subscribers’ shares still comprise
75 percent of the company but voting rights are only reserved to the 25
percent shareholders. The NTC further enhanced PLDT’s dominance by
issuing Ministry Circular 82-046 providing for the single, integrated
national backbone for voice, telegraph, telex, and data transmission, all of
which were installed by PLDT (Coronel 1998). The Government Telephone
Service (GTS), which had its own national backbone, was integrated to
the trunklines of PLDT.
The revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino (1987-1992) started
a new wave of telecom reforms. Aquino was politically bound to resolve
the telephone crisis because majority of landline phone applicants belong
to the class which brought her to power—urban, middle-class professionals
and businesspersons (Kim 2003,120). In 1987, the DOTC released
Memorandum Circular 87-188 to guide the telecommunications
development in the 1990s. A year later, Presidential Memorandum Order
163 created the National Telecommunications Development Committee

(NTDC), a joint state-industry committee composed of top-level decision
makers, chaired by the secretary of the DOTC. The NTDC was charged
with the development of strategies for rationalizing the fragmented industry
structure. This was followed by the signing of the Municipal Telephone
Act of 1989, requiring installation of public calling stations in all
municipalities, especially in rural areas. It provides for the installation,
operation, and maintenance of public telephones in each and every
municipality in the Philippines with the “Telepono sa Barangay” (Telephone
for the Barrio) as its flagship program. The Act was amended and upgraded
in 2000 by establishing the Municipal Telephone Projects Office under
the DOTC. In 1990, the DOTC issued the National Telecommunications
Development Plan (NTDP) as the agency’s overall blueprint and policies
for the communications sector through the year 2010. The NTDP is
apparently on hold because the DOTC is waiting for the resolution of the
Congress on the proposal to create a Department of Information and
Communication Technology (DICT).
The Aquino administration did not vigorously push for the industry’s
demonopolization for obvious reasons. Then PLDT President Antonio
“Tony Boy” Cojuangco was the president’s first cousin. PLDT was among
the first companies sequestered by the Philippine Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), a commission established to probe Marcos’s ill-
gotten wealth. Just weeks later, PCGG lifted the sequestration order.
PLDT’s political and economic clout made it difficult for new market
players to secure a legislative franchise. Many of them who were denied a
license have either opted to buy stocks of major telcos or form mergers.
Although the liberalization process commenced in 1987, it was only in
1989 that new licenses were granted to international gateway facilities
(IGFs), cellular mobile telephone system providers (CMTS), paging, cable
TV, and other telecom services.
At present, dominant players still obstruct the entry of other players.
The Aquino government failed to discipline PLDT on various occasions.
During the term of Commissioner Jose Alcuaz, the NTC compelled the
company to interconnect with cellular phone provider Express

Telecommunications Co. (Extelcom). It not only disregarded the
interconnection order but also questioned in the Supreme Court the validity
of the Extelcom franchise. When the decision came out in favor of Extelcom,
PLDT simply bought into the company. In another case, when Digitel
won the bid to operate the government telephone system in Luzon in
September 1991, PLDT attempted to block its operations by preventing
Digitel from leasing its phone networks (Coronel 1998, 130). In another
incident, major telcos opposed the entry of Connectivity Unlimited
Resources Inc. (CURE) and Multimedia Telephone Inc. to be a CMTS
player and maintain a 3G digital network (Today, March 29, 2004) although
the House of Representatives earlier approved CURE’s legislative franchise.
Major policy breakthroughs transpired during the term of President
Ramos (1993-1998). Consistent with his “Philippines 2000” agenda,
Ramos accelerated the liberalization thrust through his landmark executive
issuances. The president signed two unprecedented executive orders that
drastically transformed the landscape of the industry: EO 59 issued on
February 24, 1993, calling for the compulsory interconnection of
authorized public telecommunications carriers, and EO 109 issued on July
12, 1993, which outlines a policy designed to improve local exchange carrier
service to be accomplished through the Service Area Scheme (SAS). EO
109 compelled CMTS operators to install 400,000 telephone lines in three
years and 300,000 lines for IGF operators within five years. EO 109
introduced the Service Area Scheme and the three-year Basic Telephone
Program (BTP) which ended in June 1998. Through the SAS, the country
was divided into eleven geographic areas, where CMTS operators are
required to operate both in served and underserved areas. Eight carriers
were authorized to operate in these areas while IGF operators were also
mandated to install a rural exchange line for every ten urban local exchange
lines. PLDT was not required to install new lines. Bayantel, Digitel, Globe
Telecom and Smart satisfied the rollout requirements while Piltel, Islacom,
PT&T/CAPWIRE, and ETPI failed to meet their target lines. Several
reasons were raised, including the peace and order problems and poor
business environment in assigned areas. As of year 2000, six operators—

Digitel, Globe, Bayantel, PLDT, Smart, and Piltel met the required number
of local lines and rural deployment but were deficient in covering the
required areas. To further prove that the government was serious in its
demonopolization project, Ramos gave majority of seats of PLDT’s Board
of Directors to government officials, appointing six of its eleven board
members (Cabanda 2002). When PLDT felt that the entry of new market
players was inevitable, it embarked on a nationwide installation of landline
phones through its Operation Zero-Backlog program (Smith 1995).
Ramos’s EO 59 and EO 109 were not without flaws. While the SAS
attracted investments, the government failed to set realistic terms for the
telecom players. EO 109 forced the new carriers to allocate half of their
investment in areas where there are unpredictable returns. Installing landline
facilities in rural areas did not become an efficient enterprise due to lack of
market. Often, the government is the one that spends people’s taxes to
install operational lines. To make matters worse, the proactive involvement
of the DOTC as an operator in unprofitable areas gave industry players
the notion that they were not obligated to provide service in such areas.
New players also had difficulty complying with SAS due to the huge funding
requirement and the short period of completion. Half of the new carriers
were not able to meet their obligations. The target of 87 percent coverage
by 1998 was not met. As of December 2000, only 2.8 million of the total
6.8 million available lines have been subscribed, which stood at 4.26 million
in 2001. In 2001-2003, total subscribed lines still stood at 50 percent of
the total lines installed. The number of subscribed lines in December 2002
was 3.310 million, a drop from the previous year’s 3.315 million.
Distribution of the facility was ill-managed with overprovisioning
happening in urban areas. Telecom services are concentrated in the National
Capital Region (NCR) and the urban centers of Region 4, comprising 65
percent of all phone lines installed from 2001 to 2003 (NEDA 2001). To
rectify the shortcoming of SAS, the DOTC is currently intensifying its
efforts to set up Community e-Telecenters to areas where people cannot
afford to subscribe for a telephone line.
On February 20, 1995, President Ramos enacted Republic Act 7925,

the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines (supported
by NTC Memorandum Circular 8-9-95 as IRR), to further liberalize the
industry. The Act, however, appeared to be a countermeasure against the
Ramos administration’s preliminary initiatives. It contains provisions that
undermine the reforms initiated by EO 59 and EO 109. The reduction of
“rollout” period to three years from the original five years made it more
difficult for the new players to raise capital and meet their commitments.
RA 7925 also mandates for the principle of mutual agreement about the
interconnection and tariff rates among the concerned parties. This reduced
the role of NTC as a market regulator. This provision means that the nine
companies installing landlines in eleven service areas would have to forge
agreements with the other eight, with state intervention as a last resort. It
was later confirmed that the presence of more players did not ensure the
attainment of universal access due to interconnection disputes between
and among telecom carriers. PLDT has been accused, time and again, of
deliberately delaying interconnection. The common trend was that
nondominant carriers were compelled to interconnect with the dominant
carrier owing to the latter’s wide base of subscribers. The dominant carrier
was not always willing to interconnect unless its conditions are met. The
mantra of the major telcos is that small carriers tend to “piggyback” on its
facilities and wider network.
State and Civil-Society Actors

Globalization engenders new challenges that could impinge on the
normal functioning of states. Some scholars even claimed their “end and/
or retreat” mainly because they have lost their role as a fiscalizer and regulator
of the market (Ohmae 1994; Strange 1996). This study takes the contrary
position by viewing the state as a significant actor in a liberalized market.
For one, the entry of more telecom players elicits a more widespread
involvement of states to monitor and resolve market issues. State regulation
is imperative during a transition from a monopolistic market into a
competitive one. The great challenge, however, is how to put in place
adequate regulatory framework that will ensure industry growth as well as

protect consumer welfare (Aldaba 2000; Lee 2002, 1). The state’s domestic
capability is a good yardstick to determine its strength or weakness. A
strong state can “penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract
resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways” (Migdal
1987). It can insulate itself from external forces that may affect the
implementation of coherent and effective policies. The character of the
regulatory agency that exists has a major influence on the state-civil society
relations. The succeeding discussions describe the strengths and limitations
of the NTC in managing the market and how these shape the interaction
of industry actors.
The Weak (Regulatory) State
The NTC as a regulatory body suffers from a split character. On one

hand, it exhibits a proactive role in resolving market issues. On the other
hand, it falls short of its expected role as a regulator. The NTC’s strength
can be seen in its effort to implement measures to combat mobile text
frauds,6 which according to the Anti-Money Laundering task force, have
ripped about PHP 5 million from the victims in 2003 (Today, April 16,
2004). In October 2004, NTC instructed all mobile phone service centers
engaged in the repair, servicing, or maintenance of mobile phone units to
register their businesses and acquire a permit from the office (MC 08-08-
2004A). This is to control the proliferation of illegal repair shops where
cloning of SIM cards and altering of fifteen-digit International Mobile
Equipment Identifiers (IMEI) of mobile phones are being performed. Due
to numerous complaints, the NTC released a memorandum on March
16, 2005, regulating unsolicited commercial text messages (Today, January
19, 2005). It mandates that “commercial and promotional advertisements
and other broadcast or push messages shall be sent only to subscribers who
have prior consent or have specifically opted-in to receive said messages.”
The government desires to sustain growth by creating a competitive,
private-sector-driven telecom industry. Although the NTC was vested by
RA 7925 with broad regulatory powers— facilitate the entry of qualified
service providers; assure the quality, safety, reliability, security, compatibility,

and interoperability of telecom facilities and services; mandate a fair and
reasonable interconnection of services; protect other telecom entities and
the public from unfair trade practices; promote consumer welfare; manage
radio and television broadcasting, particularly licensing and spectrum
usage—they were counterbalanced by the agency’s four major limitations.
These handicaps are laid down in a consultative document released by the
commission on December 16, 2005 (NTC 2005, 22-27). These constraints
concern meager resources, legacy of past lapses, limited regulatory powers,
and asymmetry of information between the NTC and the regulatees. First,
the NTC executives reasoned out that regulatory oversight requires a
considerable number of professional staff, modern equipment, and adequate
information database which the NTC has yet to achieve. The commission
solely depends on the annual appropriations approved by the Congress.
The performance of the agency has been hampered by past regulatory
lapses and policy flaws. The Consultative Paper admits that “[i]n the past,
the Commission has taken a mediatory stance on most issues brought to
its attention. Some stakeholders have viewed such response as inadequate
from a regulator whom they expect to check against abuses of market power”
(NTC 2005, 23). The NTC must be fashioned as an effective and genuinely
independent regulatory body. It remained practically “toothless” all
throughout the Marcos and Aquino years (Coronel 1998, 124-25). It
continues to be affected by partisan politics. At present, the term of
appointment of commissioners depends on the confidence of the president
of the country. The Congress can also determine its annual budget
appropriations (Esfahani 1994). Influence-peddling and rent-seeking
activities become a serious problem especially in securing a legislative
franchise. In fact, the country has been falling short of the WTO
requirements as written in its Telecommunications Regulatory Reference
Paper. The document calls for transparency of the franchising process by
setting a maximum time required to reach a decision (sections 2.1 and
2.2) and providing information on the process to the public (sections 2.3
and 2.4). Although the Arroyo administration’s Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan (MTPDP) for 2004-2010 calls for the fixing of the
term of commission members to “insulate them from political and other
outside pressures” (NEDA 2004, 21), there are still no measures
implemented toward this goal.
Previous issuances and statutory powers of the NTC are now seen as
limited and outdated in the face of the advancement of information and
communication technologies (ICTs) and recent industry developments.
The lack of technology-specific rules often frustrates the government’s desire
to promote competition and level the playing field. The narrow and
prescriptive policies that guide the industry must be reviewed to cope with
the advancement in ICTs (i.e., VoIP, Wi-Fi/Max) and adapt to current
market realities. Often, the agency’s “wait-and-see” disposition in resolving
market conflicts can be ascribed to the lack of implementing guidelines
and policies. What was considered as a value-added service (VAS)7 fifteen
years ago is now considered either as a basic telecommunication service or
a dead technology (i.e., pagers). One big step to this end is to amend RA
7925 and review the National Telecommunications Development Plan
(NTDP) that DOTC created in 1990 for them to provide a fresh vision
for the industry. Drafting a regulatory framework for ICT-enabled industries
could resolve the current technological dilemmas. At present, there is no
government agency that regulates the Internet, particularly its contents
(e.g., pornography, gambling, sale of illegal firearms and drugs, and terrorist
activities). As such, President Arroyo’s issuance of EO 269 creating the
Commission on Information and Communication Technology is a good
development. Another obstacle concerns NTC’s lack of pertinent
information on the operations of the industry players. The dependence of
the agency mostly on the information being supplied by the regulatees
brings serious issues because not all of them comply with reportorial
obligations. At present, the agency does not have a database system of
industry trends and reports that would facilitate decision making.
The operation of the Web-based texting-service company Chikka Asia
Inc. was questioned by the NTC because of its provision of cheaper texting
services for the public. The company’s website, www.chikka.com, has
become popular among mobile phone subscribers who have access to

personal computers. Chikka offers computer software that can be
downloaded from its website. This can enable a mobile phone subscriber
to send text messages from the Web for free instead of paying the usual
PHP 1.00. However, a PHP 2.50 charge will be deducted from the mobile
phone credits of the person who “text back” through the chikka network.
The NTC released a memorandum on February 9, 2005, stating that the
company has been illegally operating as a VAS provider because of its
failure to register with the agency since its operations in 2002 (Bautista
2005). The commission, however, cannot provide sanctions to the operators
of the website because RA 7925 does not provide sanctions for VAS
violators. If a company does not register as VAS provider, the NTC cannot
run after the business entity directly, but only indirectly by ordering the
Public Telecommunication Entities (PTEs) to assist the agency in halting
the company’s financial collection (Disini 2005). To discipline a VAS
provider violator, the NTC can only order the telcos to stop charging
subscribers who receive messages from Chikka. It still needs to coordinate
with the concerned PTEs to enforce its regulatory powers.
To achieve viable competition, the NTC must ensure that other small
players must also have a good share of the market. Market competition
problems could be minimized if Congress could come up with general
market competition laws (e.g., anti-trust laws) that will provide clear rules
for the industry and establish a competition oversight office. Although
several RA 7925 provisions and executive orders were passed calling for
the compulsory interconnection among telcos, they were not entirely
implemented due to the NTC’s oversight and lack of guidelines (Fajardo
1999, 3).8 Assuming a proactive regulatory stance on competition issues is
imperative in this regard. Although the NTC can compel the two networks
to restore linkup, there were no specific rules and sanctions on the unilateral
moves of some carriers to disconnect other players from their networks.
Deadlock in negotiations or noncompliance would constrain the NTC to
take appropriate actions. One interconnection crisis took its toll in 1999
when Globe Telecom’s 850,000 subscribers were not able to connect to the
1.7 million fixed lines of PLDT, and vice versa. The dispute was highlighted
by the unilateral move by BayanTel to cut off 200,000 of its subscribers
from Smart. This was followed by the disconnection of Globe Handyphone
subscribers from PLDT networks. PLDT argued that it was due to
computer glitch while Globe ascribed the incident to sabotage. Islacom
also complained of its interconnection problems with the IGFs of PLDT
despite the former’s repeated requests for linkup. President Joseph Estrada
needed to summon the telco executives in November 16, 1999, to an
emergency meeting to resolve the interconnection mess.
Status of the Civil Society
This paper takes a non-statist “inclusionary” view of civil society as a

“public sphere where autonomous groups and individuals interact with
each other on matters of collective concern” (Ferrer 1997, 13). This paper
has identified major civil society organizations that have been engaging
the state concerning industry issues (table 4).
Apparently, mass-based civil-society groups can be described as
spontaneous, temporary, and exhibiting power only during certain periods
(Kim 2003,122). They merely provide a backdrop of the political process
between the political and business interest groups. When RA 7925 was
being deliberated in Congress, no social movement organized against the
Act’s contentious provisions. It needed the initiative of the Ramos
administration for the social sector to be mobilized, mainly to provide
legitimate support for the state’s liberalization agenda (Coronel 1998).9
Since telecommunications issues are nontraditional areas of engagement,
there is a dearth of social movements active in the industry.
Philippine League for Democratic Telecommunications (PLDTi)
President Jonathan Domingo explained that the weak social movement is
a function of the nature of issues emerging and being discussed in the
sector. Telecom concerns have not been priorities of ordinary Filipinos
since there are more basic and immediate issues that they have to deal with
(e.g., food, shelter). Telecommunication services are perceived as means
and not an end. Further, matters concerning telephone pricing, Internet,
Table 4. Civil-society groups in the telecommunications industry

Type of civil-cociety group Organization
Consumer advocacy groups 1. Philippine League for Democratic

Telecommunications, Inc. (PLDTi)
2. TxtPower
Research advocacy organization Foundation for Media Alternatives (FMA)
Business groups/stakeholders 1. Philippine Association of Private

Telecommunications Companies (PAPTELCO)
2. Philippine Cable Television Association (PCTA)
3. Philippine Chamber of Telecommunication
Operators Inc. (PCTO)
4. Philippine Electronics and Telecommunications
Federation (PETEF)
5. Philippine Internet Services Organization (PISO)
6. Telecommunications Users’ Group of the
Philippines (TUGP)
Wi-Fi, and online privacy are considered highly technical matters that
ordinary people cannot easily appreciate. Sensitive social and political issues
are often the ones that reach the congressional halls, press rooms, and the
attention of the public. The mobile phone text-tax issue reached its height
because texting has been increasingly regarded as a basic necessity among
ordinary Filipinos, especially in the National Capital Region.
The expected prime mover and forerunner of CSOs in the industry—
the consumer movement—is either lethargic or nonexistent. History is
summoned to show that there are no strong and sustainable consumer
groups in the country. Emerging organizations have been sector- and
product-specific, which could best explain the fragmented nature of mass
actions. The issue of increasing oil prices should have been a concern by
ordinary consumers, but transportation groups and labor unions have been
the ones that seize the issue by default. Further, consumer groups
disintegrate whenever companies pay off and/or pacify erring complainants.
Rep. Gilbert Remulla (second district, Cavite) (2004) perceives the
deficiency in consumer groups as unfavorable to any legislation that aims
to protect telecom consumers. In the Thirteenth Congress, he filed House
Bill 2452, entitled “Truth in Mobile Telephone Billing Act,” requiring the
six-pulse rate and billing per-second breakdown of the call usage of mobile
phone subscribers seven days after the expiration or consumption of their
prepaid cards. In August 24, 2004, a press conference on the proposal was
covered by the broadcast media but it was not recognized in the print
media. Remulla attributed the incident to the economic influence of telcos,
which he described as the largest advertising customers of broadsheets and
tabloids. Another problem is the absence of a critical mass that could rally
behind his proposal. He asserted, “There are no big consumer groups and
you don’t see them massing on the street rallying. You can only see them in
the media saying to boycott for one day and that’s all.”
The Philippine League for Democratic Telecommunications Inc. is a
consumer advocacy group that emerged as a response to the PLDT metering
proposal and rate balancing in early 1999. PLDTi vehemently opposed
the measure and argued that telephone metering should be merely optional,
alongside the current flat-rate system, if ever it is to be allowed. To
demonopolize the industry, the organization once proposed that the
government must consider breaking the PLDT into its component services
as well as into several regional companies, just like what the US did with
the AT&T. Dividing the industry behemoth could provide a level playing
field to all market players. When the metering issue subsided, PLDTi
continued its function as an industry watchdog. The organization, along
with four other individuals, filed a case in 2001 against the telcos concerning
the reduction of free texts in prepaid cards. Although a Quezon City
Regional Trial Court judge dismissed the complaint on September 14,
2001, saying that it has no jurisdiction over the case, the drastic text-
reduction plan failed. The NTC earlier said that text is a value-added service,
hence deregulated.
The Foundation for Media Alternatives (FMA), a research-based

organization, contributes to the development of scholarship on ICT
for development in the country. As the sole research organization in
the country focusing on ICT issues, FMA concentrates “on continuous
theorizing and paradigm-building in relation to issues and concerns
surrounding the emerging Information Society, by systematically
gathering data for public dissemination and for the use of other ICT
for development stakeholders”. FMA finished in 2003 a baseline survey
on ICT use of the country’s nongovernment organizations. As an
advocacy group, FMA actively participates in national and international
ICT policy development processes. It represents the civil society sector
in the Commission on Information and Communication Technology.
The organization takes a lead role in representing the network of Asian
civil society organizations to the World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS) held in Geneva in 2003 and Tunis in 2005.
Supplementing the lack and inactivity of civil society organizations in
the sector, private business organizations (PBOs) and associations fill in
the gap. They actively interact with the government in matters directly
affecting the industry. Market players often voice their concerns as part of
a bigger organization and/or coalition. Since the Marcos administration,
PBOs have been considered as valuable partners and stakeholders to the
country’s overall development (Tigno 2004, 44). They are dynamic actors
of civil society, although there is lingering doubt on the level of their social
consciousness. The typical view is that they have been unaccountable,
exploitative, socially irresponsible, mainly driven by profit, and are alien
to prevailing social realities (de Castro 1997, 221-42). These qualities
contradict the major purposes of civil society organizations—to promote
public good and benefit the society in which they function (Milner 2001,
30; O’Connel 2000, 471-78). Sectoral business organizations, nonetheless,
can give voice to their constituents. They can serve as political brokers that
can influence state policies in the public interest (Fukuyama 1995, 1; Shills
1991, 3).
State-Civil Society Interaction: Case Studies

In a liberalized industry, the state must ensure that free-market
principles work properly and protect the public from any arbitrary behavior
of industry actors. Unfortunately, neither state institutions nor market
forces can guarantee that it can uphold public interests. This is the reason
social and business sector groups emerge to serve as countervailing forces
against the excesses of the state and the abuses of other market players. The
following are empirical descriptions of the strategies of civil-society groups
in engaging the state and the outcomes of the process. Outcomes are
measured in terms of the state’s response to civil society’s demands and
agenda. Two groups are selected as case studies: TxtPower on its crusade to
protect the welfare of mobile phone subscribers and the Philippine Internet
Services Organization on its struggle for a deregulated VoIP that will offer
an alternative and cheaper telephone voice service for the public.
Txtpower and Mobile Phone Issues
TxtPower is one of the organizations that actively participated in

toppling the Estrada administration during the EDSA 2 Revolution. It is
a loose organization of different progressive organizations, mostly led by
youth leaders and middle-class professionals. The group was founded on
August 27, 2001, when Smart and Globe abruptly reduced their free-text
allocations for prepaid subscribers without due consultation with the
consuming public. The group believes that Short Message System (SMS)
should be considered as a built-in feature of cellular phones thus should
not be charged with extra costs (TxtPower 2004b). The group’s actions
achieved partial success after delaying the plan of Smart and Globe to
reduce free text. Globe continues to provide a minimum of thirty-five text
messages for every PHP 300 prepaid load while Smart cut down its free
text by 33 percent.
As of January 2006, the active convenors of the organization include
Anthony Ian Cruz, a net-activist; Giovanni Tapang, chairperson of the
scientists’ group Agham (Advocates of Science and Technology for the
People), and a physics professor at the University of the Philippines;
Raymond Palatino, vice president of the Anak ng Bayan Youth Party; Emil
Cinco, leading member of the Computer Professionals Union (CPU); Trixie
Concepcion, Philippine coordinator of the Earth Island Institute and
Agham secretary-general; Gerry Kaimo, net-activist and webmaster of
PLDT.com; Atom Araullo, media personality and student leader; and
Ederic Eder, editor of youth e-zine Tinig.com. Past convenors include UP
professors Tonchi Tinio and Roland Tolentino, triathlete Sandra Araullo,
campus journalists Len Olea and Rey Asis, and visual artist Emil Mercado.
TxtPower considers itself as the first consumer group that represented the
cause of mobile phone users. Affiliated groups include Agham, Gabriela,
Anak ng Bayan, Computer Professionals Union (CPU), Migrante, College
Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP), National Union of Students of
the Philippines (NUSP), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, among others.
When President Arroyo signified her intention to impose taxes on text
messaging in her 2004 State of the Nation Address (SONA), TxtPower
immediately responded by holding a media event titled “P1 Billion Fun
Run” on August 1, 2004, at the controversial President Diosdado Macapagal
Avenue10 as a symbolic act of protest against text tax and government
corruption. The campaign was supported by Overseas Filipino Workers’
Laban sa TextTax (OFWLaST), arguing that the tax on text messages will
certainly have adverse social effects on them. Many OFWs have been using
SMS to get in touch with their children, husbands, wives, and relatives in
the country. A week after, a text protest barrage was performed calling for
all text users to relay the following message after receiving:
Txtrs, REVOLT! B part of history, join 2day’s cyber-rally. Snd NO 2 TXT-
TAX 2 d ofc of speakr JdV 0917-8101226! Join TxtPower piket @ 2pm
outsyd congrs. Pls pas. (Texters, Revolt! Be part of history. Join today’s cyber-
rally. Send NO to Text Tax to the office of Speaker JDV [Jose De Venecia],
0917-8101226! Join TxtPower picket at 2 p.m. outside Congress. Please
pass.)
Afterward, House Speaker Jose de Venecia issued a statement that he

will oppose any kind of tax on text (Albano 2004). President Arroyo
affirmed the speaker’s position when she released a statement supporting

TxtPower’s call to junk text cuts and review the telecom deregulation policy.
TxtPower enlisted the support of House party list Bayan Muna,
particularly Rep. Teodoro Casiño who also leads the Alliance of Legislators
against Regressive Taxes (ALERT), an association of legislators aimed to
stall and destroy plans by the government to impose anti-people regressive
taxes. On October 24, 2004, twenty-seven House of Representatives
members, mainly from the opposition, signed a resolution filed by Sorsogon
Rep. Francis Escudero expressing their collective stance that “there shall
not be a tax measure, bill or enactment that shall be submitted or passed that
will impose the tax on Short Message System (SMS) or ‘text messaging’ during
regular or special sessions of the 13th Congress.” On May 24, 2005,
TxtPower convenors spoke with legislators and submitted to the House
Committee on Information and Communication Technology its position
paper on House Bills (HB) 717, 1485, 2452, 2654, 3407, and 3475, all of
which deal with the protection of the rights of mobile phone subscribers.
The Arroyo administration’s alternative proposal to tax the windfall
profits of telcos (franchise taxes) was perceived by TxtPower as another
“creative way” of Malacañang to increase the cost of mobile communications
(TxtPower 2004a). On March 16, 2005, the group launched the so-called
Second Texters Revolt, a campaign against the VAT law in general and the
telcos franchise tax in particular. All texters were encouraged to at least
bombard Senator Franklin Drilon’s number with the following message:
Pls stop d vat r8 hike. We r watching u n we wil not 4get! Texters n people
r now in revolt! (Please stop the VAT rate hike. We are watching you and
we will not forget! Texters and people are now in revolt!) A “one-minute
ringtone protest barrage” was launched during the rallies at Mendiola Bridge
and the Senate grounds.
Representative Casiño argued that the proposed franchise tax as
embodied in HB 1469 authored by Rep. Eric Singson and HB 1560 by
Rep. Danilo Suarez, as well as the DOF’s own proposal for an excise tax, is
worse than the original text tax proposal because it covers not only texting
but voice calls, multimedia messages, WAP, GPRS, internet services,
landline calls, even radio and television broadcasting. This will be eventually
passed on to all kinds of services provided by telecommunications
companies (Casiño 2004). Major telcos favored more the imposition of
an expanded value-added tax and not a franchise tax or text tax (Reyes
2004).11 After a close-door meeting with telco executives, President Arroyo
was convinced not to impose the franchise tax. Malacañang instead push a
VAT system on telecom providers that will be raised from current 10 percent
to between 12 and 14 percent (Cabacungan and Pablo 2004).
TxtPower confronted other burning concerns. It initiated debates and
mass actions on the issues of 1) drop calls (i.e., some subscribers being
charged with calls they were not able to make), 2) the limited period
imposed by telcos for the use of prepaid load credits (i.e., Smart and Globe
prepaid credits must be consumed three months starting the day it is
loaded), and the 3) subscriber identity modules (SIM) card listing proposal
of Rep. Joseph Santiago (National People’s Coalition–Catanduanes) during
the Twelfth Congress. While the SIM card listing proposal was watered
down by the lawmakers when it was first deliberated in the House
Committee on Human Rights, judging the measure as impractical,
unrealistic, and unachievable, the other issues are currently being deliberated
in the House Committees on Information and Communication Technology
and Trade and Industry.
The government provided several avenues to accommodate the group,
but not all of them have been useful. Convenors were invited to committee
hearings, formal dialogues with legislators, and government-sponsored fora
but they had modest success in achieving their targets through these avenues.
The group explained that agency executives offered delayed responses to
the recommendations they laid down, not to mention some policy
digressions politicians commit in the actual policy drafting and
implementation. But as far as the convenors are concerned, the biggest
stumbling block to their mission is the state’s refusal to recognize the rights
of consumers due to its flawed policies of deregulation, privatization, and
liberalization. Hence, the organization sees itself as having virtually no
power, no recourse in the law. One of the convenors lamented that if they
would file a case against a government agency, they would not surely win
it because the government has hands-off policy even on issues of consumer
rights. More so, there are no institutional mechanisms to protect the
consumers. Any interaction with government will prove useless in the
process. Overall, the organization calls for the repeal of the law deregulating
the telecommunications industry, which it calls as anathema to people’s
welfare.
The lack of resources and formal organizational hierarchy, although
not vital problems, still hampers the expansion of the organization.
Problems arose when convenors have prior campaign schedules, making
the all-present representation in mass action almost impossible. Nonetheless,
TxtPower’s loose organizational setup is advantageous. It enables quick
decision-making, action, and consensus in the group. The broad and
multisectoral composition of the coalition facilitates the easy recognition
by the government of its presence and campaigns. Intra-organizational
linkages offer logistical assistance among members of the network, which
come in the form of meeting venues, studies, focus group discussions, and
launching of mass actions and campaigns. The group is looking forward
to wider memberships in the next few years. A wider and bigger network
can make TxtPower’s operations more comprehensive and responsive to
the clamor of the mobile phone users even outside the National Capital
Region. It has already established chapters in major cities of the country
and one in Hong Kong.
Public campaigns using text, Internet, and the broadcast media are
considered the most effective means to contest state policies and solicit
support from the public. The mass media was used to popularize the issue
and inform the people of their communication rights. As people became
more aware of the issue, they started to air their discontent with the
government’s lack of protection for consumers. Hence, protest rallies of
TxtPower against “text tax” received overwhelming support from mobile
phone subscribers. In addition, the Internet is being maximized to propagate
campaign text messages through e-mails and e-groups within a relatively
short period. The group is being technically supported by the Computer
Professionals Union and Agham in hosting its websites: http://txtpower.cp-

union.org and www.txpower.org.
PISO and the VoIP Question

VoIP
Recent developments in Internet technology have made Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoIP) a promising alternative to more expensive
telephone calls. Simply put, VoIP is a technology that allows transmission
of data and voice using an Internet protocol without having to pass through
part or all of the facilities of Public Telecommunication Entities. A
specialized form of VoIP is called Internet telephony in which a regular
voice telephone call is transmitted via the public Internet, thus bypassing
all or part of public switched telephone network (PSTN); hence the cheaper
rates for its service. Many have discovered Skype, which offers downloadable
software from its website to make VoIP calls. All calls made through the
website are free, while those made by nonsubscribers can be as low as USD
0.03 a minute. It can occur between computers, between a computer and
a phone, and between phones (NTC 2004, 3-4). PLDT subsidiary Netvoice
Operations Manager Joseph Concio (2004) revealed that telcos have been
using the technology since early 1990s. Long-distance calls by the company
are partly, if not entirely being done through the VoIP system.
The Internet service provider (ISP) Mosaic Communications
(MosCom) president, William Torres (2004), explained that the history
of the VoIP issue commenced between 2000 and 2001 when US-based
VoIP providers started to charge fees for the formerly free technology.
Developments in the US and other countries in classifying the VoIP have
been monitored by the NTC. They coincided with the campaign of the
now-defunct Information Technology and Electronic Commerce Council
(ITECC) to lower the cost of outgoing calls from the Philippines to US
cities. It was initiated by then Trade and Industry Secretary Mar Roxas
who reinvigorated the call center industry in the National Capital Region.
In November 2003, the Department of Transportation and
Communications granted the telcos the exclusive right to offer VoIP services
as provided by RA 7925. The Act classifies Internet service providers (ISPs)
as value-added-service providers. Hence, they must first seek a legislative

franchise from Congress (which is a law) and appropriate certification and
permits from the NTC before they can offer the VoIP technology. They
shall be allowed to “competitively offer their services and/or expertise, and
lease or rent telecommunications equipment and facilities necessary to
provide such specialized services, in the domestic and/or international
market in accordance with network compatibility.” This was affirmed by
NTC draft memorandum released in January 2004 stating that only “public
telecommunications entities (PTEs) may offer voice over internet protocol
(VoIP) for compensation.” The draft, prepared during the term of NTC
Commissioner Armi Jane Borje stirred up serious scrutiny and comments
especially from VAS providers. Five months later, the memorandum was
discarded when the agency released a more comprehensive discussion paper
on July 23, 2004, presenting the nature and scope of the VoIP technology.
The first public hearing was held at the NTC office in November 2004,
which was attended by representatives of major telcos, ISPs, and individual
stakeholders. Noticeably, the meeting was filled by telcos’ legal experts
while small consumer groups were not represented. Congressional hearings
on the issue were started earlier in March 2005 in the House Committee
on Information Technology headed by Cebu Representative and former
NTC Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. Representative Clavel Martinez
submitted to the committee HB 3476 entitled “The Philippine VoIP Act
of 2005,” first read on December 15, 2004.
PISO vs. Telcos
The Philippine Internet Services Organization was established in 1996

and comprised of Internet access providers and businesses engaged in
Internet-related services such as web design, domain registration, and
wireless and software development. The organization include Brochiere
Online, Compass Internet, Convergence Solutions (CSI), Easy Call
Philippines, Email Company (EMC), Evoserve, Imperium Technologies,
Infocom Technologies, InfoBahn, MailStation, Mindgate Systems, Virtual
Asia, WebLinq, WebPhilippines, Pacific Internet, Philippines Online
(Philonline), Weblink Philippines (WebPhil), Tridel technologies (I-

Manila), Mosaic Communications (MozCom), and Philippine Network
Foundation (PhNET). As posted on its website, the organization is “engaged
in several advocacy initiatives to help promote the Internet services industry
as well as play an active role in reshaping the local business and regulatory
environment from one that turns a blind eye on monopolistic and anti-
competitive practices to one that encourages entrepreneurship, fair
competition, innovation and cooperation.” Due to industry reconfiguration
and competition, membership decreased to twenty-one. Many of the
original members either merged with other ISPs or lost their market share
and went bankrupt.
PISO first gained the attention of industry players when it collided
with PLDT in early 2000 concerning the increased pricing of E1R2 leased
lines by PLDT.12 The group saw the measure as the grand strategy of PLDT
to increase the raw cost of ISPs and monopolize even the value-added
services industry (Tabingo and Casiraya 2004). PLDT’s MyDSL service
was originally priced at PHP 2,500 and can only be offered through the
telcos’ own brand or its affiliated ISP. However, ISPs cannot compete with
the pricing because their raw and resale value of the service is already at
PHP 2,700. “PISO ISPs do not offer MyDSL because the terms are not
good. The system is designed [so] that we have become just a reseller,”
PISO Director Jayson Yu (2004) said in an interview.
The group was also dismayed over the NTC’s ruling on the Wi-Fi
issue. The group argued that the initiative to regulate the Industrial,
Scientific and Medical (ISM) frequencies (e.g., 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz) goes
against the International Telecommunications Union’s ruling that they are
“unregulated frequencies” to be available for public and private use without
the need for government regulation and franchises. The Wi-Fi technology
should be “practically free,” especially on hot-spots area (but regulating
the maximum power of the base device), the local area network, and the
campus area network, which operate wireless technology.
On the issue of the VoIP, PISO maintained that it should be considered
as a value-added service and not as a normal telecommunication voice
service. There is consensus among ISPs and similar business groups that
preventing the growth of the VoIP industry is detrimental to the public
who should reap the benefits of emerging technologies. J.J. Disini (2005)
of the UP College of Law wrote that any failure to deregulate the technology
would provide opportunities for foreign players to dominate the industry.
Further, local business entities and players must be given an opportunity
to use the technology in minimizing the costs of their operations.
Telcos were silent on the VoIP issue when it first surfaced in 2001.
When ISPs started to assert their collective position, the telcos commenced
their fight mostly by hurling legal arguments at the NTC and the VAS
providers. Local telcos are understandably anxious that VoIP technology
could render their usual circuit-switching networks obsolete. PLDT, for
instance, has launched in early 2005 its PHP 10 unlimited calling (landline
to mobile phone and vice versa) to maximize the use of its switching
networks. Although majority of telcos support the classification of VoIP as
a telecommunication service, they have variegated ways of justifying the
argument. In a forum organized by the Telecommunication Users Group
of the Philippines (TUGP) on March 31, 2004, at Mandarin Hotel, Makati
City, May Sto. Domingo, Philcom assitant vice president for business
solutions, said that VoIP is already in itself an “opportunity to bring back
what revenues are currently being lost by telcos because of the emerging
technology.”
The Philippine Chamber of Telecommunication Operators Inc.
(PCTO)—composed of BayanTel, Capwire, Digitel, Extelcom, Globetel,
Innove, PAPTELCO, Piltel, PHILCOM, PLDT, SMART, and TTPI—
contends that any process that relays and receives voice is a
telecommunication service irrelevant of the means it is being transmitted.
Although VoIP is a mix of voice and data technologies, the application is
still voice in nature. PLDT submitted a separate position paper saying
that the VoIP has always been a telecommunication service, citing the
1995 landmark case between PLDT and NTC–Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines Inc. Bell Telecoms supports this position
saying that only telcos must be allowed to offer VoIP to the public. In a
statement made by Edgardo Reyes, chairman and CEO of the company,

he explained that LEC services are still the most expensive part of telcos’
operation; hence the need to first recover the investments of telcos in putting
up their facilities. This cannot happen when VAS providers and ISPs will
compete in the process. Eastern Telecoms offered a compromise. It stated
that operators should be allowed to offer VoIP to the public for
compensation, provided that they will only be agents or resellers of telcos’
services.
Meanwhile, the Philippine Electronics and Telecommunications
Federation (PETEF), an organization of industry suppliers, proposed a
slow but sure approach. Government should create a transition program
before implementing a full-blast policy on VoIP. PETEF particularly
recommends the categorization of Internet data applications as either
regulated or nonregulated. The group is cautious in endorsing the full
deregulation of the technology because it foresees that only the big telcos
will reap the benefits of liberalization. Likewise, ISP Global Reach ebusiness
agrees to the statement that regulation will scare investment in VoIP
business. Any regulation, according to the company, “must be for the
purpose of effectively supporting the needs of the public and the
consumers.” Veering away from the debate, the Philippine Cable Television
Association (PCTA), an organization of companies serving 90 percent of
local cable subscribers, stated that VoIP should be classified as a unique
technology. In a similar vein, the Telecommunications Users Group of the
Philippines (TUGP)—composed of big companies such as ABS-CBN,
San Miguel Corporation, and major banks in the country—contends the
technology should be treated neither as a traditional voice nor as a data
service.
Under the leadership of Commissioner Ronald Solis, the NTC has
been projecting itself as a democratic institution that strives to provide a
tripartite solution which will be fair and just for the ISPs, telcos, and the
larger public. BayanTel’s VoIP Service Manager Theopatrick Ferrer (2004)
shares this observation, saying that the current NTC leadership is more
responsive to the concerns of telcos compared with previous
administrations. On March 30, 2005, the NTC released a draft

memorandum classifying VoIP as a VAS. It states that the VoIP is primarily
an enhanced telecommunication service provided by telcos (NTC 2004,
4-6). After substantial consultations, the agency finally ruled out on August
16, 2005, that VoIP is a value-added service. NTC Deputy Commissioner
Jorge Sarmiento asserted that VoIP was classified as a VAS in the spirit of
RA 7925. Sarmiento explained that the law has become outdated and
must be amended. The move was also premised on the fact that different
countries have been pressuring the country’s technology executives to classify
VoIP as a VAS, the most prominent of which is the US-based
communications service giant AT&T Corp. Earlier, then-NEDA Secretary
Romulo Neri (2004) revealed that the push for a liberalized VoIP is
integrated in the “microeconomic thrusts” of the Arroyo administrations’
Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan for 2004-2010. Many
industry players, including PISO, have lauded the NTC’s rules, effectively
favoring the deregulation of the budding VoIP sector.
Conclusion
This paper presented an empirically-grounded analysis of state-civil
society relations in the telecommunications industry. One prominent
observation is that liberalization has a direct impact on the way civil society
engages the state and the market actors. State’s weaknesses to effectively
control the market pose serious challenges to CSOs. This means that they
do not only have to engage the government (to rectify its shortcomings
and failures) but also have to contend with industry players, which have
more resources and political clout. The weak force of mass-based civil-
society groups can be gleaned from their inability to participate in important
fora and debates. With the lack of representation, state agencies obtain
only the opinions and demands of dominant market groups. This explains
why the business sector groups influence more policy outcomes.
Both TxtPower and PISO utilized formal and informal means of
intervention. To some extent, their perception of the state determined the
strategies they utilized. Confrontation defined the relationship between
the state and TxtPower because of the latter’s negative perception of the
former as the protector of the interest of the dominant, elite class. TxtPower
recognizes its limitation in influencing the government’s deregulation
policies. In fact, it sees itself as virtually having no power in the context of
a deregulated telecommunications industry. Resorting to indirect, informal
intervention like mass actions is deemed more effective in gaining political
support. Political leaders are often enticed to support advocacies that evoke
wide public support. Street protests, petition signing, mass education in
fora and seminars, public consultation talks, media press conferences, and
networking with legislators are essential in achieving this end. On the
opposite, cooperation characterizes the interaction among the ISPs, telcos,
and NTC officials in resolving the VoIP question. This can be attributed
to the common goal of the government and industry stakeholders to end
the legal impasse that has hampered the development of the VoIP
technology for more than a decade. Stakeholders, especially the telcos,
actively participated in public consultations with the view of influencing
the NTC’s ruling on the issue.
Discerning the right venue of engagement is crucial in the success of
any campaign. TxtPower first organized the public for a concerted action.
This was facilitated by forging alliances with various groups in different
sectors. Upon having the critical mass of supporters, TxtPower began to
lobby politicians and policymakers in Congress. Simultaneous actions to
mobilize the public through massive education and active engagement of
the state provided more impetus for ongoing campaigns. In the same
manner, PISO constantly participated in public discussions and fora
initiated by the NTC and industry organizations.
The two case studies have shown how internal and external resources
could produce successful state-civil society engagement. PISO’s technical
know-how helped justify the VAS nature of the VoIP technology and
debunk the legal arguments of the telcos. TxtPower, with the support of
the Computer Professionals Union (CPU) and other like-minded
organizations, maximized the use of the Internet to disseminate information
and expand the reach of its campaigns. TxtPower did not find it difficult
to organize campaigns because its coalition members already have their

own constituents to be mobilized. Both organizations maintain a wide
range of membership where they can extract resources. External
opportunities facilitate the effectiveness of the two groups especially in
maximizing state institutional openings for policy influence. The NTC
under Commissioner Solis has shown deep interest in democratizing the
policy making process by holding numerous consultations on important
industry concerns. TxtPower benefited from having political allies in the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Attendant events provided for
the immediate response of the government. Malacañang was compelled to
pull out the plan to tax the SMS technology because it created significant
political pressure on the president. Support from the public was easily
gained because of the widespread use of mobile phones. The prevailing
notion is that imposing a tax on what has already been considered as a
basic necessity must be blocked. Similarly, the NTC took a proactive role
in resolving the VoIP question because of the mounting pressure from
industry players to end the legal dilemma. There was a growing recognition
that VoIP could offer an alternative means to cut the cost of doing business
in the country, as expressed by exporters, ISPs, and other market players.
Debates on the VoIP issue also coincided with the Arroyo government’s
plan to liberalize the industry more as written in the Medium-Term
Philippine Development Plan for 2004-2010.
Overall, there is a need for a sustained capacity building of civil
society as a first step in establishing a reform coalition that would not
only be reactive to emerging issues but would also offer long-term and
strategic solutions to major industry concerns. The government must
provide an environment for this initiative to develop. One significant
step is for people’s organizations (POs) and consumer groups to be
represented in advisory councils of regulatory bodies. In this way, CSOs
can intervene in or assist the DOTC, the CICT, the NTC, and other
related agencies in formulating plans that are responsive to the needs
of the public. State-civil society relations can also be strengthened in
the area of technical cooperation. This is to provide government leaders
not only a working knowledge but also a deep appreciation of the

evolving nature of information and communication technologies.
Academic institutions are good venues to initiate policy debates among
the civil society, private sector, and the government. The theoretical
foundations of the telecom reforms discourse must be cultivated to
elevate the consciousness of the public and bring about a comprehensive
telecommunications reform agenda.
Notes
1. Major telcos compete in providing the cheapest service in the market. Digitel
brand SunCellular first offered in 2004 its unlimited call plan (24/7) to Sun-to-
Sun mobile phone numbers. Globe started in March 2005, through its Touch
Mobile brand, its thirty-day promo of unlimited one-month Touch Mobile to
Touch Mobile calls and texts for PHP 300 and PHP 50 for five days of unlimited
text messaging. PLDT’s two wireless units, Smart Communications Inc. and
Pilipino Telephone Corp. (Piltel), launched its unlimited call scheme (dubbed
25/8) in March 2005 to counter SunCellular’s and Innove’s mobile phone
subscription plans.
2. See Pulse/PNA 2005.
3. One major reason is that mobile subscription costs only around PHP 300 a
month through a prepaid card with text messaging service, compared to the
minimum PHP 600 monthly subscription to a fixed telephone. Cellular phone
users also enjoy the luxury of mobility and a personalized number, which they
can change anytime just by purchasing a SIM card.
4. The chairperson of the CICT is part of the DOTC leadership. He/she directly
reports to the president about ICT matters and to the DOTC secretary for his/
her agency responsibilities.
5. PLDT’s predominance can be traced to the adoption of the American colonial
government’s model of natural monopoly. By the virtue of the 1928 Philippine
Legislature Act 3436 passed on November 28, 1928, PLDT was first given a
fifty-year franchise to develop the telecommunications infrastructure of the
country. The franchise was extended until 2028. The Marcos government helped
Ramon Cojuangco, the first PLDT president, and his associates acquire control
over PLDT while the Aquino administration nurtured the company by placing
individuals in the company who could safeguard the interests of the Cojuangco
family.
6. Under the text scam, hoax messages are being sent to the unsuspecting victims
using the name of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and other
institutions advising the victims about winning a huge amount of prize. The
swindlers often instruct their prey that the latter should first deposit a considerable
sum of money to the former’s bank account, allegedly for tax payments and
other fees, as a requirement to getting the prize.
7. VAS is defined as enhanced services beyond those ordinarily provided for by
local exchange operators, inter-exchange operators and overseas carriers, including
Internet services. A VAS provider does not set up its own network and relies
solely on the transmission, switching and local distribution facilities of
enfranchised telephone companies. Hence, it does not need to secure a franchise
in order to operate but only a registration with the NTC (RA 7925, article 1,
section 3h).
8. Interconnection guidelines can be found in 1) RA 7925 (article 2, section 4g;
article 3, section 5c; article 4, sections 8d, 9a, 11b; article 6, section 18), 2) EO
59 (section 56), and 3) EO 109 (article 5, sections 22 and 28).
9. With the help of his topnotch technocrats, former president Ramos utilized the
social sector to further his demonopolization project. They formed the group
MorePhones to assail PLDT’s inefficient service. MorePhones accentuated the
distrust of the people toward the inefficient service of PLDT. The campaign
lasted for about three months and was characterized by anti-PLDT press releases
and numerous fora and press conferences.
10. The road was named after a former Philippine president and father of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The government spent PHP 1 billion to construct the
one-kilometer avenue.
11. Telcos are already paying a 10 percent VAT on all services, 32 percent income
tax, 10 percent overseas communication tax, and other various fees and charges
for licenses to the National Telecommunications Commission.
12. An E1/R2 is a leased line composed of 30 lines that can accommodate 30
simultaneous calls at 56 kilobytes per second (kbps). PISO filed four charges
against PLDT. First, for its unreasonable and discriminatory pricing of E1/R2
lines. Second, for its involvement in predatory pricing in order to eliminate
competition. Third, for its delayed action on the request of PISO on access to its
DSL infrastructure which is tantamount to denial of access. And fourth, for its
denial of access regarding the request of PISO to access its VIBE Service for
domestic dial-up Internet service.
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Conclusion: Palliatives for
“Globalization with a Human Face”
I
n determining whether globalization has indeed brought about positive
or negative outcomes in the concerned industries—vegetable, hog,
garment, and telecommunications—the case studies initially looked
into the state of these industries before trade liberalization.1 The nature of
state-civil society engagement during this period was also examined. Among
those studied, the Philippine vegetable industry, prior to liberalization,
had generally been the most underdeveloped and lacking in government
support, although it had survived as it held a monopoly on its target
domestic market. The situation is different for the garment industry, which
experienced growth in the past three decades on account of the Multi-
Fiber Arrangement (MFA) whose quota system assured local garment
manufacturers overseas markets for their products. Garments became a
major dollar earner for the country through the MFA, even as the industry
benefited from the state’s export-led industrialization policy. Similarly, the
hog industry, though not export-driven, profited much, buoyed by the
Filipinos’ penchant for pork. Though industry players have expressed their
apprehensions regarding the importation—and smuggling—of meat
products, profit from hog raising can still be realized. As for the
telecommunications industry, the absence of market competition before
liberalization had left it in dire straits. The introduction of new players in
197
the market, however, spelled more effectiveness and efficiency, as well as

options for the consumers.
Globalization and the Nature of

State-Civil Society Engagement
The case studies focus on civil society engagement in the vegetable,
garment, and hog industries, which are struggling against the ill effects
of trade liberalization; and the telecommunications industry, which
profited from globalization. Civil society consists of the stakeholders
who are directly affected by the problem and may entirely benefit or
suffer from the outcomes of the engagement in terms of policy response.
Based on the discussion in the introduction, those that can be
categorized as profit civil-society organizations (CSOs) are the farmers’/
peasant organizations in the vegetable industry, and the owners of the
garment factories and their workers. The hog industry has at least seven
major stakeholders; the case study focuses on the hog farmers and the
feed millers, as well as other players outside the hog industry, i.e., the
meat processors, slaughterhouse operators, and the hog and meat
dealers. The telecommunications companies’ (telcos) civil society
includes the Internet service providers (ISPs). The consumers, who
played an important role in the telecommunications industry, may also
be considered part of CSOs.
The nonprofit CSOs in the vegetable industry consisted of political
blocs, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), coalitions, and the
church. These groups not only took on commodity-specific engagement
of the state but also tackled issues concerning agricultural trade
liberalization or even the Philippine economic framework in its
entirety; thus, on some occasions, these groups were actually
advocating for policy reforms that they believe would benefit the entire
agricultural sector and not exclusively the vegetable industry. Global
CSOs, on the other hand, were found in the garment industry as the
workers linked up with global CSOs engaged in protecting workers’
rights.
Conclusion 199
The researches recognized the role of consumer groups in these

industries, but with the exception of the telecommunications sector,
these groups did not figure prominently in the debate on the positive
or negative impact of globalization in relation to the industries being
studied. These include the major consumer groups in the Philippines,
such as the Consumer Union of the Philippines (CUP), one of the
biggest consumer organizations in the country; the Consumers
Federated Groups of the Philippines Inc. (CFGP), a private organization
that works for the welfare and protection of consumers; and the Citizens’
Alliance for Consumer Protection (CACP), which has been part of a
worldwide social movement since its founding days in the late 1970s
(Directory of Consumer Organizations). These consumer groups each
have different advocacies. The CUP, for example, focused on opposition
to electric rates and airline and other transportation fares. It also
campaigned against the importation of sugar and rice, and the need to
test products and assure their quality. The CFGP is mainly concerned
with monitoring prices and quality of prime commodities, and assisting
consumers in seeking redress for their complaints. The CACP, on the
other hand, made its mark in protesting oil price hikes during the
Martial Law period and called for the promotion of locally produced
goods. It was also concerned with exposing questionable goods and
services and opposing institutions that were harmful to consumers
(Directory of Consumer Organizations).
Other consumer groups were established for even more specific
reasons. The Coalition for Consumer Protection and Welfare (formerly
Coalition 349), for instance, was organized as a result of the Pepsi
“Numbers Fever” marketing scandal in 1992, which was characterized
by “changing the rules while the game was being played.” The
Nationwide Association of Consumers Inc. (NACI), on the other hand,
was “born out of the need to protest illegal pyramid schemes” (Directory
of Consumer Organizations). No prominent consumer groups emerged
out of the impact of globalization on the garment, hog, and Benguet
vegetable industries, i.e., for cheaper garments, pork, and vegetables,
respectively. Most probably, the consumers found themselves benefiting
from the cheaper products in these industries, and so, why protest
against trade liberalization?
Before Trade Liberalization:

CSOs’ Bargaining Leverage vis-à-vis the State
For the vegetable and hog industries, trade liberalization began during
the country’s ascension to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) rules
and regulations, which had a direct impact on these two industries.
During the same period, in the Ramos administration, the
telecommunications monopoly was broken up beginning in 1992.
Trade liberalization for the garment industry, on the other hand, began
in the 1970s under Marcos’s martial law regime, when the state pursued
an export-oriented industrialization program under the auspices of the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Therefore, state-
civil society relations in the industry was discussed within the context of
the shift from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, i.e., in 1986. One
may also consider this period as the “pre-neoliberalism” period in the
garment industry, in which the authoritarian state had a heavy hand in
determining the industry’s development thrust. A major question that
emerged during the period was whether the process of democratization
had a distinct impact on state-civil society relations.
The Benguet vegetable farmers before trade liberalization exercised
little political clout to gain state support for their industry despite its
importance to the province’s economy. The weakness in their bargaining
leverage may have stemmed from the lack of demand for vegetables. But
because these farmers enjoyed a sort of market monopoly, there had been
no need for them to engage the state. Also, vegetable farming is a high-risk
enterprise, providing farmers very little incentive. Furthermore, vegetable
is not a political (or major) crop in the Philippines insofar as the number
of farmers, the total area planted/harvested, and its contribution to the
economy (GDP, gross-value added, etc.) are concerned. In the era of
globalization, instead of fighting for government support, the farmers
simply considered alternative means of livelihood.
Conclusion 201
The same cannot be said of the garment and hog industries. As one of
the country’s top dollar earners, the garment industry’s captains enjoyed a
privileged position, particularly with the MFA and the demand for
Philippine exports as facilitated by the boom in garment industries in the
First World. But state-civil society engagement in the garment industry
had differential impact on the stakeholders. That is, the owners/employers
had the bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the state because they were the ones
who profited from the earnings. However, the same could not be said of
the industry’s laborers. As pointed out in the case study, workers have been
exploited not only in terms of low wages but also in terms of inhuman
working conditions. This had been exacerbated by the political dispensation
at the time, i.e., the Martial Law period, in which political and civil rights
were curtailed. Thus, for example, the workers could not strike. Stripped
of their political rights, the workers, like the vegetable farmers, also did
not have the economic clout to engage the state. But unlike the vegetable
farmers, the garment workers benefited from the labor unions, particularly
those organized by the militant Left movement, i.e., those identified with
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which strengthened
particularly during the Martial Law period. The broadening protest
movement against Marcos’s repressive regime provided the workers the
political opportunity to organize and demand for higher wages and better
working conditions. One, therefore, had a situation in which profit CSOs
were allied with nonprofit CSOs. It was unfortunate that, first, the Left
did not organize the workers in a sectoral manner, i.e., attention was given
to the sector in general and not the specific demands of each sector. Second,
workers’ rights were integrated into the overall revolutionary struggle, so
that the Left was more concerned with what the workers’ movements could
contribute to the overthrow of the government and the establishment of a
revolutionary society rather than what kind of reforms could improve the
workers’ conditions. And lastly, even at the height of its organization, only
10 percent of the workers were organized.
The hog industry apparently saw no need to engage the state since it
has always been a profit-making venture. And even if it had to, it had the
economic clout to pursue such an engagement.
As for the telecommunications industry, because of the decades-old

monopoly of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT) Company,
there was also no pressing need to engage the state. This was especially so
when it was taken over by the government during the Martial Law period.
During the Aquino administration, the PLDT was perceived as “protected”
from other sources of competition as then-President Corazon Aquino’s
relatives had interest in the company.
These “pre-trade liberalization”/“pre-neoliberalism” experiences reveal
that in terms of state-civil society engagement, those with economic clout,
such as the garment industry, can engage the state and gain favorable
policies, helped by the world demand for garment exports. On the other
hand, the hog and telecommunications industries found no reason to engage
the state because the former was doing well on account of the domestic
demand, and the latter enjoyed a monopoly.
The garment workers engaged the state through the labor unions, and
the demands were framed not in terms of industry reforms but the need
for radical change in society.
Arguments for or against liberalization
The assessment of the impact of liberalization on the sectors studied

during the globalization period shows similarities and differences in
perspectives. Liberalization’s positive effect is best seen in the
telecommunications industry, which saw new players in the market and
therefore more options for the consumers. Foreign investors forged
partnerships with local companies; more phone lines were installed; and,
since 2000, there has been a phenomenal growth in cellular and mobile
telecommunication services (CMTS). There has also been maximum
utilization of the short message service (SMS) or “texting” in many parts
of the country. Healthy competition among industry players, favoring the
consumers and other local players outside the industry, has also been another
positive impact of globalization.
Liberalization meant something else for the hog industry: cheaper
imports not only of pork but also of other low-priced meat—beef, buffalo
Conclusion 203
meat, and poultry—could bring about a shift in consumption patterns,

thus keeping other local players from having a complete monopoly.
On a wider sphere, globalization has also opened up spaces for
transnational movements to bond for a common cause. For example, the
garment industry has links with local and global networks to uphold
workers’ rights, such as the Clean Clothes Campaign.
Losing out to cheaper imports

One major negative impact for the industries, however, is the loss of
profits for the producers in the vegetable, garment, and hog industries on
account of tariff reduction as directed by the WTO and the government’s
unilateral action.
Impacts differ, however, across the industries, even as their main
concerns have to do with tariff, import, and quota. For example, since the
ratification of the WTO agreement, the Philippines has consistently
imported less pork and poultry meat than what the minimum access volume
(MAV) agreement stipulates. This means that the threat of imports to the
domestic hog industry has not yet fully materialized (Habito 2002).
Despite the closure of several factories because of cheaper imports, the
garment industry continues to be one of the country’s dollar earners.
However, it is heavily dependent on imported raw materials—about 95
percent of its fabric and textile requirements are imported because the
price of local textiles is relatively higher than the prevailing world price.
Also because it is dollar-dependent export, it is vulnerable to fluctuations
in the world market and the protectionist policies of importing countries
like the US and the European community.
Sadly for the Benguet vegetable industry, globalization has driven the
last nail on its coffin.
The class bias

That globalization is favoring the rich is also seen in the experiences
reported in the four case studies. For example, cheap labor and long working
hours characterize the garment industry, in an effort to compete with other
garment-producing countries. This situation is epitomized by the garment

subcontracting industry wherein the workers are not given the opportunity
to unionize. Furthermore, there persists the practice of part-time, temporary,
and casual work. Women, who comprise the majority of the industry’s
workforce, are the biggest victims. Capital for garment industries has moved
to production sites that offer better opportunities for profit accumulation,
i.e., lower wages.
Class bias: An issue of governance or philosophy of development?

At the industry level, the four case studies reveal that the state supports
liberalization in industries where the players are “weak,” as in the vegetable
and garment industries, and allows for monopolistic behavior in an industry
where the players are “strong,” e.g., the telcos. The state has been passive
on the issue of telecommunications market services. It has even encouraged
monopolistic behavior by protecting strong ties with telco executives on
account of their contribution to the national treasury.
Are these more of an issue of governance or the philosophy of
development, i.e., neoliberalism? What emerges in the case studies is that
this is neither an either/or question nor are they mutually exclusive.
Neoliberalism breeds a particular form of governance, which makes it
difficult to address socioeconomic inequalities. That is, it is not concerned
with the redistribution of wealth. It argues that a market economy under
the auspices of liberalization will bring about the trickle-down effect.
But as critics of globalization have pointed out, and what has emerged
in the case studies as the class bias, globalization has witnessed the richer
states becoming richer and the poorer nations becoming poorer. Moreover,
within the respective societies, the rich are becoming richer while the poor
are becoming poorer. What is seen particularly in telecommunications is
the elite’s capture of the state whereby the state has allowed for monopolistic
tendencies. Although globalization is viewed as a means to end the
“patrimonial state,” which is captured by patronage politics and is lacking
the “vision, autonomy, and bureaucratic capacity necessary to implement
a development program,” this is really not the case (Budd 2005).
Globalization has even aggravated socioeconomic inequalities because of
Conclusion 205
the unequal competition in a country where there is a wide gap between

the rich and the poor. Thus, it seems that globalization has facilitated the
elite capture of the state. The powerless in the person of the Benguet
vegetable farmers and the garment workers have asked for state intervention
in the form of safety nets. But this also goes against the very tenet of
neoliberalism, which demands no state intervention. Neoliberalism states
that if you cannot compete, you wither away. Thus, there is actually no
room for governance as neoliberalism sees a minimal role for the state. As
argued by Jomo (2006): “The ‘retreat of the state’ in much of the
developing world in recent decades has involved a generally reduced
role for government, including the capacity to lead and sustain
development, as well as its progressive social interventions.”
The reality, therefore, is that globalization falls short of pushing the
democratization process in a country where socioeconomic inequalities
prevail. Thus workers in the garment industry, for example, are exploited
even more now because worldwide cutthroat competition has become more
intense. If they do not allow themselves to be exploited, they lose their
jobs as their factories fold up upon failing to compete.
The same argument could also apply to the intensification of
smuggling with globalization. One can argue that this is a governance
concern and cannot be blamed on globalization. But this brings again
the reality of the elite capture of the state, which allows for smuggling.
The only way to end this is to address the income inequalities in society
to empower the majority to put an end to the corruption of the elites.
Neoliberalism as a philosophy of development, however, does not
address this concern. Worse, the state is hostage not only to the elites
but also to international financial institutions (IFIs) that pressure the
Philippines, for example, to adhere to further liberalization in exchange
for much-needed loans and economic assistance.
Favoring the majority at what cost?

Globalization is also seen as favoring the “interests” of the majority
(e.g., the consumers) vis-à-vis the stakeholders (e.g., the farmers in the
Benguet vegetable industry and the workers in the garment industry). But
at what cost? The cost lies in the aspect of the sustainability of an economy
that can no longer compete with foreign goods, resulting in the ultimate
deaths of key industries, i.e., vegetable, hog, and garments.
Based on the case studies, local producers argue that globalization does
not provide an environment conducive to the creation of political
opportunities for long-term development, particularly in the development
of a domestic market for local products. With globalization’s class bias,
even if the imported vegetables, pork, and garments are cheaper, who can
afford to buy these? Certainly not the Benguet vegetable farmers and the
garment workers who have been laid off because their industries can no
longer compete with their foreign counterparts on account of liberalization.
There is need, too, to disaggregate the consumers, particularly with regard
to those who can actually afford to eat three meals a day and those who
cannot. Certainly these are not the farmers, the workers, and their families
who have lost their sources of livelihood.
The Objectives of Engagement
State-civil society engagement has to do with how the industries’

stakeholders adversely affected by globalization, particularly with regard
to the profits they earn, attempt to address the issue politically. Politics
here is defined as “a process whereby a group of people, whose opinions or
interests are initially divergent, reach collective decisions which are generally
accepted as binding, on the group, enforced as common policy” (Miller
1991, 390). For the stakeholders, the arena for intervention is the state.
The framework used is the liberal-relational approach to state-civil society
engagement, which looks at the possibilities of forming alliances with state
elites.
At the microlevel, there is the call for safety nets in the vegetable and
garment industries to keep these industries from dying. There is also a call
for state regulation as a necessary countervailing force against market power,
as exemplified by the telecommunications industry, in which there must
be a fair distribution of market power parallel to the creation of an
environment that discourages monopolistic behavior. For example, the
Conclusion 207
telcos did not want the independent ISPs to provide the Voice over Internet
Protocol (VoIP), claiming that this fell under their jurisdiction. ISPs could
provide this service at a cheaper rate, but this would pull away profits from
the telcos. The situation required a strong and neutral state regulator to
assure upfront competition.
Engagement also seeks the participation of the affected sectors in policy
making. As pointed out in the Benguet vegetable industry, the Philippine
government has created a political environment hostile to civil society
advocating reforms in trade policies that are deemed threatening to the
full realization of its economic orthodoxy. And for the garment industry,
the policy challenge is for civil society to link the issue of the workers with
the bigger rubric of pushing further the democratization process that would
uphold the workers’ rights. Another challenge for these industries is how
to modify state policies that put them at a disadvantage if the government’s
hands are already tied by agreements it has signed.
Moreover, it is also necessary to prioritize the needs of the industries
along with those of the consumers and to determine what would be best
for the public good. Should the country, for example, continue importing
vegetables to satisfy the consumers in exchange for the death of the Benguet
vegetable industry? On the other hand, the hog raisers, despite being a
powerful business lobby group, are prevented from exercising a complete
monopoly because of competition from other powerful players like the
meat processors and the corn and grain feeders. The state’s entry into
agreements for liberalization has also basically tied its hands with regard to
fully supporting the interests of the hog industry.
In all of these, the question is, under what political conditions can
civil society engage the state to address the impact of trade liberalization,
which is a by-product of government’s submission to market forces?
Again, solutions in the form of safety nets for the Benguet vegetable
farmers and garment workers and more participation in decision making
can be dismissed as an issue of governance. But this is not the case with a
philosophy of development that diminishes the role the state can play in
the economy. Furthermore, the diminished role of the state comes at a
time where there persists a big gap between the rich and the poor. Thus, if
ever stakeholders could participate in decision making, these would be the
well-off, as can be seen in the telecommunications and hog industries.
One witnesses, for example, the state’s inability to regulate the telcos because
it has been captured by the elite.
Political Opportunity Structures

at the Domestic Level
Factors facilitating the actions taken by civil society can be viewed
within the internal and external dimensions of the political environment.
Notably, state-civil society engagement is happening in a period of
democratization, i.e., not under the repressive political environment of
the Martial Law period, which was the context of state-civil society
engagement during the pre-trade liberalization period of each of the
industries, with the exception of the garment industry. The case studies
show that civil society also made use of institutional openings to dialogue
with the relevant government agencies. This has been made possible by
the expanding space for democratic and consultative processes evident in
post-EDSA governments.
Engaging the State Institutions
The general willingness of the post-Marcos Philippine state to engage

civil-society actors in designing its policies and in implementing its
programs—thus conferring on its actions a constant veneer of democratic
legitimacy—has benefited civil society as it explicitly opened spaces for
participation of non-state ators in regular politics. Such participation is
facilitated by laws, such as the Republic Act (RA) 8435 or the Agriculture
and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) of 1997, which recognizes that
civil-society actors will play a key role in its effort to modernize agriculture,
and that the state would set the rules on such partnership. There were also
institutionalized mechanisms such as those embodied in the Local
Government Code, which also facilitated civil society engagement at the
local level, particularly seen in the experience of the Benguet vegetable
Conclusion 209
industry stakeholders. Another is through the creation of agencies, which

allows for participation of various sectors in the decision-making process
as seen in the government-sponsored National Tripartite Conference that
gathered representatives from major labor organizations, management, and
government experts on the garment industry (Magadia 2003, 67-68). It is
mainly through agencies like these that labor groups formally engage the
executive branch. Civil-society engagement also focused on the established
institutions of the bureaucracy, the legislature, and the judiciary.
The garment industry, for example, engaged the bureaucrats when it
held formal and direct dialogues with relevant government officials from
the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB), the Department of Trade
and Industry (DTI), and the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), among others. Issues the garment industry raised had to do with
the case of displaced workers in factories that have closed; a comprehensive
plan on how to save the garment industry; and preparing the workers for
the MFA phaseout. Civil society in the garment industry also focused its
efforts in reforming the Bureau of Customs. Corruption in the bureau has
made it easier for smuggled garments to enter the country. Labor groups
in the garment industry likewise engaged the judiciary through the filing
of cases against employers.
Political opportunity structures also presented themselves at the
legislative and judicial levels. The Philippine Congress, for example, was
used as a venue for articulating the grievances of the Benguet vegetable
farmers, particularly through the party-list system, which has made possible
the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented in the
legislative process. In filing cases against their employers, labor groups in
the garment industry made use of the judiciary.
Mobilizing allies
Equally important in engagement is the identification of key allies in
government institutions. The Benguet vegetable industry, for example,
found a major ally in then-Department of Agriculture (DA) Undersecretary
Ernesto Ordoñez, who endorsed the actions of the vegetable traders,
allowing them to penetrate the Bureau of Customs. In some cases, allies

were also formed not on the basis of principle but because of certain
individual’s self-serving interest. For example, former DTI Secretary and
now-Senator Manuel “Mar” Roxas III, an advocate of consumer-oriented
globalization and thus opposed to an increase in tariff rates, changed his
position because the vegetable stakeholders played on his electoral ambitions
to appeal for the protection of the vegetable industry. Roxas’s case is not
unique as electoral politics provides an opportunity for policy advocacy in
exchange for votes. In the telecommunications industry, Senator Roxas
also emerged as a crucial ally. He supported the interests of ISPs when he
filed a resolution in Congress calling for the Senate to remove all obstacles
to the full commercialization and development of VoIP as a cheaper
alternative to international calls.
Such a situation reveals that although stable aspects of political
opportunity structures are fixed and regarded as givens (Tarrow 1994),
for example the strength of state institutions or the party system, there
are precarious elements that shift with events and policies, and are
essentially “matters of contention in which movements participate”
(Gamson and Meyer 1996). This could be seen in the case of elections
and the manner in which the Benguet vegetable industry framed its
concerns whereby “these volatile features are conceived as processual
rather than structural and entail perception or framing of such political
opportunities by movement participants in order to influence
mobilization” (Tarrow 1994; Gamson and Meyer 1996; McCarthy,
Smith, and Zald 1996). Furthermore, in the case of engaging the state
institutions, “importance is attributed to points of access and inclusion
in policy making. It is said that mobilization is strongest when the
political system is in the process of opening up to movement demands,
rather than when access is completely closed or when the regime has
fully met the movement’s demands” (Tarrow 1994).
Local allies are found not only in the national bureaucracy but also in
the local government. This was the experience of the Benguet vegetable
farmers when civil society was able to mobilize the local government because
Conclusion 211
of its huge stake in vegetable farming. The farmers’ allies were the Benguet
local government officials who were running during the elections, opening
doors for civil society’s advocacy in the vegetable industry. Moreover, the
farmers also mobilized nonstakeholders by making the issue part of the
larger campaign against agricultural trade liberalization.
As for powerful allies at the level of the local government, this was
found in Benguet local officials such as Fongwan, Kim, Molintas, Sacla,
and Uy. Some alliances were also formed because some of these local officials
were formerly vegetable traders themselves and thus could commiserate
with the plight of the Benguet vegetable industry players. They are referred
to as “institutional activists,” being government officials formerly associated
with civil-society advocacy groups.
Civil Society Engaging the Private Sector
The battle among the players in civil society was most evident in
the telecommunications sector: the ISPs versus the telcos that found
support from telephone companies such as Bell Telecoms with regard
to the VoIP. There was also the involvement of big US telephone
companies such as AT&T Corp., which urged the Philippine
government to classify VoIP as a value-added service (VAS), i.e., not
within the control of the telcos, which will ultimately liberalize the
industry. Thus, deregulation of the industry would be good for the
public as it would prevent foreign players to easily capture a portion
of the market. Civil-society groups emerged, like the PISO, which is
the voice of the small ISPs. In March 2005, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) classified VoIP as a VAS, thus
breaking the monopoly of telcos as the sole provider of VoIP services.
Thus, in the battle of these two profit-making enterprises, public good
was served with the triumph of the ISPs.
While liberalization, i.e., deregulation, frees the market for more
players, there is still need for a strong regulatory body that would prevent
a monopoly. While the telcos and consumers checked the government
on the tax on text messaging, the consumers seemed to be powerless
with regard to the government’s and telcos’ collusion on a franchise

tax. The government and the ISPs, in turn, checked the telcos’ monopoly
of the VoIP service. This highlights the issue of whether there
should be a strong regulatory state in place before liberalization occurs.
The more structural issue, however, is whether liberalization can
work in a society characterized by a big gap between the rich and the
poor.
Complementing Domestic Political Opportunity

Structures with Resource Mobilization
The domestic political opportunity structures that civil society could
take advantage of were also made possible by the resources at their disposal.
One of the more important ones was their ability to form alliances with
other like-minded players. In the case of the Benguet-vegetable civil society,
for example, it tapped alliances at the national level, such as the Fair Trade
Alliance (FTA), a middle-class movement; and the Kilusang Magbubukid
ng Pilipinas (KMP) and the Alyansa Dagiti Pesante iti Taeng Kordilyera
(Alliance of Peasants in the Cordillera Homeland [APIT TAKO]), which
are part of the lower-class movement. It also forged alliances with political
blocs, e.g., Akbayan and Bayan Muna, which carried their advocacy
campaign. Notably, the KMP was an organization that emerged during
the Martial Law period while the leadership of Akbayan and Bayan Muna
consists of personalities who were active during the anti-dictatorship
struggle. Thus, the Benguet civil society benefited from political movements
established in the past as well as newly created ones like the FTA and the
APIT-TAKO.
A similar experience is also shared by civil-society campaigns in the
garment industry wherein civil society formed alliances to determine a
course of action upon the MFA’s expiration. Among these organizations
are the BMP-Almagate (Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino–Alyansa
ng Manggagawa sa Garment at Textile), the Labor Forum Beyond MFA,
and the GARTEX Labor Council (Garments, Textile, and Allied Industries
Labor Council). The latter is spearheaded by the FTA and comprises
Conclusion 213
eighteen labor federations. Thus, the FTA is one network whose concerns
cut across sectors, in this case, the concern of the vegetable and garment
industries vis-à-vis liberalization.
The hog industry could also rely on its strong organizational and
business networks and its prior experience in building cooperatives. This
is seen in its ability to lobby members of the legislative and executive
branches of the government through formal dialogues, letter-writing
campaigns, and attendance in hearings and sectoral consultations as well
as in the use of the media to air their concerns. Its strength has been further
reinforced with the formation of alliances such as the Agricultural Sector
Alliance of the Philippines (ASAP) in 2001, which include feed millers’
and hog raisers’ associations and cooperatives.
The civil-society network in the telecommunications industry involved
mainly the players who had direct stakes in the industry and the consumers
(who did not figure at all in the vegetable industry). The tax issue, specifically
the so-called text tax, brought the players to a confrontation. The
government along with some legislators framed the issue by arguing that
the text tax will raise government revenue that can provide for more social
services. Civil society, which did not agree, framed its argument by saying:
1) there is no need to tax, if the government spent public money correctly;
2) to impose taxes on text messaging is antipeople; and 3) government
should just run after the big tax evaders. Civil society found allies in
legislators, church groups, and overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), among
others. The telcos also supported civil society on the issue, saying that the
cost would merely be passed on to the subscribers. In the end, the president
raised the VAT system on telecom providers from 10 percent to between
12 and 14 percent instead of the franchise tax, which could translate into
higher cost of service. Thus, one had a case of the telcos and civil society
coming together vis-à-vis the government.
Networks and alliances in the telecommunications sector were also
formed because of a common cause. The tax issue, for example, provided
a political opportunity for civil society to continue to rally around concerns
for more affordable and efficient cellular phone service. One of these groups
was TxtPower, a loose organization of different progressive organizations.

One of the issues they raised was the telcos’ reduction of the free-text
allocations for prepaid subscribers without due consultation with the
consumers. Others were the drop calls, i.e., calls charged to subscribers
who did not make the calls. The group also questioned the limited period
imposed by telcos for the use of prepaid load credits. Civil society remained
vigilant vis-à-vis the government’s apparent penchant for creating new taxes
and/or increasing current rates.
Rallies and protest actions

Protest actions also characterized the political environment. This was
seen when the garment industries held rallies and demonstrations to express
workers’ grievances in the workplace and the illegal closure of factories. It
is equally important for the garment industry to target international
institutions in its campaign to improve the industry as it engages the state.
Such a strategy is not new as labor groups were particularly involved in
several antigovernment mobilizations during the Marcos regime; well-
known among these mobilizations is the welgang bayan (people’s strike).
In fact, after President Corazon Aquino’s ascension to power, one of her
first acts was to address industrial labor relations in recognition of the
labor movement’s contribution to the downfall of the dictatorship. Along
with the workers’ utilization of the formal venues are the informal
engagements that they launch occasionally (usually through rallies and
pickets) to air their grievances.
Protest actions, however, were not limited to holding rallies. In the
hog industry, there was the “meat holiday,” i.e., the nondistribution of
meat products to the public markets in protest of the rampant smuggling
of meat products. This was led by the Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
Philippines.
The use of the media

The media, for example, gave the Benguet vegetable industry crisis
wide coverage. In a society where the media often set the agenda, it was
Conclusion 215
reasonable for the civil-society actors to count on the institution for forming
and influencing public opinion. The garment, hog, and telecommunications
industries also used the media to talk about their problems. Thus, the
media’s openness to social movements, although these are often excluded
in the standard operationalization of political opportunity, is in itself an
important component of political opportunity structures, which has both
structural and dynamic elements (Gamson and Mayer 1996). As seen in
the case studies, the content of media coverage may radically influence the
prospects for mobilization of challenging demands and movements, as it
affects public awareness and perceived importance of a particular issue
(McCombs and Shaw 1993). Mass media’s agenda-setting function,
therefore, has progressed from the classical assertion that the news merely
informs the public. The selection of objects for attention and frames for
interpreting these objects shape the manner in which news is construed
(McCombs and Shaw 1993).
Other resources for mobilization

Civil society in the telecommunications industry, coming from the
upper and middle classes, also had the resources and the capacity to launch
massive public education, organizing and mobilizing consumers, reinforcing
media activities, and lobbying with sympathetic lawmakers and government
officials. Public campaign through SMS, Internet, and the broadcast media
was also used. Civil-society groups also visited colleges and schools, markets,
churches, government offices, and communities to gather signatures for
their petition against measures that they felt went against the public
regarding telecommunications. The nature of their organization, i.e., the
loose structure, enabled them to move effectively and forge inter-
organizational linkages to accommodate more resources in their campaign.
Civil-society groups also forged alliances in Congress. Their effectiveness
was seen when the text-tax issue died a natural death and civil-society groups,
like TextPower, already had the capability to involve themselves in other
tax issues and link up with others, like the anti-VAT groups. They framed
these issues in relation to those affecting the telecommunications sector,
such as the franchise tax, which will affect a broader range of

telecommunication services.
Such resources for civil society to engage government and the public
were not seen in the Benguet vegetable industry whose constituency comes
from the middle and lower classes. However, civil society’s knowledge of
the issue was reflected in its strategy and policy proposals. Also favorable
to the advocacy campaign of civil society was the division of labor among
the federations of peasant political organizations, i.e., some focused on the
defense of resources and land reform while others tackled the issue of
vegetable importation.
As for the garment industry, the ability of the workers to engage in
formal (e.g., dialogue with government) and informal (e.g., pickets)
strategies to gain government attention has much to do with their
organizational skills and technical knowledge.
Civil society’s advocacy work in the garment and the Benguet
vegetable industries has gained government recognition as well as
appreciation of their political and economic importance. An evidence
of this is that the Benguet vegetable industry is represented in pertinent
Philippine trade agreements with other countries. Moreover, grassroots
organizing and advocacy have increased social awareness of the industry’s
plight and have held government accountable to the community. This
has also opened up opportunities for others to address similar concerns
vis-à-vis government and society in general. Some refer to this as “state–
social movement coalition,” whereby state actors use their resources to
enhance the objectives of the social movement. This is very much in
the mode of the liberal-relational approach in understanding state-civil
society engagement. Such an alliance happens when the concerns of
civil society adversely impact on the locality, which local and national
government officials cannot ignore.
Political Opportunities at the External Level

Political opportunities at the external level were best seen in the
formation of transnational alliances. For example, the garment industry
Conclusion 217
forged alliances at the global level, which differentiated it from the Benguet
vegetable industry whose alliances were limited to the local level. This is
because transnational actors could relate to the issue of human rights, which
was raised vis-à-vis the garment workers in the context of globalization.
The loss of livelihood for the vegetable farmers, on the other hand, did not
generate much sympathy from transnational actors. There was also
transnational civil-society support for the garment workers because they
are better organized, unlike the small-vegetable farmers. This enabled the
garment-industry groups to network with overseas organizations, which
allowed them to learn from the campaigns taken by other groups and
eventually apply these at home. These campaigns usually center on the
corporations’ social responsibility, with specific focus on their
responsibilities toward their workers. The Clean Clothes Campaign, for
example, was formed to improve working conditions and empower workers
in the global garment industry. Local chapters of international organizations
were also established in the Philippines. Moreover, because of the
international networking of trade unions in the Philippines, they can report
to multinational companies the violations committed by local contractors.
Civil-society groups are not the only ones making use of such
campaigns. Governments, for example, have also used these to instill social
responsibility among local manufacturers. Agreements forged through the
efforts of international institutions have also been very useful in setting
the directions of the country’s laws with regard to the protection of workers.
For the garment industry, therefore, external political structures were utilized
to protect the workers’ rights rather than stopping the flow of cheaper
garment imports to the country.
As for the telecommunications sector, an external political opportunity
was for them to draw in the OFWs in their campaign to ban the text tax.
The external environment in which the neoliberal ideology dominates as
perpetuated by the international financial institutions, e.g., the World Bank
and the IMF, has brought more positive rather than negative results. This
brings out the fact that neoliberalism discourages too much state
intervention even as it does not dissipate the state power to tax. The
“Washington Consensus” even stipulated that a country should have a

stable exchange rate and a balanced government budget. This can be
accomplished through proper tax collection alongside less spending.
Factors Hindering the Action of Civil Society

Factors that hindered the action of civil society could be seen within
the context of the limitations in the political opportunity structures both
at the domestic and international levels, and with regard to the resources
that could be utilized. In the Benguet vegetable industry, for example,
there were key government officials who were not supportive of the vegetable
farmers like then-DA Secretary Arthur Yap. Yap epitomizes government
officials, particularly technocrats, who are shielded from political pressures
in their pursuit of the neoliberal ideology because they carry no political
ambitions. Although there may be a façade of openness to consultation as
seen in the engagement of government agencies, the reality is that these
institutions are insulated from popular pressures. Aggravating the situation
at the national level, the perspective of the bureaucracy with respect to
civil-society participation differs from one unit to another. A reason for
this is that while it is easy to tap local government officials as allies, getting
allies at the national government level is much more difficult because the
agencies they are part of are more reflective of the interest of corporations.
Thus the elite capture of the state, which neoliberalism does not address.
There were also limitations in the hog industry, one of which was
government’s sheer ineffectiveness. This was seen in the foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD) incident in which the hog industry had to rely on
government to control, e.g., through the importation of FMD vaccines,
vigilant policing of hog and pork traffic, imposing quarantine measures,
and massive information campaign on FMD, among others. Civil society
criticized the government for corruption with regard to withholding money
allotted for FMD. An important concern was the government’s refusal to
act. Stakeholders in the hog industry, for example, linked the issue of meat
imports with FMD—that is, to stop FMD was to stop the importation of
meat, particularly carabeef, which had flooded the meat market. They also
Conclusion 219
pointed out that the smuggling and excessive importation of meat would
ultimately lead to the collapse of the local hog industry. No decisive action,
however, was taken by the government despite the fact that the ASAP held
protest actions and declared a meat holiday, among others. They even
demanded the resignation of government officials who they believed were
involved in smuggling, but this was also to no avail.
In the Benguet vegetable industry, the strategy of civil society to focus
on the executive branch rather than the legislature also seems to have been
flawed. For one, executive orders served only as temporary measures with
very short-term impact. The executive can also issue a policy that may
benefit the Benguet vegetable farmers but only to be negated by another
policy. For example, the government is in partnership with the vegetable
industry to stop smuggling but it will not accede to lowering the tariff
rates on imported vegetables. The legislature also has its limitations as an
arena for engagement. These include the very low awareness of policy makers
of international trade; the high rate of absenteeism, which may indicate
lack of interest or little knowledge of the issue; the long-winded process of
legislation; and the parochial disposition of Congress as an institution.
Changes in policy, therefore, are not based on principles but on realpolitik
or quid pro quo. Furthermore, at the end of the day, the executive is tasked
to implement the trade policies mandated by Congress.
In the case of the telecommunications industry, the legislature generally
played a supporting role either to the state (e.g., the NTC) or to the civil-
society players (i.e., the telcos, the ISPs, and the consumers). The telcos
have more resources; they are able to translate these to political influence.
The reality, therefore, is that the state must address the adverse effects of
globalization, despite the fact that neoliberalism calls for the state’s
diminished role.
To reiterate what Mittelman (2002, 10) said, globalization as manifested
by its major conveyors, the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like
the WTO, tends to fragment the national political system and leaves winners
and losers. Among the winners, as very well seen in the case studies, are the
executive and the bureaucracy, which conduct negotiations and provide
the representatives to IGO meetings; they therefore occupy pole position

(Hague and Harrop 2004, 27). The losers, on the other hand, include the
legislature and the political parties. The former may only learn of an
international agreement after the government has signed it. The latter may
have lost ground under the pressure from IGOs. This may explain why in
the case studies, political parties do not seem to play a role at all in state-
civil society engagement (Hague and Harrop 2004, 28). This is certainly
most unfortunate for civil-society groups as the legislature and the political
parties are the institutional vehicles of representation for the citizenry.
Furthermore, despite the inroads, such as the institutionalization of
NGOs’ and traders’ participation in the antismuggling operations of
government agencies and task forces in the Benguet vegetable industry,
the government response has been minimal. In this context, state accession
to civil-society demands is seen as a mere rhetoric or a means to legitimize
state policies, e.g., the antismuggling program. In this light, changes in
political opportunity structures as brought about by the democratization
process are only capable of facilitating civil society’s entry into the policy-
making arena and its advocacy of modest policy reforms. The long-term
but still-elusive solution, therefore, is for civil society to craft a feasible
alternative economic paradigm that serves as the foundation for its policy
advocacy on agriculture in general and the vegetable industry in particular.
This would also prevent the government from treating the concerns of the
vegetable industry as issue-specific rather than comprehensively.
Therefore, the adverse effects of globalization cannot be fully confronted
as long as there are impediments in the democratization process. These
impediments, on the other hand, cannot be addressed when socioeconomic
inequalities pervade in society, a reality which neoliberalism has failed to
address.
Limitations in the political opportunity structures

at the international level
At the international level, the major stumbling block was the state’s
submission to external forces, i.e., market forces, over which it had no
Conclusion 221
control. Nevertheless, civil society in the Benguet vegetable industry sought

to remedy this by engaging the state.
As for the hog industry, the government could not stop the importation
of meats because it had already signed agreements that opened up the
country for liberalization. Importation has had different impacts on the
various sectors directly or indirectly linked with the hog industry. For
example, it led to the loss of profits for the hog industry unless the
government reduced production costs by lowering tariff on corn and
soybeans, primary components of hog feeds. This meant that pursuing the
interest of hog industry players would go against civil-society advocates of
the producers of these commodities, such as the corn farmers. This was
also seen in the case of the call to stop the importation of carabeef from
India, which benefited the hog industry but not the meat processors who
were benefiting from carabeef imports. Thus, although the government
has attempted to address the interests of the different affected sectors, it
has failed to come up with a win-win solution.
Only the garment industry workers could take advantage of linking
up with transnational movements fighting for a similar cause. Unlike the
vegetable and hog industries, these movements are more focused on workers’
rights rather than livelihood issues.
Limitations in resources for engagement

One of the factors that went against the Benguet vegetable industry
was the lack of organization among the farmers, which kept them from
any meaningful participation. The highly technical nature of discussions
during public hearings and consultations also alienated groups that were
not conversant with the different aspects of tariff policy. This was aggravated
by the lack of pertinent information and data, thus making it difficult to
establish the validity of the case through hard facts and, in the process,
undermining civil society’s credibility vis-à-vis the policy makers.
In the formal approach to state engagement, there was also the issue of
misrepresentation. Traders, for example, misrepresented themselves as
farmers and their approach, i.e., of carrying out the antismuggling drive,
was not approved of by other civil-society groups that believed this to be

the task of the government. There was also resistance among vegetable
farmers to political organizing for fear of being manipulated to advance a
particular dogma. Misrepresentation also benefited the traders, creating a
gap between them and the farmers. Furthermore, the Benguet vegetable
industry, unlike the hog industry, could not take advantage of RA 5435
whereby the state recognizes state and civil-society partnership in
development.
For the telecommunications industry, it was very clear what
organizations the civil-society members belonged to, i.e., whether they
were with the telcos, the ISPs, or the consumer groups. The same could be
said for the civil-society players in the hog and garment industries.
As for the labor movement in the garment industry, questions that
arise include why the labor movement, one of the oldest movements in the
Philippines, is unable to assert itself with regard to the workers’ condition
in a period of democracy. One view is that the labor movement has not
been sector-specific, i.e., attention has not been given to the nuances of
each of the sectoral needs of the workers. Also, subcontracting has made it
difficult for workers to organize since they are diffused.
Conclusion
These studies have shown globalization’s different effects within and
across domestic industries as well as the multiple strategies of engagement
between civil society and the state. The impact on the stakeholders in the
Benguet vegetable, garment, and hog industries has been negative. The
impact was most severe in the case of the Benguet vegetable industry, which
barely survived despite its pre-trade liberalization monopoly of the industry.
The garment industry, despite being among the top export earners, shows
that globalization in a time of democracy has brought about profit losses
translating into the closure of several factories and the layoff of hundreds
of workers. The expiration of the MFA will only make matters worse.
Globalization has brought in cheaper meat, but this hardly threatens
the hog industry.
Conclusion 223
For the telecommunications sectors, however, globalization has been

positive as the entry of more players encouraged greater competition.
In all these, the consumers are the ones who supposedly benefit the
most as globalization provides them with cheaper products. However, this
comes at the expense of the industries that clearly cannot compete. There
is therefore a need for reforms that could be implemented vis-à-vis
developmental outcomes arising from economic liberalization in specific
sectors. Prioritization as well as safety nets are most urgent if communities
are to survive the adverse impact of globalization. In other words,
globalization should not be adopted wholesale but on a case-to-case basis,
with preference for the more marginalized sectors.
Another important lesson from these case studies is that the state cannot
afford to treat the adverse impact of globalization on a piecemeal basis,
i.e., being issue-specific. Civil society, on the other hand, also has to do its
homework to provide a feasible alternative with regard to their specific
sectoral concern vis-à-vis what unbridled neoliberalism has to offer. More
important, there is a need to come together to put these concerns within
the bigger framework of development.
The upside is that the situation provides political opportunities for
civil society to engage the state at both the local and national levels. This
can be best attributed to the current democratic dispensation, which, despite
its shortcomings, has provided the space for state-civil society engagement.
Such an engagement is best seen in the context of the liberal-relational
approach that views civil society as not just any nonstate and nonmarket
actor or that civil society is in opposition to the state (Hearn 2001, 342).
What emerges is a civil society construed “as part of what links the state to
society more broadly, and as providing the channels through which people
influence their states, and states cultivate legitimacy” (Hearn 2001, 340).
This interaction “reinforces democracy by encouraging and entrenching
the pursuit of sectional interest through generally agreed norms” (Friedman
2003, 10).
Such a situation was best exemplified in civil-society engagement of
the local government unit and the local government officials as well as
their engagement of the state at the national level, i.e., engaging the executive
and its bureaucracy, the legislature, and the judiciary. The nature of
engagement is formal and direct, e.g., through committees on tariff
involving NGOs, as well as informal and direct, e.g., lobbying government
officials. Political opportunities are also present for civil society to engage
the state in an informal and indirect manner, e.g., the use of the media as
well as demonstrations.
The state is not monolithic. While industry players may tap key allies
in government, there will always be state functionaries who are insulated
from the pressure to provide for safety nets to industries, as in the case of
the Benguet vegetable and garment industries. The allies may come from
local government officials whose communities are at risk because of
globalization, or allies who are ideologically against globalization killing
off industries, or those who see that supporting the antiglobalization
movement would mean electoral votes. These combinations were, for
example, seen in the Benguet vegetable industry, where “rifts among elites
could provide movements occasions to influence policy making” and “the
presence or absence of influential allies, such as the elite, could also have
direct impact on the movement’s actions.” This is mainly because “elite
allies possess resources and political influence that movements lack and
could serve as indirect channels of access in the system” (Tarrow 1994) as
was seen in the case studies.
The study also reveals that the industries that have more resources,
e.g., the hog and telecommunications industries, are in a better position to
engage the state because of the profits they bring to the economy. This is
where the state has to come in to provide the balance by, for example,
leveling the playing field. One consolation, though, for the marginal players
is that the competition between big industry players who are in conflict
with one another has provided a check and balance as seen in the hog and
telecommunications industries. Ironically, the check and balance does not
come from the state because of its patrimonial character, i.e., dispenser of
patronage politics, which can be attributed to the elite capture of the state.
In all these experiences, one witnesses not the retreat of the state but the
Conclusion 225
state as a major actor of contention for the different civil-society players

affected by globalization.
Nevertheless, the state is still the major arena of contention to
confront the adverse effects of liberalization. But despite the importance
of the state, it also has its limitations, as seen in its helplessness in the
face of the FMD outbreak. Executive orders as well as the competence
of legislators also have their limitations. Furthermore, as the case studies
also reveal, the hands of the state to go against the tide of liberalization
are tied, particularly in situations where it had already signed agreements
to open up the country’s economy. One, therefore, has to acknowledge
the presence of “exogenous factors that enhance or inhibit prospects
for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather
than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and
for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy”
(Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1457-58). And as for situations in which
globalization brings about a positive effect as seen in the
telecommunications industry, the reality is that state regulation alone
cannot provide the necessary countervailing force against market power.
What is needed, therefore, is a fair distribution of market power parallel
to the creation of an environment that discourages monopolistic
behavior. This can only be attained once socioeconomic inequalities
are addressed, which will lead to the empowering of the majority.
Where does that leave civil-society players? As earlier noted in the
garment industry, much is to be gained from exploring political opportunity
structures at the international level, and this may also be true for the other
sectors, which can learn from the experiences of others that have suffered
or will suffer the same fate. Transnational activism is on the rise and as
such, some issues, e.g., workers rights, have been mainstreamed into
international policy making. There is also still much to be desired in
empowering the stakeholders not only in terms of the need to organize but
also in terms of the resources available.
The anchor of all of these is the push for further democratization, i.e.,
the enlargement of the space that would allow not only state-civil society
engagement but also state-civil society cooperation vis-à-vis the onslaught

of globalization.
Such engagement and cooperation have to take into consideration the
similarities and differences in the impact of globalization on the various
sectors. The success of civil society in engaging the state has much to do
with taking advantage of the political opportunities and in mobilizing
available resources in advocating what they perceive to be the best for the
public good. Thus, much of the role of civil society is to monitor the
changes in political opportunity structures and to determine which among
the various situations encourage or discourage their advocacy and, most of
all, discern when or how struggles could lead to actual reforms (Tarrow
1994). As can be gleaned from the case studies, their success may mean
incremental gains not only for their specific sectors but for the advancement
of the country’s development and democratization process.
The long-term objective of all of these is to come out with an
alternative philosophy of development that does not separate the
economic from the political as what neoliberalism does. The challenge
is to come up with a philosophy of development that will not only be
concerned with bringing about a “trickle-down effect” of the fruits of
development but will immediately pour in the much-needed economic
benefits to the majority of the population. That is, it will have a bias
for the poor. This will come about only when one can be assured that
elite capture of the state will be eliminated and that economic policies
will be determined democratically with the participation of all those
concerned. All of these will be made possible not by the state and the
advocates of globalization but by a vigilant civil society, i.e., those who
are marginalized by neoliberalism, who against all odds have not lost
hope to bring about a just situation in which winners should always be
those who have less.
Because of the positive experience in the telecommunications
industry, can all these therefore be attained through “globalization with
a human face,” i.e., “tackling the abuses of an unregulated capitalism
without the need to alter its fundamentals” (Amin 2004, 221), or is
Conclusion 227
this merely a transition phase to a move for “de-globalization,” if the

experiences of the vegetable, hog, and garment industries are
uncontrollably replicated in the rest of the country’s industries? There
seems to be some ambivalence on the part of civil-society players in
these three industries, and for as long as such a situation prevails, the
state will be the final arbiter between civil society and the forces of
globalization. Such uncertainty also impacts on state-civil society
engagement, e.g., whether there should be more state regulation or
not. But what remains certain is, despite the ambivalence, mere
palliatives will not be acceptable, and engagement will be pursued for
as long as the adverse impact of globalization is felt, until there are no
longer excuses.
Note
1. Trade liberalization in the Philippines is defined as “lowering tariffs and lifting
quantitative restrictions on hundreds of goods (notably, not rice); removing capital
controls to allow capital to flow unimpeded in and out of the country; and
opening previously restricted sectors and industries to foreign ownership”
(Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 245).
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Index
A Angara, Edgardo, 101-2

ABS-CBN, 185 Anti-Dumping Act of 1999, also RA
Adiong, Blo Umpar, 41, 55 8752, 31, 127
Adviento, Annie, 133 Anti-Smuggling Bill, 55
Advocates of Science and Technology Anti-Smuggling Intelligence and
for the People, 176-77, 180 Investigation Center, 43
AFTA-Common Effective Preferential Anti-Sweatshops Project, 122
Tariff, 56, 84-86 Aquino administration, 29, 94, 125,
Agreement on Agriculture, 28, 31 163-64, 169, 202, 214
Agricultural Competitiveness Arroyo administration, 29, 52, 58, 103-
Enhancement Fund, 32, 46 4, 125, 161, 169-70, 177-79, 188
Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Arroyo, Mike, 103
Philippines, 94, 102, 105, 213- Association of Southeast Asian Nations
14 (ASEAN), 26, 74, 85, 112
Agricultural Tarrification Act of 1995, ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA),
also RA 8178, 28, 38 19, 74, 85-86, 119, 155
agriculture, 31, 86-87 Asian Development Bank, 2
Benguet, 1, 20-24, 31, 37-38, 40, Asian financial crisis, 6
44-46, 51, 56, 200, 209 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation,
farmers, 22, 39, 42, 209 155
Agriculture and Fisheries Asis, Rey, 177
Modernization Act of 1997, also Associated Labor Unions of the Trade
RA 8435, 39, 92-93, 208 Union Congress of the Philippines,
Akbayan, 40, 212 136
Aklan, 105 Atienza, Victor, 98
Alliance of Legislators against
Regressive Taxes, 178 B
Alliance of Progressive Labor, 136 Bad-ayan Buguias Development
Alyansa Agrikultura, 40 Multipurpose Cooperative, 44
Alyansa Dagiti Pesante iti Taeng Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, 177
Kordilyera, 27, 37-38, 212 Bagsakan Traders Association, 43
Alyansa ng mga Manggagawa sa bargaining, 1, 75
Garment at Textile (ALMAGATE), Basic Telephone Program, 165
136 Bataan, 98
Amnesty International, 8 Batangas, 97, 105, 116
229
Bayan Muna, 35, 40, 126, 178, 212 Citizens’ Alliance for Consumer
BayanTel, 165-66, 172, 184 Protection, 199
Bell Telecoms, 211 civil society, 1-3, 9-11, 20-21, 33-34,
Benguet, see agriculture 39-59, 73-74, 82, 91-94, 100,
Benguet Cold Chain Project, 41, 56 103, 105-6, 108, 123, 137-38,
Benguet Farmers’ Federation Inc., 37, 156, 167, 172, 175-76, 186, 198,
45 202, 208, 211, 213, 215-16
Benguet Vegetable Commission, 37 class bias, 203-4
Benguet Vegetable Council, 37, 53 Clean Clothes Campaign, 122, 203,
Benguet Vegetable Distributors’ 217
Cooperative, 36, 42 Clothing and Textile Industry Tripartite
Bilateral Textile Agreement, 117 Council, 135, 141
bonded warehouses, 103 Co, Nemesio, 101-2
Briones, Nicanor, 102 Coalition for Consumer Protection and
Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino- Welfare, 199
ALMAGATE, 125, 131, 134, 212 Cojuangco, Antonio “Tony Boy”, 164
Bulacan, 97, 102, 105, 116 College Editors Guild of the
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, 76, Philippines, 177
100 Commission on Information and
Bureau of Animal Industry, 98, 100, Communication Technology, 161,
103 170, 175, 188
Bureau of Customs, 27, 42-43, 48, 53, Communist Party of the Philippines,
103, 106, 126, 137, 140, 142, 209 201
Bureau of Labor and Employment Computer Professionals Union, 177,
Statistics, 121 180, 187
Bureau of Plant Industry, 27, 40-42 computerization, 127
Bureau of Telecommunications, 162 Concepcion, Trixie, 177
Concio, Joseph, 181
C confrontation, 186
Cabinet Oversight Committee on Anti- Congress, 28, 31, 38, 41, 48, 53, 102-3,
Smuggling, 43 164, 169, 171, 187, 209, 215, 219
Calimlim, Carlito, 100 Congressional Oversight Committee on
call center industry, 181 Agriculture and Fisheries
Capiz, 105 Modernization, 46
carabeef, 100-103, 105, 221 Connectivity Unlimited Resources Inc.,
Casiño, Teodoro, 178 165
Cavite, 116 Consumer Union of the Philippines,
cellular and mobile telecommunication 199
services, 160, 165, 202 Consumers Federated Groups of the
cellular mobile telephone system Philippines Inc., 199
providers, 164 contractualization, 119-20
Central Luzon, 76 Convention on the Rights of the Child,
Chikka Asia Inc., 170 123
China, 26, 56, 112, 121-22 Convergence Solutions, 182
Cinco, Emil, 176 cooperatives, 38
Index 231
Cordillera, 52 Evoserve, 182

Cordillera Administrative Region, 21, Executive Order 197, 45
37, 97 Executive Order 241, 29
Cordillera Peoples Alliance, 27 Executive Order 246, 29
Countervailing Act of 1999, also RA Executive Order 269, 16
8751, 31 Executive Order 470, 94
export processing zones, 115
D Express Telecommunications Co., 158,
democratization, 207-8, 220 160, 165, 184
Department of Agriculture, 22, 37, 40,
43, 47-48, 53, 83, 95, 96 F
Department of Labor and Fair Trade Alliance, 40, 43, 118, 134,
Employment, 120-21, 129, 131, 142, 212
133, 139, 209 farm-to-market roads, 22
Department of Trade and Industry, 37, fast-food chains, 101
43-44, 49, 53, 131, 133, 139, 209 Federation of Free Workers, 136
Department of Transportation and feed millers, 81, 94, 213
Communications, 160-62, 166, flexibilization, 143
170, 188 Fongwan, Nestor, 50, 210
deregulation, 158, 179, 213 foot-and-mouth disease, 73, 96-100,
developing countries, 115 218
development, 28 foreign debt, 33
dialogue, 1, 75, 93, 176, 212 foreign direct investments, 5, 111, 158
Digital Telecommunications Foundation for Media Alternatives, 175
Philippines, Inc., 158, 160, 165- free trade, 27
66, 184 free-market economy, 5, 9
Disini, J.J., 183 free-trade zones, 115
division of labor, 115
domestic market, 142 G
Domingo, Jed, 172 Gabriela, 126, 177
Drilon, Cesar, 103 Galang, Loretta, 99
Drilon, Franklin, 178 garment industry, 1, 112-13, 116-17,
128, 133-34, 142-43, 197, 201,
E 207, 209
Early Bird Traders Association, 43 Garment and Textile Export Board,
Early Harvest Program, 56 123, 130,133, 138-40, 209
Earth Island Institute, 177 Garment and Textile Industry Tripartite
Eastern Telecoms, 158, 185 Consultative Body, 131
electronics, 117 Garment and Textile Industry Tripartite
elite, 224 Council, 131
political, 51 Garment and Textile Labor Council of
Escudero, Francis, 178 the Philippines, 127
Estrada administration, 29, 101, 172, Garment, Textile and Allied
176 Industries Labor Council, 125,
e-Telecenters , 166 134, 212
General Agreement on Tariffs and Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 39

Trade-Uruguay Round, 19, 28, 34, Industrial, Scientific and Medical
37, 39, 46, 56, 87 frequencies, 183
Gintong Ani for the High-Value industrialization, 197
Commercial Crops, 22 InfoBahn, 182
Giugni, Marco, 8 Infocom Technologies, 155, 170, 182
global satellite systems, 156 Information Technology and Electronic
Global System for Mobile Commerce Council, 181
Communications, 160 Innove Communications Inc., 158,
globalization, 1, 5-10, 12, 43, 59, 74- 184
75, 81-82, 91, 94, 106-7, 117, Institute of Labor Studies, 120
126, 142-43, 167, 197, 203, 205, interconnection, 157, 162, 165, 167,
209, 216, 223, 220 169
Globe Telecoms Inc., 158, 160, 165-66, intergovernmental organizations, 4,
172, 176 220
governance, 205 international financial institutions, 205,
graft and corruption, 28, 126, 211, 216 217
gross domestic product, 158 international gateway facilities, 164-65
International Labor Organization, 123
H International Mobile Equipment
Habito, Cielito, 3, 87-88 Identifiers, 168
High Value Crops Development Act of International Monetary Fund, 7, 33,
1995, also RA 7900, 22 119, 217
hog industry, 1, 9, 73-76, 79, 81-82, International Telecommunications
93, 96-97, 99, 103, 107, 197, 200, Union, 155, 183
212, 221 International Textile, Garment and
hog raisers, 74, 91, 94, 97, 105, 207 Leather Workers’ Federation, 123,
House of Representatives, 188 133, 139, 141
House Resolution 834, 45 internationalization, 115
House Resolution 879, 45 Internet, 170-72, 180-81, 215
House Resolution 894, 45 Internet service providers, 181-82, 185,
House Special Committee on 188, 206, 210, 219
Globalization, 46 Isla Communications Inc., 158, 160,
human resource management, 120 165
hybrid seeds, 22 K
I Kababaihan Laban sa
Iloilo, 105 Kontraktwalisasyon, 126
Iloilo Hog Farmers Multi-Purpose Kilusan para sa Pambansang
Cooperative, 93 Demokrasya, 35
Imperium Technologies, 182 Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, 40,
importation, 20, 27-28, 41, 45, 74, 75, 212
96, 100-104, 197 Kim, John, 38, 42, 50, 210
garments, 112-18 Kintanar, Simeon, 182
pork, 84, 197
vegetables, 23, 24, 36 L
Index 233
La Trinidad, 38 meat, 79, 83

La Trinidad Anti-Smuggling Task Force, canned, 75
36 imports, 88, 100
La Trinidad Booth Holders Association, poultry, 95
43 processed, 75
La Trinidad Trading Post Association, products, 96
36, 42-43 Meat and Hog Dealers Association of
La Trinidad Vegetable Supreme the Philippines, 94, 104-5
Council, 43 meat holiday, 94, 102, 104, 214
labor flexibilization, 120 media, 134, 214
Labor Forum Beyond MFA 125, 131- mass media, 180, 215
34, 141, 212 media advocacy, 54
labor Medium-Term Philippine Development
groups, 138, 140 Plan, 29, 169, 186, 188
relations, 124 Mercado, Emil, 177
sector, 136 Migrante, 177
unions, 201 Millicom, 158
Lacson, Panfilo, 51 Mindgate Systems , 182
Laguna, 97 minimum access volume, 32, 88, 94-
landlines, 167 96, 108, 203
Lee Kuan Yew, 157 minimum wage, 143
letter-writing campaigns, 93, 212 Ministry Circular 82-046, 163
liberalization, 6, 9-10, 155-58, 162, mobile phone roaming, 156
179, 201, 211-12 mobile phone service centers, 168
Lim, Albert Jr., 100-102 Molintas, Raul, 36, 50-51, 210
Limcoma Multipurpose Cooperative, Montemayor, Leonardo, 40-41, 50
93, 102 Mosaic Communications, 181-82
livestock, 79 most favored nation, 28
Livestock Association of Pandi, 102 Mountain Province, 24, 38, 44, 97
Livestock Development Council, 83 Multi-Fiber Arrangement, 112-13, 117,
local government, 36, 39-40, 51, 56, 122, 125, 130, 137-38, 140, 209
59, 98 Multimedia Messaging System, 178
Local Government Code, 208 multinational corporations, 6, 123
Lorenzo, Luis, 41, 103-4 Municipal Telephone Act of 1989, 164
M Municipal Telephone Projects Office,
Magsaysay, Ramon Jr., 46, 102 164
MailStation, 182 MyDSL, 183
Malacañang, 104, 179, 188
Marañon, Alfredo, 102 N
Marcos administration, 29, 91, 163-64, National Anti-Smuggling Task Force,
169, 175 43
Margins of Preference, 87 National Commission on the Role of
Martial Law, 21, 163, 201-2, 208 Filipino Women, 125
Martinez, Clavel, 182 National Conciliation and Mediation
Marxist-relational approach, 11 Board, 129
National Confederation of Labor, 136 Nynex, 158

National Economic and Development
Agency, 48, 161 O
national elections, 44 Office International des Epizooties, 100
National Federation of Hog Farmers Olea, Len, 177
Inc., 93, 95, 100, 104-5 Ordoñez, Ernesto, 41-42, 50, 209
National Federation of Hog Raisers, 93, overseas Filipino workers, 177, 213,
101 217
National Hog Raisers Group Inc., Overseas Filipino Workers’ Laban sa
99 TextTax, 177
National Labor Relations Commission, Overseas Workers Welfare
125, 129 Administration, 125
National Meat Inspection Commission,
97 P
National Statistics Office, 23 Pabi-GATT, 34
National Telecommunications Pag-IBIG, 129, 144
Commission, 156, 161-62, 168- paging, 164
71, 182-88, 211 Palatino, Raymond, 176
National Telecommunications Pambansang Ugnayan ng Mamamayan
Development Committee, 164 Laban sa Liberalisasyon ng
National Telecommunications Agrikultura, 38
Development Plan, 164, 170 party-list system, 125
National Tripartite Conference, 125, patronage politics, 204, 225
208 people’s organizations, 188
National Union of Students of the permit to import, 40
Philippines, 177 Philcom, 158, 184
National Vegetable Summit, 37 Philippine Association of Broiler
National Wages and Productivity Integrators, 95
Commission, 125 Philippine Association of Hog Raisers
nationalism, 128 Inc., 93, 102
Nationwide Association of Consumers Philippine Association of Meat
Inc., 199 Processors, 105
Navea, Chodie, 131 Philippine Association of Private
negotiation, 1, 75 Telephone Companies, 163, 184
Negros Occidental Hog Raisers Philippine Cable Television Association,
Association, 100 185
neoliberalism, 5, 28, 32-33, 39, 54, Philippine Chamber of Telecommunication
204-5 Operators, 184
Neri, Romulo, 186 Philippine Constitution, 28, 91-92
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Philippine Economic Zone Authority,
Corp., 158 129
“no union, no strike” policy, 143 Philippine Electronics and
nongovernment organizations, 7, 34, Telecommunications Federation,
40, 75, 82, 198 185
Novelty Philippines, 131 Philippine Internet Services
Index 235
Organization, 156, 176, 211 Boards, 125

Philippine League for Democratic Remulla, Gilbert, 174
Telecommunication, 172-74 Republic Telephone Co., 163
Philippine Left, 126 Reyes, Edgardo, 184
Philippine Long Distance Telephone rice, 21, 199
Company, 156-66, 172, 201-2 Riverdale Biological Laboratories,
Philippine Network Foundation, 182 98
Philippine Peasant Institute, 34, 40 root crops, 44
Philippine Transport and General Rosales, Loretta, 45, 50
Workers Association, 136 Roxas, Manuel “Mar”, III 43, 181,
Philippine VoIP Act of 2005, 182 209
Philippines, 3, 7, 19, 23, 28-29, 56, 85,
87-88, 114, 116-17, 120, 124, 128, S
economy, 7, 10 Sacla, Wasing, 38, 50, 210
government, 29, 33, 47-48, 57, 96 Safeguard Measures Act of 2000, also
“Philippines 2000”, 165 RA 8800, 31
Philippines Online, 182 “Salad Bowl of the Philippines”, 21
pickets, 139 San Miguel Corporation, 185
Pilipino Telephone Company, 160, Santiago, Joseph, 179
165-66, 184 Sarmiento, Jorge, 186
Plant Quarantine Law, 27 sectoral consultations, 93
political opportunity structure, 12, 212, Securities and Exchange Commission,
214, 220 102
pork, 81, 95-96, 197 Senate, 95, 188, 210
consumption, 79, 82, 99 Senate Resolution 258, 45
Presidential Commission on Good Senate Resolution 464, 45
Government, 164 Service Area Scheme, 165-66
privatization, 5, 179 service providers, 169
public opinion, 218 Shinawatra, 158
Public Telecommunication Entities, short message service, also “texting” or
171, 181 text messaging, 160, 171, 178,
Public Telecommunications Act of the 188, 202, 215
Philippines, also RA 7925, 167, Singapore Telecoms, 158
171-72 Singson, Eric, 178
Q Slaughterhouse Operators Association
quantitative restrictions, 19, 27-28 of the Philippines, 94, 104-5
Quezon, 97 Smart Communications, 158, 160,
Quick Response Teams, 131, 136 165-66, 172, 176, 184
smuggling, 26-27, 32, 36, 41-45, 55,
R 58, 74, 83-84, 96, 100-103, 137,
rallies, 139 142, 197, 205
Ramos administration, 29, 33, 49, 98, Social Accountability International,
165, 167, 172, 200 123
ready-to-wear, 116 Social Action Center, 38-39
Regional Wage and Productivity social relations, 36
Social Security System, 129, 137, Technical Education and Skills

140 Development Authority, 128,
Solidarity of Labor for Rights and 140
Welfare, 126 telcos, 156, 164, 171-72, 178-79, 181-
Solis, Ronald, 185, 188 82, 184-85, 206, 211, 219
Sony-Ericsson, 160 Telecommunication Users Group of the
Soriano, Teresa, 120 Philippines, 184
Soro-Soro Ibaba Development telecommunications industry, 1, 10,
Cooperative, 93 155-57, 198, 215, 223
South Korea, 117 Telecommunications Office, 161-62
Southern Luzon, 76 “Telepono sa Barangay”, 164
state, 13, 50, 58, 75, 92-93, 186, 198, textile industry, 128, 134, 203
200 see garment
engagement, 9 third-generation (3G) services, 156,
institutions, 208-9 165
regulation, 167, 206 Torres, William, 181
state-civil society relations, 1, 10- trade liberalization, 5, 19-20, 26, 31,
11, 20, 24, 55, 73, 75, 91, 33-35, 44-45, 52, 55, 91, 118,
106, 124, 156, 168, 188, 197-200, 207
197, 220 traders, 40-43, 56, 220, 221
State of the Nation Address, 177 transnational corporations, 115, 143
Stop the New Round Coalition- TxtPower, 156, 176-80, 186-87,
Philippines, 35, 43 213
Suarez, Danilo, 178
sugar, 95, 199 U
Supreme Court, 162, 165 ukay-ukay, 113
Swine Information Network, 79, 83 United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), 2
T UNDP Bureau for Resources and
Taiwan, 117 Strategic Partnership, 2
Tañada, Wigberto, 40, 50 United Nations Food and
Tapang, Giovanni, 176 Agricultural Organization, 73, 76
tariff, 27-28, 31, 44, 84 United Nations Universal Declaration
rates, 38, 43-45, 84, 209 of Human Rights, 123
reduction, 26, 29, 51, 86, 118, United States, 95, 114, 117
203 United States Agency for International
reforms, 94 Development, 7
Tariff and Customs Code, 55, 84 United Swine Producers Association,
Tariff Commission, 41, 44, 46, 49, 53, 100
119, 127 urbanization, 79
Tariff Reform Program, 29 Uy, Gabby, 102
Tariff-Related Matters, 44, 49 Uy, Johnny, 36
Tarlac, 102
Task Force Blue Collar, 42 V
technical cooperation, 188 value-added service, 170, 184-86, 211
Index 237
value-added tax, 213 117, 119, 123, 127, 155, 169,

vegetable industry, 1, 19-22, 26- 28, 200, 203
31-32, 34, 37, 40- 42, 44-45, 49- Worldwide Responsible Apparel
50, 55-56, 197-200, 205, 207, 215 Production, 123
Vicariate of Baguio-Benguet, 38
Virtual Asia, 182 Y
Voice over Internet Protocol, 170, 176, Yap, Arthur, 41, 218
181-88, 206, 210 Yu, Jayson, 183
W
“Washington Consensus”, 217
welgang bayan, 124, 214
Wi-Fi/Max, 170, 173, 183
women, 204
World Bank, 2, 7, 29, 33, 116, 200,
217
World Summit on the Information
Society, 175
World Trade Organization, 6-7, 26-29,
31, 33, 43, 46, 84, 87, 95, 112,
About the Authors
Ma. G lenda S. Lope

Glenda Lopezz Wui is assistant professor at the Faculty of Education,
University of the Philippines Open University, and formerly university
researcher and deputy director of the UP Third World Studies Center.
Teresa S. E
eresa ncarnacion Tadem is associate professor at the Department of
Encarnacion
Political Science, University of the Philippines Diliman, and director of
the UP Third World Studies Center.
Sharon M. Q
haron uinsaat is university researcher at the UP Third World Studies
Quinsaat
Center.
Joel F
F.. Ariate Jr
Jr.. is university research associate at the UP Third World
Studies Center.
Ronald M. M olmisa is a fellow and formerly university research associate

Molmisa
at the UP Third World Studies Center.

People, Profit, and Politics - State-Civil Society Relations in The Context of Globalization

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People, Profit, and Politics

Ma. G lenda S. Lope

Published in cooperation with the

Third World Studies Center

Third World Studies Center

© 2006 by the UP Third World Studies Center

Printed in the Philippines by CORASIA Inc.

List of Acronyms vii

Mobilizing against Vegetable Importation

Protests and Perceived Threats in the Hog Industry

Confronting the Challenges in the Garment Industry

Balancing Consumer and Corporate Interests

Conclusion: Palliatives for “Globalization with a Human Face”

ACEF Agricultural Competitiveness Enhancement Fund

CEGP College Editors Guild of the Philippines

INGO international nongovernment organization

NTDP National Telecommunications Development Plan

SIM Subscriber Identity Module

During the research phase, we like to express our gratitude to a number

Lastly, we express our heartfelt gratitude to all the respondents of the

Ma. Glenda S. Lopez Wui

looking at the dynamics of state-civil society engagement in a time of

Habito, however, notes that “this uniqueness in the Philippine situation

Defining Civil Society

of the social interests represented by CSOs, which has witnessed a move

Some would consider this a second category of nonprofit CSOs—

State-Civil Society Engagement

believe that basic structural changes from below, e.g., redistribution of

Propositions on Civil Society-State Engagement

Civil Society and State Engagement

Another dimension introduced by this study in state-civil society

its downside effects and maximize its developmental potential. In the

There are three major approaches in viewing and explaining state-

community; the business sector; the voluntary, nonprofit, independent

These perspectives, however, may not fully capture state-civil society

their agenda. Thus, the concept of political opportunity structures is applied

alliances and oppositions, which movements can use as a political resource

The Case Studies

These theoretical perspectives were applied to the four case studies

reforms to be undertaken by the government to secure their profits. As

For this research, a preliminary review of the literature was undertaken,

Limongi. 2000. Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-

In 1999, massive importation of government-subsidized Australian

processes after Martial Law, the neoliberal ideology strongly and

Contours of the V egetable Sector in

However, the Philippine vegetable industry, in general, has by and

Commodity (fresh/chilled) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Total vegetable imports 144,639,221 191,494,671 1,924,244,095 227,941,098 180,256,455

(3%) (123%) (-47%) (-42%) (-35%)

Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics (BAS).

Table 2. Annual average farmgate price of

Commodity 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Cabbage 15.17 10.63 7.71 4.78 7.9 8.39

Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics.

Institute for Development Studies (PIDS) show a 152 percent increase in

Key Elements Affecting State-Civil Society Relations

Pinpointing the Problem: Variances in Analysis

Recognition and understanding of the problem is a critical first step in

Smuggling: The proverbial culprit

When a commodity is protected with high tariffs and quota restrictions,

instead of legal importation, the problem is relegated to the level of

Tariff reduction: Diktat of the WTO