Professional Documents
Culture Documents
by
Martin Blumenson
UNITEDSTATES ARMY
JAMES A. NORELL
Washington 25, D.C. Brigadier General, USA
15June 1960
Chief of Military History
The Author
Martin Blumenson, a graduate of Bucknell University, received M .A.
degrees in History from Bucknell in 1940 and from Harvard University in
1942. Commissioned in the Army of the United States, he served as a his-
torical officer of the Third and Seventh Armies in the European theater dur-
ing World War II. After the war he taught history at the U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy (Kings Point) and at Hofstra College. Recalled to active
duty with the U.S. Army in 1950, he commanded a historical detachment
in Korea before beginning work on Breakout and Pursuit in June 1952. He
wrote the book while on active duty in the Office of the Chief of Military
History. After a tour of duty as Historian, Joint Task Force SEVEN, he
returned to OCMH as a civilian historian and is writing a volume on the
war in the Mediterranean theater—Salerno to Casino. His works include
Special Problems of the Korean Conflict (Washington, 1952); T h e Atomic
Weapons Tests in the Pacific, 1956 (Washington, 1957); two essays in Com-
mand Decisions (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959); and
numerous articles in military and historical journals.
vi
Preface
Covering the period 1 July to 11 September 1944, Breakout and Pursuit
takes u p the story of the European campaign at the time when the Allies
considered their cross-Channel beachhead well established on the Continent.
How the Allies exploited the initial success of their landings and drove from
the shores of Normandy to the German border is the subject of the volume.
T h e events of the period comprise a rich variety of military experience.
Virtually every sort of major operation involving co-ordinated action of the
combined arms is found: the grueling positional warfare of the battle of
the hedgerows, the breakthrough of the main enemy position, exploitation,
encirclement, and pursuit, as well as a number of actions falling under the
general heading of special operations—an assault river crossing, the siege
of a fortress, and night combat, among others. I n their variety and com-
plexity, these operations frequently bring into sharp focus the delicate prob-
lems of coalition warfare.
T h e point of view is from the top down–how the situation appeared to
the commanders and what decisions they made to solve their problems.
Though the author has tried to present at some time or other the situation
at each command echelon on the Allied side, the most consistent observa-
tion post is at the corps level where, because of the nature of the operations,
particular independence of judgment and great initiative in action were
required.
T h e emphasis is on the ground combat performed by U.S. Army troops.
T h e activities of the other Allied forces and of the opposing Germans are
included to the extent required to bring the American effort into proper
perspective. Air support and logistical arrangements have been detailed
when necessary for a better understanding of ground operations.
T h e attempt has been made to fulfill two objectives, each of which has
sometimes excluded the other. On the one hand, the author has endeavored
to present material of interest to the career soldier, who may seek instruc-
tion and who may perhaps be prompted to further study. On the other
hand, the author has tried to write an account of interest to the general
reader, who may be motivated by curiosity and the hope of learning in
some detail about the conduct of the campaign, the expenditure of men and
matériel, and the problems that face military leaders engaged in war.
T h e dates in the volume are all in 1944 unless otherwise noted.
vii
T h e author has had the privilege and pleasure of working with many
who have lightened his task and to whom he is greatly indebted. Mr.
Wsevolod Aglaimoff, Deputy Chief Historian for Cartography, gave liberally
of his military sophistication, perspective, and wisdom; his contributions to
the military content and language of this volume were considerable. Mr.
James B. Hodgson did most of the research in the German records; his
knowledge of enemy operations was always a tonic to an author struggling to
reflect both sides of the same battle in a single mirror. Miss Mary Ann
Bacon, the editor, saved the author embarrassment by discovering before it
was too late many inconsistencies and contradictions in fact as well as in
style. Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, the former Chief Historian, by his very
presence an inspiration in the cause of scholarship, gave invaluable help in
military as well as historical matters during the writing and revision of the
manuscript.
Mrs. Lois Aldridge at the Federal Records Center, Alexandria, was never
too busy to locate and make available pertinent documents, which otherwise
would not have come to the author’s attention. Mrs. Helen V. Whitting-
ton, copy editor, performed a painstaking task with cheerful patience.
Ruth Alexandra Phillips selected the photographs. Nicholas J. Anthony
compiled the Index.
Among those to whom the author owes a special debt of appreciation
are the present Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. James A. Norell, as
well as Maj. Gens. Orlando Ward, Albert C. Smith, and John H. Stokes, for-
mer Chiefs of Military History, and Cols. George G. O’Connor and Ridgway
P. Smith, Jr., former Chiefs of the War Histories Division.
T h e work was undertaken under the guidance of Dr. Hugh Cole and
the supervision of Dr. Roland A. Ruppenthal, former chiefs of the European
section. It was completed under the direction of Mr. Charles B. Mac-
Donald, Senior Historical Adviser of the World War II Branch, whose
understanding of military operations, felicity of phrase, and patient and un-
sparing counsel put him without question first among those who helped to
give the volume whatever value it may have.
To these and many more go my sincere thanks.
For the facts presented, the interpretations made, and the conclusions
drawn, for inadequacies and errors, I alone am responsible.
viii
Contents
P A R T ONE
II . THE ENEMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
T h e Machinery of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
T h e Changing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Tactical Dispositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
III . T H E SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
American . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
German . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
P A R T TWO
V. T H E OFFENSIVE BROADENED . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
T h e Carentan–Périers Isthmus . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
T h e Vire and T a u t e Bridgehead . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
VI . T H E A T T E M P T T O EXPLOIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
ix
Chapter Page
VII . T H E OFFENSIVE CONTINUED . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
T h e Battle for Caen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Toward Lessay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Toward Périers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Countera t tack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Toward the Périers–St . Lô Road . . . . . . . . . . . 140
PART THREE
Breakthrough
X . T H E BREAKTHROUGH IDEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
In Search of a Panacea ................ 185
In Search of a Breakthrough: GOODWOOD ..... 188
X
Chapter Page
XIV . T H E BREAKTHROUGH DEVELOPED . . . . . . . . . 264
T h e Second Thrust Toward Coutances . . . . . . . . . 264
T h e Pressure Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
C O B R A Completed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
PART FOUR
xi
PART FIVE
PART SIX
xii
Chapter Page
XXVIII . T H E DRIVE T O THE SEINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
South to the Loire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 559
T h e Drive to the East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563
T o the Seine and Across . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572
T h e Second Encirclement Attempt . . . . . . . . . . . 575
Through the Paris–Orléans Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . 583
XXIX . THE LIBERATION OF PARIS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
590
Allied Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
590
German Hopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
591
French Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .594
T h e Critical Days . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
595
T h e French Point of View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 598
Eisenhower's Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602
On to Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 606
T h e Liberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 610
T h e Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 618
PART SEVEN
Pursuit
XXX . THE BATTLE FOR BREST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631
T h e. Post-OVERLORD Decision . . . . . . . . . . . 631
T h e Problems at Brest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634
T h e Fight for Brest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640
T h e Best Laid Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 655
XXXI . T H E DRIVE BEYOND T H E SEINE . . . . . . . . . . . 657
T h e Framework of the Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . 657
Patton's Advance to the Meuse . . . . . . . . . . . . 664
T h e Main Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 670
XXXII . TOWARD T H E HEART OF GERMANY . . . . . . . . . 676
T h e Mons Pocket . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 676
Broad Front versus Narrow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
T h e Nature of the Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 688
T o the West Wall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692
T h e End of the Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696
Appendix
A . TABLE OF EQUIVALENT RANKS . . . . . . . . . . . 703
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 723
Maps
1 . The Bocage Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 . Order of Battle OB WEST. 2 July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. Attack of VIII Corps. 3-7 July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4 . Attack of VII Corps. 4-7 July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5 . Attack of XIX Corps West of the Vire River. 7–10 July 1944 . . . 91
6. Battle for Caen. 8–9 July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7. Panzer Lehr Attack. 1 1 July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8. Attack on Hill 192. 1 1 July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
9. Attack of Second British Army. 18–21 July 1944 . . . . . . . . 190
10. Operation COBRA.VII Corps Plan. 20 July 1944 . . . . . . . . 216
11 . Reduction of St . Malo. 4–17 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 395
12 . XV Corps. 2–8 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
13 . First U.S. Army. 1–6 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445
14. 12th Army Group Plan. 8 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
15 . Normandy Front. 7–11 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 496
16 . XV Corps. 9-12 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498
1 7. Argentan–Falaise Pocket. 12–16 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . 512
18. Into the City. 25 August . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 616
xiv
Page
XIII . Liberation of Paris. 23–15 August 1944
XIV. Battle for Brest. 25 August–18September 1944
XV . Pursuit to the German Border. 26 September 1944
August–10
Illustrations
Typical Cotentin Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
General Dwight D . Eisenhower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
General Sir Bernard L . Montgomery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Hedgerow Position in the Cotentin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Adolf Hitler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Generaloberst Alfred Jodl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Generaloberst Paul Hausser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Generalfeldmarschall Guenther von Kluge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
La Haye-du-Puits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Maj . Gen . Charles H . Corlett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Stone Bridge at Airel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
German Bicycle Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Congestion at Airel Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
British Troops in Caen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Shelled Church in Sainteny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
German Panther Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
St. Lô . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Martinville Ridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
Sunken Road Near Carillon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
German Hedgerow Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
After Securing Hill 1 2 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Infantrymen in St . Lô . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
Ruins of St. Lô . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Symbol of St . Lô . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Lt . Gen . Miles C. Dempsey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
Advancing Toward St. Germain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Rhino Tank with Hedgerow Cutter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
Advancing Toward Périers–St . Lô Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
155.mm . Howitzer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Waiting for the COBRABombardment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
After the COBRABombardment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
9th Division Troops After COBRABombardment . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Troops Rolling Through Canisy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
Engineers Clearing Mines in Lessay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Wrecked German Armor Near Roncey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
Tessy-sur-Vire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
xv
Page
Knocked-out American Tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Abandoned German Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Destroyed Enemy Vehicles in Avranches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
General Bradley with Lt . Gens . Courtney H . Hodges and George S.
Patton. J r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
Pontaubault Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
St. Malo and Environs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
Beach at Dinard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Artillerymen Firing 3-inch Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
Street Fighting in St. Malo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
T h e Citadel. St. Malo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
Interior of the Citadel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411
Bombing of Ile de Cézembre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
St. Malo Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
Maj. Gen. Wade H . Haislip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
Maj. Gen. Manton S. Eddy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
Troops Advancing From Juvigny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
Clearing Operations in Vire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453
Artillery Observation Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459
North of Mortain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468
Scurrying Along Hedgerow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
Antiaircraft Position Near St. Hilaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488
Through the Rubble of Mortain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489
Wrecked German Armor, Sourdeval Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491
Mamers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
Signal Corps Troops in Domfront . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
Le Bourg.St . Léonard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526
Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 531
General der Fallschirmtruppen Eugen Meindl . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
A Polish Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 542
Truckloads of Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
T h e Pocket Deserted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556
1 1 th Infantrymen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560
Maj. Gens. Walton H . Walker and Lindsay McD. Silvester . . . . . . . 569
Armored Bivouac Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 571
German Removing Boobytrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 573
Ferrying Jeeps Across the Seine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585
Advancing Under Fire Toward Fontainebleau . . . . . . . . . . . . 587
Allied Airlift, Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605
Maj. Gen. Jacques Philippe Leclerc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 611
French Soldiers Attack Toward Châteaufort . . . . . . . . . . . . . 612
In the Rue de Rivoli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 617
General von Choltitz and High-Ranking German Prisoners . . . . . . . 619
General Charles de Gaulle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 621
xvi
Page
French Resistance Fighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 623
Parisians’ Welcome to General de Gaulle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 627
Supplies for Brest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637
Ancient Wall and Moat. Brest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639
Maj . Gen . Troy H . Middleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 640
2d Division Troops Near Brest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 645
Gun Crew Firing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 646
Troops Fighting in Brest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 647
Remains of Fort Keranroux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 648
Fort Montbarey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 649
Generalmajor Hans von der Mosel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650
Generalleutnant Herman B. Ramcke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651
Drydock Destruction at Brest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 654
Demolished Bridge at Châlons-sur-Marne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 665
Liberated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689
Dragon’s Teeth. the Siegfried Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698
xvii
The U.S. Army Center of Military History
The Center of Military History prepares and publishes histories as required by
the U.S. Army. It coordinates Army historical matters, including historical proper-
ties, and supervises the Army museum system. It also maintains liaison with public
and private agencies and individuals to stimulate interest and study in the field
of military history. The Center is located at 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20005–3402.
xviii
PART ONE
The Allies
Mission ward to executing the second stage of the
invasion: expanding their continental
The heart of Germany was still a long foothold to the size of a projected lodg-
way off for the United States and British men t area.
and Canadian troops battling the Ger- Lodgment was a preliminary require-
mans on the Channel coast of France ment for the offensive operations aimed
on 1 July 1944. The invading armies of toward the heart of Germany. Before the
the Western Allies, with the help of Allies could launch their definitive
other United Nations, had crossed the attack, they had to assemble enough men
Channel to strike at the heart of Ger- and material on the Continent to assure
many and destroy her armed forces. success. T h e plans that had shaped the
Their purpose: the liberation of western invasion and
Europe.1 Two months later, in Sep- the boundaries of the
tember, after combat in the hedgerows, lodgment area selected.2 Securing this
breakout, exploitation, and pursuit, the region was the Allied objective at the
Allies were much closer to their goal. beginning of July.
Having carried the battle across France, T h e lodgment area contemplated in
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Nether- the master plan consisted of that part of
lands to the frontier of Germany-to northwest France bounded on the north
within sight of the dragon's teeth along and the east by the Seine and the Eure
the Siegfried Line-the Allies seemed Rivers and on the south by the Loire, an
very close indeed. area encompassing almost all of Nor-
The cross-Channel attack, launched mandy, Brittany in its entirety, and parts
from England on 6 June 1944, had ac- of the ancient provinces of Anjou,
complished the first phase of the invasion Maine, and Orléans. Offering adequate
by 1 July. Ground troops had broken maneuver room for ground troops and
through the crust of the German coastal providing terrain suitable for airfields,
defenses and had also established a con- it was within range of air and naval sup-
tinental abutment for a figurative bridge port based in England. Perhaps most im-
that was to carry men and supplies from portant, its ocean coast line of more than
the United Kingdom to France. At the
beginning of July the Allies looked for- 2 (43) 28, Opn OVERLORD,15 Jul 43,
COSSAC
conveniently digested in Harrison, Cross-Channel
1Dir, CCS to SCAEF, 12 Feb 44, quoted in Gordon Attack, App. A; NEPTUNE Initial J t Plan by the
A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, UNITED ANCXF, the CinC 2 1 AGp, and the Air CinC
STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washing- AEAF, 1 Feb 44, NJC 1004, copy 1 0 0 , SHAEF RG
ton, 1951), App. B. 910.
4 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
five hundred miles contained enough to the Continent lagged behind the plan-
port facilities to receive and nourish a ners’ expectations, and the 31 air squad-
powerful military force. T h e Seine ports rons that operated from 17 continental
of Rouen and Le Havre; Cherbourg; St. airfields contrasted with the planners’ re-
Malo, Brest, Lorient, and Vannes in quirements for 62 squadrons based on
Brittany; St. Nazaire and Nantes at the 27 fields. In addition, the small Allied
mouth of the Loire-these and a number beachhead was crammed and congested.
of smaller harbors had the capacity to Airstrips were so close to the beaches
handle the flow of men and materiel that flight operations sometimes inter-
deemed necessary to bolster and augment fered with ground traffic. Carentan, a
the invasion force. (See Maps I, VIII, XII.) major communications center on the
T h e planners felt that Allied troops single lateral road held by the Allies, was
could take the lodgment area in three little more than three miles from the
months, and in June the Allies had front, and the city and its small but im-
already secured a small part of it. After portant highway bridge received periodic
seizing the landing beaches, the troops shelling from German field artillery.
pushed inland to a depth varying from Caen, a D-Day objective, still remained
five to twenty miles. They captured in German hands and blocked the ap-
Cherbourg and the minor ports of St. proaches to the Seine over a compara-
Vaast, Carentan, Isigny, and Grandcamp. tively flat plain that favored tank war-
They possessed a good lateral route fare and the construction of airfields.4
of communications from Cherbourg, T h e disparity between plans and real-
through Valognes, Carentan, and Bay- ity prompted speculation as to whether
eux, toward Caen. Almost one million the Allies had lost their momentum,
men, about 500,000 tons of supplies, and whether a military stalemate had already
over 150,000 vehicles had arrived on the been reached, and whether trench war-
Continent. 3 fare similar to that of World War I was
Despite this impressive accomplish- to recur. It also caused revision of the
ment, certain deficiencies were apparent. build-up schedules. Additional combat
According to the planners’ calculations, troops were ferried to the Continent a t
the Allies at the end of June should have
4 Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory,
held virtually all of Normandy within “Despatch, Air Operations by the Allied Expedi-
the confines of the lodgment area; in tionary Air Force in N.W. Europe, November 1944,”
actuality, they occupied an area scarcely Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette of De-
cember 31, 1946 (January 2, 1947) ; PS/SHAEF (44)
one fifth that size. T h e amounts of per- 13 (Final), SHAEF Plng Staff, POST-NEPTUNE Plng
sonnel, equipment, and supplies brought Forecast 1, 27 May 44, and SHAEF (44) 17, Com-
ments on NEPTUNEInitial Jt Plan and Annexes,
1 2 Feb 44, both in SGS SHAEF File 381, Post-OVER-
* Maps numbered in Roman are in accompanying LORD Plng; Annex A to SHAEF/1062/7/GDP, 17
map envelope. Jun, Summary of Manoeuvre, SHAEF File 307.2,
3Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of Logistic Studies; CS (44) 16th Mtg (19 May), Min
the Armies, Volume I , UNITED STATES ARMY of CofS Conf, SGS SHAEF File 337/3; IX Engr
IN WORLD WAR I I (Washington, 1953) (here- Comd Prog Rpt, 8 Jul, and 5th ESB Tel Rpt, 28
after cited as Ruppenthal. Logistical Support, I), Jun, FUSA G-3 Jnl File; Ruppenthal, Logistical
42 1, 422, 422n. Support, I, 415-16.
T H E ALLIES 5
TYPICAL
COTENTINTERRAIN,
looking westward from U T A H Beach.
the expense of service units. T h e dis- little choice. Their basic need was
ruption of the planned equilibrium of space-room for maneuver, space for the
combat and service troops was not seri- build-up, and more depth in the beach-
ous, for the lines of communication were head for security.5
short and required only a small adminis- Tied to the need for space was a corol-
trative establishment; but if the Allies lary requirement for port capacity. Cap-
suddenly surged forward and overran a
5Ltr, General Dwight D. Eisenhower to Lt Gen
large area, the disproportionately small Omar N. Bradley, 25 Jun, FUSA G-3 Jnl File;
number of service troops might prove Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New
unequal to the task of maintaining ade- York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948). pp 245,
265; Answers by Lt Gen Walter B. Smith and Maj
quate logistical support. Despite this Gen Harold R. Bull to questions by members of
unpleasant possibility, the Allies had the Hist Sec. ETOUSA. 14-15 Sep 45, OCMH Files.
6 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ture of Cherbourg had confirmed the ing quick success in their endeavors, the
expectation that the Germans would Allies were not aware of the heartbreak-
destroy the major harbors before allow- ing combat that awaited them in Nor-
ing them to fall to the Allies. T h e de- mandy. T h e difficulty of the campaign
struction of the Cherbourg facilities had in July was to exceed the forebodings of
been so thorough that extensive and the most pessimistic, even as compar-
lengthy rehabilitation was necessary. atively rapid advances in August were
Although restoration of the minor ports to surpass the prophecies of the most
was practically complete by the begin- daring.
ning of July, their facilities could accom- T h e operations in western Europe
modate only a relatively insignificant comprised but one act of the larger per-
portion of the build-up requirements. formance on the stage of World War II.
Consequently, as anticipated by the plan- In widely separated theaters of opera-
ners, the Allies were relying on impro- tions the war against the Axis powers
visation at the invasion beaches. At the had entered the decisive phase. In the
end of June the Allies did not yet appre- same month that Allied troops invaded
ciate the surprisingly large tonnage ca- western Europe, U.S. forces in the Pacif-
pacities developed there. What seemed ic invaded the Marianas and gained an
more important were the effects of a important naval victory in the Philip-
severe Channel storm that had occurred pine Sea. In Burma and India, the
between 19 and 21 June, a storm that had Allies put the Japanese on the defensive.
interrupted logistical operations, de- In southern Europe the capture of Rome
ranged shipping schedules, diminished prompted the Germans to start with-
the rate of build-up, and destroyed be- drawing 150 miles up the Italian penin-
yond repair one of two artificial harbors. sula toward Florence and Pisa. OnIy in
This seemed to indicate beyond doubt China was the enemy still conducting
the pressing need for permanent installa- offensive operations, but this was to be
tions that would be serviceable in the his last major attack of the war. T h e
autumn and winter as well as the sum- Russians broke the Mannerheim Line in
mer of 1944. 6 Securing major continental Finland and were gathering strength for
ports to sustain the invasion effort advances in the Minsk area and western
depended on the acquisition of more Ukraine, and also in Poland and Ruma-
space, and so the Allies hoped to expand nia. Arrangements were being com-
their continental foothold to gain first pleted for an Allied invasion of the
the ports of Brittany and later those of Mediterranean coast of France in sup-
the Seine. port of OVERLORD.
Though achievement had not kept Of all these actions, the cross-Channel
pace with the blueprint, there was good attack was perhaps the most dramatic.
reason in the summer of 1944 for Allied It illustrated clearly that the Allies had
confidence in ultimate victory. Expect- taken the initiative. By the summer of
1944, Allied strategy rather than Axis
6Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 406-15; Msg, aims had become the controlling factor
NCWTF to ANCXF, 28 Jun, FUSA G-3 Jnl File. in the bitter struggle.
THE ALLIES 7
Brest. A move to the Seine ports, a partmentalized character that was bound
more direct thrust toward Germany, was to impose limitations on the Allies. It
the bolder course of action, but unless restricted maneuver and by the same
the Germans were already withdrawing token favored the German defense. T h e
from France or at the point of collapse, natural limitations were further aggra-
success appeared dubious. More logical vated by a man-made feature encoun-
was an American drive southward to cap- tered at every turn, the hedgerow, the
ture the Breton ports while the British result of the practice of Norman farmers
and Canadians covered American opera- for centuries of enclosing each plot of
tions by striking through Caen and later arable land, pasture as well as orchard,
toward the Seine. A major impediment no matter how small.
to this course of action was the terrain. T h e hedgerow is a fence, half earth,
(Map I) half hedge. T h e wall at the base is a
T h e ground that was to serve as the dirt parapet that varies in thickness from
battlefield in July was of a diversified one to four or more feet and in height
nature.15 On the Allied left was the from three to twelve feet. Growing out
Caen-Falaise plain, gently rolling open of the wall is a hedge of hawthorn,
country of cultivated fields and pastures, brambles, vines, and trees, in thickness
dry and firm ground suitable for large- from one to three feet, in height from
scale armored operations and airfield three to fifteen feet. Originally prop-
construction. Facing the Allied center erty demarcations, hedgerows protect
between the Orne and Vire Rivers were crops and cattle from the ocean winds
the northern fringes of a sprawling mass that sweep across the land. They pro-
of broken ground-small hills, low vide the inhabitants with firewood. De-
ridges, and narrow valleys-gradually limiting each field, they break the ter-
rising in height toward the south. West rain into numerous walled enclosures.
of the Vire River in the Carentan area Since the fields are tiny, about zoo by
was a marshy depression crisscrossed by 400 yards in size, the hedgerows are in-
sluggish streams and drainage ditches. numerable. Because the fields are ir-
On the extreme right of the Allied front, regular in shape, the hedgerows follow
between the marshland and the coast, a no logical pattern.
cluster of hills dominated the country- Each field has an opening in the hedge-
side and gave the Germans a solid anchor rows for human beings, cattle, and
for their left flank. wagons. For passage to fields that do
With the exception of the Caen- not lie adjacent to a road, innumerable
Falaise plain, the battlefield had a com- wagon trails wind among the hedgerows.
T h e trails appear to be sunken lanes,
Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudesand where the hedgerows are high and
Economiques, Régions géographiques de la France
(Paris, n.d.) , pp. 263-65; British Admiralty, Hand- the tops overarch and shut out the light,
book Series, France, 3 vols. (London, 1942), Vol. they form a cavelike labyrinth, gloomy
I, p. 12, fig. 7. and p. 18, Vol. II, passim; Atlas Bot.
and damp.
tin, 2 vols. (Paris, 1951), II, 145; Opn Plan NEPTUNE
(20 May 44) ; First U.S. Army, Report of Opera- XXII, all references cited as First U.S. Army, Report
tions, 20 October 1943–1 August 1944, 7 vols. (Paris, of Operations, are to the 20 October 1943–1 August
1945), I, 124-25. In footnotes through Chapter 1944 report. See also footnote 13, Chapter XXIII.
12 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
MAP I
From a tactical point of view, each ons fire, and limit the use of armor and
field is a tiny terrain compartment. the supporting arms.
Several adjoining fields together form a T h e hedgerow is the most persistent
natural defensive position echeloned in feature in the Cotentin. Unimpressed
depth. T h e abundant vegetation and by fine terrain distinctions, American
ubiquitous trees provide effective cam- soldiers called the whole area the hedge-
ouflage, obstruct observation, hinder the row country, often simply “this goddam
adjustment of artillery and heavy weap- country.” Many troops had already be-
T H E ALLIES 13
Tactics
T h e OVERLORDand NEPTUNEplans
had been so concerned with the scope
and complexity of the problem of getting
troops ashore on the Continent that the
bulk of the invasion preparations had
pointed only toward the initial assault.
In comparison to the wealth of material
on the physiography of the coastal
region, little attention had been given
to the hedgerows inland. Operational
techniques had not been developed, nor
had special equipment been devised.
T h e combat units had devoted little
HEDGEROW POSITION in the Cotentin.
time in England to training for hedgerow
tactics.
Looking beyond the landing, some rilla war of ambush against the superior
British officers, particularly those who armies of the Republic.17
had withdrawn across France toward Other invasion planners had found
Cherbourg in 1940, were convinced that argument to support the contrary con-
the Allies could not wage effective war- tention. They felt that the natural
fare in the hedgerows against a strongly defensive features of the hedgerow coun-
established enemy. Such leaders as try would aid the Allies in maintaining
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief their initial continental foothold during
of the British Imperial General Staff, the critical early period of the build-up.
and Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Morgan, They believed that the Germans would
the chief COSSAC planner, were among be unable to stop an attack mounted
those who anticipated serious difficul- across a wide front. And they expected
ties.16 They remembered also the poorly enough progress to be made by the Brit-
armed Chouans, who in the last decade ish through Caen, the gateway to the
of the eighteenth century had utilized Seine, to outflank the Cotentin. 18
the hedgerows to fight an effective guer- Failure to secure Caen by 1 July was
the greatest single disappointment of the foothold. Retaining the initiative and
invasion. A vital communications center, avoiding setbacks and reverses were
Caen was the key to operations eastward the guiding principles that determined
to the Seine and southeastward to the his course of action.20
Paris-Orleans gap. Held by the Germans These aims were paradoxical. Retain-
who blocked the comparatively flat plain ing the initiative was possible only by
that invited the use of armor and continued offensive operations; yet this
the construction of airfields, Caen also course was often risky because the Ger-
offered harbor installations for small mans had massed the bulk of their
ships. Three groups clamored for the armor in front of the British sector of
capture of Caen: the proponents of operations.21 If in trying to maintain a
armored warfare, who were in search of balance between offense and defense
mobility; the tactical air force engineers, General Montgomery seemed to give
who were looking for airfield sites; and more weight to preventing Allied re-
the logistical organizations, which were verses, he was motivated by his belief
seeking port facilities. In addition, con- that holding the beachhead securely was
tinued German occupation of Caen more important at that time. By direct-
seemed to be dramatic evidence of Allied ing General Dempsey to make a series of
impotence. Without Caen, the Allies limited objective attacks with his British
were vulnerable to an enemy armored Second Army during June, however,
thrust to the sea, a drive that would, if General Montgomery had prevented the
successful, split the Allied foothold and Germans from regrouping their forces
imperil the entire invasion effort. T o for a major counterattack and thus had
some observers, the failure to take the denied them the initiative.22
city savored of hesitation and excessive From the equilibrium that General
caution .19 Montgomery established, a corollary
Conspicuously untroubled about principle was evolved. Unable to move
Caen, and apparently unaware of the through Caen for the moment, General
concern the situation was causing, Gen- Montgomery reasoned that if he could
eral Montgomery directed the tactical “pull the enemy on the Second Army,”
operations on the Continent with what he would facilitate the U.S. First Army
might have seemed like exasperating advance to the south. General Eisen-
calm. For Montgomery, the com- hower had come to the same conclusion
mander of the Allied ground forces, the and expressed the hope that General
important factors at this stage of the Bradley could attack south while Mont-
campaign were not necessarily the cap- gomery had “got the enemy by the
ture of specific geographical objectives,
or even the expansion of the continental
2021 AGpDir, M–502, 18 Jun, Pogue Files.
21See below, Ch. 11.
19
Lewis H. Brereton, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., 22Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of
T h e Brereton Diaries (New York: William Morrow Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic (Boston: Hough-
and Company, 1 9 4 6 ) , p. 287; Captain Harry C. ton Mifflin, 1948), p p 86, 108; see also Field
Butcher, USNR, My Three Years W i t h Eisenhower Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein.
(New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1946), p. Despatch (New York: T h e British Information
581. Services, 1946), p. 6.
T H E ALLIES 15
throat on the east.”23 Both men were fire what turned out to be un-co-or-
harking back to the OVERLORD concept, dinated thrusts.25 T h e situation then
which had proposed that the British in- became relatively calm.
stitute operations toward the east in T h e results of General Montgomery’s
order to cover American operations to activity were clear in retrospect. He
the south. Attracting the bulk of the had held the eastern flank firmly and
enemy strength was a dangerous game, had continued to keep a great part of
but the Germans, for other reasons, had the German strength on the British
already concentrated a larger part of front. But if this had been General
their power in front of the British sector. Montgomery’s basic intention, his ap-
General Montgomery thus had little parent determination to take Caen had
alternative but to contain these forces. obscured it. Even General Eisenhower
He had begun to do so even before the seemed bewildered, particularly since
Americans were ready to attack to the Montgomery had informed him that the
south. While the U.S. First Army was British offensive launched on 25 June
driving north toward Cherbourg, Gen- was to be a “blitz attack.” 26
eral Montgomery had planned an attack General Montgomery had certainly
by the British Second Army to insure, as wanted Caen. That he had not secured
he later wrote, “the retention of the bulk it led to inevitable comparison and con-
of the enemy armour on the Second trast of the British and the American
Army front.” 24 operations. On 18 June General Mont-
Originally set for 18 June, the British gomery had given the Americans the
attack had been postponed because cer- “immediate task” of seizing Cherbourg
tain essential units were still unloading and the British the “immediate task” of
on the beaches and artillery ammunition capturing Caen. He had quickly changed
was temporarily in short supply. Not the British task after judging the diffi-
until a week later, on 25 June, had the culties too great for immediate execu-
British Second Army jumped off—its tion. T h e Americans had secured Cher-
objective the capture of Caen and bridge- bourg on schedule.27
heads across the Orne River south of Debate had already arisen over Gen-
that city. Rainy weather and deter- eral Montgomery’s intentions, a debate
mined enemy resistance balked the Brit- that was to grow as time passed. Did
ish of gaining their objectives, and Caen Montgomery, from the beginning of the
remained in enemy hands. Yet the invasion, plan to attract and contain the
nearness of the British to Caen threat- bulk of the German power to facilitate
ened the city, and on 29 June, in order an American advance on the right? Or
to insure retention of it, the Germans did he develop the plan later as a ration-
launched a large-scale counterattack. alization for his failure to advance
T h e British dispersed by massed artillery
25 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 94,
97, 101; see below, Ch. II.
23Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-30, 25 Jun, 26Montgomery to Eisenhower; M-30, 25 Jun,
SGS SHAEF File 381, OVERLORD, I (a); Eisenhower SHAEF Incoming Msgs.
to Montgomery, 25 Jun, Pogue Files. 2721 AGp Dirs, M-502 and M-504, 18 and 19
24Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 94. Jun, Pogue Files; Pogue Intervs.
16 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
through Caen? Was he more concerned sector offered terrain more favorable for
with conserving the limited British man- offensive operations, American troops in
power and was his containment of the July were to undertake the unenviable
enemy therefore a brilliant expedient task of launching a major attack in the
that emerged from the tactical situation Cotentin through terrain ideally suited
in June? 28 T h e questions were interest- for defense.
ing but irrelevant, for the Germans had Romans, Franks, Bretons, and Nor-
massed their power opposite the British mans had fought on the Cotentin, and
without regard for General Mont- innumerable skirmishes had occurred
gomery’s original intentions. there between the English and the
Whatever Montgomery’s intent- French. But since the devastating civil
which was obviously not clear to other wars of religion and revolution, little
Allied commanders at the time-the Brit- had disturbed the tranquillity and
ish seemed to be stalled before Caen. prosperity of the inhabitants. Even the
Denied access to the desirable terrain German occupation had had little effect
east of Caen and to the main approaches on the habits of people who were mainly
to the Seine and Paris, the Allies concerned with the problems of cattle
looked to General Bradley’s U.S. First breeding and the production of butter
Army for operational progress. Thus it and cheese. Although they had “prayed
came about that, although the British for an Allied landing,” they had “hoped
that it would take place far from
28Pogue Intervs; Memo, Eisenhower for Pogue,
10 Mar 47; 21 AGp CinC Notes, 15 Jun 44; 21 AGp them.” 29 They were not spared. Where
Dirs, M– 5.02, 18 Jun, M– 505, 30 Jun; Photostatic megalithic monuments of prehistoric
copy of Gen Montgomery’s address, Brief Summary times lay beside the remains of medieval
of Opn OVERLOR 7 Apr 44; Stateme concerning
British manpower strength, no title, n.d., in folder monasteries, the armies of World War
labeled CALA Docs, Cables and Dirs, etc. All six II marked the land in their turn, creating
in Pogue Files. Montgomery, Normandy to the their own historic ruins to crumble with
Baltic, pp. 21-24; Chester Wilmot, T h e Struggle
for Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952) , the others.
pp. 336-41 ; Harrison Cross-Channel Attack, p. 181;
Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 183ff; Omar N .
Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holr 29Robert Patry, St.-Lô (St. Lô, 1948), page 14
and Company, Inc., 1951), pp. 325-26. of Eugene Turbonlt’s English translation.
CHAPTER II
The Enemy
At the beginning of July 1944, Ger- addition to the responsibility and the
many was the target of military opera- nominal command borne by all heads of
tions on four fronts: the Soviet drive in states, Hitler exercised a direct control
the east, the partisan warfare in the over military operations. He deter-
Balkans, the Allied operations in Italy, mined the military strategy on all fronts
and the Allied offensive in western and supervised closely the formulation
France. Only in Scandinavia did Ger- of plans and their execution. Increas-
man military forces enjoy the quiet of a ingly, as the struggle continued, he con-
relatively static situation. trolled the tactical operations of the
Of the four fronts, the Balkan battle- troops. This close control of the mil-
field was of minor importance, and the itary was perhaps inevitable. T h e py-
Italian sector, where the Germans fought ramidal hierarchy of command reached
a delaying action as they fell back, was its ultimate in him.
of secondary significance. T h e Eastern With an active and bold imagination,
Front, engaging the preponderance of and often displaying an astute grasp of
German resources, was of most concern military matters, Hitler could co-
to the Germans, although the cross-Chan- ordinate his military objectives and his
nel attack had posed a more direct threat political goals far better than anyone
to the homeland, and for a brief time- else in Germany. Though by 1944
until the Russians launched their sum- Hitler had delegated to others many of
mer offensive late in June-the Nor- his governmental functions, he felt that
mandy front was more important. From he could not afford to do so in the mil-
July on, the Eastern and Western Fronts itary realm. T h e urgency of the life and
received nearly equal attention from death struggle with the Allies, he was
those directing the German war effort, convinced, compelled him to give his
though far from equal resources. personal attention even to relatively
Exhausted by almost five years of war, minor problems, and his self-assumed
its Navy powerless, its Air Force reduced commitments overworked him.
to impotence, and able to offer serious As head of the state, Hitler bore the
resistance only on the ground, Germany title of Fuehrer. 1 As such, he was also
seemed on the verge of defeat.
1 The fol lowing account is based on: Harrison,
T h e Machinery of War Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 128ff; Pogue Supreme
Command, pp. 175ff; James B. Hodgson, The Ger-
Adolf Hitler was directing the war. In man Defense of Normandy, OCMH MS R-24; Capt.
18 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ence in defensive planning, the three ington:6Herbert Rosinski, T h e German Army (Wash-
Infantry Journal, Inc., 1944), 185ff; Fuehrer
commanders acted in unison when the Dir 40, quoted in translation in Harrison, Cross-
Allies assaulted the beaches. Rommel Channel Attack, App. A.
9See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 247,
gave battle on the coast, Rundstedt be- 348–49, 373–74. The commander of Panzer Group
gan to prepare a counterattack, and West is hereafter referred to as Geyr.
T H E ENEMY 23
from gaining a major port, at least until West, under the control of Army Group
the counterstroke, now planned for 25 B , was to direct the tactical operation,
June, was launched. While the master which would now be launched no earlier
counterattack was being prepared to oust than 5 July. T h e purpose of the attack
the Allies from Normandy, Hitler was was to split the Allies on the coast and
unwilling to yield cheaply what he cor- dispose of each separately.
rectly judged to be an important link in As tactical plans for the Bayeux of-
the projected chain of Allied logistics. fensive were being readied and troops
Despite Hitler’s wishes, the defense of and supplies assembled, the British
Cherbourg was disappointing. 12 German launched their attack toward Caen on
troop confusion, inadequate provision- 25 June. 15 Almost at once the local com-
ing of the fortress, and the vigor of the mander defending Caen judged that he
American attack were disheartening to would have to evacuate the city. To
the Germans. T h e field marshals con- retain Caen the Seventh Army on 26
centrated their efforts on mounting the June prepared to employ the troops as-
still pending major counterattack, even sembling for the Bayeux offensive, not in
though Hitler continued to recommend the planned offensive mission but for
counterattacks designed to aid the Cher- defensive reasons, to counterattack the
bourg defenders. 13 British. Before the commitment of this
Conferring with Hitler at Soissons on force, however, the situation eased and
17 June, the field commanders agreed to became somewhat stable. Nevertheless,
launch through Bayeux what they all German apprehension over the possibil-
hoped would be the decisive counter- ity of continued British attacks in the
attack. 14 A reorganized Panzer Group Caen sector did not vanish.
At this time not only the commanders
in the west but also OKW passed from
12After capture of the city, the American corps thinking in terms of offensive action to
commander asked, but the German commander
(who had been taken prisoner) refused to answer, an acceptance of a defensive role. 16 “No
why he had defended the high ground around matter how undesirable this may be,”
Cherbourg, good outer defensive positions, instead
of retreating to the better inner ring of forts to
Rundstedt informed OKW, “it may be-
make his stand. Maj William C. Sylvan, former come necessary to commit all the new
senior aide to Lt Gen Courtney H. Hodges, Deputy forces presently moving up-in an effort
Comdr, First Army, Personal Diary (hereafter cited
as Sylvan Diary), entry of 27 Jun. Major Sylvan
to stop and smash . . . the British attack
kept his diary, dealing primarily with General expected to start shortly southeast from
Hodges’ activities, with the approval of General
Hodges. A copy is on file in OCMH through
courtesy of Major Sylvan.
13 Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 411-12,
442; A G p B K T B , 17 Jun; OB WEST K T B , 24 Jun, 17 Jun; Der Westen (Schramm) ; Hans Speidel,
Anlage 295, 27 Jun, Anlage 355, and 28 Jun, Anlage Invasion 1944 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company,
375; Der Westen (Schramm) ; for a more detailed 1950), pp. 92–99.
explanation, see Martin Blurnenson and James B. 15Ltrs, Rommel to Rundstedt, and Speidel to
Hodgson, “Hitler versus his Generals in the West,” OQu West, 2 1 Jun, A G p B 1a Operationsbefehle;
United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Decem- see above, Ch. I.
ber, 1956). 16OB WEST K T B , 25 Jun, Anlage 306. T h e
14Ecksparre Min, A G p B K T B , Anlagen, Fall best evidence of the changing attitude is found in
1940–Sep 1944, Annex 17; Notes in the Jodl Diary, OB WEST K T B , 26 Jun.
T H E ENEMY 25
Caen.” 1 7 So serious had the British Rundstedt had long been convinced
threat appeared on 2 5 June that Rund- that if only a defensive attitude were
stedt and Rommel fleetingly considered possible, it would be hopeless to expect
withdrawing to a line between Avranches ultimate success in the war. 21 Rommel,
and Caen. 18 too, became persuaded that the German
By withdrawing to an Avranches-Caen chance of victory was slim. 22 More than
line the Germans would have good Rundstedt perhaps, Rommel felt that
positions from which to hold the Allies the Allied naval guns employed as long-
in Normandy. Yet such an act might range artillery would prevent the Ger-
also be interpreted by higher headquar- mans from ever regaining the invasion
ters as the first step in a complete with- beaches, and significantly he had plotted
drawal from France. Keitel and Jodl the first objectives of the Bayeux attack
had agreed soon after the invasion that just outside the range of Allied naval
if the Germans could not prevent the gun fire. 23 By 15 June Rommel had
Allies from breaking out of their beach- admitted that the front would probably
head, the war in the west was lost.19 have to be “bent out” and Normandy
T h e point in question was a definition of given up because the danger of an Allied
the term beachhead. Would not a with- attack toward Paris from Caen was worse
drawal from the lines already established than a possible threat to Brittany.24
give the Allies the space and maneuver Hitler nevertheless remained firm in
room to launch a breakout attempt? his resolve. Even though Rundstedt in-
T h e alternatives facing the German sisted that the focal point was Caen,
field commanders late in June seemed Hitler kept thinking in terms of an
clear: either the Germans should mount attack west of the Vire River to save or
the Bayeux offensive and attempt to regain Cherbourg. He cared little
destroy the Allied beachhead in a single whether the reserves gathered near Caen
blow, or they should abandon hope of were used for offensive or defensive pur-
offensive action and defend aggressively poses.
by counterattacking the British near Tactical developments in the Caen
Caen.20 T h e British, by acting first, had sector bore out the apprehensions of the
temporarily nullified the possibility of field marshals. There seemed to be no
offensive action, and this seemed to crys- alternative but to commit additional
tallize a growing pessimism among the reserves against the doggedly persistent
German commanders in the west. British. T h e only troops available were
those of the II SS Panzer Corps with- tackled the important problems of logis-
drawn from the Eastern Front and slated tics and mobility. Goering and Doenitz
to initiate the Bayeux offensive. T h e were to hamper Allied logistics and deny
corps jumped off on 29 June in an the Allies mobility; they were to give
attack that, if successful, would disrupt the German ground forces a measure of
the British beachhead, but it was in no protection for their supply system, there-
sense the contemplated decisive master by assuring them a certain degree of
blow. mobility. Until these missions were
On that day, 29 June, Rundstedt and executed, the ground forces had to hold
Rommel were at Berchtesgaden, where every inch of ground in a stubborn de-
they listened as Hitler enunciated his fense. Unless Hitler could insure for
strategy. 25 Acknowledging that Allied his troops at least temporary protection
air and naval supremacy prevented a from Allied planes, offensive maneuvers
large-scale German attack for the mo- on a large scale were out of the question.
ment, Hitler deemed that, until an attack Until he could secure a more favorable
could be launched, the Germans had to balance of supply, he could not launch
prevent the development of mobile war- the decisive action designed to gain a
fare because of the greater mobility of conclusive victory.
the Allied forces and their supremacy Whether or not Hitler believed that
in the air. T h e German ground troops Goering and Doenitz with the obviously
must endeavor to build up a front inadequate forces at their disposal could
designed to seal off the beachhead and give him what he wanted, he proceeded
confine the Allies to Normandy. Tac- on the assumption that they might.
tics were to consist of small unit actions When Rundstedt and Rommel re-
to exhaust the Allies and force them turned to the west on 30 June, they
back. In the meantime, the German learned that the German counterattack
Air Force and Navy were to disrupt north of Caen had bogged down. T h e
Allied logistics by laying mines and brief presence, for once, of German
attacking shipping. More antiaircraft planes over the battlefield, until dis-
protection against Allied strafing and persed by Allied air forces, had been
bombing was to permit the German ineffective. T h e larger situation in
Army to regain a freedom of movement Normandy resembled an intolerable im-
for troops and supplies that would en- passe. While the Allied build-up pro-
able the field forces to launch a decisive ceeded smoothly, the Germans were hav-
offensive sometime in the future. ing great difficulty reinforcing the battle-
Thus, the ground troops in Normandy field; destroyed bridges and railroads
were to assume a defensive role tem- and Allied air strafing during daylight
porarily, while the Air Force and Navy hours made this task nearly impossible.
With the balance of force in Normandy
swinging in favor of the Allies, continued
25Wolfram’s Min, 1 Jul, in A G p B K T B , Annex German defense seemed a precarious
33; Jodl Diary, 29 Jun; ONI Fuehrer Confs; Der course of action. Such was the basis on
Westen (Schramm) ; Harrison, Cross-Channel
Attack, pp. 445ff. which the field marshals now formally
T H E ENEMY 27
26AGp B K T B , 1830, 29 and 30 Jun; Harrison, Study in Command, I, 46-47; Der Westen
Cross-Channel Attack, p. 446. (Schramm) .
27ONI Fuehrer Confs, 12 Jun; Harrison, Cross- 2 8D e r Westen (Schramm) .
Channel Attack, pp. 411, 412, 447; OB W E S T , a 29 OB WEST Ia KTB, 1 Jul.
28 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
to the position warfare tactics of World the Allied invasion three weeks before,
War I was desirable. T h e Germans only Rommel remained in command,
needed “to build an insurmountable and even he had supposedly asked Hitler
barrier in front of the enemy along the at Berchtesgaden how he still expected
tactically most adantageous line, from to win the war.33
which the enemy numerical and materiel Hitler was not impressed with the pro-
superiority must be beaten down with fessional abilities of his senior officers in
every conceivable means.” If the Ger- the west. T h e Germans had failed in
mans could fight a war of attrition over June. T h e Allies had established a firm
a long period of time, using all the guns beachhead in Normandy. Cherbourg
in their arsenal, antiquated or not, they had fallen. A major German counter-
would perhaps be able some time in the offensive had failed to materialize. A
future to launch a counterattack with fresh armored corps had been committed
specially chosen and trained troops to with no apparent result.
inflict a defeat on the Allied forces on T h e Germans had massed troops for
the Continent.30 a decisive counterattack that did not
In complete disagreement, Rundstedt get started. When the German frame
called Keitel, chief of the OKW, and of reference changed from an offensive
stated that he did not feel u p to the to a defensive cast, it seemed fortunate
increased demands. Whether he meant to find the bulk of the German strength
the increased demands placed on him by in Normandy opposite the British. For
higher headquarters or the increased the Caen sector appeared to lead directly
demands of an impossible situation was to Paris, and that was where the Ger-
perhaps a deliberate ambiguity.31 Read- mans figured the Allies intended to go.
ing Rundstedt’s message as a request for As the German ground action became
relief, as an admission of defeat, or sim- defensive in character, Hitler placed his
ply as an expression of disagreement, main reliance on air and naval effort and
Hitler relieved his commander in chief hoped that Goering and Doenitz would
in the west on 2 July. T w o days later, correct the balance of power then un-
Hitler also relieved Geyr, the command- favorable to the Germans. Until this
er of Panzer Group West, who had had occurred, the German ground troops
the temerity to initiate a report crit- were to hold fast and preserve a vital
icizing the “tactical patchwork” in the condition-a restricted Allied beach-
west-a report endorsed and transmitted head-for the offensive action that was
up the chain of command to Hitler.32 eventually to “throw the Anglo-Saxons
Of the field commanders who had met out of Normandy.” 34
30 “Ia Notitzuer Chef,” 1 Jul, OB WEST KTB, 32Der Westen (Schramm) ; Rommel to Rund-
Anlage 415. stedt, 2400, 30 Jun, AGp, B Ia Operationsbefehle;
31Taetigkeitsberichte des Chefs des Heeresper- P z G p W K T B , Anlagen, Annex 33a; Harrison,
sonalamtes, 1 Jul; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 445, n.880. Headquarters
pp. 446–47. OB WEST KTB, 3 July, clearly states have been personalized as much as possible in the
that Rundstedt requested relief for reasons of health citations in the interest of brevity.
and age. This contrasts with his later denials of 33Liddell Hart, T h e Rommel Papers, pp. 480-81.
ever having requested relief. 34Handakte Chef A b t . Fremde Heere West, Jun.
T H E ENEMY 29
with infantry. On 1 July some 35,000 tively meager forces in southern France
combat infantrymen were moving toward six divisions-four infantry, one panzer
the front to make this substitution. grenadier, and one armored-all under
When the infantrymen eventually sup- orders or marching toward Normandy at
planted the armor in defensive positions the end of June.
during the month of July, Army Group Only the Fifteenth Army remained
B hoped to have two army sectors nearly untouched. T h e few divisions it had
equally manned. Nine armored divi- sent to Normandy had been replaced by
sions, most relieved by the infantry, units brought from Norway and Den-
would be in immediate reserve.45 mark. At the beginning of July the
T o obtain this hoped-for disposition, Fifteenth Army, deployed between the
the Germans had reinforced the battle Seine and the Schelde, still had seven
area in Normandy by virtually depleting divisions under direct control and
by 1 July their reserves in the west. T h e directed four subordinate corps that
First Parachute Army, under OKL con- controlled eleven additional divisions.
trol, was only a small headquarters the- T h e Germans had refused to divert
oretically performing an infantry train- this strong force into Normandy because
ing mission in the interior of France they expected a second Allied invasion
and could, in extreme emergency, be of the Continent in that area. German
counted as a reserve force. OKW con- estimates throughout June had consid-
trolled only one parachute regiment; ered an Allied invasion of the Pas-de-
O B WEST had no units in reserve. Calais-the Kunalkueste-a strong possi-
Army Group B had an armored division bility. 48 They were convinced that
and an armored regiment still uncom- launching sites of a new weapon-the
mitted. T h e Seventh Army had not yet V -1 -on the coast of northern France
committed one SS panzer division and and Belgium constituted a challenge the
one parachute division. Panzer Group Allies could not ignore. T h e Pas-de-
West had nothingin reserve. 46 Calais was the section of continental
T o get troops to the battlefield in Nor- Europe nearest to England, and an Al-
mandy, the Seventh Army had stripped lied assault there could be supplied most
its forces in Brittany of four divi- easily and supported by air without in-
sions and two regiments, and a fifth divi- terruption. T h e fact that this Channel
sion was to come forward early in July. 47 coast area also offered the shortest route
T h e commander of the Netherlands to the Rhine and the Ruhr was not ig-
forces had furnished one division. Army nored. 49
Group G had contributed from its rela- 48The term Pas-de-Calais is here and hereafter
used in the loose sense as designating the coast line
4 5 See James B. Hodgson, “Counting Combat between the Somme River and Gravelines (near
Noses,” Combat Forces Journal (September, 1954) , Dunkerque) . See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack,
pp. 45-46, for a definition and explanation of Ger- p. 450.
man combat effectives. 49Hitler Ltr of Instr, 8 Jul, cited n. 44; OB
46Hodgson, R-24, Order of Battle, 6 Jun and 3 WEST, a Study in Command, I 37; JIC (44) 276
Jul, Apps. D and F; MS # P-154. (O) (Final) and JIC (44) 287 (O) (Final), Ger-
47James B. Hodgson, German Troops Withdrawn man Appreciation of Allied Intentions in the West,
from Brittany, 6 June to 15 July 1944, OCMH MS 26 Jun and 3 Jul, Pogue Files. For the V-1. see
R-34. below, p. 34.
32 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
and a certain number of recruits and been destroyed, barges moving on the
foreigners. 52 Seine from Paris to Elbeuf and an
T o replace combat losses in the vari- eighty-mile overland route for trucks
ous units in the face of competition be- and horse-drawn wagons from Elbeuf
tween Himmler and Goering for the to Caen formed perhaps the most de-
limited German manpower was no easy pendable line of communications. All
task. In late 1942 the Germans had highways and other supply routes were
set u p training, or reserve, divisions de- overcrowded and in constant danger of
signed to furnish replacements for units Allied air attacks during daylight hours.
in combat. Originally these divisions Units traveling to reinforce the front
had had an occupation role, which had had to move in several echelons, reload
not impaired their training function, several times en route, and march a good
but later they became garrison troops, part of the way on foot, mostly at night.
and when occupying coastal sectors they Transportation difficulties also created
were upgraded to field divisions. Thus, supply and equipment shortages. At
instead of existing for the purpose of the beginning of July, the deficit in fuel
supplying replacements to the combat amounted to over 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 gallons per
forces, they were themselves eventually day. Of daily requirements figured at
in need of replacements. 53 tons oammunition, 1,000 tons of 1 , 0 0 0
Although diversity of units, competi- fuel, and 2 5 0 tons of rations, only about
tion between services, and a defective re- 400 tons of all classes of supply could be
placement system prevented the Ger- brought to the front.54 That the quar-
mans from maintaining combat forma- termaster general of the west had to bor-
tions at authorized strengths, the difficul- row fifteen machine guns from the mili-
ties of transportation comprised the most tary governor of France in order to fill
important reason for manpower short- a request from the Cherbourg garrison
ages on the front. By the end of June, illustrated into what straits German sup-
when the railroads were badly damaged ply had fallen.55 For lack of depend-
by Allied air atttack and all the Seine able and long-distance railroad routes,
River bridges except those at Paris had armored divisions wore out valuable
equipment on the highways before get-
ting to the combat area. T h e major
52 Behind the front the Organization Todt, a highways to Normandy were littered
paramilitary formation of German and foreign with wrecked vehicles. Movement was
laborers, both hired and impressed, was an auxiliary possible only during darkness, and that
construction force. Formed in 1938 to build the
West Wall, Todt helped Army engineers repair at a snail’s pace.56
roads, build bridges, and construct fortifications. Conspicuous by their absence from
Order of Battle Annex 9, Semi.Mil Servs, XV Corps the battlefield were the planes of the
G–2 Per Rpt 25, 28 Aug.
55WD TM–E 30-451, Handbook on German Third Air Fleet. German ground
Military Forces (Washington, 15 March 1945) ; troops grimly joked that Allied aircraft
SHAEF Intel Notes of 24 Aug 44, German Replace-
ments to the Normandy Battle Area, FUSA G–2 Jnl
and File; Order of Battle Annex 2, 17 Luftwaffen 54Hodgson, R-24.
Feld Division (Air Force Field Div) . 18 Aug. XV 55OB WEST OQu WEST K T B , 2 1 and 24 Jun.
Corps G–2 Per Rpt 16, 19 Aug. 56 OB WEST, A-Study in Command, I , 91ff:
34 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
were painted silver, while German planes launching sites. Despite air force pro-
in contrast were colorless and invisible: tests that the bombardment (Operation
“In the West they say the planes are in CROSSBOW) diverted planes from their
the East, in the East they say they’re in primary offensive mission, and despite
the West, and at home they say they’re the fact that air bombardment of the
at the front.” Of an authorized 500 sites was an inadequate defense against
aircraft in the west, the Germans had the reality of the V-1 attack and the po-
about 300 planes, of which only about tentiality of the V–2, General Eisen-
go bombers and 70 fighters could get off hower on 29 June ordered the air attacks
the ground at any one time because of to “continue to receive top priority.”
shortages of spare parts and fuel. This Without effective defenses to combat
small number could not challenge the either the V-1 or the V–2, the Allies
Allied air supremacy. 57 could only hope that ground forces on
By July there was, however, a new the Continent would soon overrun the
weapon in operation that gave the Ger- launching sites. Though the guided
mans hope of redressing their discour- missile attacks caused widespread death
aging situation. Air missiles called the and destruction in England, they had no
V–1 (originally after Versuchmuster, effect on Allied tactical or logistical op-
meaning experimental model, later erations. Yet in late June and early
Vergeltungswaffe, translated vengeance July the V–1’s and the V–2’s were a
weapon) and launched for the most part “threat of the first magnitude” to the
from the Pas-de-Calais area had on 13 Allied command, for “no member of the
June begun to fall on England in a cam- Allied forces, at any level, knew exactly
paign that was to last eighty days. Ad- what the new German weapons might
mittedly a terror agent directed at the accomplish.” 58
civilian population, the V–1’s were in- Though many difficulties and disad-
tended as a reprisal for Allied air at- vantages faced the German ground sol-
tacks on German cities. T h e campaign diers, morale was generally high. Dis-
reached its greatest intensity during the
seven-day period ending 8 July, when a 58Royce L. Th ompson, Military Impact of the
total of 820 missiles were counted ap- German V-weapons, 1943–1945. MS, OCMH; Lt Col
proaching the English coast. T h e Ger- Melvin C. Helfers, The Employment of V-weapons
by the Germans during World War II, OCMH
mans soon began to launch some V-1’s Monograph; Magna Bauer, The German With-
from medium bombers. Though they drawal From the Ardennes (May 1955). R- 59;
were not to appear until early Septem- Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds.,
The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. III,
ber, the allieslearned inJuly thatV–2 Europe: Argument to V – E Day (Chicago: The Uni-
weapons, supersonic rockets deadlier versity of Chicago Press, 1951) (hereafter cited as
than the V–1’s, were almost ready for AAF III), p. XXV, Chs. IV and XV; Eisenhower,
Crusade in Europe, pp. 259–60; SGS SHAEF File
operational use. 381, CROSSBOW.Allied concern over German jet-
Allied bombers had since 1943 been propelled planes, another new development,
prompted warnings to the ground forces that any
attacking V-weapon installations, par- jet aircraft that were shot down were to be guarded
ticularly those diagnosed as ground so that AEAF personnel could make a technical
examination of the remains. VII Corps Opns Memo
57MS #C–017 (Speidel) . 36, 1 3 Jul.
T H E ENEMY 35
The Situation
American campaign and the operations in Sicily.
In the fall of 1943 he was called to Eng-
General Bradley was responsible for land to command both the U.S. 1st
the conduct of American operations in Army Group and U.S. First Army. As
Normandy. His mild and modest man- commander of the 1st Army Group,
ner might easily have led those who did General Bradley supervised the planning
not know him to underestimate his of the U.S. ground units that were to
qualities as a commander in combat. participate in OVERLORD. 2 As com-
But General Eisenhower judged that he mander of the First Army, he directed
had “brains, a fine capacity for leader- the American elements in the invasion
ship, and a thorough understanding of assault.3 Under the control of General
the requirements of modern battle.” 1 Montgomery, temporarily the Allied
General Bradley was to prove more than ground commander, General Bradley, as
equal to his tasks. the senior American field commander on
During most of his early career Gen- the Continent, enjoyed a far wider lati-
eral Bradley had alternated between as- tude of action than would normally
signments at the U.S. Military Academy have been granted him had he been di-
and the Infantry School, both as student rectly under an American commander.4
and instructor. After Pearl Harbor, as T h e land force that General Bradley
a division commander, he directed in commanded at the beginning of July
turn the training activities of two di- consisted of four corps headquarters and
visions. He received his first overseas thirteen divisions-nine infantry, two
assignment as deputy commander of armored, and two airborne. Not all the
General Patton’s II Corps, in North units had been tested and proved by
Africa. When General Patton relin-
quished the corps command in order to
212th AGp AAR, I, 5.
form the Seventh U.S. Army headquar- 3 The First Army staff assisting General Bradley
ters for the invasion of Sicily, General on the Continent was formed about a nucleus of
Bradley became the corps commander veterans. One tenth of the headquarters officers,
over 30 individuals, had had combat experience in
for the remainder of the North African the Mediterranean. Maj. Gen. William B. Kean.
the chief of staff, Col. Joseph J. O’Hare, the G–1,
Col. Benjamin A. Dickson, the G–2, Col. Truman
1 Ltr, Gen Eisenhower to General George C. C. Thorson, the G–3, and Col.Robert W. Wilson,
Marshall, 24 Aug 43, as quoted in parchmented MS the G–4, belonged in this category. First U.S.
by Forrest C . Pogue, The Supreme Command, Ch. Army, Report of Operations, I 14–15.
I, p. 73, OCMH Files. 4 Bradley, Soldier’s Story, pp. 209–10 350.
T H E SITUATION 37
combat, but except for one armored and taneously, the VIII Corps offensive was
two infantry divisions all had had some postponed.6
battle experience during June. Sched- On the day that Cherbourg fell—26
uled to lose both airborne divisions in June—General Bradley had again di-
the near future, General Bradley mo- rected the advance south toward Cou-
mentarily expected the arrival of two tances, this time to begin on or about
additional infantry divisions and soon 1 July, VIII Corps moving out first and
thereafter several armored divisions. the other corps following on army order.
Even while the focus of the U.S. First Once more the operation had to be de-
Army effort had been directed north layed because tactical regrouping and
toward Cherbourg in June, General logistical arrangements were not com-
Bradley had tried to get an American pleted in time. 7
attack to the south started. General On the last day of June General Brad-
Montgomery had urged him not to wait ley received from General Montgomery
until Cherbourg fell before extending the formal instructions that were to gov-
his operations southward toward la Haye- ern his action in July. Montgomery
du-Puits and Coutances. General Eisen- took his cue from the NEPTUNEplan,
hower had reminded Bradley to “rush which had projected a wheeling move-
the preparations for the attack to the ment, as opposed to a north–south axis
south with all possible speed,” before of advance in the OVERLORD plan, and
the Germans could rally and seal off the directed the U.S. First Army to pivot
First Armyin the Cotentin. 5 on its left in the Caumont area. Wheel-
T h e attack had depended on the ar- ing south and east in a wide turn, the
rival in France of the VIII Corps, a First Army was to find itself, upon com-
headquarters assigned to the U.S. Third pletion of the maneuver, facing east
Army but attached temporarily to the along a north–south line from Caumont,
First. Operational on the Continent on through Vire and Mortain, to Fougéres,
15 June, the VIII Corps had assumed its right flank near the entrance into
control of those forces holding a line Brittany. At this point in the opera-
across the base of the Cotentin Peninsula tions General Patton’s Third U.S. Army
and had protected the rear area of the was to become operational and move
troops driving toward Cherbourg. Gen- south and west to seize Brittany, while
eral Bradley had instructed the VIII the First Army, in conjunction with the
Corps commander to attack to the south British and Canadian forces on the left,
on 22 June, but the Channel storm of was to advance east toward the Seine
19–21 June disrupted logistical opera- and Paris. Desiring “drive and energy,”
tions and caused a temporary shortage General Montgomery wanted General
of artillery ammunition. Because the
Cherbourg operation and the attack to
the south could not be supported simul- 6First U.S. Army, Report Of Operations, I, 82;
VIII Corps AAR, Jul; Montgomery to Eisenhower,
M–30, 25 Jun, SGS SHAEF File 381, Opn OVERLORD,
I (a) ; Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, pp. 303–04.
521 AGp Dir, M– 5, 19 Jun, Pogue Files; Ltr, 7 FUSA FO 1 , 26 Jun; First U.S. Army, Report of
Eisenhower to Bradley, 25 Jun, FUSA G–3 Jnl File. Operations I, 82.
38 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Bradley, once started, to continue with- time, as the elements on both sides of
out pause.8 the Vire River would be on similar ter-
General Bradley’s revised and final rain, he would be able to deliver an at-
order disclosed his intention to accom- tack with equal effectiveness from either
plish his mission in several phases. He his left or his right. Then he would
named the Coutances—Caumont line as be ready to begin another operation in
the immediate objective of the First further compliance with General Mont-
Army attack that was to start on 3 July. gomery’s directive to wheel on his left
T h e main effort was to be made in the to the Fougères–Mortain–Vire–Caumont
Cotentin.9 line. But first Bradley had to move the
Not all of the U.S. troops were in the forces on his right across the waterlogged
Cotentin. In the left portion of the area west of Carentan.
army sector, east of the Vire River, This swampy terrain was a natural
Americans lightly held a salient in bo- position for defense. There, in 1940,
cage terrain, where the small hills, while the French had established a line and
not particularly favorable for offensive had endeavored to prevent the Germans
action, were not discouragingly adverse. from capturing Cherbourg. In 1944
Since the middle of June, while the the Germans were holding approxi-
major portion of the American strength mately the same positions they had oc-
had been operating against Cherbourg cupied four years earlier, but this time
on the army right, the troops near St. they were on the defensive 11 . T h e area
Lð and Caumont had remained inactive was excellent for defense because of the
because General Bradley had been un- prairies marécageuses. Large marshes
willing to divert to them resources sometimes below sea level, the prairies
needed for the drive on Cherbourg, and appear to be ancient arms of the sea, land
because offensive activity on the left partially reclaimed from the ocean.
could have extended the salient and per- Open spaces that seem absolutely flat,
haps opened a gap between the American they are breaks in the hedgerow country
and the British forces. 10 It was this lat- providing long vistas across desolate
ter factor that prompted General Brad- bogs.
ley to initiate the attack to the south There are five of these large swamps
across the damp spongy ground of the on the Carentan plain. Four are lo-
Carentan plain. ( S e e Map I.) cated along rivers draining into the Ca-
At the conclusion of the attack on the rentan bay—the Merderet, the Douve,
right, and with his troops holding the the Taute, and the Vire. T h e river
Coutances—St. Lð—Caumont line, Gen- beds are so close to sea level that the
eral Bradley would have his entire army water does not flow at a discernible rate
on firm dry ground, terrain suitable for of speed but rather oozes toward the
offense by mechanized forces. At that ocean; often the streams appear stag-
nant. T h e fifth marsh or bog, called
821 AGp Dir, M– 505, 30 Jun, Pogue Files.
9 FUSA FO 1 (rev), 1 Jul.
10See Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 374, 11See Jacques Mordal, “La Defense de Cher-
376–77; First U.S. Army Report of Operations, I, bourg,” La Revue Maritime, New Series No. 76
72–73. (August, 1952), 963–80.
T H E SITUATION 39
the corridors of advance was thereby T h e VIII Corps, which comprised the
intensified. army right flank on the west coast of the
T h e U.S. forces by the beginning of Cotentin, was to advance through la
July had secured jump-off positions on Haye-du-Puits to Coutances, a longer dis-
the dry land of the Carentan plain. tance than that down the corridors lead-
These were obvious to the Germans, ing south from Carentan to Périers and
who held superior ground on the bo- St. Lô. By having VIII Corps begin its
cage hills that ring the Cotentin marshes. advance first, General Bradley expected
With excellent observation of American all the army elements to reach the ob-
movements, the Germans were able to jective line at the same time. T h e VII
mass their fires with such accuracy that Corps, alerted to advance along the Ca-
American commanders warned drivers rentan—Périers axis, and that part of
against halting their vehicles at cross- the XIX Corps west of the Vire River,
roads, near bridges, or in towns; drivers positioned for an advance from Caren-
were to proceed briskly through inter- tan toward St. Lô, were to go into ac-
sections, to take cover during a forced tion in turn, from right (west) to left
halt, and, if not able to camouflage their (east).
vehicles when stopped, to get clear with- Although General Bradley thus ex-
out delay.13 Even far behind the front, posed himself to criticism for piecemeal
care had to be exercised. When a tank commitment, he had no other logical
destroyer unit disregarded the warnings choice.15 T h e VII Corps headquarters,
of military police and crossed a bridge which had hurried south from Cher-
on a main route three miles behind the bourg to take a sector at Carentan,
front line, a division provost marshal needed time for orientation. T h e XIX
renounced his “responsibility” for the Corps required troops that were in the
safety of that unit.14 process of arriving from the landing
Three corridors of advance lead beaches. But with higher headquarters
through the Carentan plain, each marked impatiently demanding that the offen-
by a road. One goes along the west sive to the south get underway at once,
coast of the Cotentin from la Haye-du- and with the attack having been post-
Puits to Coutances. Another runs from poned twice before, General Bradley
Carentan southwest to Périers. T h e felt that he could not delay. Further-
third goes south from Carentan to St. more, waiting until all units could at-
Lô. General Bradley decided to make tack simultaneously would give the en-
his main effort along the coastal road, emy more opportunity to prepare his
for that corridor is the widest and the defenses, an opportunity the Germans
ground the most firm. Along this axis, had certainly exploited during the pre-
but in reverse, the Germans had broken vious two-week period of inactivity.
through the French defenses in 1940 and Although most of the Americans fac-
gained Cherbourg. ing the hedgerow and marshy terrain
of the Cotentin were aware of the dif-
131st AGp Observers Gp Ltr, 1 Jul, VIII Corps ficulties to come, the opposite had been
G–3 Jnl File.
1482d Abn Div G–3 Jnl, 0130, 2 Jul. 15See VIII Corps AAR, Jul.
T H E SITUATION 41
true before the invasion. American of- sprayed the flank hedgerows and the far
ficers for the most part had known lit- side of the field to be taken with cover-
tle of the hedgerow country. Few had ing fire. T h e infantry advanced along
seen the hedgerows, and air photos gave the flank hedges to the next lateral row
no real appreciation of what they were and cleared the enemy out at close range.
like. If most American commanders With the field thus secured, one section
had not been able to visualize hedgerow of tanks moved forward, while the other
fighting, most of the soldiers had not remained temporarily at the rear to
even been able to imagine a hedgerow. eliminate enemy troops that might sud-
Not until the U.S. troops entered the denly appear from a concealed point or
hedgerows in June had they begun to from an adjacent field. White phos-
have an idea of how effectively the ter- phorus shells from 4.2-inch chemical
rain could be used for defense.16 mortars and artillery could be brought
T h e hedgerow fighting in June had to bear on stubborn enemy groups. l7
been so difficult that many units made Advancing from one field to the next
special studies of the problem. Most and clearing out individual hedgerows
concluded that the principles of tactics was a costly and slow procedure. It
taught at T h e Infantry School at Fort exhausted the troops and brought a high
Benning, Georgia, applied in this ter- rate of casualties, but the slow plodding
rain as elsewhere. T h e task was to pin technique seemed necessary since “blitz
the enemy down with a base of fire and action by tanks” was usually unsuccess-
maneuver an element along a covered ful. A rapid armored advance generally
approach to assault from the flank. In resulted in only bypassing enemy groups
Normandy the lateral hedgerows marked that held up the infantry that was fol-
not only the successive lines of advance lowing.18
and the positions for a base of fire but Several drawbacks complicated the
also the enemy defensive positions; simple type of small unit attack devel-
hedges parallel to the line of advance oped in June. One difficulty was mov-
could be made to serve as covered ap- ing armor through the hedgerows. T h e
proach routes. openings that -already existed in the en-
As this technique developed in June, closures for wagons and cattle were well
a refinement emerged. T h e tank-in- covered by German antitank gunners,
fantry team operating toward a short ob- and the appearance of an American tank
jective and with a simple plan proved to prompted an immediate reaction. Al-
be effective. T h e objective was always though it was possible for a tank to
the same, the next hedgerow. T h e plan climb the smaller hedgerow banks, the
was to provide for simultaneous advance tank’s most vulnerable part, the rela-
of armor and infantry and their mutual tively lightly armored underbelly, was
support. As it usually worked out, a
tank platoon supporting an infantry
company fired through the lateral hedge 17 XIX Corps, The Tk-Inf Team, 24 Jun, VIII
Corps G–3 Jnl File, Jul; 507th Parachute Inf
that marked the line of departure and AAR, Jun and Jul.
18 FUSA Armd Sec Memo 1 Lessons from Com-
16 Answers by Gens Smith and Bull, 14–15 Sep 45 bat in Normandy, 19 Jun, 30th Div G–3 Jnl File.
42 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
22Maj Gen Leonard T. Gerow to Gen Bradley, 24See, for example, John Miller, jr., CART-
0905,27 Jun, and 90th Div Operational Memo 8, WHEEL: The Reduction of Rabaul, UNITED
2 Jul, FUSA G–3 Jnl File. STATES ARMY I N WORLD WAR II (Washing-
23First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, ton, 1959).
121–22. 25See CI 47 (8th Div) .
44 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ginning to appear in the west, increased bazooka carried by the individual sol-
Allied concern.28 dier, could be employed with any hope
In contrast, the heaviest British tank of consistent success.
used in Europe, the Churchill, was not Although experiments were being
quite 40 tons, while the all-purpose made in the United States to improve
Sherman, the American medium tank the armor-piercing quality of ammuni-
used by the British as well, weighed only tion, General Eisenhower in early July
30. Most of the Shermans mounted the wrote to General George C. Marshall,
relatively low-powered 75-mm. gun at Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, “We cannot
this time, although a few carried a 76- wait for further experimentation.” 29
mm. gun or a 105-mm. howitzer. T h e T h e 90-mm. guns, organic at this time
primary weapon of the American light to the antiaircraft artillery gun battal-
tank was the 37-mm. gun, although a ions, seemed to offer a means to im-
few were beginning to be equipped with prove antitank defense and armor capa-
the 75-mm. gun. bilities in the attack. But greater
Though German tanks were more numbers of this weapon were needed,
heavily armed and armored than Allied both for tank destroyers and for tanks.
tanks, they had the disadvantages of be- So urgent was this need that General
ing less mobile and less dependable me- Eisenhower sent a special representative
chanically. Also, in contrast with Allied to the United States to expedite not
armor, they lacked a power-driven tra- only delivery of the 90-mm. guns but also
versing turret; the German hand-oper- research on improved armor-piercing
ated firing turrets could not compete ammunition. At the same time, in the
with those of the Allied tanks, but they field General Bradley was attaching 90-
were more than adequate for long-range mm. antiaircraft artillery gun battalions
action. to ground combat elements for defense
American antitank weapons and am- against armor, since the weapon of this
munition were not generally effective unit was the only one “sure to pene-
against the frontal armor of the heavier trate” the front of the heavier German
German tanks. It was necessary to at- tanks.3o
tack enemy tanks from the flanks, and At the end of June the apparent supe-
the restricted terrain and narrow roads riority of German tanks seemed par-
of the hedgerow country made this dif- ticularly serious. Searching for evidence
ficult. Even from the flanks, American of a forthcoming enemy counterattack
weapons were not wholly effective. against the Allied foothold, Allied in-
Only the 2.36-inch rocket launcher, the telligence estimated that 230 Mark IV,
150 Mark V (Panther), and 40 Mark VI
(Tiger) tanks faced the Allies. T o these
28 See XIX Corps AAR, Jul, for a descriptive could be added the tanks of three elite
sheet on enemy armor circulated to the troops.
This sheet lists the dimensions of the enemy tanks
and has photographs of the Mark IV and V. Op- 29Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jul, Pogue
posite the Mark VI listing there is a large ques- Files.
tion mark and the inscription: “None met yet- 30Ltr, Gen Bradley to Maj Gen J. Lawton Col-
will YOU get the first?” lins, 6 Jul, FUSA G–3 Jnl File.
46 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
German
to adopt the methods of combat of the mander, Marcks, had been killed early
enemy with all his ruses and tricks.” 38 in June, and OKW had appointed Gen-
Because of the planning for offensive eralleutnant Dietrich von Choltitz to
action in June, the bulk of German take his place. While Choltitz was travel-
strength was still concentrated in the ing from the Italian front to take u p his
Caen sector under Panzer Group W e s t . new post, General der Artillerie Wilhelm
In comparison, the Seventh Army, with Fahrmbacher had temporarily left his
a defensive mission of preventing the corps command in Brittany to lead the
Americans from driving south, was ex- LXXXIV Corps in the Cotentin. Chol-
pecting the imminent arrival of a single titz assumed command on 18 June, and
armored division. T h e army had three Fahrmbacher returned to Brittany.
relatively fresh infantry-type divisions Responsible for the area west of the
four composite units of battered t r o o p Vire River to the Cotentin west coast,
that were divisions in name alone, one Choltitz in reality had two sectors
detached parachute regiment, and three separated by the Prairies Markcageuses
kampfgruppen. Of two sorts, kampf- de Gorges. A panzer grenadier divi-
gruppen were mobile combat teams of sion, reinforced by an infantry kampf-
regimental size formed from static of gruppe and a separate parachute regi-
infantry divisions with organic or req- ment, defended on the right (east). On
uisitioned transport to meet the crisis the left, elements of five infantry divi-
of the invasion, or they were improvised sions were deployed in an outpost posi-
field formations used to organize rem- tion and on a main line of resistance.
nants of combat units. T h e kampfgrup- Desiring a deeper defense, Choltitz had
pen in the Seventh Army sector at the on his own initiative delineated addi-
beginning of July were of the first type; tional lines of defense in the rear, lines
during July many were to become the he had not divulged to higher headquar-
second sort. ters for fear of appearing to controvert
T h e Seventh Army had two corps, the Hitler’s instructions to hold fast. In
II Parachute and the LXXXIV. The II the center and to the rear, a parachute
Parachute Corps, which had moved from regiment, under OKW control, con-
Brittany in mid-June, held a sixteen- stituted the corps reserve.
mile sector between the Vire and the T h e strength of the German defenses
Drðme Rivers. Responsible for the St. in the Cotentin stemmed not so much
Lð–Caumont area, the corps controlled from the quality or the number of the
two divisions and two kampfgruppen. troops as from the nature of the terrain
On the extreme left (west) of the Ger- occupied. T h e soldiers of the static
man positions in Normandy, the coastal divisions that had met the initial
LXXXIV Corps faced the Americans in onslaught of the Allied invasion were
the Cotentin. T h e initial corps com- older personnel, many of limited duty,
equipped for the most part with a variety
38Report of combat experience, “Erfahrung der of weapons that were not the most
Panzer-Bekaempfung an der Invasionsfront Nor- modern. These units, as well as others
mandie,” Sonderstab Oehmichen, z. Z t . Oberbefehl- that had arrived later, had sustained very
shaber West Ic/Pz. Offz., 25 Jun, A G p B K T B
Anlage, 29 Jun; MS # B– 731 (Fahrmbacher). heavy losses during the June fighting.
50 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Yet the ground they held in the Cotentin mandy was a gamble. As Rundstedt
was so favorable for defense that the and Rommel had pointed out, if the
Germans could look forward with con- Allies succeeded in penetrating the Ger-
fidence to the forthcoming American man positions, the absence of defensive
attack. lines between Normandy and the Ger-
American preoccupation with Cher- man border meant that the Germans
bourg in June and the German decision would have to withdraw from France.
to contest not that main effort but the Lacking mobility comparable to that of
anticipated drive to the south had the Allies meant that the withdrawal
resulted in a two-week respite in the would probably turn into retreat and
Cotentin that the Germans had used to rout. Yet the fact was that the German
advantage. They had fashioned a troops held the best positions they could
coherent defense.39 hope for in France. T h e line was rela-
Despite excellent defensive prepara- tively short; the terrain was naturally
tions—Eberbach facing the British with strong; the battlefield imposed serious
a deep-zone defense, Hausser facing the restrictions on Allied deployment.
Americans and utilizing the terrain to Only a small sector of open ground near
advantage-holding the line in Nor- Caen was difficult to defend. With
reserves on the way, the Germans could
reasonably hope to hold out until the
decisive counterattack or the miracle
39MS # B–418 (Choltitz) ; Dietrich von Choltitz,
Soldat unter Soldaten (Konstanz–Zurich–Wien:
promised by Hitler turned the course
Europa Verlag, 1951). of the war.
PART TWO
F.Temple
MAP3
westward extension of the marécage nar- the VII Corps Artillery. Only on the
rowed the corps zone south of la Haye- afternoon before the attack did he learn
du-Puits. T o replace the airborne that he was also to have extensive air
troops, the 8th Division was to join the support. In accordance with routine
corps upon its arrival in France. Ex- procedure, the air liaison officer at corps
pecting to use the 8th Division beyond headquarters had forwarded a list of five
the initial objective, staff officers at corps targets considered suitable for air bom-
headquarters tentatively scheduled its bardment-suspected supply dumps and
commitment to secure the final objec- troop concentration areas deep in the
tive, Coutances. enemy rear. A telephone call from
Thus the VIII Corps was to make First Army headquarters disclosed that
its attack with three divisions abreast. General Eisenhower had made available
Each was to secure a portion of the a large number of aircraft for employ-
heights forming a horseshoe around la ment in the VIII Corps zone. When
Haye-du-Puits: the 79th was to seize the assured “You can get all you want,” the
Montgardon ridge on the west and Hill corps commander submitted an enlarged
121: the 82d Airborne was to capture request that listed targets immediately
Hill 131 and the triplet hills of the in front of the combat troops. 2
Poterie ridge in the center: and the 90th, Allied intelligence was not altogether
making the main effort, was to take in agreement on the probable German
Mont Castre on the east. With the reaction to the American offensive. Ex-
commanding ground about la Haye-du- pecting a major German counterattack
Puits in hand, the 79th Division was to momentarily, higher headquarters an-
push south to Lessay. There, where the ticipated strong resistance.3 On the other
tidal flats of the Ay River extend four hand, the VIII Corps G–2, Col. Andrew
miles inland and provide an effective R. Reeves, thought either a counter-
barrier to continuing military opera- attack or a strong defense most unlikely.
tions southward, the 79th was to halt Because of the inability or reluctance of
temporarily while the 90th continued the Germans to reinforce the Cherbourg
with the newly arrived 8th.1 garrison, because of their apparent short-
Two problems confronted VIII Corps age of artillery ammunition and their
at the start of the attack: the hedgerow lack of air support, and because of the
terrain north of la Haye-du-Puits and
the German observation points on the 2 VIII Corps G–3 Jnl File, 2 Jul. Requests for
air support usually came from the G–3 Air Sec-
commanding ground around the town. tion of a division and were funneled through the
T o overcome them, General Middleton corps and army G–3 Air Sections to the IX TAC,
placed great reliance on his nine bat- which fulfilled the requests according to the
availability of planes. For a detailed study of
talions of medium and heavy artillery, air-ground liaison, see Kent Roberts Greenfield,
which included two battalions of 240- Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle
mm. howitzers; he also had the tem- Team Including Organic Light Aviation, AGF
Study 35 (Hist Sec, AGF, 1948), particularly pp.
porary assistance of four battalions of 69ff.
8 21 AGp Dir, M–505, 30 Jun, Pogue Files;
1VIII Corps AAR, Jul. FUSA G–2 Est 7, 29 Jun.
56 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
fragmentary nature of German units and allotted for the attack revealed tem-
underestimated German organizational porary removal of restrictions and a new
efficiency and flexibility. T h e First system of self-imposed unit rationing.
Army G–2 cautiously estimated that the Although ammunition stocks on the
German infantry divisions in Normandy Continent were not copious, they
averaged 75 percent of authorized appeared to be more than adequate.
strength and lacked much equipment. Even though officers at First Army
But the VIII Corps G–2 judged that warned that unreasonable expenditures
among the enemy forces on his im- would result in a return to strict con-
mediate front “the German divisional trols, the implicit premise underlying
unit as such . . . has apparently ceased to the relaxation of controls for the attack
exist.” 6 Perhaps true in the last week of was the belief that each corps would have
June, the latter statement was not ac- to make a strong or major effort for only
curate by the first week in July. two days. Two days of heavy artillery
For all the optimism, combat patrols fire by each corps was considered ade-
noted that the Germans had set up an quate to propel the army to the Cou-
exceptionally strong outpost screen, re- tances–Caumont line.8
plenished their supplies, reorganized In the two days immediately preced-
their forces, and resumed active recon- ing the attack, U.S. units on the VIII
naissance and patrolling. It was there- Corps front noted a marked change In
fore reasonable to assume that the enemy enemy behavior. German artillery be-
had strengthened his main line of resist- came more active; several tanks and as-
ance and rear areas. Morale had un- sault guns made brief appearances; small
doubtedly improved. On the other arms, automatic weapons, and mortar
hand, intelligence officers judged that fire increased in volume; infantrymen
enemy morale and combat efficiency had seemed more alert. American patrols
risen only from poor to fair. Germans began to have difficulty moving into hos-
still lacked aggressiveness when patrol- tile territory. Only in the corps center
ling; critical shortages of mines and wire could reconnaissance patrols move more
existed; and artillery fired but sporadi- freely into areas formerly denied them.
cally, indicating that the Germans were From these indications, corps concluded
undoubtedly conserving their meager that the enemy was preparing to make a
ammunition supplies to cover delaying show of resistance before withdrawing.9
action as they withdrew. 7 Commanders and troops making last-
Confidence and assurance gained in minute preparations for the jump-off
the Cherbourg campaign led most Amer- watched in some dismay a few minutes
icans to expect no serious interruption after midnight, 2 July, as a drizzling rain
in the offensive to the south. A schedule began to fall. T h e early morning
of artillery ammunition expenditures attack hour was fast approaching when
the rain became a downpour. It was
6 FUSA G–2 Est 7, 29 Jun; VIII Corps G–2 Est 8 FUSA Ltr, Fld Arty Ammo Expenditures, 2
2, 28 Jun. Jul, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl File; 83d Div G–2 G–3
7 82d Abn Div Rev Intel Annex to FO 7 (Rev), Jnl and File, 2 and 3 Jul.
28 Jun, and G–2 Est, 1 Jul. 9 VIII Corps Weekly Per Rpt, 1 Jul.
58 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
obvious that the heavy air program Cherbourg and to build a strong line
promised in support of the offensive across the Cotentin from Portbail to the
would have to be canceled. 10 As events Prairies Marécageuses de Gorges 11 . By
developed, not even the small observa- insisting on compliance with original
tion planes, invaluable for locating plans for a forceful defense of Cher-
artillery targets in the hedgerow coun- bourg, however, Hitler had disrupted
try, were able to get off the ground. the German commanders’ plan. As a
Despite this early disappointment, the result, the troops in the south were
attack otherwise began as scheduled. weaker than had been hoped. T h e des-
American troops plodded through the ignated chief of the forces in the south
darkness and the mud toward the line (Generalleutnant Heinz Hellmich of
of departure. At 0515, 3 July, the artil- the 243d Division) was killed in action on
lery started a 15-minute preparation. 17 June, and Col. Eugen Koenig (the
acting commander of the 91st Infantry
T h e Defenses Division, whose general had died on 6
June) became the local commander
T h e Germans had no intention of responsible for erecting a defense to halt
falling back. From the high ground the expected drive to the south.
near la Haye-du-Puits, so dominating Koenig had had available a total of
that observers on the crests could watch about 3,500 combat effective soldiers of
Allied shipping off the invasion beaches, several units: remnants of the 91st and
Germans studied the preparations for 243d Divisions, a kampfgruppe of the
the attack they had been expecting for 265th Division (from Brittany), and mis-
almost two weeks. They were ready. cellaneous elements including Osttrup-
Yet despite their readiness, they were pen, non-German volunteers from east-
almost taken by surprise. T h e state of ern Europe. Together, the troops com-
affairs harked back to the development posed about half the effective combat
of the LXXXIV Corps defenses west of strength of a fresh infantry division.
the Prairies Marécageuses de Gorges. With these few forces, but with adequate
In June, just before American troops artillery in support, Koenig had fash-
had cut the Cherbourg peninsula and ioned a line that utilized marshland as a
isolated the port, Rundstedt, Rommel, defensive barrier.
Dollman, and Fahrmbacher had decided When Choltitz had taken command
to divide the LXXXIV Corps forces into of the LXXXIV Corps, he had soon come
two groups-one in the north to defend to the conclusion that he could not
Cherbourg, the other to block American depend on Koenig to hold for long.
movement south. Their intention had American paratroopers of the 82d Air-
been to leave weak forces in defense of borne Division had actually penetrated
the marsh line as early as 12 June. 12
10FUSA G–3 Jnl, 0340, 3 Jul. Note: The hours Koenig’s forces were too weak to
of the day in this volume are British Double Time
when used in connection with Allied activities,
one hour earlier for the Germans-so that 1300 11Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 413ff;
for the Allies is the same as 1200 (noon) for the Hodgson, R–24, R–34, and R–49.
Germans. 12
Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 402.
T H E OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED 59
eliminate the penetration or to hold the Koenig’s marsh line marked on maps as
positions already seriously threatened. the main defenses in the area, the fresh
T h e Osttruppen were not always reli- troops of the 353d Division seemed un-
able.13 Besides, Choltitz felt that the occupied. In order to use them, OKW
high ground near la Haye-du-Puits was ordered Hausser to have Choltitz move
better defensive terrain. He therefore the 353d to replace the panzer grenadiers
had his reserve units—the 353d Division, in the eastern portion of the corps sector.
which had just arrived from Brittany, T h e panzer grenadiers were to dis-
and remnants of the 77th Division- engage and become a mobile reserve for
establish positions on the Montgardon the Seventh Army. With the 353d
ridge and on Mont Castre. T h e ridge scheduled to depart the high ground
defenses, sometimes called the Mahl- around la Haye-du-Puits, Choltitz had to
mann Line after the commander of the reduce the Mahlmann Line to the reality
353d, were hastily organized because of of a rally line manned entirely by the
anxiety that the Americans might attack kampfgruppe of the 77th.
at any moment. When the positions By 3 July the 77th Division troops
were established, Choltitz regarded them had moved to the eastern part of Mont
as his main line of resistance. Think- Castre, while the 353d was moving from
ing of Koenig’s troops as manning an ridge positions to assembly near Périers.
outpost line, he expected them to resist T h e VIII Corps attack thus occurred at
as long as possible and eventually to fall a time of flux. Members of the
back to the ridge line. LXXXIV Corps staff had correctly
In contrast with Choltitz’s idea, Rund- assumed, from the noise of tank motors
stedt had recommended that the main they heard during the night of 2 July,
line of resistance be established even that an American attack was in the mak-
farther back—at the water line formed ing, and they had laid interdictory fires
by the Ay and Sèves Rivers. Although on probable assembly areas. But judg-
Choltitz did not place troops there, he ing that the rain would delay the jump-
considered the water line a convenient off—on the basis that bad weather neu-
rally point in case withdrawal from the tralized American air power—theSeventh
la Haye-du-Puits positions became Army staff mistakenly labeled the VIII
necessary. 14 Hitler, who disapproved of Corps offensive only a reconnaissance
all defensive lines behind the front be- in force with tank support. T h e real
cause he feared they invited withdrawal, American intention soon became ap-
wanted Koenig’s positions to be held parent to both headquarters, however,
firmly. T o inculcate the idea of hold- and Hausser and Choltitz recalled the
ing fast, he had Koenig’s defenses desig- 353d Division from Périers and reposi-
nated the main line of resistance. With tioned the men on the high ground
about la Haye-du-Puits. 15Hitler’s desires
13 Telecon, Choltitz to Hausser, 30 Jun, Sev- notwithstanding, these positions became
enth Army Tel Msgs. the main line of resistance.
14Pz Lehr Div I b K T B , Allg. Anlagen, Annex
241; see MS # B–418 (Choltitz) for an account of
L X X X I V Corps activity, 18 Jun to 15 Jul. Choltitz, I5Seventh Army and A G p B KTB’s, 3 Jul; Tages-
Soldat unter Soldaten, p. 187 is rather confused. meldungen, O B W E S T K T B , Anlage 433.
60 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
As a result of the last-minute changes fore departing the Continent for Eng-
that occurred on 3 July, the Germans land. Having fought on French soil
opposing VIII Corps were able to since D Day, the airborne division had
defend from positions in depth. Fanned lost about half its combat strength. Yet
out in front was Group Koenig, with it still was an effective fighting unit,
parts of the 91st, the 265th, and the with three parachute infantry regiments
243d Divisions on the flanks, and east and one glider infantry regiment form-
European volunteers (including a large ing the principal division components.
contingent of Russians) generally hold- T h e troops had been carefully selected
ing the center. Artillery support was for airborne training only after meeting
more than adequate—the entire division special physical and mental standards.
artillery of the 243d, plus two cannon T h e division had participated in World
companies, five antitank companies, a War II longer than most units in the
complete tank destroyer battalion, and European theater, and its members
an assortment of miscellaneous howitz- regarded with pride their achievements
ers, rocket launchers, antiaircraft bat- in Sicily and Italy. T o an esprit de
teries, captured Russian guns, and sev- corps that sometimes irritated others by
eral old French light tanks. Behind its suggestion of superiority, the aggres-
Group Koenig, the 353d and a kampf- sive veterans added a justifiable respect
gruppe of the 77th were to defend the and admiration for their leaders. Maj.
high ground of the Montgardon ridge Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the division
and Mont Castre. T h e 2 d SS Panzer commander, displayed an uncanny
Division, assembling well south of St. ability for appearing at the right place
Lô in Seventh Army reserve, was able at the right time. His inspiring
to move, if needed, to meet a serious presence, as well as that of the assistant
threat near la Haye-du-Puits. 16 Even division commander, Brig. Gen. James
closer, in the center of the LXXXIV M. Gavin, was responsible in no small
Corps sector, south of Périers, was one degree for the efficiency of the unit.17
regiment (the 15th) of the 5th Para- I n the center of the VIII Corps sector,
chute Division (still in Brittany). the 82d Airborne Division held a line
Although under OKW control, it could across the tip of a “peninsula” of dry
probably be used in an emergency to ground. In order to commit a max-
augment the la Haye-du-Puits defenses. imum number of troops at once, Gen-
All together, the German forces were eral Ridgway planned to sweep his sector
far from being a pushover. by attacking westward—between marsh-
land on the north and the la Haye-du-
Poterie Ridge Puits–Carentan road on the south—to
take the hills just east of the St. Sauveur-
In the VIII Corps attack, the 82d Air- le-Vicomte–la Haye-du-Puits road, which
borne Division had the relatively modest separated the airborne division’s zone
role of securing a limited objective be-
17 The divisi on journals and other records give
16 AGp B Id Memo, 4 Jul, AGp B Ia Op. ample evidence of the high regard the men had for
Befehle. their leaders.
T H E OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED 61
from that of the 79th Division. T h e expected and nasty task of clearing small
terrain was hedgerowed lowland, with isolated groups, the leading units were
half a dozen tiny settlements and many at the base of the objective by noon and
farmhouses scattered throughout the several hours later were ensconced on
countryside; there were no main roads, the slope. Casualties were few.
only rural routes and sunken lanes. On the left the story was different.
In the early hours of 3 July, even be- Making the main division effort, the
fore the artillery preparation that 325th Glider Infantry (Col. Harry L.
signaled the start of the First Army offen- Lewis) was to move west to the base of
sive, a combat patrol made a surprise the Poterie ridge, then up and down
thrust. Guided by a young Frenchman across each of the triplet hills. After a
who had served similarly in the past, a slow start caused by enemy mines, the
reinforced company of the 505th Para- regiment moved rapidly for a mile. At
chute Infantry (Lt. Col. William this point the advance stopped–two
Ekman) slipped silently along the edge miles short of the eastern slope of the
of the swamp and outflanked German Poterie ridge. One supporting tank
positions on the north slope of Hill 131. had hit a mine, three others were floun-
At daybreak the company was in the dering in mudholes, and German fire
midst of a German outpost manned by rained down from the slopes of Mont
Osttruppen. Startled, the outpost with- Castre, off the left flank.
drew. T h e main body of the regiment It did not take long for General Ridg-
arrived by midmorning and gained the way to recognize the reason for easy suc-
north and east slopes of the hill. Four cess of the regiments on the right and
hours later the 505th was at the St. the difficulty of the 325th. While the
Sauveur-le-Vicomte–la Haye-du- Puits parachute regiments on the right were
road and in possession of the northern rolling up the German outpost line, the
portion of the division objective. T h e glider men had struck the forward edge
regiment had taken 146 prisoners and of the German main line of resistance.
had lost 4 dead, 25 wounded, and 5 At the same time, they were exposed to
missing. .18 observed enfilading fire from Mont
T h e 508th Parachute Infantry (Col. Castre.
Roy E. Lindquist) had similar success in T o deal with this situation, Ridgway
gaining the southeast face of Mill directed the 325th commander to
131, and a battalion of the 507th Para- advance to the eastern edge of the
chute Infantry (Col. Edson D. Raff) Poterie ridge. Using this position as a
cleared its assigned sector. T h e leading pivot, the other regiments of the divi-
units moved so rapidly that they by- sion were to wheel southward from their
passed enemy troops who were unaware earlier objectives and hit the triplet hills
that an attack was in progress. Though from the north in frontal attacks.
the U.S. follow-up forces had the un- Colonel Lewis renewed the attack dur-
ing the evening of 3 July, and although
18 The account of operations is taken from the the glider men advanced over a mile and
official records of the division and the regiments. a half, they were still 600 yards short of
62 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
their objective when resistance and dark- ordered a night attack. As darkness
ness forced a halt two hours before mid- fell on 4 July, the men moved up the
night. When another effort on the hedgerowed and unfamiliar slopes of the
morning of 4 July brought no success, Poterie ridge. T h e 325th Glider In-
General Ridgway ordered the wheeling fantry secured its objective on the east-
movement by the other regiments to ern slope of the ridge with little diffi-
begin. Each battalion of the 508th was culty. T h e battalion of the 508th Para-
to attack one of the triplet hills while chute Infantry that had taken Hill 95
the 505th moved south along the divi- during the afternoon only to lose it
sion boundary to protect the open right walked up the slope and secured the
flank. crest by dawn. A newly committed
Problems immediately arose when battalion of the 507th Parachute Infan-
two battalions of the 508th and the glid- try, moving against the easternmost hill,
er regiment disputed the use of a had trouble maintaining control in the
covered route of approach. Because of darkness, particularly after making con-
the delay involved in co-ordinating the tact with the enemy around midnight.
route and because of withering fire from Withdrawing to reorganize, the battalion
both the Poterie ridge and Mont Castre, commander sent a rifle company to
the two battalions made little progress envelop the hill from the east while he
during the day. T h e third battalion, led the remainder of his force in a flank
on the other hand, had by noon gained approach from the west. Several hours
a position from which it could assault after daylight on 5 July the two parties
the westernmost eminence, Hill 95. met on the ridge line. T h e Germans
Following an artillery preparation rein- had withdrawn.
forced by corps guns, two rifle com- Another battalion of the 507th moved
panies made a double envelopment against the center hill of the Poterie
while the third attacked frontally. T h e ridge, with one company in the lead as
battalion gained the crest of the hill but, a combat patrol. Reaching the crest
unable to resist the inevitable counter- without interference and assuming that
attack that came before positions could the Germans had retired, the advance
be consolidated, withdrew 800 yards and company crossed the ridge line and
re-formed. formed a defensive perimeter on the
Meanwhile, troops of the 505th moved south slope. Daybreak revealed that
south along the division boundary, the men were in a German bivouac area,
advancing cautiously. Reaching the and a confused battle took place at close
base of Hill 95 that evening, the regi- range. T h e remainder of the battalion,
ment made contact with the 79th Divi- which had stayed on the north slope,
sion and set up positions to control the hurried forward at the sound of gunfire
St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte–la Haye-du-Puits to find friend and foe intermingled on
road. the ridge. Not until afternoon of 5 July
His battalions now in direct frontal did the battalion establish a consolidated
contact with the German positions but position. 19
operating at a disadvantage under Ger- 19 Pfc. James L. Geach of the 325th Glider In-
man observation, General Ridgway fantry, though he had never handled a rocket
T H E OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED 63
During the afternoon the 82d Air- good: two days earlier the 79th Division
borne Division reported Hill 95 cap- had briefly entered la Haye-du-Puits,
tured and the Poterie ridge secure. the 90th had moved up the slopes of
Small isolated German pockets remained Mont Castre, and the 8th was almost
to be cleared, but this was a minor task ready to enter the lines.
easily accomplished. Maintaining con-
tact with the 79th Division on the right Mont Castre
and establishing contact with the 90th
Division in the valley between the T h e action at the Poterie ridge was
Poterie ridge and Mont Castre on the not typical of the VIII Corps attack
left, the 82d Airborne Division assumed launched on 3 July, for while the 82d
defensive positions. Airborne Division swept an area rela-
In advancing the line about four miles tively lightly defended, the 79th and 90th
in three days, the airborne division had Divisions struck strong German positions
destroyed about 500 enemy troops, taken in the la Haye-du-Puits sector. Trying
772 prisoners, and captured or destroyed to execute the V-shaped maneuver Gen-
two 75-mm. guns, two 88-mm. antitank eral Middleton had projected, the in-
guns, and a 37-mm. antitank weapon. fantry divisions hit the main body of the
T h e gains had not been without serious LXXXIV Corps on two major eleva-
cost. T h e 325th Glider Infantry, which tions, the Montgardon ridge and Mont
was authorized 135 officers and 2,838 Castre. Their experience was char-
men and had an effective strength of acteristic of the battle of the hedgerows.
55 officers and 1,245 men on 2 July, T h e ability of the 90th Division,
numbered only 41 officers and 956 men which was making the corps main effort
four days later; the strongest rifle com- on the left (east), was an unknown
pany had 57 men, while one company quantity before the July attack. T h e
could count only 12. Casualties sus- performance of the division during a
tained by this regiment were the highest, few days of offensive action in June had
but the depletion of all units attested to been disappointing. T h e division had
the accuracy of German fire directed lacked cohesion and vigor, and its com-
from superior ground. manding general and two regimental
By the morning of 7 July, all enemy commanders had been relieved. Maj.
pockets had been cleared in front of Gen. Eugene M. Landrum, with expe-
the airborne division. Lying in the rience in the Aleutian Islands Campaign
rain-filled slit trenches, the men “began the preceding year, had assumed com-
to sweat out the much-rumored trip to mand on 1 2 June and had attempted
England.” 20 T h e probability appeared in the three weeks before the army offen-
sive to reorganize the command and in-
still it with aggressiveness.21
launcher, seized a bazooka and fired several rounds,
forcing two enemy tanks to withdraw. He was
awarded the DSC.
20William G. Lord, II, History of the 508th Para- 21 [Maj. Roland G. Ruppenthal], Utah Beach
chute Infantry (Washington: Infantry Journal, to Cherbourg, AFA Series (Washington, 1947), p.
Inc., 1948), p. 37. 129; Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp. 402–09.
64 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
hibited the use of artillery fire. After lation among American riflemen that
the engineers had worked their way to German tanks might be hiding nearby
safety, Partridge at last brought co- preceded the appearance of three
ordinated and concentrated tank, artil- armored vehicles that emerged from
lery, and infantry fire on the area, and a hedgerows and began to fire. T h e in-
rifle company finally managed to push fantrymen withdrew in haste and some
through les Sablons that evening. confusion.
Colonel Partridge wanted to continue his Through most of the day, all attempts
attack through the night, but an enemy to advance brought only disappoint-
counterthrust at nightfall, even though ment. Then, at dusk, unit commanders
quickly contained, convinced General rallied their men. Unexpectedly the
Landrum that the regiment had gone regiment began to roll. T h e advance
far enough. did not stop until it had carried almost
T h e excellent observation that had two miles. 25
enabled the Germans to pinpoint 90th T h e sudden slackening of opposition
Division activity during the day allowed could perhaps be explained by several
them to note the American dispositions factors: the penetration of the airborne
at dusk. Through the night accurate fire troops to the Poterie ridge, which men-
harassed the division, rendering re- aced the German left; the heavy losses
organization and resupply difficult and sustained mostly from the devastating
dangerous. fire of American artillery; and the lack
Resuming the attack on 4 July, the of reserves, which compelled regrouping
90th Division fired a ten-minute artillery on a shorter front. With great satisfac-
preparation shortly after daybreak. T h e tion the Germans had reported that their
German reaction was immediate: coun- own artillery had stopped the 90th Divi-
terbattery fire so intense that subordinate sion attack during the morning of 4
commanders of the 90th Division looked July, but by noon the L X X X I V Corps
for a counterattack. Not wishing to was battling desperately. Although two
move until the direction of the German battalions of the 265th Division (of
thrust was determined, the regimental Group Koenig), the 77th Division
commanders delayed their attacks. It remnants, and a battalion of the 353d
took vociferous insistence by General Division succeeded in denying the
Landrum to get even a part of the divi- approaches to Mont Castre throughout
sion moving. No German counter- 4 July, the units had no local reserves
attack materialized. to seal off three small penetrations that
Colonel Fales got his 359th Infantry occurred during the evening. Only by
moving forty-five minutes after the getting OKW to release control of the
scheduled jump-off time as a surprising
lull in the German fire occurred. 26Capt. Leroy R. Pond, a battalion com-
Heading for Mont Castre, the infantry mander, and Pvt. Barney H. Prosser, who
advanced several hundred yards before assumed command of a rifle company (upon the
loss of all the officers) and two leaderless platoons
the enemy suddenly opened fire and of another company, were key figures in the
halted further progress. Uneasy specu- advance. Both were awarded the DSC.
T H E OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED 67
15th Parachute Regiment and by com- Although German fire continued, the
mitting that regiment at once was the 358th Infantry got an attack going late
Seventh Army able to permit the in the afternoon toward the corridor.
LXXXIV Corps to refashion its defen- With the aid of strong artillery support
sive line that night.26 and led by Capt. Phillip H. Carroll, who
Despite their difficulties, the Germans was wounded in one eye, the infantry
continued to deny the 90th Division en- moved forward several hundred yards to
trance into the corridor between Mont clear a strongpoint. 27 By then it was
Castre and the swamp. German fire, in- almost midnight. Because the units
filtrating riflemen, and the hedgerows were badly scattered and the men com-
were such impediments to offensive pletely exhausted, Colonel Partridge
action that Colonel Partridge postponed halted the attack. Long after midnight
his attack several times on 4 July. Most some companies were still organizing
of his troops seemed primarily con- their positions.
cerned with taking cover in their slit On its second day of attack, 4 July,
trenches, and American counterbattery the 90th Division sustained an even
fire seemed to have little effect on the higher number of casualties than the
enemy weapons. 600 lost on the first day.28 Mont Castre,
When part of the 358th Infantry was dominating the countryside, “loomed
pinned down by enemy artillery for increasingly important.” Without it,
twenty minutes, the division artillery in- the division “had no observation; with
vestigated. It discovered that only one it the Boche had too much.” 29
enemy gun had fired and that it had fired More aware than ever of the need for
no more than ten rounds. Despite this Mont Castre as a prerequisite for an
relatively light rate of fire, one rifle advance through the corridor, General
company had lost 60 men, many of them Landrum nevertheless persisted with his
noncommissioned officers. T h e com- original plan, perhaps because he felt
manding officer and less than 65 men that the Germans were weakening.
remained of another rifle company. Judging the 358th Infantry too depleted
Only 18 men, less than half, were left and weary for further offensive action,
of a heavy weapons company mortar he committed his reserve regiment, the
platoon. A total of 125 casualties from 357th, on 5 July in the hope that fresh
a single battalion had passed through troops in the corridor could outflank
the regimental aid station by midafter- Mont Castre.
noon, go percent of them casualties from T h e 357th Infantry had only slight
artillery and mortar shelling. Tired success in the corridor on 5 July, the
and soaking wet from the rain, the rifle-
men were reluctant to advance in the
face of enemy fire that might not have 27 Captain Carroll was awarded the DSC.
been delivered in great volume but that 2890th Div AAR, Jul. FUSA Daily Estimated
was nonetheless terribly accurate. Loss Reports, July, gives 549 casualties sustained
by the organic units on 4 July as contrasted with
382 reported for the previous day, but the figures
26OB W E S T K T B , 1330, 4 Jul; Seventh Army for both days were incomplete.
K T B , 4 Jul, and Tagesmeldungen, 5 Jul. 2990th Div AAR, Jul.
68 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
third day of the attack, but on the right Success, still not entirely certain, was
the 359th registered a substantial gain. not without discomfiture. T h e wide
Good weather permitted tactical air sup- envelopment had extended the 90th
port and observed artillery fires, and Division front. A roving band of Ger-
with fighter-bombers striking enemy mans on the afternoon of 6 July had dis-
supply and reinforcement routes and persed a chemical mortar platoon oper-
artillery rendering effective support, the ating in direct support of an infantry
regiment fought to the north and north- battalion, thus disclosing gaps in the
east slopes of Mont Castre in a series of line, and had harassed supply and com-
separate, close-range company and pla- munications personnel, thus revealing
toon actions. Still the Germans con- the tenuous nature of the contact be-
tinued to resist aggressively, launching tween the forces in the valley and those
repeated local counterattacks.30 T h e on the high ground.31 T o fill the gaps
failure of the 357th Infantry to force the and keep open the supply routes, Gen-
corridor on the left and the precarious eral Landrum committed the remaining
positions of the 359th on the slopes of two battalions of the 358th Infantry in
Mont Castre at last compelled General support of his units on Mont Castre,
Landrum to move a battalion of the even though concentrating the weight
358th Infantry to reinforce his troops on of his strength on the right deprived the
Mont Castre, the beginning of a gradual troops on the left of reserve force. Two
shift of division strength to the right. complete regiments then comprised a
Colonel Fales on 6 July sent a battal- strong division right.
ion of his 359th Infantry in a wide en- T h e decision to reinforce the right
velopment to the right. Covered by a did not entirely alleviate the situation.
tactical air strike and artillery fire and T h e terrain impeded efforts to con-
hidden by hedgerows on the valley floor, solidate positions on the high ground.
the infantry mounted the northern slope Underbrush on the eastern part of the
of Mont Castre. At the same time, the hill mass was of such density and height
other two battalions of the 359th and a as to limit visibility to a few yards and
battalion of the 358th advanced toward render movement slow. T h e natural
the northeastern part of the hill mass. growth obscured terrain features and
Diverted by the wide envelopment that made it difficult for troops to identify
threatened to encircle their left and their map locations and maintain con-
forced to broaden their active front, the tact with adjacent units. T h e incline
Germans fell back. T h e result was that of the hill slope, inadequate trails, and
by nightfall four battalions of U.S. in- entangling thickets made laborious the
fantry were perched somewhat precar- task of bringing tanks and antitank guns
iously on Mont Castre. Not only did forward.32
General Landrum have possession of Evacuation of the wounded and
the high ground, he also owned the high- supply of the forward troops were haz-
est point on the ridge line—Hill 122.
3190th Div G–3 Jnl, 0255, 7 Jul.
3290th Div G–3 Jnl, 2330, 6 Jul; Lt Col Charles
30 Seventh Army K T B (Draft), 5 Jul. H. Taylor’s Notes on Mont Castre, ML–1071.
T H E OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED 69
ardous because obscure trails as well as General Landrum’s anxiety was justi-
the main routes were mined and be- fied, for the enemy counterattacked
cause many bypassed or infiltrating Ger- repeatedly during the dark and rainy
mans still held out in rear areas. T h e night, but on the morning of 7 July the
understrength infantry battalions were 90th Division still possessed Hill 122 and
short of ammunition, water, and food. the northeast portion of the ridge. One
Seriously wounded soldiers waited hours battalion summed up the action by
for transportation to medical installa- reporting that it was “a bit apprehen-
tions. One regiment could hardly sive’’ but had “given no ground.” 34
spare guards or rations for a hundred Continuing rain, deep mud, and the
German prisoners. Vehicles attempt- difficulty of defining the enemy front
ing to proceed forward came under small hindered further attempts on 7 July to
arms and artillery fire. Much of the re- consolidate positions on Mont Castre.
supply and evacuation was accomplished Judging the hold on the high ground
by hand-carry parties that used tanks as still to be precarious, General Landrum
cargo carriers as far as they could go, placed all three lettered companies of
then proceeded on foot. A typical the engineer battalion into the line that
battalion described itself as “in pretty evening.35 With the division recon-
bad shape. Getting low on am and naissance troops patrolling the north
carrying it by hand. Enemy coming edge of the Prairies Maréageuses de
around from all sides; had 3 tks with Gorges to prevent a surprise attack
them. Enemy Arty bad. Ours has against the division left flank and rear,
been giving good support. N o report one battalion of the 357th Infantry, less
from [the adjacent] 1st Bn.” 33 Gen- a rifle company, remained the sole com-
eral Landrum relieved one regimental bat element not committed. During
commander, who was physically and the night of 7 July General Landrum
mentally exhausted. About the same held onto this battalion, undecided
time the other was evacuated for whether the situation on Mont Castre
wounds. was more critical than that which had
Rain, which began again during the developed during the past few days in the
evening of 6 July, added to General corridor on the left.
Landrum’s concern. Conscious of the In the corridor, Colonel Barth’s 357th
enemy’s prior knowledge of the terrain Infantry had first tried to advance along
and his skillful use of local counter- the eastern base of Mont Castre on the
attack at night as a weapon of defense, morning of 5 July. Shelling the regi-
General Landrum drew on the regiment mental command post, the Germans
engaged in the corridor to shift a battal- delayed the attack for an hour and a
ion, less one rifle company, to reinforce half. When the fire subsided, Colonel
Mont Castre and alerted his engineers Barth sent a battalion of infantry in a
for possible commitment as infantry. column of companies, supported by
3390th Div G–3 Jnl, 2340, 6 Jul; Engr Opns,
2000, 5 Jul, 90th Div G–3 Jnl File; 315th Engr Com- 3490th Div G–3 Jnl, 0425, 7 Jul.
bat Bn Jnl, 1530, 6 Jnl, and 0020, 7 Jul; 358th Inf 3590th Div Sitrep 58, 8 Jul; 315th Engr Combat
Jnl, 7 Jul. Bn Jnl, Jul.
70 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
tive. 38 One of the three rifle companies In quest of ammunition, a small party
south of Beaucoudray fell back on the of men from the isolated group reached
positions of a company north of the vil- safety after traversing the swamp, but
lage. T h e other company north of the battalion commander to whom they
Beaucoudray fell back and consolidated reported deemed the return trip too
with the company at the entrance to the hazardous to authorize their return. In
corridor. T h e six rifle companies of the the early evening, radio communication
two battalions became three two-com- with the surrounded companies ceased.
pany groups, two of them—thoseimmedi- Shortly afterward a lone messenger,
ately north and south of Beaucoudray- after having made his way through the
in close combat with the enemy. swampy prairies, reported that one
Fused together by the pressure of company had surrendered after enemy
the German attack, the consolidated tanks had overrun its command post.
two-company units inside the corridor Although Colonel Barth made his re-
fought through a rainy, pitch-black night serve company available for a night
to repel the enemy. When morning attack to relieve any survivors, the in-
came the group north of the village eptitude of a battalion commander kept
appeared to be in no serious danger, but the effort from being made.
the group south of Beaucoudray had Sounds of battle south of Beaucoudray
been surrounded and cut off. ceased shortly after daylight on 8 July.
T o rescue the isolated group, Colonel When six men, who had escaped through
Barth on 7 July mounted an attack by the swamp, reported the bulk of both
another rifle company supported by two companies captured or killed, Barth can-
platoons of medium tanks. Despite celed further rescue plans.39 Appre-
heavy casualties from mortar fire, the hensive of German attempts to exploit
infantry reached the last hedgerow at the success, he formed his regimental
the northern edge of Beaucoudray. cooks and clerks into a provisional re-
There, the company commander com- serve.
mitted his supporting tanks. A mo- After five days of combat the 90th
ment later the commander was struck by Division had advanced about four miles
enemy fire. As the tanks moved up, at a cost of over 2,000 casualties, a loss
the Germans launched a small counter- that reduced the infantry companies to
attack against the right flank. By this skeleton units. Though this was a high
time all commissioned and noncommis- price, not all of it reflected inexperience
sioned officers of the company had been and lack of organization. T h e division
either killed or wounded. Deprived had tried to perform a difficult mission
of leadership, the infantrymen and tank- in well-organized and stubbornly de-
ers fell back across the muddy fields. fended terrain. T h e German defenders
Difficulties of reorganizing under con- were of equal, perhaps superior numbers
tinuing enemy fire prevented further -approximately 5,600 front-line combat-
attempts to relieve the encircled group effective troops of the 91st, 265th, 77th,
that afternoon.
39The Germans took 250 men and 5 officers pris-
38 357th Inf Jnl, 16 Jul. oners. Seventh Army K T B (Draft), 8 Jul.
72 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
and 353d Infantry Divisions, the 15th Division, on the VIII Corps right, had
Parachute Regiment, and lesser units. made its effort along the west coast of
T h e pressure exerted by the 90th Di- the Cotentin. On the basis of the attack
vision alone had forced LXXXIV Corps on Cherbourg in June, the 79th was con-
to commit all its reserve, Seventh Army sidered a good combat unit.40 Imbued
to commit certain reserves, and OKW to with high morale and commanded by
release control of the parachute regi- the officer who had directed its training
ment, its only reserve in the theater. and baptism of fire, Maj. Gen. Ira T.
Wresting part of Mont Castre from Wyche, the division was in far better
the enemy had been no mean achieve- shape for the July assignment than was
ment. Though fumbling and inepti- the 90th.
tude had marked the opening days of the During the first phase of the VIII
July offensive, the division had displayed Corps drive to Coutances, General
workmanship and stamina in the fight Wyche was expected to clear his zone as
for Mont Castre. far south as the Ay River estuary, seven
T o commanders at higher echelons, miles away. He anticipated little diffi-
possession of undeniably precarious posi- cult. 41 To reach his objective, he had
tions on Mont Castre and failure to have first to secure the high ground in his
forced the Beaucoudray corridor seemed path near la Haye-du-Puits—the Mont-
clear indications that the 90th Division gardon ridge and its high point, the flat
still had to learn how to make a skillful top of Hill 84. Capture of the height
application of tactical principles to would give General Wyche positions
hedgerow terrain. T h e division had dominating la Haye-du-Puits and the
demonstrated continuing deficiencies, ground descending southward to the Ay,
hangovers from its June performance. would make la Haye-du-Puits untenable
Some subordinate commanders still for the Germans, and would permit the
lacked the power of vigorous direction. 79th to meet the 90th approaching from
Too many officers were overly wary of the corps left.
counterattack. On the surface, at least, To take the Montgardon ridge, the
the division appeared to have faltered in 79th Division had to cross six miles of
July as it had in June. T h e conclusive hedgerowed lowland defended by rem-
evidence that impressed higher com- nants of the 243d Division and under
manders was not necessarily the failure the eyes of a battalion of the 353d Di-
to secure the initial objectives south of vision entrenched on the ridge. Only
la Haye-du-Puits in five days, but the fact a frontal assault was possible. T h e di-
that by 8 July the division seemed to vision was also to seize the incidental ob-
have come to a halt. jective of Hill 121, a mound near the
left boundary that provided good obser-
Montgardon Ridge vation toward la Haye-du-Puits and
While the 90th Division had been at-
40 Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jul, Pogue
tacking Mont Castre and probing the Files.
corridor leading toward Périers, the 79th 4179th Div Intel Annex 2 to FO 5, 1 Jul.
T H E OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED 73
during the morning of 3 July. With a withdrawal of the 243d to the main
two battalions abreast and in columns line of defense on the Montgardon ridge.
of companies, the third echeloned to the During the action the Germans took
right rear, and a company of tanks in 64 prisoner. 44
close support, the regiment at first ad- Temporarily checked in the drive on
vanced slowly but steadily; self-assurance the Montgardon ridge, General Wyche
and optimism vanished just before noon ordered the 314th Infantry to enter la
when three concealed and bypassed Ger- Haye-du-Puits the next morning, 5 July,
man armored vehicles on the coastal in the hope of outflanking the German
flank opened fire. T h e loss of several positions on the high ground. Moving
tanks promoted panic, and infantrymen down mined and cratered roads to the
streamed to the rear in confusion. northeastern outskirts of town, one com-
Because artillery and antitank weap- pany formed a base of fire while another
ons reacted effectively, the disruption to slipped into the railroad yard. T h e suc-
the attack proved only temporary, al- cess was short-lived, for enemy artillery
though not until midafternoon were and mortar fire soon drove the company
tanks and infantry sufficiently reorgan- back.
ized to resume the attack. By nightfall By midmorning of 5 July General
the 315th had advanced a little over a Wyche had decided on a new, bold move,
mile. which he hoped might explode the di-
Movement through the hedgerows to- vision out of its slow hedgerow-by-hedge-
ward Montgardon was slow again on the row advance and perhaps trap a sizable
second day of the attack until the obser- number of Germans north of the Ay
vation provided by the 3 14th Infantry's River. He committed his reserve, the
conquest of Hill 121 began to show ef- 313th Infantry (Col. Sterling A. Wood),
fect. Such good progress had been made in a wide envelopment to the right, to
by afternoon that the division artillery pass across the western end of the Mont-
displaced its battalions forward. gardon ridge and drive rapidly downhill
Not until evening, when the infantry to the Ay.
was two miles short of Hill 84 and taking Starting at noon on 5 July, the 313th
a rest, did the Germans react with other Infantry moved toward the ridge with a
than passive defense. Enemy infantry two-company tank-infantry task force in
supported by armored vehicles suddenly the lead. Marshy terrain and lack of
emerged from the hedgerows. Two rifle adequate roads slowed the movement.
companies that had halted along a By late afternoon the task force was
sunken road were temporarily surround- still several hundred yards short of the
ed, but 50 men and 4 officers held firm ridge. As the troops reached a water-
to provide a bulwark around which the filled ditch running through the center
dispersed troops could be reorganized. of a flat grassy meadow, they came under
As the division artillery went into ac- such a volume of artillery fire that the
tion with heavy fire, the regiment built
up a solid defensive perimeter. T h e 44Seventh Army K T B , 5 Jul; MS # A–983 (Mahl-
Germans had counterattacked to cover mann) .
T H E OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED 75
advance stalled. Just before dark the strong positions protected by wire and
enemy counterattacked twice and drove mines, the 315th in the center overran
the task force and the rest of the regi- Hill 84, and the 314th on the left com-
ment several miles back in confusion. pleted occupation of the eastern portion
Before daybreak, 6 July, few would of the main ridge. By daybreak of 7
have attested either to the location or July the 79th Division could note that
the integrity of the regiment. Merci- la Haye-du-Puits was outflanked, that
fully, the Germans did not exploit their the Germans ought now to abandon the
success. T h e regiment found time to town, and that as soon as earlier advances
regroup. were extended to cover the entire ridge,
Disappointed in the results of the the division might head south toward
313th Infantry advance even before the the Ay River.
counterattack, General Wyche late on 5 It did not take long on 7 July for
July had again sent the 315th, supported General Wyche and his subordinate
by tanks and tank destroyers, directly commanders to realize that this kind of
against Hill 84. This time the regiment thinking was premature. T h e Germans
reached the north slope of the hill. T h e held doggedly to the rest of the high
79th Division at last had a toehold on the ground. They also stayed in la Haye-
highest part of the Montgardon ridge. du-Puits; an American patrol accompa-
T o reinforce this success and prepare nied by a German prisoner who was re-
for final conquest of the ridge, General cruited to talk the garrison into sur-
Wyche on 6 July jockeyed his other two render could not even get past the first
regiments. He ordered the 314th to houses. T h e Germans not only refused
swing its right around la Haye-du-Puits to budge from the high ground and the
and gain a foothold on the eastern slope. town, they prepared to attack. Having
T h e regiment accomplished its mission hurriedly reinforced the la Haye-du-
during the morning. He turned the Puits sector with a small portion of the
313th eastward from its location on the 2d SS Panzer Division, Choltitz launched
division right rear to positions in sup- his counterattack on the afternoon of 7
port of the troops on Hill 84. By noon July as armored contingents in about
of 6 July, the fourth day of the attack, two-battalion strength assaulted the
the 314th and 315th Regiments were on Montgardon ridge.45
the northern and eastern slopes of Mont- T h e German armored troops struck
gardon, while the 313th was echeloned with such violence and behind such a
to the right rear at the base of the ridge. volume of supporting fire that the first
In ordering all three regiments to at- blow almost pushed the 79th Division off
tack during the afternoon to carry the the ridge. In an attempt to achieve
crest, General Wyche bowed to the com- better co-ordination between the two
partmentalizing effect of the hedgerow regiments on the main ridge, General
terrain and told each commander to at- Wyche placed both under one com-
tack alone when ready. T h e technique
worked. Although the 3 13th Infantry
on the right gained no ground against 45Seventh Army K T B , 7 Jul.
76 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
their infantry units. With both the 8th Division, VIII Corps could expect
79th and the 90th Division needing rest no sudden success. On the other hand,
and the aggressive 82d Airborne Di- the Germans could anticipate no respite,
vision about to depart the Continent, its for to the east the U.S. VII Corps in its
place to be taken by the inexperienced turn had taken up the battle.
CHAPTER V
would be at a juncture with the VIII T h e first problem that General Collins
Corps. Continuing south, the two corps faced was how to use to best advantage
would come abreast at the Coutances– in the constricted corps zone the three
St. Lô highway, the final army objective. infantry divisions available to him. Re-
Should resistance disintegrate before taining the 4th and 9th Infantry Di-
the final objective was reached, General visions, which had participated in the
Bradley could use an armored division Cherbourg operation, Collins on 2 July
that he had in the army reserve to exploit took control of the 83d Infantry Di-
the American success. 4 vision, which was manning the Carentan
General Bradley had thought of sector. Little more than three miles
launching the VII Corps attack on 3 from Carentan, one fourth of the way to
July, at the same time the VIII Corps Périers, the 83d Division held defensive
jumped off, but he had decided to help positions across the narrow isthmus.
VIII Corps on its first day of operations Directing the 83d to advance a little
by giving it temporary control of the VII over two miles to Sainteny, which was
Corps Artillery. He therefore post- half way to Périers, Collins set the stage
poned the VII Corps effort until 4 July, for committing at least part of another
when VII Corps was to regain control of division. Hoping that the 83d Division
its own artillery support. A battalion would reach Sainteny in one day, he
of 8-inch howitzers and several battalions planned to have elements of the 4th Di-
of medium artillery from army were to vision go on to Périers on the second
reinforce the fires of the corps pieces. 5 day. If on reaching Sainteny the 83d
T h e VII Corps commander was Maj. did not make contact with the VIII
Gen. J. Lawton Collins, who as a lieu- Corps attacking along the western edge
tenant colonel three years earlier had of the Prairies Marécageuses de Gorges,
been the corps chief of staff. In the Pa- surely the 4th Division would meet the
cific he had commanded the 25th Di- VIII Corps near Périers. At that point,
vision on Guadalcanal and New Georgia. if the 83d Division made a similar ad-
T h e division code name, LIGHTNING,vance, crossed the Taute River, and
seemed to describe General Collins’ gained its assigned portion of the Pé-
method of operation. As VII Corps riers–St. Lô highway, enough terrain
commander, his direction of the invasion would be available to employ the 9th
landings on UTAHBeach and his vigorous Division.
prosecution of the Cherbourg campaign Though General Collins wanted the
had reinforced the suitability of his nick- 83d Division to reach Sainteny in a day,
name, “Lightning Joe.” Flushed with he nevertheless recognized that the width
success and generating unbounded con- of the Carentan–Périers isthmus might
fidence, General Collins and his staff enable comparatively few enemy troops
enthusiastically accepted the challenge to hold up forces of superior numbers.
presented by the new task assigned to the T o reach Sainteny, the 83d Division
VII Corps. had to squeeze through the narrow-
est part, a neck scarcely two miles
4 [2d Lt. David Garth], St.-Lô, AFA Series
(Washington, 1946), p. 5.
wide. Hedgerows restricted mechanized
5 VII Corps AAR, Jul; 83d Div AAR, Jul. units to well-defined channels and gave
T H E OFFENSIVE BROADENED 81
the enemy ideal cover and concealment Though the primary aim was a short
for delaying action. Except for the advance to allow the commitment of a
tarred highway to Périers and a lateral second division, Collins, with character-
route between causeways, the roads on istic confidence, ordered the 83d to
the isthmus were little better than wag- maintain the momentum of its attack;
on trails. American observers had de- if the division destroyed the German de-
tected neither antitank ditches nor fenses at once, it was to advance as far as
permanent fortifications, but they felt the Taute River in the left (east)
sure that the Germans had organized portion of the corps zone.
their positions to a depth of several miles T h e 83d Division had arrived in Nor-
and were covering all road junctions with mandy in the latter part of June and
machine guns.6 under VIII Corps control had relieved
T h e Germans in the Périers sector, the 101st Airborne Division (Maj. Gen.
comprising part of the right (east) wing Maxwell D. Taylor) at Carentan. T h e
of the LXXXIV Corps, were under the airborne troops had moved into the army
local operational control of the head- reserve to prepare for their return to
quarters of the 17th SS Panzer Grena- England, but not before boasting of
dier Division, a tough, well-trained unit. their accomplishments and exaggerating
T h e division had one of its two regi- the toughness of the Germans to the
ments holding positions below Carentan. novice infantrymen who replaced them.
Attached to it was the separate 6th Para- Some members of the new division
chute Regiment, a veteran though some- became jittery. 8 Highly conscious of
what depleted unit. T h e leadership of the division’s inexperience, General Col-
these forces was especially strong and lins was to supervise its activities closely.
experienced.7 T h e 83d Division commander, Maj.
Aware of the German units that faced Gen. Robert C. Macon, who had com-
the 83d Division, General Collins did manded a regiment in North Africa, had
not underestimate their fighting ability. the problem of advancing units in terrain
He also realized that early morning that could hardly have been less favor-
marsh mist and the promise of con- able for offensive action. T h e almost
tinuing rain would reduce the effective- incessant rain of the previous weeks had
ness of artillery support and diminish soaked the isthmus beyond saturation.
the help offered by tactical air. But he As the drainage ditches swelled into
had no alternative to striking the Ger- streams and the swamps turned into
mans frontally–terrain, unit boundaries, ponds, the surface of the fields became
and the First Army plan made a frontal a potential sheet of mud. Progress for
attack by the 83d Division inevitable. foot troops would be difficult; cross-
country movement by vehicles virtually
impossible; movement of armor in close
6 VII Corps AAR, Jul, and FO 4, 3 Jul, with support most difficult; good direct fire
Intel Annex, 2 Jul. support by tanks and tank destroyers
7OKH Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen,
Zustandberichte, SS Divisiones, Jun 43 –Jul 44; MS
# B–839 (von der Heydte): Harrison, Cross-Chan- 8 Lt Col Henry Neilson, Hosp Intervs, III, GL–
nel Attack, pp. 356–65. 93 (238).
82 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
rifle companies had crossed a stream progress, General Collins was infuriated
swollen by rain and overflowing its when he learned of the battalion with-
banks. T h e adjacent terrain had be- drawal on the division right. “Tell the
come virtual swamp, with some mud- CG,” he informed the division chief of
holes waist deep. When the battalion staff by telephone, “that I want the
commander tried to get his heavy weap- withdrawal investigated.” Why make
ons company across the stream just be- it necessary, he demanded, to lose more
fore noon, enemy mortars and machine lives in forcing a crossing of the stream
gun fire forced the men to hug the a second time? And when, he wanted
ground. Commitment of the reserve to know, was the division going to
rifle company produced no effect since launch a co-ordinated attack down the
the riflemen could do no better than the corridor?
machine gunners of the weapons com- For all the strenuous efforts of the di-
pany in the face of the enemy fire. Tak- vision and assistant division commanders,
ing heavy casualties, unable to ma- the regiments were not ready for a con-
neuver in the swampy terrain, and fear- certed attack until late afternoon.
ing attack from the rear by the same After two postponements, General
infiltrating Germans who had earlier Macon finally got it started. T h e di-
isolated several tanks, the battalion com- vision artillery fired a preparation, and
mander ordered a withdrawal. T h e the two regiments attacked again down
men moved back to their original line the Carentan–Périers road. They had
of departure. Upon reorganization, the made only minor advances before heavy
battalion discovered that one rifle com- artillery fire forced one regiment to pull
pany was almost a total loss; another back; a counterattack just before dark
could muster only one third of its pushed back the other.
strength.10 Large numbers of stragglers T h e terrain and stubborn resistance
intensified the impression of extreme had soured the Fourth of July cele-
losses. About fifty men of the battalion bration and had thwarted the 83d Di-
entered the division artillery positions vision in its attempt to advance beyond
during the afternoon and caused short- its outpost lines. “If the going is good,
lived consternation by claiming to be and it should be,” General Macon had
the only survivors. Having lost most said, “we will have them rocked back,
of its equipment in the swamp, the bat- and will go right on.” T h e going had
talion remained on its line of departure not been good. Prepared defenses, ac-
to protect the division right flank. That tive mortar fire, and extensive use of
evening it arranged a truce with the automatic weapons had been too effec-
enemy, without authorization from tive. Only six German prisoners had
higher headquarters, to collect its dead been taken.
and wounded. A count of personnel in the front-line
Impatient over the division’s lack of positions of the 33 1st Infantry revealed
only 300 men. T h e commander of the
102d Battalion, 329th Infantry, Combat Digest
German parachute regiment in oppo-
(Germany, n.d.), p. 15. sition, Col. Friedrich A. Freiherr von der
84 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Heydte, returned medical personnel his sustained the highest number of casual-
forces had captured, with a note stating ties, was to relinquish part of its zone to
that he thought General Macon needed two battalions of Colonel Crabill’s 329th
them.11 He was right. In its first day Infantry. T h e third battalion of the
of combat the 83d Division had lost al- 329th would remain on the division’s
most 1,400 men. An accurate break- extreme right as flank protection.
down of casualty figures was impossible. T h e attack on 5 July began on a dis-
One regiment reported a total of 867 heartening, if exaggerated, note. Dur-
casualties without attempting further ing the ten-minute artillery preparation,
classification. On the basis of such in- the executive officer of one of the regi-
complete information, the division arbi- ments phoned division headquarters that
trarily categorized the total casualties the division artillery was “slaughtering
and reported 47 killed, 815 wounded, our 3d Battalion.” In reality, the regi-
and a surprising 530 missing in action. ment had received only a few short
Many of the missing were stragglers rounds.
and isolated troops who were later to re- T h e division jumped off on schedule.
join the division, but at the end of the Unfortunately, the attack that morn-
first day the division had suffered a more ing repeated the unsuccessful pattern
than 10percent loss.12 of the previous day. T h e troops made
Although the 83d Division had failed little progress.
to achieve its mission of allowing the Restless and impatient in a situation
VII Corps to commit a second division that denied use of available strength,
in the isthmus after the first day’s action, General Collins ordered General Macon
General Collins had no alternative but to make room “or else.” Since there
to keep pushing. He ordered the at- was no place to go except forward, Macon
tack to secure Sainteny to continue on 5 had to insist on continuation of a costly
July. General Macon changed his dis- frontal attack. That afternoon he be-
positions but slightly. T h e 331st Infan- gan to apply more pressure on his sub-
try, now commanded by Lt. Col. William ordinate commanders. “You tell him,”
E. Long, was to try again on the right General Macon ordered, “that he must
of the Carentan–Périers road. Colonel take that objective and go right on down
McLendon’s 330th Infantry, which had regardless of his flank; pay attention to
nothing, not even communication.” An
11With caution, von der Heydte added that if hour later he instructed a regimental
the situation were ever reversed in the future, he
hoped that General Macon would return the commander, “Never mind about the
favor. Ltr, Ferenbaugh to OCMH, 20 May 53; MS gap; keep that leading battalion going.”
# B–839 (Heydte). When a battalion commander pro-
12By 7 JuIy the consolidated figure of those miss-
ing in action declined to 243 (83d Div G–2 G–3 tested that he had only about 400 men,
Jnl). Casualty figures in the sources available General Macon assured him, “That is
(FUSA Daily Estimated Loss Rpts, Jul; the 83d
Div G–2, G–3 Jnl; the 83d Div G–4 Daily Rpts, G–4
just what I need, 400 men; keep driving.”
Jnl; and the 83d Div G–1 AAR, Jul) are con- In midafternoon a regimental com-
stantly at variance. Figures chosen for the text mander reported infiltrating enemy.
represent an estimate compiled from all sources.
Discussions recorded in the telephone journal are
“They won’t hurt you any,” Macon
valuable contemporary estimates. promised. “They shoot us,” the regi-
THE OFFENSIVE BROADENED 85
had managed by sheer persistence to ad- ranks, Maj. Gen. Raymond O. Barton,
vance over a mile down the Carentan- who had commanded the unit since
Périers road. As a result, the division 1942, remarked with regret, “We no
was at the southern end of the narrow longer have the division we brought
neck and was ready to debouch into ashore.” l3
wider terrain just north of Sainteny. General Barton planned to commit
But in making the advance, it had suf- the 12th Infantry (Col. James S. Luck-
fered an additional 750 casualties. With ett), with a company each of the 87th
these losses, many among key personnel, Chemical, the 70th Tank, and the 801st
the future effectiveness of the division Tank Destroyer Battalions, and a pla-
had been seriously impaired. toon of the 377th Antiaircraft Artillery
Although the advance of the 83d still Automatic Weapons Battalion. T o sup-
did not permit commitment of a second port the attack, Barton regained control
division, General Collins, already de- of his division artillery and an additional
layed one day, decided to wait no longer. battalion of medium field artillery,
T h e depletion and exhaustion of the which for three days had been operating
83d must have been a factor in his de- with the 90th Division. At the same
cision. He ordered General Macon to time that the 12th Infantry moved into
confine his efforts to the left of the position to make the main division ef-
Carentan-Périers road and to shift his fort toward Périers, elements of Col.
direction from the southwest toward James S. Rodwell’s 8th Infantry were to
Périers to the south toward the bank of relieve the battalion of the 329th Infan-
the Taute River. Collins then in- try still on the extreme right flank of
structed the 4th Division commander to the corps.
take temporary control of the battered Early on 6 July the 12th Infantry be-
and depleted 33 1st Infantry on the right gan to relieve the 331st. It was a diffi-
of the Carentan-Périers road, commit cult relief since strong enemy fire and
one of his own regiments through it, local counterattack harassed the troops.
and drive toward Périers. Responsi- When the 12th Infantry had finally
bility for the isthmus on the right of the passed through and attacked to gain a
road passed to the 4th Division. favorable line of departure for the co-
T h e 4th Division was an experienced ordinated effort planned with the 83d
unit. It had taken part in the D-Day Division, the regiment met firm resist-
invasion of the Continent and had par- ance that halted the advance at once.
ticipated effectively in the Cherbourg Further attack for that day was can-
operation. In the process, however, the celed.
division had lost about 5,400 men. In the meantime, the enemy main-
Only five of the rifle company com- tained heavy fire on the 83d Division and
manders who had made the D-Day land- launched minor counterattacks, inflicting
ing were with the division three weeks about 700 additional casualties. Under
later. Though many key individuals
remained to steady the 4,400 replace-
ments who partially refilled the division’s 13
CI 30 (4th Div)
T H E OFFENSIVE BROADENED 87
punishing pressure, the division never- bothered the 83d Division, which had
theless held its positions. made an unsuccessful effort to clear it
T h e lack of success during the third on the first day of its attack. T h e main
day of action along the Carentan–Périers obstacle to success was the stream, which
axis, this time involving a veteran unit, was difficult to cross. Deciding that it
must have confirmed General Collins’ could best be crossed during darkness,
suspicions that the inexperience of the General Barton had instructed the com-
83d Division had not been the principal mander of the 8th Infantry to make a
factor in holding back its advance. He surprise move during the night of 6
concluded that the cost of bulldozing July. By sending two battalions over
through the lowlands with conventional the stream at night, the units would be
tactics was too high and turned to an in position to clear the area at daylight,
ally, the IX Tactical Air Command. 7 July, thus eradicating a potential nui-
During the previous few days, as the sance to the division rear that might hold
weather had permitted, fighter-bombers up the advance should the division
of the IX TAC had attacked targets of break through to Périers.
opportunity and struck enemy positions Though the regimental commander
located by ground observers. General complied with instructions, one of his
Collins now asked for more. He wanted battalions could not cross the stream
a mass dive-bombing effort by more even at night because of enemy fire.
than a hundred planes to pummel the T h e other battalion, after having picked
enemy in front of the 4th and 83d Di- its way through the marsh during the
visions for forty-five minutes before re- night and made the crossing, found it-
newal of the ground attack on 7 July.14 self in an untenable position at day-
With this assistance and a co-ordinated break and was forced to withdraw after
attack by the two divisions, General Col- taking more than a hundred casual-
lins hoped that the 83d Division would ties.16
reach Sainteny by dark on 7 July and T h e second disappointment was a
that the 4th Division would move far drizzling rain on the morning of 7 July
enough forward toward Périers to allow that resulted in cancellation of the
the 9th Division to be committed. Ex- strong air support. “Disappointing
pecting this to be fulfilled, General Col- news,” General Collins reported to the
lins alerted the 9th Division for a move divisions prepared to jump off. “But
to an assembly area near Carentan.15 go right ahead with your attack.”
Two events marred the beginning of General Macon attempted to swing
the attack on 7 July. T h e first occurred his 83d Division gradually southward to
after General Barton had decided to the bank of the Taute River. His new
obliterate the resistance in the small axis of advance was the secondary road
area on the right near the Prairies Mark- that crossed the Carentan–Périers isth-
cageuses de Gorges. T h e area had mus laterally and led to the causeway
over the flooded Taute. Despite the
14VII Corps Opns Memo 30, 6 Jul.
15 [VII Corps] Notes for the CofS, 7 Jul, VII 16 4th Div and VII Corps AAR’s, Jul; Telecon
Corps G–3 Jnl and File. Seventh Army to AGP B, 1050, 7 Jul, A G p B K T B .
88 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
new direction of advance, the right flank Division Artillery followed the bombard-
elements of the division were still to ment with a preparation, and the regi-
take Sainteny. As the division en- ment jumped off once more. Unfor-
deavored to move forward during the tunately, the strenuous efforts resulted
morning of 7 July, it repelled five coun- in hardly any gain.
terattacks, local in nature but fierce in In their attack on 7 July the two com-
intensity. Strong fire from the division mitted regiments of the 4th Division sus-
artillery, effective use of bazooka teams, tained almost 600 casualties. T h e 12th
and direct fire from tanks and tank Infantry moved forward but slightly; the
destroyers finally defeated the enemy 8th, on the right flank, advanced not at
efforts, though one battalion, isolated by all. Even for an experienced division,
German infiltrators, had to hold out the stubborn and skillful resistance of
until jeeps escorted by light tanks the Germans in the Cotentin was proving
brought ammunition and food and re- too much. T h e swamps and the mud
stored communications. In the late were themselves formidable enemies, but
afternoon Colonel McLendon's 330th the most important obstacle insofar as
Infantry made effective use of the divi- the 4th Division was concerned was the
sion artillery, chiseled a narrow penetra- old problem of the hedgerows. T o take
tion through the enemy positions, and an average-size field required an entire
gained several hundred yards on the infantry company, for there was no way
east flank. T h e achievement was hailed of telling along which row or on which
as substantial, raising hopes that the side of the hedge the Germans would
enemy defense was deteriorating, but the be, and therefore there was no way of
enemy quickly recovered as the recon- knowing the best approach.18
naissance battalion of the SS panzer As the 4th Division rediscovered the
grenadiers sealed off the penetration.17 problems of waging offensive warfare in
T h e 83d Division captured only seven- Normandy, the 83d Division began to
teen prisoners that day. T h e German show signs of improvement. T h e men
paratroopers and SS soldiers fought stub- who had survived the early fighting be-
bornly, refusing to surrender when out- gan to feel like veterans and to act as
numbered and overpowered and giving such. Command control tightened,
ground only with desperate reluctance. communications improved, and the divi-
T h e 83d Division failed to reach either sion began to utilize its attached units
Sainteny or the bank of the Taute River with confidence. When requesting re-
during the day. placements for the 83d Division from
T h e 12th Infantry of General Bar- the First Army on 7 July, General Col-
ton's 4th Division had even less success. lins remarked that the division was com-
Improved weather conditions during the ing along pretty well.
afternoon permitted several fighter- T h e improvement was a bright spot in
bombers to operate over the VII Corps an otherwise bleak situation. Although
front, where they bombed enemy posi- the 83d Division was beginning to gain
tions opposing the regiment. T h e 4th experience, each of its regiments was ap-
proximately 600 men understrength, and tention, the Seventh Army urgently
the men remaining were exhausted after called for help. With two U.S. Corps
four days of combat. While the 4th exerting pressure, the Germans began
Division had not sustained such high to be concerned over their relatively
casualties, it was not fully committed. meager forces in reserve.20 Anticipating
Nor was it possible yet for General Col- by 5 July that the Americans might break
lins to employ the 4th Division in full through to Périers and cut off the
force. Early commitment of the 9th LXXXIV Corps forces in the-la Haye-
Division appeared unlikely. T h e VII du-Puits sector, Hausser, the Seventh
Corps had failed to move even to Saint- Army commander, had demanded addi-
eny, an advance of only two and a half tional reserves. T h e 2d SS Panzer Divi-
miles. T h e combination of German sion had been moved westward from the
resistance and the Cotentin marshes and II Parachute Corps sector to meet the
hedgerows had stymied the Americans, American attack, and by 7 July its troops
at least for the moment in the Carentan- were strung across the Cotentin and
Périers isthmus. Continuation of the battling both VIII Corps at la Haye-du-
attack meant costly frontal effort with Puits and VII Corps on the Carentan-
little promise of rapid success. Périers isthmus.21
Unknown to the Americans, their T h e VII Corps attack had thus robbed
offensive action was more successful than the German sectors on both sides of the
the results seemed to indicate. T h e corridor; it had prevented the Germans
aggressive defense of the Germans–tac- from employing all their available armor
tics to seal off local penetrations by coun- at la Haye-du-Puits; it also had weakened
terattack and to encircle American spear- the St. Lô sector just to the east. In-
heads-was unable to function properly stead of massing the armored division for
under effective artillery fire and fighter- a strong counterattack, the Germans had
bomber attack. Despite skillful ground had to meet American pressure by com-
defense, the Germans were gradually be- mitting the armored unit piecemeal in
ing forced back, their reserves were being defense. T h e panzer division’s striking
used up, and their defensive line was power was thus dissipated across the
dangerously stretched. With the two active front. T o meet the need for still
regiments on the isthmus being in- more reserves, Rommel and Kluge pre-
creasingly depleted, the SS panzer grena- vailed upon OKW and Hitler to release
dier division committed in defense of the 5th Parachute Division from its sta-
Périers part of its regiment that had tion in Brittany, and on 7 July the para-
been east of the Taute River.19 troopers began to move toward the
Despite the impact of the VII Corps Cotentin battlefield.22
thrust, the Seventh Army looked upon it If General Bradley surmised these
as it had done when judging the adjacent
VIII Corps attack on the previous day- 20Seventh A r m y K T B , 4 Jul; Telecon, Seventh
as merely a reconnaissance in force. Army to A G p B, 1300, 4 Jul, A G p B K T B .
21Seventh Army K T B (Draft), 5 Jul; Telecon
Although depreciating the American in- Seventh Army to A G p B , 1610, 7 Jul, A G p B K T B .
22Telecons Hausser to Rommel, 1930, 7 Jul, and
19 Seventh Army and A G p B KTB’s 5–7 Jul. Rommel to Kluge, 2020, 7 Jul, A G p B K T B .
90 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
developments, he could not have been right flank to that part of the objective
entirely dismayed by the fact that the west of the Vire. Such action would
VII Corps attack on the isthmus had protect the lateral coastal highway be-
been halted at the same time as that of tween Carentan and Isigny, which was
the VIII Corps. Also, on the same day, still under occasional hostile fire; but
7 July, operations immediately to the more to the point, it would place troops
east, in the XIX Corps zone, seemed on the high ground along the Périers-
to show an opportunity for rapid suc- St. Lô highway, which was part of
cess. Shifting his hopes eastward, Gen- the First Army’s Coutances–Caumont
eral Bradley looked to the region be- objective line. U.S. forces there would
tween the Taute and the Vire Rivers, outflank St. Lô on the west and threaten
where additional American pressure the city from that direction. Reaching
seemed to promise a swift penetration of Pont-Hébert, about half way to the
the enemy defenses. objective, would be enough to indicate
this menace to the Germans, and at that
T h e Vire and Taute Bridgehead point the troops on the corps left were
to launch their attack east of the Vire.23
T h e XIX Corps held positions strad- T h e XIX Corps was commanded by
dling the Vire River, which split the Maj. Gen. Charles H. Corlett. A West
corps zone into equal parts of dissimilar Pointer whose quiet manner inspired
terrain—Cotentin lowland on the west confidence and who had a knack of get-
and rolling country on the east. T h e ting the most from sometimes difficult
difference was accentuated by the fact subordinates, General Corlett had par-
that the troops on the left (east) were ticipated in operations on Attu and
along a front that was several miles in had led the 7th Division in the successful
advance of the line on the right. (Map 5 ) Marshall Islands campaign in the Pa-
T h e corps portion of the First Army cific. Sent to the European theater as
objective lay astride the Vire River an expert in amphibious warfare, he had
along the Coutances–St. Lô–Bayeux brought the XIX Corps from England
highway—between the villages of St. to France in June.24
Gilles and St. André-de-l’Epine, about General Corlett controlled two divi-
four miles southwest and northeast of St. sions: the 30th Infantry on the corps
Lô, respectively. T h e objective in- right was to make the attack on 7 July
cluded not only the high ground ad- to seize the high ground immediately
jacent to the highway but also the city west of St. Lô; the 29th Infantry was to
of St. Lô. attack later east of the Vire and directly
In compliance with the dictates toward St. Lô. T h e 35th Infantry Divi-
of the terrain, the corps attack was
to take placein two steps—firstwes 23Ltr, Corlett to OCMH, 19 Jan 54; XIX Corps
of the Vire River, the second east of it. FO 4, 2 Jul (rescinding FO 4, 28 Jun).
T h e initial effort (on 7 July) was to get 24Ltr, Corlett to OCMH, 2 S e p 53; see Philip
A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gil-
troops across the Vireet Taute canal berts and Marshalls, UNITED STATES ARMY IN
and the Vire River and push the corps WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955).
MAP 5
92 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
400 yards in width bordered the Vire on Kelly), a regiment that had demonstrated
each side, but the land was relatively river crossings at T h e Infantry School,
dry. East of the river the ground was Fort Benning, Georgia. T h e 117th In-
firm and had a well-surfaced road net- fantry was to move across the open ter-
work. Where a highway crossed the rain at the edge of the river just before
river near Airel, an arched stone bridge daybreak and at dawn was to embark in
was only slightly damaged. assault boats several hundred yards north
Although the size of the canal made of the Airel stone bridge. Three assault
it a less obvious obstacle, the river offered waves were to be ferried across the river
several positive advantages for an assault on a 400 -yard front while bridges were
crossing. Getting across the 60 -foot being prepared to accommodate the rest
river in assault boats was likely to be of the troops. If the bridges were not
quicker and less costly than wading the ready at the end of the third assault
canal. T h e Germans had flooded both wave, the infantry was to continue cross-
waterways, but their efforts at the Vire ing in boats until enough bridges were
were less efficacious. T h e road network placed to permit foot and vehicular pas-
east of the river was better than that sage. Upon reaching the far shore, the
north of the canal, and the damaged infantry was to clear the hamlet at the
stone bridge at Airel could be easily re- western end of the Airel bridge, get
paired. There was little cover and con- astride the road leading west, and move
cealment in either of the two areas. uphill toward the St. Jean-de-Daye cross-
T h e logical immediate objective of roads. As soon as the entire regiment
forces establishing a bridgehead was a was across the river, Col. Alfred V.
road intersection near St. Jean-de-Daye, Ednie’s 119th Infantry was to follow.
a crossroads equidistant–about three At the canal, Col. Hammond D.
miles-from the canal and the river. Birks was to send the 120th Infantry
T h e fact that artillery and infantry across the water on foot in the early
weapons could support a crossing of afternoon of the day of attack. T h e
either the river or the canal with equal crossing site was to be at the destroyed
effectiveness influenced General Hobbs’ bridge on the highway leading south to
decision to make a two-pronged attack St. Jean-de-Daye. T h e land was suffi-
across both water barriers. T h e divi- ciently dry for about 400 yards on each
sion was to move from the north across side of the bridge site to permit deploy-
the canal and from the east across the ing two battalions abreast. After wad-
river to seize a bridgehead defined by ing the canal, the battalions were to
the roads that intersected south of St. drive south. In the wake of the infan-
Jean-de-Daye. Once in possession of the try, Col. William S. Biddle’s 113th
bridgehead, the division would move Cavalry Group was to cross and turn
south to the high ground west of St. west toward the Taute River to protect
Lô. the 30th Division’s right flank. T h e
T o cross the Vire River in the divi- third battalion of the 120th Infantry was
sion main effort, General Hobbs selected to remain on the north bank of the canal
the 117th Infantry (Col. Henry E. a t the country road near the Taute
94 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
River. Designated as the corps reserve, three vehicular bridges were in opera-
the battalion was to support the regi- tion, General Hobbs planned to use the
mental crossing by fire, make a crossing stone structure and the treadway for one-
feint of its own, and check any German way traffic moving west into the bridge-
attempt to make a countercrossing.26 head, the ponton bridge for traffic mov-
As in almost all opposed bridgehead ing east out of it.
operations, much depended upon the At the canal the engineers were to lay
work of the division engineers, in this duckboards as footbridges for the men
case the 105th Engineer Combat Battal- of the heavy weapons companies and
ion (Lt. Col. Carroll H. Dunn). In also for the litter bearers evacuating
addition to assisting the infantry with casualties. Medical planners expected
demolitions, flame throwers, and mine long hand-carry hauls at both the river
removal, the engineers had major assign- and the canal because the lack of exist-
ments at both the river and the ing vehicular bridges and the absence of
At the river the engineers were to blow cover in the areas bordering the water
gaps for infantry passage through the precluded the use of jeeps fitted with
last hedgerow before the water. They litter racks.28 For eventual vehicular
were to supply 40 assault boats and passage at the canal the engineers were
crews of four men per boat. Three men to install a section of treadway bridging
of each crew were to paddle the boats and repair the destroyed structure at the
across while the fourth remained on the crossing site.
east bank to pull the boat back by rope American G–2 officers expected both
for the next wave. T o help the infan- crossings to meet strong resistance. In-
trymen mount the steep bank on the far telligence indicated three regimental-
side, the engineers were to build scaling sized organizations deployed between
ladders with special hooks. the Taute and Vire Rivers: a regiment
In addition, the division engineers, of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Divi-
with the help of corps engineers, were sion, three battalions of the 275th Divi-
to span the river with a variety of sion formed into Kampfgruppe Heinz,
bridges. First priority was given to a and elements of the 266th Division sup-
footbridge: next, a ponton infantry sup- ported by troops of the 352d Division
port bridge was to be placed across the organized into Kampfgruppe Kentner—
river to permit the organic division all under the local operational control
vehicles to cross. Afterwards, a floating of the panzer grenadiers, which in turn
treadway was to be installed and the functioned under LXXXIV Corps.
stone bridge at Airel was to be repaired German tanks had not been noted in
for the heavy vehicular traffic of the the region, but an assault gun battalion
armor and artillery units. When all with about three dozen 75 -mm. and
105 -mm. pieces in support of the infan-
26Field orders of the division and the regiments try had been observed. Occupying
in the 30th Div G–3 Jnl File. ground that rises gradually toward the
27 105th Engr C Bn Plan “C,” 29 Jun, 30th Div
G–3 Jnl File; 105th Engr C Bn Traffic Circ Plan south, the Germans had good observa-
and Overlay, 5 Jul, AAR, Jul; 105th Engr C Bn
Hist, Feb 42 – 15 Nov 45, Vol. II. 28 XIX Corps Office of the Surgeon AAR, Jul.
T H E OFFENSIVE BROADENED 95
tion of the entire area. They had Vire and a part of the II Parachute
rested, reorganized, and increased their Corps. Thus, the only units ready to
supply levels during several weeks of oppose the 30th Division between the
inactivity, and had maintained a strong Taute and the Vire were Kampfgruppe
counterreconnaissance screen that in- Heinz and a small part of the SS panzer
hibited American patrolling. Their grenadiers. These forces nevertheless
probable course of action, as judged by possessed positive advantages in superior
intelligence, was to be a tenacious de- observation and terrain readily adapt-
fense employing strong local counter- able to defense.30
attacks.29 T o overcome the expected resistance,
This estimate, in marked contrast General Hobbs called upon a tremen-
with the optimistic appraisals made dous amount of fire power. Dive
several days earlier by the VII and VIII bombers were to blast the German posi-
Corps, was in error. Whereas the two tions and potential routes of reinforce-
U.S. corps on the First Army right ment. An elaborate artillery plan
had underestimated the opposition, the (drawn by Brig. Gen. George Shea,
XIX Corps overestimated the German the XIX Corps Artillery commander)
strength. utilized the division artillery, the corps
T h e XIX Corps had actually faced artillery,, and the artillery of a nearby
strong German forces on 3 July. An armored division. In all, eight field
attack between the Taute and the artillery battalions, including one of 8-
Vire on that date would have met a inch howitzers, were to augment the
considerable force of German reserves. organic division artillery. In addition,
The SS panzer grenadier regiment in the 92d Chemical and the 823d Tank
full force, supported by Kampfgruppe Destroyer Battalions were to deliver in-
Heinz, would have opposed the water direct fire. All buildings suspected of
crossings; the 353d Division would have housing enemy strongpoints were to be
contributed units for a counterattack; destroyed. A rolling or creeping bar-
and the 15th Parachute Regiment near rage was to precede the foot troops, the
Périers and the 2d SS Panzer Division fire to advance 100 yards every five
near St. Lô would have been available minutes. “Hug the artillery barrage,”
for commitment. General Hobbs instructed his subordi-
By 7 July, however, almost the entire nate commanders, “it will carry us
SS panzer grenadier division was fighting through.” 31
on the Carentan–Périers isthmus. T h e In preparing to execute the plan, the
353d Division and the 15th Parachute division applied itself to perfecting the
Regiment were engaged on Mont Castre techniques of getting across the water.
and at la Haye-du-Puits. T h e 2d SS T h e 117th Infantry conducted practice
Panzer Division was largely committed
at la Haye-du-Puits and north of Périers. 30Hodgson, R–54.
Kampfgruppe Kentner was east of the 3130th Div, Notes for Div and Unit Comdrs, 2
Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl File; 30th Div AAR, Jul;
30th Div Arty AAR, Jul; the division and the reg-
29 XIXCorps AAR, Jul, G–2 Per Rpt 22, 6 Jul, imental field orders; 3d Armored Div G–3 Per Rpt
and Intel Annex to FO 5, 7 Jul. 13. 7 Jul.
96 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
crossings, and each officer and noncom- the flank, neutralize it, or bypass it. This
missioned leader in the regiment studied would eliminate the necessity of feeling
the terrain and the plan on a large sand out every hedge in the kind of slow
table model of the area. T h e engineers deliberate advance that increased the
practiced the details of bridge construc- effectiveness of the enemy’s prearranged
tion, made ready the assault boats, and fires. But applying the technique was
assembled the required equipment. At not easy. T h e excellent German
the same time, the bulk of the division camouflage made it extremely difficult
studied and practiced hedgerow tactics. to find the enemy positions. So incle-
General Hobbs emphasized the neces- ment was the weather between 25 June
sity of achieving close infantry, armor, and 7 July that not one aerial photo-
and engineer co-ordination. He stressed graphic mission couldbe flown. 32
the need to keep moving. Since bunch- T h e 30th Division completed its
ing up or building up a firing line along attack preparations during the first days
a hedge or a landmark was an “invita- of July, T h e attached 743d Tank
tion for casualties,” he insisted on ex- Battalion reportedall its tanks—52
tended formations. mediums and 17 light—ready for com-
During their training period the men bat; the engineers made known their
found that the lightmachine gun was readiness; the infantry seemed to be set.
not the best weapon to support infantry General Hobbs was satisfied that the
attacks in the hedgerows. They dis- division would make a good showing.33
covered that two 15 -pound charges of On the morning of 7 July it rained.
T N T in burlap bags opened a gap in a All air strikes were canceled. T h e
hedgerow bank large enough for a tank. artillery observation planes remained on
Learning that without demolition 50 the ground.
percent of the hedgerow dikes could be At 0300 one battalion of the 117th In-
breached by engineer tank dozers, the fantry moved out of its assembly area
division attached dozers to the tank one mile east of the Vire River.34 LOW
units. T h e men were reminded that
the Germans particularly feared white
3230th Div Memo, Inf Tk Coordination, 2 Jul,
phosphorus shells which were highly30th Div G–3 Jnl File; XIX Corps Draft Memo,
effective against hedgerow positions. 4 Jul, XIX Corps G–3 Jnl File; G–2 Sec, German
They were instructed to use the bazooka Organization of Defense, Villiers-Fossard, 4 Jul,
XIX Corps AAR, Jul; [Garth], St.-Lô, p. 7.
as more than a antitank weapon since its 33743d Tk Bn Msg, 2 Jul; 105th Engr C Bn
rocket head, when employed in high- Rpts, 1 and 2 Jul; Telecons, Corlett and Hobbs,
angle fire and against a hard object, was 4 Jul. All in 30th Div G–3 Jnl File.
34The following account is taken from the of-
almost as effective against personnel as ficial recordsof the division.The division G–3
the 60 -mm. mortar shell. Journal is a rich source of recorded telephone con-
T h e division also studied the lessons versations and has been used extensively. [Garth],
pp. 9–14, and Hewitt, Story of 30th Division,
of its first minor combatactiona few St.-Lô, pp. 26ff, give good detailed accounts of the action,
weeks earlier. T h e troops determined the former from the point of view of the small
that the proper way to advance was to units involved, the latter from that of the division
headquarters. Also of use were: XIX Corps Msgs
locate the enemy's main line of resist-to FUSA, 7 Jul, FUSA G–3 Jnl File; 30th Div AAR,
ance, then drive to it and roll it up from Jul; and CI 94 (30th Div).
T H E OFFENSIVE BROADENED 97
clouds obscured the moon. A drizzling and third infantry assault waves paddled
rain fell. Fog hovered over the ground. across the river.
T h e brush dripped moisture, and the As the first assault wave pulled away
earth became mud. T h e corps artillery from the near shore, the first critical task
began its preparation at 0330 by firing of the supporting engineers began–in-
on distant targets. Forty-five minutes stalling a footbridge. Having carried
later the division artillery, tank de- preconstructed sections of the footbridge
stroyers, and 4.2 -inch mortars began to to the edge of the water, a platoon of
fire at close-in enemy installations and engineers had installed six bays when
troop Concentration areas. At the line enemy artillery struck the bays and a
of departure—the last hedgerow before group of engineers carrying additional
the river—engineer guides met the two duckboard sections. T h e shells killed
infantry assault companies at 0430. four men and wounded four. Though
Picking up their rubber assault boats the platoon repaired the bays and set
and scaling ladders, the infantrymen them in place again, enemy artillery tore
and engineers moved through holes the bridge loose from its moorings and
already blasted in the hedgerow and wounded several more men. Doggedly,
walked along prepared paths to the the engineers swam into the river to
water. Organized into groups of twelve, secure the bridge again. About 0600
the men carried their craft in addition the footbridge at last was in. Assault
to their weapons, ammunition, and com- boats no longer were needed for the
bat packs. They slid down the slick crossing. In the process, the engineer
clay bank and lowered their boats into platoon had lost about twenty men, half
the stream. Because of the sharp angle its strength.
of launching, most of the craft shipped On the far shore, the two leading rifle
some water. T h e riflemen climbed companies moved quickly to the south-
aboard; the men of the weapons platoons west across the hedgerowed fields for a
placed their mortars and machine guns thousand yards. A rifle company that
in the boats and swam alongside to avoid had landed in the second wave moved
swamping them. south against the hamlet on the west
Shortly after 0430, as artillery shells side of the Airel bridge and took it after
slammed into the ground ahead, the first a short, sharp engagement. By about
assault wave of thirty-two boats crossed 0830, the first battalion of the 117th In-
the Vire River. T e n minutes later the fantry to cross had met strong but
men were scrambling up the bank on scattered resistance and was astride its
the far side and heading for the first axis of advance, ready to drive west to
hedgerow in enemy territory. A single the St. Jean-de-Daye road intersection.
hostile machine gun opened fire. As On the near bank of the Vire, en-
the engineers on the east bank of the gineers continued their bridging efforts.
river began pulling on their ropes to At 0700 they removed bodies and a
haul the boats back, enemy artillery and wrecked truck from the Airel bridge and
mortar shells began crashing into the began demining the stone structure and
stream. Under this shelling the second its eastern approaches. Harassing rifle
98 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
fire ceased after American infantrymen ways off and set them in place. Heaving
cleared the hamlet across the river. An and prying six tons of steel into place,
engineer officer and six men began to the engineers laid the treadways over the
repair the two large holes in the bridge damaged span and by 0900 had covered
roadbed. Though this provided suffi- the gaps in the roadway. T h e operation
cient space for jeeps to make a careful took thirteen minutes. Five minutes
crossing, the bridge had to be capable of later a bulldozer crossed the stone bridge
bearing heavier traffic—the tank battal- and cleared rubble from the streets of
ion attached to the division had been the hamlet while engineers swept the
given first priority for use of the bridge. western approaches for mines. Vehicles
Under fire from enemy mortars and soon began to cross.
artillery, which smoke shells fired by the At 0730 another group of engineers
division artillery failed to discourage, a had started constructing an infantry sup-
small engineer group maneuvered two port bridge for the vehicles organic to
trucks fitted with special Brockway the division. They completed it in an
bodies to the river. These vehicles not hour at a cost of fifteen casualties from
only carried treadway sections but also enemy artillery fire. Another engineer
had hydraulic booms to lift the tread- crew commenced work at 0845 on a
THE OFFENSIVE BROADENED 99
floating treadway bridge, which was in About fifteen minutes late, the leading
place by noon. men of the two attacking battalions
T h e efforts of the engineers gave the finally plunged into the canal to launch
division one footbridge and the three their advance south along the highway
planned vehicular entrances into the toward St. Jean-de-Daye.
bridgehead, two of which were capable During the afternoon all six battalions
of sustaining heavy traffic. Without on the far side of the water obstacles-
these bridges, the infantry on the far three from the 117th Infantry, one from
bank might have been unable to sus- the 119th, and two from the 120th-
tain offensive operations for long. 35 attempted to establish mutual contact
All three battalions of Colonel Kelly’s and set up a consolidated position at the
117th Infantry were across the Vire River crossroads. New to the hedgerow fight-
before 1000 on 7 July. Meeting ing, the men of the 30th Division found
scattered delaying action from Kumpƒ- that attaining their objectives was no
gruppe Heinz, the regiment advanced simple task. T h e men soon discovered
west toward St. Jean-de-Daye 36 At how difficult it was in actuality to locate
1015 a battalion of Colonel Ednie’s 119th the enemy positions, how hard it was to
Infantry crossed the Airel bridge and maintain communications, how easy it
moved to protect the left flank of the was to get lost, how much depended on
bridgehead. Tanks and tank destroyers the individual initiative of the com-
began rolling across about noon. manders of small units.
As the Vire River bridgehead broad- Rain added to problems of restricted
ened, Colonel Birks prepared to launch observation in the hedgerows, and there
the 120th Infantry across the Vire et was little effective infantry-artillery co-
Taute Canal at 1330. When artillery ordination on 7 July. Early in the
turned an increased volume of fire on morning General Hobbs himself can-
the German positions along the canal celed the rolling artillery barrage when
just before the scheduled jump-off time, he noted that the infantry could not keep
plans temporarily went awry. Instead pace with it. Inspection later revealed
of wading the canal as instructed, the that the barrage was wasteful. Firing
assault companies decided to wait for for five minutes each on lines arbitrarily
engineers to install footbridges. T h e drawna hundred yards apart meant that
engineers, having miscalculated the rounds struck the enemy hedgerow posi-
width of the waterway, found it difficult tions only by chance. T h e 4.2 -inch
to lay their duckboards. Confusion mortars, participating in the barrage,
developed at the line of departure, an fired about 2,100 shells, so much am-
occurrence furthered by incoming enemy munition that expenditures were re-
artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. stricted for the remainder of the
month. 37
35 Engr Sitreps and Engr Sec Jnl, XIX Corps
AAR, Jul; 105th Engr C Bn Annual Hist, 1944, 37 Although there had been some discussion of
Incl 3 (photographs of typical bridge installations) ; attaching heavy mortar companies to the infantry
ETOUSA Engr Hist Rpt 10, Combat Engineering regiments for better close support, the use of
(Aug 45), pp. 106–08. chemical mortars to support an infantry attack
36 Seventh Army K T B (Draft), 7 Jul. was judged to be “a most unusual role.” The
100 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
All afternoon Colonel Birks kept call- row roads, originally in poor condition,
ing for commitment of the third battal- worsened under the rain and the weight
ion of the 120th Infantry into the bridge- of the heavy vehicles. T h e single
head. T h e corps commander would not bridge across the canal was inadequate
release the battalion from reserve posi- for the main supply route where rein-
tions on the north bank of the Vire et forcements and supplies flowed in one
Taute Canal until Colonel Biddle’s direction while casualties moved in the
113th Cavalry Group had crossed the other. Using bulldozers to fill the canal
canal and secured the 30th Division right with earth, the engineers completed a
flank. T h e cavalry could not cross the second vehicular crossing site just before
canal until the engineers spanned the midnight. 39
water with a treadway bridge. T h e T h e traffic congestion at the Vire
engineers could not put in the bridge River was worse. T h e division had
because the site was under constant planned to use the stone bridge and the
enemy artillery fire. After waiting im- treadway for one-way traffic into the
patiently for several hours, General bridgehead, the infantry support bridge
Hobbs finally commanded the engineers for casualties and traffic moving east.
to disregard the enemy fire and set the Early in the afternoon, as a half-track
bridge in place. Less than an hour later and trailer were crossing the infantry
the bridge was in. Pleased, General support bridge, an enemy shell scored
Hobbs remarked that he “knew it could a direct hit. T h e half-track and trailer
be done if they had guts.” He ordered sank and fouled the ponton structure,
Colonel Birks to “pour that cavalry and efforts to raise the vehicles and re-
over.” 38 pair the bridge during the afternoon
Before the cavalry could cross, a and evening were unsuccessful. This
traffic jam developed as three tank left but two vehicular bridges at Airel,
platoons entered the bridgehead to sup- both targets of interdictory shelling.
port the infantry. Not until two hours Under the direction of impatient com-
later, at 2030, could Colonel Biddle be- manders, personnel and supplies trickled
gin to move his 113th Cavalry Group across the structures while the roads be-
across the bridge, an operation that took came more and more congested and the
five and a half hours. Enemy harassing bridge approaches jammed. As engines
fire and intermingling vehicles of several labored, tires churned and men cursed.
units impeded the crossing. T h e nar- T h e six battalions in the bridgehead
paused to rest and reorganize several
heavy mortar companies remained for the moment
under artillery control, but by August opinion hundred yards short of the crossroads in
definitely characterized the heavy mortar as an the late afternoon of the rain-soaked day.
area weapon that “should be employed in close During the evening they established
support of infantry troops.” 30th Div Arty AAR,
Jul; XIX Corps Cml Sec Jnl, XIX Corps AAR, mutual contact, a continuous line, and
entries 8, 13, 14, 18 Jul; 12th AGp Immed Rpts 26 a consolidated position overlooking the
and 29, 10 and 28 Aug.
38 Telecons, Corlett, Hobbs, Birks, and Dunn, 7
Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl File; 120th Inf S–3 Rpt, 7 39 XIX Corps Engr Sec Msg, 2230, 7 Jul, and
Jul; Msg from Lt Col Walter M. Johnson, 2215, 7 113th Cav Gp Msg, 0245, 8 Jul, XIX Corps G–3
Jul, XIX Corps G–3 Jnl and File. Jnl and File.
T H E OFFENSIVE BROADENED 101
road intersection. Although General only a light enemy screen protected the
Corlett wanted the division to continue ground between the Vire and the Taute
the attack after nightfall to secure the Rivers, as seemed likely, armored com-
crossroad objective, General Hobbs per- mitment in the bridgehead was in
suaded him that exerting pressure by order.43 T e n minutes after General
active and aggressive patrolling would Corlett learned that General Bradley
suffice.40 had attached the 3d Armored Division to
T h e 30th Division had failed to take XIX Corps, Corlett was telling the
its objective, but it had made a signif- armored division commander to cross
icant advance on its first day of attack the Vire River at Airel, move southwest
with less than 300 casualties. 41 So suc- through the 30th Division, and make a
cessful was the river crossing that even “powerdrive” toward the high ground
before the assault was made across the west of St. Lô T h e 30th Division was
canal it was rumored that the armored to follow rapidly in support.44
division earlier predicted for the XIX Not long afterwards, contingents of
Corps would be forthcoming for em- armor were moving toward the stone
ployment in the bridgehead. That bridge at Airel. Although the two corps
afternoon General Corlett thought that on the First Army right wing appeared
if he did get the armored division, he halted, it looked as though the XIX
would put it across the Vire, pass it Corps between the Taute and the Vire
through the infantry, and direct it south had only begun to advance. If this
to the corps objective, the ridge west development were exploited adroitly, the
of St. Lô. 42 entire First Army offensive might pick
That evening the rumor became fact. up speed.
General Bradley had decided that if
43Telecon, Col Charles W. West and Col Richard
40Telecon, Corlett and Hobbs, 7 Jul, 30th Div W. Stephens, 1750, 7 Jul; FUSA Msg to XIX Corps,
G–3 Jnl File. 1815, 7 Jul, XIX Corps G–3 Jnl File; [Garth],
41Lt. Col. Arthur H. Fuller of the 117th Infantry St.-Lô, p. 17.
received the DSC. 44 XIX Corps FO 5, 1900, 7 Jul (confirming ver-
42 Telecons, Corlett and Hobbs, 1255 and 1725. bal orders), and Special Map “A”; Ltr, Corlett to
7 Jul, 30th Div. G–3 Jnl File. OCMH, 19 Jan 54, OCMH Files.
CHAPTER VI
GERMANBICYCLEBRIGADE
before the enemy could act.2 Hopeful lett to support the 30th Division with
that the First Army offensive was at last the armored division.
about to move with dispatch, but also General Corlett had definite ideas of
looking to the lesser goal of shoring up his own. He wanted to get the 3d Ar-
the bridgehead against counterattack, mored Division across the Vire, pass it
General Bradley gave XIX Corps the 3d through the 30th Division, and advance
Armored Division, which had been in rapidly to the south to seize and hold
the army reserve.3 Unwilling to dictate the high ground west of St. Lô. Unfor-
the details of commitment, General tunately, it was difficult to translate the
Bradley simply instructed General Cor- desire into action, for General Corlett
was severely ill and confined to bed at
his command post for several days. He
2 See, for example, the 3d Armd Div CCB G–2 telephoned the armored division com-
Daily Narrative, 7–16 Jul.
3 T h e official records of the units involved have
mander, Maj. Gen. Leroy H. Watson, in
been supplemented by letters to OCMH from Gen- the late afternoon of 7 July and instruct-
eral of the Army Omar N. Bradley, 16 Mar 54; ed him to cross the Vire River as soon as
Maj Gen Charles H. Corlett (Ret.), 19 Jan 54;
Maj Gen Leroy H. Watson (Ret.) (CG, 3d Armd
he could and then drive south. “How
Div) , 22 Feb 54; Maj Gen Leland S. Hobbs (Ret.), far do you want me to go?” General Wat-
5 Mar 54; and Brig Gen John J. Bohn (Ret.) (CG, son asked. “The Germans have little or
CCB, 3d Armd Div), 14 Jan 54. All in OCMH
Files. [Garth], St.-Lô, presents a n excellent nar-
nothing over there,” the corps com-
rative of the events described below. mander replied, “just keep going.”
104 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Thus, at the beginning of the new when a new table of organization, effec-
phase of action between the Taute and tive September 1943, had triangularized
the Vire, clarity of aims was lacking. the armored division and reduced its
T h e army commander envisioned a size to make it less cumbersome and
build-up of the bridgehead forces with more maneuverable. Because reorgan-
armor; the corps commander foresaw a izing the two divisions in England might
limited exploitation to the ridge west have delayed their battle readiness, they
of St. Lô; the armored division com- had retained their original organization.
mander understood that he was to make In contrast with the new and smaller
an unlimited drive to the. south. T h e armored divisions, the 3d Armored Di-
incompatibility of intent led to some vision possessed two combat commands
confusion that was the beginning of in- instead of three, 232 medium tanks in-
creasing disorder. stead of 168, and with its attached units
Although General Corlett had known numbered over 16,000 men instead of
for some time that the armored division 12,000. Powerful, if somewhat un-
might be attached to his corps, illness wieldy, the 3d Armored Division was
prevented him from personally directing subdivided into twin combat commands,
its commitment. T o help him with the each a strong force easily detached from
operation, Maj. Gen. Walton H. Walker, the whole. Neither Bradley nor Corlett
commander of the XX Corps, which had had specified the size of the armored
not yet been committed to action, tem- force to be committed west of the Vire
porarily acted as Corlett’s representative. River on 7 July, but Watson’s decision
General Watson was surprised by the to commit one combat command as a
sudden news of his impending commit- start was normal.
ment. He had not been informed be- T h e armored division had arrived in
forehand of the corps objectives and Normandy late in June. Early plans
plans, nor had he discussed with Gener- for July had caused the division to be
als Corlett and Hobbs such arrange- tentatively alerted for an attack in the
ments as co-ordinating artillery fires, VII Corps sector; but because of increas-
constructing additional bridges, facilitat- ing danger that the Germans might
ing the entry of the division into the counterattack the army left, east of the
bridgehead, providing passage through Vire River, the division remained in
the 30th Division, or determining routes army reserve. Since Combat Command
of advance. Guessing that General Cor- A (CCA) had taken part in a limited
lett intended to commit the entire ar- objective attack at the end of June,
mored division, which happened actually General Watson decided to give Combat
to be the case, Watson decided to send Command B (CCB), headed by Brig.
one combat command across the river Gen. John J. Bohn, the first mission be-
first. tween the Taute and the Vire. In an
General Watson’s force was one of assembly area east of the Vire River,
the two “old-type” armored divisions CCB had been prepared to execute
in the European theater. Both had been several potential plans of action, among
in England preparing for the invasion them one based on the assumption that
T H E ATTEMPT T O EXPLOIT 105
it would attack south after the 30th Di- command column was normally esti-
vision seized St. Jean-de-Daye—exactly mated at four hours, and since the Airel
the situation the unit was called upon crossing site was but five miles from the
to implement.4 (See Map 5.) combat command assembly area, the
Having been alerted for movement at unit under normal conditions should
1615, 7 July, and having received the have been across the Vire River shortly
march order at 1830, General Bohn led after midnight, 7 July. 6 Conditions on
his column toward the Airel bridge. the night of 7–8 July were far from nor-
Although he had asked permission to mal. T h e combat command could use
phone General Hobbs to co-ordinate his only one road to approach the river, a
river crossing with the infantry-wire road that was narrow, rain-soaked, and
had been laid to the 30th Division head- heavily burdened with other traffic.
quarters in anticipation of this kind of Maintaining radio silence, the armored
emergency-the 3d Armored Division force proceeded slowly toward an area
chief of staff assured him that the di- that was receiving intermittent enemy
vision staff would take care of all such artillery fire and becoming increasingly
details. Bohn was to perform under congested with vehicles. T h e 30th Di-
3d Armored Division control. vision alone, attempting to reinforce,
General Bohn had quite a task. He supply, and stabilize the bridgehead,
had to get 6,000 men in 800 vehicles and was having difficulty maintaining a con-
300 trailers, a column over 20 miles long, tinuous flow of traffic across the river.
across a single bridge that was under Of the three vehicular bridges construct-
enemy fire, enter, partially during the ed near Airel, the ponton structure had
hours of darkness, a bridgehead that be- been knocked out during the afternoon
longed to another division, and attack by enemy shells. Of the two remain-
a distant objective in strange territory ing-the permanent stone bridge and the
with inexperienced troops.5 floating treadway-one had to carry traf-
Since the time length of a combat fic moving east from the bridgehead. A
single bridge was all that was available
for CCB, and even that had to be shared
4Plan 5 of an undated draft ltr, Bohn to Wat- with the 30th Division, which was in
son, in compliance with 3d Armd Div FO 2, 2 Jul, the process of moving an additional in-
3d Armd Div CCB S–3 Jnl File. Subsequent let-
ters omitted Plan 5. See 3d Armd Div Opn Plan fantry battalion into the bridgehead.
1, 6 Jul. With vehicles of both organizations in-
5CCB consisted of a reconnaissance company termingling, the enemy fire falling near
and three tank battalions of the 33d Armored
Regiment; one battalion and the headquarters of Airel further retarding the flow of traf-
the 36th Armored Infantry Regiment; the 54th fic, and blackout discipline increasing
and 391st Armored Field Artillery Battalions, each
with an attached battery of antiaircraft artillery;
a company each of the 83d Reconnaissance Battal- 6 T h i s was an estimate given by CCA of the
ion, the 23d Armored Engineer Battalion, the 703d 3d Armored Division on 10 July, based on a speed
Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 45th Armored Medi- of 8 miles per hour at night and 12 miles per
cal Battalion, and the division Maintenance Bat- hour, but with a longer interval between vehicles,
talion; and an additional battery of antiaircraft during the day. 9th Div G–3 Jnl, 10Jul; see also
artillery. 3d Armd Div FO 3, 7 Jul; 3d Armd Di- CCB March Table, 29 Jul, 3d Armd Div CCB S–3
CCB AAR, 7–16 Jul. Jnl File.
106 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the difficulties, the combat command St. Jean-de-Daye crossroads. Two bat-
did not get its last vehicle across the talions of the 120th Infantry were eche-
bridge until long after daybreak on 8 loned to the right along the road between
July. St. Jean-de-Daye and the canal. West
Across the river, the combat command of that road as far as the Taute River,
had to find lodgment in a small area about four miles away, the area still had
crowded with 30th Division troops and to be cleared by the 113th Cavalry
closely hemmed in by an active enemy. Group, which had followed the 120th
A tank battalion received enemy small Infantry across the canal.
arms and mortar fire as it moved into As soon as General Hobbs had learned
assembly just south of the Airel–St. Jean- that the combat command was to en-
de-Daye road. A reconnaissance com- ter the bridgehead, he had ordered his
pany scouting several hundred yards troops to clear the main road west of
south of the same road ran into a road- Airel of all unnecessary traffic and give
block guarded by enemy infantrymen the armor priority of movement. He
with machine guns. During the night, envisioned the advance of the combat
minor enemy forces attacked and drove command to the St. Jean-de-Daye road
one small armored unit back to the main intersection, where the armor would
road. As the men sought places where turn left and drive rapidly south along
they could park their tanks and other the good highway toward the corps ob-
vehicles west of the Vire, they were har- jective, the high ground west of St.
assed by enemy mortar and artillery Lô. T h e first part of this action, the
fire.7 advance to the crossroad, would se-
T o pass one major element through cure the bridgehead objective, which
another is always a delicate procedure. the 30th Division had not taken. T h e
Passing the combat command through second part, the drive to the south,
the 30th Division was to be a frustrating would provide the infantry division with
experience. Without reconnaissance on an armored spearhead. But General
the part of the armored unit and without Hobbs did not have operational control
co-ordination between the combat com- of Combat Command B.
mand and the infantry division, misun- General Watson, the armored division
derstanding was inevitable. commander, gave some consideration to
On the night of 7–8 July the 30th Di- this course of action but decided against
vision had the bulk of its combat troops it. An advance along the Pont-Hébert
west of the Vire. One battalion of the highway would present an open flank
119th Infantry held the left flank, which to the enemy between the highway and
rested on the Vire River, and another the Taute, and taking the crossroads and
battalion of that regiment was moving establishing adequate flank protection
into the bridgehead. T h e three bat- would involve the armored unit in a
talions of the 117th Infantry, in the cen- task that might delay the movement
ter, occupied positions just short of the southward. General Watson therefore
directed General Bohn to turn left im-
7 Msgs, 2337 and 2338, 7 Jul, 3d Armd Div CCB
S–3 Jnl and File. mediately after crossing the Airel bridge,
T H E ATTEMPT T O EXPLOIT 107
move southwest over a network of un- as well as the lighter weapons, whether
improved roads and trails, and reach the towed or self-propelled. T h e experi-
main highway leading south at a point ence of CCA of the 3d Armored Division
three miles below the St. Jean-de-Daye at the end of June had specifically indi-
crossroads. T h e division field order cated: that tanks could escape the deadly
and overlay subsequently showed a short enemy antitank fire by avoiding the
arrow pointing generally southwest from roads and trails and advancing cross-
the Airel bridge. country. Directives and memoranda
There was nothing unusual in send- from higher headquarters endorsed the
ing armor over secondary roads or cross- view. T h e 3d Armored Division train-
country to outflank or bypass resistance ing had stressed the techniques of field-
before resuming an advance along the to-field movement; rapid advance along
main axis, and General Watson did not the narrow and restricted highways of
think that the combat command would the hedgerow country and under the
be unduly delayed. T h e distance to sights of well-sited zeroed-in enemy
the main highway was between four and weapons was considered rash, reckless,
six miles. Although the combat com- and ill advised. 8
mand had not made a prior reconnais- General Bohn had divided his com-
sance, the ground was believed lightly mand into three task forces—eachformed
held by the enemy. T h e risk of getting around a reinforced tank battalion-
the tanks involved in hedgerow tactics and an administrative element. They
of fighting from one field to the next were to deploy in column on a thousand-
seemed slight, and the potential compli- yard front and attack in normal armored
cations of pointing the command di- manner, the leading task force advancing
agonally across the zones of two regi- in two columns along parallel routes.
ments of the 30th Division seemed mi- Shortly after daybreak, 8 July, even be-
nor. fore all the combat command’s units
Another factor that contributed to were across the Vire, the leading task
General Watson’s decision on the route force commenced the attack. Without
of advance was the framework of refer- artillery preparation, men and tanks be-
ence that governed the employment of gan to move southwest in an area trav-
armor in the Cotentin at this time. ersed by country roads and hedgerowed
T h e knowledge that German antitank lanes.
guns were superior to American armor Almost at once the task force met and
plate produced among American troops destroyed five Mark IV tanks attached
an unwholesome respect of all enemy to Kumpƒgruppe Heinz. In the ex-
antitank weapons. Perhaps the most change of fire the task force lost one
effective was the German 88 -mm. anti- tank. Through this auspicious begin-
aircraft gun, which was used also against ning augured well, the task force soon
ground targets. Just as Americans tend-
ed to confuse assault guns with tanks, it 8 See, for example, XIX Corps Ltr, Notes on Com-
bat Experience, 5 Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
became general practice to refer to all Unless otherwise noted, the documents cited in
German antitank guns as 88’s —the 75’s this chapter are in the 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
108 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
CONGESTION
AT AIREL BRIDGE
became involved in the kind of tortuous ress of the combat command was un-
advance that had become typical of of- satisfactory. Pointing out the “great
fensive action in the hedgerow country. opportunity” that faced the command
T h e armor overflowed the narrow and the “good chance of a break
trails and entered the fields, making it through,” he urged Bohn to fit his
necessary for demolition teams and engi- method of advance to the situation. If
neer bulldozers to breach the hedgerows. he found it impossible to go ahead on
Though the task force received two ad- the roads, he was to move cross-country;
ditional dozers and encountered only if his tanks bogged down in the fields,
light resistance, the day’s gain totaled he was to dispel among his subordinate
only about a mile and a half. 9 commanders the “inflexible idea that
T h e limited advance was disappoint- cross-country progress is essential.” 10
ing, particularly since only minor units Although there was no real difference
had come to the aid of Kampƒgruppe between methods of advance in this area,
Heinz during the day. General Watson General Bohn had emphasized to his
informed General Bohn that the prog-
10 On General Watson’s lack of clarity over the
9 3d Armd Div CCB S–3 Jnl and File, entries advantages of cross-country versus road advance,
1100 and 1128, 8 Jul. see 12th AGp Immed Rpt 24, 9 Aug.
THE ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT 109
task force commander the need for speed after crossing the Vire, the combat com-
and had insisted that he use the roads mand had impinged on the sector of the
wherever possible. T h e task force com- 119th Infantry. Only after moving for-
mander had been reluctant or perhaps ward several miles would the armored
simply unable to move his men and ve- unit have created a zone for itself be-
hicles out of the fields. tween the 119th and the 117th Regi-
Meanwhile, in the rear areas of the ments. Agreement on this procedure
bridgehead there was a disheartening was reached by representatives of armor
spectacle of confusion, a confusion and infantry at a special conference for
throttling an orderly development of co-ordination during the afternoon of 8
the bridgehead and the attack. Seven July. At the same time, the artillery
infantry battalions, one tank battalion, commanders of the 3d Armored and
and an artillery battalion of the 30th 30th Divisions were meeting to keep
Division; one infantry battalion, three the artillery of one from firing on the
tank battalions, and two artillery bat- troops of the other.11
talions of CCB; plus an almost equal General Hobbs complained bitterly
number of supporting troops of both of the presence of the combat command
units jammed an area of hedgerowed in the bridgehead. He protested that
labyrinths scarcely four miles wide and the armor was cluttering up his sector
less than three miles deep. T o the and bogging down his advance. T h e
tankers the fields seemed full of rifle- presence of tanks in his regimental rear
men; to the infantrymen the terrain ap- areas, he was sure, was preventing ar-
peared covered with armor. In this tillery, supplies, and men from reaching
overpopulated morass of mud, tank his forward areas quickly. Promiscuous
treads chewed up wire and destroyed tank fire, he reported, had caused six-
communications, while unemployed teen casualties in his division. It was
combat units jostled supply personnel impossible, he contended, to protect his
attempting to carry out their functions. troops with artillery fire for fear of strik-
Infantrymen ignorant of the armored ing armored elements. So incensed was
commitment were surprised by the ap- he that he ordered his artillery to give
pearance of tanks, while tankers were the infantry the fire requested “wherever
indignant when they found infantrymen they are, irrespective of armor or any-
occupying fields useful as armored as- thing else.” He felt that either the
sembly areas. Experienced troops might combat command or the infantry di-
have surmounted the difficulties engen- vision had to be halted, for both could
dered by restricted space, but both infan- not operate in the restricted area. He
trymen and tankers were novices. Nerv- was convinced that the 30th Division
ous soldiers of both units aggravated without CCB would reach the corps ob-
conditions by firing their weapons wild- jective rapidly, but that CCB without
ly in rear areas and on the flanks. Each the 30th Division would “never get any-
organization accused the other of stifling
11 Memo by Brig Gen William K. Harrison, jr.,
the advance. Coordination CCB, 117th, 119th Inf, 8 Jul, 3d
By striking southwest immediately Armd Div CCB S–3 Jnl File.
110 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
cally, the combat command was to rein- gained Hauts-Vents quickly, General
force the calvalry group. Corlett thought he might then attack
On the afternoon of 8 July, Brig. Gen. St. Lô from the northwest, or perhaps
Doyle O. Hickey’s Combat Command A drive farther south to the original corps
crossed the Vire and moved west along objective. With these intentions of the
the main road toward the Taute. Its corps commander in mind, General
passage through the bridgehead intensi- Hobbs ordered General Bohn to resume
fied the congestion. T o add to the con- his attack on 9 July, continuing south-
fusion, the last battalion of the 120th west across the St. Jean-de-Daye–Pont-
Infantry entered the bridgehead after Hébert highway to Hauts-Vents and
being replaced along the north bank of Hill 91.
the Vire et Taute Canal by a suddenly On the second day of the attack, 9
available battalion of the arriving 35th July, General Bohn passed his second
Division. T h e battalion of the 120th task force in column through the first.
moved south through St. Jean-de-Daye. Passage was difficult because of the
When the infantry met and crossed terrain, but by midmorning the task
the CCA column, which was moving force was making slow progress across
west, inevitable delays occurred. “Every muddy fields and along narrow roads
road is blocked by armor,” Hobbs com- and trails. Only occasional harassing
plained. 15 artillery fire came in. T h e opposition
Although General Hobbs had said he seemed slight. This prompted Hobbs
would let CCB trail along after the 30th to order Bohn to get the task force out
Division in his attack south on 9 July, of the fields and on to the roads.
General Corlett insisted that he use the In part, the order was virtually mean-
armor to spearhead his advance. T h e ingless. T h e roads in the area were
objective was no longer the high ground little better than trails—narrow, sunken
west of St. Lô, which General Corlett in many places, and frequently blocked
felt could not be attained by a quick by trees and overhanging hedges.
armored thrust, but instead Hill 91 at Movement along these country lanes
Hauts-Vents, a little more than three was not much different from cross-coun-
miles ahead of the combat command. try advance, and possibly worse. A
About 300 feet above sea level and fallen tree or a wrecked vehicle could
aptly named for the high winds that easily immobilize an entire column.
sweep across it, Hauts-Vents overlooks Floundering in the mud, fighting the
the Cotentin lowlands as far north as terrain rather than the enemy, the
Carentan. It dominates the St. Jean- tankers could not advance with true
de-Daye–Pont-HCbert road and com- armored rapidity.
mands the Vire River crossing to the T h e meaning of the order lay not in
east that leads to St. Lô. It would serve General Hobbs’ directive to get onto
as a compromise objective. If CCB the roads but rather in his judgment
that the combat command was not act-
15 Telecons, Hobbs and Walker, 1615, 8 Jul, Cor- ing aggressively enough to get out of the
lett and Hobbs, 2210, 8 Jul; XIX Corps G–3 Per
Rpt 32, 9 Jul. repressive terrain. Although General
112 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Bohn had ordered the attacking task General Walker, who was assisting be-
force to use the roads in the same sense cause of Corlett’s illness, to inform
that Hobbs had meant it, the task force Bohn that if Bohn’s relief were recom-
commander had instructed his units to mended, he, Corlett, would have to con-
use the “hedgerow method of advance.” cur. Walker transmitted the message
When Bohn repeated his order and shortly after Hobbs’ ultimatum arrived.
when the task force commander seemed Still impatient to know why CCB was
hesitant about carrying it out, Bohn not getting underway, General Hobbs
started forward to expedite personally sent his assistant division commander,
a change in the manner of attack. Brig. Gen. William K. Harrison, jr., to
Traffic congestion, intensified by in- find out. General Harrison reached
termittent rain, so delayed General Bohn the task force about 1500; an hour
that he did not reach the task force later he was satisfied that General Bohn
command post until an hour after noon. had the situation well in hand.
Reiterating his orders, he told the task With the task force commander still
force commander to get on the roads muttering that “it was fatal to get on
and move. In response, the officer de- the roads . . . after all the indoctrina-
manded with some heat whether Gener- tion by the Division Commander,’’ Gen-
al Bohn realized that he was “asking eral Bohn finally succeeded in reorgan-
him to go contrary to General Corlett’s izing the task force so that it could move
directives, General Watson’s directives, in column along parallel routes without
and the rehearsals . . . of the tank-in- the delay of plowing abreast through
fantry teams.” At this point, General the fields. Anxious to give higher
Bohn himself took charge of the task headquarters some sign of progress, he
force. directed a tank company to proceed
While Bohn was attempting to get without delay and without pause south-
through the traffic congestion to the west to the objective. T h e tank com-
task force, General Hobbs was becoming pany was to disregard communications
increasingly dissatisfied with the slow with the rear, move to the St. Jean-de-
progress. Unwilling to suffer longer Daye–Pont-Hébert highway, cross the
what appeared to him a clear case of in- highway, and continue on to Hill 91 at
efficiency, Hobbs sent Bohn an ulti- Hauts-Vents.
matum: either reach the objective, Eight tanks of the company moved
Hauts-Vents, by 1700, or relinquish ahead down a narrow country lane in
command. single file, spraying the ditches and
General Corlett had also become dis- hedges with machine gun fire as they
satisfied. Learning at 1400 that the advanced. They soon vanished from
leading task force had advanced only sight.
600 yards in eight hours but had lost One reason higher commanders were
not a man or a tank to German fire, so insistent upon getting CCB rolling
Corlett had come to the conclusion was their knowledge of the approach of
that Bohn was not pressing the attack substantial enemy forces: from the west
with sufficient vigor. He requested a part of the 2d SS Panzer Division, an
T H E ATTEMPT T O EXPLOIT 113
This exaggeration was typical of the un- St. Jean-de-Daye. T h e other seven tanks
certainty and the rumors of disaster that in column followed.21
spread through the bridgehead during In the meantime, just south of the
the afternoon. News of the destruction St. Jean-de-Daye crossroads, a company
of the tank company fed the apprehen- of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion
sion and contributed to a panic that had emplaced its 3-inch guns along the
touched about 200 soldiers who were main highway. Stragglers falling back
performing close support missions. As on the crossroads told the tank-destroyer
soldiers streamed toward St. Jean-de- crewmen of a breakthrough by German
Daye in small, disorganized groups, two armor, which, the stragglers said, was
medical collecting stations, a cannon just a short distance over the hill. Air
company, and an infantry battalion bursts exploding in the vicinity from
headquarters, becoming convinced that unidentified guns seemed to substantiate
the enemy had made a penetration, also the reports. A short while later the re-
withdrew, but in good order, to the vi- ports took on added credence when one
cinity of St. Jean-de-Daye. On the basis of the 30th Division’s regiments passed
of these withdrawals, front-line units be- on the erroneous information that fifty
came concerned about the integrity and enemy tanks were moving north on the
disposition of adjacent troops. Several highway from Pont-Hébert toward St.
headquarters complained that subordi- Jean-de-Daye. Manning their guns and
nate units of other headquarters were outposting them with bazookas, the
fleeing in disorder.20 tank-destroyer crewmen peered anx-
At the height of the counterattack, iously through the drizzling rain of the
the eight tanks dispatched by General foggy afternoon and listened for the
Bohn were proceeding toward the sound of tank motors.
St. Jean-de-Daye–Pont-Hébert highway. They were fully alert when the sil-
Several miles ahead of CCB’s leading houette of a tank hull nosed over the
task force, and angling southwest toward top of a small rise a thousand yards
the highway, the tanks were to turn away. Although there was little doubt
left when they reached the main road. that this was the enemy, a tank-destroyer
They were then to go several hundred officer radioed his company to ask
yards south before turning right on a whether any American tanks were in
secondary road to the objective, Hauts- the area. T h e reply came at once:
Vents. Spraying the hedges and ditches nearby armor was German. By then
continuously with machine gun fire, the several other tanks had come into view.
tankers reached the north-south high- Firing machine guns and throwing an
way. Instead of turning left and south, occasional round of high explosive into
the company commander in the lead the adjacent fields, the tanks moved
tank turned right and north toward
21 An element of CCA had made a similar mis-
take at the end of June “because one TF got mixed
up on proper use of Slidex and Map Lay.”
20 30th Div G–3 Jnl, entry 1749, 9 Jul; 3d Armd (Penned note, n.d., 3d Armd Div CCB S–3 Jnl and
Div CCB S–3 Jnl, entry 1830, 9 Jul; XIX Corps IG File.) Slidex was a slide-rule type of decoding de-
Ltr, Rpt of Investigation of Incident . . . , 13 Jul. vice.
T H E ATTEMPT T O EXPLOIT 115
steadily toward the tank-destroyer posi- about a mile short of Hauts-Vents. Al-
tions. There could be no doubt that though Bohn requested permission to
these were anything but the long- continue-on the consideration not only
awaited enemy. T h e tank-destroyer of weak opposition but also that the
guns opened fire at a range of 600 yards. armor was at last free of the constricting
T h e first round scored a direct hit on terrain and could reach Hauts-Vents be-
the lead tank. fore dark–Hobbs refused.
At this moment General Bohn at the General Hobbs had based his decision
task force command post was trying to upon the likelihood that the Germans
get in touch with the tanks he had might continue to counterattack after
sent ahead. On the open radio channel dark. If the combat command took
he heard a cry of anguish and the voice Hauts-Vents, the division would have to
of the tank-company commander say advance in a strong supporting effort.
with awful clarity, “I am in dreadful Although the division had sustained less
agony.” than 300 casualties that day, most of
Before mutual identification could be them from enemy artillery fire, Hobbs
established, crews of the tanks and tank felt that he needed to reorganize before
destroyers together had sustained about attempting to attack. He judged that
ten casualties. Two tanks were knocked strong defensive positions were more im-
out. 22 portant. Without a supporting advance
Reversing direction, the six remain- by infantry, he believed that Combat
ing tanks began rolling back down the Command B would be too far in ad-
highway toward Hauts-Vents. Again vance at Hauts-Vents for adequate flank
they disappeared, again they lost com- and rear protection in an area where
munication with Bohn’s headquarters. enemy strength was manifest. He told
Although the tank radios could trans- Bohn to direct his troops to “button up
mit, they perversely failed in reception. along the line I gave them and get a
General Bohn subsequently succeeded good night’s rest.” 23
in getting the bulk of his leading task As the combat command assumed the
force to the St. Jean-de-Daye–Pont- defensive, General Bohn tried to call
Hébert highway. By evening the task back the six tanks that had disappeared.
force was advancing toward the objec- Shortly before darkness, the tankers had
tive. T h e third task force, having reported being on the hill objective at
moved west and cross-country in the Hauts-Vents. A moment later, an air
rear, debouched on the main road and mission, requested earlier but delayed
rolled rapidly to the south. by the bad weather, struck Hauts-Vents
Just as it began to appear that CCB in the fading light. Though American
might complete its mission that night, pilots strafed the six tanks, the tanks
General Hobbs ordered a halt. Gen- luckily escaped losses. Unable to re-
eral Bohn was to set up defensive posi- ceive on their faulty radio sets, and
tions astride the Pont-Hébert road ignorant of the order that had halted
222d TD Gp Ltr, Rpt of Investigation, 11 Jul; 23 Telecon,Gen Bohn and Lt Col Harold E.
823d TD Bn Rpt 15, 9 Jul. Hassenfelt, 2015, 9 Jul.
116 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ably well ironed out,” Hobbs reported. ately, but the attack continued. Reach-
“Roysdon is kicking them along.” 27 ing the crest of Hill 91 once more, men
T h e honeymoon was short lived. and tanks again had to give way. A
That afternoon, as the hedgerow terrain second assault, led personally by Colonel
and German fire continued to retard the Roysdon, finally secured Hauts-Vents
advance, General Hobbs again be- during the afternoon. T h e accomplish-
came discontented. “If Colonel Roys- ment caused Roysdon to characterize the
don doesn’t do what he can do, and morale of his exhausted troops as “amaz-
should have done by noon today,” he ing’’; his words of praise: “Enough can-
threatened, he too would have to be not be said.” 31
relieved of command. Roysdon’s “only Earlier in the afternoon General
trouble” was that he “wasn’t doing any- Hobbs had refused an offer by General
thing.” “Please get them out of our Corlett of an additional tank battalion.
hair,” Hobbs begged.28 He already had three battalions of CCB,
In the evening General Corlett de- he said, “sitting on their fannies.” Not
cided to detach CCB from the 30th until a day later, with Hill 91 in hand,
Division as soon as Hill 91 at Hauts- could Hobbs look at the matter dif-
Vents was secured. T h e infantry divi- ferently. He agreed with Roysdon that
sion alone would continue to the ridge the combat command had done a good
west of St. Lô, the final corps objec- job, and he regretted his relief of Gen-
tive. 29 eral Bohn. “If he [Bohn] had had a
By this time, Panzer Lehr was mov- little more of a chance,” Hobbs ad-
ing into the area. Hauts-Vents was no mitted, “he probably would have done
longer undefended and waiting to be the same thing [as Roysdon].” 32
occupied. A contingent of CCB did T h e entrance of CCB into the bridge-
reach the top of Hill 91 on the eve- head had resulted in another frustration
ning of 10 July, but strong enemy similar to those on the other active por-
artillery and mortar fire forced with- tions of the First Army front. Five days
drawal. Though unsuccessful in seizing of combat had advanced the XIX Corps
and holding the ground, the contingent right wing only halfway to the ridge west
nevertheless disrupted Panzer Lehr of St. Lô. Great promise of quick suc-
preparations for an attack that had been cess had turned into failure primarily
planned to start shortly after midnight. 30 because of the un-co-ordinated commit-
Combat Command B jumped off ment of the combat command into
again on the morning of 11 July. restricted operational space. Whether
Enemy antitank guns east of the Vire General Bradley had intended only a
River knocked out six tanks immedi- reinforced tank battalion to enter the
27Telecon, Corlett and Hobbs, 1025, 10 Jul.
28 Telecons, Corlett and Hobbs, 1750 and 1935, 31 XIX Corps G–3 Per Rpt 35, 12 Jul; 3d Armd
10 Jul. Div G–3 Per Rpt 17, 11 Jul, and CCB S–3 Per
29 XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs, 10 Jul; 3d Armd Div Rpt, 11 Jul. Capt. George T. Stallings of the 33d
CCB FO 5, 11 Jul. Armored Regiment received the DSC for his actions
30Seventh Army K T B , 10 Jul; Panzer Lehr FO, between 8 and 11 July.
10 Jul, Pz Lehr Ib KTB; see below, Ch. VII, for 32Telecons, Hobbs and West, 1310, 11 Jul, Hobbs
the Panzer Lehr attack. and Corlett, 0830, 12 Jul.
118 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
bridgehead on 7 July, as was later done than to hope that the armor would
claimed, was an academic question by disentangle itself from the congestion
the morning of 8 July.33 T h e entire and the terrain. An opportunity to
combat command had crossed the Vire make a deep penetration had been
and was on the ground, and that fact missed, for by the time the combat com-
was unalterable. Little more could be mand got free of its external repressions
and its internal inhibitions, the Ger-
33Interv of Capt Franklin Ferriss with Gen Bohn,
14 Jul 44, in CI 259; Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall,
mans had plugged the gap. Panzer
27 Jul 44, S–56328, Pogue Files. Lehr was ready to attack.
CHAPTER VII
“I am, myself, quite happy about the of accidental bomb spillage and inac-
situation,” General Montgomery re- curate aim? General Eisenhower re-
plied. He had maintained Allied initia- solved the first question. He favored
tive, prevented reverses, and set into using strategic air for tactical ends when-
motion “a very definite plan.” Three ever those ends were important and
needs determined Montgomery’s opera- profitable. Caen, he believed, was im-
tions-the Breton ports, space for maneu- portant and profitable. 5 Ground and
ver, and destruction of German forces. air planning staffs worked out a solution
“Of one thing you can be quite sure,” to the second question. A bomb line
General Montgomery promised; “there 6,000 yards (about three and a half
will be no stalemate.” 3 miles) ahead of the leading units, they
While the Americans were struggling decided, would minimize the danger to
in the Cotentin, the British had friendly ground troops.
mounted another effort against Caen. For the July attack on Caen, heavy
Because in earlier attempts to take the bombers were to saturate a rectangular
city the British had been unable to mass target, 4,000 by 1,500 yards, on the
sufficient artillery to destroy the strong northern outskirts of the city. T h e pur-
defenses, the planners discussed the use pose was to destroy both infantry and
of heavy bombers to deliver preparatory artillery positions, cut off forward troops
fire for the ground action. In February from supply, demoralize enemy soldiers
and March 1944 heavy bombers had in and out of the target zone, and,
launched attacks at Cassino in Italy to finally, boost British ground force mo-
assist ground troops, but without notable rale. Field artillery was to cover the
success, and during June heavy bombers gap between the British line and the air
had rendered occasional close support in target with normal preparation fires.
France by attacking targets that the chief (Map 6 )
of the RAF Bomber Command sar- Canadian troops initiated the offen-
castically termed of “immediate and sive on 4 July with a preliminary attack
fleeting 4 But there had
importance.” designed to secure the western exits of
been no large-scale use of heavy bombers Caen. Three days later, at 2150 on
in direct support of the ground troops. 7 July, 460 planes of the RAF Bomber
Use of bombers in a direct support Command dropped 2,300 tons of high
role hinged upon the answer to two explosive bombs in forty minutes. Six
major questions: Was it justifiable to hours later, just before dawn on 8 July,
divert heavy bombers from their main three British and Canadian divisions at-
strategic role? Could the planes bomb tacked directly toward the objective with
close enough to the forward line to fa- three armored brigades in immediate
cilitate the ground advance without un- support and a fourth in reserve.
duly exposing the troops to the hazards Though the British found many Ger-
mans stunned, some units cut off from
3Montgomery to Eisenhower, 8 Jul, SGS SHAEF ammunition and gasoline supplies, and
File 381, OVERLORD I (a).
4 Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 339; Marshal of the
RAF, Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive (Lon- 1 Capt Butcher (USNR) , Diary, 29 Jun 44, Pogue
don: Collins, 1947), p. 210. Files.
THE OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 121
F.Temp le
MAP 6
one regiment virtually decimated, resist- Group West line. With one regiment
ance did not collapse, the fighting was of the 16th destroyed and quickly over-
bitter, casualties heavy. Widespread run, Eberbach committed without result
debris and tremendous craters further the powerful 21st Panzer Division,
obstructed a rapid ground advance. 6 which had just been moved out of the
T h e full force of the air bombard- line and into reserve. T h e attack of
ment had struck the 16th Luftwaffe the 21st “did not have much point,”
Field Division, recently arrived in Nor- according to Rommel, “because of the
mandy from the Pas-de-Calais to replace strong enemy artillery fire.” T h e air
an armored division in the Panzer bombardment had also fallen on the
6Montgomery, Normandy to the Battic, pp. 113ff;
excellent 12th SS Panzer Division, still
Stacey, T h e Canadian Army, pp. 187ff; [Robert W. not relieved from front-line defensive
Ackerman] , Employment of Strategic Bombers in duty as had been hoped. . Though some
a Tactical Role, 1941–1951, USAF Hist Study 88
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University,
strongpoints in this unit’s main line of
1953), p. 66; Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 211. resistance held until burned out by
122 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
flame-throwing British tanks, the divi- closer toward the Breton ports, he had
sion eventually was forced to give way. not gained much maneuver space, nor
On the evening of 8 July, Rommel and had he captured all of Caen. But he
Eberbach decided to prepare to evacuate had inflicted heavy losses on the Ger-
Caen. They began by directing that all mans. With Panzer Lehr moving to
heavy weapons be moved across the the Seventh Army sector to counter the
Orne River, which flows through the breakthrough threatened by American
city.7 troops between the Taute and the Vire,
T h e Luftwaffe field division lost 75 Panzer Group West, after meeting the
percent of its infantrymen and all of British attack, was in difficult straits.
its battalion commanders in those units On 10July Montgomery directed the
in contact with the British. No longer British Second Army to drive south be-
able to fight as an independent unit, the tween Caumont and Caen in order
division was attached to the 21st Panzer to broaden the beachhead and open
Division. T h e 12th SS Panzer Division lateral routes of communication. Sub-
lost twenty medium tanks, several sequently, the army was also to advance
88-mm. pieces, all its antitank guns, and across the Orne River at Caen toward
a high percentage of its troops. All Falaise, if it could do so “without undue
together, Rommel estimated losses as the losses,” in order to position its armor
equivalent of four battalions of men. for a drive in strength farther south or
Eberbach moved the 1st SS Panzer Divi- toward the Seine. T h e First U.S. Army
sion to positions southeast of Caen to was to continue its offensive to the
forestall a British breakthrough, but south.10
Kluge, by refusing to permit its commit- Vitally interested in maneuver room
ment, accepted the eventual loss of and the Breton ports, General Bradley
Caen.8 had been attempting to move out of
On the morning of 9 July British and the Cotentin swamps to dry land along
Canadian troops entered Caen from the the Coutances–Caumont line, where he
flanks and reached the Orne River. could mount an attack toward Brittany.
T h e bridges across the river had been But after nearly a week of bitter fight-
destroyed or were blocked by rubble, ing, both the VIII and the VII Corps
and there the troops halted.9 on the army right seemed to be halted,
T h e Allied ground commander, Gen- and the XIX Corps had been unable to
eral Montgomery, had not moved much develop and extend its bridgehead be-
tween the Taute and the Vire. Since
7OB WEST K T B , Anlagen 536 and 537.
the Germans were defending with unex-
8Conf, Rommel and Eberbach, 2100, 8 Jul, and pected determination, making excellent
Telecon, Rommel and Gause, 1115, 9 Jul Pz Gp use of the terrain, and inflicting con-
West K T B ; Telecons, Rommel to Kluge, 0655, 9
Jul, Speidel to Blumentritt, 0950, 9 Jul, Eberbach
siderable losses, prospects of continuing
to Tempelhoff, 0910, 11, Jul, AGp B K T B ; Eber- a frontal attack along the well-defined
bach to Rommel, 10 Jul Pz Gp W K T B , Anlage corridors leading through the Cotentin
104; Map dated 10Jul, O K W WFSt Op (H), Lage
West, Stand 9.VII.44; O B W E S T K T B , 9 Jul.
9Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 10 Jul, SGS 10 21 AGp Dir, M–510, 10 Jul; Montgomery,
SHAEF File 381, Opn OVERLORD,I (a). Normandy to the Baltic, p. 120.
T H E OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 123
marshes appeared to assure only a repeti- that ground near the Lessay-St. Lô—Cau-
tion of painful progress at prohibitive mont highway might serve his purposes.
cost. Getting to the first objective, the A compromise objective, it would per-
Coutances-Caumont line, would so haps give sufficient dry land for the at-
weaken the army that a delay would tack to the Coutances-Caumont line.
have to preface a subsequent effort to While General Bradley was bringing
get to Brittany. his idea to maturity, the slow and pain-
Searching for a different way to gain ful advance through the hedgerows con-
the Coutances-Caumont line, General tinued.11
Bradley began to consider that a power- Toward Lessay
ful attack on a very narrow front might
dissolve the hedgerow stalemate. Yet After five days of attack in July, Gen-
before he could mass forces on a narrow
front, he had to get at least partially out 11Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 329; FUSA Opns
of the Cotentin lowlands. He decided Instrs, 8 Jul.
124 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
eral Middleton’s VIII Corps had moved 8th Division zone, General Middleton
only to the high ground near la Haye- directed the 79th Division to take it,
du-Puits. General Wyche’s 79th Divi- probably because the 79th had already
sion, on the right, occupied most of the started the job. 13 T h e town was held
Montgardon ridge; General Ridgway’s by only about 150 Germans, who lacked
82d Airborne Division had taken the antitank weapons but defended with
Poterie ridge in the corps center; and machine guns, small arms, and mortars.
General Landrum’s 90th Division, on Virtually surrounded, shelled almost
the left, held precarious positions on the constantly by artillery and tanks, the
northeast portion of Mont Castre. T h e Germans had mined the approaches to
infantry divisions were to have met just the town and refused to capitulate.
south of la Haye-du-Puits to pinch out T h e 79th therefore made a thorough
the airborne troops and allow them to plan of attack; artillery, armor, and tank
return to England, but by the evening destroyers were to support an assault bat-
of 7 July the divisions on the flanks were talion of infantry.
still more than three miles apart. Late in the afternoon of 8 July, as
(Map II) They had each sustained heavy fire crashed overhead, infantry-
casualties of close to 15 percent of origi- men moved toward German mine fields
nal strength. To give the attack im- strung with wire in checkerboard pat-
petus, General Middleton committed the terns about a foot off the ground. As
newly arrived 8th Division. the riflemen tried to high-step over the
To make room for the new unit, wire, enemy mortar bursts bracketed
General Middleton redrew the division them. Machine gunners in trenches
boundaries. He restricted the 79th Di- that the Americans had not even sus-
vision to a narrow sector along the west pected of being in existence opened fire.
coast of the Cotentin, where it was to Taking many casualties, three rifle
perform a clearing mission as far south companies advanced. Engineers placed
as the Ay River estuary. He reoriented their white tapes across mine-swept
the 90th Division from a south by south- areas, while bulldozers cut avenues
west direction to an axis of advance through the hedgerows for the support-
generally south by southeast; at the ing tanks. T h e infantry reached the
Séves River near Périers the 90th was to northwest edge of la Haye-du-Puits by
be pinched out on its left by the VII evening. One rifle company by then
Corps in the Carentan-Périers isthmus was without commissioned officers, but
and on its right by the 8th Division. its men methodically cleared the rail-
T o the fresh troops of the 8th Division, road yards and inched toward the center
General Middleton gave the mission of of town. After a bloody house cleaning
making the main effort of the corps: by the light of flaming buildings, the
moving to the Ay River between Lessay 79th Division turned la Haye-du-Puits
and Périers and securing a bridgehead
over the river. 12
Although la Haye-du-Puits was in the 1379th Div Telecon, 2330, 7 Jul, VIII Corps G–3
Jnl File; Msg, 28th Inf to 8th Div, 0705, 8 Jul, 8th
12 VIII Corps FO 7, 7 Jul, and AAR, Jul. Div G–3 Jnl and File.
T H E OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 125
over to the 8th Division at noon, Hodges, visited the division commander
9 14
July. and learned that “the 8th had made no
Except for taking la Haye-du-Puits, known progress, for reasons not very
the VIII Corps made no advance during clear.” 15
8 and 9 July. T h e temporary stalemate T h e commitment of the division coin-
resulted from the last German attempts cided with vigorous local counterattacks
to retake the heights near the town-the launched by the enemy. Nevertheless,
Montgardon ridge and Mont Castre. even after the enemy was repelled or
Although the Germans failed to reach contained, the subordinate units failed
the high ground, they did prevent prog- to press forward. General McMahon
ress toward Lessay-Périers. confessed more than once that he did
At the time it appeared that the fail- not know exactly what was holding up
ure to move for forty-eight hours rested his troops. 16 T h e solution he applied
squarely on the 8th Division, which was to relieve the commanders of both
was exhibiting the usual faults of a unit committed regiments. About the same
new to combat. Commanded by Maj. time the energetic assistant division com-
Gen. William C. McMahon, the 8th was mander, Brig. Gen. Nelson M. Walker,
rated one of the best-trained U.S. divi- was killed as he attempted to organize
sions in the European theater. Never- an infantry battalion for an attack.17
theless, hesitation, inertia, and disorgani- Finally, four days after committing the
zation marked its first attempts to 8th Division, General Middleton re-
advance. Inaccurate reporting of map lieved the commander.
locations, large numbers of stragglers, Brig. Gen. Donald A. Stroh, formerly
and poor employment of attached units assistant commander of the 9th Division,
were usual symptoms of inexperience, assumed command. Advocating side-
but the division also demonstrated a slipping and flanking movements, he
particular ineptness in the realms of committed his reserve regiment imme-
organization and control. When the diately in hope of gaining his objec-
90th Division insisted that a regimental tive quickly. Without special hedgerow
commander take responsibility for a sec- training, the division learned through
tor assigned to him, he reported, “We its own errors how to solve the problems
explained we could not do so tonite or of attack and soon began to manifest
tomorrow morning. Must have time.” that steady if unspectacular advance that
After the division had struggled for a was feasible in the hedgerows. T h e
day to attain a measure of organization, troops moved with increasing confi-
a neighboring unit noted, “Everyone dence, maintaining momentum by by-
was more or less confused. . . . They
didn’t seem to be operating according to 158th Div G–3 Jnl, 8 Jul, and entry 2400, 9 Jul;
90th Div Msg, 1105, 8 Jul, and VIII Corps Msg,
any particular plan.” T h e deputy army 0940, 9 Jul, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl and File; CI 47
commander, Lt. Gen. Courtney H. (8th Div) ; 357th Inf Jnl, entry 1017, 9 Jul; Sylvan
Diary, 10Jul.
14314th Infantry Regiment, Through Combat, p. 16 8th Div G–3 Jnl, entries 1810, 8 Jul, and 1540,
22; Wyche Diary; 79th Div AAR, Jul; VIII Corps 9 Jul.
G–3 Jnl File, 7 and 8 Jul; 8th Div G–3 Jnl, 8 and 17General Walker was posthumously awarded the
9 Jul. DSC.
126 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
passing small isolated enemy groups.18 maining distance to the Ay River was
Despite continuing resistance, the marked by decreasing resistance.
division occupied the ridge overlooking T h e 79th Division reached the Ay
the Ay River on 14 July and began to River on 14 July. Although Lessay re-
reconnoiter for crossing sites. mained in German hands, General
T h e 79th Division, which had at- Wyche had cleared the coastal sector be-
tempted to advance south of the Mont- tween la Haye-du-Puits and the estuary.
gardon ridge, had sustained heavy casu- T h e effort might have seemed easy in
alties and had moved not at all during retrospect, but it had cost close to 2,000
8 and 9 July.19 A typical rifle company men.20
had one officer and 94 men on 7 July, On the corps left, the 90th Division,
only 47 men two days later which had been brutally handled by the
When German pressure lessened on Germans while taking Mont Castre and
10 July, General Wyche again moved trying to push through the Beaucoudray
the division toward the Ay estuary, a corridor, clung doggedly to positions on
blue blob of water shimmering tanta- the northeast portion of Mont Castre.
lizingly three miles away in the midst of As the enemy launched strong and re-
the green lowland. Jockeying his sub- peated attacks on 8 and g July, General
ordinate units in a series of apparently Landrum reinforced his infantry not
unrelated moves, short jabs that took only by committing his engineers but
advantage of local enemy weakness, also by forming and employing miscel-
General Wyche pressed his advance laneous groups of cooks, drivers, and
down the terrain that sloped toward clerks, as well as dismounted cavalry,
Lessay. A fortunate mistake that oc- to guard lines of communications and
curred in the late afternoon of 1 1 July fill gaps in the infantry positions. T o
facilitated progress. Bombing inadvert- perform the normal engineer functions
ently 4,000 yards inside the safety line, in the division area, the corps tem-
American planes rendered unexpected porarily attached one of its battalions
close support. As a result, the division to the 90th Division. T h e 82d Air-
easily took Angoville-sur-Ay. T h e re- borne Division also helped. One enter-
prising officer set up a consolidated ob-
18VIII Corps Msg, 1430, 12 Jul, 8th Div Msg, servation post in a château stable tower
1800, 12 Jul, and Jnl, entry 1900, 12 Jul, 8th Div
G-3 Jnl File; CI 47 (8th Div). Capt. Harry L.
and on 8 July massed the fires of his
Gentry, an artillery officer who took command of regimental mortars on a counterattack
leaderless infantry soldiers during an attack, 1st in the 90th Division zone. This was a
Lt. William L. Pryor, who singlehandedly covered
the withdrawal of his company, and Pfc. Leo T. last burst of exuberance for the air-
Zingale were awarded the DSC for their actions borne unit; three days later the troops
on 10 July. Pfc. Walter S. Wanielista, for his ac- moved to the beach for transport to
tions on 11 July, and Sgt. Harry Weiss (post-
humously), for his singlehanded capture of a pill- England.21
box on 13 July, also received DSC's. As the German pressure diminished
19T/5 John G. Prentice of the 125th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron, for remaining in his 2079th Div AAR, Jul; Wyche Diary; FUSA Daily
tank though it had been set ablaze by an enemy Estimated Loss Rpt.
shell and continuing to fire his gun until killed by 21 315thEngr C Bn Jnl, Jul; 82d Abn Div AAR,
a second direct hit, was awarded the DSC. Jun and Jul.
THE OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 127
on 10 July, the depleted regiment on By this time the division strength was
the 90th Division left, the 357th Infan- so diminished that small German delay-
try, attacked in the Beaucoudray cor- ing groups exacted proportionately
ridor. Enemy machine gun, mortar, higher prices for local objectives. No
and artillery fire brought disorganiza- company totaled more than a hundred
tion at once. T h e previous loss of com- men. Operating as a single battle
missioned and noncommissioned officers group of but 122 men and 4 officers, the
made effective control difficult. When rifle components of the 3d Battalion,
two rifle companies broke ranks and 358th Infantry, suffered 40 casualties, in-
fled, the regiment canceled further of- cluding all of the officers, at a crossroad
fensive effort for the day. ambush on 12 July.24
At the same time, a battalion of the Reduced ranks and fatigue, the hedge-
358th Infantry pushed through the row terrain, and tactical, supply, and
dense thickets of Mont Castre and put communication difficulties combined to
to rout platoon-sized groups of Germans deny the 90th Division a rapid advance
at close range. In the late afternoon in pursuit of a withdrawing enemy. It
the leading company with the help of was 14 July when the division reached
six tanks reached the edge of the woods the Séves River and established contact
and the south slope of Mont Castre. As with the VII Corps on the left. General
they left the concealment of the trees, Landrum was finally at his objective,
German self-propelled guns opened three miles north of Périers, but the
fire on them. Flat-trajectory shells de- move across the few miles from Mont
stroyed the tanks immediately and Castre had cost almost 2,000 casualties.25
forced the infantry company, reduced to After twelve days and over 10,000 cas-
one officer and twenty-four men, back ualties, the VIII Corps had moved across
into the forest. 22 seven miles of hedgerows to the banks
Despite this local success, the Ger- of the Ay and the Séves River. Early
mans at the end of 10 July at last vir- hope that the Germans would break
tually abandoned Mont Castre. On the quickly had long been dispelled. T h e
following day the 358th Infantry de- enemy had given ground only grudg-
scended the south slope of the hill mass ingly. Not until 10 July had the Ger-
against little opposition.23 T h e situa- mans weakened even slightly. Not until
tion eased; General Landrum relieved 13 July had they begun a genuine with-
the division engineers of their infantry drawal to positions south of the Ay and
role. On 12 July the 357th Infantry the Séves.
moved through Beaucoudray against no For all the lack of encouragement
more than perfunctory opposition. from an American viewpoint, Choltitz,
22Taylor Notes on Mont Castre, ML– 1071. Lt. 241st Lt. Hubert G. Miller, a company com-
Col. Jacob W. Bealke, Jr., and Capt. John W. Marsh mander who though wounded took command of a
received the DSC, the latter posthumously, for their leaderless battalion, and Lt. Col. Frederick H.
actions this day. Loomis, who led four tanks and ten men in a
23 Pfc. Theodore G. Wagner, who crawled for- successful attack, received the DSC.
ward alone to destroy a key machine gun emplace- 2590th Div AAR, Jul; FUSA Daily Estimated
ment with grenades, was awarded the DSC. Loss Rpts, Jul.
128 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Collins kept his interest focused on it. space, hindered by soft marshland, hand-
The 4th Division was to secure high icapped by the difficulties of observation,
ground near Périers, then move south to General Barton was unable to con-
cut the Lessay-Périers highway. T h e centrate the power of his infantry and
83d Division was to gain the west bank supporting arms in a sustained effort.
of the Taute River, cross the stream, Even the four battalions organic to the
and move south to cut the Périers–St. division artillery and the additional
Lô road. T h e 9th Division would have attached battalion of medium artillery
to be employed outside the C a r e t a n were rarely able to mass their fires effec-
Périers 27
isthmus. tively. Because of the compartmen-
On the right (western) half of the talizing effect of the terrain, General Bar-
Carentan-Périers isthmus, General Bar- ton attacked with regimental combat
ton was finally able on 8 July to bring teams that pursued quite independent
all three regiments of his 4th Division actions. Some measure of co-ordina-
into the sector available to him, but tion in the attack could be attempted at
only the 22d Infantry (Col. Charles T . the regimental level; more often it was
Lanham) was directed toward Périers. feasible only at the battalion echelon.
Deployed on the narrowest portion of While the 22d Infantry fought
the isthmus, squeezed by the Prairies through the narrowest neck of the isth-
Marécageuses de Gorges on the right, mus and the 12th rested in reserve, the
the regiment was on the verge of leaving 8th was trying to clear in a slow and
the narrow neck of land that ends near methodical operation the small area on
Sainteny. Even this prospect meant the division right rear, the area just
little, for the area southwest of Sainteny north of the corridor and adjacent to
offered small hope of rapid advance. the Prairies Marécageuses de Gorges.
Dry ground suitable for military opera- Four separate attacks since 8 July had
tions was nonexistent. T h e sluggish failed. But on 10 July the Germans
Sévesand Holerotte Rivers were swollen launched a counterattack; with enemy
with rain, transforming the six miles of soldiers in the open for the first time,
approach to Périers into a desolate bog American artillery and mortar fire
scarcely distinguishable from swamp. decimated their ranks. Striking quickly,
The division not only had to fight the the 8th Infantry caught the enemy off
soggy crust of the land and the high balance. Infantry and tanks swept the
water table, it also had to cross in- area, collecting 49 prisoners, burying
numerable drainage ditches, small 480 German dead, and incurring 4
streams, and inundated marshes in an casualties in return. On 11 July the
area without a single hard-surfaced road. 4th Division was ready to add the 8th
The terrain alone would have been a Infantry to its effort toward Périers and
serious obstacle; defended by Germans attempt to blast through the corridor
it was almost impassable. just north of Sainteny.
Restricted by inadequate maneuver Still there was no sudden propulsion
27VII Corps AAR, Jul, FO 5, 9 Jul (and An-
forward. T h e 22d Infantry moved into
nex 2). swampy terrain on the right for about
130 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
two miles against diminishing opposi- used tank, artillery, tank destroyer, and
tion; patrols crossed the Holerotte and bazooka fire effectively to destroy them.
the Séves Rivers on 11 and 12 July and Nevertheless, so many tanks were in
sought to make contact with the 90th evidence that subordinate commanders
Division, which was descending along found it difficult to think beyond the
the western edge of the great marsh. necessity of eliminating them. Weakened
T h e other two regiments in columns of by attrition and fatigue, the units failed
battalions fought toward Périers against to press toward their objectives even
strong resistance. Aided by occasional after eliminating the tanks that barred
dive-bombers during the infrequent days the way.
of good weather, the division had Thinking in the broader terms of
advanced about two ,miles below Saint- taking the main objectives, General
eny by 15 July. At the end of that day, Macon exercised close supervision.
still four miles short of Périers, General When the 330th Infantry failed to
Barton received the order to halt. advance during the morning of 9 July,
T h e 4th Division was to be relieved he could see no reason for it.29 Just
and sent into reserve. In ten days of some tanks, the regimental commander
combat it had sustained approximately explained, but he had a plan to eliminate
2,300 casualties, including three battal- them; just as soon as he accomplished
ion commanders and nine rifle company this, his attack would get under way.
commanders.28 Progress at this cost General Macon suggested that with
was prohibitive. T h e division was to bazooka teams well forward and tanks
rest for a vital role in the forthcoming in close support the regiment could
First Army operation hopefully designed attack and thereby accomplish both pur-
to end frontal attack. poses, but the regimental commander
Hampered by similar conditions, the insisted that he had to send out the
83d Division on the left in the meantime bazookas before he moved his infantry
had been trying to advance south along forward.
the road that crosses the isthmus later- “If you just send a [small] party down
ally to the Taute River. T h e division there,” General Macon warned, “you
was to secure the western bank of the will be fooling around all day.”
river where a mile-long causeway trav- “Yes, sir,” the regimental commander
erses the Taute River flats; it also had agreed. But first he had to make cer-
to secure its original objective, Sainteny, tain that the enemy tanks were de-
which was now on its extreme right stroyed.
flank. General Macon patiently explained
T h e 83d Division’s major problem at that it was “awfully bad for the morale
first centered around German tanks. of the troops” to wait in place “hour
Increasing numbers of them were be- after hour; you’ve got to keep moving,”
coming apparent, not in concerted offen- he insisted.
sive action, but individually, backing up When General Macon phoned three
the defensive line. T h e 83d Division
29 The following is taken from the telephone
28 CI 30 (4th Div) ; 4th Div AAR, Jul. messages in the 83d Division G–2, G–3 Journal.
T H E OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 131
hours later, the regimental commander tanks and assault guns, often dug into
admitted that progress had been neg- the ground and employed as pillboxes,
ligible. Aware of how physically and dominated the few trails in the area.
mentally tired all the subordinate com- Neither dive-bombing nor artillery and
manders were, General Macon made his tank-destroyer fire appeared to have any
next move with reluctance. “I’ll have effect on them. Although antiaircraft
to send someone down there to take guns of go-mm. caliber were brought
over,” he said. “We have got to take forward, they too appeared powerless to
that objective.” dislodge or destroy them.30 Only
Ten minutes later General Feren- bazooka teams of infantrymen, approach-
baugh, the assistant division comman- ing by stealth to close range before firing
der, was on his way to assume temporary their rockets, were capable of taking out
command of the regiment. That eve- the tanks and assault guns.
ning General Macon relieved the regi- Prisoners, who said that cooks and
mental commander. bakers were acting as riflemen, gave the
T h e objective was the Taute River 83d hope that the German defenses were
west bank, but the 330th failed to reach cracking, but the enemy had some
it on 9 July. T h e 331st, on the other butchers too, and optimism vanished as
hand, finally took Sainteny on that day, the Germans continued to defend with
assisted by several fighter-bombers and the skill of trained infantrymen. Never-
by an adjacent unit of the 4th Division. theless, at the end of 13 July, the 330th
In terms of real estate, the objective had Infantry reached the west bank of the
little to offer, for it had been gutted by Taute near the causeway. T o make
white phosphorus shells; it was neverthe- the advance, the regiment had destroyed
less an important milestone on the road over twenty tanks in four days. On 14
to Périers. July the 330th Infantry crossed the
With the 4th Division assuming the Tribehou causeway and joined other
task of driving toward Périers, the 83d units in sweeping the east bank of the
Division turned its entire effort to reach- Taute. T h e regiment was temporarily
ing the west bank of the Taute. T h e detached from 83d Division control.
immediate objective was the western T h e remaining two regiments of the
point of the mile-long Tribehou cause- 83d attacked to reach the other cause-
way across the Taute River flats. When way south of the Tribehou crossing site
reached, the causeway would provide a but made little progress. On 13 July
crossing site for part of the division, several enemy tanks advanced boldly and
which was to join other units that were sprayed a battalion position with ma-
sweeping the east bank of the Taute. chine gun fire, causing the unit to with-
The remainder of the 83d Division was draw from a hard-won objective.
to clear the west bank of the Taute to Cruising tank-infantry teams surrounded
another causeway and cross there to the the 3d Battalion, 331stInfantry, that
east bank. night and isolated 126 men for two days
Continuing toward the west bank of before adjacent units could come for-
the Taute, the men found that enemy 30VII Corps Msg, 1020, 10 Jul, FUSA G–3 Jnl.
132 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ward in relief. In vain the 83d Divi- T h e attached tank battalion had lost
sion strove to plow the few miles to the half its tanks to enemy fire by 10July.31
projected crossing site. T h e failure of the 83d Division to
During twelve days, the 83d Division make gains in mileage was not due to
had sustained a staggering total of 5,000 inherent deficiency. General Collins
casualties. Indeed, had it not been for made a personal test on 11 July when he
progressive integration of replacements arrived at the division command post at
as the fighting developed, the division a time when General Macon was visiting
would have been little more than a a subordinate unit. In an attempt to
skeleton. As it was, the units were far get the division moving, the corps com-
from first-rate fighting forces. T h e mander issued specific attack instruc-
331stInfantry had five commanders in tions and directed the subsequent attack,
one week, and only when Col. Robert but he could not free the division from
H. York arrived on 13 July to become
the seventh commander did the regi- 31331st Inf AAR, Jul; 746th Tk Bn Rpt, 10 Jul,
ment achieve a measure of stability. 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl File.
T H E OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 133
the frustration of advancing, at most, at If the U.S. troops reached their objec-
the rate of several hedgerows per day. tive, the Germans reasoned, they might
At midnight on 15 July, the 4th and unhinge the German line in the Coten-
83d Divisions (the latter less the 330th tin and outflank not only those units de-
Infantry) passed to control of the VIII fending la Haye-du-Puits and Périers but
Corps as part of a reorganization along also the II Parachute Corps in the St.
the entire army front. T h e 83d began Lô—Caumont sector. T o reinforce
to relieve portions of the 4th Division. Kampfgruppe Heinz and the small por-
Several days later, the newly arrived 4thtion of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier
Armored Division completed the relief.32 Division resisting between the Taute
Terrain and the enemy had brought and the Vire, the II Parachute Corps
the VII Corps to a halt on the Carentan– sent part of its reserves, light forces
Périers isthmus by 15 July. “The Ger- organized around a mobile brigade, to
mans are staying in there just by the guts
close the gap opened by the American
of their soldiers,” General Barton re- attack. But these troops were obviously
marked. “We outnumber them ten to too few to dissipate the danger of a se-
rious breakthrough, and the 2d SS Panzer
one in infantry, fifty to one in artillery,
and by an infinite number in the air.” 33Division consequently added a tank-
T h e VII Corps attack nevertheless had infantry task force, which attacked the
achieved several ends: by moving the American flank on 9 July.35
front line a few miles farther from Car- Deciding two days earlier that they
entan, the corps had eliminated the needed a strong force between the Taute
nuisance shelling of the town and its and the Vire, Kluge and Rommel
vital highway bridge; it had prevented obtained the Panzer Lehr Division from
the Germans from launching a counter- the Panzer Group West front in order to
attack in the sector considered the weak-mount a major counterattack.36 While
est along the entire American front; and the division traveled westward across the
Normandy front toward the Taute and
it had inflicted serious losses on the Ger-
man forces.34 Vire region, the inexperience and errors
of the U.S. units as much as firm resist-
Counterattack ance offered by the relatively small Ger-
While the Germans defended stub- man combat groups—the armored task
bornly and adroitly in the zones of the forces and the remnants of Kampfgruppe
VII and VIII Corps, they directed their Heinz, reinforced by the parachute
greatest effort against the XIX Corps corps reserves—prevented a genuine
between the Taute and Vire Rivers.
This was the Sector where the 30th Divi- 35MS # B–455 (Ziegelmann) ; Telecons, Pemsel
and Meindl, 1800, 7 Jul, Hausser and Rommel,
sion and Combat Command B of the 1935, 7 Jul, Criegern and Pemsel, 1945, 7 Jul, Sev-
3d Armored Division were attacking to- enth Army Tel Msgs; Pemsel and Meindl, 1910, 7
ward the high ground west of St. Lô. Jul, AGp B KTB.
36Telecons, Rommel and Hausser, 1930, 7 Jul,
32 VIIICorps G–3 Per Rpt 33, 18 Jul. unidentified, 2005, 7 Jul, Kluge and Rommel, 2020,
33CI 30 (4th Div) . 7 Jul, and Pemsel and Speidel, 2350, 8 Jul, AGp B
34See Brereton, Diaries, p. 307. KTB; OB WEST KTB, 7 and 8 Jul.
134 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
fantry regiments abreast, attacking west- repeatedly broken radio silence en route,
ward toward the Taute. as a demonstration of German bluff, an
T h e 9th Division crossed the Vire et action presaging in reality a general
Taute Canal on 9 July and was ready withdrawal 41
.
on the following morning to meet again T h e Germans were not bluffing.
the challenge of fighting in the hedge- Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, the
rows. A preparation by dive-bombers commander of Panzer Lehr, had received
and artillery preceded the attack. Two his march order on 8 July and had moved
regiments met opposition immediately at once, though poor roads and strafing
and to their consternation advanced but by Allied planes had hampered the divi-
several hedgerows. T h e third regiment sion march. Not until the night of 10
had better success clearing the corner July was the division in position to
formed by the juncture of the Taute attack—too late, Rommel thought.
River and the Vire et Taute Canal. Kampfgruppe Heinz, which had suffered
Resistance was light and enemy artillery approximately 30 percent casualties and
conspicuous by its silence. A recon- had virtually disintegrated as an organ-
naissance patrol, however, moving to- ized unit, was withdrawn to the south-
ward Tribehou Island in the Taute west as artillery of the 17th SS Panzer
River flats, was turned back by mortar Grenadiers gave covering fire and the
and machine gun fire. 30th Mobile Brigade and the tank-
That night, as the 9th Division re- infantry teams of the 2d SS Panzer Divi-
organized for attack on the morning of sion launched local counterattacks.
11 July, enemy fire increased and small Hausser, the Seventh Army commander,
groups of tanks and infantry attempted attached these elements to Panzer Lehr,
to infiltrate the lines. German tank visited the division command post, and
motors sounded in the distance. From talked over the details of the attack with
just beyond the division positions came Bayerlein. With Rommel pushing for
the noise of infantrymen digging in. speed, Panzer Lehr was to attack at
T h e 9th Division staff officers depreciated once–that night. (Map7)
these signs, for they believed that the Bayerlein planned to attack with two
Germans were merely covering prepara- regimental combat teams abreast. T h e
tions for a general withdrawal during regiments were to converge on the St.
the night. Although the 30th Divi- Jean-de-Daye crossroads from the south-
sion on the left reported heavy enemy west and the south. With the high
traffic moving toward the Taute River, ground at the crossroads in his posses-
the 9th Division staff preferred to accept sion, he would have command of the
as more valid an announcement from American crossing sites over the canal
the 4th Division that the enemy was fall- and the river, north and east of St. Jean-
ing back. This judgment coincided de-Daye. Hoping that the night attack
with the view held at First Army head- would easily achieve a breakthrough,
quarters. T h e army G–2 had inter-
419th Div G–3 Jnl, 0005, 0040, 11 Jul, and AAR,
preted the noisy march across the Amer- Jul; FUSA G–3 Jnl, 0600, 11 Jul, and G–2 Per Rpt
ican front by Panzer Lehr, which had 31, 11 Jul.
MAP 7
T H E OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 137
Bayerlein envisioned the infantry riding dicate that enemy tanks were throughout
tanks to the objective. T h e I I Para- the division area, telephone lines from
chute Corps was to launch a feint directly all the regiments went out. Still the
north from St. Lô in a limited objective situation did not seem serious enough to
attack along the east bank of the Vire wake the division commander.44
River.42 Panzer Lehr’s leading elements on the
T h e jump-off was scheduled for 0145, left-two battalions of armored infantry,
11 July. Unfortunately for Panzer a company of tanks, and two companies
Lehr, Combat Command B of the 3d of self-propelled guns-had actually
Armored Division in driving toward made two shallow penetrations of the
Hauts-Vents had jostled and delayed the U.S. lines near le Désert, one along a
leading panzer elements getting ready to regimental boundary of the 9th Division,
attack. Still in firm possession of Hauts- the other between the 9th and 30th
Vents, Panzer Lehr jumped off just be- Divisions. T h e penetrations prompted
fore dawn, 11 July, after a short artillery confusion and some withdrawal be-
preparation. T h e routes of attack fore subordinate American commanders
passed on both sides of CCB. T h e regi- could begin to control their troops in
ment on the right, moving close to the close-range fighting.
Vire River through Pont-Hébert, aimed After daylight brought some ameliora-
for the Airel bridge and struck the 30th tion of the confusion, and after wiremen
Division. T h e regiment on the left, by 0900 had restored communications to
moving through le Desert, struck the the regiments, General Eddy got a co-
30th and 9th Divisions.43 ordinated defense into action. Infan-
In the 9th Division sector, the divi- trymen cut behind German spearheads
sion staff still was not seriously perturbed to seal routes of withdrawal, while tanks,
even after receiving reports at 0300 of tank destroyers, and infantry bazooka
German infiltration along the left flank. teams stalked the isolated enemy
Two hours later the fact that Germans armor.45 Tank destroyers alone claimed
were making noise, were firing a great destruction of at least one Mark IV and
deal, and appeared “to be all around twelve Mark V (Panther) tanks. T h e
now” occasioned little more than non- division artillery pounded enemy tanks
chalance mixed with some incredulity. parked along the road west of le Desert.
Not until the division artillery reported American planes flying other missions
some confusion because German infan-
trymen were approaching the gun posi- 449th Div G–3 Jnl, 0305, 0515, 0525, 11 Jul.
tions did the staff realize that a counter- 45Capt. James D. Allgood and 1st Lt. William F.
Squire of the 47th Infantry received the DSC for
attack was under way. About the same their efforts in repelling the counterattack. T/3
time an infantry battalion command post Henry J. Kucharski of the Medical Detachment,
47th Infantry, when unable to render aid because
was overrun. As reports began to in- of fire, ripped off his Red Cross armband and
waved it in front of him as he advanced toward
42 Pz Lehr FO, 1O Jul, in Pz Lehr Div Ib KTB; wounded men. The enemy recognized his mission
Seventh Army K T B , 10 Jul; 3d Armd Div CCB and halted fire. When a German officer ap-
G–2 Daily Narrative, 7–16 Jul. proached, Kucharski sued for and secured a thirty-
43 See below, Chapter VIII, for the II Parachute minute truce, time for him to treat and evacuate
Corps feint down the east bank of the Vire River. American casualties. He received the DSC.
138 BKEAKOUT AND PURSUIT
were diverted to counter the Panzer Lehr of the enemy armored column had been
threat, and one formation dropped blunted and the main body forced to
twenty-two 500 -pound bombs on a Ger- withdraw.
man armored column. At the same time, units of the 30th
By the middle of the afternoon of 11 Division near the west bank of the Vire
July, the 9th Division had contained River were repelling the other regi-
the enemy attack. General Eddy was mental column of Panzer Lehr. Before
then able to launch his own counter- noon of 11 July, U.S. troops had con-
attack and regain ground abandoned tained the enemy attack in that area and
earlier in the day. Because of the pos- had cleared German stragglers from
sibility of further enemy armored action, the division rear.46 Though General
Eddy established a strong defensive line, Hobbs launched his own attack, it ran
giving particular attention to antitank into resistance at once and made only
precautions. T h e 9th Division had slight gain.
sustained little more than a hundred T h e effect of the Panzer Lehr attack
casualties. T h e only effect of the Pan- was hot confined to the front line. At
zer Lehr effort was to delay the 9th the still inadequate crossing sites over
Division attack twenty-four hours. the Vire, military policemen had been
Along the boundary between the 9th driven from their traffic control posts by
and 30th Divisions, confusion had at the increased enemy shelling. Traffic
first also prevailed among men of the quickly coagulated. T o relieve the
30th. At a roadblock on a secondary congestion and reduce the possibility of
route, guards heard tanks approaching, embarrassment if a direct shell hit de-
but were told by higher headquarters stroyed a bridge, a Bailey bridge was
that American tanks were in the vicinity. erected and completed late on 12 July:
T h e men let a column of tanks and it took somewhat longer than normal
infantry pass before noticing that the because of continuing German fire.47
soldiers in the column were speaking T h e 30th Division estimated that, with
German. They immediately alerted CCB, it had destroyed about 20 Mark
troops in the rear who engaged the IV tanks on 11 July. General Collins
column with antitank rifles and ba- judged that the VII Corps had destroyed
zookas. Individual groups of infantry- over 30 German tanks, most of them in
men spontaneously and with little co- the 9th Division sector. Three tactical
ordination or direction destroyed five air squadrons, which had bombed Ger-
enemy tanks and four armored scout
462d Lt. Richard A. Kirsting of the 246th En-
cars, two of the latter mounting flame gineer Combat Battalion was awarded the DSC for
throwers. Machine guns emplaced ear- heroic action that resulted in the capture of forty
lier that evening for all-around security Germans.
47As army engineers manipulated the Carentan
fired into the ranks of enemy infantry. locks on 14 July in an attempt to drain the flooded
As the night exploded into sound and areas of the Cotentin, the Vire River water level
flash, the noise of withdrawing tanks descended so rapidly that it endangered the tem-
porary bridge and made additional trestling neces-
gradually became discernible. In the sary. XIX Corps Engr Sec Jnl and Sitreps, XIX
morning it was obvious that the point Corps AAR, Jul.
T H E OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 139
man armored columns, claimed 19 tanks guns, and 10 bazookas), plus a company
destroyed, 2 probably destroyed, and 7 of tanks (10); only 7 noncommissioned
damaged; 2 half-tracks destroyed and 6 officers and 23 men had returned with
damaged. 48 Perhaps more important, their individual small arms and 6 light
at the height of the counterattack, CCB machine guns. T h e Panzer Lehr coun-
of the 3d Armored Division had been terattack had been a dismal and costIy
attacking Hauts-Vents and Hill 91, failure.49
objectives the unit secured at 1730, 11 Prompt American reaction was only
July. Without this commanding ter- part of the story. More important was
rain, Panzer Lehr was in the situation of the presence of the 9th Division, which
having had the prop knocked out from the Germans had not known was there.
under its effort; an immediate resump- Hastily executing an attack that had
tion of the counterattack was out of the come too late, Bayerlein had tried a
question. blitzkrieg in the hedgerows against a
T h e effect of the American action was numerically superior American force.
considerable. Panzer Lehr had lost a He had also courted defeat in detail by
quarter of its effective combat strength. committing his two assault columns
One task force had started out with 6 along routes that turned out to be too
infantry officers, 40 noncommissioned far apart for mutual support.
officers, and 198 enlisted men (with 36 Judging the attack to have been an
light machine guns, 5 heavy machine attempt to cut through to Isigny and
48VII Corps Msgs, 1100, 1230, 1505, 2300, 11 Jul, 49Telcon, Pemsel to Tempelhoff, 1000, 15 Jul,
FUSA G–3 Jnl File; 3d Armd Div CCB G–2 Daily Seventh Army Tel Msgs; Rommel to Kluge, 15 Jul,
Narrative, 7–16 Jul. OB WEST K T B , Anlage 646.
140 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
divide the Allied beachhead, the Amer- parachutists’ training was sufficiently
icans disparaged the German plan as advanced for the unit to be committed
carelessly conceived, hastily organized, in Normandy, the troops of the division
and imperfectly directed. This ap- sat idle along the roads in Brittany.
praisal overestimated the importance of After much lobbying of OKW by OB
the effort. As far back as 13 June, when W E S T staff members, Kluge on 7 July,
German troops had failed to retake finally wheedled Hitler’s reluctant con-
Carentan, tactical commanders had sent and ordered the paratroopers to
abandoned all hope of regaining Isigny march on foot to Normandy. Young
and the coast in that sector, even though troops under inexperienced commanders,
as late as 24 June Hitler talked about they moved into the Taute and
the possibility of recovering Carentan. Vire area behind Panzer Lehr during
From the Panzer Lehr attack the Ger- the night of 11 July. Behind them
mans had expected little more than came the additional forces of the 275th
limited success, but even that came to Infantry Division.51 Bolstering the
naught. By 12 July Panzer Lehr was Panzer Lehr defenses, they were in posi-
entirely committed in passive defense. tion to hamper the 9th and 30th Divi-
Its only accomplishment was having sion efforts to move south to the Périers-
“stopped the American drive to St. St. Lô highway.
Gilles,” the high ground west of St. Lô. Although General Bradley felt that his
Bayerlein congratulated his troops for troops had “pretty well chewed up the
that. 50 Panzer Lehr,” that the Germans were
If Panzer Lehr had not succeeded in “on their last legs,” and that the Amer-
eliminating the U.S. positions south of ican offensive “should open up,” sub-
the Vire et Taute Canal, it was at least ordinate commanders were of the opin-
in position to block American attempts ion that the Panzer Lehr soldiers were
to continue quickly to the south. Nor “great big, husky boys, and arrogant . . .
was it by this time alone. T h e original not beaten at all.” 52
decision to move Panzer Lehr from the
Panzer Group West front had been made Toward the Périers–St. Lô Road
at least partially because units outside
Normandy that were to reinforce the Although the ground between the
front still had not arrived. O B W E S T Taute and Vire Rivers was intrinsically
had wanted to move the 5th Parachute suitable for the application of a unified
Division from Brittany to Normandy but command, General Bradley had split the
needed Hitler’s permission to do so.
Hitler delayed because the division had 51Seventh Army K T B ,12 Jul; O B W E S T K T B ,
been rated in June as suitable only for 6 Jul; Telecons, 1030, 5 Jul, A G p B K T B ; Msg,
1900, 5 Jul, A G p B Op. Befehle; Telecons, Helm-
defensive missions. As various echelons dach and Tempelhoff, 1000, 6 Jul, Zimmerman
discussed the question of whether the and Tempelhoff, 2345, 6 Jul, A G p B K T B ; Tele-
cons, Tempelhoff and Helmdach, 0015, 7 Jul, Pem-
sel and Zoeller, 0630, 7 Jul, Hausser and Rommel,
50 90th Div G–3 Jnl File, 11 and 12 Jul, and AAR, 2245, 11 Jul, Seventh Army Tel Msgs.
Jul; [Garth], St.-Lô, pp. 36–42; Hodgson, R–54; 52Telecons, Corlett and Hobbs, 1422, 1507, 1614,
Pz Lehr FO, 11 Jul, Pz Lehr Diu Ib KTB. 11 Jul.
T H E OFFENSIVE CONTINUED 141
region in two. T h e 9th Division on the west of le Desert against what appeared
right (west) thus could operate with the to be the main German defenses. T h e
VII Corps and toward the objectives of 60th Infantry (Col. Jesse L. Gibney)
that corps. T h e 30th Division on the was to secure the three remaining objec-
left (east) carried the XIX Corps attack tives that adjoined the east bank of the
toward the high ground west of St. Lô. Taute.
On io July, when the 9th Division first Attacking on 12 July, the Goth Infan-
had been committed between the Taute try met little opposition. While the
and the Vire, General Eddy was sup- 24th Reconnaissance Squadron of Colo-
posed to have secured the east bank of nel Biddle’s 113th Cavalry Group
the Taute River before turning south to blocked Tribehou on the northeast, the
cut the Périers–St. Lô highway. T o 60th bypassed it. Patrols found the
secure the river bank, he had attacked northern portion of the Bois du Hommet
westward toward four specific objectives unoccupied, and after an artillery prepa-
adjoining the stream: the corner formed ration fired by eight battalions, the regi-
by the juncture of the Taute River and ment moved through the forest in force
the Vire et Taute Canal; the island of against light resistance. Another artil-
Tribehou, a hedgerowed mound of lery preparation that evening preceded
earth the possession of which would en- an infantry move into Vincenterie, which
able the 83d Division to make an admin- was occupied by midnight. T h e recon-
istrative rather than an assault crossing naissance squadron cleared Tribehou of
of the Taute; the Bois du Hommet, a weak forces on the following day, 13
scrub forest that the Germans were using July.
as an assembly area for troops and sup- T h e Goth Infantry’s quick success
plies; and the peninsula of Vincenterie. found no counterpart in the other regi-
With these objectives cleared and a por- mental sectors. Battling west and south
tion of the 83d Division across the Taute of le Désert, the 39th and 47th Regi-
and operating on the 9th Division’s ments met an obdurate enemy. T h e
right flank, General Eddy could then Germans had shifted their forces to
turn south to cut the east—west highway strengthen their positions near le
between Périers and St. Lô. (See Maps 5 Desert, and they were aggressive. Small
and II.) tank-infantry combat teams provided a
General Eddy had secured only one of roving defense employing tactics of sur-
his objectives, the corner formed by the prise.53 As the 39th Infantry fought
river and the canal, when the Panzer from hedgerow to hedgerow astride the
Lehr attack disrupted his plans. T o le Desert road, a small German force,
forestall a recurrence, Eddy oriented the with mortars and self-propelled guns,
47th Infantry (Col. George W. Smythe) worked around the flank of a rifle com-
toward the south so as to be ready to pany late in the afternoon of 12 July.
swing west to outflank and isolate the Sudden German fire inflicted heavy
spearhead of any counterattack. T h e casualties, including all the company
39th Infantry (Col. Harry A. Flint) was 58Panzer Lehr FO, 11 Jul, Panzer Lehr Div Ib
to drive along the axis of the highway K T B ; Seventh Army K T B (Draft), 11–13 Jul.
142 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
days later, after fighting to come abreast ures undertaken seemed to improve the
of the combat command, the 30th Divi- situation but little.58
sion had taken even heavier losses, Although the Vire River was an effec-
almost another 2,000. 57 tive barrier to enemy infiltration on the
In coming virtually abreast of the left flank, the Terrette was not large
combat command at Hauts-Vents by 14 enough to deny movement. T h e pri-
July, the 30th Division was in advance mary requirement on the right thus was
of units on its flanks and found itself a closely tied-in series of defensive
compressed into a narrow zone. Hauts- strongpoints. Compressed into a nar-
Vents is at the northern tip of a narrow row zone, the 30th Division could do
ridge leading directly to the Périers–St. little but hold doggedly to its positions,
Lô highway. Scarcely two miles wide concentrate on preserving its defensive
and rising between the Vire River on integrity, hope fervently that the ad-
the east and the Terrette
River on the jacent units would soon come abreast,
west, this ground sharply defined the and advance whenever possible in the
30th Division's zone of advance. T h e slow, tedious process of moving fron-
division positions represented a kind of tally from one hedgerow to the next.
peninsula in an enemy sea that had to On 14 July, in conjunction with an
be defended as much on the flanks as at attack launched on the east bank of
the tip. Because the narrow ridge de- the Vire River, the 30th Division,
nied maneuver room, the troops had no after several days of effort, finally se-
choice but to operate on the exposed cured the bridge at Pont-Hébert.
eastern and western slopes. T h e men Possession of the bridge plus the pres-
on the faces of the ridges presented good ence of the combat command at Hauts-
targets to German enfilading fire from Vents constituted a threat to St. Lô
the flanks. German artillery pieces em- from the west. Although the Germans
placed across the Vire River in defense defending St. Lô were by this time fight-
of St. Lô inflicted go percent of the ing off an attack by the XIX Corps di-
casualties incurred by the 119th Infan- rectly toward the city, they were Suffi-
try on the division left flank. For effec- ciently concerned with the indirect
tive counterbattery fire, the 30th Divi- threat to increase their artillery fire
sion on at least one occasion directed against the 30th Division. They became
missions fired by U.S. artillery battal- very much aware of the fact that con-
ions east of the Vire. T h e division tinued American progress in the Taute
suddenly became highly conscious of the and Vire sector would outflank the entire
importance of camouflage, though meas- LXXXIV Corps. 59
Delayed by both the Panzer Lehr
counterattack and a combination of ene-
57 Telecon, Corlett and Hobbs, 1507, 11 Jul; 3d my and terrain, the 9th and 30th Di-
Armd Div CCB S–3 Rpt 1, 11 Jul; 743d Tk Bn visions still were short of fulfilling their
Unit Rpts 7 and 8, 10 and 11 Jul. All in 30th Div
G–3 Jnl and File. FUSA Daily Estimated Loss
Rpt, Jul. Capt. John S. Milligan, Jr., of the 58 35th Div Arty Unit Rpt 4, 35th Div Arty AAR,
197th Field Artillery Battalion was awarded the Jul; 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File, 11–14 Jul.
DSC. 59 Est of Situation, 12 Jul, Seventh Army K T B .
144 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
and 20 July lost over 3,000 men; the 9th dominated the road by fire. T h e VII
Division between 10 and 20 July sus- Corps was abreast of the positions at-
tained about 2,500 casualties.63 Al- tained several days earlier by the VIII
though the divisions were several hun- Corps, which dominated the same high-
dred yards short of the highway, they way between Lessay and Périers.
In the meantime, the First Army of-
fensive had again been broadened, this
63 FUSA Daily Estimated Loss Rpts, Jul; 30th Div time by an attack east of the Vire River,
G–3 Jnl, 1935, 15 Jul, 2335, 17 Jul; Telecon, Col-
lins and Hobbs, 1600, 17 Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl
where the XIX Corps was trying to take
and File. St. Lô.
CHAPTER VIII
St. Lô
148 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
partment of the Manche, St. Lô was po- determined to challenge the effort to the
litically and psychologically important extent of their strength.4
to the French. A Norman road center German strength appeared adequate.
rivaling Caen, St. Lô would give the St. Lô was the responsibility of the II
Allies additional lateral communications Parachute Corps, which held the sector
and routes to the south. T h e Ameri- between the Vire and the Drôme Rivers.
cans felt that their possession of St. Lô On the left (west) were three kampf-
would correspondingly deny the Ger- gruppen—one each from the 353d, the
mans the ability to move troops and 266th, and the 352d Divisions-under
supplies easily from one side of the Vire the operational control of the 352d
River to the other immediately behind headquarters. On the right was the 3d
the front. Parachute Division. In support was the
By mid-July, the prestige factor and 12th Assault Gun Brigade. Although
the value of the city as an access point the troops in the line were spread thin
to roads leading south gave way to a across a wide front, they were veterans.
more important reason. Because of its T h e corps commander, Meindl, though
location at the apex of the Coutances- concerned with what amounted to a
St. Lô–Lessay road triangle, the city was manpower shortage for his wide front,
specifically important to General Brad- felt certain that the defensive skill of
ley’s emerging plan for achieving more his troops and the excellent positions
rapid advance in the Cotentin. A prem- would offset to a great extent the rather
ise of the new plan was American pos- sparse dispositions. He was confident
session of St. Lô, a need that by mid-July he could keep the Americans out of St.
imparted a sense of urgency to the battle Lô.5
for the city.3 T h e old part of the city of St. Lô oc-
T h e Germans had anchored their cupied a rock bluff that was crowned
positions on the hills north and north- by ancient ramparts, a tower, and the
east of St. Lô, advantageous terrain for graceful double spires of a fifteenth cen-
defense. At first they fought not so tury church. Surrounding the bluff,
much to hold St. Lô as to maintain their modern St. Lô spreads across the low-
line. T h e city was useless to them for lands and up the slopes of encircling
lateral communications because it was hills. T h e Vire River, flowing general-
within range of U.S. artillery, and their ly northward, enters the city from the
troop and supply movements were tak- southwest, executes a horseshoe loop,
ing place far to the south. But in July, and leaves to the northwest. T h e
just before the Americans opened their greater part of the city lies east of the
attack toward the city, the Germans cap- river and outside the horseshoe. (Map
tured an American field order. With III)
St. Lô revealed as a major U.S. objective, The western suburb of St. Lô inside
the Germans reappraised its worth and
4 Seventh Army K T B (Draft), 11 Jul.
5 Seventh Army K T B (Draft) , 11 Jul; Telecons,
Pemsel to Hausser, 1220, 11 Jul, and Pemsel to
3 Answers by Gens Smith and Bull to questions, Tempelhoff, 1245, 11 Jul, Seventh Army Tel Msgs;
14–15 Sep 45. O B WEST K T B , 11 Jul; MS # B–401 (Meindl).
T H E BATTLE FOR ST. LO 149
the horseshoe loop, is on the high ground to participate in the direct attack toward
that extends westward to Coutances. the city.6 Hill 192 is the culminating
T h e northern part of St. Lô rises steep- point of the high ground that straddles
ly toward the plateau-like top of Hill the Bérigny–St. Lô road four miles
122. On the east, the city spreads to- northeast of St. Lô. In the V Corps
ward the base of the Martinville ridge, zone of operations, Hill 192 gave the
an eminence that ascends in a gentle Germans observation not only of the V
slope for four miles to Hill 192. T h e Corps sector as far to the rear as the in-
southern portion climbs very briefly to- vasion beaches but also of all the ap-
ward high ground that dominates the proaches to St. Lô. Capture of the
southern approaches. height thus was a prerequisite to the
Two main highways intersect at St. XIX Corps attack on the city. T h e
Lô, and five blacktop roads converge on XIX and V Corps consequently planned
the city. On the west, the highway co-ordinated action for simultaneous at-
from Coutances and the road from Les- tacks east of the Vire River on 11 July.7
say and Périers merge inside the river
loop before crossing the stream into Hill 192
town. From the north two routes ar-
rive, one the highway from Carentan As the offensive east of the Vire be-
through Pont-Hébert and along the gan, the focal point of the operations
western slope of Hill 122, the other the initially developed on Hill 192 and in-
road from Isigny along the eastern edge volved the right (west) flank unit of the
of the hill. From the east, the road V Corps. While the 2d Armored and
from Caumont merges with the high- the 1st Infantry Divisions on the left
way from Bayeux and Caen at the Bé- (east) of the V Corps sector defended
rigny fork (seven miles from St. Lô) Caumont and held the pivot point of
and the resultant single large highway the projected First Army wheeling move-
runs along the south face of the Martin- ment, the 2d Infantry Division attacked
ville ridge and into town. From the on the right to secure Hill 192 in con-
south one highway and two roads enter junction with the XIX Corps attack to-
the city. ward St. Lô.8 (Map 8)
At the time of the invasion, St. Lô had Under Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robert-
been in the V Corps zone. Command- son, division commander since 1942, the
ed by Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, 2d Division had arrived in Normandy
who had directed the landings on OMAHA
Beach and the drive to Caumont, the V FO6 FUSA Ltr, Timing of Attack as Set Forth in
1, rev as of 1 Jul, 2 Jul, FUSA G–3 Jnl File.
Corps in June had anchored the Ameri- 7XIX Corps Memo, 7 Jul, XIX Corps G–3 Jnl;
can left flank firmly on Caumont and Air Plan for Support of the 29th Div and Ltr of
in mid-June had surrendered the St. Lô Instr, 10 Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl.
8V Corps Operations in the E T O , 6 Jan. 1942–
region to the XIX Corps, under Gener- 9 May 1945 (G–3 Historical Sub-section; n.p., n.d.) ,
al Corlett. Yet the configuration of pp. 101ff. This is an excellent source containing
a narrative account, reproductions of important
the terrain—specifically, the location of documents, and annexes detailing the activities
Hill 192 —is such that both corps had of the supporting services.
150 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
MAP 8
the day after the invasion and had par- the assault. T h e training emphasized
ticipated in the early drive from OMAHA tank-infantry-engineer proficiency in ap-
Beach. Considered a good unit, the di- plying the tactics of demolition, fire
vision had no illusions about taking Hill power, and speed in the hedgerow ter-
192 easily, for an attempt in June had rain. T o achieve speed in the attack,
cost over 1,200 casualties within three troops scooped holes, large enough for
days.9 T h e division awaited the inevi- tanks to drive through, in the hedgerow
table order to attack the hill again; and embankments that served as the line of
while in physical contact with the ene- departure-holes that left a thin shell of
my at distances varying from several earth on the side facing the enemy;
yards to a few hedgerowed fields, the di- when the attack order came, the tanks
vision shelled the hill thoroughly, drew would be able to crash through under
up elaborate plans of attack, and con- their own power. Bursting through
ducted training specifically designed for the hollowed-out hedgerows, the tankers
hoped to be upon the Germans in the
9 See Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jul, Pogue
next row before antitank weapons could
Files. be brought to bear.
T H E BATTLE FOR ST. LO 151
Hill 192 had been “so pounded by the approaches to St. Lô and also the
artillery that aerial photographs showed slopes of Hill 192 with precision fire.
it as a moth-eaten white blanket.” 10 T h e “top of the hill is the big thing,”
Yet it was a strong position. T h e slopes General Gerow said, but to make it se-
of the hill rise gradually to a rather flat cure the 2d Division had to advance be-
top, and the small fields bordered by yond it and occupy a two and a half mile
hedgerows and the scattered woods that stretch of the Bérigny highway between
surface the slopes provided concealment the Calvaire road and the Bérigny fork.
for the defenders. Hedgerows present- T h e other corps units were to make a
ed natural defensive lines in depth. strong demonstration; air support was
Sunken lanes provided excellent lines arranged; the corps artillery and four
of communication easily protected by a artillery battalions of the other divisions
few carefully sited weapons. Several in the corps sector were to reinforce the
hamlets and occasional farmhouses of- 2d Division fires.11
fered shelter for crew-served weapons T h e 38th Infantry (Col. Ralph W.
and centers of resistance. A tower con- Zwicker), on the right (west) and less
cealed in a diamond-shaped patch of than a thousand yards north of the crest
woods, earlier destroyed by U.S. artil- of Hill 192, was to make the main assault
lery fire but rebuilt by the Germans, with three tank companies and two heavy
gave the defenders a good observation mortar companies attached. T h e 23d
post. A battalion of the 3 d Parachute Infantry (Lt. Col. Jay B. Loveless), in
Division occupied the hill and had forti- the center, was to send one battalion
fied it with an intricate system of mutu- across the eastern slope of the objective.
ally supporting positions. T h e 9th Infantry (Col. Chester J.
T h e Germans maintained a tight coun- Hirschfelder), in position east of the
terreconnaissance screen, made maxi- Bérigny fork, was to support the division
mum use of sunken roads and hedges, attack with fire.
and employed roadblocks, wire entangle- Since a haze limited visibility on the
ments, and mine fields. Although the morning of 11 July, the planned air sup-
main defensive positions were judged port was canceled. T h e artillery fired
shallow-perhaps only two or three a heavy preparation for twenty minutes,
hedgerows in depth–the Americans ex- and shortly after 0600 the division
pected the Germans to defend with de- jumped off.12
termination and vigor and to employ T h e preceding night Colonel Zwick-
local counterattacks to retain their posi- er’s 38th Infantry had withdrawn sev-
tions. There seemed to be few if any eral hundred yards for safety during the
German tanks in the area, and intelli- anticipated air strike, and when the regi-
gence officers estimated that the II Para- ment jumped off the troops immediately
chute Corps did not have an impressive
amount of artillery. T h e Americans 112d Div G–3 Jnl, 0925, 11 Jul, FO 5, 6 Jul, and
were sure, however, that prior registra- G–3 Per Rpt 33, 12 Jul; V Corps FO 10, 4 Jul.
12[Garth], St.-Lô, pp. 58–60, This American
tion would enable the Germans to cover Forces in Action booklet contains an excellent de-
tailed account of the battle for St. Lô with emphasis
10Sylvan Diary, 11 Jul. on small unit action.
152 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
met a heavy volume of enemy fire that across the road in small groups and
temporarily prevented them from reach- organized the high ground immediately
ing their line of departure. T h e Ger- to the south.
mans had discovered the slight with- Meanwhile, a battalion of the 23d In-
drawal, had moved forward, and had fantry outflanked a gully called “Purple
thus escaped the full force of the twenty- Heart Draw.” Tanks placed direct fire
minute artillery preparation. During on houses suspected of concealing Ger-
the first half hour of the attack, they dis- man strongpoints. Several lucky shots
abled with panzerfaust fire or forced to by rifle grenades struck enemy-held
retire all six tanks in the first wave of hedgerows just right to achieve the effect
one of the assault battalions. T h e of air bursts over enemy crew-served
stratagem of scooping out hedgerow weapons. By late afternoon the bat-
banks to gain a surprise forward bound talion had crossed the east slope of Hill
had thus been nullified. 192 and gained positions overlooking
American infantrymen advanced slow- the Bérigny highway.
ly with the help of heavy and accurate That evening Hausser, the Seventh
artillery fire. Twenty thousand rounds Army commander, ordered Meindl, the
were fired by the division artillery alone; II Parachute Corps commander, to hold
a total of 45 tons of high explosive came Hill 192 at all costs.14 It was already
from all the artillery in support. Tanks too late. As US. artillery placed harass-
and bazooka teams knocked out assault ing fires south of the Bérigny road dur-
guns concealed in the rubble of a village. ing the night, the infantry repelled
A dozen riflemen enveloped by stealth small and ineffective counterattacks.
an enemy position known as “Kraut It became obvious to the Americans that
Corner,” reached grenade distance, the Germans were establishing a new
and destroyed the enemy weapons. Fif- line of defense in the hills south of and
teen German paratroopers surrendered. overlooking the St. Lô–Bérigny high-
Three who refused to capitulate were way.
buried alive by a tank dozer. On 1 2 July the 2d Division advanced
“We have a battle on our hands,” Gen- little, spending the day consolidating its
eral Robertson said, “[but] things are new positions south of the Bérigny
breaking a little, a hundred yards here road. T h e Germans were relieved when
and a hundred yards there.” 13 This was the American attack halted, for with
the pattern of the slow, vigorous advance their troops tied down by the XIX Corps
that by noon got the 38th Infantry to attack toward St. Lô, German com-
the top of Hill 192. T h e Germans then manders felt that if the 2d Division had
disengaged and withdrew, and only scat- continued its attack toward the south,
tered groups opposed the descent on the the Americans would have accomplished
south slope. Part of the 38th Infantry a clean breakthrough.15
dug in on a defensive perimeter just T h e 2d Division had nonetheless
short of the highway and covered the 14Telecon, Pemsel and Meindl, 1900, 11 Jul, Sev-
road with fire; the other elements slipped enth Army Tel Msgs.
15Telecon, Blauensteiner to Helmdach, 1140, 12
182d Div G–3 Jnl, 0925 and 0955, 11 Jul. Jul, Seventh Army Tel Msgs.
T H E BATTLE FOR ST. LO 153
achieved a notable success. Although for attachment to the XIX Corps, would
it had taken only 147 prisoners and sus- reach France in time to participate at
tained heavy losses— 69 killed, 328 the beginning of the attack was the ques-
wounded, and 8 missing—ithad captured tion. Though advance elements of the
the best observation point in the St. Lô division had relieved portions of the
sector, a point from which the Ameri- 30th Division and freed them for their
cans could look down the Martinville bridgehead operations on 7 July, it
ridge toward the XIX Corps objective. would take “very strenuous efforts” to
get all of the division’s men and equip-
Down the Martinville Ridge ment into position to take over the right
portion of the 29th Division zone. Not
T h e attack directly toward St. Lô, by until 11 July was the 35th Division ready
that part of the XIX Corps east of the to attack.17 (See Map 111.)
Vire River, should logically have fol- A scant four miles north of St. Lô,
lowed soon after the successive corps the 29th and 35th Divisions held posi-
attacks in the Cotentin—those of the VIII tions across an eight-mile front—from
Corps on 3 July, the VII on 4 July, and la Meauffe through Villiers-Fossard to
the XIX Corps bridgehead operation the Couvains–Calvaire road. St. Lô
launched on 7 July. Although General was in the center of the projected corps
Bradley had tentatively extended the zone of operations. In order to secure
pattern of his offensive by scheduling the St. Lô, the divisions would have to ad-
direct attack toward St Lô for 9 July, con- vance to the river line west of the city
siderations twice caused him to postpone and to the Bérigny road, the eastward
the effort, each time for twenty-four exit from the city.
hours. T h e first was his hope that com- T h e divisions were to attack abreast in
mitment of armor west of the Vire would narrow zones. T h e boundary separating
promote quick capture of the high them ran from Villiers-Fossard along the
ground west of St. Lô. T h e second was western base of Hill 122 to the loop of
his feeling that additional troops were the Vire River. T h e 35th on the right
needed east of the Vire. Though the was to move to the two-mile stretch of
29th Division, regarded as a good outfit, the Vire immediately northwest of St.
had formed the left of the XIX Corps Lô; the 29th was to take the city. While
early in July, Bradley believed, on the one battalion of medium artillery sup-
basis of combat experience in June, that ported the XIX Corps attack west of the
a single division deployed on a wide Vire, the reminder of the corps artil-
front was not strong enough to take St. lery-four battalions of 155 -mm. how-
Lô. At least one additional division itzers and a battalion each of 4.5 -inch
would be necessary in order to mount guns and 8 -inch howitzers—was to assist
an attack that could be supported in the attack on St. Lô. General Corlett
depth. 16 attached an additional battalion of medi-
Whether the 35th Division, designated
17 35th Div CofS Memo, 9 Jul, 35th Div G–3 Jnl;
16 Telecon, Corlett and Gerhardt, 0825, Jul,
8 XIX Corps Ltr of Instrs, 7 Jul; XIX Corps and
29th Div G–3 Jnl; Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 29th Div Msgs, 0712 and 1200 10 Jul, XIX Corps
Jul, Pogue Files. G–3 Jnl.
154 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
um artillery to the 29th Division, which the east, and the heights southeast of St.
was to make the main effort of the Lô. With these in his possession and
corps.18 with the 2d Division holding Hill 192,
T h e 29th Division was a veteran unit Gerhardt hoped that by threatening to
with D-Day experience on OMAHA encircle the city he could compel the
Beach. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Germans to evacuate.
Charles H. Gerhardt, it had taken Isigny Two of the three heights General Ger-
and attempted to capture St. Lô in June. hardt deemed necessary for his purpose
While awaiting the reopening of offen- were within striking distance—Hill 122
sive operations, General Gerhardt had and the Martinville ridge. Although
organized small tank-infantry-engineer possession of Hill 122 would give the
teams and rehearsed their co-ordinated 29th Division a more direct avenue of
action according to a plan that assigned approach to the city–the Isigny–St. Lô
an infantry squad and one tank to each highway, which enters St. Lô from the
hedgerowed field and an engineer squad northeast—Gerhardt preferred not to at-
to each infantry platoon or three fields. tack it directly. Second only to Hill 192
He directed the division ordnance com- in importance in the St. Lô area, Hill
pany to weld iron prongs to his tanks 122 was a bastion of the German defen-
so that they could ram holes in the sive line, a position that anchored for-
hedgerow banks to facilitate the placing tifications on a two-mile ridge extending
of demolitions. He also experimented north to Carillon. T h e Germans were
with the technique of infantry crossing sensitive to a threat against this height,
the center of the fields rather than mov- since its plateaulike crest ends abruptly
ing along hedgerows.19 By these means, at a steep slope near the edge of the
and with heavy artillery support, he northern outskirts of St. Lô. From the
hoped—even though replacements had top of the slope, the city lies exposed
not brought all of his infantry battalions and vulnerable.
back to authorized strength—to make a General Gerhardt preferred to make
rapid, sustained advance. his main effort on the left (east). He
Bombed from the air and shelled therefore deployed the 115th Infantry
from the ground, St. Lô was in ruins. (Col. Godwin Ordway, Jr.) across a
T o avoid not only the costly fighting broad front, north and northeast of Hill
involved in rooting Germans from the 122, on the division right. Even though
crumbling houses but also the task of all three infantry battalions were in the
clearing the rubble-clogged streets, Gen- line, a gap of several hundred yards
eral Gerhardt designated high ground separated two of them. T h e reason for
near the city rather than St. Lô itself as such thin deployment was Gerhardt’s
the immediate objectives: Hill 122 north plan to make his main effort to secure
of the town and just inside the division the Martinville ridge. By holding this
right boundary, the Martinville ridge to eminence east of St. Lô, U.S. troops
would threaten the Germans on Hill 122
18 XIX Corps Arty AAR, Jul.
19The Div Comdr’s After Combat Battle Notes, 29 with encirclement and isolation from
Div AAR, Jul. the south. In a potentially untenable
T H E BATTLE FOR S T . LO 155
MARTINVILLERIDGE
position, the Germans on Hill 122 would resistance from Hill 122, along the
have to withdraw through St. Lô before Isigny–St. Lô axis.20
the Americans entered the city and cut General Gerhardt's scheme was almost
their route of escape. As the Germans disarranged just before daybreak on 11
withdrew the Americans could decimate July when the II Parachute Corps
them with artillery fire. Occupation of launched a diversionary feint in support
both Hill 122 and the high ground of the Panzer Lehr attack west of the
southeast of St. Lô would then be a Vire.21 A German patrol cut the com-
simple matter. munication wires of the 115th Infantry.
Assuming that the 2d Division would Enemy artillery and mortars opened fire.
take Hill 192 and thus secure his flank Two paratroop companies supported by
and rear, General Gerhardt directed the engineers struck the thinly deployed
116th Infantry (Col. Charles D. W. Can- troops of the 115th, overran the Ameri-
ham) to slip south on a narrow front can lines, encircled part of an infantry
near the division left boundary to the battalion, and drove a company of 4.2-
Martinville ridge. There the regiment inch mortarmen from their positions.
would turn right (west) and descend Without communication and direction
the ridge toward the eastern edge of from higher headquarters, heavy mortar
town. T h e 115th Infantry was to make support, or knowledge of the extent of
a diversionary effort down the Isigny–St. the German effort, small groups fought
Lô road toward Hill 122 and protect the isolated engagements in the early morn-
division right flank. T h e 175th Infan- ing light. At 0730, judging that they
try (Col. Ollie W. Reed) was to be pre- had done their duty by Panzer Lehr,
pared to exploit success-either on the
2029th Div FO 18, 4 Jul; 29th Div Arty FO 2, 4
Martinville Ridge or, if despite con- Jul; 116th Inf FO 10, 5 Jul.
trary expectation the 115th met little 21See above, Ch. VII.
156 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the German assault companies broke As soon as the assaulting troops surged
contact and withdrew to their former forward, Colonel Canham, the regimen-
positions. What was essentially a raid tal commander, committed his reserve
alerted the 29th Division to the possi- battalion. By the end of the day this
bility that German reserves had been battalion, with a company of tanks in
massed in depth for counterattack and close support, had set up blocking posi-
would be in position to make a strong tions on the division left flank. En-
defense of St. Lô. T h e raid also inflict- trenched on the south slope of the Mar-
ed more than a hundred casualties on tinville ridge, the battalion overlooked
the 115th and disrupted its scheduled the Bérigny road.
jump-off. Regimental reorganization Toward the end of the first day Gener-
took the remainder of the morning, and al Gerhardt’s effort to outflank Hill 1 2 2
Colonel Ordway did not launch his at- from the east and south promised suc-
tack down the Isigny–St. Lô road until cess. T h e 2d Division had captured
afternoon. As anticipated, little ad- Hill 192 and was protecting the strong
vance was made in the face of strong 116th Infantry positions on the Martin-
enemy fire directed from Hill 122.22 ville ridge. Apparently ready to close
Meanwhile, General Gerhardt had in on St. Lô and threaten Hill 1 2 2 with
been able to get his main effort under isolation, Gerhardt alerted his reserve
way on the division left flank early that regiment, the 175th, to pass through the
morning when two battalions of the 116th on the following day and drive
116th Infantry jumped off in column into the city from the east.
behind a heavy artillery preparation. T h e plan had one drawback. As soon
T h e hedgerows made it difficult to lo- as the 116th had turned the axis of at-
cate the exact sources of enemy fire, and tack from the south to the west, its left
progress was slow against determined re- flank had become exposed: men moving
sistance. As 4.2-inch mortars fired on across the open fields and orchards of
the Martinville ridge and tanks knocked the southern face of the Martinville
out a self-propelled gun on the Calvaire ridge came under observed German fire
road, the infantry finally got past its from high ground south of the Bérigny
first major obstacle, a sunken road road. Having in effect sought defilade
heavily protected by antipersonnel from the fires of Hill 1 2 2 against the
mines. T h e regiment still had gained north face of the Martinville ridge, the
only six hedgerows in five hours when, Americans had come under enfilading
suddenly, as the 2d Division secured the fire from the south, shelling that har-
crest of Hill 192, the German opposition assed movement and depleted ranks.
gave way. T h e 116th Infantry then As a result the 29th Division on 11 July
moved rapidly south to the Martinville lost almost 500 men.
ridge, turned right (west), and began to If Gerhardt persisted with his original
move down the ridge toward St. Lô. scheme of maneuver and brought the
bulk of the division down the Martin-
2229th Div AAR, Jul and Extract from the Bat- ville ridge, he would send his men
tle Report of the 3d Parachute Division Operations, through a gantlet of German fire. But
10–20 Jul; XIX Corps Cml Sec Rpt, XIX Corps
AAR, Jul. because control of the southern face of
T H E BATTLE FOR ST. LO 157
the Martinville ridge would protect his corps commander, requested that a regi-
flank against attack across the Bérigny ment of the 5th Parachute Division, ar-
highway and because an approach to St. riving at this time from Brittany, be
Lô from the east still held out the prom- sent to reinforce his sector. Hausser,
ise of quickly dislodging the Germans the Seventh Army commander, refused,
on Hill 122, General Gerhardt decided judging that the Panzer Lehr defeat
to continue. He became convinced, made the region west of St. Lô more
however, that as long as the Germans had critical. Hausser insisted, nevertheless,
control of the hills north and south of that the Martinville ridge be held at
St. Lô, they were not likely to give up all costs. In response, Meindl remarked
the city. Thus he had to take St. Lô that someone was soon going to have to
by direct assault and occupy the town. come up with a brilliant plan if they
On the evening of 11 July he instructed were to counter the American pressure.
Colonel Canham to “push on, if possible Meanwhile, Meindl established a new
take St. Lô.”23 Encroaching darkness line during the night. T h e positions
helped to thwart the attempt. extended north across the Bérigny high-
With the American scheme of maneu- way and over the Martinville ridge to
ver revealed by a captured field order, tie in with Hill 122, and faced eastward
German commanders during the morn- to meet the threat that had developed
ing of 11 July had been unworried by on the Martinville ridge.24
the American attack. By noontime the On the second day of attack, 1 2 July,
outlook had changed. They had lost the 29th Division made little progress.
the top of Hill 192, and the Panzer Lehr On the right the 115th Infantry, ex-
attack west of the Vire River had fizzled. tended over a broad front, without a
T h e considerable American pressure, reserve, and under the eyes of the Ger-
not only in the St. Lô region but all mans on Hill 122, did little more than
across the Cotentin, was having a cumu- maintain pressure and sustain casualties.
lative effect that could not be wished On the left, the 175th Infantry was un-
away. Trying to retain possession of able-because of German artillery fire-
the St. Lô defenses, the II Parachute to pass through the 116th and get into
Corps reported that its entire front had position for a drive down the Martin-
“burst into flame.” A strong volume ville ridge. German artillery and mor-
of effective artillery fire had by nightfall tar fire immobilized the division and
of 11 July reduced the 3 d Parachute Di- again inflicted almost 500 casualties.
vision to 35 percent of its authorized Losing nearly 1,000 men in two days
strength. T h e kampfgruppe of the was a serious drain on the division,
353d Division, fighting alongside the which had not been up to strength at
paratroopers, had shrunk from almost the beginning of the attack. A bat-
1,000 men to 180. Approving commit- talion of the 175th Infantry, even before
ment of the last reserve battalion of the
3 d Parachute Division, Meindl, the 24Telecons, Pemsel to Meindl, 1900, 11 Jul, and
Blauensteiner to Helmdach, 1140, 12 Jul, Seventh
Army Tel Msgs; Seventh Army K T B (Draft), 11
Jul; Daily Sitrep, 12 Jul, A G p B Tugesmeldungen;
28[Garth], St.-Lô, p. 58. MS # B–455 (Ziegelmann).
158 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
commitment, had only 225 men in its continuation of the effort down the
three rifle companies. Several hours Martinville ridge—one more day. T o
after the jump-off another battalion com- support the attack he requested particu-
mander had replied, when General larly heavy air bombardment of Hill
Gerhardt asked him how he stood in 122. 27
strength, “On one leg, sir.” German By morning of 13 July the two regi-
fire depleted the division at an alarming ments on the Martinville ridge had
rate, and the hedgerow fighting wore managed to assume definite regimental
out the survivors. On the evening of 12 zones abreast and facing west, the 116th
July a regimental commander under- generally holding the ridge line, the
stated the case when he informed Ger- 175th occupying positions across the
hardt, “I think everybody is enthusiastic southern face of the ridge to the Bérigny
about taking up a strong defensive posi- road. In compliance with the corps
tion right now and I would recommend commander’s decision, General Gerhardt
it too.” 25 directed the 175th Infantry to drive
After two days of battle the corps down the Bérigny highway to St. Lô be-
and division commanders, Generals Cor- hind a spearhead of tanks. With dive
lett and Gerhardt, both came to the bombers blasting ahead of the ground
conclusion, “Hill 122 is SOP”-they troops and neutralizing Hill 122, artil-
needed Hill 122 before they could take lery giving close protection, and tanks
St. Lô. By 13 July, however, General driving the point down the road, there
Gerhardt no longer had the strength to was reason to hope that the city might
seize the hill. T h e bulk of the 29th fall.
Division, the 116th and 175th Regi- T h e hope was short lived. Hardly
ments, was inextricably committed in had daylight come before hindrances de-
the left portion of the division zone, veloped. Not only did bad weather
the Martinville ridge; the 115th Infan- nullify the air effort, but lack of proper
try, facing Hill 122 and in position to co-ordination prevented the tanks from
assault the height, remained stretched refueling and immobilized them for the
across a broad front. Gerhardt tenta- duration of the attack. Deprived of
tively proposed to envelop and bypass both armor and air support, the infantry,
the German strongpoint on Hill 122, although aided by strong artillery fire,
but he did not press the point since he advanced but 500 yards under the
did not feel it was a satisfactory solu- pounding of German artillery and mor-
tion.26 tar shells directed from the ridge south
General Corlett held the solution to of the highway.
the problem of Hill 122. He could Late in the afternoon the regimental
commit his corps reserve against it. commander, Colonel Reed, requested
Yet before doing so, he wanted to give permission to commit his reserve bat-
Gerhardt’s original plan of maneuver- talion against the high ground south of
the Bérigny road. When General Ger-
25 29th Div G–3 Jnl, 1215 and 1558, 11 Jul, and
1707, 14 JuI. 2729th Div FO 20, 12 Jul; 29th Div Arty AAR,
2629th Div G–3 Jnl, 0955, 13 Jul. Jul.
T H E BATTLE FOR ST. LO 159
hardt relayed the request to the corps miles away, was the two-mile stretch of
commander, General Corlett refused for the Vire River between the loop and
fear it might promote a dispersal of ef- the bend. T h e division’s right flank
fort. Also, he had by then decided to was fairly well protected by the Vire
take action against Hill 122 by com- River; but on the left, just outside the
mitting his reserve, a regiment of the boundary, Hill 122 dominated the en-
35th Division, and he needed the reserve tire zone.
battalion of Reed’s regiment to consti- For his attack on 11 July, the same
tute a new corps reserve. Ordering day that the 2d and 29th jumped off,
General Gerhardt to rest his troops and General Baade planned to commit two
reorganize his positions on the following regiments abreast—the 137th ( Col. Grant
day, 14 July, General Corlett turned his Layng) on the right adjacent to the
main attention to the 35th Division, the river, the 320th (Col. Bernard A. Byrne)
unit on the right that had also been at- on the left. T h e 134th Infantry (Col.
tacking since 11 July and would now Butler B. Miltonberger) was to be held
have to take Hill 122. as corps reserve. After a thirty-minute
artillery preparation, the division moved
Hill 122 forward at 0600. 29
T h e right flank elements of both as-
Commanded by Maj. Gen. Paul W. sault regiments advanced a mile and a
Baade, the 35th Division, though well half in two hours and straightened the
trained, was handicapped by the haste division front, but then the attack
with which it had to be committed. stalled. Meeting strong resistance in
T h e troops had taken over part of the the hedgerows, the troops encountered
active front without extensive ground many of the same difficulties that plagued
reconnaissance; their knowledge of the nearly all inexperienced divisions in the
enemy was limited to the general idea of hedgerows. Communications went out
where the German forward line lay, the almost immediately. Gaps soon devel-
impression that the Germans were de- oped between units. T h e men seemed
fending with vigor, and the immediate surprised to find strong opposition from
realization that the Germans had excel- machine guns in sunken roads and be-
lent observation of all movement, par- hind hedges. With astonishment they
ticularly in the open fields. Only when noted that it was “hard to put down
the division launched its attack did the [artillery] fire behind hedges close to
men learn how thoroughly the Germans our tr[oop]s.” 3o Though the troops
had organized the terraim.28 had been informed while in England
From a line of departure running be- that the Cornish countryside was some-
tween la Meauffe (on the Vire) and what like Normandy, neither planning
Villiers-Fossard, the 35th Division faced nor training to overcome the terrain
hedgerow country. T h e objective, four obstacles of the hedgerows had gone far
28 Interv with Lt Col Beckley by Capt Franklin 29 35thDiv FO 2, 10 Jul, and AAR, Jul.
Ferris, CI 106; 35th Div G–3 Jnl, 9 Jul. 3035th Div G–3 Jnl, 1820, 11 Jul.
160 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
junction with the 30th Division attack against Hill 122. Success on the flanks
on the other side of the river, gave the would neutralize the Carillon position,
35th a favored position. With a foot- eliminate Hill 122, and open the way
hold on the ridge road, the Americans for an easy advance to the final division
held an excellent approach to St. Lô objective, the stretch of the Vire River
from the northwest. Having outflanked between the loop and the bend.
the German strongpoint at Carillon, A need to diverge from this plan be-
they also threatened Hill 122. Though came obvious on 15 July soon after the
the 320th Infantry, which was echeloned 137th Infantry attacked on the right to
to the left rear for two miles, could do cross the Pont-Hébert–St. Lô ridge road.
little more than exert unavailing pres- Artillery and mortar fire directed from
sure against Carillon, the 137th had Hill 122 inflicted 117 casualties and
fashioned an enveloping pincer against stopped the regiment cold. T h e 137th
the Carillon–Hill 122 complex from the could not advance, General Baade de-
west. A similar pincer from the east duced, until the 134th Infantry took
would form a double envelopment of Hill 122.
Carillon and Hill 122. Because the Colonel Miltonberger’s 134th Infantry
29th Division, with the bulk of its forces also had attacked early on 15 July. T h e
on the Martinville ridge, did not have axis of advance was a country road, dirt-
enough troops in position to assault Hill surfaced and narrow, from Villiers-
122 from the northeast, Corlett shifted Fossard through Emélie to the hardly
the division boundary to the east, to discernible flat top of the hill. T h e
the Isigny–St. Lô highway, giving the road parallels the Isigny–St. Lô highway,
35th Division more maneuver space and a mile to the east, and rises slightly for
Hill 122 as an objective. Corlett re- almost three miles as it mounts the
leased the 134th Infantry from the corps gentle northern incline of Hill 122, then
reserve and directed Baade to take the drops down the precipitous descent into
height. In preparation for the attack, the northern edge of St. Lô. On both
the 134th on 14 July replaced two bat- sides of the road typical bocage terrain
talions of the 115th Infantry that were offered advantages to the defenders–im-
west of the Isigny–St. Lô highway, pressive hedgerows and sunken lanes
thereby getting into position to strike that are veritable caves.
for Hill 122 while at the same time The 134th Infantry moved toward
bringing relief to the overextended 29th the cluster of farm buildings at Emélie
Division.35 behind a rolling artillery barrage. Al-
General Baade’s intention was to at- most immediately the men became en-
tack with both flank regiments. While meshed in a tangle of hedgerowed lanes
the 320th contained the Germans at and a shower of enemy fire. T h e threat
Carillon, the 137th, on the right, was of confusion hovered over the battlefield
to advance across the Pont-Hébert–St. as small units fought for individual
Lô ridge road. T h e 134th, on the left, fields. Although the regiment suffered
was to move forward in direct assault high casualties in severe splinter actions,
3535th Div AAR, Jul. it had the hamlet of Emélie by noon.
T H E B A T T L E FOR ST. LO 163
to the slow costly pattern of yard-by-yard the northeast—by way of the Isigny–St.
advances already so familiar. Lô highway—or the east—downthe Mar-
There was little improvement on 16 tinville ridge. Because Hill 122 was
July. While the 35th Division fought not yet entirely secure, General Ger-
to retain Hill 122, the 29th Division hardt still expected to make his climactic
seemed virtually paralyzed. T h e 115th drive into St. Lô from the east, but he
Infantry advanced about 300 yards down wanted to be ready to drive from the
the Isigny–St. Lô highway and came northeast should capture of Hill 122
abreast of the 35th Division forces on prove in reality to be the decisive factor
Hill 122, but the regiments on the in the battle for St. Lô.
Martinville ridge could not relieve the
isolated battalion. A Legend is Born
Six days of fighting had brought the
29th close to its goal, but with consid- On 17 July, the seventh day of attack,
erably weakened forces. Two days the 29th Division struck before dawn.
earlier, 125 replacements had restored Maj. Thomas D. Howie, commanding
one battalion of the 116th Infantry the 3d Battalion, 116th Infantry, led his
to only 60 percent of its authorized men in a column of companies in a
strength; during the night of 16–17 July silent march toward Major Bingham’s
another battalion received 250 enlisted isolated unit. Suspicious Germans in-
replacements, bringing its total strength creased their artillery and mortar fire
to 420. On 16 July a battalion of the and played grazing machine gun fire
115th had only a platoon of riflemen re- across the slope of the Martinville ridge.
maining in each rifle company. On 17 Howie’s men resisted the impulse to re-
July 200 men comprised the three rifle turn this fire and crept forward through
companies of a battalion of the 175th, an early morning mist, still undetected.
and most of the commissioned and non- Several hours after daybreak, they
commissioned officers had been killed reached Bingham’s isolated force.
or wounded. Although these were ex- T h e regimental commander, Colonel
treme cases, the other infantry battalions Dwyer, had hoped that the two bat-
were also seriously depleted. 44 talions together would be able to enter
For the final assault on St. Lô at the the city, but Bingham’s men were ex-
opportune moment, General Gerhardt hausted. Howie informed Dwyer by
turned to the supporting arms. He in- telephone that they were incapable of
structed Brig. Gen. Norman D. Cota, the further effort. When Dwyer asked
assistant division commander, to form a whether Howie could move his battalion
task force of tank, reconnaissance, tank alone to the eastern edge of town, Howie
destroyer, and engineer troops. They replied, “Will do.” Several minutes
were to be assembled in the division rear later an enemy shell killed him.
area at a location that would enable Taking command of Howie’s battal-
them to attack toward St. Lô from either ion, Capt. William H. Puntenny tried to
4429th Div G–3 Jnl, 1335, 16 Jul, and 1256, 17
mount the attack on St. Lô along the
Jul. Bérigny highway, but the Germans
T H E BATTLE FOR ST. LO 167
threw up such a heavy curtain of mortar been reduced to 23 veterans but re-
fire that the men could not move. All plenished with 85 replacements-opened
through the day the German fire denied a supply route to Bingham and Puntenny
an advance. Late that afternoon a across the thousand-yard gap. Advanc-
counterattack with tank support started ing in two columns along the axial
from St. Lô to eliminate the Bingham- hedgerows one field apart, maintaining
Puntenny force. Only the fortuitous visual contact between columns, and
presence of American dive bombers leaving four men in each field to hold
saved the day. While the planes strafed the supply line open, the company met
and bombed the German column, the only light rifle fire. Supplies were
division artillery placed a protective brought forward and the wounded were
screen of fire about the American evacuated. T h e few Germans, in small
positions. 45 Disorganized, the Germans and disorganized groups, who blundered
withdrew their assault force, but now into the supply route during the day
two American battalions were isolated. were either killed or captured.
All efforts of the 1st Battalion, 116th By the time contact was firmly estab-
Infantry, to open a route to Bingham lished with the two isolated battalions,
and Puntenny on 17 July and to bring the Martinville ridge had lost impor-
forward ammunition, food, and medical tance in the battle of St. Lô. T h e ex-
supplies failed. Half-tracks and tank planation had its basis in the condition
destroyers, escorted by quadruple .50- that for seven long days had plagued
caliber machine guns, found the sunken the attacks along the ridge.
roads about Martinville so clogged with In full view of the Germans south of
debris, dead horses, and wrecked Ger- the Bérigny highway, every American
man vehicles that an advance under con- movement along the south face of the
tinuing enemy artillery fire was impos- Martinville ridge had brought deadly
sible. T h e 175th Infantry also at- fire. Though the two regiments on the
tempted to reach the isolated men by ridge had constituted a threat to the
attacking down the Bérigny highway, town, they had been unable to make the
but the regiment sustained severe losses threat good. Attempts to impress the
and made little advance. T h e only re- troops with the fact that the German
lief was that brought by light planes of positions were worse than their own had
the division artillery, which dropped suf- not succeeded. “Tell them that Jerry
ficient blood plasma for 35 wounded is in a wedge,” the division G–3 had
men. ordered a liaison officer. “Jerry doesn’t
On the night of 17 July a carrying seem to realize it,” had come the reply. 46
party of about forty men of the 1st Bat- So it seemed, for in spite of the wedge
talion, 116th Infantry, finally reached exerting pressure from the north-Hill
the isolated units. T h e next morning, 122 —and from the east-the Martinville
18 July, a rifle company-which had ridge-the Germans had obstinately re-
fused to release their hold on the city.
45[Lt. Col. Robert H. George], Ninth Air Force,
April to November 1944, USAF Hist Study 36
With the passage of time it had become
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University,
1945) , p. 118. 4629th Div G–3 Jnl, 1216, 17 Jul.
168 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
4729th Div G–3 Jnl, 1456 and 1545, 17 Jul. 4929th Div G–3 Jnl, 0638 and 0641, 18 Jul.
48XIX Corps Msg 2245, 17 Jul, XIX Corps G–3 50 Telecon, Pemsel to Tempelhoff, 1520, 17 Jul,
Jnl and File; Ltr of Instr, 2300, 17 Jul. AGp B K T B .
THE BATTLE FOR ST. LO 169
INFANTRYMEN
HIT THE GROUNDON A STREETIN ST. Lô
Ednie, who had come from the 30th the gate. “I believe this is the time
Division to understudy the assistant to alert that Task Force,” he advised
division commander, took his place. General Gerhardt. T h e division com-
Ednie’s mission was to open the north- mander no longer doubted. “Every-
east entrance to the city for the passage thing’s shaping up now,” he informed
of General Cota’s task force. Unaware General Cota, “so I think you’d better
of the German withdrawal, General Ger- get moving.” 55
hardt was cautious. “We may go into Forty minutes later General Gerhardt
St. Lô,” he informed the corps com- transmitted another order to General
mander, “but we don’t want anyone to Cota. He wanted the body of Major
get cut off in there.” 54 Howie to accompany the first U.S. troops
After an artillery preparation, the into town. 56 T h e act was to be not only
115th Infantry attacked. Since Hill 122 a gesture of honor and respect to the
was no longer a point of embarrassment, fallen but also a visible reminder to the
the regiment made good progress. At members of the task force of all their
noon Colonel Ednie was hammering on comrades who had given their lives in a
5529th Div G–3 Jnl, 1147 and 1149, 18 Jul.
54 29th Div G–3 Jnl, 0725 and 0901, 18 Jul. 5629th Div G–3 Jnl, 1236, 18 Jul.
T H E BATTLE FOR ST. LO 171
RUINSOF ST. Lô
resistance remained to be cleared. T h e vious, for its seizure the day before the
bridgesoverthe Vire were still intact. 57 fall of St. Lô had deprived the Germans
About the time the 29th Division task of a vital point in their line of defense.
force began its drive into St. Lô, the T h e other event was of more subtle
35th Division completed its assignment. significance. At the same time that the
Colonel Byrne’s 320th Infantry mopped 35th Division was securing a hold on
up bypassed enemy in the center of the Hill 122, the 29th Division was pene-
division zone, Colonel Emery’s 137th trating the enemy defensive line across
Infantry reached the bank of the Vire the Martinville ridge by means of Major
River between the loop and the bend, Bingham’s accidental advance of 1,000
and Colonel Miltonberger’s 134th Infan- yards. Although temporarily encircled
try moved down the south slope of Hill and isolated, Bingham’s battalion, less
122 to the northern edge of St. Lô. Be- than 1,000 yards from St. Lô, presented
cause the division boundary did not per- a serious menace to the defenders—“an
mit the 35th to enter into town, General enemy battalion behind our lines.” 59
Baade requested a boundary change. Major Howie’s relief force had strength-
T h e XIX Corps G–3 first checked with ened the threat. Although the 29th
General Gerhardt: “We have another Division troops on the Martinville ridge
division crying for part of St. Lô,” he did not have the power to take the city,
reported. their positions constituted a contain-
“OK,” General Gerhardt said, “let ment force, a base or anchor for the
them go to it.” coup de grâce delivered by Task Force C.
Despite General Gerhardt’s largess, T h e original scheme of maneuver had
the corps commander was reluctant to thus been reversed. T h e intended ma-
condone the possibility of confusion and neuver force, the 116th and 175th Regi-
lack of control that might result from ments, had become the base, while the
intermingling troops of the two divi- 115th Infantry, earlier designated the
sions in the city. He decided not to holding force, had become, with Task
shift the boundary, yet some 35th Divi- Force C, the assault element.
sion troops inevitably entered St. Lô If speed was a fundamental require-
and moved a short way into town. 58 ment of General Gerhardt’s mission, the
What had caused St. Lô to fall was the question of whether the corps attack had
weight of two divisions pressing forward been the most expeditious manner of
relentlessly for eight days. But if securing St. Lô remained a lingering
specific events have direct causal rela- doubt. Other U.S. units advancing
tion, two were mainly responsible. T h e with the same slow rate of speed in the
capture of Hill 122 was the more ob- hedgerow country obscured the possi-
bility that the corps might have secured
5729th Div G–3 Jnl, 0517, 19 Jul.
its objective more rapidly had it attacked
58 29th Div G–3 Jnl, 1615, 18 Jul; Penciled note, Hill 122 at the same time that the V
n.d., 35th Div G–3 Jnl File, 18 Jul; 134th Infantry Corps had attacked Hill 192. Had the
Regiment, Combat History of World War II, com-
piled by Butler Buchanan Miltonherger (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana: Army and Navy Publishing 59 Telecon, Pemsel to Tempelhoff, 2110, 17 Jul,
Company, 1946), p. 44. Seventh Army Tel Msgs.
T H E BATTLE FOR ST. LO 173
SYMBOL OFST. Lô. The Pug-draped cofƒin of Major Howie rests on the rubble-
buried steps of Ste. Croix church.
Americans controlled Hill 122, the 29th but before General Gerhardt could pro-
Division would have been able to make claim the achievement, General Corlett
its thrust to St. Lô across the north slope telephoned to inform him that he had
of the Martinville ridge and have been already heard the news on a radio broad-
shielded from the German fire south of cast. “NBC beat you to it,” General
the Bérigny road. Corlett announced.60
General Gerhardt had a formal mes- Although St. Lô was taken, it was by
sage prepared to announce the capture no means safe. German artillery
of St. Lô. At 1830, half an hour after smashed into the town. Surprised and
Task Force C entered the streets of the embarrassed by the speed with which the
town, he confidentially released the mes- Americans had taken the city, Hausser
sage to his special services officer in time ordered Meindl to have the 352d Divi-
to make that evening’s edition of the sion retake the town, but refused
division mimeographed newspaper. “I
6029th Div G–3 Jnl, 1830, 2028, 2048, 18 Jul, and
have the honor,” the message read, “to Msg, 2100, 18 Jul, XIX Corps G–3 Jnl and File;
report to the Corps Commander . . .,” FUSA, Spec Sitrep, 0045, 19 Jul.
174 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Meindl’s request for part of the 275th on the morning of 19 July. T h e 29th
Division, which had just arrived from Division finished clearing the city, and
Brittany and was in the Seventh Army the 35th Division reported no active
reserve behind Panzer Lehr. T h e 352d enemy troops in its sector.63
Division, which had tried to hold the In capturing St. Lô the divisions had
Vire bridges by fighting in St. Lô with sustained the high losses that had be-
too few men, mounted a counterattack come typical of the battle of the hedge-
but was too weak to expel the Amer- rows. T h e 35th Division lost over
icans. Hausser and Meindl both later 2,000 men; the 29th Division suffered
blamed an announcement by the Wehr- over 3,000 casualties. On 19 July, in
macht on the afternoon of 18 July of the compliance with corps instructions, the
withdrawal as the stimulus that had 35th Division relieved the 29th, and
caused the final American assault. Actu- General Baade deployed his troops across
ally, however, they had been unable to the entire corps front from the Vire
secure additional troops and they had River east to the Couvains–Calvaire
feared that U.S. forces west of the Vire road.
would outflank St Lô from the west; both By the time the men of the 29th Divi-
commanders in reality had been forced sion marched out of St. Lô on 20 July,
by American pressure to pull the II Para- the body of Major Howie had become a
chute Corps back.61 symbol. Task Force C had carried the
T o maintain contact and determine flag-draped corpse as a battle standard
the extent of the withdrawal, General into town on a jeep. 64 Placed on a pile
Corlett instructed the 113th Cavalry of rubble before the rather plain
Group to pass through the city. T h e Romanesque church of Ste. Croix and
cavalry received such a volume of anti- surrounded by empty, gaping houses, the
tank, mortar, and artillery fire 500 yards body had become a shrine, a universal
south of St. Lô that it became evident symbol of sacrifice. When the men of
at once that the Germans had retired the division removed the body and de-
only to the high ground less than a mile parted the town, the symbol remained
to the south. T h e 352d Division coun- in St. Lô. St. Lô itself, disfigured and
terattack launched that evening con- lifeless, had become a memorial to all
firmed the fact that the enemy had not who had suffered and died in the battle
gone far.62 of the hedgerows.
T h e XIX Corps completed its task
635th Div Msg, 1019, 19 Jul, XIX Corps G–3
61 Telecon,
Hausser to Pemsel, 1950, 18 Jul, S e v - Jnl; Huston, Biography of A Battalion, pp. 23–46.
enth Army Tel Msgs; Seventh Army K T B (Draft) 64A legend had also been born. In 1953 a road-
and Tel Msgs, 17 and 18 Jul; Hodgson, R– 54. side sign in St. Lô read: “ . . . This martyred city
62XIX Corps Memo, 19 Jul, XIX Corps G–3 Jnl [was] liberated the 26th [sic] of July 1944 by
and File. Major Howie, killed at the head of his troops. . . .”
CHAPTER IX
The Conclusions
T h e American Point of View during July, of which 90 percent were
infantrymen. A rifle company after a
T h e First Army’s July offensive came week of combat often numbered less than
to an end on 19 July, the day after the one hundred men; sometimes it resem-
capture of St. Lô. Despite the fact that bled a reinforced platoon. Casualties
the operations had moved U.S. troops to among infantry officers in the line com-
the southern edge of the Cotentin panies were particularly high in the
swampland—along the Lessay-Périers- hedgerow country, where small-unit in-
St. Lô-Caumont line—the results were itiative and individual leadership figured
disappointing. so largely. Of all the infantry company
Heroic exertion seemed, on the sur- officers in one regiment that had entered
face, to have accomplished little. With Normandy shortly after D Day, only four
twelve divisions, the First Army in sev- lieutenants remained by the third week
enteen days had advanced only about in July, and all four by then were com-
seven miles in the region west of the manding rifle companies.2
Vire and little more than half that dis- T h e majority of the casualties were
tance east of the river. Not only was caused by shell fragments, involving in
the distance gained disappointing, the many cases multiple wounds.3 Many
newly established Lessay-Caumont line other men suffered combat fatigue.
was less than satisfactory. T h e VIII Not always counted in the casualty re-
Corps physically occupied neither Lessay ports, they nevertheless totaled an addi-
nor Périers; the VII Corps did not actu- tional 25 to 33 percent of the number of
ally possess the Périers-St. Lô highway; men physically wounded. All the divi-
and the city of St. Lô remained under sions made informal provision for treat-
enemy artillery and mortar fire for more ing combat fatigue cases, usually at the
than a week after its capture by the XIX regimental collecting stations, and
Corps.1 several divisional neuropsychiatrists
T o reach positions along the Lessay— established exhaustion centers. Work-
Caumont line, the First Army had sus-
tained approximately 40,000 casualties 2 FUSA Daily Estimated Loss Rpts, Jul, KCRC;
Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 460; 30th Div
G–3 Jnl, entries 1615 and 1935, 15 Jul, and 2335, 17
1The XIX Corps civil affairs detachment could Jul; VIII Corps IG Ltr, Rpt of Investigation of
not become operational in St. Lô until 29 July, 358th Inf Regt, 90th Inf Div, 11 Aug.
and only then did the French civilian administra- 3The 8th Division, for instance, recorded 2,080
tion begin again to function. XIX Corps AAR, battle casualties between 8 and 31 July as having
Jul. sustained 3,050 wounds. 8th Div AAR, 8 Jul– 4 Aug.
176 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ing with improvised facilities and with- company like a giant’s club, you never ex-
out personnel specifically assigned for pected to live to see it.7
this purpose, the doctors returned a It seemed incredible that only a few
large percentage of fatigue cases to duty days and a few miles separated the water-
after 24 to 72 hours of rest and sedation. filled foxholes from the British pubs, the
Patients who did not respond were desolate Cotentin from the English coun-
evacuated to one of two First Army com- tryside, the sound of battle from the
bat exhaustion centers—250 -bedhospitals noise of Piccadilly. T h e hedgerows that
eventually expanded to 750 and 1,000 surrounded the rectangular Norman
beds.4 fields seemed to isolate the men from all
“We won the battle of Normandy,” past experience and oppress them with
one survivor later said, “[but] consider- the feeling that they were beings inhabit-
ing the high price in American lives, we ing another planet. Units separated by
lost.” 5 Not a bitter indictment of the a single hedgerow were frequently una-
way warfare was conducted in the hedge- ware of each other’s presence. Each
rows, the statement revealed instead the small group knew only of its own efforts
feeling of despair that touched all who and had but a vague impression that
participated. Frustration was the clear- other individuals were similarly en-
est impression. T h e “working day” was gaged.8
determined by daylight, usually from T h e transition from training for war
about 0500 to the final wisp of visibility to the reality of battle was difficult and
an hour or two before midnight. Pa- often rapid. Some units incurred cas-
trol action and preparations for the mor- ualties before they actually entered com-
row meant that even the few hours of bat, as when ships on their way to France
darkness were full of activity. A new occasionally struck mines or when long-
morning meant little, for little changed range German guns found a mark.9 Ar-
in the dreary landscape of the Norman tillery gun crews frequently unloaded
battleground. 6 the ships that had brought them to the
Over a stretch of such days, you became Continent and proceeded at once, even
so dulled by fatigue that the names of the though they were already weary, to sup-
killed and wounded they checked off each port an attack.10 T h e experience of
night, the names of men who had been your four and a half newly arrived divisions
best friends, might have come out of a underscored the problems of transition.
telephone book for all you knew. All the
old values were gone, and if there was a In addition to the mistakes made by
world beyond this tangle of hedgerows . . . , units, many individuals temporarily for-
where one barrage could lay out half a got the lessons of basic training and
failed, for example, to use cover and con-
4 First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I. 95; cealment properly. After a week of ac-
8th Div and XIX Corps AAR’s, Jul; CI 84 (29th
Div) . 7 314th Infantry Regiment, Through Combat, p.
5 Raymond J. Goguen, 329th “Buckshot” Infan- 19.
try Regiment (Wolsenbuettel, Germany: Ernst 8Typewritten MS, Comment on 82d Div Opn,
Fischer, 1945), p. 36. 82d Abn Div AAR, Jul.
6PERAGIMUS—“We Accomplish” (n.p., n.d.) a 9 Hewitt, Story of 30th Division, p. 16.
brief history of the 358th Infantry; 358th Inf Jnl, 9 10See, for example, 174th FA Gp S–3 Rpt, 3 Jul,
Jul. VIII Corps G–3 Jnl and File
T H E CONCLUSIONS 177
tion one tank battalion was “not avail- with Germans formed an “alloy” that
able for any employment whatsoever be- withstood little pressure despite the ex-
cause of losses in personnel,” and the ceptional leadership of German com-
division to which it was attached used missioned and noncommissioned officers.
instead three 105 -mm. self-propelled guns Non-Germanic troops, who comprised
and three 81 -mm. mortars mounted on the bulk of the prisoners of war taken
half-tracks. T h e intricate maze of by the First Army, seemed to be con-
sunken roads between matted hedgerows vinced that Germany could not continue
emphasized the sense of bewilderment the war much longer, and Americans
that afflicted those new to the terrors of wondered when all the Germans would
combat. It was easy to get lost, and come to this realization. But the Ger-
some tank crews found it necessary to man troops, as distinguished from the
designate a man to act as navigator. Af- Osttruppen, were good. Not invinci-
ter the initial shock, however, the sights ble, the regular Wehrmacht units never-
and sounds of life and death in Nor- theless had “staying power,” while SS
mandy became familiar. Dulled by fa- forces and paratroopers were a breed
tigue and habit, the men soon accepted apart: “Elite troops, with an unshak-
their lot as normal.11 able morale, they asked no quarter and
Behind . . . [the battalions] the engineers made certain that they gave none. . . . " 14
slammed bulldozers through the obstinate T h e Germans had conducted an active
hedgerow banks, carving a makeshift supply defense, mounting local counterattacks
route up to the forward elements, and
everywhere the medics were drafting litter with local reserves supported by small
bearers to haul the wounded the long way groups of tanks. Well-employed mor-
back. 12 tars and machine guns and roving artil-
Several features distinguished combat lery pieces characterized their stubborn
in Normandy during July 1944 from delaying tactics. Generally, during the
combat elsewhere. Very soon General early part of the month, the Germans
Eisenhower had concluded that three seemed reluctant to employ their artil-
factors were making the battle extremely lery in volume, but as the month pro-
tough: “First, as always, the fighting gressed they increasingly used battery
quality of the German soldier; second, and battalion volleys to obtain mass and
the nature of the country; third, the concentration on fewer targets. When
weather.” 13 forced to withdraw, the Germans broke
T h e fighting quality of the enemy contact during darkness and covered
troops encompassed a great range. Rus- their withdrawal with large numbers of
sians and Poles employed in combination automatic weapons in order to delay the
advance by forcing the Americans to
commit additional units. By the time
American attacks made the covering
11 329th Inf AAR, Jul; 314th Infantry Regiment,
Through Combat, p. 22; 9th Div G–3 Jnl, entry force break contact, another covering
1430, 17 Jul; XIX Corps Ltr, Notes on Combat force had set up another delaying posi-
Experience, 5 Jul, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl.
12 314th Infantry Regiment, Through Combat, 14314th Infantry Regiment, Through Combat,
p. 20. pp. 20–21; Telecon, Corlett and Gerhardt, 1833, 1
13Ltr,Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jul, Pogue Files. Jul, 29th Div G–3 Jnl.
178 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
tion, and U.S. troops seemed “unable to ual soldier played a dominant role.
find the solution to this problem.” 15 Units were assigned frontages according
American commanders had been alert to specific fields and hedgerows rather
for evidence that would indicate a pene- than by yardage, and distances and in-
tration of the German defenses. Short- tervals between tactical formations were
lived pursuit had occurred, for example, reduced.16 T h e battleground reminded
in the VIII Corps sector when the Ger- observers of the tiny battlefields of the
mans withdrew in good order from la American Civil War.
Haye-du-Puits to the Ay and the Sèves Feeling out each hedgerow for the
Rivers. But the only real opportunity hidden enemy was a tense affair per-
to exploit a penetration came after the formed at close range. “Must go for-
bridgehead was established between the ward slowly, as we are doing,” a regi-
Taute and the Vire Rivers, and this had mental commander reported; “take one
been muffed. Capture of Hill 192 by hedgerow at a time and clean it up.”
V Corps forces had also pierced the Ger- This was standing operating procedure
man defensive line, but the projected much of the time. At that slow rate,
First Army wheeling maneuver on Cau- often a single hedgerow per day, the
mont precluded a deep thrust in the troops “could see the war lasting for
eastern sector of the First Army line. twenty years.” “Too many hedges” and
T h e advance all along the army front not the enemy was the real deterrent to
had been painful. T h e Germans gave rapid advance.17
way so slowly that the July offensive T h e weather helped the enemy. T h e
seemed to have failed. T h e nature of amount of cloud, wind, and rain in June
the country favored the Germans. T h e and July of 1944 was greater than that
marshes of the Cotentin canalized Amer- recorded at any time since 1900. It
ican attacks into well-defined corridors. nullified Allied air superiority on many
Soggy ground in large part immobilized days. Although the IX Tactical Air
the mechanized power of U.S. ground Command flew over 900air missions for
forces. T h e hedgerows subdivided the the First Army between 26 June and 24
terrain into small rectangular compart- July, approximately 50 percent of the
ments that the Germans had tied to- potential air support could not be em-
gether to provide mutual support. T h e ployed because of adverse weather con-
result was a continuous band of strong- ditions.18 T h e rain and the sticky, re-
points in great depth all across the front.
Handicapped by lack of observation, by
16First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I,
the difticulty of maintaining direction, 122–23.
and by the limited ability to use all sup- 1730th Div G–3 Jnl, entry 1935, 15 Jul; 2d Battal-
porting weapons to maximum advantage, ion, 329th Infantry, Combat Digest, p. 16; First U.S.
Army, Report of Operations, I, 86; Sylvan Diary, 29
the Americans adopted a form of jungle Jun.
or Indian fighting in which the individ- 18First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, 91;
SHAEF Draft Note for submission to SHAEF
G–3 for Release to Public Relations, Meteorological
1530th Div G–2 Est 2, 20 Jul (Incl 2 to Intel Forecast for Allied Assault on France, June 1944
Annex 3) ; VII Corps G–2 Est, 17 Jul; Observations [ 14 Aug], SHAEF File GCT 000.9/Ops (A), Mete-
of the Div Comdr, 2d Div AAR, Jul. orological Matters.
T H E CONCLUSIONS 179
pulsive mud it produced made the being exercised and unrestricted firing
ground troops wonder whether they forbidden. To compensate for the lack
would ever be warm and clean and dry of observation in Normandy, deeper and
again. wider concentrations than normal were
Since the depth of the continental fired. Although reserve stocks of am-
beachhead was not much greater in July munition sometimes dropped to low
than it had been in June, the problem levels on certain types of shells, particu-
of congestion was still acute. Allied larly for the 105 -mm. howitzer, the
army and corps headquarters that had troops were seldom obliged to curtail
become available on the Continent could their firing because of shortages. While
not be utilized because of lack of room artillery, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft
for the troops they would command. personnel replacements were available in
With a single regiment requiring be- unnecessarily large quantities, infantry
tween 14 and 20 miles of road for move- replacements, particularly riflemen, were
ment, traffic flowed at a pedestrian rate, in short supply because of the unexpect-
often with vehicles bumper to bumper. edly high casualty rates. By the middle
Macadam roads, the best in Normandy, of the month the deficiency in infantry-
were few; the great majority of the roads men became so serious that 25,000 rifle
were of gravel. They were all difficult replacements were requested from the
to keep in good repair under the wheels zone of interior by the fastest transporta-
and tracks of heavy military vehicles. tion possible. Weapons losses-Brown-
In wet weather they were slippery or ing automatic rifles, grenade launchers,
muddy; during the infrequent periods bazookas, mortars, and light machine
of sunshine, they quickly became dusty.19 guns-were also higher than anticipated,
Despite the difficulties of ground trans- but replacements arrived through nor-
portation, the actual delivery of supplies mal channels of resupply from stocks in
to the combat forces was generally sat- England. Also, in combat that meas-
isfactory. Short lines of communica- ured gains in yards rather than in miles,
tions, lower consumption rates in gaso- many more small-scale maps were
line and oil, the absence of the Luftwaffe needed. Air shipments of maps
1:25,000
over the combat zone, and the large vol- from England remedied the deficiency.20
ume of supplies brought over the open Since the Allies needed to expand the
beaches resulted in a relatively stable continental foothold in order to gain
logistical situation. Artillery ammuni- room for maneuver, airfields, and the
tion expenditure was heavy between 4 increasing quantities of troops and sup-
and 15 July, even though control was plies of the build-up, and also to acquire
ports of entry, the battle of the hedge-
198th Div G–3 Jnl, entry 0815, 30 Jul; 1st Div rows, in geographical terms, was hardly
G–3 Jnl and File, 15–22 Jul; Annex B to SHAEF/
successful in either the American zone
1062/7/GDP, 17 Jun 44, Topography and Com-
munications, and SHAEF/6876/E, SHAEF Engr in the Cotentin or the British zone
Div Ltr, Effect of Postponing D-Day for OVERLORD,
10 Apr 44, SHAEF File 370.2, Logistic Studies; Talk 20Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 439. 442,
to Directors of QMGs Dept on Visit to Normandy, 461; First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I,
n.d., SGS SHAEF File 381; Stacey, The Canadian 93-94; FUSA G–4 Daily Summary Rpt, 11 Jul,
Army, p. 187. FUSA G–3 Jnl.
180 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
around Caen. Space and port facilities able to launch simultaneous attacks all
remained the most serious Allied con- across the front.
cern. Fulfilling the requirement of Op- T h e activity of the 2d SS Panzer Di-
eration OVERLORD—securing adequatevision, located south of St. Lô and con-
lodgment in northwest France-seemed stituting the entire Seventh Army re-
a long way off. serve, exemplified German flexibility.
In the third week of July, as the FirstT h e division had on 5 July dispatched
Army regrouped for a new attempt to a kampfgruppe to la Haye-du-Puits and
gain the Coutances-Caumont line, there a battalion of tanks to St. Lô while the
was little realization that the July offen-
main body of troops moved toward
sive had achieved results of vital signifi-
Périers. T h e tank battalion near St.
cance. Allied preoccupation with geog- Lô marched onto the Carentan-
raphy and the undiminished German re- Périers isthmus on 7 July. Two days
sistance had combined to obscure the later a regiment entered the battle be-
fact that in pressing for geographical gain
tween the Taute and the Vire. T h e
the Allies had been fulfilling a precept regiment fought there until relieved by
of Clausewitz: destroying the enemy mil- Panzer Lehr, and then, together with the
itary forces. Allied pressure along a kampfgruppe near la Haye-du-Puits,
broad front had prevented the enemy helped the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Di-
from building strong mobile reserves vision in defense of Périers. 22
and concentrating them in offensive ac- T h e units rushed to Normandy had
tion against any one point; it had also performed a similar function. By the
thinned the forces in contact. 21 How time the 5th Parachute Division arrived
close the Germans in Normandy had from Brittany, on 12 July, the 15th Regi-
been brought to destruction was to be- ment, which had earlier been detached,
come apparent with surprising clarity was already fighting on Mont Castre.
in the next few weeks of warfare. Seventh Army plans to commit the en-
tire division in the la Haye-du-Puits sec-
T h e German Point of View tor were abandoned when the Panzer
Lehr attack miscarried, and one of the
T o the Germans, even more than to new regiments was immediately com-
the Americans, the July operations had mitted between the Taute and the Vire. 23
been hard. Only the skillful defensive On the other hand, such fragmentary
tactics in the hedgerow terrain plus the commitment led to the dispersal of Ger-
pattern of the American offensive had man units. Goering, whose headquar-
averted complete disintegration of the ters had administrative control of Luft-
German defenses in Normandy. T h e waffe ground forces, soon threatened to
successive nature of the American corps stop the flow of replacements to the 5th
attacks had enabled the Germans to shift Parachute Division if the scattered ele-
units from one threatened portion of the ments were not immediately reassembled
front to another, a course of action per-
haps impossible had the First Army been
22 Seventh Army K T B (Draft), 5–10 Jul.
21 FirstU.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, 89. 23Seventh Army K T B , 12 Jul.
T H E CONCLUSIONS 181
and the division used as a unit. 24 T h e rate of fire because their transportation
275th Division, which had arrived in the network had been systematically bombed
Cotentin by mid-July, could not be em- by Allied planes and sabotaged by the
ployed in toto because one of its regi- French Resistance. Efforts to expedite
ments was already battered by the fight- the flow of supplies by increasing the
ing near la Haye-du-Puits. Thus the use of the Seine River barges failed to
strength of three divisions—each of meet the battlefield demands.26
which, if employed as a powerful uni- That much needed to be replaced and
fied force, might have turned the course resupplied was obvious from the mate-
of the battle in any one sector—had been riel losses sustained in Normandy. Be-
dissipated by the more urgent need to tween 6 June and 9 July, the Germans
hold back the American pressure. had lost 150 Mark IV tanks, 85 Panthers,
Plagued by the necessity of commit- and 15 Tigers, 167 75-mm. assault and
ting their reserves piecemeal, the Ger- antitank guns, and almost 30 88-mm.
mans were also concerned by the decline pieces—more than enough to equip an
of aggressiveness among their troops. entire SS armored division.27
T h e mounting reluctance of armored Casualty figures were even more de-
divisions to make a wholehearted effort pressing. Between 6 June and 1 1 July
seemed particularly serious. T h e clas- the losses in the west totaled almost
sic example of too little too late, at least 2,000 officers and 85,000 men. T h e
in Rommel’s opinion, had been the Pan- 243d Division had lost over 8,000 men
zer Lehr attack on 1 1 July. Even in the in the Cotentin, the 352d Division al-
earlier fighting about Caen, there was most 8,000 men in the Cotentin and St.
dissatisfaction at the higher command Lô sectors, the 716th Division more than
echelons with panzer effectiveness. 6,000 near Caen. T h e 12th SS Panzer
Spirit was a vital prerequisite for success, Division, with casualties numbering
and signs that spirit was subsiding on 4,485, had seen its infantry components
the troop level were evident.25 reduced to the strength of a single bat-
T h e Germans faced shortages in both talion-one sixth of its authorized
men and munitions, but the latter was strength. T h e 21st Panzer Division had
the more significant. Against an esti- taken 3,411 casualties; Panzer Lehr
mated British expenditure of 80,000 ar- 3,140.28 T o replace these losses, only
tillery rounds around Caen on 10July, 5,210 replacements, or 6 percent of the
the Germans had been able to fire a casualties, had arrived at the front,
scant 4,500 shells in return. “Although though another 7,500 or 9 percent were
our troop morale is good,” a German of- promised or on the way. By 1 7 July
ficer protested, “we cannot meet the German casualties in Normandy had
enemy materiel with courage alone.” risen to about 100,000, of which 2,360
T h e Germans could not meet the Allied were officers. Replacements promised
to fill the depleted ranks would total of developing into an ungeheures Klad-
about 1 2 percent of the losses. 29 deradatsch-an awful mess-and he won-
T o Choltitz, who commanded the dered whether OKW appreciated “the
LXXXIV Corps, it seemed that the bat- tremendous consumption of forces on
tle of the hedgerows was “a monstrous big battle days.” In view of the heavy
blood-bath,” the like of which he had losses, he told Jodl, Hitler’s order for
not seen in eleven years of war.30 Yet inflexible defense necessitated an ex-
there seemed to be no way of stopping it penditure of troops the Germans could
except to commit units arriving from no longer afford. Because Kluge be-
quiet sectors in the west to reinforce lieved that the infantry would not hold
the sagging Normandy defense. T h e much longer, he wanted tanks, more
suggestion by Eberbach, who com- tanks, “to act as corset stays behind the
manded Panzer Group West, that it was troops.” He also wanted Hitler to know
time to close most military specialist that the Normandy situation was “very
schools and send the students to the bat- serious.” “If a hole breaks open, I have
tlefield at once bespoke an impending to patch it,” he said. “Tell this to Hit-
bankruptcy of manpower resources.31 ler.” 32
T o Kluge, the OB WEST commander, Whether Jodl told Hitler or not, Al-
the Normandy front was on the verge lied leaders were conceiving an opera-
tion that would soon make strikingly
29OB WEST K T B , 11 and 17 Jul. evident exactly how serious the situation
30Telecon, Choltitz to Pemsel, 2350, 15 Jul, in Normandy actually was.
Seventh Army Tel Msgs.
31Telecon, Eberbach and Rommel, 1225, 11 Jul, 32 Telecon, Kluge and Jodl, 1828, 13 Jul, O B
AGp B KTB. W E S T K T B , Anlage 615.
PART THREE
BREAKTHROUGH
CHAPTER X
bilized beachhead might possibly require petus to this planning by indicating his
amphibious reinforcement.4 specific interest in airborne and amphib-
Despite the disadvantages and difficul- ious operations “involving every likely
ties of amphibious and airborne opera- objective” in Brittany. 8 Yet all the pro-
tions in support of OVERLORD, Allied posed operations seemed to present haz-
planners in June and July continued to ards incommensurate with potential
explore the possibilities because no gains.9
other solution was discernible. Since T h e search for a panacea to relieve
the basic planning already completed for the stalemate came to an end soon after
future Allied operations beyond the 21 Army Group planners began to press
OVERLORD lodgment area assumed Al- Allied naval sections for definite amphib-
lied possession of the Breton ports, the ious assault plans against Quiberon Bay
planners of subsidiary operations to and Brest. Because Quiberon and Brest
break the stalemate invariably looked were Breton ports vital to the American
toward Brittany.5 Of four major com- build-up, the U.S. 1st Army Group
bat plans considered by the U.S. 1st raised few objections to the British pres-
Army Group, three focused on Brittany sure. Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay,
as the target area. 6 Invasion of Brit- the Allied naval commander, thus found
tany was also the central theme of the himself obliged to consider operations
U.S. Third Army planning in June and he was unwilling to recommend because
July.7 General Eisenhower gave im- formidable enemy coastal defenses and
the presence of German U-boat bases
4 James A. Huston, Airborne Operations, OCMH
would subject naval vessels to unaccept-
MS, p. 278; Memo, Eisenhower for Smith, 6 Jul, able risk. Ramsay reminded Eisen-
SHAEF G–3 File 24533/Ops, Future Opns. hower that, before the invasion, ground
5 See, for example, PS SHAEF (44) 11, Post- commanders had rejected the idea of
NEPTUNE Courses of Action After Capture of
Lodgment Area, 3 May 44, SGS SHAEF File 381, subsidiary airborne operations because
POST-OVERLORDPlng; SHAEF Msgs to AGWAR for they might weaken the main OVERLORD
JPS, 22 Jun, 3, 13, PO, and 27 Jul, SHAEF G–3 effort. Amphibious operations, he sug-
File 381-2, 17264/1, SHAEF Weekly Plng Cables;
SHAEF/17409/Ops, Status of Plng, 21 AGp, 16 gested, might have the same result. Ac-
Jun, SHAEF File (A), 21 AGp,
GCT/322–17/Ops cepting the implicit recommendation,
Gen; PS SHAEF (44) 20, SHAEF G–3 Div, Outline General Eisenhower decided, “The prin-
Plan for Air Landing Opn in the Brittany
Peninsula, 13, 16, and 19 Jul, and AEAF/T3.22536/ cipal pressure is to be kept on buildup
Air, Final Draft, App. B, both in SHAEF G–3 File in the beachhead, with sideshow excur-
24533/Ops, Future Opns; AEAF, Airborne Opns sions to be held down to those which
to Further ‘OVERLORD,’ 6 Jul, and SHAEF/24500/3/
Ops, 14 Jul, both in SGS SHAEF File 373/2, Em- will show profit with small invest-
ployment of Airborne Forces in Opn OVERLORD; ment.” 10 It was already apparent that
Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 124.
LUCKYSTRIKE: to exploit eastward in Nor-
mandy; SWORDHILT: to secure port facilities in 8 Memo,Eisenhower for Smith, 6 Jul, SGS
Brittany; BENEFICIARY: to seize the Breton port of SHAEF G–3 File 24533/Ops, Future Opns.
St. Malo; HANDSUP: to seize the Quiberon Bay 9 SHAEF G–3 Div Ltr, Opn in Brittany, 29 Jun,
area in Brittany with airborne troops and Ranger/ SHAEF G–3 File 24533/Ops, F u t u r e Opns; Rup-
Commando forces, assisted by the FFI. 12th AGp penthal, Logistical Support, I, 468.
Rpt of Opns, V, 11. 10Butcher Diary, 11 Jul; Huston, Airborne Opns,
7TUSA AAR, I, Chs. 1 and 2. PP. 198–99.
T H E BREAKTHROUGH IDEA 187
no sideshow investment promised a rea- planners, who had concluded long before
sonable profit. that the best way to break a stalemate
Although planning for subsidiary op- was by marshaling air power in support
erations did not cease, two events indi- of a land offensive mounted from within
cated that a final decision had been made the stabilized beachhead. 12
against them: the movement of a divi- Having searched for a new idea since
sion from England to the Continent and the second week in July, when the First
the publication of a new plan of action. Army had begun to display definite signs
The 28th Division, trained for amphib- of bogging down in the Cotentin, Gen-
ious operations and originally scheduled eral Bradley had begun to envision an
for the OVERLORD assault, had remained operation that combined concentrated
in England in SHAEF reserve, ready to land power and an overwhelming bom-
execute a subsidiary amphibious opera- bardment from the air. By 11 July
tion if necessary. The only amphib- General Bradley had conceived the idea;
iously trained force still uncommitted two days later the idea became the First
twenty days after the invasion, the 28th Army's plan. It was called COBRA.13
Division was released by SHAEF to the The outstanding feature of COBRA
1st U.S. Army Group on 26 June with (a name eventually applied to the oper-
the condition that it be used only in an ation as well as the plan) was the use of
amphibious assault. On 13 July SHAEF a heavy air bombardment to destroy an
withdrew the restriction, and ten days enemy defensive position of tactical sig-
later the division moved to the Conti- nificance. An unusual employment of
nent to augment the land forces already air power, it was not novel. General
committed. 11 Montgomery had used heavy bombers
The release of the 28th Division co- on 7 July in his attack against Caen.
incided with the appearance of a new Although the bombardment had helped
operational plan presented by General the British gain several miles of ground
Bradley and enthusiastically received by and part of Caen, the results of the at-
General Eisenhower. Bradley proposed tack had not been particularly spectac-
to break out of the German containment ular or sufficiently decisive to warrant
and obtain maneuver room and eventu- the expectation that a similar operation,
ally the Breton ports through a ground such as COBRA, might achieve more than
offensive supported by massive air power. a limited advance.
A project that would concentrate on the That COBRA stirred hope of more than
main OVERLORD operation, Bradley's a limited advance-indeed, of a dissolu-
plan followed the advice of SHAEF tion of the stabilized condition of OVER-
LORD-wasattributable to the planners'
belief that they could eliminate two fac-
11 SHAEF/17100/44/OpS, Strategic Reserves for
OVERLORD,6 Jun, and SHAEF/17100/44/Ops ( A ) ,
SHAEF G–3 Div, Release of 28th Inf Div, 26 Jun 12PS SHAEF (44) 21 (Final), 10Jun, NEPTUNE,
and 13 Jul, both in SHAEF File GCT 322-12/Ops Stabilization of the NEPTUNEArea, SGS SHAEF File
(A) , SHAEF Reserve: Ruppenthal, Logistical Sup- 381, POST-OVERLORD Plng.
port, I , 457. 13 FUSA Outline Plan Opn COBRA, 13 Jul.
188 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
In Search of a Breakthrough:
GOOD W O O D
by Hitler’s thinking to consider sending Panzer Group West sector, the 12th SS
a panzer division from the Caen front Panzer Division had started to move to
to Lisieux, not far from the Seine Bay.22 Lisieux when recalled to meet the threat
Before actually dispatching a division of GOODWOOD.
toward the Seine Bay, Kluge protested T h e SS armored division was recalled
to higher headquarters. He asked Gen- partly because Eberbach no longer had
eral der Artillerie Walter Warlimont, a strong reserve. Since the night of 15
Jodl’s assistant, what made Hitler insist July, the British had attacked on the 1 2
on sending mobile troops to Lisieux. Corps front using flame-throwing tanks
“The expectation that in the next and artificial moonlight, which was
couple of days, because of weather con- created by pointing searchlights at the
ditions . . . ,” Warlimont began. overcast sky. T h e limited objective at-
“Oh, the usual reports,” Kluge inter- tacks, designed to mask the main effort
rupted. to be launched on 18 July, forced the II
“.. . another landing can be made SS Panzer Corps and part of the X L V I I
that will put pressure on the weakly Panzer Corps to pull back slightly. Not
held coastal front,” Warlimont con- only did the corps have to commit their
cluded. local reserves, Eberbach had to commit
Well, Kluge said, he felt that the Al- two of his reserve divisions. If the 12th
lies were more dangerous in the area SS Panzer Division completed the move
where they already were. “We aren’t to Lisieux, Eberbach would have only
strong enough there,” he said. And two divisions left in reserve.24
since he did not have enough troops to On the British side, the 8 Corps of the
cover adequately his entire area of re- Second British Army, eventually employ-
sponsibility, he preferred to take his ing three armored divisions, closely fol-
chances where the Allies had not yet ap- lowed the air bombardment of 18 July
peared. Thus, as to sending troops to and advanced over three miles in little
Lisieux, he told Warlimont, “I don’t more than an hour. Tactical surprise
like what you say.” and the effect of the bombardment were
“I’ll transmit your opinion to the responsible. Eberbach had not ex-
Fuehrer,” Warlimont suggested. pected Montgomery, who had a reputa-
“Never mind,” Kluge said hastily. tion for caution, to make a major at-
“You don’t have to tell him anything tack out of the narrow bridgehead he
more. I just wanted to talk it over possessed east of the Orne. Even after
with you.” Still trying to make it clear the attack got under way, Eberbach
to Warlimont that he wasn’t pleased by could not really believe that it was the
the shift at all, he nevertheless agreed British main effort. Montgomery had
to move the 12th SS Panzer Division to achieved surprise by moving his assault
Lisieux.23 T h e weakest division in the divisions across the Orne only a few
hours before the jump-off. With Ger-
man troops destroyed or dazed by the
22Telecon, Kluge and Speidel, 1645, 16 Jul, OB
W E S T KTB Anlagen 667, 668, and 671.
23Telecon, Kluge and Warlimont, 1708, 16 Jul,
OB W E S T K T B , Anlage 669. 24 Hodgson, R–57.
190 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
F. Temple
MAP9
the actual GOODWOOD effort to create a his “whole eastern flank” would “burst
diversion. T h e immediate objective of into flames,” General Montgomery re-
GOODWOODwas the plain southeast of quested the “whole weight of air power”
Caen, rolling terrain rising toward Fa- to bring about a “decisive” victory.
laise. Though neither Montgomery nor General Eisenhower was enthusiastic,
Dempsey mentioned Falaise specifically “pepped up concerning the promise of
in their orders, they and other com- this plan,” which he termed a brilliant
manders were thinking of Falaise and stroke calculated to knock loose the
even of Argentan as objectives perhaps shackles that bound the Allies in Nor-
quickly attainable if the battle developed mandy. Air Chief Marshal Tedder as-
favorab1y.17 ( M a p 9 ) sured Montgomery that the air forces
Promising General Eisenhower that would be “full out” to support the “far-
reaching and decisive plan.”18
17Liddell Hart, The Tanks, “The Aims of
Operation ‘GOODWOOD’”; Rpt 23, Battle Study 18Ltrs, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 12 and 13
Opn GOODWOOD. Jul. Montgomery to Tedder, 14 Jul, Eisenhower
THE BREAKTHROUGH IDEA 191
While British naval units fired from about 1,200 yards deep, consisted of
the Seine Bay in support, bombers in three lines, while local reserves had or-
the largest concentration yet utilized in ganized another defensive line about a
direct support of a single ground attack mile to the rear. Dual-purpose 88 -mm.
loosed their explosives near Caen at day- guns of the III Flak Corps, ample artil-
light, 18 July. Almost 1,700 planes of lery pieces, and a rocket launcher bri-
the RAF Bomber Command and the gade in each corps sector supported the
U.S. Eighth Air Force, plus almost 400 infantry positions. Behind the support
medium and fighter-bombers of the U.S. weapons, four of the reserve divisions
Ninth Air Force, dropped more than had been assembled from two to seven
8,000 tons of bombs to open a path for miles in the rear; the fifth reserve divi-
British ground forces.19 sion, the 12th SS Panzer, was undergo-
Before the bombers came, a quiet had ing rehabilitation farther to the rear.20
pervaded most of the Panzer Group West Principally from prisoner of war inter-
front since 9 July. Under the control rogations, Eberbach had learned that
of four corps, eight divisions had manned Montgomery was planning a three-
the 70 -miledefensive line, and five di- pronged attack from Caen.21 Accept-
visions had been in reserve. Of the ing Eberbach’s expectation as valid and
thirteen divisions that comprised Panzer respecting Montgomery’s large number
Group West, a single division had held of divisions in reserve, Kluge had dared
twenty miles of marshy coast land on not weaken the Panzer Group West de-
the east flank; two divisions had guarded fenses. No further withdrawal from
fifteen miles of bocage on the west flank; the Caen region seemed possible with-
and ten divisions-five in the line and out inviting disaster.
five in reserve-had covered the critical Although Kluge had not wished to
Caen sector of about thirty-five miles in disturb Eberbach’s zone defense around
the center. Caen, Hitler was not so reluctant. Signs
T o protect the open country around and portents, the Allied deception plan,
Caen, Eberbach, the commander of Pan- and weather conditions had convinced
zer Group West, had established a zone the Fuehrer that the Allies were about
defense composed of infantry positions to make another continental landing
echeloned in depth and covered by an- near the Seine Bay. T h e presence of
titank fire. T h e main battle positions, Allied vessels to support GOODWOOD by
naval fire added to the conviction. De-
spite agreement by Kluge and Rommel
to Montgomery, 13 Jul, Pogue Files; Ltr, Tedder
to Montgomery, 13 Jul, SGS SHAEF File 381, that they had not Seen anything to jus-
OVERLORD,I (a). tify suspicion of another Allied landing
19 Despatch, Fourth Supplement
Leigh-Mallory, and despite their ‘‘discomfort” with the
to the London Gazette of December 31. 1946, pp.
64-65; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp.
Coutances–St. Lô sector, theywere forced
13–31; FUSA Sitrep 86, 19 Jul; Harris, Bomber
Offensive, p. 212; [Ackerman], Employment of
Strategic Bombers in a Tactical Role, 1941—1951, 20James B. Hodgson, The Eve of Defeat, OCMH
p. 87; Battle Study Opn GOODWOOD. The figures on MS R-57.
the number of tons of bombs dropped differ slightly 21 Telecon,
Kluge and Eberbach, 2158, 17 Jul,
from source to source. OB W E S T K T B Anlage 694.
192 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
by Hitler’s thinking to consider sending Panzer Group West sector, the 12th SS
a panzer division from the Caen front Panzer Division had started to move to
to Lisieux, not far from the Seine Bay.22 Lisieux when recalled to meet the threat
Before actually dispatching a division of GOODWOOD.
toward the Seine Bay, Kluge protested T h e SS armored division was recalled
to higher headquarters. He asked Gen- partly because Eberbach no longer had
eral der Artillerie Walter Warlimont, a strong reserve. Since the night of 15
Jodl’s assistant, what made Hitler insist July, the British had attacked on the 1 2
on sending mobile troops to Lisieux. Corps front using flame-throwing tanks
“The expectation that in the next and artificial moonlight, which was
couple of days, because of weather con- created by pointing searchlights at the
ditions . . . ,” Warlimont began. overcast sky. T h e limited objective at-
“Oh, the usual reports,” Kluge inter- tacks, designed to mask the main effort
rupted. to be launched on 18 July, forced the II
“.. . another landing can be made SS Panzer Corps and part of the X L V I I
that will put pressure on the weakly Panzer Corps to pull back slightly. Not
held coastal front,” Warlimont con- only did the corps have to commit their
cluded. local reserves, Eberbach had to commit
Well, Kluge said, he felt that the Al- two of his reserve divisions. If the 12th
lies were more dangerous in the area SS Panzer Division completed the move
where they already were. “We aren’t to Lisieux, Eberbach would have only
strong enough there,” he said. And two divisions left in reserve.24
since he did not have enough troops to On the British side, the 8 Corps of the
cover adequately his entire area of re- Second British Army, eventually employ-
sponsibility, he preferred to take his ing three armored divisions, closely fol-
chances where the Allies had not yet ap- lowed the air bombardment of 18 July
peared. Thus, as to sending troops to and advanced over three miles in little
Lisieux, he told Warlimont, “I don’t more than an hour. Tactical surprise
like what you say.” and the effect of the bombardment were
“I’ll transmit your opinion to the responsible. Eberbach had not ex-
Fuehrer,” Warlimont suggested. pected Montgomery, who had a reputa-
“Never mind,” Kluge said hastily. tion for caution, to make a major at-
“You don’t have to tell him anything tack out of the narrow bridgehead he
more. I just wanted to talk it over possessed east of the Orne. Even after
with you.” Still trying to make it clear the attack got under way, Eberbach
to Warlimont that he wasn’t pleased by could not really believe that it was the
the shift at all, he nevertheless agreed British main effort. Montgomery had
to move the 12th SS Panzer Division to achieved surprise by moving his assault
Lisieux.23 T h e weakest division in the divisions across the Orne only a few
hours before the jump-off. With Ger-
man troops destroyed or dazed by the
22Telecon, Kluge and Speidel, 1645, 16 Jul, OB
W E S T KTB Anlagen 667, 668, and 671.
23Telecon, Kluge and Warlimont, 1708, 16 Jul,
OB W E S T K T B , Anlage 669. 24 Hodgson, R–57.
T H E BREAKTHROUGH IDEA 193
bombardment, the divisions manning de- turned back from Lisieux, hardly suf-
fensive positions in the bombed corridor ficient to affect the situation, Kluge re-
were momentarily paralyzed. Despite quested and received permission to bring
valiant efforts to reorganize, they were the 116th Panzer Division from the Fif-
unable to offer real resistance to the Brit- teenth Army sector across the Seine
ish armored attack. River. “We have to get tanks,” Kluge
From about 0900 to noon, the 8 Corps insisted. “We have to let higher head-
was on the verge of achieving a clean quarters know without misunderstand-
penetration. Only when the British hit ing that we must have more tanks.” 26
the enemy’s antitank and flak guns on Though the British had lost 270 tanks
the last defensive line was the advance and 1,500 men on the first day of attack,
halted. T h e heavy antitank screen and GOODWOOD continued on 19 July as the
the efforts of individual German gun British endeavored to extend their gains
crews and bazooka teams contributed by limited local attacks. Resistance
greatly to delaying an immediate ex- continued strong, and the British that
ploitation of the potential breakthrough. day lost 131 tanks and incurred 1,100
More important perhaps, the congested casualties. Further attempts to advance
battlefield prevented rapid British ma- on 20 July, at a cost of 68 tanks and
neuver, restricted approaches through 1,000 casualties, resulted in little prog-
British mine fields hindered follow-up ress. When a heavy thunderstorm on
forces, and subordinate commanders the afternoon of 20 July turned the
were hesitant to bypass defended vil- countryside into a quagmire, GOODWOOD
lages. came to an end. An ineffective Ger-
Recovering from the surprise by noon, man counterattack on 21 July signaled
Eberbach mobilized and committed four the close of the operation.
tank battalions and four infantry bat- During the four-day attack, 8 Corps
talions of the 1st SS and 21st Panzer Di- had secured thirty-four square miles of
visions in a counterattack, which dis- ground and the Canadian 2d Corps had
pelled British hope of further immediate captured the remainder of the city of
penetration.25 Despite Eberbach’s abil- Caen and part of the plain immediately
ity to block a clean penetration, his to the southeast. T h e 8 Corps lost 500
counterattack failed to regain the lost tanks and over 4,000 men; tank losses
ground, primarily because German tanks in the entire operation totaled 36 per-
moving forward to counterattack “sank cent of all British tanks on the Conti-
into a field of craters and had to be nent. Although territorial gains were
pulled out by tractors.” With all of small, particularly when compared with
Eberbach’s forces committed and with losses and with the expenditure of the
the 12th SS Panzer Division, which had air bombardment, Montgomery’s attack
by 2 0 July had exhausted Eberbach’s
reserves. Eberbach had to resort to that the purpose of the attack had been
small task forces detached from armored accomplished. T h e 8 Corps had ad-
and infantry divisions to operate under vanced nearly six miles and taken 2 , 0 0 0
the direct control of Panzer Group West prisoners, all of Caen had been secured,
as “fire-fighting forces.” 27 and the Orne bridgehead had been more
At a conference with subordinate com- than doubled in size. General Mont-
manders on 20 July, Kluge reviewed the gomery on 20 July instructed General
battle. There was no recrimination, for Dempsey to withdraw his armored troops
the troops had fought well. “We will into reserve and replace them with in-
hold,” Kluge promised as he attempted fantry. 31
to inspire his subordinate leaders, “and T o those in the Allied camp who had
if no miracle weapons can be found to expected a decisive breakthrough and
improve our basic situation, then we’ll exploitation, expressions of satisfaction
just die like men on the battlefield.” 2 8 seemed hollow. A profound disappoint-
While the Germans, despite discour- ment swept through the high levels of
agement, were content that they had command. At SHAEF there was much
fought as well as they could, the Allies feeling that the 2 1 Army Group and the
were far from happy. General Eisen- Second British Army had not pushed as
hower had expected a drive across the hard as they might have. “The slow-
Orne from Caen and an exploitation to- ness of the battle, . . . [and] inward but
ward the Seine Basin and Paris.29 generally unspoken criticism of Monty
Montgomery had been more cautious in for being so cautious” brought unusual
his anticipations. On the afternoon of gloom to General Eisenhower’s features.
18 July, the first day of the attack, Gen- Impatient critics pointed out that Mont-
eral Montgomery had been “very well gomery had gained less than a mile for
satisfied” to have caught the enemy off each ton of high explosives dropped
balance. T h e effect of the air support from the planes. Gossips speculated on
seemed “decisive.” T h e Second British “who would succeed Monty if sacked.” 3 2
Army had three armored divisions oper- Later, General Montgomery attempted
ating in the open country southeast of to explain the reason why “a number
Caen, and armored cars and tanks, he of misunderstandings” had arisen. He
thought, were threatening Falaise.30 had been concerned on his eastern flank,
Two days later, Montgomery judged he stated, only with “a battle for posi-
tion,” a preliminary operation designed
to aid the projected American attack,
27Hodgson, R-57; Rpt 23, Battle Study Opn
Operation COBRA. Being a major op-
GOODWOOD;FUSA Sitrep 86, 19 Jul; Brereton, eration, although important only as a
Diaries, p. 310.
28Tempelhoff Conf Min, 21 Jul, AGP B O p .
Befehle, pp. 169–78; Meyer-Detring Conf Min, 2 2 31Rpt 23, Battle Study Opn GOODWOOD;FUSA
Jul, OB WEST KTB, Anlagen IC Anlageband IV, Sitreps 85 and 89, 18 and 20 Jul; Montgomery,
Annex 25; Rothberg Conf Min, n.d., Pz G p W Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 130–33.
K T B , Anlagen, Annex 165. 32Butcher Diary, 19 and 20 Jul; Liddell Hart.
29See Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 2438. T h e Tanks, “The Aims of Operation ‘GOODWOOD.’ ”
30Ltr, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 18 Jul, M–60, The Pogue Files, OCMH, offer abundant evidence
Pogue Files. of the widespread disappointment and discontent.
T H E BREAKTHROUGH IDEA 195
preliminary, Operation GOODWOOD had that the Allied needs were the Breton
suggested “wider implications than in ports; increased space for maneuver, ad-
fact it had.” 33 ministration, and airfields; and the de-
Apologists could claim that there had struction of German military forces. He
been no thought of a breakthrough at remarked that he had been “extremely
the 2 1 Army Group headquarters, merely hopeful and optimistic” that GOODWOOD,
hope of a threat toward Falaise to keep “assisted by tremendous air attack,”
the enenly occupied. Critics could would have a decisive effect on the bat-
claim that Montgomery had tried for a tle of Normandy. “That did not come
breakthrough with one hand while with about,” he wrote, and as a result, he was
the other he had kept the record clear “pinning our immediate hopes on Brad-
in case he did not succeed. Although ley’s attack.” Nevertheless, because the
General Montgomery had in fact re- recent advances near Caen had partially
ferred in July 1944 to GOODWOOD and to eliminated the necessity for a defensive
COBRAas parts of an over-all break- attitude, and because the Allies had suf-
through plan, he had also, perhaps inad- ficient strength and supplies to support
vertently, or perhaps to insure all-out major assaults by both British and
air support, promised that his eastern American armies, he urged General
flank would “burst into flames” and Montgomery to have Dempsey’s army
that he would secure a “decisive” vic- launch an offensive at the same time that
tory there.34 Eisenhower had inter- COBRA began. Eventually, he reminded
preted Montgomery’s intentions for the Montgomery, the U.S. ground strength
8 Corps armored attack as a promise of would be greater than that of the Brit-
a plunge into the vitals of the enemy. ish, but “while we have equality in size
“I would not be at all surprised,” Gen- we must go forward shoulder to shoul-
eral Eisenhower had written Montgom- der, with honors and sacrifices equally
ery, “to see you gaining a victory that shared.” 36
will make some of the ‘old classics’ look On that day General Montgomery was
like a skirmish between patrols.” 35 instructing General Dempsey to continue
When the British attack failed to achieve operations “intensively” with infantry
a spectacular breakthrough, disappoint- to make the enemy believe that the Al-
ment was natural. lies were contemplating a major advance
Disappointment led General Eisen- toward Falaise and Argentan.37 Refer-
hower to write Montgomery on 2 1 July ring to these instructions, General Mont-
to question whether they saw “eye to gomery told the supreme commander
eye on the big problems.” He reiterated that he had no intention of stopping of-
fensive operations on the east flank.
33Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 127- Nevertheless, as a result of General Ei-
30; see also Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pp. 353-
54, 361–62.
senhower’s letter, Montgomery gave
34 Ltrs, Montgomery to Eisenhower and Tedder, Dempsey more specific instructions to
12, 13, 14, and 18 Jul, cited above, n. 18 and n.
90; Liddell Hart, The Tanks, “The Aims of Opera- 36Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 21 Jul, Pogue
tion ‘GOODWOOD.’ ” Files.
35Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 13 Jul, cited 3721 AGp Dir, 21 Jul, M-512, 12th AGp File
above, n. 18. 371.3, Mil Objectives.
196 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
supplement the rather general provisions mies.’’ 39 But again, as in June when
of his original directive and thereby the U.S. First Army had driven toward
“fattened up” the attack on the east Cherbourg, and as at the beginning of
flank designed to supplement the Ameri- July when the Americans had com-
can effort in the west.38 menced their offensive toward the
Reassured, General Eisenhower wrote, south, the Allies, and particularly Gen-
“We are apparently in complete agree- eral Eisenhower, had their immediate
ment in conviction that vigorous and hopes pinned on General Bradley’s at-
persistent offensive effort should be sus- tack.
tained by both First and Second Ar-
38Ltr, Montgomery to Eisenhower, M–65, 22 Jul, 39Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 23 Jul, Pogue
Pogue Files; Butcher Diary, 25 Jul. Files.
CHAPTER XI
COBRAPreparations
T h e perspective within which Opera- T h e word breakthrough, frequently
tion COBRA was conceived was essentially used during the planning period, signi-
the same as had bounded General Brad- fied a penetration through the depth of
ley’s July offensive. T h e objectives re- the enemy defensive position. T h e
mained unchanged: Brittany was the word breakout was often employed later
eventual goal, the first step toward it the somewhat ambiguously or as a literary
Coutances—Caumont line. term to describe the results of COBRA
According to General Montgomery’s and meant variously leaving the hedge-
instructions of the end of June, repeated row country, shaking loose from the Co-
in July, the First U.S. Army was to pivot tentin, acquiring room for mobile war-
on its left at Caumont and make a wide fare-goodbye Normandy, hello Brest.
sweep to a north-south line from Cau- Reporters writing after the event and
mont to Fougères so that U.S. troops impressed with the results stressed the
would eventually face east to protect the breakout that developed rather than the
commitment of General Patton’s Third breakthrough that was planned. Par-
Army into Brittany.1 T o set the First ticipants tended later to be convinced
Army wheeling maneuver into motion, that the breakout was planned the way
General Bradley decided to breach the it happened because they were proud of
German defenses with a massive blow by the success of the operation, perhaps also
Corps on a narrow front the cen- VII because it made a better story. In truth,
ter of the army zone and to unhinge the Operation COBRA in its original concept
German defenses opposing VIII Corps reflected more than sufficient credit on
by then making a powerful armored those who planned, executed, and ex-
thrust to Coutances. With the basic ploited it into the proportions it event-
aim of propelling the American right ually assumed. COBRAbecame the key
(west) flank to Coutances, COBRAwas maneuver from which a large part of the
to be both a breakthrough attempt and subsequent campaign in Europe devel-
an exploitation to Coutances, a relatively oped.
deep objective in the enemy rear-the During the twelve days that separated
prelude to a later drive to the southern the issuance of the plan and the com-
base of the Cotentin, the threshold of mencement of COBRA, command and staff
Brittany.2 personnel discussed in great detail the
possible consequences of the attack. “If
121 AGp Dir, M–510, 10 Jul, FUSA File, 21
AGp Dirs.
this thing goes as it should,” General
2First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, 96ff. Collins later remembered General Brad-
198 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
attacked along the west bank of the regularly spaced trees that gave the ap-
Taute toward Périers and had reached pearance of a country lane. T h e road
a causeway leading to la Varde. In its in fact was the approach—the driveway—
pre-COBRA assignment, the division was to a small chateau on the west bank of
to attack across the la Varde causeway the swamp. T h e small bridge over the
to the east bank of the Taute. In pos- Taute near the chateau had been de-
session of la Varde and near the Lessay– stroyed by the Germans. Along both
Périers highway, the division would have edges of the swamp, lush banks of trees
a water-and-swamp obstacle behind it and hedges concealed the chateau, which
and be in position to threaten encircle- was the jump-off point, and the hamlet
ment of Périers from the east. At this of la Varde, the objective. In between,
point it would also regain control of the there was no cover. Foxholes in the
350th Infantry. ( S e e Map II.) flats would quickly fill with water. T h e
The Germans did not hold la Varde in only feasible method of attack was to
strength. A reinforced company was crawl forward and then charge the en-
sufficient since the flat ground around la emy machine guns with grenades and
Varde provided open fields of fire for bayonets. T h e swamp was mucky, and
more than a thousand yards in all di- vehicles could not cross the causeway
rections. Only five machine guns were unless the bridge near the château was
at la Varde, but they were able to fire as repaired. 6
tho ugh “shootingacrossa billiardta- T h e division commander, General
ble.”5 From nearby positions at Mar- Macon, decided that an attack launched
chésieux, German assault guns could around 1800 would give engineers five
provide effective support. hours before darkness to lay temporary
In contrast to the excellent assistance bridging across the stream. Thus,
the terrain furnished the defense, there build-up and consolidation of a bridge-
were no natural features to aid the at- head established at la Varde could be
tack. Between the 83d Division on the accomplished during the night. Colonel
west bank and the Germans holding la York’s 331st Infantry was to make the
Varde on the east bank stretched the assault, Colonel Crabill’s 329th Infantry
gray-brown desolation of the Taute a diversionary attack. A strong artillery
River flats. T h e Taute River, at this preparation was to include considerable
point a stream fifteen feet wide and two smoke. Though the division tried to
feet deep with about a foot of soft mud get tracked vehicles capable of carry-
on the bottom, flowed along the western ing supplies across the swamp in the
edge of the marsh. T h e causeway that event engineers could not repair the
crossed the swamp was a tarred two-lane bridge over the Taute, their efforts
road little higher than the open area of
stagnant marsh and flooded mudholes. Jnl 6 Min of Mtg, 1330, 21 Jul, 83d Div G–2, G–3
File. The following account has been taken
Over a mile long, the causeway ran from the 83d Div AAR, Jul, and G–2, G–3 Jnl and
straight and level through borders of File, 16–19 Jul; 331st Inf AAR, Jul; Sgt. Jack M.
Straus, We Saw It Through, 331st Combat Team
(Munich, Germany: F. Bruckmann K.-G., n.d.) , p.
5 Telecon, Macon and York, 0110, 18 Jul, 83d 19; FUSA Sitreps 84, 85, and 86, 18 and 19 Jul; VIII
Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File. Corps G–3 Per Rpt 34, 19 Jul.
200 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
failed. First Army headquarters, after the battalion during the night over the
much prodding, agreed to lend the di- causeway, engineers had been unable to
vision eight “Alligators” for one day but erect a temporary bridge because of
refused to furnish drivers.7 Normally heavy enemy tank destroyer fire on the
used on the Normandy invasion beaches bridge site. Unable to get supply ve-
to handle supplies unloaded from ships, hicles, tanks, and artillery over the flats
the Alligators arrived in the division to support the battalion at la Varde, and
area too late for use in the la Varde at- deeming it impossible either to trans-
tack. port a sufficient supply of ammunition
In the afternoon of 17 July, shortly by hand or to send reinforcements across
before the main attack, reconnaissance the treacherous swamp, General Macon
troops of the 330th Infantry, on the east reluctantly agreed to let the battalion at
side of the river, attempted to approach la Varde—which shortly after daylight,
la Varde from the east. Enemy ma- 18 July, reported it was unable to re-
chine gun fire stopped the effort. T h e main on the east bank—fall back.
diversionary attack on the west bank, T h e 331st Infantry tried again at
launched by the 329th Infantry in com- dawn, 19 July, in an attack keyed to
pany strength, turned out to be little fire support from the 330th Infantry on
more than a demonstration that “just the east bank of the Taute and to con-
pooped out” after taking thirteen casual- cealment by smoke and an early morn-
ties. 8 At 1830, half an hour after the ing haze. Eschewing the swampy low-
diversion commenced, Colonel York lands, the assault battalion advanced di-
sent one battalion of his 331st Infantry rectly down the causeway. Against sur-
toward la Varde in the main effort. prisingly light enemy fire, the troops
Because the causeway was the natural again established a foothold at la Varde.
crossing site and because the flat straight Engineers in the meantime installed a
road would obviously be swept by Ger- Bailey bridge across the Taute near the
man fire, Colonel York sent his assault château. Unfortunately, a normal pre-
battalion through the spongy swamp. caution of mining the bridge so it could
Using prefabricated footbridges, the in- be destroyed in case of counterattack
fantry struggled across muck and water backfired when enemy shellfire deto-
sometimes neck deep. At nightfall the nated the explosives. T h e bridge went
battalion reached la Varde and estab- up with a roar. Since tanks again could
lished an insecure bridgehead. Many not cross the swamp, the foothold at la
infantrymen who had crawled through Varde was once more precarious. When
the swamp found their weapons clogged the enemy launched a small counterat-
with silt and temporarily useless. T h e tack that afternoon, the troops retired.
mud, the darkness, and enemy fire dis- T h e failure of this attack ended the
couraged weapons cleaning. Though attempts to take la Varde. T h e par-
the regiment had planned to reinforce ticipating rifle companies had taken cas-
ualties of 50 percent of authorized
Alligator was the nickname given to an un- strength, and one battalion commander
armored, tracked landing vehicle, the LVT ( I ) .
8Telecon, Macon and Crabill, 1920, 17 Jul, 83d was missing in action. Difficult terrain
Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File. and plain bad luck had contributed to
COBRA PREPARATIONS 201
the failure, but more basic was the inef- replacements were poorly trained and
fectiveness of the 83d Division. T h e di- undependable, as soon became obvious
vision earlier that month had incurred in the division’s new assignment.
more casualties and received more re- T h e pre-COBRAobjective of the 90th
placements in its short combat career Division was a low hedgerowed mound
than any other U.S. unit in Normandy in of earth surrounded by swampland.
a comparable span of time. T h e loss Athwart the division zone of advance,
of trained leaders and men in the com- the island of dry ground held the village
bat echelons and their replacement by of St. Germain-sur-Sèves. Possessing the
the large influx of relatively untrained island and across the Sèves River, the
personnel had diminished the division’s division would be in position not only
efficiency. “We have quite a few new to threaten Périers but also to get to the
men and they are really new,” Colonel Périers-Coutances highway.
York explained; “[they] don’t know Only a weak German battalion held
their officers . . . and the officers don’t the island, but it had excellent positions
know their men.” 9 dug into the hedgerowed terrain, good
Recognizing the condition of the di- observation, and a superb field of fire.
vision, Generals Bradley and Middleton Several assault guns and a few light
saw no purpose in continuing the futile tanks supported the infantry; artillery
pattern at la Varde. They saw more was tied into the strongpoint defenses.]”
hope in revising the VIII Corps role in Two miles long and half a mile wide,
COBRA. In the meantime the 83d Di- the island had been more than normally
vision was to train and try to assimilate isolated by the heavy rainfall in June,
its replacements. which had deepened the shallow streams
In the same way, the results of the along its north and south banks. Link-
90th Division’s attempts to execute a ing the hamlet of St. Germain to the
pre-COBRAmission also contributed to “mainland” was a narrow, tarred road
a modification of the VIII Corps role from the western tip of the island. T h e
in COBRA. After twelve days of sus- Germans had destroyed a small bridge
tained action at Mont Castre and Beau- there, the only suitable site for engineer
coudray, the 90th Division had also bridging operations. Several hundred
seen its ranks depleted in the wearing yards away, a muddy country lane gave
battle of the hedgerows. Less than six access to the island from the north, across
weeks after commitment in Normandy, a ford. How to cross level treeless
the division’s enlisted infantry replace- swamps that offered neither cover nor
ments numbered more than 100 per- concealment was the assault problem.
cent of authorized strength; infantry of- Although a night attack seemed appro-
ficer replacements totaled almost 150 priate, the division commander, Gen-
percent. In comparison to the veterans eral Landrum, quickly abandoned the
who had fought in the hedgerows, the idea. With so many newly arrived re-
placements he dared not risk the prob-
9 Telecon, Macon and York, 0110, 18 Jul, 83d
Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File; 83d Div G–3 Per
Rpt 22, 18 Jul. 10Hodgson, R– 54.
202 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
a corner of one field, inflicting heavy cas- quarters decided to relieve the division
ualties on men huddling together in commander. “Nothing against Land-
fear. At this moment, despite little fir- rum,” General Eisenhower remarked,
ing and few Germans in evidence, a adding that he would be glad to have
group of American soldiers started to- General Landrum in command of a di-
ward the enemy, their hands up, some vision he himself had conducted through
waving white handkerchiefs. That was the training cycle.14
the end. T h e rest of the men either Failure in the preliminary operations
surrendered or fled across the swamp. was in many ways depressing, but Amer-
At the conclusion of the fight for St. ican commanders still were hopeful that
Germain, about 300 men were missing in COBRAwould not bring another recur-
action. A later check revealed that ap- rence of the difficult hedgerow fighting.
proximately 100 men had been killed, T h e First Army that was to execute
500 wounded, and 200 captured. COBRAwas not the same one that had
T h e causes for failure were clear. launched the July offensive. Battle had
Weather, terrain, a resourceful enemy, created an improved organization, and
command deficiency at the battalion a continuing continental build-up had
level (caused perhaps by combat exhaus- strengthened it. What the army needed
tion during the preceding battle of the was the opportunity to get rolling, and
hedgerows) had contributed to the re- COBRAmight well provide just that.
sult. The main cause, however, was
the presence of so many inadequately T h e Troops
trained replacements. T h e 90th Divi-
sion had not had enough time to fuse T h e hedgerow fighting that had ex-
its large number of replacements into hausted and depleted the ranks had also
fighting teams. made the survivors combat wise. Com-
It seemed as though the performance mon mistakes of troops entering combat
of the 90th Division at St. Germain was were “reliance on rumor and exagger-
but a logical extension of earlier unsat- ated reports, failure to support ma-
isfactory behavior. General Eisenhower neuvering elements by fire, and a tend-
remarked that the division had been ency to withdraw under HE [high-ex-
“less well prepared for battle than al- plosive] fire rather than to advance out
most any other” in Normandy, for it of it.” 15 Each unit now had a core of
had not been “properly brought up” af- veterans who oriented and trained re-
ter 13 Judging that the divi-
activation placements. Most combat leaders had
sion needed new leadership, a com- taken the test of ordeal by fire. T h e
mander not associated with experiences great majority of divisions on the Conti-
of the hedgerow battle, higher head- nent were battle trained.
An assurance had developed that was
13Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jul, Pogue particularly apparent in dealings with
Files; see Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, p. 403;
Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, William R. Keast, 14Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 2 Aug, Pogue
T h e Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Files.
Troops, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD 1512th AGp Immed Rpt 41, Misc Comment, 29
WAR II (Washington, 1948), p. 459, n. 19. Aug.
COBRA PREPARATIONS 205
enemy armor. Earlier, when a regi- was going to destroy the whole world.”
ment had blunted a tank-infantry coun- Three times that soldier had fired his
terattack, the significant and gratifying bazooka, but still the tank kept coming.
result was that it had stopped German Waiting until the tank passed, he had
armor. “Glad to know they can hold disabled it with one round from be-
their own against tanks,” was the com- hind.19
ment. 16 But such experience was be- T h e ability to destroy German armor
coming increasingly common, and defi- generated a contagious confidence that
nite identification of a knocked-out Mark prompted some units to add a two-man
VI Tiger proved conclusively that even bazooka team to each infantry battalion,
the German tank with the strongest ar- not principally for defense but to go out
mor was vulnerable to American weap- and stalk enemy armored vehicles.20
ons. Artillery, tanks, bazookas, tank With this frame of reference becoming
destroyers, and tactical aircraft could prevalent, the troops displayed a decreas-
and did destroy German tanks. By 11 ing tendency to identify self-propelled
July the First Army Ordnance Section guns as tanks. Even such a battered
had accumulated in collecting points 36 division as the 83d manifested an aggres-
Mark III’s and IV’s, 5 Mark V’s and VI’s. siveness just before COBRAwhen it
T h e hedgerowed terrain had neutralized launched a reconnaissance in force that
to a great extent the ability of the Ti- developed spontaneously into a co-
ger’s 88 -mm. gun and the Panther’s ordinated limited objective attack. Not
75 -mm. gun to penetrate an American the objective gained but the indication
tank at 2,500 yards. Tanks generally of a spirit that was ready to exploit
engaged at distances between 150 and favorable battle conditions was what
400 yards, ranges at which the more ma- counted.21
neuverable Sherman enjoyed a distinct One of the major problems that had
superiority. 17 hampered the First Army—how to use
Though a tank destroyer crew had tanks effectively in the hedgerow coun-
seen three of its 3 -inch armor-piercing try-appeared to have been solved just
shells bounce off the frontal hull of a before COBRA. T h e most effective
Mark V Panther at 200 yards range, a weapon for opening gaps in hedgerows
fourth hit had penetrated the lower was the tank dozer, a comparatively new
front hull face and destroyed the tank.18 development in armored warfare. So
A soldier who had met and subdued an recently had its worth been demonstrated
enemy tank later reported, “Colonel, that a shortage of the dozers existed in
that was a great big son-of-a-bitch. It Normandy. Ordnance units converted
looked like a whole road full of tank. ordinary Sherman tanks into dozers by
It kept coming on and it looked like it
19 CI 30 (4th Div) . T h e soldier was Pvt. Eugene
16 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, entry 1209, 8 Jul. Hix of the 22d Infantry, who was posthumously
17 XIX Corps Msg, 1800, 8 Jul, FUSA G–3 Jnl; awarded the DSC for destroying three tanks in
Annex 1 to FUSA G–2 Per Rpt 48, 28 Jul; XIX and three days with his rocket launcher.
VII Corps AAR’s, Jul. 20 See, for example, 356th Inf Jnl, 24 Jul.
l8 Notes, XIX Corps AAR, Jul; VII Corps AAR, 21 83d Div AAR, 23 Jul; Confirmation of Oral
Jul. Instrs, 22 Jul, 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File.
206 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
a hedgerow as though the hedgerow were cause units had worked together. Part
pasteboard. T h e hedgecutter sliced of the developing confidence was gen-
through the earth and growth, throwing erated by the fact that increasing num-
bushes and brush into the air and keep- bers of medium tanks had received the
ing the nose of the tank down. T h e newer and more powerful 76 -mm. gun
device was important in giving tankers a to replace the less effective 75 -mm. gun,
morale lift, for the hedgerows had be- and thus were better able to deal with
come a greater psychological hazard than the enemy. 25
their defensive worth merited. Perhaps the most significant improve-
Named Rhinoceros attachments, later ment in team operations was the in-
called Rhinos, the teeth were so effec- creasing co-ordination that was develop-
tive in breaching the hedgerows that ing between the ground forces and the
tank destroyer and self-propelled gun tactical airplanes. In addition to per-
units also requested them, but the First forming the primary mission of trying to
Army Ordnance Section carefully super- isolate the battlefield by attacking
vised the program to make certain that enemy lines of communication, the IX
as many tanks as possible were equipped Tactical Air Command had employed a
first. By the time COBRAwas launched large portion of its effort in direct and
three out of every five tanks in the First close ground support. T h e pilots had
Army mounted the hedgecutter. In attacked such targets as strongpoints re-
order to secure tactical surprise for the tarding the ground advance, troop con-
Rhinos, General Bradley forbade their centrations, gun positions, and com-
use until COBRA. 23 mand posts. They had also flown ex-
Not the least beneficial result of the tensive air reconnaissance for the ground
July combat was the experience that had troops.26 On a typical day of action the
welded fighting teams together. “We fighter bombers of the IX TAC exerted
had a lot of trouble with the tanks,” an 40 percent of their air effort in close sup-
infantry commander had reported; “they port of the First Army, 30 percent in
haven’t been working with us before direct support of the Second British
and didn’t know how to use the dyna- Army, 10percent against rail lines and
mite.” 24 Co-operation among the arms communications 50 to 70 miles behind
and services had improved simply be- the enemy front, and 20 percent in offen-
sive fighter activity and ground assault
2379th Div G–4 Jnl, 5 Jul; XIX Corps G–4 area cover. 27
(Rear Echelon) Jnl, 10 and 19 Jul; XIX Corps
Ord Sec Jnl, 24 Jul; 30th Div G–3 Jnl, 1405, 19 24Telecon, Stephens and Kelly, 1225, 15 Jul,
Jul; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 342; Eisenhower, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File; 30th Div Ltr of Instrs,
Crusade in Europe, p. 269; First U.S. Army, Report 15 Jul.
of Operations, I, 122; V Corps Operations in the 25[Pillsbury], 2d Armd Div in Opn COBRA,
E T O , pp. 120–21; [Lt Col Glenn T. Pillsbury et p. 19.
al.], Employment of 2d Armored Division in 26First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, 91;
Operation COBRA,25 July– 1 August 1944, a research [Robert F. Futrell] , Command of Observation
report prepared by Committee 3, Officers’ Advanced Aviation: A Study in Control of Tactical Air
Course (Fort Knox, Ky., The Armored School, Power, USAF Hist Study 24 (Maxwell Air Force
May, 1950) (hereafter cited as [Pillsbury], 2d Base, Ala., Air University, 1952) , passim.
Armd Div in Opn COBRA),p. 8; Guingand, Opera- 27 FUSA and IX TAC Air Opns Summary for
tion Victory, p. 395; Sylvan Diary, 14 and 17 Jul. 18 Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
208 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Ground-air communications were be- dive bombing and with the technique of
ing improved. “Wish you would tell talking a flight in on target indicated
the Air Corps we don’t want them over that night fighter operations might soon
here,” an irate division staff officer had become more practical. Since no fields
pleaded early in July after a few strafing for night fighters were operational on the
planes had struck an American artillery Continent, the craft were based in Eng-
battalion and wounded several men. land. Employment of night fighters in
“Have them get out in front [and] let tactical support was not usually con-
them take pictures [but] no strafing or sidered profitable even though ground
bombing.” 28 Complaints of this nature forces requested it. 31 In July work
were decreasing. Pilots of a tactical re- with radar-controlled night flights and
connaissance group attended courses of projects for eventually basing night
instruction in artillery fire adjustment, fighters on continental airfields promoted
and as a result high performance air- hope of round-the-clock air support.
craft began to supplement the small Fighter-bomber groups in direct tac-
artillery planes with good effect. 29 tical support of the First Army were
Particularly interested in developing a moving to continental airfields at the
practical basis for plane-tank commu- rate of about two each week. By 25
nications, General Quesada, the IX TAC July twelve had continental bases.
commander, had very high frequency Their nearness to the battle zone elim-
(VHF) radios, used by the planes, in- inated the need to disseminate ground
stalled in what were to be the lead tanks information across the channel to air-
of the armored column just before COBRA fields in England as prerequisite for
was launched. Tankers and pilots ground support. American ground
could then talk to each other, and the units desiring air support channeled
basis for the technique of what later be- their requests to the First Army joint air
came known as armored column cover operations section, which secured quick
was born. T h e success of the technique action for specific missions.32
in August was to exceed all expecta- During July, the American ground
tions. 30 build-up proceeded steadily. Four in-
T h e development of new air opera- fantry and four armored divisions
tional techniques and weapons such as reached the Continent during the month
rocket-firing apparatus and jellied gaso-
line, or napalm, also promised more 3183d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, 8 Jul; 1st Div G–3
effective support for the ground troops. Jnl, entries 1326, 5 Jul, 0008 and 0012, 6 Jul. Two
American night fighter squadrons operated under
Experiments with radar-controlled blind British control, mainly against guided missiles.
281st Div G–3 Jnl, entry 1717, 7 Jul. In September P–38’s of one IX TAC fighter group
29First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, 124; operated by radar control against German night
Ltr, Corlett to OCMH, 1956. troop movements, but they were not very suc-
3o Brereton, Diaries, 2 1 Jul, p. 311; Bradley, cessful. [Joe Gray Taylor], Development of Night
Effect of Air Power, p. 41; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, Air Opns, 1941–1952, USAF Hist Study 92 (Max-
pp. 337–38; Leigh-Mallory, “Despatch,” Fourth Sup- well Air Force Base, Ala., Air University, 1953),
plement to the London Gazette of December 31, pp. 26–27, 116–17. See Leigh-Mallory, “Despatch,”
1946, pp. 65–66. Artillery often marked ground tar- Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette of
gets for the aircraft. Interv by author with Gen December 31, 1946, p. 89.
Collins, 30 Mar 56, Washington, D.C. 32First US. Army, Report of Operations, I, 91.
COBRA PREPARATIONS 209
the Second British Army front.38 And, T h e quiet period before COBRAalso
on the American side of the beachhead, made possible increased comforts such as
General Patton’s Third Army, along hot meals, showers, and clothing changes.
with several corps headquarters, was still Even though B rations-a nonpackaged
not employed in combat. Since Brittany food affording a variety of hot meals-
had been selected as the stage for Gen- had reached the Continent early in July
eral Patton’s initial operations, the U.S. and were ready for issue to the troops,
First Army had to reach the base of the the battle of the hedgerows had
Cotentin peninsula to provide the Third prevented their being substituted for
Army a means of ingress. A successful combat 10 -in-1, K, and C rations until
COBRAwas a vital step toward this later in the month. With kitchens set
achievement. up to serve hot meals, “it was amazing
General Eisenhower on 25 July gave how many cows and chickens wandered
General BradIey authority to change the into minefields . . . and ended u p as
existing command structure of the U.S. sizzling platters.”41
forces and erect the organization en- As Allied leaders searched rain-filled
visioned by the OVERLORD planners. At skies for a break in the clouds that might
General Bradley’s discretion in regard permit the air bombardment planned for
to timing, the 12th Army Group head- COBRA,a phrase of the Air Corps hymn
quarters was to become operational, as- came to mind: “Nothing can stop the
sume control of the First Army, and Army Air Corps.” Nothing, they
commit under its control the Third added, except weather. While im-
Army. 39 patient commanders waited anxiously
Between the end of the earlier July for sunshine, and while General Bradley
offensive and the launching of COBRA, facetiously assumed the blame for having
there was a lull for about a week. Not “failed to make arrangements for proper
only did the period of inactivity permit weather,” the First U.S. Army rested
plans to be perfected and the troops to and prepared for the attack.42
be better organized for the attack, it also
gave the men some rest and time to re- T h e Plot Against Hitler
pair the equipment damaged in the
battle of the hedgerows. Units were During the lull over the battlefield in
able to integrate replacements. By the the west that followed GOODWOOD and
time COBRA got under way, all the divi- preceded COBRA,and while defeats in
sions on the Continent were close to the east gave the Germans increasing
authorized strength in equipment and worry over the eventual outcome of the
personnel and most had undergone a war, a dramatic attempt was made on
qualitative improvement.40 Hitler’s life on 20 July. In a speech
38Stacey, The Canadian Army, pp. 187, 194. 41314th Infantry Regiment, Through Combat, p.
39 12th AGp AAR, I , 6. 23; 357th Inf Jnl, entry1900, 15 Jul; 2d Div AAR,
40See, for example, 9th Div Jnl, 1525, Jul;
17 Jul, Observations of the Div Comdr; 79th Div
743d T k Bn Rpt 14, 18 Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and G–4 Jnl, 14 and 18 Jul.
File; FUSA Daily strenth Rpt; First U.S. Army, 42Bradley, Effect of Air Power, p. 53; Ltr, Brad-
Report of Operations, I, 99. ley to Leigh-Mallory, 23 Jul, OCMH Files.
COBRA PREPARATIONS 211
the following day, Hitler himself That a “military clique,” as Hitler calls
released the news to the world. “A very them, should have been plotting to liq-
small clique of ambitious, unscrupulous uidate him is encouraging; that they should
have chosen this moment is exhilarating. . . .
and stupid officers” he announced, “made The very fact that plotters reckoned that the
a conspiracy to kill me, and at the same time was ripe for a venture so complicated
time to seize hold of the German as the assassination of the Fuehrer argues
Supreme Command.”43 Within a short that they had good reason to hope for suc-
time Allied intelligence officers had cess. . . . There seems . . . no reason to dis-
believe Hitler’s assertion that it was an
pieced together a remarkably accurate Army Putsch cut to the 1918 pattern and
account of the occurrence: a cabal of designed to seize power in order to come
high-ranking Army officers had tried to to terms with the Allies. For, from the
assassinate Hitler with a bomb in order military point of view, the rebels must have
to seize political power in Germany. argued, what other course is open? How
else save something, at least, from the
T h e bomb had inflicted only minor chaos? How else save the face of the Ger-
wounds on Hitler, and the Fuehrer man Army, and, more important still,
moved swiftly to suppress the revolt. enough of its blood to build another for
He named Heinrich Himmler—already the next war?46
Reich Minister of Interior, Reichs- Colonel Dickson, the First Army G–2,
fuehrer of the SS (and Wuflen-SS), and believed that the Hitler government
Chief of the Gestapo and German would remain in office by suppressing all
Police-Commander of the Home Forces opposition ruthlessly. He saw no evi-
and gave him control of the military re- dence to suppose that the existing Ger-
placement system. Hitler replaced the man Government would be overthrown
ailing Generaloberst Kurt Zeitzler, chief by internal revolution or by revolt of
of staff of OKH and vaguely implicated one or more of the German field armies.
in the conspiracy, with Generaloberst He was certain that only the military
Heinz Guderian. High-ranking officers defeat and the surrender of the German
of Army, Air Force, and Navy were armies in the field would bring about
quick to reaffirm their loyalty to Hitler. the downfall of Hitler. T h e first step
T h e immediate result of the conspiracy toward that goal was to intensify “the
was to tighten centralized control of the confusion and doubt in the mind of the
military in Hitler’s hands. 44 German soldier in Normandy” by “an
Allied intelligence had not only the Allied break-through on the First Army
facts but a plausible interpretation. front at this time, which would threaten
T h e cause of the Putsch was “undoubt- to cut him off from the homeland, [and
edly the belief . . that Germany had which] would be a decisive blow to the
lost the war.” 45 German Seventh Army.” 47 On its
knees, the Seventh Army had no future
43Hitler Speech, 21 Jul, FUSA G–3 Jnl File, 23
Jul. “save in the fact that so long as the battle
44FUSA G–2 Est 11, 24 Jul; see Hodgson, R–57,
for a detailed bibliographical account of the Putsch 46Hitler and His Generals, App. B to 15 (S) Inf
and also for the reaction in the west; see Wilmot, Div Intel Summary 30, n.d., reprinted in SHAEF
Struggle For Europe, pp. 366 ff., for a good account Weekly Intel Summary 18, n.d., V Corps G–3 Jnl
of the revolt. File.
45FUSA G–2 Est 11, 24 Jul. 47FUSA G–2 Est 11, 24 Jul.
212 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
continues the miracle may still take ciency of the German war machine
place. Buoyed up by accounts of what under Hitler increased, for Himmler
V1 had done, no less than by the promise took immediate steps to unify the mili-
of V2, and still imbued with a discipline tary replacement system and eventually
that has been impaired only by the sub- improved it. T h e Putsch also in-
stitution of apathy for enthusiasm, the tensified Hitler’s unfounded suspicion
German soldier is still on the [Nazi] that mediocrity among his military com-
party’s side.” 48 manders might in reality be treason.
T h e fact was that very few officers in Rommel, recuperating at home from an
the west were implicated in the plot injury received in Normandy, was
against Hitler. A small but important eventually incriminated and forced to
group in the headquarters of the Military commit suicide. Speidel, the Army
Governor of France at Paris staged a Group B chief of staff, was later im-
coup that was successful for several prisoned on evidence that indicated in-
hours, but except for isolated individ- volvement. Kluge, the principal com-
uals who knew of the conspiracy, and mander in the west, fell under suspicion
rarer still those who were in sympathy nearly a month later when battlefield
with it, the military elsewhere on the reverses in Normandy seemed to give
Western Front were overwhelmingly substance to whispered accusations of
loyal to Hitler, even though some might his friendliness with known conspira-
be doubtful of the eventual outcome of tors. Thus the Putsch, while giving
the war. Those who did play some Hitler the opportunity to consolidate
small role in the plot had not delib- military control even more in his own
erately or unconsciously hindered field hands, pointed a blunt warning that the
operations by treasonable conduct. T h e symptoms of military defeat were spread-
conspiracy had virtually no effect on the ing an infectious distrust and suspicion
military situation in the west. T h e among the higher echelons of the Ger-
combat soldier in the “you-or-me” life- man military organization.51
and-death struggle was too busy trying On the battlefield in Normandy the
to remain alive.49 T h e higher officers half-hearted planning for an offensive
pledged their continuing loyalty to action near Caen in August came to an
Hitler. All Germans were more or less end. Even before GOODWOOD had vio-
impressed with the miracle that had lently disrupted German operational
saved Hitler’s life.50 planning, Rommel, just before his near-
As a result of the Putsch, the effi- fatal accident, had estimated that the
Germans could hold the Normandy front
only a few more weeks at the maxi-
48 Hitlerand His Generals, cited above, n. 46.
49See XIX Corps G–2 Per Rpt 55, Annex 3, Study
mum.52 Several days later Kluge en-
of the Morale of the German Troops on XIX
Corps Front, 9 Aug.
50See Constantine FitzGibbon, 20 July (New 51 Hodgson, R–57; OB WEST, a Study in Com-
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1956) and John mand, I , 123 ff MS # B–272 (Blumentritt).
Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (London: 52Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm, Der 20, Juli
Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1953) for accounts of the in Paris (Bad Woerishofen, Germany: 1953), p.
Putsch. 77; Speidel, Invasion 1944, p p . 113–17.
COBRA PREPARATIONS 213
made possible by “three or four thou- St. Lô highway, General Bradley chose
sand tons of bombs” from the air. He that road as the COBRA line of departure.
stated that aggressive action and a readi- T h e COBRA battleground-the Cout-
ness to take stiff losses if necessary were ances–St. Lô plateau-was to be south of
the keys to the success of COBRA. “If they the highway. It was a region of typical
[the Germans] get set [again],” he bocage, an area of small woods and
warned, “we go right back to this hedge small hills, land bounded on the west by
fighting and you can’t make any speed.” the ocean, on the east by the Vire River.
He insisted, “This thing [COBRA] must The sombre hedgerowed lowland gave
be bold.” 55 way to rolling and cheerful terrain, the
Requisites for the COBRAoperation swamps disappeared, arable land was
were many and complex, and General more plentiful and fertile, the farms
Bradley could only estimate that they in more prosperous, the hedgerowed fields
fact were fulfilled. He assumed that the larger. Pastoral hillsides replaced the
Germans in the Cotentin, under the desolation of the prairies and the over-
pressure of the July offensive, would luxuriant foliage of the Carentan low-
withdraw to an organized and stable lands. Roads were plentiful, for the
defensive line. He had to determine most part tarred two-lane routes. There
where they would be likely to erect their were several wider highways-four main
defense. He had to be certain that the roads leading south and three principal
Americans were in contact with the east-west roads across the Cotentin.
main line of resistance when the opera- Road centers such as Coutances,
tion commenced. He had to be sure Marigny, St. Gilles, le Mesnil-Herman,
that the enemy line would not be so and Notre-Dame-de-Cenilly assured an
strongly fortified as to defy rapid pene- adequate communications network.
tration. He had to have firm ground Streams were relatively small.
beyond the Cotentin marshes that would A jumble of small ridge lines and low
not mire and delay mobile columns. hills at first glance, the Coutances—St.Lô
He had to have a region traversed by a plateau contains a series of east-west
sufficient number of roads to permit ridges that rise toward the south for
quick passage of large numbers of troops. about eight miles from the Lessay–St.
Finally, he had to be reasonably sure he Lô highway. Forming cross-compart-
could shake his armor loose before the ments that would hinder an advance to
Germans could recuperate from the the south, the ridges favored lateral
penetration. 56 movement across the First Army front.
Reasoning that the Germans would When in July the VII Corps had attacked
withdraw to the vicinity of the Lessay– down the Carentan—Périers isthmus to-
ward the plateau, General Collins had
55FUSA G–3 Conf Notes, 12 Jul, FUSA G–3 indicated awareness of the advantages of
Misc File; Garth, Battle for Normandy, pp. 156, swinging the offensive to a lateral axis
171. in that region. He had pointed out
56FUSA G–3 Conf Notes, 12 Jul; FUSA Outline
Plan, Opn COBRA, 13 Jul; Bradley, Soldier’s Story,
that if infantry forces reached Marigny,
p. 318. armored troops might well drive west-
COBRA PREPARATIONS 215
ward along the highway from St. Lô to the southern edge of the battlefield to
Coutances in exploitation.57 General prevent the Germans from bringing in
Bradley's COBRAplan took advantage of reinforcements. T h e forces in the main
the terrain in the same way. After air exploiting thrust, on the right (west),
force bombs facilitated the infantry were to drive toward the Cotentin west
penetration, mobile troops were to veer coast near Coutances and encircle the
westward and drive to the Coutances, enemy opposite VIII Corps. T h e VIII
thereby encircling the Germans on the Corps in turn was to squeeze and de-
west coast of the Cotentin. stroy the surrounded enemy forces. At
General Bradley called upon the VII the conclusion of COBRA, the First Army
Corps to make the main effort. He would find itself consolidating on the
therefore changed the corps boundary to Coutances–Caumont line. If the air
reduce the corps zone to a width of four bombardment and ground attack par-
and a half miles. He also enlarged alyzed German reaction completely, the
General Collins' force to a total of troops were to be ready to exploit enemy
three infantry and two armored di- disorganization still further by con-
visions. (Map 1O) tinuing offensive operations without
As outlined by the army plan, COBRA consolidation.58
would start with a tremendous air bom- Since the larger and basic American
bardment designed to obliterate the Ger- maneuver defined by Montgomery was
man defenses along the Périers—St. Lô to be a sweep through the Cotentin
highway opposite the VII Corps. Two around a go-degree arc with the pivot at
infantry divisions, the 9th and the 30th, Caumont, the U.S. troops east of the
were to make the penetration and keep Vire had the subsidiary role of contain-
the breach open by securing the towns ing the enemy forces. While XIX
of Marigny and St. Gilles, thereby seal- Corps remained in place and supported
ing off the flanks of the breakthrough. the VII Corps effort, V Corps was to
Two armored divisions, the 3d and the make a diversionary attack on the second
2d (the latter after being moved from day of the COBRA operation. Both corps
the V Corps sector), and a motorized in-
fantry division, the 1st (also after hav-
ing been moved from the V to the VII 58FUSA Outline Plan COBRA,13 Jul, with artil-
lery and tank destroyer fire support plans, over-
Corps zone), were then to speed through lays, and amendments; FUSA Msg, 2055, 14 Jul, and
the passageway-the three-mile-wide IX TAC Msg, 17 Jul (Amendment 1 to IX TAC
Marigny—St. Gilles gap-in exploitation. Order 84). Both in FUSA G–3 Jnl. Annex 2 (Over-
lay) to VIII Corps FO 8, 15 Jul; VII Corps Opns
Tactical aircraft were to have already Memos 38 and 44, 15 and 20 Jul.
destroyed river bridges around the limits Bombardment on 17 July rendered eight bridges
of the projected COBRAarea to isolate around the COBRA battlefield unserviceable and
the battlefield, and the exploiting forces damaged five; seven bridges escaped damage. Col-
lins Msg, 1230, 23 Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
on the left were to establish blocking For the British-American boundary changes that
positions on the eastern flank and along permitted the movement of the 2d Armored and
1st Division from the V Corps. to the VII Corps
sector, see FUSA Msgs, 14 and 17 Jul, and V Corps
57 VII Corps Tactical Study of the Terrain, 28 Msg, 23 Jul, FUSA G–3 Jnl; 21 AGp Dir, M–510,
Jun. 10 Jul; Bradley, Soldier's Story, pp. 326–28.
COBRA PREPARATIONS 217
were to tie down German troops that of the exploitation, which virtually
might otherwise be moved to seal off a changed the character of COBRA. Ac-
COBRApenetration. T h e XIX Corps cording to the army plan, the mobile
was also to be ready to displace west of forces were to use two main highways
the Vire River and assume a new zone; leading south, the Marigny–Carantilly
as VII Corps veered westward toward road on the right (west) and the St.
Coutances, XIX Corps was to be pre- Gilles–Canisy road on the left. One
pared to take over the left portion of the armored division, presumably the 3d,
VII Corps zone and drive to the south after moving south for six miles to Car-
along the west bank of the river.59 antilly, was to swing in a wide arc for
T h e rather general concept expressed eleven miles—southwest,west, and north-
in the army outline plan was developed west-to encircle Coutances in the corps
into a detailed course of action by the main effort. T h e other armored divi-
VII Corps. Corps planners also made two sion, the 2d, after pushing five miles
major modifications that affected the south to Canisy, was to split into three
weight of the infantry assault and the columns and drive southeast, south, and
routes as well as the relative strengths of southwest in order to protect the main
the exploiting units. effort developing toward Coutances. At
Because the 9th and 30th Divisions the conclusion of its advance, the 2d
were near exhaustion from their battle Armored Division was to set up blocking
in the Taute and Vire region, General positions across the fronts of both the
Collins requested and received the 4th VII and the VIII Corps—at Bréhal,
Division as well, and assigned to it a role Cérences, Lengronne, St. Denis-le-Gast,
in the initial infantry assault. Though and Hambye, also inferentially at Ville-
General Bradley had planned to retain baudon and Tessy-sur-Vire—andthereby
the 4th in army reserve, he acceded to across the entire Cotentin. In advance
Collins’ request in order to insure a of the forces actually encircling and de-
quick follow-up of the air bombardment stroying the enemy near Coutances, the
and a speedy penetration.60 blocking positions were to prevent the
More important was the modification Germans from bringing in reinforce-
ments from the southeast and from the
south. T h e motorized 1st Infantry
59FUSA Outline Plan COBRA,13 Jul; Corlett to
OCMH, 19 Jan 54. Plans at the beginning of July
Division was to provide reserve strength
had envisioned the eventual displacement of the to reinforce either armored thrust, or
XIX Corps west of the Vire. These plans had both.61
projected an easy capture of St. Lô, and the dis-
placement was to have occurred south of that city.
Less concerned with the possible ar-
Map Overlay to accompany V Corps FO 9, 1 Jul, in rival of enemy reinforcements than with
V Corps Operations in the E T O , p. 103. the strength already facing the VII and
60First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, 98; VIII Corps in the Cotentin, General
VII Corps G–3 Ltr, Info Relative to Opn COBRA,
29 Oct 45, and Ltr, Gen Collins to Maj Kenneth W. Collins redistributed the power available
Hechler, 13 Nov 45, both cited on p. 27 of Hech- to him. He re-formed and strengthened
ler’s VII Corps in Operation COBRA,a preliminary
MS, Hist Div, USAFET, OCMH Files. The Hechler
manuscript has been used extensively in the chap- 61 FUSA Outline Plan COBRA,13 Jul; see also
ters dealing with the breakthrough. Annex 2 (Overlay) to VIII Corps FO 8, 15 Jul.
218 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the main attack force and rerouted it the VIII Corps, to avoid “a hell of a
along a more direct approach to Cou- scramble” likely to come if VII and VIII
tances. He transformed the drive along Corps units intermingled south of Cout-
the original and longer route to Cou- ances, and to prevent the 2d Armored
tances into a subsidiary and protective Division from being “strung out too
effort. He consolidated the blocking badly.” 62
force on the left from three dispersed T h e COBRAplan in final form thus
columns into two compact thrusts. called for three infantry divisions, the
As formulated by Collins, the plan of 9th, 4th, and 30th, to make the initial
exploitation assigned the main encircle- penetration close behind the air bom-
ment to the motorized 1st Division, with bardment and create a “defended cor-
Combat Command B of the 3d Armored ridor” for exploiting forces, which were
Division attached. Armor and infantry, to stream westward toward the sea. T h e
after driving south to Marigny, were to motorized 1st Division, with CCB of the
attack westward along the excellent 3d Armored Division attached, was to
highway directly to Coutances in order thrust directly toward Coutances. T h e
to block and help destroy the Germans reduced 3d Armored Division was to
facing the VIII Corps. T h e 3d Ar- make a wider envelopment. T h e 2d
mored Division, less CCB, was to follow Armored Division, with the 22d Infantry
the original and more roundabout route attached, was to establish blocking posi-
to Coutances; it was to seize the southern tions from Tessy-sur-Vire to the Sienne
exits of Coutances and provide flank River near Cérences and, in effect, make
protection on the south for the main a still wider envelopment of COU-
effort. T h e 2d Armored Division, tances. 63
strengthened by the attachment of the T h e VII Corps plan expressed a con-
22d Regimental Combat Team of the cept quite different from the army idea.
4th Division, was to drive along the left T h e corps plan reinforced the initial in-
(east) flank of the corps. One thrust fantry assault. It massed more power
was to go directly to le Mesnil-Herman against Coutances. It strengthened
to cover the movement of the other ex- blocking positions. It projected three
ploiting forces and prepare for further encircling columns across the Cotentin
movement to Villebaudon and Tessy- and around Coutances. Instead of cut-
sur-Vire, two critical points of entry for ting across the VIII Corps zone of
possible German reinforcements from advance, it provided a corridor for the
the southeast. Another 2d Armored VIII Corps to exploit further a success-
Division force was to be ready to go fully completed COBRA. As a result of
southwest from Canisy through Notre- these changes, COBRAwas no longer a
Dame-de-Cenilly to block German rein- plan designed primarily to encircle
forcement from the south, but instead of Coutances after penetration: it had be-
driving all the way to Bréhal near the 62VII Corps FO 6 (rev), 20 Jul; FUSA G–3 Conf
Cotentin west coast it was to stop at Notes, 12 Jul; Ltr, Collins to Hechler, 9 Dec 45,
Cérences. T h e armor was to halt at quoted in Hechler, VII Corps in Opn COBRA,p.
27.
Cérences in order to provide a coastal 63Annex 1 (Overlay) to VII Corps FO 6 (rev),
corridor for an advance to the south by 20 Jul.
COBRA PREPARATIONS 219
come a plan to encircle and secure Cou- uled to make the VII Corps COBRA
tances, disrupt the German defenses west attack were combat experienced; three-
of the Vire River, and set up a situation the 2d Armored, the 1st, and the 9 t h -
suitable for further exploitation, pre- had fought in North Africa and Sicily.
sumably by the VIII Corps. While the 9th and 30th manned the
Expecting the VII Corps ground corps front in mid-July, the other divi-
attack to complete the penetration six sions slated for commitment in COBRA
hours after the bombardment, General assembled in the rear, careful to avoid
Bradley originally scheduled the VIII contact with the enemy lest their identity
Corps attack for that time. T h e failure be revealed. Tactical surprise was to be
of both preliminary operations in the as important in COBRAas was the con-
VIII Corps zone caused him to modify centration of strength.
this arrangement. If the German resist- In keeping with the mission of VII
ance to the pre-COBRAoperations at la Corps, First Army gave the corps a large
Varde and St. Germain was typical of part of its artillery: 9 of its 21 heavy
what the Americans could anticipate in battalions, 5 of its 19 mediums, and all
COBRA,then six hours was not enough 7 of its nondivisional lights. Nondi-
time. General Bradley consequently visional artillery pieces of all types under
postponed the VIII Corps attack. If corps control totaled 258. 65 For the an-
COBRAwere launched in the morning, ticipated duration of the attack-five
VIII Corps would attack at dawn of the days-the army allocated the VII Corps
following day; if COBRAwere launched almost 140,000 rounds of artillery am-
in the afternoon, VIII Corps would at- munition. 66 Because ammunition re-
tack on the morning of the third day. 64 strictions made all-inclusive prearranged
One other change in plan came as a fires difficult, the VII Corps Artillery
result of the preliminary operations. (Brig. Gen. Williston B. Palmer) did not
Instead of reverting to control of the draw up an over-all fire plan. Attaching
83d Division, the 330th Infantry east of to the divisions all seven of the light bat-
the Taute River flats remained a separate talions the army had made available, the
unit. Although still considered for- corps suballocated to the divisions the
mally under control of the VIII Corps, greater part of its supply of ammuni-
the regiment was to begin the COBRA tion.67 T h e division fire plans included
attack with the VII Corps.
Since COBRA’S success depended essen- 65 VIIICorps had 108, XIX Corps 100, V Corps
tially on VII Corps progress, General 98. Draft MS, Arty in Opn COBRA,App. C to Gen
Collins had six divisions under his con- Bd66Rpts, ML–2229.
Ibid. VIII Corps received about 42,000 rounds,
trol, virtually an army. T h e armored XIX Corps 31,000, and V Corps 27,000, for 105 -mm.
units augmented the corps strength still howitzers, 155 -mm. howitzers and guns, 4.5 -inch
more since both were “old type” or guns, 8 -inch howitzers and guns, 240 -mm. howit-
zers, and 90 -mm. guns.
“heavy” armored divisions, the only ones 67 Each armored division received two self-
in the theater. All the divisions sched- propelled battalions, the 9th Dit-ision received two
towed battalions, and the 30th Division received
one towed battalion. The 30th also received the
64FUSA Msg to VIII Corps, 24 Jul, FUSA G–3 92d Chemical Battalion, less one company. VII
Jnl. Corps Opns Memo 45, 22 Jul.
220 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
separated them from the air target at the additional missions as necessary. Dive
conclusion of the heavy bomber strike bombers were to be ready for missions
while fighter-bombers still were strafing on one hour's notice. If the infantry
and bombing the narrow strip immedi- divisions made rapid progress and the
ately south to the Périers—St. Lô road. exploiting forces were employed at once,
T h e arrival of the infantry at the line fighter-bombers were to furnish column
of departure and the conclusion of the cover by flying protection and reconnais-
fighter-bomber strike were to be simul- sance for the armored spearheads.80
taneous. Medium bombers were then This was the plan on which the Allies
to commence attacking the southern counted so much, and on 23 July Allied
half of the carpet and to continue until weather experts expressed a cautious
the ground troops were across the road hope that COBRA might soon be
and the narrow strip. To insure co- launched. Predicting that a slight over-
ordination, the units on the ground cast might break in the late morning of
were to move forward at the rate of one 24 July and that morning haze and light
hundred feet a minute.79 Artillery was fog would disappear later that day, the
to deliver normal preparatory fires, rein- forecasters reported that the weather on
forced by tank destroyer concentrations 24 and 25 July would be favorable for
and antiaircraft artillery ground fire, on ground operations and moderately favor-
the area between the troops and the able for air activity. 81 After a week of
bombarding planes. waiting, the Allies found the prospect
One hour after the ground attack tempting. With Caen and St. Lô in
jumped off, all the fighter-bombers of Allied hands, the arrival of fresh infan-
the IX Tactical Air Command and one try and armored divisions on the Conti-
group of RAF Typhoon planes were to nent, mounting stocks of supplies and
be available to support the First Army equipment increasingly available, and
for the rest of the day with assault area the Germans suffering from attrition, a
cover, offensivefighter operations, armed lack of supplies, and an absence of air
reconnaissance, and air support request support, the situation appeared favorable
missions. Six hours after the ground for the breakthrough operation. Air
attack, medium bombers, after having Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory gave the
returned to England for refueling and green light, and the dormant body of
reloading, were to become available for COBRAprepared to strike.
79Misc Notes, n.d., 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File; 80IX TAC Opns Order 90, 20 Jul, IX TAC Opns
Overlay, Amendment 1 to Incl 1, Annex 3 to 30th COBRA,USAF Hist Sec Files.
Div FO 13. 22 Jul; VII Corps Opns Memo 43, 20 81 Weather Squadron Msg, 23 Jul, 30th Div
Jul. G–3 Jnl and File.
CHAPTER XII
COBRA
T h e Opposition terattack from the base of the Cotentin,
they would need more time to concen-
While awaiting the signal for COBRA trate sufficient forces than the Americans
to begin, intelligence officers pondered thought they themselves needed to
some troublesome questions.1 Did the achieve the success they expected of
enemy defenses on the Lessay–St.Lô road COBRA. Though the Germans might
represent the actual main battle position? attempt a rigid defense of the Périers-
Were there enough mobile German re- St. Lô line, deficiencies in manpower
serves assembled locally to counter the and supplies made an effective defense
attack successfully? What major re- doubtful. T h e most likely course of
serves were available to the Germans? enemy action, then, seemed to be a
Where were they? Where were they gradual withdrawal accompanied by
likely to be committed? Was the Luft- strong delaying action in terrain favor-
waffe capable of intervention? Would able to defense, probably along three
the Germans employ the V–1, V–2, or successive natural defensive lines: be-
some other secret weapon against COBRA? tween Coutances and Canisy, in the Gav-
Barring the appearance of miracle ray area, and at the base of the Cotentin
weapons and a miraculous resuscitation near Avranches.
of the German Air Force, the enemy was T h e Americans estimated that the
thought capable of only defensive action. enemy troops facing VII and VIII Corps
Neither the LXXXIV Corps nor the II numbered no more than 17,000 men
Parachute Corps seemed to have local with less than 100 tanks in support-a
reserves capable of intervening with ef- slight force to resist the power of more
fect. Nor did either Seventh Army or than five times that strength assembled
Panzer Group West appear to have ex- for COBRA. Since captured letters and
cess troops that might be committed documents and prisoner-of-war interro-
against COBRA. Even if the Germans gations indicated that the German sol-
somehow assembled a reserve for a coun- dier was weary of war and had no real
hope of victory, the fierce resistance met
1 M aterial on intelligence is from: FUSA Intel in the hedgerows seemed inexplicable.
Annex to Opn Plan COBRA,16 Jul; FUSA G–2 Est
9 and 10, 10 and 18 Jul; Annex 2 to VII Corps
Perhaps the Germans would suddenly
FO 6, 17 Jul; VII Corps G–2 Est, 17 Jul; VIII give way during COBRA. Similarly, on
Corps G–2 Est 4. 15 Jul; JIC (44) 301 (O) (Final). the strategic level, it seemed impossible
Weaknesses in Germany’s Capacity to Resist, 20 Jul
44, JIC Papers, 1944, Pogue Files; TUSA G–2 Per
that Germany could hold out much
Rpt 35, 16 Jul. longer. A shortage of oil had become
COBRA 225
the major factor limiting strategic and the Pas-de-Calais kept strong forces im-
operational efficiency both in the air and mobile there. It was reasonable to sup-
on the ground. Deficiencies in heavy pose that the Germans would probably
armament had dropped the tank strength maintain an aggressive defensive atti-
of panzer divisions to an average of about tude along the entire battle front in Nor-
70 percent of tables of equipment. A mandy and try to amass reserves for a
scarcity of drivers, as well as of oil, had major counterattack sometime in the fu-
intensified a shortage of motor transport ture, but not in time to affect COBRA.
that was further increased by wastage far Allied estimates were quite correct,
exceeding vehicle replacements and cap- even though Kluge, commander in chief
tured materiel. All types of ammuni- in the west who had also formally taken
tion had deteriorated in quality and command of Army Group B , had had
quantity. T h e same could be said for some success in building up the front in
manpower. Propaganda inside Ger- Normandy. Kluge had managed to se-
many seemed to be losing its force and cure four infantry divisions from south-
influence. Yet there was no evidence to ern France and the Pas-de-Calais (more
suggest that anything but invasion of were promised him), and he was using
Germany proper would produce a col- them to replace armored divisions on
lapse of the home front. Both at home the Panzer Group West front. His mo-
and on the battlefield, the Germans re- tive was twofold: to keep the panzer di-
fused to accept the defeat that from the visions from being “ground to pieces,”
Allied point of view seemed inevitable because if that happened “there won’t
and only a matter of time. be anything left”; and to create a mobile
T h e significant factors on the battle- reserve. Eberbach, the Panzer Group
field appeared to be the continued lag West commander, helped Kluge by tak-
in infantry build-up and the piecemeal ing drastic steps to assemble transport
employment of reserves as they reached and thus speed the arrival of the infan-
the battle area. As a result, instead of try divisions. Eberbach also feared that
massing reserves for a co-ordinated coun- if the infantry divisions arriving as re-
teroffensive, the Germans had dissipated placements came too slowly, little of the
them. T h e Germans had been com- panzer divisions would be left to be re-
pelled to assume a purely defensive at- lieved. Between 10 and 22 July, the
titude, and were forced to fight a con- four newly arrived infantry divisions re-
stant delaying action from one hastily placed five panzer divisions. 2 Operation
prepared line or position to another GOODWOODvirtually nullified this
while mounting local counterattacks in 2The 277th Division replaced the 9th SS Pan-
company or battalion strength. With- zer Division on 10 July; the 272d relieved the 1st
out a strategic reserve, the Germans were and the 12th S S Panzer Divisions during the night
of 13 July; the 271st replaced the 10th SS Panzer
stripping their Breton defenses and de- Division on 17 July; and the 326th relieved the
nuding their French Mediterranean 2d Panzer Division on 22 July. Telecon, Kluge and
coastal positions to meet Allied pressure Jodl, 1828, 13 Jul. O B WEST K T B , Anlage 615;
“Unterrichtung ueber die Arbeitsweise des Stages
in Normandy. Only the continued fear O b . West . . . ,” 20 Jul, O B WEST K T B , Anlage
of another Allied amphibious assault in 773; Hodgson, R–54.
226 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
achievement by forcing the recommit- ser might have taken Panzer Lehr out of
ment of armor. the line by substituting for it the 275th
T h e reason for Kluge’s primary con- Infantry Division, which he retained un-
cern with the Panzer Group West por- der army control immediately behind
tion of the front-that part facing the Panzer Lehr. He might have replaced
British-was the terrain around Caen. the entire 2d SS Panzer Division with the
Montgomery’s pressure, climaxed by the 353d Infantry Division, which Choltitz,
GOOOOD attack, indicated that both the LXXXIV Corps commander, with-
Montgomery and Kluge were acting ac- drew to form a reserve of his own. But
cording to the dictates of the terrain. Hausser hesitated to pull armor out of
T h e little offensive planning on higher the front line because he felt that “the
German echelons during July turned defensive capabilities of an infantry di-
about the idea of launching an attack in vision are less” than those of an armored
the Caen region some time in August.3 division. Apparently believing that the
As a result of preoccupation with both type of terrain furnished adequate reason
the vulnerability of the Panzer Group for maintaining the static defense al-
West sector and its excellence for offen- ready erected, Hausser did little more
sive operations, the Germans virtually than clamor for battlefield replacements,
overlooked the Seventh Army front. additional artillery and supplies, and the
(Map IV) sight of air cover.4
Dissatisfied with the strength of the Yet Hausser was concerned. T h e bat-
Cotentin defenses, Kluge advised Haus- tle of the hedgerows had worn down his
ser, the Seventh Army commander, that forces at an alarming rate. T h e little
his mission was to avoid being pushed that remained of the static units that had
back into the interior of France, where fought since the invasion lacked trans-
the Allies could swing wide and outflank port, adequate equipment, and even
the German positions near Caen. Spe- weapons.5 T h e more recently arrived
cifically, Hausser was to remove the two units in the Cotentin were also suffering
armored divisions on his front–the 2d the ravages of attrition. Had the
SS Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr– Americans continued their pressure, a
and concentrate them under army con- decisive result would probably have oc-
trol to be used flexibly against threatened curred within a month. But Hausser
penetrations. Hausser’s only immediate and other German commanders expected
move in this direction was to detach two that the Americans would be too impa-
tank companies from the 2d SS Panzer tient to await this kind of decision, and
Division and place them in the army re- they looked for signs of a big new U.S.
serve. Before complying further, he offensive. Hausser watched where it
awaited the arrival of the 363d Infantry seemed more likely to begin-east of the
Division (coming from the Fifteenth Vire–and in doing so he failed to per-
Army), which was not to reach the Sev-
enth Army sector until August. Haus- 4 Seventh Army K T B , 20 Jul; Zimmerman Tele-
con, 1320, 15 Jul, and Telecon, Helmdach and
Tempelhoff, 2240, 25 Jul, AGP B K T B ; Hodgson,
8 Ltr, Rommel to Kluge, 15 Jul, Seventh Army R–57.
K T B , Anlagen, Chefsachen; see Hodgson, R–57. 5 See MS # B–731 (Fahrmbacher) .
COBRA 227
ceive the build-up west of the Vire. He only one regiment. Panzer Lehr (aug-
could not conceive of a major attack in mented by 450 combat troops of the
strength taking place between St. Lô and badly damaged Kampfgruppe Heinz of
Coutances because the terrain there was the 275th Division and by 500 partially
not conducive to a massive effort. Al- trained combat troops of an inexperi-
though Choltitz on 23 July reported a enced regiment of the 5th Parachute Di-
concentration of strong armored forces vision, plus some elements of the 2d SS
near the Cotentin west coast, the Seventh Panzer Division), occupied the greater
Army headquarters denied categorically part of the ground between the Taute
that any indications of an immediately and the Vire, but its right boundary was
impending attack existed.6 Part of the two miles short of the Vire River. On
reason for the lack of perception at the right (east) of the L X X X I V Corps
higher headquarters was an overaware- boundary and adjacent to Panzer Lehr,
ness of the importance of the terrain, a 650 battle-fatigued combat troops of the
feeling that the menacing strength of 352d Division plus some attached units,
the British and Canadian units encour- all under the control of the II Parachute
aged. It was this that made the German Corps, occupied a two-mile front on the
surprise even greater when COBRA came. west bank of the Vire.
Facing the U.S. troops poised to exe- Each of these units held a portion of
cute COBRA and holding positions gener- the front. In immediate reserve were
ally along the Lessay–St.Lô highway, the infantry, reconnaissance, and engineer
L X X X I V Corps controlled many units battalions in the process of rehabilita-
but relatively few troops. In the coastal tion. Forming the L X X X I V Corps re-
sector, near Lessay, were the battered serve, the tired 353d Division was as-
remnants of the 243d Division and beside sembled south of Périers and behind the
it the 91st, with control over remaining 5th Parachute Division. In Seventh
elements of the 77th Division and the Army reserve the 275th Division, newly
exhausted kampfgruppe of the 265th Di- arrived from Brittany and controlling
vision (the depleted 15th Parachute two regiments, was stationed behind
Regiment of the 5th Parachute Division Panzer Lehr. Two infantry companies
had moved east of the Vire River to pro- and two tank companies of the 2d SS
vide a reserve for the 3d Parachute Di- Panzer Division were also under the
vision in the St. Lô sector). T h e still- Seventh Army control as a mobile task
strong 2d SS Panzer Division (augment- force in reserve.7
ed by the separate (independent) 6th T h e troops directly opposing the U.S.
Parachute Regiment) and the consider-
ably weakened forces of the 17th SS Pan- 7 Panzer L e h r Division Monthly Status Rpts for
zer Grenadier Division defended in the Jun and J u l 44, O K H Generalinspektor der Pan-
zertruppen, Zustandsberichte, Heer, Jun–Aug 44;
Périers area. Immediately to the east A G p B K T B , 15.1–4.X.44; A G p B I n Letztemel-
was the 5th Parachute Division, recently dungen, 8.VI.–10.VIII.44, and Ia Tagesmeldungen,
arrived from Brittany and controlling 6.VI.–31.VIII.44; Seventh A r m y K T B (Draft) 6.VI–
16.VIII.44; MS # A–902 (Bayerlein); MS # A–973
(Schmidt); MS # A–375 (Schmidt); MS # B–820
6Maj. Kenneth W. Hechler, T h e Enemy Build- (Wilke) ; Hodgson, R–54; Hechler, T h e Enemy
u p Prior to Operation COBRA,MS, OCMH Files. Build-up Prior to Operation COBRA.
228 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
VII Corps on the morning of 24 July smaller roadblocks to cover the highway
totaled about 30,000 men, quite a few to St. Gilles and secondary roads near
more than the Americans estimated. the village of la Chapelle-en-Juger. If
T h e actual number of combat effectives the Americans succeeded in crossing the
on or near the front between the Taute Périers–St. Lô highway, Bayerlein was
and the Vire was much less, perhaps only prepared to commit regimental reserves-
5,000. Of these, approximately 3,200 several companies of infantry and a few
combat effectives of Panzer Lehr and its tanks-located along a country road just
attached units were directly in the path south of and parallel to the main high-
of COBRA. way.
Authorized almost 15,000 men, Panzer Except for the combatants, the battle-
Lehr was seriously reduced in strength. field was deserted. Most of the French
Its losses had been almost entirely among inhabitants had evacuated their homes
its combat elements. Its two regiments and departed the battle zone. T h e few
of armored infantry, its tank regiment, who remained in the COBRAarea took
and its tank destroyer battalion had to- refuge in isolated farmhouses, most of
taled slightly more than 7,000 combat them, fortunately, outside the air bom-
effectives and over 200 tanks and tank bardment target. 8
destroyers at full strength; on 24 July
only about 2,200 combat troops and per- Bom bardment
haps 45 serviceable armored vehicles
held the main line of resistance. These Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory had
organic troops of Panzer Lehr and its at- set the COBRAH Hour at 1300, 24 July,
tached units were to receive the full and on the morning of 24 July he went
force of the COBRA bombardment. to Normandy to observe the operation.
T h e Panzer Lehr front extended He found the sky overcast, the clouds
about three miles along the Périers–St. thick. Deciding that visibility was in-
Lô highway. Several small infantry adequate for the air attack, he ordered
groups formed centers of resistance on a postponement. Unfortunately, he was
an outpost line north of the highway, too late. T h e message announcing his
but most of the troops were deployed decision reached England only a few
just south of the road. On the left minutes before the actual bombing was
(west) the attached parachute regiment to commence in France. Although the
had formed a strongpoint and roadblock planes were ordered to return without
near the road to Marigny. On the right making their bomb runs, it was impossi-
(east) Kumpfgruppe Heinz, near the vil- ble to get them all back.
lage of Hébécrevon, had organized five In accordance with the original plan-
strongpoints, each in the strength of a ning, six groups of fighter-bombers of the
reinforced infantry platoon with a few IX TAC and three bombardment di-
tanks or tank destroyers and light anti-
tank guns. In the center, organic infan-
try and tanks had erected three strong- 8Joseph Toussaint, La Percée Américaine à
l'Ouest de Saint-Lô (La Chapelle-Enjuger dans la
points, each in battalion strength, be- Bataille) (Coutances, France: Editions Notre-Dame,
tween Marigny and St. Gilles, and three n.d.), pp. 75ff.
COBRA 229
visions (about 1,600 heavy bombers) of not only because of the likelihood of
the Eighth U.S. Air Force had departed negating the surprise planned for COBRA,
their bases in England and headed to- but also because it killed 2 5 men and
ward France. Only the medium bomb- wounded 131 of the 30th Division.10
ers, scheduled to bomb last, had not T h e tragedy was the result of one acci-
left the ground when the postponement dent. T h e lead bombardier of a heavy
order came. Of the six groups of fighter- bomber formation had had difficulty
bombers in the air, three received moving his bomb release mechanism and
the recall order before they dropped had inadvertently salvoed a portion of
their bombs. T h e other three bombed his load. T h e fifteen aircraft flying in
the general target area, the narrow strip, the formation followed his example and
and certain targets north of the Périers- released their bombs. T h e bomb load
St. Lô highway, with no observed results. fell 2,000 yards north of the Périers–St.
T h e postponement message to the heavy Lô highway.11
bombers stayed only a few planes in the On the ground, VII Corps had exe-
last formation. cuted the initial part of the COBRAat-
Ignorant that COBRAhad been post- tack by withdrawing the front-line troops
poned, pilots of the great majority of the of the 9th and 30th Divisions several
heavy bombers guided their big craft on hundred yards to the north. T h e poor
toward the target. Because no precise weather conditions had prompted com-
radio channels had been designated for manders to wonder whether the lack of
emergency communication, there was no visibility would cancel the air bombard-
certain means of transmitting the news ment, but General Collins was character-
to the planes. While air force person- istically optimistic. He believed that
nel in France attempted to get word to the planes would get through the haze.
the craft aloft, the first formation of 500 Even if the heavy bombers were not able
planes arrived over the target area. For- to take part in the air attack, he felt that
tunately, they found visibility so poor the fighter-bombers would be on hand
that no attack was made. T h e second
formation found cloud conditions so bad 10The death of a liaison officer who was sent
that only 35 aircraft, after making three from the 8th Infantry (4th Division) to the 120th
bomb runs to identify the target, re- Infantry (30th Division) is included in these
figures, which are taken from F. P. Halas' Notes,
leased their loads. Over 300 bombers ML-2244. General Collins' Talk cites the same
of the third formation, with slightly im- figures. ARGUMENT to V-E Day, page 230, gives
proved weather conditions, dropped their the casualty figures as 16 killed and 64 wounded.
11AAF III, 230. Other short bomb releases did
bombs-about 550 tons of high explosive not affect the ground troops: one fighter-bomber
and 135 tons of fragmentation-before pilot made a mistake in landmark identification
the postponement message finally got and dropped his bombs on an American ammuni-
tion dump; when another plane was hit by enemy
through to cancel the remainder of the flak, a bombardier in a reflex action touched the
strike.9 toggle switch, released his load on an American
T h e 24 July bombing was unfortunate, airfield, and thereby destroyed two bomb-loaded
and manned aircraft on the ground and damaged
others. Enemy antiaircraft artillery fire destroyed
9AAF III, 228–30; Eighth AF Tactical Mission three heavy bombers that participated in the
Rpt, Opn 492. 24 Jul, USAF Hist Sec Files. at tack.
230 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
and that their bombardment would give While discussion took place at higher
sufficient impetus for the attack. He headquarters, General Collins decided
therefore told his subordinate com- that the VII Corps had to attack. With-
manders to go ahead. If the fighter- drawal of the 9th and 30th Divisions had
bomber effort proved insufficient, he created a vacuum that the Germans
expected the heavy bombers to return would fill unless the infantry returned
on the following day. 12 to the vicinity of the Périers–St. Lô high-
Notice that the air bombardment had way. If COBRAwas to start without
been postponed reached the ground benefit of the full air preparation, the in-
troops a short time before the bombard- fantry could simply continue the attack,
ment actually commenced. What then cross the line of departure at the high-
was the meaning of the bombs that were way, and attempt to pry open the
dropped? What was the mission of the Marigny–St. Gilles gap. If, on the other
ground troops? Was COBRAdelayed? hand, postponement in the air meant
Or were the ground troops to initiate postponement on the ground, then the
COBRAon the basis of the incomplete same conditions on which the COBRA
air effort? plan was based had to be restored.
12 Telecon, Collins and Hobbs, 1115, 24 Jul, 30th General Collins therefore told the 9th,
Div G–3 Jnl and File. 4th, and 30th Divisions, the units sched-
COBRA 231
IX TAC, dispatched a telegram of in- were being worked out, the direction of
dignant protest on the direction of the the bombing approach had “evoked con-
heavy-bomber approach (his fighter- siderable discussion.” General Bradley
bombers had made a lateral approach). had insisted on his parallel plan, while
Quesada demanded whether “another all the Air Forces representatives had
plan” had actually been employed..19 argued that perpendicular runs were
Obviously, something was wrong. Per- more suitable.20 At the end of the con-
haps something was inexcusably wrong, ference the question had not been set-
since COBRAhad been conceived and tled formally, though General Bradley
planned, not hastily, but thoroughly must have assumed that his recommen-
over a period of almost two weeks. dation for lateral bomb runs would be
At the conference between General accepted. T h e Air Forces representa-
Bradley and air representatives on 19 tives had understood that General Brad-
July, when the COBRAair arrangements ley “was aware of the possibility of gross
[bombing] errors causing casualties”
19Red Line Msg, Quesada to Brereton, 24 Jul,
Rpts of Bombing Errors Made on 25 Jul, 8 Aug, 20Eighth AF Spec Rpt on Opns 24 and 25 Jul,
USAF Hist Sec Files. n.d., USAF Hist Sec Files; Halas Notes, ML–2244.
COBRA 233
among his troops, and they thought he Despite the absence of agreement, the
had said “that he was prepared to accept basic planning documents of the air
such casualties no matter which way the strike plainly indicated that 450 fighter-
planeap proached.” 21 Un aware of this bombers and medium bombers were
conception, General Bradley had con- each to carry two 500 -pound general pur-
sidered the conference “very satisfac- pose bombs as well as 260 -pound general
tory.” Even though Air Chief Marshal purpose and fragmentation bombs.25
Leigh-Mallory had had to “rush off” be- Although 70 percent of the heavy
fore its conclusion, General Quesada bombers were to carry 100 -pound general
had remained throughout.22 T h e re- purpose bombs, the remaining 30 per-
sult of what in reality had been an un- cent were to use 260 -pound fragmenta-
satisfactory conference was an absence tion bombs to the extent of their availa-
of firm understanding and mutual agree- bility and heavier bombs when no more
ment. 260 -pound bombs could be had.26
T h e approach route was not the only There was no time for recrimination
difficulty. General Bradley recalled on 24 July, for an immediate decision
after the war that he had gained the im- had to be made. Should General Brad-
pression that the air forces would use ley agree to another bombardment under
bombs no heavier than 1 0 0 pounds and the same terms and thereby indirectly
was surprised when larger bombs were condone the possibility of additional
dropped. 23 Yet during Bradley’s con- American casualties? Or should he in-
ference at the First Army command post sist on changing the pattern of air attack,
on 12 July, General Collins had asked, which would mean postponing COBRA
“Do we get heavy or medium bombs or for several days at least? With higher
both?” and Bradley had replied, “Both.” headquarters anxious for action, General
T h e 260 -pound bomb in Bradley’s esti- Bradley had little choice. T h e ground
mation did not “make too big a crater.” attack on the afternoon of 24 July had
Collins, who wanted to take a chance on re-established the necessary COBRAcon-
the cratering, had voted for “bigger and ditions. Prospects for good weather on
better bombs,” even 500 -pound bombs, 25 July were improving. T h e question
while General Quesada had suggested whether the premature bombing had
that 260 -pound bombs would be large lost the Americans tactical surprise was
enough. T h e discussion had not cleared to be resolved at once: the Allies would
up the matter, and when the conference launch COBRA again at 1100, 25 July.
ended the question was still not settled.24 For the second COBRAbombardment
several alterations were made in an .at-
tempt to avoid a repetition of the bomb-
21
Eighth AF Draft Ltr, Summary of Plng and ing errors. Air bombardment targets
Execution o f Missions 24 and 25 Jul, n.d., Rpts of
Bombing Errors Made on 25 Jul, 8 Aug, USAF
north of the Périers–St. Lô highway-
Hist Sec Files.
22 Ltrs,Leigh-Mallory to Bradley, 19 Jul, and 25 IX TAC Opns Order 88, 19 Jul; [George],
Bradley to Leigh-Mallory, 23 Jul, OCMH Files. Ninth Air Force, p. 124.
23Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 341. 26
Eighth AF FO’s 913 and 917, 23 and 24 Jul,
24FUSA Conf Notes, 12 Jul, FUSA G–3 Misc Eighth AF Spec Rpt on Opns 24 and 25, n.d.,
File; Halas Notes, ML–2244. USAF Hist Sec Files.
234 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
six in all—were relegated to the artil- in the COBRAarea, and more than 380
lery.27 A special weather reconnais- medium bombers dropped over 650 tons
sance plane was to enter the assault area of high explosives and fragmentation
early in the morning to obtain exact at- bombs. In groups of four, over 550
mospheric data and find out if there was fighter-bombers dropped more than 200
adequate visibility for the bombardment. tons of bombs and a large amount of
T h e heavy bombers were to fly as low napalm. 29 T h e earth shook.
as safety would permit, and, if possible, Bombing heights had been fixed
bomb visually. 28 around 15,000 feet, but the presence of
Again on the morning of 25 July the clouds forced readjustment in flight.
planes came. Flying in groups of Most bombardiers had to recompute
twelve, over 1,500 B–17’s and B–24’s their figures en route. Some planes
dropped more than 3,300 tons of bombs
29 AAF III, 232–33; Eighth AF Tactical Mission
27 Lt. Col. Orlando C. Troxel, Jr., Telecon, 2257, Rpt Opn 494, 25 Jul, USAF Hist Sec Files; Leigh-
24Jul, and VII Corps Msg, 0155, 25 Jul, 30th Div Mallory, “Despatch,” Fourth Supplement to the
G–3 Jnl. London Gazette o f December 31, 1946, p. 65; Sylvan
28 AAF III, 232. Diary, 25 Jul.
COBRA 235
bombed from the relatively low altitude and German artillery. Because it was
of 12,000 feet, which brought them impossible to keep bomb formations
closer to the enemy antiaircraft fire and tight and because the crew members had
thus added to pilot strain, loosened flight been impressed with the necessity of
formations, and increased the hazards of avoiding short bombing, a good portion
crowded air over the target. Artillery of the bombs landed south of the target
smoke markers proved of little value be- area or west and east of it. Some
cause they were not visible until the bombs, however, again fell north of the
smoke drifted to high altitudes, and by Périers–St. Lô highway and on American
that time the wind had dispersed and positions.30
displaced it. Once the attack began, T h e bombs fell north of the highway
great clouds of dust and smoke obscured because of human error. T h e lead
not only markers but terrain features as bombardier of one heavy bomber forma-
well. Furthermore, the red smoke of
artillery markers could hardly be dis-
tinguished from shell and bomb bursts 30A A F III, 232–34; First U.S. Army, Report of
and from muzzle flashes of American Operations, I, 1 2 1 .
236 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
tion had trouble with his bombsight and nominal commander of the fictitious
released visually with bad results. An- army 33
group.
other failed to identify landmarks prop- As news of the second short bombing
erly. T h e lead pilot of a third forma- spread across the battle area on 25 July,
tion prematurely ordered bombs away, the sense of elated anticipation that had
and all the planes in his unit released come with the appearance of the COBRA
their loads. Fragmentation bombs and bombardment fleet vanished. Resent-
high explosives from 35 heavy bombers ment that the air force “had done it
and the bombs of 42 medium bombers again” and grimness over the prospects
dropped within American lines.31 of successful ground action spread
This relatively light bombardment throughout American ranks.34 Dis-
north of the road killed 111 of the mayed and dejected over the nearly goo
American troops and wounded 490.32 U.S. casualties sustained from the bomb-
In addition some spectators, official ob- ings in the two days, General Eisenhower
servers, and newspaper reporters were resolved that he would never again use
hit. Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, com- heavy bombers in a tactical role.35
manding general of the Army Ground Near the vicinity where the short
Forces and pro tern commander of the bombs had fallen, troops were disorgan-
1st U.S. Army Group, was killed. Gen- ized and in some cases attack plans were
eral McNair had been placed in com- disrupted. T h e entire command group
mand of the army group in order to give of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, had
continuing verisimilitude to the Allied been destroyed with the exception of
deception maintained by Operation the battalion commander; 30 men were
FORTITUDE.Because the news of Gener- killed or wounded, and the unit had to
al McNair’s death might compromise
FORUDE, he was buried secretly, with
only senior officers in attendance. T h e
news was suppressed until Lt. Gen. John killed and 11 wounded. (See 9th Div G–3 Jnl,
25 Jul.) General Collins in his Talk agreed with
L. DeWitt reached the theater to become the figures of 111 killed and 490 wounded. AAF
III, page 234, states that a total of 102 were killed
and 380 were wounded. Eighth Air Force Special
31
A A F III, 232–34. On the problems of direct Report on Operations 24 and 25 July, USAF Hist
support bombing, see Roswell Wing’s pertinent Sec Files, gives a very complete report including
Comment on the Medium Bombardment Effort to plans, maps, photos, bomb damage assessment, and
Support the 30th Division’s West Wall Assault, prisoner of war interrogations on the effect of the
MacDonald Files, OCMH, and Harris, Bomber Of- bombing. [Ackerman] , Employment of Strategic
fensive, p. 213. Bombers in a Tactical Role, pp. 89ff, does not give
32USSTAF In Europe, Report of Investigation, a particularly good account.
14 Aug, USAF Hist Sec Files, lists the following 33Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 349; Brereton,
casualties: 47th Infantry, 9th Division: 14 killed, Diaries, pp. 313–15; Ltrs, Eisenhower to Marshall,
33 wounded: 15th Engineer Battalion: 15 killed, 26 and 27 Jul, Pogue Files; ETOUSA Ltr, Assign-
23 wounded; 60th Field Artillery Battalion: 4 ment of Comd, 21 Jul, AG 322/011 MPM, and
wounded; 84th Field Artillery Battalion: 1 killed, SHAEF Ltr, Orders, 9 Aug, AG 211–3 (Generals) ,
2 wounded; 4th Division: 10 killed, 27 wounded: SHAEF AG File 322–3 (FUSAG) .
30th Division: 61 killed, 374 wounded. In addition, 34AAF III, 234.
the 39th Infantry of the 9th Division lost 16 wound- 35Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 349. He later
ed, and the 957th Field Artillery Battalion lost 10 changed his mind.
COBRA 237
erlein had no reason to believe that his very strong air activity; attacks in the
division could not repeat its perform- form of bomb carpets three kilometers
ance and turn the Americans back again. behind the MLR. Attack against the
For the real COBRAbombardment that middle of the left sector. Only limited
was to come on 2 5 July, Panzer Lehr attacks; no concerted assault recogniz-
was deployed substantially as on the able.”
preceding day. T h e only difference was “In other words,” Kluge pressed for
advantageous to the Americans: Bayer- an interpretation, “as weather improves
lein had thinned his outpost line north we can expect increasingly severe fight-
of the highway and moved more troops ing around St. Lô and westward. Isn’t
directly into the area scheduled for that about it?”
saturation bombing. Hausser agreed. “On the extreme
Bayerlein’s self-confidence was shared left wing also,” he added.
by Hausser, the Seventh Army com- “I’d like to ask you again,” Kluge
mander, but not by Kluge. When insisted, “do you get the impression that
Kluge learned the Allies had bombed you’re heading for heavy fighting?”
front-line positions, he thought im- “We’ve got to expect it somewhere,”
mediately the strike must have occurred Hausser allowed. He revealed little
in the Panzer Group West sector, for concern or worry.
that was the area he considered of pri- “Have you created appropriate re-
mary importance to the integrity of the serves?” Kluge asked.
entire Normandy front. He lost no Hausser reminded him that the 353d
time in telephoning Eberbach and ask- Division had been pulled out of the
ing in alarm what had happened. line.
Nothing new, Eberbach replied; every- But Kluge seemed already to be think-
thing very quiet.40 ing of something else. “Without any
Discovering that it was Panzer Lehr doubt,” he said, as though talking to
in the Seventh Army sector that had himself, “there’s something new in all
been bombed, Kluge telephoned Haus- this air activity. We have got to ex-
ser and asked for “a quick run-down on pect a heavy enemy offensive some-
the situation.” where.” 41
Hausser complied. He began a calm Kluge’s hunch was right, but his guess
recital of facts. “Strong fire and patrol was wrong. Still assuming that the
activity on the right wing; artillery fire Allies would make their main effort
on the Vire bridges; reorganization of against the eastern sector, Kluge spent
the [American] army front.” the following day, 25 July, inspecting
“Reorganization for what?” Kluge in- the forward positions of Panzer Group
terrupted. West.42 He was on hand to witness the
“To insert another corps,” Hausser reaction to an attack near Tilly launched
explained. Then after waiting a mo-
ment, he continued. “On the left flank
41Telecon, Kluge and Hausser, 1810, 24 Jul, OB
WEST K T B , Anlage 829.
40
Telecon, Kluge and Eberbach, 1800, 24 Jul, 42AGp B KTB, Anlagen, Fall, 40-X.44, Annex
OB WEST KTB, Anlage 828. 40.
240 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
still hope of stopping the Americans. control of the corridor had been care-
Although “we must fight for every yard fully assigned to each small unit partici-
on the right wing [Panzer Group West pating in the attack, and the assault
sector],” Kluge stated, he had freedom troops were to drive to their objectives
of movement and of withdrawal on the without regard to the rate of advance
left, west of the Vire. If he could de- of adjacent units. They were to bypass
crease the length of his line west of St. enemy strongpoints, leaving their reduc-
Lô by withdrawal and thereby extricate tion to others who would come later.
the 2d SS Panzer Division and use it as Engineers were to assist forward move-
a mobile reserve, he might salvage some- ment by hastily repairing the roads
thing from the discouraging situation, and removing obstacles. All unneces-
but he needed “a free hand in his deci- sary traffic was to stay off the roads in
sions about Seventh Army.” Would the assault area. T h e attacking units
Hitler give him a free hand? Shortly had been stripped of nonessential equip-
after midnight, Hitler said he would.47 ment to reduce column time lengths.
T h e troops carried extra rations to keep
Ground Attack supply traffic to a minimum. They
were to hold wounded men and prisoners
Hopeful that the COBRAbombard- in place whenever possible. They had
ment on the morning of 25 July had been issued enough ammunition to last
caused widespread devastation on the until the exploiting armor passed
German main line of resistance but not through them. Commanders or respon-
at all sure that it had, infantrymen of sible staff officers were to be at unit
the VII Corps moved out in attack at radios at all times and tuned to the com-
1100. Despite the disorganization that mand net for word that the mobile
the bombing errors had prompted, only columns were about to begin their ex-
two units, a regiment of the 9th Division ploitation. When that was announced,
and a battalion of the 30th Division, the infantry was to clear the main roads
were unable to attack on the hour, and and allow the exploitation to get under
these jumped off after only a slight way without impediment.49 ( M a p V )
delay.48 T h e towns of Marigny and St. Gilles
T h e infantry units initiating the were the main infantry objectives.
COBRAground attack were to create a Their capture would signify a penetra-
protected corridor for those troops sched- tion of three miles in depth, and their
uled to follow and exploit a break- retention would give the VII Corps con-
through. T h e infantry, therefore, had trol of the road network needed for the
the mission of securing specific geo- exploitation. If the air bombardment
graphical objectives as rapidly as pos- had destroyed the German defenses, the
sible. Critical terrain features such as
high ground and crossroads that meant 49VII Corps Opns Memo 43, 20 Jul; 9th Div FO
10, 20 Jul; 4th Div FO 11, 20 Jul; 30th Div FO 13,
47Telecons, Speidel to Zimmerman, Zimmerman 20 Jul; 117th Inf FO 10, 20 Jul; 119th Inf FO 5, n.d.;
to Friedel, Friedel to Zimmerman, 2315, 2335, 25 120th Inf FO 12, 20 Jul; 30th Div Administrative
Jul, and 0045, 26 Jul, O B WEST K T B , Anlage 849. Order 20, 23 Jul; 105th Engr C Bn FO 3, 21 Jul;
48 VII Corps Sitrep 98, 25 Jul. Misc Notes, n d . , 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
242 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
infantry would reach and secure In forty minutes the assault battalion
Marigny and St. Gilles without great advanced 800 yards. When the planes
difficulty. General Collins would then left, the Germans raised their heads from
catapult his armor forward. their foxholes, discovered that the satu-
On the VII Corps right (west), the ration bombing had taken place several
330th Infantry (detached from the 83d miles away, and realized that they were
Division) was to seize a part of the not at all hurt. Opening fire from their
Périers—St. Lô highway, including a vital hedgerow positions and quickly repair-
road intersection, and block to the west ing breaks in communication wires
in order to hamper any German attack caused by a few stray bombs, the soldiers
from Périers against the corps right of the regiment that the 5th Parachute
flank. In effect, the regiment was to Division controlled soon achieved a co-
secure and hold the pivot on which the ordinated defense that stopped the 330th
VII Corps main effort was to swing in Infantry. At the same time, shells from
its turn toward Coutances. Eventually, Marchésieux began to fall on the 330th’s
the 330th Infantry was also to turn west- right flank.
ward and join its parent unit and VIII T h e 330th Infantry could get no
Corps. 50 farther than a point several hundred
T h e immediate regimental objective yards short of its objective. Counter-
was near the Taute River flats, marshy battery fire by the 83d Division Artillery
hedgerowed lowland that was outside the seemed to have little effect in reducing
COBRA bombardment area. Because the the volume of enemy shells. Unless a
83d Division had been unable a week bombing attack destroyed the March-
earlier to force a crossing of the Taute ésieux emplacements and thus elimi-
River over the la Varde causeway, Ger- nated the threat to the regimental right
mans still occupied the la Varde penin- rear, there seemed little hope that the
sula and constituted a threat to the 330th Infantry would attain its im-
regimental right flank.51 Dispersed over mediate COBRA objective.52
a large area, without strength in depth, T h e 9th Division was to attack to
facing hedgerowed lowlands, about to Marigny, along the main highway, which
attack enemy troops that had not been was later to serve the principal exploit-
affected by the COBRAbombardment, ing thrust. General Eddy’s regiments
and harassed by tank destroyer fire from were to peel off to the west in order to
the right rear near Marchésieux, the uncover the highway and form a strong
regiment had a mission as difficult as protective line facing west. T h e ter-
it was vital. rain in the zone of advance–low ridges
T h e advance was rapid so long as and small marshes—wasrather difficult.
fighter-bombers and medium bombers After some confusion occasioned by
were still striking the COBRAtarget area the bombing errors, the assault units
southeast of the regimental positions. moved rather quickly through the hos-
tile outpost line north of the Périers—St.
50Min of Mtg (on COBRA),21 Jul, 83d Div G–2,
G–3 Jnl and File; 330th Inf (COBRA)Attack Plan,
n.d., 9th Div G–3 Jnl and File. 5283d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File, 25 Jul, and
51See above, Ch. XI. AAR, Jul.
COBRA 243
St. Gilles for the armored thrust to fol- gineers from clearing the road of mines,
low and was also to establish roadblocks tanks could not accompany the infantry.
at the bridges across the Vire River Lack of alternate roads, absence of
south of St. Lô. T h e bridges across the stream-crossing sites, closeness of ad-
Vire had been bombed by tactical air- jacent units, and troop congestion pre-
craft in pre-COBRA operations, and al- cluded maneuver. An air strike seem-
though some structures were damaged or ingly had no effect on the volume of
destroyed, actual possession of the bridge enemy fire. In the early evening the
sites by 30th Division infantrymen regimental commander of the 119th In-
would enhance the security of the COBRA fantry sought clarification of what ap-
east flank.54 As the 30th Division peared to be a paradoxical mission: was
veered eastward and uncovered the road he to seize Hébécrevon or was he to
to St. Gilles, an armored column, alerted bypass enemy resistance? Both, replied
to follow, would drive south to foil Ger- General Hobbs; “The important thing
man reinforcement from the southeast. was to gain control of the crossroad in
General Hobbs thus mounted a two- the town.” 55 But not until darkness
pronged attack, one thrusting toward St. fell were infantrymen and tanks able to
Gilles, the other pointing toward the move against Hébécrevon. Soldiers act-
high ground inside the horseshoe loop ing like seeing-eye dogs led Shermans
of the Vire River at St. Lô. T h e around bomb craters and through mine
minimum assignment for the division fields into positions for direct fire.
was capture of Hébécrevon. Their shelling soon had the desired
Just across the Péiers–St. Lô highway, effect. Around midnight American
30th Division troops met a roadblock troops entered Hébécrevon.
built around three Mark V tanks. A T h e ground attack following the
frontal three-company attack, supported COBRAbombardment on 2 5 July moved
by Shermans, failed to dislodge the road- the VII Corps across the Périers–St. Lô
block and resulted in the loss of three highway but not much farther. Al-
American tanks. An attempted double though crossing the highway was no
envelopment brought infantrymen into mean achievement, the prevailing Ameri-
contact with additional German centers can attitude was far from elation. T h e
of resistance. Aggressive reconnaissance immediate verdict of American com-
and excellent tank-infantry co-ordina- manders judging the effectiveness of the
tion were finally responsible for knock- COBRAair strike was virtually unani-
ing out a dozen armored vehicles and mous: the bombardment had had al-
uprooting the German defense. most no effect on the enemy. German
In attacking Hébécrevon, the 30th artillery fire on 2 5 July had been light
Division had to cross a valley, using an when compared to that of the previous
unpaved and mined road with precipi- day, but still the volume had been
tous banks, and make a frontal assault strong. T h e difference could be as-
against commanding terrain. Because cribed to low ammunition stocks or to
German fire prevented American en-
55Hobbs, Telecons, 1750. 1917, and 2225, 25 JuL
54 [George], Ninth Air Force, p. 118. 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
COBRA 245
could not be dissipated by an air strike man defense. If this meant that the
or by an order. T h e presence of Ger- enemy main line of resistance had been
man defenders per se implied stubborn smashed, Collins reasoned, then the Ger-
and skillful opposition. mans must not be permitted to refashion
T h e ground attack had actually suc- another and he should commit his mo-
ceeded better than anyone supposed. bile reserves immediately. On the
T h e VII Corps infantrymen had de- other hand, if the Germans had been
stroyed almost all the Germans who forewarned by the premature bombing
survived the bombardment, but the of 24 July, had withdrawn their main
Germans knew this better than the line, and escaped the full force of the
Americans. It would have been hard main bombardment, then the sporadic
to convince the 330th Infantry, for ex- nature of their defense possibly presaged
ample, which had not yet crossed the a counterattack. If the German de-
Périers–St. Lô highway, that a yawning fenses had not been pierced, or if the
hole existed before the VII Corps. T h e Germans had erected another line, com-
9th Division also was far short of mitting additional forces to the attack
Marigny; the committed regiment of the might promote a congestion that could
4th Division had not secured la Chapelle- prove fatal.
en-Juger; and the 30th Division had had T o General Collins a decision either
great difficulty taking Hébécrevon and to commit or to withhold his mobile
uncovering a small part of the road to striking force was a gamble. T h e in-
St. Gilles.63 In the opinion of American fantry had not secured the minimum
commanders, a clean penetration had objectives deemed prerequisite for com-
not been made by the end of 2 5 July. mitment of the armor. Nevertheless,
They could not believe that once the he noted that the vital roads south to
troops broke through the main line of Marigny and to St. Gilles appeared to
resistance, which in actuality they al- have been uncovered sufficiently to per-
ready had, there was “nothing in back to mit at least the commencement of the
stop us.” 64 armored thrusts. Collins chose to move.
For his part, General Collins noted During the afternoon of 2 5 July he de-
the absence of co-ordination in the Ger- cided to commit the armor on the fol-
lowing morning.65
63VII Corps Sitrep 99, 26 Jul. 65 The earliest indication discovered of Collins’
64VII Corps G–2 Memo, 25 Jul, VII Corps G–3 decision is a telephone conversation at 1745, 25
Jnl and File. July, in 30th Division G–3 Journal and File.
CHAPTER XIII
The Breakthrough
Although the armored phase of COBRA his LXXXIV Corps reserve, a reinforced
was about to begin, the infantry on the regiment of the 353d Division. From
morning of 26 July still had much to an assembly area south of Périers, the
do. While getting out of the paths of regiment moved eastward to secure la
the armored columns, they had to broad- Chapelle-en-Juger and thereby seal off
en the penetration achieved after the the penetration. Not long afterward,
big bombardment and insure its per- Hausser committed part of his Seventh
manence.1 This was no minor assign- Army reserve, a regiment of the 275th
ment; the infantry found that, even Division, which, from its assembly area
though the Germans were considerably near Canisy, also moved toward la
disorganized, enemy morale had not Chapelle-en-Juger. Thus, Choltitz and
been “shaken to the point where the Hausser, acting on the same idea, sent
individual soldier will not carry out his two converging columns to deny the
mission, which still is to defend every Americans the vital road network con-
inch of ground and inflict . . . as many trolled by the village in the center of
casualities as possible.” 2 (See Map V.) the attack zone.
Hausser hoped that retention of la
German Reaction Chapelle-en-Juger would permit him to
re-establish a main line of resistance
T h e first report to give German eastward to Hébécrevon, but he was un-
higher headquarters any picture of what aware of the extent of the disaster that
had happened after the COBRA bombard- had overcome his troops. His command
ment revealed that the Americans had channels had been disrupted by the
penetrated the main line of defense. COBRA bombing and were saturated with
German commanders learned at 1600, overdue messages. Counting on the 5th
25 July, that American troops were south Parachute Division, which controlled
of the Périers—St. Lô highway, in one regiment, to hold its positions near
Montreuil, and on the road to Marigny.3 the Taute River and prevent the Ameri-
Choltitz immediately committed part of cans from broadening their breach, he
was not disappointed, for the para-
13d Armd Div Ltr of Instrs, 26 Jul (issued orally
by CG VII Corps, 25 Jul) . troopers checked any genuine advance
29th Div FO 11, 26 Jul. by the 330th Infantry. But Hausser
3Telecon, Helmdach and Tempelhoff, 1600, 25 also counted on the 352d Division
Jul, A G p B K T B ; see also Morning and Daily
Sitreps, 25 Jul, LXXXIV Corps Meldungen; Seventh
(under II Parachute Corps) to hold the
Army K T B , 25 Jul. west bank of the Vire River and prevent
248 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
a request, which he had been making to He had to prevent the enemy from
OKW since 13 July, that OKW permit cutting the road and thereby blunting
the 9th Panzer Division to be brought the main COBRAthrust. Restricted to
up from southern France to reinforce a narrow zone of operations and facing
the Seventh Army at once.5 German forces unharmed by the COBRA
bombardment, General Eddy maneu-
Penetration vered his units so that the 9th Division
by the end of the day was two and a half
On the morning of 26 July, the situa- miles south of the Périers—St. Lô high-
tion from the American point of view way and almost two miles west of the
did not appear very bright. On the Marigny road. T h e division had sus-
right of VII Corps, the 330th Infantry, tained almost 200 casualties and had
which was to safeguard the flank of the captured somewhat fewer prisoners.
COBRA main effort by cutting the Although General Eddy had prevented
Périers—St. Lô highway, securing a road his own troops from hampering an
intersection, and turning gradually west-. armored column moving south and had
ward, was hopeful of accomplishing its kept the Marigny road clear of enemy
missions early on 26 July, for the tank fire to the extent of his penetration, he
destroyer fire that had been harassing faced the opposition of the 353d Divi-
the regiment from Marchésieux ceased.6 sion, which, in trying to retake la
But it soon became evident that the Chapelle-en-Juger, threatened the VII
German paratroopers in opposition were Corps right flank.8
as determined as ever. Not until late in T h e 8th Infantry of the 4th Division
the evening was the 330th Infantry able took la Chapelle-en-Juger in the early
to cross the Périers—St. Lô highway, and morning of 26 July. Combat patrols
even then the Germans continued to had entered the village during the night,
deny the regiment its crossroads objec- but the village crossroads was not secured
tive. 7 until morning.9 Continuing south, the
Instructed to permit the principal regiment moved slowly, clearing isolated
COBRAarmored column to pass through enemy groups. Commitment of the
his 9th Division zone, General Eddy on reserve battalion in the afternoon pro-
26 July had to clear both enemy troops vided enough added weight for a three-
and his own from the Marigny road. mile surge that overran part of the 353d
Division and put Panzer Lehr artillery
units to flight. Early that evening the
5 Seventh Army K T B , 26 Jul; LXXXIV Corps
Daily Sitrep, 26 Jul, in LXXXIV Corps Meldungen;
leading troops engaged what seemed like
Kluge Order, 1935, 26 Jul, A G p B O p . Befehle; the remnants of a German battalion,
Telecons, Kluge and Jodl, 1828, 13 Jul, and Kluge captured about a company of miscella-
and Zimmerman, 1750, 26 Jul, O B W E S T K T B ,
Anlagen 615, 860, and 862.
6Overlay to accompany 9th Div G–3 Per Rpt, 8 9th Div G–3 Jnl, entries 1140, 1145, 1406, 1545,
2400, 25 Jul; 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, entry 0915, 26 2040, 26 Jul; 39th Inf S–3 Rpt, 26 Jul; VII Corps
Jul. Sitreps 100 and 101, 26 Jul.
7 83d Div AAR, Jul, and G–3 Per Rpt 30, 26 9Telecon, Collins and Hobbs, 2215, 25 Jul, 30th
Jul; 9th Div G–3 Jnl, entries 1100, 1145, 2025, and Div G–3 Jnl and File; 8th Inf Msg, 1020, 26 Jul,
2100, 26 Jul. 4th Div G–3 Jnl File.
250 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
neous troops, and destroyed or dispersed evening, after a heavy 4.2 -inch mortar
the others. T h e regiment cut the preparation that coincided with a Ger-
Coutances–St. Lô highway and at the man withdrawal, did the regiment cross
end of the day was about five miles the ravine and move quickly to the en-
south of the COBRAline of departure.10 trance of the loop, less than two miles
On the corps left, the 30th Division west of St. Lô. 12
had not only to protect the COBRAflank T h e 119th Infantry, the other assault
but also to permit an American armored regiment, moved rapidly in the after-
column to pass through the division zone noon for two miles south of Hébtécrevon
for exploitation beyond St. Gilles. and cut the Coutances–St. Lô highway.
Enemy artillery fire from what was Given a new mission at once–cutting
estimated to be one medium and three the Canisy–St. Lô highway two miles to
light battalions, as well as from several the south—the regiment was half way to
88 -mm. guns, checked any real advance its objective by nightfall. At this point
during the morning of 26 July; but the leading troops of the 30th Division
counterbattery missions delivered by the were more than three miles south of the
artillery units of the 30th Division, the -COBRAprepositi ons.
VII Corps, and the XIX Corps produced By late afternoon of 26 July, Gen-
the desired effect early that afternoon. eral Collins no longer doubted that his
As the division began to advance against forces had achieved a clear penetration
diminishing artillery and mortar fire, an of the enemy defenses. Deeming that
armored column passed through the the situation demanded speed rather
division zone and drove toward St. than caution, he told the infantry divi-
Gilles.11 sions to continue their attacks through
T h e 117th Infantry, attacking toward the night.13
the loop of the Vire River, was stopped General Collins' directive coincided
at a steep ravine where a well-positioned with a German order to make a slight
line held by part of the 352d Division withdrawal. During the night of 2 6
was supported by II Parachute Corps July the German units west of the Taute
artillery firing from the high ground River—those comprising the left of
south of St. Lô. T h e regiment made the LXXXIV Corps—withdrew slightly
five different attempts to overcome the along the coast and took up a new line
resistance, but without success. Though of defense anchored on Périers and Mar-
close support by fighter-bombers might chésieux. T h e 6th Parachute Regi-
have aided the attack, General Hobbs ment passed into the corps reserve at St.
was reluctant to request it because he Sauveur-Lendelin. Just to the right of
feared a repetition of bombing errors. the corps boundary, the 352d Division
Accepting the apprehension as valid, of the II Parachute Corps, already out-
General Collins did not press for the
employment of tactical air. Not until
12 Telecon, Hobbs and Kelly, 1535, 25 Jul, 30th
Div G–3 Jnl and File; 30th Div EO 14, 25 Jul; MS #
10 4th Div AAR, Jul. B-489 (Ziegelmann) .
1130th Div G–2 Per Rpt, 26 Jul, and G–3 Jnl, 13 VII Corps Opns Memo 49, 27 Jul (confirming
26 Jul. oral orders, 26 Jul) .
T H E BREAKTHROUGH 251
flanked, also withdrew from the loop of mainder.15 T h e 4th Division sent its
the Vire and along the west bank of the reconnaissance troop ahead to screen a
Vire River–in order to try to re-estab- rapid advance.16 Strong resistance from
lish contact with Panzer Lehr. 14 This enemy positions hastily erected during
could be no more than a hope, for by the night melted away. T h e 8th Infan-
that time there was virtually no organ- try cut the Carantilly–Canisy road and
ized resistance between the 352d and the proceeded to a point more than seven
5th Parachute Divisions, though the miles south of the Périers–St. Lô high-
German higher commands did not seem way. T o clear small pockets of bypassed
to know it. Germans, General Barton committed
Although the 330th Infantry on the portions of the 12th Infantry, which had
extreme right flank of the VII Corps been in division reserve since the com-
again struck stonewall resistance, all the mencement of COBRA. Contingents of
other infantry units advanced during the the 30th Division moved all the way into
night of 26 July. T h e 9th Division se- the loop of the Vire River and estab-
cured a road junction of local impor- lished physical contact with the 35th
tance. T h e 8th Infantry of the 4th Di- Division at the St. Lô bridge. Other
vision, leaving its vehicles and antitank units secured the two Vire River bridges
guns behind, moved unencumbered for on the main roads south of St. Lô. Gen-
several miles, outflanked both the Panzer eral Hobbs committed his reserve regi-
Lehr artillery and the remaining reserves ment, the 120th, which drove south
of the regiment of the 275th Division at along the Vire River for almost six miles
Marigny, and, at dawn, hastened the against little opposition.
flight of a withdrawing enemy column. “This thing has busted wide open,”
Some troops of the 30th Division moved General Hobbs exulted. He was right.
easily into the loop of the Vire River Evidence of German disintegration was
while others cut the Canisy–St. Lô road. plentiful. Some German soldiers were
Except on the extreme right flank of walking into command posts to sur-
the VII Corps where the 330th Infantry render; other were fleeing south or
was denied for the third day the cross- across the Vire River.17
roads on the Périers—St. Lô highway that On the morning of 28 July, the 330th
constituted its original objective, de- Infantry at last was able to move against
velopments after daylight on 27 July virtually no resistance to rejoin its parent
indicated that the infantry was nearing unit, the 83d Division. In the 9th Di-
fulfillment of its COBRAaims. T h e 9th vision sector, only an occasional round
Division, in a regimental attack against
some 200 Germans, who were on a small 15Leading his platoon in an assault across open
ridge and were supported by four tanks ground in view of the enemy, 2d Lt. Edward F.
Koritzke was killed but inspired his men to over-
and several antitank guns, destroyed the run the hostile positions. Koritzke was posthu-
bulk of this force and dispersed the re- mously awarded the DSC.
164th Div Msg, 1015, 27 Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl
and File.
17Telecon, Hobbs and Birks, 2300, 27 Jul, 30th
14MS # P–159 (Stoeckler); MS # B–839 Div Jnl and File; 30th Div G–3 Jnl, entries 0725,
(Heydte) ; MS # B–439 (Ziegelmann) . 2033, and 2100, 27 Jul.
252 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
of artillery or mortar fire was falling by rigny and St. Gilles. T h e success of the
noon; small arms fire had ceased. Hav- larger effort depended basically on a VII
ing fulfilled its COBRAassignment, the Corps breakthrough. Emphasizing this
9th Division passed into reserve for rest fact, General Bradley assigned to VII
and reconstitution. T h e 4th Division Corps all the air support available on 26
mopped up isolated enemy remnants and July, thus obliging Collins to step up
prepared to move south in a new opera- the attack. T h e only way to do this was
tion. T h e 30th Division, advancing to commit the armor.
south along the west bank of the Vire T h e basic gamble involved was the
River, passed from control of the VII possibility that armored columns would
Corps. congest the VII Corps battlefield. “The
For the infantry units that had run only doubtful part of it [the original
interference, Operation COBRA had COBRA plan] to my mind,” General Col-
ended. General Hobbs perhaps typified lins had said two weeks earlier, “is we
infantry sentiment when he stated, “We shouldn’t count too much on fast move-
may be the spearhead that broke the ment of armored divisions through this
camel’s back.”18 There was no doubt country; if we make a break-through it
that the camel’s back was broken and is O K but until them . . . [the armored
that the infantry had helped break it. divisions] can’t move any faster than
But the armored forces of Operation the infantry.” 20 T o minimize conges-
COBRAalso played their part. tion, General Collins called upon only
part of his reserve, two armored columns
Commitment of Armor instead of the three that were ready.
T h e commitment of the mobile units
For the Americans, the critical day on 26 July was not so much the start of
of the COBRAoperation was 26 July, the exploitation as an effort to deepen
when General Collins had gambled. He the penetration. Instead of assigning
committed some of his forces assembled exploitation objectives, Collins told one
for the exploitation before the situation of the armored columns to take Marigny,
was unquestionably ripe for an exploi- the other St. Gilles. Two hundred
tation maneuver. Specifically, the in- fighter-bombers were to attack each town
fantry had not captured the towns of in advance of the thrusts.21 Only after
Marigny and St. Gilles, road centers these original infantry objectives were
considered prerequisite to an uninhibit- secured was the true exploitation phase
ed exploitation by mobile armored re- of COBRAto begin.
serves. 19 Having expected the COBRAair bom-
T h e fact that COBRAon 26 July was bardment to obliterate the German de-
to become a three-corps offensive actu- fenses and the infantry to clear the
ally made it impossible for General Col- routes of advance, the commanders of
lins to wait for the infantry to seize Ma- the mobile forces had planned to move
20FUSA Conf Notes, 12 Jul,. FUSA G–3 Misc
18Telecon, Hobbs and Birks, 2300, 27 Jul, 30th File.
Div Jnl and File. 21 1st Div G–3 Jnl and File, entries 0500 and
19See Ruppenthal Notes, ML–2185. 0550, 26 Jul.
T H E BREAKTHROUGH 253
at least as far as Marigny and St. Gilles T h e 1st Division made its approach
with reconnaissance squadrons ahead of march to the vicinity of the Périers–St.
their main spearheads. Now a semiad- Lô highway during the night of 25 July
ministrative road march of this type was without incident. Shortly after day-
out of the question. T h e commanders break, 26 July, the leading units bypassed
replaced their reconnaissance units with an enemy pocket of 150 men still north
assault troops and retained their artillery of the COBRA line of departure. Leaving
under centralized control rather than the reduction of this small force to the
parceling it out to subordinate combat reserve battalion of the 18th Infantry,
teams.22 the advance troops drove toward Ma-
Clearing the road to Marigny became rigny.25
the responsibility of Maj. Gen. Clarence With the combat command on the
R. Huebner, who commanded the 1st right (west) of the road and the infantry
Infantry Division and the attached Com- regiment on the left, the 1st Division
bat Command B of the 3d Armored Di- troops moved cautiously against small
vision. Alerted on the afternoon of 25 arms fire. Bomb craters in the roads
July to pass through the 9th Division and defended hedgerows bounding the
the next day and capture Marigny, Gen- fields were the principal deterrents to a
eral Huebner ordered CCB (Col. T r u - rapid advance. Small roadblocks also
man E. Boudinot) and the reinforced slowed the attack. Artillery and tank
18th Infantry (Col. George Smith, Jr.) fire eliminated most of the opposition,
to attack abreast astride the road. Not but only after the infantry components
quite certain whether the 1st Division, had received heavy casualties, particu-
which had motorized its infantry troops, larly among key personnel.
was embarking on exploitation, a VII Near Marigny, the troops encountered
Corps staff officer in a routine telephone the increasing resistance of the 353d Di-
call to transmit the bomb safety line re- vision and the two companies of the 2d
marked somewhat facetiously that his SS Panzer Division. Several Mark IV
message was unnecessary if “you are tanks and a few 75 -mm. antitank guns
going someplace and are going fast.” 23 north of the town halted progress early
General Huebner, who commanded one in the afternoon. Under cover of an
of the two divisions General Eisenhower extended tank fire fight, CCB attempted
had characterized as “tops” in the thea- an envelopment to the right but achieved
ter, was planning to go somewhere fast no success. A tactical air strike late in
all right.24 He hoped to take Marigny the afternoon enabled armored elements
quickly and proceed at once to exploit to reach the northern edge of the town;
westward from Marigny to Coutances. the enveloping forces buttoned up for
the night about a mile west of Ma-
221st Div FO’s 38 and 39, 19 and 25 Jul; G–3
rigny. 26
Jnl, entry 1700, 25 Jul; Arty S–3 Per Rpt 38, 26 25 1st Div AAR, Jul, G–3 Jnl, 25 and 26 Jul, Situa-
Jul; [Pillsbury] , 2d Armd Div in Opn COBRA,p. tion Overlay, 2400, 25 Jul, and Msgs, 0725 and 1010,
18; 3d Armd Div Arty Annex to 3d Armd Div FO 26 Jul; 1st Div Arty S–3 Per Rpt 39, 26 Jul; 9th
5, 19 Jul. Div G–3 Jnl, entries 0130 and 0210, 26 Jul.
231st Div G–3 Jnl, entry 2155, 25 Jul. 26 3d Armd Div CCB AAR, Jul, Action 25 Jul-
24Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 5 Jul, Poque Files. 31 Jul.
254 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Limited Exploitation
TROOPS ROLLING THROUGH CANISY
South of St. Gilles, CCA of the 2d
Armored Division, with the 22d Infan- enemy resistance. In late afternoon
try still attached, headed for its initial General Rose reported opposition in his
objective in the exploitation: the high zone negligible and estimated that the
ground five miles beyond St. Gilles, rear of his column would soon clear St.
ground commanding an extensive net- Gilles.32 Rose's optimism contributed
work of roads leading into the COBRA materially to General Collins' decision
zone from the east and south. There, to continue the corps attack during the
at St. Samson-de-Bonfossé, le Mesnil- night.
Herman, and Hill 183, the armor would Part of the reason why the opposition
find good defensive positions from which was negligible lay in the clearing opera-
to halt a possible German counterattack tions of the 30th Division. Another
from across the Vire River. To reach part lay in the fact that the St. Gilles-
the area, CCA had to pass through Canisy road was the boundary separating
Canisy, not quite two miles south of St. the L X X X I V and II Parachute Corps
Gilles. sectors. Panzer Lehr was specifically re-
Proceeding steadily against mortar, sponsible for the highway. T h e virtual
artillery, and antitank fire interdicting destruction of Panzer Lehr left the road
the Canisy road, CCA had more difficulty open. T h e 352d Division, manning the
with bomb craters, mine fields, and sector between the road and the river,
hedgerows than with the occasional
322d Armd Div Msgs, 1730 and 1830, 26 Jul, 30th
31 FUSA G–2 Per Rpt 47, 27 Jul. Div G–3 Jnl and File.
256 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
was thus continually outflanked as Rose’s le Mensil-Herman. Hill 183 fell during
combat command drove down an excel- the afternoon. With that, CCA com-
lent route of advance, threatened solely pleted its initial mission.35
by occasional flanking fire. In two days Combat Command A had
Only as CCA neared the first buildings lost less than 200 men, 3 medium tanks,
in Canisy was there any real resistance. and 2 small trucks. Not only the weak-
At a railroad embankment north of ness of the opposition but the dispatch
Canisy where a bombed railway overpass with which General Rose had secured
had tumbled across the highway, a few his objective had prevented higher casu-
Germans tried to make a stand; the com- alties. Even so, Rose was not satisfied
bat command outflanked the position with his accomplishment; he complained
from the east and raked the defenders that the poor condition of the roads, the
with enfilading fire.33 Coincidentally, absence of road bypasses, and the hedge-
dive bombers struck Canisy and set half rowed terrain had slowed his move-
the town ablaze. T h e armor rolled ment.36
through the burning town that evening. As General Rose prepared to recon-
Just beyond Canisy, General Rose noiter in force toward Villebaudon and
split his command into two columns. Tessy-sur-Vire on the morning of 28
One moved southeastward toward St. July, word came that CCA’s role in
Samson-de-Bonfossé,the other southward COBRAwas over. T h e combat com-
toward le Mesnil-Herman. Although mand and the attached infantry regi-
division headquarters assumed that the ment were soon to pass from the control
combat command had halted for the of the VII Corps.
night, Rose drove his men forward with While General Rose’s attack had
single-minded purpose and determina- moved smoothly against light opposi-
tion in compliance with General Collins’ tion, General Huebner had met unex-
and General Brooks’ orders.34 An hour pected difficulty at Marigny on 26 July.
before midnight one column entered St. T h e 1st Division, with Combat Com-
Samson-de-Bonfossé without a fight. mand B of the 3d Armored Division at-
Three hours later the other seized the tached, had been unable to start the
road intersection just north of le Mesnil- main effort of the exploitation—its thrust
Herman. Only then, with part of the westward from Marigny to Coutances to
initial objective in hand, did General slash across the rear of the German
Rose sanction a halt. troops facing north against the VIII
T h e next morning, 27 July, as bat- Corps. Since the VIII Corps had be-
teries of the 14th Armored Field Artil- gun to exert pressure from the north on
lery Battalion leapfrogged forward to 26 July, it became vital for the 1st Di-
give continuous fire support, the com- vision to get to Coutances at once in or-
bat command engaged enemy tanks and 352d Armd Div Msg, 1130, 27 Jul, 30th Div Jnl
antitank guns before taking and securing and File. Lt. Col. Lindsay C. Herkness, Jr., was
awarded the DSC for his heroic leadership of ar-
mored troops; Capt. Mario T. DeFelice, a medical
33 2d Armd Div Msgs, 1930 and 2030, 26 Jul, officer, was awarded the DSC for heroism.
30th Div G–3 Jnl and File. 36 2d Armd Div Msg, 0730, 27 Jul, 30th Div Jnl
342d Armd Div G–3 Per Rpt 4, 27 Jul. and File.
THE BREAKTHROUGH 257
der to execute the squeeze play that was cess of the COBRAscheme of maneuver
part of the basic COBRA idea. and because the highway between Ma-
Even though General Huebner did rigny and Coutances was excellent.
not possess a secure pivot point at Ma- CCB was to seize the first objective,
rigny, he felt impelled to begin his ex- Camprond, then the third objective,
ploitation on the morning of 27 July. Monthuchon. Motorized infantry regi-
He ordered Colonel Boudinot’s CCB to mental combat teams of organic 1st Di-
initiate the westward thrust toward vision troops were to follow in column.
Coutances. In the meantime, Colonel T h e 18th Infantry was to relieve CCB
Smith’s 18th Infantry was to attack Ma- first at Camprond, then at Monthuchon.
rigny and high ground south of the town In turn, the reinforced 16th Infantry
in order to secure the road network re- (Col. Frederick W. Gibb) was to relieve
quired for sustaining the exploitation. the 18th at Camprond. T h e reinforced
Getting CCB on the way to Coutances 26th Infantry (Col. John F. R. Seitz)
conformed with the original 1st Division was to follow secondary roads on the left
plan, a plan devised to employ as the flank of the other units and seize the
axis of advance the east-west Coutances- second objective, Cambernon. In the
St. Lô .highway, which passes through end, all three infantry regiments would
rolling bocage country. West of Ma- be lined up on the three objectives to
rigny the highway runs along the south- the rear of the German line.
ern slope of a ridge line formed by a After being relieved at Monthuchon,
complex of three hills-the highest rising CCB had a further mission, which was
580 feet-a mile or so north of the high- determined by the location of Monthu-
way. This prominent terrain feature chon on the north-south Périers-Cou-
dominating the approaches to Coutances tances highway, one of the main escape
from the north and east provided an routes for Germans withdrawing before
excellent natural blocking position VIII Corps. T h e combat command was
astride the routes of withdrawal of the to be prepared to do one of two things:
German forces facing the VIII Corps, if the VIII Corps had not pushed back
and together with Coutances was the 1st the Germans, CCB was to attack north-
Division’s objective. ward toward Périers; if the Germans
Of the three hills forming the ridge were trying to escape to the south, CCB
line, the first, five miles west of Marigny, was to proceed southwestward from
is near Camprond. T h e second, two Monthuchon to high ground a mile or
miles farther to the west, is near Cam- so north of Coutances in order to block
bernon. T h e third is near Monthu- the three main highways leading into
chon. T o General Huebner the early Coutances from the north.37
capture of these hills was of double im-
portance, for they dominated also his
371st Div FO 38, 19 Jul; Annex 1 to 3d Armd
own route of approach to Coutances. Div FO 4, 19 Jul. There was some question on
General Huebner had selected his at- the final mission of the combat command. The
tached armored command to spearhead 3d Armored Division CCB Field Order 5 of 20
July states that the combat command was to pre-
the attack both because a rapid advance pare to attack north toward Périers only after
along the highway was essential for suc- blocking the roads above Coutances.
258 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Because of the unexpected resistance in four hours. Shortly after midday the
at Marigny, General Huebner changed task force on the right turned to the
his plan of maneuver on the morning north and struck cross-country for the
of 27 July. Since continued German hill near Camprond, two miles away.
possession of Marigny denied the 1st Di- By midafternoon the task force held the
vision an adequate road net, General objective.
Huebner withheld one regiment, the T h e advance along the highway had
26th, in order to reduce the hazard of been virtually a road march except for
traffic congestion. CCB was to secure casual encounters with German motor-
Camprond, the first objective. Instead cyclists, ambulances, and staff cars.
of following the armor, the 18th Infan- Progress on the flanks had been more
try was to capture Marigny, then send difficult, for the presence of hedgerows
a battalion to free the armor at Cam- enabled scattered enemy groups to form
prond. T h e 16th Infantry, instead of hasty defenses and resist with determina-
relieving the 18th at Camprond, was to tion. T h e result was a gain on a nar-
make a wider swing to the west, eche- row front scarcely wider than the width
loned to the left rear of CCB, and move of the highway.
all the way to the blocking positions on Moving to relieve the force at Cam-
the highways just north of Coutances. prond, the battalion of the 18th Infan-
Meanwhile, CCB was to attack and se- try encountered virtually no opposition
cure in turn all three hill objectives.38 on the Coutances highway, but when it
T h e 18th Infantry cleared Marigny moved off the road toward the hill small
on the morning of 27 July, and that enemy groups supported by random
afternoon two battalions attacked to the tanks began to cause trouble. With the
south against strong opposition in an help of fighter-bombers, the battalion
attempt to seize the high ground needed gained the hill shortly before midnight.
to secure the town.39 T h e reserve bat- Meanwhile, the 16th Infantry, which
talion in midafternoon moved westward was to make a parallel advance on the
along the Coutances highway to relieve left and move swiftly to Coutances, was
CCB at Camprond. unable to pass through Marigny until
Early that morning CCB had lunged late afternoon of 2 7 July. Against scat-
down the Coutances highway.40 Spear- tered opposition and sporadic fire, the
headed by the reconnaissance battalion regiment advanced in a column of bat-
and divided into three balanced teams talions immediately south of the Cou-
or task forces (a company each of medi- tances highway. Shortly before mid-
um tanks and armored infantry), the night the leading battalion came abreast
combat command advanced with two of CCB at a point directly south of Cam-
teams abreast. Against disorganized op- prond.
position, the attack carried four miles Thus at midnight, 27 July, the 1st Di-
vision had advanced on a front not quite
38 1st Div AAR, Jul. three miles wide to a point about five
39VII Corps Msg, 0930, 27 Jul, VII Corps G–3 miles west of Marigny.41 Though no
Jnl and File.
40
3d Armd Div CCB Opns Overlay and FO, 26 41 1st Div Situation Overlay, 2400, 27 Jul, 9th
Jul. Div G–3 Jnl and File.
THE BREAKTHROUGH 259
organized enemy opposition was appar- T h e reason for the disappointing ad-
ent, small enemy groups supported by vance by the forces carrying the main
an occasional tank or antitank gun COBRAeffort was to be found in the
formed islands of resistance, floating and German dispositions. The LXXXIV
static, in the American sea of advance, Corps left had made a withdrawal along
endangering both supply and evacua- the Cotentin west coast during the night
tion. When twenty-one supply trucks of 26 July with the intention of estab-
loaded with rations, gasoline, ammuni- lishing a new main line of resistance.
tion, and military police went forward Yet on 27 July the contemplated posi-
from Marigny, a company of medium tions of this line were becoming unten-
tanks accompanied them to give protec- able even before they were established
tion. T h e column reached Camprond because of the VII Corps threat develop-
without incident, but, returning after ing west of Marigny toward the German
dark with two truckloads of prisoners, right (east) flank. When Hausser and
the column had to fight its way back to Choltitz suddenly became aware that
Marigny.42 T h e attempt of a reconnais- American armored columns were mov-
sance platoon to cross the Lozon River ing through the Marigny–St. Gilles gap,
three miles west of Marigny stimulated they realized that they would have to
a counterattack by about a hundred move fast to avoid encirclement from
Germans supported by a medium tank the east. There was no alternative to
and an antitank gun. T h e platoon had continuing the withdrawal along the
to call for infantry and armor reinforce- Cotentin west coast. T o insure escape
ments from the 9th and 1st Division be- from encirclement, they erected a north-
fore dispersing the enemy group.43 south defensive line facing eastward.
T h e result of the main COBRAef- Units manning the line included ele-
fort produced disappointment. “Gen- ments of the depleted 17th SS Panzer
erally, we are not being able to push Grenadier Division, reluctantly with-
very fast,” the VII Corps G–3 admit- drawing paratroopers, the 353d Divi-
ted.44 General Huebner had hoped sion, and small elements of the 2d SS
to rip into the rear of the German de- Panzer Division.
fense line. His troops were to have cut During the early afternoon of 27 July
German telephone wires, disrupted com- Choltitz learned that American troops-
munications, and in general produced CCB of the 3d Armored Division, at-
confusion and disorganization.45 But tached to the 1st Division–seemed to
instead of raising havoc in a slashing ex- have clear sailing toward Coutances.
ploitation, the ist Division had not yet American scouting parties on minor
secured Marigny and was only half way roads had made contact with artillery
to Coutances. units of the 353d Division and the
423d Armd Div CCB AAR, Jul.
LXXXIV Corps, and German artillery-
434th Cav Recon Sq (Mechanized) Unit Rpt 1, men were fighting as infantry. Dis-
27 Jul, 1st Div G–3 Jnl and File. covering also that American troops had
44VII Corps Msg, 0930, 27 Jul, VII Corps G–3 reached Guesnay, Choltitz ordered the
Jnl and File.
451st Div FO 38, 19 Jul. engineer battalion of the 17th SS Panzer
260 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
counted on a tank battalion of the 2d SS south through the VIi Corps column or
Panzer Division at Quibou that in reality moved around the western end of the
had but fourteen tanks. American point during the night of
Still primarily concerned with the 2 7 July. Covered by a reinforced regi-
Caen sector held by Panzer Group West, ment of the 2d SS Panzer Division,
Kluge refused to countenance the with- which held a defensive arc from Cam-
drawal by the II Parachute Corps, which bernon to Savigny, the units on the
might expose the Panzer Group West Cotentin west coast continued to move
flank. He instead ordered the II Para- south on 28 July. T h e units were the
chute Corps to defend in place in depleted 243d Division, the kampf-
the St. Lô—Caumont sector while the gruppe of the 265th Division, and ele-
L X X X I V Corps anchored its forces on ments of the 77th Division and of the
Coutances and executed a fighting with- 5th Parachute Division, all apparently
drawal to the Soulles—Sienneriver line. under the operational control of the
Meanwhile, he was assembling an ex- 91st Division. T h e 17th SS Panzer
perienced and somewhat rested armored Grenadier Division moved in broad day-
division in the Caumont area for action light, though harassed from the air, to
in the Cotentin. Aided by whatever Cerisy-la-Sallein time to meet an Ameri-
could be found of Panzer Lehr, the can armored column there. At the same
275th Division, and the 2d SS Panzer time the 6th Parachute Regiment, to-
Division, the experienced armored divi- gether with 2d SS Panzer Division tanks
sion was to launch a counterattack to and the engineer battalion of the 17th
close the gap between the L X X X I V and SS, covered the rear of the withdrawal
II Parachute Corps of the Seventh Army. and protected Coutances from positions
In addition to the 9th Panzer Division, near Ouville.
which Kluge had requested on the pre- These moves reflected and contributed
vious day, he asked OKW to send a total to the changing situation. Already, on
of four infantry divisions to Normandy the evening of 2 7 July, General Bradley
from the Fifteenth and Nineteenth had altered plans by assigning General
Armies. Still concerned with the Allied Huebner’s last two objectives—Monthu-
threat to invade southern France, yet chon and the high ground north of
realizing that Kluge’s situation was Coutances—to the VIII Corps.50 But
serious, Hitler approved release of the since Huebner saw no certainty that the
9th Panzer Division for commitment in VIII Corps could reach these objectives
Normandy. On the following day, 28 ahead of the 1st Division, he proceeded
July, he authorized the movement to on the tentative assumption that they
Normandy of three infantry divisions, might still be valid for him. Huebner
the 84th, the 331st, and the 708th.49 thus ordered a continuation of his attack
Meanwhile, in the Cotentin those on 28 July. CCB was to take Cam-
L X X X I V Corps units still north of the bernon, the 16th Infantry to capture
St. Lô—Coutances highway infiltrated Monthuchon, the 18th Infantry to re-
main in the Marigny area, and the 26th
49AGp B and O B W E S T KTB’s, 27-28 Jul; OB
WEST K T B , Anlage 878. 50FUSA FO 2, 28 Jul; see below, Ch. XIV.
262 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
on the rear of German troops trapped in the trap?” a 1st Division officer
near the village of Savigny.54 asked. “Yes, probably,” came the re-
Like CCB’s shift to the south, the 26th ply. 55 T h e division had lost two big
Infantry’s turn to the south was a con- fish: the prestige of capturing Coutances
sequence of the changing situation de- and the opportunity of trapping large
veloping out of COBRA. According to numbers of Germans north of the St.
the plan, the main battle was to have Lô–Coutances highway. In three days,
occurred in the triangular region formed the division had taken only 565 prison-
on the Cotentin west coast between ers.56 The bulk of the Germans, by
Lessay and Coutances by the highways escaping the VII Corps main effort, had
from; Lessay and Coutances to St. Lô. slipped through the COBRA noose. As a
As the VIII Corps exerted pressure south result, the fighting shifted to the region
from the Lessay–Périers road, the main south of the Coutances–St. Lô highway.
exploiting force of the VII Corps was to T h e 1st Division had little alternative
have raced to Coutances to cut off Ger- but to face south and assume the role
man escape. “Did we lose the big fish that the VIII Corps had earlier played,
the role of a pressure force.
541st Div AAR, Jul, and Situation Overlay, 2400,
28 Jul. S. Sgt. George E. Jackson received the DSC 5516th Inf Jnl, 28 Jul.
for heroic action that day. 561st Div G–2 Per Rpt 39, 28 Jul.
CHAPTER XIV
Dividing CCA into three task forces- Heavy fire from CCA’s tanks eventually
each basically a battalion of tanks subdued the defenses, but again the bulk
and one of armored infantry-General of the column had to wait impotently for
Hickey sent the comand across the several hours along the roads to the
Périers–St. Lô highway in column early rear. Traffic congestion and more en-
on 27 July. T h e troops were to drive emy pockets prompted a halt shortly
forward aggressively, outflanking or by- after dark.
passing resistance and avoiding hedgerow T h e advance had been disappointing.
fighting. Though the road net was not T h e third task force in the column was
the best for rapid armored advance, little still far back in the vicinity of Marigny
opposition was expected because the 4th and St. Gilles, the second was in the
Division already had passed through the Carantilly–Canisy area, and the head of
area. With Operation COBRAwell on the combat command was more than
the way to success, there seemed no rea- three miles short of Cerisy-la-Salle, the
son why the armored column should not pivot point for the westward thrust to-
move quickly to the village of Cerisy-la- ward Coutances.4
Salle, then swing to the west.3 T h e villages of Cerisy-la-Salle, on a
This line of thought did not take hill almost 400 feet high, and Montpin-
into account certain obstacles-bomb chon, on a mound about 425 feet high
craters, wrecked vehicles, and traffic con- two miles to the west and on the other
gestion. T h e leading task force met a side of a steep-walled valley, dominate
well-organized strongpoint southeast of the surrounding terrain in general and
Marigny around noon of 27 July and lost in particular the road net westward to
four of its medium tanks. While the Coutances. T h e 3d Armored Division
head of the column sought to disengage, commander, General Watson, had as-
the rest of the armor jammed up along sumed that COBRAwould develop so
the roads to the rear for a distance of rapidly that CCA would occupy Cerisy-
almost ten miles. Though the point la-Salle without difficulty. Plans had
finally broke contact and bypassed the thus been prepared for operations only
resistance (which the 12th Infantry of in the area west of that village-along
the 4th Division cleared later in the the Montpinchon–Coutances axis.
day), another obstacle developed in the On the evening of 27 July, the situa-
Carantilly–Canisy region. Here CCA’s tion demanded a change. CCA had
advance units encountered several Ger- started a day late, and its approach
man tanks and antitank guns deployed march had been disappointingly slow.
along a railroad embankment. Pre- In addition, there were indications that
vented from bypassing this resistance be- the Germans were in the process of
cause of inadequate roads, the leading establishing a front line facing east-
task force had no choice but to fight. ward to cover a withdrawal through
Coutances. Should they institute a full-
scale withdrawal, they would inevitably
3 3d Armd Div CCA AAR, Jul, and Warning Or
try to pass through the Montpinchon-
der, 19 Jul; 3d Armd Div FO 4, 19 Jul, FO 5, 20
Jul, and G–3 Per Rpt 34, 28 Jul. 4 3d Armd Div G–3 Per Rpt 33, 27 Jul
266 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Cerisy-la-Salle region and hold the com- to run into a German pocket near
manding terrain. If CCA followed the Savigny, part of the same one that the
original plan and passed through Cerisy- 1st Division’s 26th Infantry had en-
la-Salle in column, it would continue to countered a few hundred yards to the
move across the German front and be north. Together, the 26th Infantry and
exposed to flanking fire. It might even CCA eliminated the pocket, but not
get involved in an engagement at Cerisy- until the following day.
la-Salle or Montpinchon that might pre- In the meantime, the task forces mov-
vent the armor from reaching Coutances ing on Cerisy-la-Salle and Montpinchon
in time to block German withdrawal had made few gains. Troops of the
through that important road center. 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division held
Thus, a quicker way to Coutances had to the commanding terrain tenaciously and,
be found, but at the same time Cerisy- from good positions on the hedgerowed
la-Salle and Montpinchon had to be slopes of both hills, refused to give way,
seized and secured to deny the Germans even in the face of bombing and strafing
dominating terrain, which in their hands by sixteen planes. T h e resistance at
would facilitate their escape from the Cerisy-la-Salle and Montpinchon weak-
Coutances area. ened only when night afforded the Ger-
General Hickey’s solution, which Gen- mans concealment for withdrawal. T h e
eral Watson approved, was to start his next day, 29 July, when the two task
turn westward toward Coutances at once forces of CCA renewed their attacks,
and to move on a broad front. T h e the opposition had virtually vanished.
leading task force was to turn west from Moving together, the task forces con-
Canisy, bypass Cerisy-la-Salle on the tinued with little difficulty to the north-
north, and drive to Montpinchon. T h e south Coutances–Gavray highway.
second task force in the CCA column was Like the 1st Division, CCA had not
to continue to Cerisy-la-Salle and cap- crossed the Cotentin in time to ensnare
ture the high ground there. T h e last the German forces. T h e Germans had
task force in the column was to assume escaped and thus had thwarted the
the CCA main effort, swing westward original COBRAintent. T h e Americans
from Carantilly, and head straight for were not sure whether their threat of
Coutances. (See Map VI. ) encirclement had made the Germans
Despite hopes for success, CCA was pull out or whether the pressure of the
due for another day of disappointment VIII Corps had driven them out before
on 28 July. Because of traffic conges- the trap could be sprung.
tion, the main effort from Carantilly did
not get started until midafternoon. T h e Pressure Force
Even then terrain broken by hedgerows
and small hills as well as a dearth of As “the direct pressure force,” VIII
good roads slowed the advance markedly. Corps was to tie down the Germans to
Clearing isolated resistance, the task prevent their disengagement and with-
force in late afternoon reached a point drawal before the completion of the VII
about five miles west of Carantilly only Corps envelopment. While the VII
T H E BREAKTHROUGH DEVELOPED 267
Corps was supposed to block the escape 79th Division was opposite the town of
routes of the Germans opposing VIII Lessay and faced the Ay River, which
Corps, VIII Corps was to cross the meanders across an open, swampy flood
Lessay–Périers highway on a broad front, plain that offered the Germans superb
advance half way to Coutances (to the fields of fire. T h e Germans had de-
lateral highway from Geffosses through stroyed the only bridge across the Ay,
St. Sauveur-Lendelin to Marigny), and the one to Lessay, and had mined the
apply pressure to crush the trapped Ger- only good ford. Between the Ay and
man forces.5 the Sèves, the 8th Division held a nar-
With four experienced infantry divi- row front where hedgerows constituted
sions, a recently arrived armored divi- natural defensive obstacles in depth.
sion, and a two-squadron cavalry group, Along the Shes, the 90th Division
and with nine battalions of corps artil- looked across a flood plain to the island
lery (five heavy and four medium) and of St. Germain, still held by the German
a sufficient quantity of ammunition and forces that had turned back the division
supplies for a major operation, General a week earlier. T h e 4th Armored Divi-
Middleton planned to attack with his sion occupied the western portion of the
four infantry divisions abreast.6 His Carentan–Périers isthmus, and the 83d
difficulty was the terrain on the VIII Division held the eastern part.
Corps front. T wo good highways outh—one
Theoretically, the VIII Corps zone from Lessay, the other from Périers—
was a fifteen-mile portion of the Cotentin and converge at Coutances. T h e ter-
between the west coast and the Lozon rain between these roads was in the 8th
River, but since the 330th Infantry of Division zone. Between the Ay and
the 83d Division was attacking in con- Sèves Rivers it was thick with hedge-
junction with VII Corps, General Mid- rows, though the least unfavorable on
dleton’s sector actually stopped at the the corps front for offensive action.
Taute River. T h e troops of the VIII General Middleton chose to make his
Corps facing south toward the Lessay– main effort there with the 8th Division,
Périers–St. Lô highway held an ir- which was to attack frontally to the south
regularly shaped front of from one to and effect a penetration. T h e 79th
five miles north of the highway T h e Division was to follow through the gap,
line followed the north banks of the Ay turn west to outflank the enemy posi-
estuary and the Ay and Sèves Rivers and tions south of the Ay, and seize Lessay.
cut across the Carentan–Périers isthmus. T h e 90th Division was to bypass the
( S e e Map V . ) St. Germain area on both sides and
On the coast, the 106th Cavalry Group advance on Périers, while the 83d Divi-
looked toward the Ay estuary. T h e sion was to attack southwest along the
5FUSA Outline Plan COBRA, 13 Jul; VIII Corps west bank of the Taute and eventually
FO 8, 15 Jul, and G–3 Sec Msg, 20 Jul, 8th Div cross the river. When all four divisions
G–3 Jnl File. were south of the Lessay–St. Lô highway,
6VIII Corps G–3 Per Rpt, 25 Jul, and Amend- they were to move to the objective
ment 1 to FO 8, 15 Jul; Gen Bd Arty Rpt, App.
C, Arty Support in Opn COBRA. line, the Geffosses–St.Sauver-Lendelin–
268 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
to bypass and isolate the St. Germain mortars, and artillery—and although the
area. On the right, a battalion of the 83d Division alone fired more than 300
359th Infantry crossed the Sèves River individual missions before noon, the
in a rapid assault, traversed open, committed regiments “didn’t do a
marshy ground, and overran a German thing.” They advanced no more than
trench dug along a fringe of woods. 200 yards. T h e Germans fought re-
T h e momentum of the assault carried sourcefully from entrenched positions
the battalion a hundred yards beyond along hedgerows and sunken roads, using
the trench to a sunken road. As the their mortars and few available tanks
soldiers climbed the road embankment effectively and keeping their limited
to continue south, they met a burst of artillery active all day.10
small arms and mortar fire. A German American intelligence officers had
counterattack supported by tanks and earlier considered that the Germans fac-
artillery soon followed, driving the in- ing the VIII Corps had two alternatives
fantry out of the sunken road and back of equal plausibility. T h e Germans
to the trench. There the battalion could, they judged, defend in place or
held. Bazooka fire, destroying one Ger- make a strong pretense of defending
man tank, discouraged others from clos- while withdrawing to the high ground
ing in. In the rear, part of the 358th north of Coutances.11 There seemed no
Infantry began a demonstration by fire question by the end of 26 July but that
to distract enemy attention, and the divi- the Germans had chosen to take the
sion artillery placed smoke shells ahead former course of action. T h e VIII
of the assault battalion of the 359th. Corps had succeeded in making a small
Engineers attempted to construct a ford penetration to the Lessay-Périers high-
across the stream for supporting tanks, way, but in so doing its divisions had
but German artillery and tank fire incurred more than 1,150 casualties
barred the only approach route to the while capturing less than 100 prisoners.
stream and prevented not only tanks Yet General Middleton was satisfied.
but also infantry reinforcements from His troops appeared to be tying down
coming forward. the enemy and holding him in place for
Four and a half miles to the east, the the VII Corps encirclement.12
357th Infantry, comprising the left prong During the early evening of 26 July,
of the 90th Division attack, entered the General Middleton instructed his sub-
Carentan–Périers isthmus and tried to ordinate commanders to resume the at-
advance toward the southwest to make tack the following morning. Several
eventual contact above Périers with the hours later, after receiving reports that
main body of the division on the right. the German opposition on other fronts
At the same time, the 329th and 331st seemed to be disintegrating and after
Regiments of the 83d Division attacked
along the west bank of the Taute River 10Telecon, Middleton and Macon, 2100, 26 Jul,
toward the southwest. Although the 83d Div G–2 G–3 Jnl and File; VIII Corps Arty
three committed regiments had at least Per Rpt, 26 Jul.
11VIII Corps G–2 Est 4, 15 Jul.
twice the strength of the enemy forces 12Telecon, Middleton and Macon, 2100, 26 Jul,
that opposed them—in troops, tanks, 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File.
270 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
learning that General Collins had and moved south to protect the coastal
ordered the VII Corps to continue the flank. T h e enemy had disengaged.14
attack during the night, Middleton In the 90th Division zone, after the
alerted his commanders to possible Ger- enemy withdrawal was discovered, the
man withdrawal. He told all units to division reconnaissance troop moved out
patrol vigorously. If a withdrawal were ahead of the 359th Infantry in search of
discovered in any sector, the unit in that Germans. A destroyed Sèves River
sector was to attack at daylight, 27 July, bridge on the main road to Périers de-
in close pursuit.13 layed the advance until early afternoon
Patrols all along the front found not and extensive mine fields on the roads
only extensive mine fields but also evi- slowed the leading troops by forcing
dence that appeared to indicate that the them to proceed dismounted. By the
enemy lines were being maintained in middle of the afternoon, however, the
place. Rain and haze during the early reconnaissance unit was in the badly
morning hours of 27 July obscured battered and deserted town of Périers.15
visibility and made further investigation A mile south of Périers, on the high-
fruitless. On the premise that the Ger- way to St. Sauveur-Lendelin, when troop-
mans were still going to defend in ers encountered a roadblock defended
strength, the units made careful, com- by infantry and tanks, members of the
prehensive attack plans. 359th Infantry, following the reconnais-
Soon after the attack commenced, it sance troop, moved against the opposi-
became apparent that little more than a tion. Unable to bring antitank weapons
profusion of mine fields opposed the and tank destroyers into range until
assault troops all across the corps front. evening because of mines, the regiment
Artillery preparations proved to have attacked shortly after nightfall, knocked
been a waste of ammunition. T h e 8th out four German tanks, and then dug
Division eliminated insignificant resist- in for the night.
ance and advanced more than a mile On the Carentan–Périers isthmus, the
beyond the Lessay–Périers road. Two 357th Infantry had suspected an enemy
battalions of the 79th Division crossed withdrawal because German artillery
the Ay River in single file, each man had ceased early that morning, 27 July.16
stepping carefully into the footsteps of When the troops attacked, they found
the soldier ahead to avoid mines, and only mines hampering their advance.
against slight harassing small arms fire Late that evening the regiment crossed
took Lessay. Division engineers bridged the Taute River, overwhelmed German
the stream at the ford, and by the end delaying positions just north of the
of the day all three regiments were south Périers–St. Lô highway, and dug in along
of the river and abreast of the 8th Divi- the highway for the night. T h e 358th
sion. T h e 106th Cavalry Group crossed
the Ay estuary that evening at low tide 1479th Div AAR, Jul, FO
7, 19 Jul, and G–3 Jnl,
26 Jul; Wyche Diary; VIII Corps G–2 Per Rpt 43,
27 Jul.
13VIII Corps Fragmentary Orders, 1815 and 2050, 15 8th Div G–3 Jnl, entry 1542, 27 Jul; VIII
26 Jul, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl; Msg, 2130, 26 JuI, 8th Corps Msg, 1415, 27 Jul, FUSA G–3 JnI.
Div G–3 Jnl. 16375th Inf Jnl, 27 Jul.
T H E BREAKTHROUGH DEVELOPED 27 1
Infantry, after sending patrols into the lin–Marigny highway—and to permit the
St. Germain area and finding that the troops to proceed beyond it.19 T h e
Germans had withdrawn, moved south 79th and 8th Divisions met no resistance
to the vicinity of the Périers–St. Lô as they moved about ten and seven miles,
high way. respectively, to the vicinity of Coutances.
T h e 83d Division also advanced T h e 90th and 83d Divisions proceeded
against light resistance and encountered to the proximity of the Coutances–St.
many mines. Early in the afternoon of Lô highway, where the 1st Division of
27 July resistance vanished, and the the VII Corps lay athwart their zones
division extended its control over the of advance. T h e unopposed advance of
entire west bank of the Taute River in the VIII Corps and the sense of victory
zone. Just before dark troops crossed that it engendered were somewhat
the Taute and advanced almost a thou- empty achievements. T h e number of
sand yards into the Marchésieux and la prisoners taken by all the divisions on
Varde area.17 28 July, for example, was little more
In possession of the Lessay–Périers than 200.
highway by the end of 27 July, the VIII Aided by the terrain, the weather, the
Corps had made a significant gain, but darkness, the absence of Allied night
had captured hardly more than 1 0 0 fighter planes, and the extreme caution
prisoners. T h e enemy had disengaged of American troops, who had come to
and moved behind a strong protective respect the ability of the Germans to
shell. Though small delaying forces fight in the hedgerows, the German
and isolated pockets of resistance had troops facing the VIII Corps had neatly
hampered American pursuit, the biggest slipped out of the trap set by COBRA.
problem to the Americans had been American commanders had begun to sus-
mines—antitank and antipersonnel pect an impending withdrawal and had
mines, Teller mines, Schu mines, mus- noted evidence of it. Operations in the
tard pot mines, box mines, and all types adjacent VII Corps sector had confirmed
of booby traps rigged in buildings, it. Plans had been changed to antici-
hedgerows, ditches, fields, along the pate it.20 Yet despite precaution, warn-
roads, and at road junctions and inter- ing, and suspicion on the part of the
sections. Behind this screen, the Ger- Americans, the Germans gave them the
mans had escaped the COBRApressure slip.
force. 18 T h e Germans, on the other hand,
After engineers laid a treadway bridge though they had escaped the VIII Corps
across the Ay at Lessay, the VIII Corps pressure force and had avoided entrap-
continued to advance on 28 July. T h e ment by the first and second thrusts of
absence of opposition prompted General
19VIII Corps Msg, 1515, 28 Jul; 83d Div G–2
Bradley to revoke the original objective G–3 Jnl, entry 1620, 28 Jul; ETOUSA Engr Hist
line—the Geffosses–St. Sauveur-Lende- Rpt 10, Combat Engineering, Aug 45, pp. 35. 36;
Hosp Intervs, IV, GL–93 (317); XV Corps G–3
1783d Div G–3 Per Rpt 31, 27 Jul, and G–2, Memo, Conf at G–3 Office, Hq Third U.S. Army,
G–3 Jnl, 27 Jul. 281600 Jul, 29 Jul, XV Corps G–3 Jnl and File.
18VIII Corps G–2 Per Rpt 43, 27 Jul, and G–3 2079th Div and VIII Corps AAR’s Jul; Wyche
Per Rpt 43, 28 Jul. Diary.
272 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the VII Corps toward Coutances, were By the evening of 26 July, with the
not yet safe. They still had to reckon road to Canisy clear of CCA troops and
with a third thrust by the VII Corps. COBRAgiving cause for optimism, Gen-
eral Brooks made ready to commit CCB
COBRA Completed on the morning of 27 July in its
originally planned role. Because the
T h e 2d Armored Division, com- road network between the Périers–St.
manded by General Brooks, had the Lô highway and Canisy needed exten-
mission of erecting a fence around Op- sive repairs, division engineers worked
eration COBRA. With General Rose’s through the night and during the morn-
CCA driving along the west bank of the ing to fill craters, remove wrecked vehi-
Vire River toward the ultimate objec- cles, and construct bypasses. Shortly be-
tive of Tessy-sur-Vire and with the re- fore noon, 27 July, CCB crossed the
mainder of the division driving south- Périers–St. Lô highway. Three hours
westward from Canisy toward Bréhal, later, after having ruthlessly barred other
General Brooks was to set up a series of units from the roads assigned to him,
blocks along the Cérences–Tessy-sur- General White had his leading units
Vire line.21 Although protective by through Canisy and headed southwest.22
motivation, the armored attack was ex- At that time General White received
ploitive by nature. By traversing the a change in mission: “Move at once,”
comparatively large distances involved, General Brooks, the division com-
the armored units would arrive in the mander, ordered, “on Cérences and
rear of the German defenses, contribute Bréhal.” T h e enemy forces facing the
to enemy disorganization, and shield the VIII Corps were withdrawing, and CCB
VII Corps main effort westward to was to cut off the withdrawal.23 Instead
Cou tances. of halting at Lengronne, at the Sienne
North of the Périers–St. Lô highway River, in order to leave a coastal cor-
on 26 July and in position for commit- ridor for ap VIII Corps advance beyond
ment behind General Rose’s CCA, CCB Coutances, CCB was to drive all the way
(Brig. Gen. Isaac D. White) was pre- to the Cotentin west coast. General
pared to reinforce the CCA attack to Bradley’s original COBRAmaneuver had
the south or the 1st Division drive to thus been reinstated. T h e primary con-
Coutances. If neither action proved cern of CCB was no longer to prevent
necessary, CCB was to execute its own German reinforcement from the south;
planned role in COBRAby following the combat command attack had become
CCA as far as Canisy and then turning the main thrust of the VII Corps pincer
to the southwest. With the aim of pro- movement westward.24 Inheriting the
tecting the COBRAoperation against a
possible German counterthrust from the
222d Armd Div G–3 Jnl, entries 1735, 26 Jul,
south, CCB was to set up blocking posi- 0859 and 1405, 27 Jul, and Msg, 0030, 27 Jul 30th
tions on the main road between Notre- Div G–3 Jnl and File.
Dame-de-Cenilly and Lengronne. 232d Armd Div G–3 Jnl, entries 1454 and 1600,
27 Jul.
212d Armd Div FO 3 (Rev 1), 20 Jul, and 24 Ltr, Collins to Hechler, 13 Nov 45, quoted in
Annex 3 to FO 3, 18 Jul. Hechler, VII Corps in Opn COBRA,p. 188.
T H E BREAKTHROUGH DEVELOPED 273
mission earlier held by the 1st Division, highway crossed the Soulle River.
General White was to speed his troops to Antitank and small arms fire from the
the coast to intercept and trap the Ger- village halted progress briefly, but the
mans withdrawing toward the south. advance guard soon arrived, deployed,
T h e altered mission involved no change attacked, and seized Pont-Brocard. T h e
in route but rather an extension of the advance continued.
drive as originally planned. Speed be- Two hours after midnight, 27 July,
came even more important. T h e com- the combat command without difficulty
bat command was to race an opponent secured Notre-Dame-de-Cenilly, a village
who had a head start. seven miles southwest of Canisy.
CCB was divided into two columns, This swift advance during the after-
but the absence of parallel roads made it noon and evening of 27 July illustrated
necessary to advance the columns alter- more than anything else the penetration
nately.25 T h e 82d Reconnaissance Bat- achieved by COBRA. There was nothing
talion in the meantime sped forward between the L X X X I V and II Parachute
ahead of the main body. Two miles Corps to stop the American forces roll-
southwest of Canisy, at Quibou, the ing through the Marigny–St. Gilles gap.
reconnaissance troops struck an enemy Positions at Quibou had proved ineffec-
roadblock. While they engaged the tive and illusory. Soon after American
German force, the advance guard out- tanks at Dangy unknowingly passed
flanked the resistance. A battery of the within a few yards of a joint command
78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, post of the 275th Division and Panzer
traveling with the advance guard, took Lehr, a shocked Bayerlein reported Pan-
firing positions on the side of the road zer Lehr “finally annihilated.” Units of
and opened fire on self-propelled guns the 275th Division had been out of con-
and mortar emplacements half a mile tact with headquarters during the entire
distant. A flight of dive bombers per- afternoon and by evening were con-
forming armed-column cover struck an sidered lost. Remnants of the Lehr and
enemy-held ridge nearby. Before this 275th Divisions retired toward Pont-
smooth-working team, the German de- Brocard and Hambye, carrying with
fense disintegrated. them miscellaneous troops in the area.
Once more on the highway, recon- Realizing the extent of the defeat, Bayer-
naissance troops raced through the ham- lein placed the blame on higher head-
let of Dangy, unaware that Bayerlein, the quarters. “All calls for help have been
division commander of Panzer Lehr, ignored,” he complained, “because no
was conducting a staff meeting in one of one [on the upper echelons] believed
the houses. Overrunning isolated op- in the seriousness of the situation.” 26
position, the fast-moving reconnaissance This was hindsight, of course, but the
battalion quickly covered the four miles serious situation was about to become
to Pont-Brocard, a village where the worse.
25 The following account is based on [ Pillsbury] ,
2d Armored Div in Opn COBRA,pp. 47-66; Hech- 26Bayerlein’s Est of the Situation, 2215, 27 Jul,
ler, VII Corps in Opn COBRA,pp. 187-216; 2d Armd A G p B O p . Befehle; see also Liddell Hart, The
Div AAR, Jul. Rommel Papers, p. 490, and MS # A-973 (Schmidt) .
2 74 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
275th Division, and assorted stragglers was killed close to his command post by
found themselves trying to re-form a an American patrol.28
front at Pont-Brocard, where Americans Late in the afternoon of 28 July,
had passed the previous evening.27 when communications between the
Early on 28 July some of these German LXXXIV Corps and the 2d SS Panzer
troops overran part of the 183d Field Division ceased, Col. Friedrich von
Artillery Battalion, a VII Corps Artillery Criegern, the corps chief of staff, went
unit supporting the 2d Armored Divi- forward to make personal contact with
sion from positions near Pont-Brocard. the division. He found that Lt. Col.
Fortunately, the Division Reserve (Col. Otto Baum, the commander of the 17th
Sidney R. Hinds) was on the road from SS Panzer Grenadier Division, had also
Canisy, and it quickly restored Amer- assumed command of the 2d SS Panzer
ican control in the Pont-Brocard–Notre- Division upon Tychsen's death. Baum
Dame-de-Cenilly area. and Criegern together concluded that
This and other evidence made it American troops had probably already
apparent on 28 July that a large German reached the Cotentin west coast and had
force was bottled up near Montpinchon thereby encircled the German forces still
and Roncey. CCB gradually turned its in the Coutances region. They agreed
major attention to the north and north- that an immediate withdrawal to the
west to contain it. T h e combat com- south was in order. They planned to
mand, then, had not, after all, arrived gather all the troops they could find
too late. into an all-around defensive cordon,
On the German side, confusion in the then make a strong attack southward to
LXXXIV Corps coastal sector on 28 July reach the ground below the Bréhal–
was appalling. Communications were Hambye road. While Baum busied
virtually nonexistent. T h e corps head- himself with the preparations for this
quarters had some contact with some course of action, Criegern rushed back
divisions but could not exercise effective to inform Choltitz.29
control. The regiment of the 2d SS Choltitz had just received an order
Panzer Division that was covering the from Hausser to break out of the Cout-
withdrawal of the 91st Division had no ances region by attacking not to the
knowledge of how the withdrawal was south toward Bréhal but to the southeast
proceeding, and the 91st had no informa- toward Percy. Hausser wanted to get
tion about its covering force. Some those forces that broke out of the Amer-
withdrawing troops found to their dis- ican encirclement to join troops that
comfiture that the Americans that had Kluge was assembling east of the Vire
crossed the Soulle River at Pont-Brocard River for a counterattack west of the
were already behind them. Hausser
was fired on by an American armored Jul,28 Telecons, Pemsel and Tempelhoff, 0845, 28
Helmdach and Tempelhoff, 1555, 28 Jul, and
car near Gavray. Tychsen, the com- Hoehne and Zimmerman, 1030, 28 Jul, in AGp B
mander of the 2d SS Panzer Division, KTB; MS # A–984 (Mahlmann); MS # B–839
(Heydte); MS # P–195 (Wisliceny).
29 Choltit Soldat Unter Soldaten, p. 209 17th
SS Engr Bn KTB, 28 Jul; MS # P–159 (Stueckler) ;
27MS # A–984 (Mahlmann) Sitrep, 29 Jul, in A G p B Tagesmeldungen.
276 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Vire to seal off the COBRApenetration. Kluge’s instructions did not reach the
A good meeting point for the two forces LXXXIV Corps units. Unable to
moving toward each other, Hausser phone Choltitz, Hausser transmitted a
figured, would be Percy. Choltitz pro- message to the corps rear command post.
tested that an attack southeast from There, the corps quartermaster took a
Coutances would leave only weak forces bicycle and rode forward to give the
to anchor the entire Normandy front on message to Choltitz. He arrived about
the Cotentin west coast. But Hausser midnight of 28 July. Without com-
insisted, and Choltitz complied. He munications to subordinate units and
transmitted the order forward-the therefore lacking control of their opera-
troops that were virtually encircled south tions, Choltitz did nothing. Satisfied
of Coutances were to attack to the south- that the units under the control of the
east, and not to withdraw to the souh. 91st Division were withdrawing south
Hausser of course notified Kluge of along the coast, he allowed the rest of
the instructions he had issued through the situation to develop as it would.
Choltitz, and when Kluge learned that T h e corps headquarters moved to the
Hausser had virtually stripped his coastal south and escaped intact. Meanwhile,
positions and thereby jeopardized the the other units along the coast prepared
entire Normandy defenses by inviting to attack southeast in compliance with
American encirclement of the German Hawser’s original order. T h e effect
left flank, he nearly became violent. He would be to storm the blocking positions
told Hausser to send an officer courier that the 2d Armored Division had
to Choltitz at once to cancel the order stretched across the Cotentin.
for the southeastward attack to Percy. T h e American commanders, Generals
Instead, Choltitz was to mount a hold- Brooks and White, guessing that the
ing attack to enable the main LXXXIV Germans would try to break out during
Corps body to escape south along the the night of 28 July, called in their dis-
coast. T h e withdrawal was to be made persed and exposed detachments late in
under the protection of outposts that the afternoon. Reinforced by the Divi-
were to hold positions along the north- sion Reserve and by an infantry battal-
south railroad between Coutances and ion of the 4th Division that came into
Cérences. Meanwhile, a counterattack, Notre-Dame-de-Cenilly that evening, the
to be launched now by two fresh panzer armored troops took strong defensive
divisions, would strike westward across positions along a seven-mile line be-
the Vire toward Percy to act as a diver- tween Pont-Brocard and St. Denis-le-
sion for the withdrawal. Once south of Gast, alert to the possibility that the
Cérences, the LXXXIV Corps was to Germans might try to break out from
occupy a new ten-mile-long main line the Montpinchon–Roncey area to safety.
of resistance from Bréhal through St. Meanwhile, Hawser’s original order
Denis-le-Gast to Gavray. 31 transmitted by Choltitz had brought dis-
30Choltitz, Soldat Unter Soldaten, p. 208; see MS
# B–179 (Hausser). A G p B KTB; see MS # B–179 (Hausser) for a
31Telecons, kluge and Hausser, 2000 and 2130, candid account of the command confusion and the
28 Jul, and Pemsel and Tempelhoff. 2000, 28 Jul, conflicting orders.
T H E BREAKTHROUGH DEVELOPED 277
may to Baum. Baum had been pro- proached a crossroads about three miles
ceeding on the assumption (made by southwest of Notre-Dame-de-Cenilly,
him and Criegern) that he could easily where a company of armored infantry
get the two divisions under his control- and a company of tanks were deployed.
the 2d SS Panzer and the 17th SS Panzer German infantrymen crawled along the
Grenadier –to safety by way of a south- ditches on both sides of the road as half
ern exit. He had become even more a dozen enemy tanks and armored
confident when he learned that the 2d vehicles assaulted frontally to force open
Armored Division had pulled in its an escape route. T h e self-propelled gun
troops to St. Denis-le-Gast, thereby leav- in the lead overran the American defen-
ing open a ten-mile-wide corridor be- sive line and was about to make a break-
tween that village and the coast. Further- through when rifle shots killed the driver
more, Baum had already pulled his units and gunner. With the gun carriage
back from the eastern edge of the pocket, blocking the road, individual American
and he no longer had a firm hold on the and German soldiers battled for the
area northwest of Notre-Dame-de- crossroads until daybreak, when the Ger-
Cenilly. Without that sector as an as- mans withdrew, leaving 17 dead and 150
sembly area, he could not launch an wounded. T h e motor of the un-
attack to the southeast through Notre- damaged self-propelled gun carriage was
Dame-de-Cenilly to Percy. Baum com- still running, the gun still loaded. T h e
promised. He withdrew southward Americans sustained less than 50 casual-
across the Sienne River, then turned ties and lost a tank and a half-track.32
eastward to Percy and thereby achieved About the same time, not far away,
the desired result by different means. about fifteen German tanks and several
T h e other German troops north hundred troops overran an outpost
of Cérences that were covering the manned by a company of the recently
LXXXIV Corps withdrawal drifted arrived battalion of the 4th Division.
south in the meantime and gathered T h e American company commander
near Roncey to attempt to break out to was killed at once and the infantrymen
the southeast. T h e main components fell back half a mile into the positions of
of this force that could be identified in- the 78th Armored Field Artillery Battal-
cluded parts of the 2d SS Panzer Divi- ion. Two artillery batteries in direct
sion and the 17th SS Engineer Battalion, fire, a third in indirect fire, and four
most of the 6th Parachute Regiment, guns of the 702d Tank Destroyer Battal-
and what remained of the 17th SS Pan- ion held off the Germans for thirty
zer Grenadier Division. By striking to- minutes until nearby armored infantry-
ward Hambye and Percy, these and other men arrived to re-establish the outpost
troops were to demonstrate that the line. They found seven destroyed Mark
defensive efforts on the parr of the 2d IV tanks and counted more than 125
Armored Division had not been wasted. enemy dead. Some Germans had
Shortly before dawn, 29 July, about
32S. Sgt. James J. Cermak of the 41st Armored
thirty enemy tanks and vehicles, led by Infantry Regiment was awarded the DSC for
an 88 -mm. self-propelled gun, ap- heroism.
278 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
escaped in these two actions. Others Germans maintained their control over
escaped by filtering through American the bridge at Gavray, elsewhere only
lines in small groups. In general, how- small enemy groups offered half-hearted
ever, the CCB cordon proved effective. resistance.
Troops all along the line had collected German hopes for an eventual con-
enemy stragglers and demoralized rem- certed breakout attempt were largely
nants of small German units. destroyed on 29 July by Allied tactical
Quite certain that Allied fighter- aircraft. T h e destruction that occurred
bombers would prevent a German escape went far beyond Allied anticipation.
in strength during daylight, General On the afternoon of 29 July pilots of the
White again pushed his defensive line to IX Tactical Air Command discovered
Lengronne on the morning of 29 July. a “fighter-bomber’s paradise” in the
He re-established the roadblocks at inter- Roncey area–a mass of German trafic,
sections and sent outposts to the Sienne stationary, bumper to bumper, and
River bridges. General Brooks moved “triple banked.” Pilots estimated at
the Division Reserve to St. Denis-le-Gast least 500 vehicles jammed around Ron-
to keep an eye on German movements cey, and for six hours that afternoon the
south of the Sienne River. Though the planes attacked what became known as
T H E BREAKTHROUGH DEVELOPED 279
that had attacked St. Denis-le-Gast got At the same time the small task force
through the village, but instead of driv- that had established an outpost on the
ing south they moved westward toward Coutances–Gavray road near Cambry
Lengronne, toward the bivouac of the finally saw action after two days of
78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. patient waiting. Shortly after mid-
Earlier that night U.S. artillerymen night, 29 July, about 2,500 Germans
manning guard posts around their how- made an organized break for safety.
itzers had killed or captured individual T h e point of the German attack overran
soldiers and small groups of men, but a tank roadblock and threatened to
the small German column entered the crush the entire outpost force. Sgt.
American lines undetected. Moving Hulon B. Whittington, of the 41st
rapidly, the column passed an antitank Armored Infantry, jumped on an Amer-
gun guarding the road. Perhaps the ican tank, shouted through the turret
sentries assumed that the vehicles were to direct its crew, and maneuvered it
American, perhaps they were too startled through enemy bullets to a place where
to open fire. Well inside the artillery its point-blank fire destroyed the
bivouac area, an American officer momentum of the German attack.36
stopped the column and challenged the Its attack stalled, the German force
driver of the lead truck. “Was ist?” fell apart. Some panic-stricken Ger-
came the surprised and surprising reply. mans fled or surrendered, others battled
Mutual astonishment quickly vanished at close range near burning vehicles.
and the battle commenced. Machine U.S. artillery battalions gave excellent
guns chattered. Howitzers at point- supporting fires without prior registra-
blank range, some from distances of less tion and without clearance from the divi-
than a hundred yards, opened fire. A sion artillery. As a result of the six-
tank destroyer crew at the side of the hour engagement, 450 Germans were
road making emergency motor repairs killed, 1,000 taken prisoner, and about
began to fire 3 -inch shells into the rear 100 vehicles of all types destroyed.
of the German column. With the lead- American losses were about 50 killed
ing and rear vehicles of the column de- and 60 wounded.
stroyed, the Germans tried to flee on As day broke on 30 July, hundreds of
foot. Silhouetted by the flames of burn- destroyed vehicles and wagons, innumer-
ing vehicles, they made excellent targets able dead horses, and the miscellaneous
for the small arms of the artillerymen. wreckage of defeat lay scattered over the
T h e battle was short. In the morning, countryside, grim testimony to the ex-
the artillerymen counted go enemy tent of the debacIe that the Germans
dead, over 200 prisoners, and all 11 had suffered in the Cotentin. T h e 2d
vehicles destroyed. T h e Americans had Armored Division alone had killed an
lost 5 killed and 6 wounded.35 estimated 1,500 enemy and captured
about 4,000, while losing not quite 100
35 Among those killed was Capt. Naubert O. Si- dead and less than 300 wounded. CCB,
mard, Jr., who manned an exposed machine gun
though he knew that to do so was certain death.
Captain Simard was posthumously awarded the
DSC. 36Sgt. Whittington received the Medal of Honor.
T H E BREAKTHROUGH DEVELOPED 28 1
General Collins felt, had done “a mag- Percy westward to the sea, the difficulty
nificent job.” 37 was that the men were exhausted. As
T h e fact that the action was over by they attempted to establish a defense they
30 July became apparent as recon- fumbled about in various stages of wake-
naissance troops combing the region fulness. One unit commander, von der
rounded up 250 prisoners and killed Heydte, brought his 6th Parachute Regi-
nearly 100 other Germans still trying to ment into a concealed bivouac and there,
escape. Shortly before noon, a group hidden from Americans and Germans
of 100 enemy soldiers walked into a alike, permitted his men to sleep for
command post of the armored division twenty-four hours before reporting his
and surrendered. location to higher headquarters.38
Thus ended Operation COBRAon the From Gavray west to the sea the front
Cotentin west coast in a final action not was held largely by remnants gathered
unlike the last twitch of a lifeless snake. under the banner of the 91st Division.
Even as COBRAwas expiring, the battle Although these forces had had a rela-
was passing beyond the limits contem- tively easy time in withdrawing south
plated for the action. With the Ger- along the coast, they had nevertheless
mans reduced to impotence, the offen- been bombed and strafed and had lost
sive was becoming quite different from troops, equipment, and supplies. Un-
the original conception. able to form a continuous, strong, or
Despite German losses in the Coten- stable line of defense, they were destined
tin, a rather large force escaped in the to be overrun in the midafternoon of
confusion. Among the units that fought 30 July.
or fled to safety were a battalion of Mark Learning that little existed to oppose
IV tanks of the 2d SS Panzer Division, an American sweep down the Cotentin
and sizable contingents of the 17th SS west coast, the German naval coast artil-
Engineer Battalion, the 6th Parachute lery battery in Granville destroyed its
Regiment, and the 17th SS Panzer Gren- guns and retreated toward Avranches.
adier Division. Many individual sol- By nightfall, 30 July, headquarters of
diers had also reached refuge. Quite a the LXXXIV Corps and the advance
few who had abandoned their vehicles command post of the Seventh Army were
in the congested mass of traffic around behind American lines. T h e only con-
Roncey and left them to Allied air force tact that Army Group B had with the
bombardment organized themselves in- combat troops along the Cotentin west
to haphazard command groups, some coast was that maintained by the crew of
effective, some not, and made their way a telephone relay station in Avranches,
south. Though a sufficient number of at the base of the Cotentin. Just before
troops gathered to man a line from dark on 30 July, the signal crew reported
the approach of U.S. troops.39
37Ltr, Collins to Hechler, quoted in Hechler,
VII Corps in Opn COBRA,p. 216; [Pillsbury], 2d
Armored Div in Opn COBRA,p. 85; VII Corps AAR, 38M S # P-159 (Heydte) .
Jul. 39AGp B K T B , 30 Jul.
CHAPTER XV
4 V Corps AAR, Jul, Ltr of Instrs to the 5th Div, 6 Observations of the Div Comdr During Jul,
24 Jul, FO Jul, Ltr of Instrs supplementing
13, 21 2d Div AAR, Jul; 2 d Div FO 6, 19 Jul; 5th Div FO
FO 12, 24 Jul, and G–3 Situation Map, 2030, 25 2, 17 Jul, and FO 3, 22 Jul; V Corps Ltr of Instrs
Jul; Memo, Maj Gen S. LeRoy Irwin to Gen to 5th Div, 24 Jul.
Gerow, 23 Jul, V Corps G–3 Jnl. 7V Corps History, p. 121; Gen Bd Arty Rpt,
5 FUSA Ltr, Relief of 1st Div by 5th Inf Div, App. C; V Corps Ord Sec Rpts V Corps AAR, Jul.
11 Jul, and Msgs, FUSA G–3 Jnl, 12–14 Jul; V 89th Inf AAR, Jul; Observations of the Div
Corps History, p. 124; Gen Bd Arty Rpt, App. C; Comdr During Jul, 2d Div AAR, Jul; 741st T k Bn
V Corps Ord Sec Rpt, V Corps AAR, Jul. AAR, Jul.
EXPLOITING T H E BREACH 285
notable advances. On the division left, another 1,500 yards. Cutting the St.
the 9th Infantry used twenty-five .50- Lô–Caumont highway, the regiment
caliber machine guns previously em- made a total advance of two miles. 10
placed on high ground to deliver flank- By the end of the first day, the units of
ing fire across the regimental front and the V Corps had taken about 300
advanced steadily for almost two miles. prisoners and advanced half way to the
Against artillery, mortar, and slight St. Jean-des-Baisants ridge. T h e drive
small-arms fire, the regiment nearly cost nearly a thousand casualties, chiefly
reached the St. Lô–Caumont highway. from artillery fire.11 T h e assault troops
Comprising one half of the corps right had broken through the crust of the
flank pincer force, the 23d Infantry German defenses, though they had been
gained almost a mile and reached a unable to exploit local penetrations be-
lateral country road. There, German cause of the terrain, the wide frontages,
artillery and high-velocity weapons and, in the case of the 2d Infantry Regi-
placed flanking fire on the road and ment, a certain amount of disorganiza-
prevented a crossing in strength. T h e tion within the battalions.12 T h e V
fire also made it difficult to evacuate Corps clearly appeared to be accomplish-
casualties and bring up supplies. On ing its main mission of containing some
the division right, where the 38th In- of the German forces and preventing
fantry composed the other half of the them from bringing their strength to
pincer force, a comparable advance was bear on the main development of COBRA
made except on the extreme right. west of the Vire River.
Stanch resistance and an increasingly ex- Resuming the attack on 27 July, V
posed right flank forced a halt.9 Corps advanced but did not reach its
Employing artillery fire to good objective. T h e two regiments of the
advantage, the only regiment of the 5th 2d Division, comprising the right arm
Division to attack, the 2d Infantry, also of the corps pincer movement, gained
made a quick initial gain of about a about a thousand yards against resist-
thousand yards. It was making a flank- ance that was appreciably less deter-
ing approach to the St. Jean-des-Baisants
ridge when intense and accurate Ger- 10The intensity of the combat may be judged
man fire caused considerable disorganiza- from the fact that five soldiers of the 5th Division
were awarded the DSC, two posthumously: Pfc.
tion. Nevertheless, by committing all Milo J. Flynn, Pfc. Amijan O. Lazar, Pvt. Jack Gill,
three battalions judiciously, the regi- S. Sgt. Richard F. Heinzelman, and T. Sgt. Lloyd
mental commander, Col. A. Worrell N. Peterson.
11V Corps G–2 Per Rpts, 26 and 27 Jul. Losses
Roffe, was able to keep the attack going for the 2d Infantry were officially placed at 147,
a low figure produced in compliance with a First
9S. Sgt. Edward V. Maloney of the 38th Cavalry Army order that estimates of men missing in action
Reconnaissance Squadron, who though mortally were to be “no higher than absolutely necessary.”
wounded continued to fire the guns of his tank to (5th Div G–1 Jnl, 26 Jul.) To equate its reported
cover the defensive preparations of his unit, was figures and its actual losses, the division reported
posthumously awarded the DSC. Pfc. Clifford L. higher losses during the succeeding days. General
Curry of the same unit walked through fire on Irwin, Personal Diary; see also Topete et al., Opns
the battlefield to rescue a wounded soldier. All of V Corps, p. 25.
fire “ceased in salute” as he carried the wounded 13Observations of the Div Comdr During Jul,
man back to safety. He was awarded the DSC. 2d Div AAR, Jul; Comments, 5th Div AAR, Jul.
286 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
was apparent that the success of COBRA Thus the German course of action would
warranted a continuation of the attack, probably be an attempt to erect a hasty
and Bradley decided to exploit his gains defensive line between Avranches and
and broaden and extend his effort. the town of Vire, a line along the south
Specifically, the enemy withdrawal bank of the Sée River and the high
along the west coast of the Cotentin on ground south of Villedieu-les-Poëles and
27 July-later judged the decisive con- St. Sever-Calvados. T h e possibility was
sequence of COBRA–seemed to offer an also present that the Germans might
opportunity to hasten the withdrawal counterattack from the east with two
and turn it into a rout.16 T h e fact that panzer divisions, but this hardly seemed
the opposition east of Coutances was so likely at the moment. T h e significant
strong appeared particularly significant- conclusion was that “destruction of
the forces there were obviously trying LXXXIV Corps is believed at hand, and
“to hold open the door of retreat for the destruction of II Parachute Corps is
the LXXXIV Corps.” Even the Luft- an immediate possibility.” 19
waffe put in an appearance-a total of T o give the enemy “no time to re-
thirty planes made eight daylight and group and reorganize his forces,” Gen-
sixteen night raids.17 T h e Germans eral Bradley ordered his subordinate
had realized the danger of becoming commanders to “maintain unrelenting
isolated on the Cotentin west coast and pressure” on the Germans.20 His great
had attempted to escape encirclement reliance on the judgment of his corps
by withdrawing. “ T o say that . . . [we commanders, as well as the fluidity of
are] riding high tonight is putting it the situation, led him to formulate his
mildly,” General Bradley wrote General instructions in rather general terms.21
Eisenhower. “Things on our front There was no need for specifics. Two
really look good.” 18 immediate tasks lay ahead. T h e Ger-
As judged by American intelligence man forces still north of Coutances had
officers-whose gratification over the to be destroyed, those retreating to the
COBRA results led to some optimistic ex- south had to be pursued. Difficulties
aggeration-the Germans in the Coten- were apparent.
tin were in flight by 27 July. T h e only On the Cotentin west coast, where
hope the Germans could have of stem- German disorganization seemed greatest,
ming their retreat was to gain refuge be- the VII and VIII Corps still had to com-
hind the Sée River at Avranches. T h e plete their COBRA mission of eliminating
“bits and pieces,” the “shattered rem- the German forces trapped near Cout-
nants,” and the “battered portions” of ances. At the same time, the VII Corps,
the units in the Cotentin were hardly which had veered westward toward the
in shape to make a stand unless fresh coast, now had to turn south. Futher-
troops came forward to reinforce them, more, VII Corps threatened to cause
and no fresh troops seemed available. confusion by intermingling with VIII
16First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I , 102. 19FUSA G–2 Est 12, 28 Jul.
17FUSA G–2 Per Rpt 48, 28 Jul. 20FUSA FO 2, 28 Jul.
18Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 2 8 Jul, Pogue 21 First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I , 104-
Files. 06.
288 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Corps units. T h e VIII Corps, in addi- T o take the step into Brittany, Gen-
tion to concern over the approach of the eral Patton’s Third Army headquarters
VII Corps toward its zone of advance, was ready to become operational. When
faced mines and wrecked vehicles, the Third Army became actively in-
obstacles that were serious hindrances to volved in operations on the continent,
a rapid advance in the restricted coastal the projected new U.S. command struc-
road net. Time would be needed to ture was to go into effect: General Brad-
regroup both corps and clear the roads, ley would take command of the 12th
minimum prerequisites, it seemed, for Army Group and Lt. Gen. Courtney H.
effective exploitation south toward Hodges, the Deputy Commander, First
Avranches. Army, would replace him as the First
East of the Vire River, where only the Army commander. It seemed as though
V Corps remained, General Gerow’s the moment for the change might coin-
offensive was inevitably tied to British cide with the end of the exploitation
efforts on his left flank. growing out of COBRA.
Only the XIX Corps received precise So that the U.S. forces could slip neatly
instructions from General Bradley. into the new command organization at
General Corlett was to displace the XIX the conclusion of the exploitation, Gen-
Corps west of the Vire River and assume eral Bradley made a special arrangement.
responsibility for what had been part of He asked General Hodges “to keep close
the VII Corps zone. Corlett was to track of” the three corps on the left.
“attack aggressively” in a drive south He informally appointed General Pat-
along the west bank of the Vire to a ton a second deputy commander and
“goose egg” Bradley had drawn on a assigned him the mission of supervising
map. T h e “goose-egg” objective was the activities of the VIII Corps on the
about twenty miles south of le Mesnil- right. T h e VIII Corps, scheduled to
Herman and encompassed the Forêt de come under control of the Third Army,
St. Sever and the town of Vire. was to act as a bridge to link the post-
If XIX Corps could secure its objec- COBRAexploitation and the entrance of
tive, it would be into and partially U.S. troops into Brittany. T h e Third
through the highest terrain in Nor- Army was expected to be committed
mandy-a hill mass extending from and pass into Brittany about 1 August.22
Avranches through Vire to Falaise— In the meantime, although COBRA
and would be able to deny the Germans and its consequences were an American
use of the ground as the basis of a new responsibility, General Montgomery, as
defensive line. Vire, an important road the Allied ground commander, was
center less than twenty miles from the vitally concerned to promote progress
base of the Cotentin, would provide the on the American front. T o create a
First Army an excellent pivot for the diversion for COBRA,he had directed
wheeling movement projected a month General Crerar to launch a holding
earlier-the turn to the east that would attack on the Canadian front from Caen
allow other American forces to enter 22TUSA AAR, I, Ch. 2 ; Ltr, Bradley to Eisen-
Brittany. hower, 28 Jul, Pogue Files.
EXPLOITING T H E BREACH 289
l’Evêque to the town of Vire, the British As the opposing II Parachute Corps
were to attack on 30 July. 24 pulled back in the hope of establishing
Out of Operation COBRA thus emerged defenses that could be tied in with the
a plan of exploitation, a plan that line the German units west of the Vire
sought to intensify German disorgani- were trying to form, the V Corps on 28
zation by relentless pressure on the July secured its COBRAobjective, the St.
American front and by a quick thrust Jean-des-Baisants ridge from Ste. Suz-
south from Caumont on the British anne-sur-Vire to Vidouville. All three
front. If the plan succeeded, the Allied divisions advanced against light resist-
turning movement toward the southeast ance and captured few prisoners. Al-
would become a reality, and American though the enemy seemed much weaker
troops would be able to enter Brittany. as a result of the three-day attack and
For the plan to succeed, the V and XIX thus made prospects of a virtually un-
Corps of the First Army and the right limited advance seem possible for the
flank corps of the Second British Army V Corps, General Gerow was reluctant
first h a dt o secure a firm pivot point at to initiate an unrestrained attack because
the town of Vire. of the terrain and his left flank. (See
Map VI.)
East of the Vire River The Souloeuvre–Vire river line, eleven
miles beyond the St. Jean-des-Bais-
While the British were preparing to ants ridge, appeared the obvious V Corps
join the offensive east of the V i r e ,t h e objective. Although the water alone
V Corps resumed the attack. Assuming constituted an obstacle to vehicular
responsibility for all the American-held movement, the river runs through a
territory east of the Vire on 2 8 July by ridge mass more than two miles in depth
taking control of the 35th Division, Gen- that presented an even more serious bar-
eral Gerow had free rein to push the V rier to military advance. Steep-walled
Corps to the south in the general di- hills from 600 to 900feet high would
rection of the town of Vire. Though provide the Germans dominant obser-
General Bradley had assigned him no vation, cover and concealment, fields of
specific objectives, Bradley had asked fire, and a good communications net-
him to keep the army headquarters in- work. Hoping to secure the area before
formed on his intentions and progress. the Germans could organize it for de-
To his three divisions—the 2d, 5th, and fense, General Gerow nevertheless felt
35th—General Gerow stated his mission that the intervening terrain precluded
as he understood it: “We must keep a rapid advance. In the heart of the
going to maintain contact, and not give bocage country, the corps sector east of
the Boche a chance to dig in. See that the Vire was a region of small irregular
all understand this.” 25 hills, small winding roads, and small
hedgerowed fields. Combat there was
24British Army of the Rhine, Operation BLUE- sure to resemble the earlier battle of the
COAT, p. 1; Conf Notes, 1100, 28 Jul, and 1645,
28 Jul, FUSA G–3 Misc File.
hedgerows in the Cotentin.26
25V Corps Memo, FUSA FO 2, 28 Jul, and pen- 26V Corps G–2 Sec Tactical Study of the Ter-
ciled note, V Corps G–3 Jnl. rain, 30 Jul; XIX Corps G–2 Est of Bocage, 25 Jul.
EXPLOITING T H E BREACH 291
T h e second factor working against an will relieve you when I get ready to do
unchecked V Corps advance was Gener- so,” he snapped, but later sought to
al Gerow’s concern over his left flank. soothe him: “Do not get discouraged,”
Until the British attacked south from he said, “this is hedgerow fighting. It
Caumont on 30 July (prevented until is tough.” 30
then by difficulties of regrouping and Receiving word that the Germans
deployment) and covered the flank, a were withdrawing all along the First
headlong advance by V Corps would Army front and learning that the British
expose an increasingly vulnerable side were planning to attack on the following
to the enemy. day, General Gerow on 29 July ordered
General Gerow’s solution for his two his division commanders into an all-out
problems was to set limits on his ad- advance. Instead of merely preventing
vance in order to keep tight control.27 disengagement, the corps was to “drive
T h e Germans facilitated the V Corps strong and hard” in “a relentless pur-
advance when the II Parachute Corps, suit.’’31 As translated by General Rob-
with permission, pulled back again.28 ertson, the troops were to “by-pass
Moving to the first limit of advance with everything. Never mind these little
very little difficulty, V Corps by noon pockets of resistance. . . . Let’s get
29 July held a line from Condé-sur-Vire down and take a bath in the Vire.” 32
to the British positions near Caumont. (Map VII)
When the corps commander ordered the T h e instructions came too late.
attack continued, troops pushed forward Though army headquarters claimed that
again for several thousand yards against only some “tired old Austrians” were in
sporadic resistance.29 opposition, the troops had moved into
Despite the absence of an organized contact with a defensive line covering
German defensive line, the V Corps di- an important road net centering on To-
visions did not have an easy time. T h e rigni-sur-Vire. As the 35th Division on
terrain inhibited rapid advance, and am- 30 July tried to take Torigni and the 2d
bush lurked around every twist in the and 5th Division to occupy high ground
road. T h e bocage hills were populated east of the village, the Germans inflicted
by German rear-guard parties who used close to 1,000 casualties, halted the ad-
artillery, mortars, and small arms fire
effectively. One American regimental 30Telecon, Robertson and Hirschfelder, 1930,
commander, apparently near exhaustion, 29 Jul, 2d Div G–3 Jnl. On the previous day,
reported, “Things are not going very Colonel Hirschfelder, the 9th Infantry commander,
had inspired his assault troops by turning his
well,” and said he “would like to be re- back to enemy lire and, in full view of the Ger-
lieved of command.” T h e division mans, had removed his helmet, placed his hands
commander was not sympathetic. “I on his hips, and asked his men what was holding
them up. This display of courage and of psycho-
logical inspiration provided the spark for continued
27V Corps FO, 29 Jul, and G–3 Situation Map, attack. Colonel Hirschfelder was awarded the DSC.
2030, 28 Jul; 5th Div Outline Plan, 0230, 27 Jul. 31V Corps FO 16, 29 Jul, Ltr of Instrs, 29 Jul,
28Msg, Kluge to Hausser, 28 Jul, A G p B Op. Be- and Memos for the Record by the CofS, 1120 and
fehle, p. 195; Telecon, Tempelhoff and Pemsel, 1250, 29 Jul.
0935, 28 Jul, AGp B K T B . 32Telecon, Robertson and Hirschfelder, 0920, 30
29V Corps G–3 Jnl, 29 Jul. Jul, 2d Div G–3 Jnl.
292 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
vance, and dashed American hopes for XIX Corps on the right advanced as pro-
an immediate pursuit.33 jected, the V Corps would be pinched
T o breach the new line, the subordi- out near Vire.37 Blocking the approach
nate units of the V Corps made detailed to the V Corps limit of advance was the
attack plans, only to discover as they east-west Vire-Souloeuvre river line and
prepared to launch a co-ordinated offen- hill mass, seven miles north of Vire.
sive on the morning of 31 July that the These factors generally and a conver-
Germans had disengaged.34 Kluge had sation with General Bradley specifically
authorized the II Parachute Corps to governed General Gerow's desire to cross
withdraw. 35 In falling back, the Ger- the hills and the water barriers quick-
mans abandoned not only the Torigni ly.38 Earlier on 31 July, Gerow had in-
road net but also terrain that was highly structed his division commanders to
defensible. Only mines and sporadic move only as far as the river line. Later
harassing artillery fire opposed an unin- in the afternoon he ordered each division
terrupted advance. American troops commander to get at least one battalion
cheerfully advanced across undefended of each front-line regiment across the
ground, while their commanders chafed river before dark.
at the thought of the enemy slipping On the corps right and in its center,
away undetected.36 the 35th and 2d Divisions met such
Although all concerned pressed for strong resistance on the approaches to
speedy pursuit, the pace of the V Corps the water line-and particularly near
advance slowed during the afternoon of Tessy-sur-Vire-that it became obvious
31 July. Nearing the Souloeuvre-Vire that they could not comply with instruc-
water line, the corps encountered pockets tion. 39 On the other hand, the 5th Di-
of resistance and delaying forces with vision on the left met relatively light
increasing frequency. T h e pursuit resistance, indicating that a hard push
again threatened to come to a halt. might gain a bridgehead across the
T h e boundaries delineating the corps stream.
zone of advance met near the town of Unable to reach General Irwin, the
Vire, fourteen miles southwest of To- 5th Division commander, personally,
rigni. If the British on the left and the Gerow phoned one of Irwin's regimental
commanders and told him to mount his
3335th Div G–3 Per Rpt 22, 31 Jul; Ltr, Brig infantry on tanks. They were to bypass
Gen Ralph W. Zwicker to OCMH, 14 Mar 56, resistance, use only good roads, and get
OCMH files. Three members of the 5th Division to the water and across it in at least bat-
were awarded the DSC for heroic action that day:
1st Lt. Arthur J. Miller, S. Sgt. Konstanty Gugala,
and Pfc. Henry N. Powell, the latter posthumously. 37V Corps G–3 Situation Map, 2030, 29 Jul.
342d Div G–2 Per Rpt and G–3 Jnl, 31 Jul; 35th 38Telecon, Gerow and Irwin, 1710, 31 Jul, 5th
Div FO 11, 30 Jul, and G–2 Per Rpt, 31 Jul; 5th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
Div AAR, Jul, and G–2 Per Rpt, 31 Jul; Gerow 392d Lt. John F. Hermanspan, Jr., of the 35th
Msg, 1930, 30 Jul, 5th Div G–3 Jnl and File. Division, after withdrawing his platoon from a
35Telecon, 0030, 31 Jul, A G p B KTB; Msg, AGp village, discovered that six wounded men had been
B to II Para Corps (for information to the Seventh abandoned there. Hermanspan re-entered the vil-
Army and Panzer Group W e s t ) , 31 Jul, AGp B Op. lage and created a diversion to cover the evacuation
Befehle, p. 206. of the casualties. Fatally wounded, Hermanspan
36See the corps and div G–3 Jnls, 31 Jul. was posthumously awarded the DSC.
294 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
talion strength. “In short,” Gerow throughout the day, out of contact much
commanded, “hurry.” 40 Half an hour of the time with other division units.
later he explained to Irwin, “I told you By then, however, after having ad-
before to stop at the river–now I want vanced more than seven miles in six
you to change that.” T h e 5th Division days, the corps had reached the end of
was to cover the more than six miles to what had earlier promised to develop
the river line in record time.41 into an unlimited pursuit. On 1 Au-
Less than an hour after Gerow for- gust, as the 35th and 2d Divisions fought
warded these instructions, he learned near Tessy-sur-Vire to get to the Soulo-
that a British armored division had at- euvre–Vire line, the boundary separating
tacked to the southwest, entered the V the British and Americans was moved
Corps zone, and secured two bridges to the west, thereby narrowing the V
across the river. “Well now, I don’t Corps sector and pinching out the en-
like British walking across our front tire 5th Division.
[and] taking [our] objectives,” Gener- Part of the reason for the boundary
al Gerow complained.42 But since the change was the success of the British at-
British had already secured a bridge- tack south from Caumont. In compli-
head he saw no reason why the Amer- ance with Montgomery’s endeavor to
icans could not use it, specifically the 5th deny the Germans the pivot point near
Division, for a quick drive across the re- Mont Pincon, General Dempsey had
maining seven miles to the town of launched the 8 Corps in Operation
Vire. 43 BLUECOATon 30 July. Following a
Unfortunately, the intermingling of bombardment by 700 heavy bombers
British tanks and American infantrymen and 500 medium and light bombers that
caused confusion. T h e opportunity for dropped 2,200 tons of high explosive,
an immediate exploitation by either the the British attacked a sector that was
British or the Americans was lost. 44 lightly defended. Only the bombed and
One regiment of the 5th Division inexperienced 326th Infantry Division
reached the north bank of the Soulo- stood in the way. On the first day of
euvre River during the early morning the attack, the 11th British Armoured
hours of 1 August. There it remained Division advanced six to eight miles to
come abreast of the V Corps east of To-
40Telecon, Gen Gerow and Col Charles W. Yuill, rigni-sur-Vire. Operations on 31 July
1645, 31 Jul, 5th Div G–3 Jnl and File. were hampered by the terrain: by the
41Telecon, Gerow and Irwin, 1710, 31 Jul, 5th pronounced ridges running across the
Div G–3 Jnl and File.
42Telecon, Gerow and Irwin, 1750, 31 Jul, 5th axis of advance; by the streams, which
Div G–3 Jnl and File. According to V Corps O p - flowed in all directions and which in
erations in the E T O , page 150, the British secured many cases were tank obstacles because
permission to move the armored unit on the road
net across the 5th Division front. Who gave per- of their width, depth, or marshy ap-
mission is not stated. proaches; and by the tortuous roads,
43V Corps Msg, 1750, 31 Jul, and Telecon, Gerow which were often banked by high
and Irwin, 1910, 31 Jul, 5th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
44 5th Div G–3 Jnl, entries 1840, 1855, and 2245,
hedges. But these difficulties were
31 Jul. quickly overcome when the British dis-
EXPLOITING T H E BREACH 295
covered that the Forêt l’Evêque, which River to launch a counterattack designed
was astride the boundary between the to close the gap.
Seventh Army and Panzer Group West, Kluge at first thought of using the II
had through oversight been left unoc- Parachute Corps to direct the counter-
cupied by the Germans. A vital stretch attack, but he quickly decided to insert
of some 1,500 yards of country was theirs a new corps between the II Parachute
for the taking. Thrusting through the and the LXXXIV. T h e LVIII Panzer
forest, the 11 th Armoured Division Corps headquarters was moving from
quickly gained the south bank of the the Fifteenth Army toward the Panzer
Souloeuvre River and by 1 August oc- Group West area, and Kluge considered
cupied high ground immediately east employing the panzer corps in the Sev-
of the Vire.45 enth Army center to handle the 2d Pan-
zer Division counterthrust already
A Clash of Spearheads planned to take place toward Marigny
and St. Gilles. 46 Kluge soon recognized,
While the V Corps and the British however, that the situation was chang-
were driving toward Vire from the north ing too rapidly for him to await commit-
and northeast, XIX Corps was thrusting ment of the LVIII Panzer Corps. Tak-
toward Vire from the northwest. T h e ing the XLVII Panzer Corps, which was
evidence unearthed by COBRAindicated not only more experienced but also
that the Germans had nothing to stop closer to the Cotentin, and replacing it
a XIX Corps advance along the west in the Panzer Group West front with
bank of the Vire, and General Bradley the incoming LVIII, Kluge ordered the
had acted on that premise. Unfortu- XLVII to take control of the 2d Panzer
nately, Kluge had not been idle. Division. By then the division was
As early as the evening of 27 July, moving to an assembly area directly be-
Kluge had begun to try to plug the hind the 352d Division on the west bank
spreading gap between LXXXIV and of the Vire.47
II Parachute Corps. He seized upon Though Kluge was obviously con-
the 2d Panzer Division, then under Pan- cerned by the gap in the middle of the
zer Group West control. T h e panzer Seventh Army, he judged the Panzer
division had been relieved from front- Group West front still to be the more
line duty on 22 July by the 326th Infan- critical sector. T h e 2d Canadian Corps
try Division (which had come from the had launched an attack south of Caen
Pas-de-Calais), and the armored unit toward Falaise on 25 July, and, although
had moved into reserve southwest of commitment of the 9th SS Panzer Di-
Caen. Having had a few days of respite vision had soon checked the Canadians,
from battle, the 2d Panzer Division was continuing activity brought Kluge to
to move westward and across the Vire that sector again two days later, on 27
July. While he was there, Hausser and units of Panzer Lehr near Percy. T h e
Choltitz were struggling to maintain a 116th Panzer Division, making a forced
semblance of order in the L X X X I V daylight march, was expected to be in
Corps sector. When Kluge returned to position to attack northwest from Percy
his headquarters that evening, he learned on the following afternoon, 29 July.
that the L X X X I V Corps sector was in On 29 July the XLVII Panzer Corps
turmoil. When he discovered, on the also took command of the 2d SS Panzer
following morning, 28 July, that three Division, deployed between the Sienne
divisions had to be considered lost in River and a point east of Percy.49
the Cotentin and that the gap was larger Meanwhile, Kluge was satisfied on 28
than had been earlier reported, Kluge July that these arrangements were the
realized that the 2d Panzer Division best that could be made, particularly
would not be enough. He needed since Warlimont had promised to re-
more troops west of the Vire. quest permission from Hitler for the
T h e 363d Division was en route to the Seventh Army to withdraw to the Gran-
Normandy front but was not immediate- ville-Gavray-Percy-Tessy-sur-Vire-Cau-
ly available for commitment. T h e 9th mont line.50 Kluge felt reasonably cer-
Panzer Division, released from the Nine- tain that he could re-establish a stable
teenth Army in southern France, would defensive line. T h e II Parachute Corps
not be on hand for about ten days. would remain essentially in place, mak-
With no alternative but to call upon ing minor adjustments to conform to the
Panzer Group West and thereby weaken new defenses but keeping the Panzer
the front south of Caen, Kluge took the Group West left flank well covered.
116th Panzer Division, a unit that had T h e XLVII Panzer Corps would plug
recently come from the Pas-de-Calais the gap in the Seventh Army center.
into Panzer Group West reserve. To- And the L X X X I V Corps, it still seemed
gether, the 2d and 116th Panzer Divi- at that date, would hold Coutances until
sions, under the command of the XLVII strong forces withdrawing south had re-
Panzer Corps, were to attack north from established a firm anchor at Granville
Percy to close the gap between Notre- for the entire German defenses in Nor-
Dame-de-Cenilly and the Vire River.48 mandy. This was Kluge's hope. But
Starting on the night of 27 July, the first he had to reckon with the XIX U.S.
2d Panzer Division crossed the Vire Corps.
River at Tessy-sur-Vire and assembled General Corlett on 28 July was also
near Moyon, three miles northwest of displacing troops west of the Vire River.
Tessy. On 28 July the XLVII Panzer He had hoped to take with him his two
Corps assumed command not only of experienced divisions, the 35th and 29th
the 2d Panzer Division but also of the
remnants of the 352d Division near 49 Telecon, Kluge and his son Guenther, a It
Beaucoudray and the few remaining col, 1800, 28 Jul, and Speidel and Pemsel, 1350,
28 Jul, A G p B K T B ; AGp B K T B , 29 Jul, Darstel-
lung der Ereignisse; Choltitz, Soldat Unter Soldaten,
48Telecons, Kluge and Warlimont, 0925, 28 Jul, p. 208; MS # P–59 (Stoeckler).
Kluge and Gause, 1303, 28 Jul, and Kluge and 50 Telecon, Kluge and Warlimont, 0925, 28 Jul,
Blumentritt, 1645, 28 Jul, A G p B K T B . A G p B K T B ; Der Westen (Schramm).
E.XPLOITING T H E BREACH 297
leaving the untested 28th Division (Maj. place, a stream south of the villages of
Gen. Lloyd D. Brown) on a relatively Moyon and Troisgots, where General
static front at St. Lô. But the need for Hobbs hoped to “get a little breather.” 52
the 35th Division to advance south of CCA was in possession of its primary
St. Lô on 2 7 July to maintain pressure COBRA objective, le Mesnil-Herman, and
on the withdrawing Germans changed was probing toward the towns of Ville-
Corlett’s plans. T h e 35th Division at- baudon and Tessy-sur-Vire.
tack nevertheless provided an assist by Less concerned with blocking a pos-
securing an additional bridge over the sible German move across the Vire than
Vire southeast of St. Lô, thereby facili- with launching a rapid advance to the
tating the movement of the 28th and south, General Corlett believed a quick
29th Divisions into the new corps movement to his objective to be possible.
zone.51 Estimates indicated that the XIX Corps
At noon on 28 July, while the dis- faced fewer than 3,000 German com-
placement was being carried out, Gen- bat effectives–disorganized and battered
eral Corlett assumed responsibility for units suported by only four artillery bat-
the units already engaged in his new talions and scattered batteries of self-
zone–the 30th Division and CCA of the propelled guns. Without prepared posi-
2d Armored Division, the latter rein- tions and lacking reserves, the Germans
forced by the 4th Division’s 22d Infantry, could make a stand at only two places,
plus the 113th Cavalry Group. (See on high ground south of Tessy-sur-Vire
Map VI.) and on commanding terrain near Vire.53
T h e XIX Corps mission of driving One speck blemished this optimistic
south about twenty miles from le Mesnil- view. While reconnoitering in force
Herman to the town of Vire in what was from le Mesnil-Herman toward Ville-
hoped would be a virtually uncontested baudon and Tessy-sur-Vire on 27 July,
pursuit contrasted with the previous aim task forces of CCA had encountered in-
of the forces already engaged on the creasing resistance that denied advance
west bank of the Vire River. While of more than two miles in each direc-
under VII Corps and engaged in Opera- tion. 54 It became apparent that part of
tion COBRA,the 30th Division and the the 2d Panzer Division, believed moving
reinforced CCA of the 2d Armored Divi- westward, was already west of the Vire
sion had driven south to wall off the River. Although Allied planes were
Vire River against possible German at- harassing the enemy’s approach, the
tacks launched from the east. By noon, panzer division was judged capable of
28 July, they were completing their getting at least a motorized infantry
COBRA assignments. T h e 30th Division, regiment and about twenty tanks in
after securing three Vire River bridges front of the XIX Corps by the morning
south of St. Lô, was moving against slight of 28 July.55
resistance toward a natural stopping 52Telecon, Hobbs, 2210, 27 Jul, 30th Div G–3
Jnl and File.
51 FUSAMemo, 23 Jul, and Msg, 0015, 28 Jul, 53Intel Annex to XIX Corps FO 8, 0300, 28 Jul.
FUSA G–3 Jnl; 28th and 29th Div AAR’s, Jul; 542d Armd Div G–3 Jnl, entry 1130, 27 Jul;
XIX Corps Ltrs of Instr, 6, 1130, and 9, 2330, 27 Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl, entries 1540, 2100, 2305, 27 Jul.
and G–3 Per Rpt 51, 28 Jul. 55Intel Annex to XIX Corps FO 8, 0300, 28 Jul.
298 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
So long as this estimate remained only ments were too late, for on 28 July the
a pessimistic possibility, General Corlett 2d Panzer Division was assembling west
saw no reason why he could not advance of the Vire River on a small plateau
beyond Tessy-sur-Vire and block off this around Tessy-sur-Vire. T h e panzer
excellent crossing site before the 2d troops gathered behind an east–west
Panzer Division and other German units tributary of the Vire River—the stream
could offer serious resistance. Thus he running south of Moyon and Troisgots–
designated the high ground south of and in the area immediately northwest
Tessy—along the Percy–Pontfarcy line- of Tessy for an attack to the northwest.
as the initial corps objective. With this T o protect the assembly of the 2d Panzer
potential enemy defensive line neu- Division, Kluge had instructed Hausser
tralized and with the 28th and 29th Divi- to have the II Parachute Corps, which
sions in place for the attack, he would still straddled the Vire River, establish a
driveto the townof Vire.56 strong defensive line from Moyon east-
T o seize the Percy–Pontfarcy line, ward through Condé-sur-Vire and Bib-
General Corlett directed General Hobbs ville to Caumont, where it was to tie in
to take Tessy-sur-Vire with the 30th with the L V I I I Panzer Corps.59 Al-
Division and block the river crossing though the line east of the Vire—from
sites. No doubt recalling the confusion Condé-sur-Vire through Biéville–had
that had occurred in the Taute and Vire successfully delayed the V Corps north
bridgehead area when the 30th Division of Torigni-sur-Vire, the slashing COBRA
and a different combat command had attack of the 30th Division and CCA had
intermingled, the corps commander invalidated positions along that line west
halted movement of the 2d Armored of the Vire. CCA had already out-
Division's CCA toward Tessy-sur-Vire. 57 flanked the line on the west by reaching
Instead, the reinforced CCA was to con- Villebaudon on 28 July, and the 30th
centrate on the right of the corps zone Division was approaching Troisgots.
and attack south through Villebaudon to T h e remnants of the 352d Division, re-
Percy. Counting on the mobility of the inforced by elements of the 2d Panzer
armored force and on continuing enemy Division as they arrived, got set to hold
disorganization, Corlett instructed the the Moyon–Troisgots line. As troops of
armored commander, General Rose, to the 30th Division descended a naked
move from Percy eastward to the Vire slope during the afternoon of 28 July
River. This would serve to encircle and moved toward the stream and a long
Tessy from the west and isolate the town incline behind it, they came under in-
from the south. Then the 29th Divi- tense fire. T h e configuration of the
sion, and later the 28th, would attack terrain exposed the attackers and
to the south.58 gave the defenders defilade. American
As events developed, these arrange- counterbattery missions seemed to have
no effect on enemy fire, and from the
56 XIXCorps FO 8, 28 Jul.
57 30th Div G–3 Jnl, entry 1550, 28 Jul; Telecons,
Corlett and Hobbs, 1313 and 1937, 28 Jul, 30th 59 Msg, Kluge to Hausser, 28 Jul, AGp B Op.
Div G–3 Jnl and File. Befehle, p. 195; Telecon, Tempelhoff and Pemsel,
5 8X I X Corps FO 8, 28 Jul. 0935, 28 Jul, AGp B K T B .
EXPLOITING T H E BREACH 299
ridge just south of the Moyon–Troisgots Tessy-sur-Vire to Troisgots.62 Not only
stream German machine guns, tanks, did Tessy seem completely out of reach
self-propelled guns, and artillery denied for the moment, even Troisgots ap-
advance.60 peared unattainable. T h e 30th Divi-
Although General Hobbs committed sion was far from getting the “little
his reserve regiment on the following breather” General Hobbs had hoped for.
day, 2d July, the forces failed to move For all the indications of failure, the
forward. Certain internal difficulties 30th Division to a great extent had pre-
were apparent: the troops were ex- vented the 2d Panzer Division from
hausted, a shortage of telephone wire launching its own counterattack. Haus-
hampered communications, and fighter- ser had helped the Americans too.
bombers in close support inadvertently Having become convinced that the
strafed and bombed several 30th Divi- X L V I I Panzer Corps attack had failed
sion units. But the principal reason even before it got started, Hausser
why the 30th Division did not take ordered the corps to assume defensive
Troisgots was the presence of the fresh positions along a broad front between
and strong 2d Panzer Division defending the Vire River and Gavray. Kluge
advantageous terrain. Two co-ordi- countermanded the order at once, but
nated attacks against Troisgots–the bas- the resulting delay as well as inevitable
tion of the defensive line-by all three confusion on the staff levels harmed the
regiments of the 30th Division abreast offensive purpose.
on 30 July and artillery fire exceeding Some credit for balking the 2d Panzer
thrice the amount usually expended still Division’s offensive intentions also be-
failed to propel the division beyond the longed to the 2d Armored Division’s
line of departure. Enemy shells knocked CCA, which had made its weight felt
out six of nineteen tanks supporting one on the right of the 30th Division. By
regiment.61 noon of 28 July, when General Corlett
By this time General Corlett had assumed control, General Rose’s combat
changed the division objective from command had already secured Ville-
baudon. An armored column conduct-
ing a reconnaissance in force that morn-
ing had destroyed six German armored
60 [Maj. Franklin Ferriss], Operations of 30th
Infantry Division, 24 July– 1 August (hereafter cited
vehicles and a Mark IV tank and had
[Ferriss], Opns of 30th Div) , a preliminary MS, overrun about fifty soldiers to take the
Hist Div USFET, 1946, OCMH Files: 30th Div G–3 village. Another column reconnoiter-
Jnl, entry 1955, 30 Jul; Telecon, Hobbs and Kelly,
1413, 2d Jul, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File; 117th Inf
ing simultaneously toward Tessy-sur-
S–3 Rpt, 30 Jul. Vire, in contrast, met strong armored
6130th Div G–3 Jnl, entries 0540, 0910, 1342, 1347, forces obviously belonging to the 2d
and 1350, 29 Jul; 30th Sig C o Unit Rpt, 29 Jul;
Hewitt, Story of the 30th Infantry Division, pp.
Panzer Division and returned to the
43ff. S. Sgt. J. W. Parks, who though wounded vicinity of le Mesnil-Herman. Ordered
took command of a platoon after both the platoon
leader and the sergeant became casualties, T. Sgt.
Fred D. Steelman, who exercised heroic leadership, 62 30th Div Ltr of Instr, 30 Jul; Overlay to
and S. Sgt. Frederick W. Unger were awarded the Accompany Verbal FO Issued 1140, 30 Jul, 30th
DSC for their actions. Div G–3 Jnl and File.
300 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
across the route and set up hasty road- by Allied airplanes during its march
blocks. across the Vire River, the 116th finally
T h e arrival of the 29th Division, while jumped off on the morning of 30 July.
not ameliorating the situation at once, At once it became bogged down in a
gave hope of improvement in the near struggle for the hills around Percy,
future. Two of General Gerhardt’s Villebaudon, and Beaucoudray. (See
regiments—the 116th and 175th—moved Map VII.)
into the line near Moyon and Percy to For the Americans, the problem of
relieve the CCA task forces, which then taking Tessy vanished under the more
assembled near le Mesnil-Herman. Di- pressing need to hold Villebaudon.
rected to advance through Villebaudon While the 28th Division’s 109th Infantry
and Percy, the third regiment, the 115th remained north of le Mesnil-Herman to
Infantry, was stopped by the German constitute the corps reserve, the other
roadblocks on the highway. Although two regiments of the division—the 110th
General Corlett that evening optimis- and 112th—moved south of le Mesnil-
tically ordered an advance to Vire, the Herman to back up the defense of Ville-
corps objective, it was obvious that he baudon. T h e 116th and 175th Regi-
first had to eliminate the enemy bridge- ments of the 29th Division exerted pres-
head at Tessy-sur-Vire. 64 sure meanwhile against Moyon and
T o eliminate the bridgehead, General Percy, and the 30th Division placed
Corlett decided to shorten CCA’s pressure against Troisgots. As a result
planned envelopment of Tessy. Instead of this corps-wide effort and of assistance
of moving eastward from Percy, General from fighter-bombers that struck Tessy-
Rose was to strike east from Villebaudon. sur-Vire several times during the day,
If successful, the combat command might CCA retained possession of Villebau-
outflank the enemy’s Moyon–Troisgots don. 65 Meanwhile, the 29th Division’s
line. T h e 29th Division would then be 115th Infantry, which had been blocked
able to proceed through Villebaudon south of Villebaudon, finally reached the
and Percy and launch the drive toward outskirts of Percy.
Vire. T h e 14th Armored Field Artillery Bat-
On the morning of 30 July, a rein- talion played a significant part in the
forced tank battalion and an infantry battle on 30 July. Ordered to move
company of CCA moved from le Mesnil- from Villebaudon to Percy that morning,
Herman through Villebaudon, turned the battalion had formed in a march
east toward Tessy-sur-Vire, and immedi- column with the heads of the battery
ately met firm opposition. A fire fight columns on the main road leading south.
involving forty American tanks as well Before the move started, news of the
as infantry and antitank guns lasted all counterattack prompted the unit to hold
day. T h e 2d Panzer Division was tied in place and assume firing positions.
down in the Tessy region, but the 116th Although scattered small arms fire struck
Panzer Division had appeared on the near the guns for an hour around noon,
scene. After being harassed and delayed
65 30th Div G–3 Jnl, entries 1440 and 1539,
64 XIX Corps FO 9, 2330, 29 Jul. 30 Jul.
302 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the artillerymen accepted and fulfilled tempt by CCA to destroy the bridge-
all fire missions. They marked enemy head. While this attack was in prog-
attack concentrations with red smoke to ress, the 28th Division was to move south
lead fighter-bombers to lucrative targets. through Villebaudon to Percy to get
They also engaged enemy tanks at into position for a drive south to Vire.
ranges of less than 2,000 yards. Finally, About noon, 31 July, two battalions-
when German fire became too intense, one from the 66th Armored Regiment
they withdrew to new positions north of and the other from the attached 22d
Villebaudon. There the 18th and the Infantry—advanced eastward from Ville-
65th Field Artillery Battalions were at- baudon toward Tessy-sur-Vire to spear-
tached to the 14th Armored Field Artil- head a 29th Division supporting attack.
lery Battalion, which also assumed opera- Halfway to Tessy, the armored troops
tional control of the 44th Field Artillery encountered several enemy tanks in a
Battalion through its fire direction cen- wood on the far side of a ravine. Un-
ter. Controlling the fires of four bat- able to find a crossing site over the ravine
talions of 105-mm. howitzers, the 14th and receiving heavy artillery fire, they
also co-ordinated missions for the XIX halted and took cover while fighter-
Corps Artillery, which sent a liaison bombers attempted without success to
officer to the battalion for this purpose.66 dislodge the Germans. T h e troops of
At the end of 30 July, the XIX Corps the 29th Division, like the spearhead,
still was seriously engaged in the Percy- were unsuccessful in achieving more
Tessy-sur-Vire area. From the high than limited advances.68
ground between Percy and Tessy, the Meanwhile the 28th Division was mov-
Germans shelled the American units ef- ing south toward Percy and on that day
fectively and interdicted the roads in assumed responsibility for its zone.
the Villebaudon area at will.67 Still T h e move was far from successful, even
trying to eliminate the German bridge- though the division was moving through
head at Tessy, General Corlett ordered what was essentially a rear area.69 Dis-
the attack to resume on 31 July, but playing the usual symptoms of a unit
with a modification. From positions new to combat, the troops of the 28th
forming an arc from Moyon through Division would need several days to over-
Villebaudon to Percy, all three regiments come a natural hesitancy to advance
of the 29th Division—the 116th on the under fire, to become accustomed to
left (north), the 175th in the center, and maneuvering in unfamiliar terrain, and
the 115th on the right (the 115th after to learn the techniques of advancing
relief near Percy by the 28th Division's through hedgerow country.70
110th Infantry)—were to attack eastward
toward Tessy and support another at-
6830th Div G–3 Jnl, entry 1440, 31 Jul.
69S. Sgt. Walter R. Tauchert, armed with a rifle
66
[Pillsbury], 2d Armored Div in Opn COBRA, and grenade launcher, destroyed two machine guns.
pp. 36–39. routed an armored vehicle, and enabled his pla-
67 [Maj Franklin Ferriss], Notes on the Opns toon to reach its objective. He was awarded the
of the XIX Corps, 28 Jul 44–13 Jan 45 (hereafter DSC posthumously.
cited [ Ferriss] , Notes) , ML-2208; see Hodgson, 70XIX Corps Msg, 1450, 31 Jul, 30th Div G–3
R-58. Jnl and File; 28th Div AAR, Jul.
EXPLOITING T H E BREACH 303
advanced along the road; two medium commander was disconcerted when
tanks, one hundred yards ahead of the enemy forces appeared and drove his
light tank, moved along the sides of the men out helter-skelter.
road to flush and engage enemy tanks; CCA mounted a second attack that
and two tank destroyers, two hundred afternoon and penetrated Tessy. Men
yards behind the light tank, advanced of the 22d Infantry cleared the center of
along the sides of the road, alert to rein- the town and crossed the river to estab-
force the medium tanks by quick fire. lish outposts. In the meantime, several
Taking advantage of ground mist, CCA tanks rumbling through the north-
the men and vehicles of CCA crossed ern outskirts of Tessy restored spirit to
the ravine that had held up progress on the company of the 30th Division that
the previous day and overran and de- had earlier been driven out. “The
stroyed a column of German vehicles. tanks could have had wooden guns,” said
Although three American tanks entered one of the men. Their presence alone
the outskirts of Tessy during the morn- was invigorating. Together, infantry-
ing, the Germans drove the crewmen men and tankers cleared the northern
out after all three tanks developed outskirts.78
mechanical failures. Getting into Tessy did not mean that
Earlier on 1 August General Hobbs the town was secure. German artillery
had instructed the 120th Infantry to shells continued to fall into the streets
send a token force to participate in the until the 35th Division of the V Corps
capture of Tessy-sur-Vire. “We were across the river took high ground east of
suddenly ordered . . . to take off for the town on the following day, 2 August.
Tessy,” explained the commander of the At that time, the 30th Division passed
rifle company selected for the mission, into XIX Corps reserve and CCA re-
“so we took off.” 77 Without an artil- verted to 2d Armored Division control.
lery forward observer, the company T h e XIX Corps was still far from its
moved cross-country to within a mile of post-COBRA objective. But it had con-
the town before an enemy machine gun tributed handsomely to the final success
and several mortars took the troops growing out of COBRA. By blocking for
under fire. Knocking out the machine five days the German attempt to re-
gun with grenades, the infantrymen in- establish a defensive line across the
filtrated into the edge of Tessy. Having Cotentin, XIX Corps had enabled troops
understood that Tessy had already been on the First Army right to make a
secured by CCA and that he was merely spectacular end run.
to set up roadblocks there, the company
78Hewitt, Story of the 30th Infantry Division,
pp. 45-46; [Ferriss], Opns of 30th Div, pp. 35-36;
77 Quoted in Hewitt, Story of the 30th Infantry XIX Corps G–3 Per Rpts 54 and 55, 31 Jul and
Division, p. 45. 1 Aug.
CHAPTER XVI
go into bivouac for rest and reorganiza- had less difficulty, despite poor country
tion. 3 roads and wrecked German vehicles that
T h e 3d Armored and 4th Divisions had to be pushed off the roads before
were ready to take up the post-COBRA the columns could pass. Reaching
exploitation on the morning of 30 July. Hambye in early afternoon of 30 July,
T h e two divisions were to attack south- CCB found a damaged bridge and met
east for seven miles from Gavray to small arms fire from the south bank,
Villedieu-les-Poëles. T h e infantry was but a small reconnaissance party sup-
to take Villedieu, an important road ported by fire from the advance guard
center in the middle of the Cotentin was sufficient to drive the Germans back.
about half way between Granville and Engineers repaired the bridge by late
the town of Vire, and high ground east afternoon, and the combat command
of Villedieu, while the armor was to continued the march south toward Vil-
seize high ground and river crossing sites ledieu-les-Poëles. Like the infantry, the
west of Villedieu. armor ran into increasing resistance
T h e situation seemed propitious since when nearing Villedieu. Since portions
the Germans west of the Vire River- of the combat command still had to cross
perhaps 16,000 men and less than the Sienne before a full-scale attack
three tank battalions-were in retreat. could be mounted against the objective
Neither reserves nor a German defensive west of the town, Colonel Boudinot
line north of the Avranches–Tessy-sur- halted CCB and established perimeter
Vire area was in evidence.4 defenses for the night.6
Attacking with two regiments abreast In moving to Gavray, CCA of the
on the morning of 30 July, the 4th 3d Armored Division had been ham-
Division encountered little opposition pered by the presence of troops of other
until it arrived about four miles north divisions. CCA’s COBRA attack had
of Villedieu-les-Poëles. Here an artil- brought it to, and in some places be-
lery preparation and a battalion attack yond, the Coutances–Lengronne high-
during the afternoon failed to eliminate way, which had been pre-empted by,
the opposition. Excellent defensive ter- then turned over to, the VII Corps.
rain and the presence of strong enemy Since armor of the VIII Corps was driv-
forces, particularly on the 4th Division ing south along this route, intermingling
left on ground south of Percy, brought of VII and VIII Corps troops was
operations to a temporary halt. inevitable. “Things were in wild dis-
On the 4th Division right, the two order,” General Collins later recalled.
combat commands of the 3d Armored Extricating hundreds of CCA men and
Division in the meantime had driven vehicles from what had become the ad-
toward Gavray and Hambye to cross the jacent corps sector was difficult work.
Sienne River abreast.5 Of the two, CCB Had CCA been able to use the main
highway from Coutances through Len-
3 VII Corps Opns Memo 52, 30 Jul (confirming gronne to Gavray, its advance would
oral orders issued 29 Jul) .
4 3d Armd Div FO 5, 30 Jul.
have been simplified. But CCA, like
53d Armd Div FO 5, 30 Jul (confirming oral
orders) . 6 3d Armd Div G–3 Per Rpt 36, 30 Jul.
BREAKTHROUGH BECOMES BREAKOUT 307
tation coming forward.” T o replace the make only minor gains. At the same
3d Armored Division, Collins brought time, CCB moved eastward along the
the 1st Division south to take responsi- vulnerable left flank of the division and
bility for the 3d Armored Division zone. spent most of the day building bridges,
This gave him “two exceptionally able reorganizing, and reducing occasional
commanders” in Generals Huebner and enemy roadblocks.
Barton.9 Not until the evening of 31 July, after
Attaching CCA to the 1st Division and the arrival of the 8th Infantry, was the
CCB to the 4th Division-thereby reduc- 4th Division altogether ready to drive
ing the 3d Armored Division head- south. Calling his principal subordi-
quarters to an administrative agency nates together, General Barton made it
charged only with supplying and servic- clear he had in mind rapid, sweeping
ing the combat commands-Collins or- advances. “We face a defeated enemy,”
dered the infantry divisions to attack he told his commanders, “an enemy ter-
abreast, each spearheaded by the attached ribly low in morale, terribly confused.
armor. With COBRA completed, he I want you in the next advance to throw
visualized a more distant objective ten caution to the winds . . . destroying, cap-
miles south of Villedieu-les-Poëles: the turing, or bypassing the enemy, and
4th Division was to proceed through pressing”-he paused to find the correct
Villedieu to St. Pois, which earlier, until word-“pressing recklessly on to the ob-
the Tessy-sur-Vire battle developed, had jective.” 11 T h e units of the 4th Divi-
been a XIX Corps objective; the 1st sion and the attached armor took Gen-
Division was to drive to Brécey and be- eral Barton at his word when they re-
yond, across the Sée River.10 newed the attack on 1 August.
T h e challenge of rapid advance came Meanwhile, developments had oc-
a day too early for the 4th Division, for curred even more rapidly on the corps
the division lacked troops. Though the right, where CCA spearheaded the 1st
organic regiment that had been attached Division attack on 31 July. One task
to the XIX Corps had been replaced by force drove quickly against scattered
the 1st Division’s 26th Infantry, the 26th German forces that were employing oc-
now passed to its parent unit. Another casional tanks and antitank guns in inef-
of the 4th Division’s organic regiments, fective delaying actions. Hitting the
the 8th Infantry, would not arrive from broad side of an enemy column-light
the Notre-Dame-de-Cenilly region until armor and personnel carriers-moving
too late for the first day of renewed at- southwest from Villedieu toward Av-
tack. Only one regiment, the 12th In- ranches, tankers of this task force dis-
fantry, plus the attached armor, was on organized and dispersed the enemy with
hand.. When the infantrymen attacked fire at close range, though fast-falling
toward Villedieu-les-Poëles, they could twilight helped a large part of the
column to escape. Sensing the proxi-
9 Gen Collins’ Talk at T h e Armored School;
Ruppenthal Notes, ML–2185.
10 VII Corps Opns Memo 53, 31 JuI (confirming 11CI 30 (4th Div); see Hechler, VII Corps in
oral orders 30 Jul). Operation COBRA,pp. 236–37.
BREAKTHROUGH BECOMES BREAKOUT 309
mity of stronger enemy forces, and un- and in houses along the main street of
willing to chance contact while his own the town.12
troops were dispersed, General Hickey Though the principal bridge south of
ordered the task force into defensive Brécey had been destroyed, Doan’s com-
positions for the night near the village mand prepared a hasty ford by hand-
of 1’Epine. carrying rock to line the river bed. In-
More spectacular was the thrust of an- fantrymen waded the stream and sub-
other task force under Colonel Doan dued scattered small arms fire. Tanks
that cut the Villedieu-les-Poëles-Gran- and vehicles followed. T h e final objec-
ville highway just west of Villedieu in tive, Hill 242, lay three miles to the
the late afternoon of 31 July. As Doan south, and only when his men reached a
was searching for a good place to halt, wooded area on the north slope of the
he received a message that General Col- hill did Doan permit a halt.
lins wanted him to continue twelve On 1 August, a week after the begin-
miles farther to the final objective, Hill ning of Operation COBRA,VII Corps
242, south of Brécey. Doan spurred was near the base of the Cotentin, more
his force on. Looking ahead to a rail- than thirty miles due south of the
road embankment where he could ex- Périers–St. Lô highway. General Col-
pect opposition, he asked for fighter- lins had reversed his field and made an
bombers to fly column cover to strafe extraordinary gain that outflanked the
and bomb the tracks as their last mission German left.
in the fading light of day. When the
ground column crossed the railway un- T h e Breakout to Avranches
opposed, the tankers noticed several un-
manned antitank guns. Though the In the coastal sector of the Cotentin
enemy crews later returned to their posi- an even more outstanding achievement
tions to oppose the infantry in wake of was developing. Under the supervision
the armored spearhead, the effective of General Patton, the Third Army com-
work of the fighter-bombers had spared mander, VIII Corps had been demon-
the armor what could have been a costly strating vividly just how much Opera-
engagement . tion COBRAhad accomplished.
Bypassing one of its original objec- When General Bradley instructed
tives, Hill 216 southwest of Villedieu- General Patton to supervise the VIII
les-Poëles, Doan’s task force barreled Corps exploitation growing out of
down the main road to Brécey during COBRA,he gave Patton charge of opera-
the early evening hours of 3 July. tions that intimately and personally con-
When the commander of the point had cerned the Third Army commander.
difficulty selecting the correct road at an T h e quicker Patton got the VIII Corps
intersection, Colonel Doan himself took to the threshold of Brittany, the sooner
over in his command tank. Making a he would be able to enter battle at the
Hollywood-type entry into Brécey, the head of his army.
task force commander took pot shots
123d Armd Div CCA intervs cited in Hechler,
with his pistol at surprised German sol- VII Corps in Operation COBRA, pp. 246–48; 3d
diers who were lounging at the curb Armd Div CCA AAR, Jul.
310 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
KNOED-OUT
AMERICAN
TANKS OUTSIDEAVRANCHES
spearheads were in place, the columns the bulk of the German artillery was en
were strung out and backed u p through route south.24
the countryside. T h e armor would re- Convinced that German reinforce-
quire another day to wriggle through ments must be on their way to the Cot-
the infantry. entin from Brittany and from sectors
From a study of the terrain, it seemed east of the Vire River, American com-
that the Germans might try to anchor manders hoped to overrun the potential
their right on Tessy-sur-Vire and with- defensive lines that remained in the
draw their left. On this basis, the Cotentin before the reinforcements
Germans might try to consolidate de- could arrive. General Middleton con-
fenses and hold on one of three possible sequently raised his immediate sights to
lines: Tessy–Coutances; Tessy–Gran- Avranches.25
ville; or Tessy-Villedieu-les-Poëles- On a picturesque bluff 200 feet high,
Avranches. Avranches overlooks the bay of Mont St.
By the end of 28 July, however, the Michel and the famous rock clearly
Germans had lost Coutances and ap- visible eight miles away. Avranches
peared incapable of stabilizing the front fascinated the Americans, not because of
in the Cotentin. There was little in- the sights that have interested tourists
dication of defensive preparations. T h e for so long but because it is at the base
Germans seemed “completely disorgan- of the Cotentin. For practical-minded
ized with no sign of co-ordinated resist- Americans in July 1944, Avranches was
ance.” Air reconnaissance disclosed no the symbol of egress from the Cotentin
movement of reinforcements toward the and entrance into Brittany.
area roughly bounded by Coutances, Avranches lies between two rivers, the
Avranches, and Percy. On the contrary, Sée and the Sélune, which flow westward
German vehicular columns were clutter- to the bay about four miles apart. T h e
ing the roads below Bréhal, Gavray, and city snuggles against the Sée where two
Percy as they hurried south under highway bridges funnel traffic from five
punishment administered by American highways arriving from the north and
tactical aircraft. Destroyed and burn- the east–two from Granville, one each
ing vehicles lined almost every main from Coutances, Villedieu-les-Poëles,
road. Trees along a 200 -yard line in and Brécey. Below Avranches the roads
Coutances had been notched for felling are compressed into one main highway
across the highway, but were still stand- leading due south and across the Sélune
ing when American troops arrived, clear River near Pontaubault, where the high-
evidence of the haste of the German way splits, the roads diverging and
withdrawal. Mines were scattered along affording access to the east, south, and
roads and at intersections rather than west. A bottleneck in the north–south
in disciplined patterns. Defenders of the road network, protected by water on
few isolated roadblocks that existed
fought half-heartedly. Bridges were 24VIII Corps G–2 Per Rpt 44, 28 Jul; FUSA
sometimes demolished, sometimes not. Air Sec Msgs, 1800 and 2201, 28 Jul, 83d Div G–2,
G–3 Jnl File, and G–2 Per Rpt 49, 29 Jul.
A small amount of light-caliber artillery 25VIII Corps Msg, 0030, 29 Jul, 83d Div G–2,
fire harassed the American advance, but G–3 Jnl and File.
314 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
three sides, situated on commanding ter- and tank destroyer fire, armored infan-
rain, Avranches in the summer of 1944 trymen crossed the river early in the
was a prize beyond compare. evening against light mortar and small
On the evening of 28 July, armored arms fire and dispersed the few defend-
spearheads of the VIII Corps were more ers. Engineers began to construct a
than thirty miles from Avranches, but bridge and prepare a ford.
separated from the city, General Mid- T h e ground gained was disappoint-
dleton believed, only by scattered op- ing, and the loss of 3 killed and 10
position. He ordered the 6th Armored wounded as against only 39 prisoners
Division to strike swiftly through Gran- taken seemed to indicate that the divi-
ville to Avranches while the 4th Armored sion had been less than aggressive in its
Division took Cérences, then moved initial action. General Patton noted
southeastward to secure a crossing of the this pointedly to the division command-
Sée River at Tirepied, several miles east er, as did General Middleton, who
of Avranches. T h e capture of Avran- tersely commanded General Grow to
ches and of crossing sites over the Sée “put on the heat.” 27
and Sélune Rivers would make possible On the left, the 4th Armored Divi-
the commitment of the Third Army into sion was making better progress. Gen-
Brittany, and to this end the 4th eral Wood saw that his axis of advance,
Armored Division was to hold open the the Coutances-Hyenville-Cérences high-
natural bottleneck at the base of the way, crossed the Sienne River in three
Cotentin and block German forces that places. Anticipating that the Germans
might threaten the slender corridor from would have destroyed the bridges, he
the east. Attaching forty Quartermaster requested permission to use, in addition,
trucks to the 79th and 8th Divisions, the parallel highway–the Coutances-
Middleton instructed each of these in- Lengronne road–two miles to the east.
fantry division commanders to motorize Unfortunately, the road was in the VII
a regimental combat team. T h e teams Corps sector. After a conference at
were to be ready to assist the 6th and corps and army echelons and despite rec-
4th Armored Divisions, respectively.26 ognition that VII Corps troops driving
Shortly after daybreak, 29 July, the westward from Montpinchon would
leading units of the 6th Armored Divi- probably overflow the highway and
sion moved southwest of Coutances to cause confusion and delay, the road was
the Sienne River. At the destroyed reassigned to the VIII Corps. General
bridge of Pont-de-la-Roque, small arms Wood then ordered CCB to use both
fire from the south bank stopped the main highways, a course of action the
advance. When reconnaissance revealed tankers had already initiated.28
no other river crossing site in the divi- Brig. Gen. Holmes E. Dager’s CCB
sion zone, CCA prepared a full-scale 27 George S. Patton, Jr., War as I Knew It
assault. T h e arrangements consumed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), pp.
most of the day. After a five-minute 96–97; Ltr, Grow to OCMH, 29 Mar 56.
artillery preparation reinforced by tank 28V I I I Corps G–3 Jnl, entry 0250, 29 Jul; VII
Corps Opns Memo 51, 29 Jul (confirming oral
26VIII Corps Msg, 2355, 28 Jul, VIII Corps G–3 orders 28 Jul) ; 4th Armd Div G–3 Jnl, entry 0040,
Jnl and File. 29 Jul, and Overlay (Routes of CCB, 4th Armd
BREAKTHROUGH BECOMES BREAKOUT 315
had worked through the night of 28 July By the end of 29 July, the 4th and 6th
to clear the scattered enemy troops in Armored Divisions were sufficiently for-
Coutances and just south of the city. ward to give promise of rapid thrusts to
At daybreak, 29 July, when two armored the south on the following day. Noth-
columns departed, only a few armed ing the enemy seemed capable of doing
Germans and a profusion of mines re- appeared strong enough to block the
mained in Coutances.29 A damaged advance. T h e “disorderly withdrawal
bridge immediately south of the city was of the enemy throughout the period con-
quickly repaired.30 Then, as fighter- tinued, showing no signs of slackening.”
bombers provided air cover, the armor German vehicular movement southward
drove forward on two routes, meeting still clogged the roads south of Bréhal
sporadic resistance so disorganized that and Cérences. Sporadic fire from
deployment was usually not necessary in isolated self-propelled guns harassed
order to overrun and eliminate it. In- American bridging parties along the
terference from VII Corps tanks that Sienne River, but other than that the
overflowed from the adjacent corps zone leading units of VIII Corps were out of
was more serious, though not fatal. T h e contact with organized German defenses.
CCB columns encountered and destroyed T o the rear of the armor, the infantry
several German tanks late in the after- divisions had held in place and collected
noon and rolled on to the Sienne River about a hundred prisoners. T h e 79th
at Cérences and south of Lengronne. and 8th Divisions each had a motorized
There, destroyed bridges brought the regimental combat team ready to rein-
advance to a halt. force the armored divisions. T h e corps
In gaining about ten miles on 29 July, artillery had fired only registration mis-
CCB had sustained little more than 30 sions, had reconnoitered forward areas,
casualties and had taken 125 prisoners. and had displaced to the south as rapidly
T h e problem of handling surrendering as possible. All seemed in readiness for
enemy threatened throughout the day to a decisive thrust to Avranches.32
consume more time and energy than did T o General Middleton, the 4th
the terrain, traffic, and spotty resistance. Armored Division instead of the 6th
“Send them to the rear disarmed with- now seemed in a better position to secure
out guards” became a standing operating Avranches. T h e 4th was also mani-
procedure. 31 festing the superiority over untested
units that experienced troops generally
Div, East and West Elements), 1230, 29 Jul, 4th
Armd Div G–3 Jnl; Interv by author with Gen display. Earlier in the month, to the
Collins, Washington D.C., 2 Sep 55. horror of some armored experts who had
29 4thArmd Div G–3 Jnl, 29 Jul, and CCB S-3 protested that an armored division
Jnl, entry 0614, 29 Jul; VIII Corps G–3 Jnl, 29 Jul.
Col. Louis J. Storck, the CCR commander, was should not be used to hold a static front,
killed when a mine destroyed his jeep in Coutances.
30Capt. William F. Pieri, who deactivated a row
of mines blocking the bridge and enabled the
armor to continue, was posthumously awarded 32FUSA Sitrep 108, 30 Jul, G–2 Per Rpt 50, 30 Jul,
the DSC. and Msg, 0320, 30 Jul, 83d G–2, G–3 Jnl and File;
314th Armd Div G–3 Jnl, 1825, 29 Jul, and VIII Corps G–2 Weekly Rpt 6, 29 Jul, and G–3
CCB S–3 Jnl, entries 0730, 1033, and 1430, 29 Jul. Per Rpt 45, 30 Jul.
316 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
General Middleton had assigned the pared but undefended roadblock and
4th a portion of the defensive line on drove through light artillery fire inter-
the Carentan–Périers isthmus. There, dicting the highway to Granville. Gen-
during the week before COBRA, the divi- eral Grow halted the advance short of
sion had learned enough of actual com- the city to consolidate his gain. The
bat to acquire a confidence that was division had moved about twelve miles,
evident in its operations of 28 and 29 had taken more than 200 prisoners
July. T o take advantage of these fac- against 2 men killed and 10 wounded,
tors, Middleton gave Avranches, the and was demonstrating that it, too, was
corps objective, to General Wood. T h e capable of aggressive and assured action.
6th Armored Division was to capture Meanwhile, the 4th Armored Division
Bréhal and Granville.33 was carrying the main effort of VIII
Dissatisfied with the progress of CCA, Corps. As soon as General Wood had
General Grow wished to get CCB (Col. learned that he was to take Avranches,
George W. Read, Jr.) into action. He he notified the CCB commander:
therefore passed CCB through the 6th “Present mission cancelled–using any
Armored Division forces holding the roads [in zone] . . . move on Avranches
bridgehead at Pont-de-la-Roque. Antic- . . . to capture it and secure crossings east
ipating little resistance at Bréhal, Grow thereof.” 35 For all the urgency implied
expected CCB, after driving through the in this order, the destroyed Sienne River
town, to bypass Granville on the east bridges at Cérences and south of Len-
and encircle it from the south.34 gronne continued to thwart advance
As expected, little besides small arms until the afternoon of 30 July, when
fire along the main road opposed the engineers bridged the stream. Only
approach to Bréhal. CCB leapfrogged then could both columns of CCB cross
forward, firing high-explosive shells and the river and proceed to the south.
canister into wooded areas along the T h e eastern column ran into an am-
road, and reached the outskirts of town, bush almost at once and after losing six
where a log roadblock with a rolling half-tracks spent the rest of the day
steel gate barred the way. After a flight eradicating the resistance. Dismounted
of four P-47’s made several unsuccessful infantry, with support from artillery and
passes at the obstacle, the lead tank in a flight of fighter-bombers, attacked Ger-
the column simply rammed the block, man positions on high ground obstruct-
knocked down the logs, and opened a ing the advance, while antitank gunners
passage into the main street of Bréhal. engaged and destroyed two German
After several random shots, a few be- tanks. At the approach of darkness the
draggled Germans were herded into the Germans retired, then shelled the high
town square. ground they had vacated, apparently on
South of Bréhal, CCB passed a pre- the premise that American infantrymen
had occupied it. But the Americans
had abandoned the hill to outpost the
33VIII Corps Msg, 29 Jul, 83d Div G–2, G–3
Jnl and File.
346th Armd Div FO 3, 0300, 30 Jul. 354th Armd Div G–3 Jnl, entry 2130, 29 Jul.
BREAKTHROUGH BECOMES BREAKOUT 317
tanks on the road during the night. ment at Avranches.38 Abundant evi-
When the skirmish ended, CCB had in- dence indicated the complete absence of
curred 43 casualties and lost eight half- organized resistance in the corps zone.
tracks. Airplane pilots reported having seen
T h e western column, under the Frenchmen from Granville to Villedieu-
personal command of General Dager, les-Poëles “waving the Tri-Color,”
had better luck. Tanks moved rapidly which obviously meant that the Ger-
for about ten miles through la Haye- mans had withdrawn south of that line.
Pesnel and Sartilly against virtually no Civilians reported Germans asking the
resistance. Three and a half miles north road to Mayenne, twenty-five miles to
of Avranches, the troops unknowingly the south. Prisoners, numbering 1 , 2 0 0
passed within several hundred yards of on 30 July, consistently affirmed that
the Seventh Army advance command German units were completely out of
post. General Hausser, Generalmajor contact with each other and with higher
Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr Gersdorff, headquarters.39 Yet the experience of
and other general staff officers made their the 6th Armored Division in the coastal
way to safety through the meticulously sector and the ambush of the 4th
regular intervals of the column serials. Armored Division eastern column
On foot at first, later in comman- pointed to the presence of hard-fighting
deered vehicles, the German officers fled enemy units. At the same time the
eastward through Brécey toward Mor- whereabouts of the column in Avranches
tain.36 was unknown. If, as was rumored,
T h e CCB column continued to the Sée troops of the 4th Armored Division’s
River just north of Avranches and dis- CCB had entered Avranches, then the
covered that both highway bridges were VIII Corps left flank from Gavray to
intact. Early in the evening troops en- Avranches, a distance of ten miles, was
tered Avranches, an undefended city for wide open since the adjacent VII Corps
all its prize aspects. After outposting on the evening of 30 July was crossing
the southern and eastern outskirts quick- the Sienne River at Gavray.40
ly, General Dager sent a small force east- Unable to believe that German dis-
ward along the north bank of the Sée organization was as great as represented,
to secure the bridge at Tirepied, five General Middleton was hopefully cau-
miles aw 30 tious until he learned definitely that
T h e situation as it was known at VIII American troops were in Avranches.
Corps headquarters on the evening of Then, late on the evening of 30 July,
30 July was obscure, even to the achieve- Middleton acted with dispatch. He
ordered Wood to push through Avran-
36 James B. Hodgson, Report of Interview [on
Avranches] With General von Gersdorff, 1954,
MS R–40, OCMH. 38 See,for example, VIII Corps Msg,. 2030, 30 Jul,
37 Armor, in the Exploitation or the 4th Armored 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File.
Division Across France to the Moselle River (Ft. 39 FUSAG–2 Per Rpt 51. 31. Jul; VIII Corps
Knox, Ky., May, 1949), a research report prepared G–2 Jnl, 30 Jul, and Tel Msg, 1000, 30 Jul, VIII
by Committee 13, Officers Advanced Course, p. 20; Corps G–3 Jnl.
Koyen, Fourth Armored Division, pp. 25, 26. 40 VIIICorps G–2 Jnl, 30 Jul; see above, p. 307.
318 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ches and across the Sélune River and other tasks around Avranches, to Gen-
attached to the 4th Armored Division eral Dager’s CCB.43
the motorized regimental combat team General Dager learned at 0200, 31
of the 8th Division that was ready to July, that he was soon to receive addi-
move, T o prevent intermingling of the tional forces to help him hold Avranches,
4th and 6th Armored Divisions on the establish Sélune River crossing sites, and
restricted road net, Middleton told take Ducey. T h e news was opportune,
Grow to take Granville and move only less in terms of seizing the other objec-
as far toward Avranches as the Sartilly- tives than in holding the one he had
la Haye-Pesnel line.41 taken with such ease the afternoon be-
Appreciating the necessity for speed fore. T h e fact was that trouble had
and on-the-spot co-ordination, General developed at Avranches.44
Wood delegated control of all the 4th First indications that Avranches might
Armored Division forces in the vicinity not be as easy to hold as it had at first
of Avranches to General Dager by attach- appeared had developed about two hours
ing to CCB not only the infantry regi- before midnight of 30 July. At the Sée
ment of the 8th Division but also CCA River bridge on the main highway from
(Col. Bruce C. Clarke), which he had Granville, men of a CCB tank company
already dispatched to Avranches.42 detected the approach of a large German
Taking Avranches was not enough. vehicular column along the coastal road
T h e narrow coastal corridor, consisting from Granville. Because the vehicles
of the single main highway from Avran- were marked with red crosses, the tank-
ches to the Sélune River crossing near ers assumed they were evacuating Ger-
Pontaubault, four miles to the south, man wounded. They allowed the first
had to be made secure to allow the few to pass and cross the bridge into
Third Army to pass into Brittany. T h e Avranches. But when Germans in
troops thus needed to hold Avranches several of the trucks opened fire with
and at the same time to seize and hold rifles, the tankers returned the fire and
essential adjacent objectives: river cross- destroyed a few vehicles, thus blocking
ings south and southeast of Avranches the road. With the column halted,
and high ground east and southeast. German soldiers piled out of their
Part of the high ground between the Sée vehicles and came toward the bridge,
and Sélune River s–rugged terrain hands high in surrender. T h e tank
where several reservoirs and dams were company took several hundred prisoners.
located–was an eventual objective of Examination revealed that the vehicles
the VII Corps, but responsibility for the were loaded with ammunition and other
portion south of the Sélune near the nonmedical supplies.
village of Ducey belonged, as did the Learning from their prisoners that
another, more heavily armed German T h e Germans turned back, but only
column was also approaching down the to reorganize for a second attack that
coastal road from Granville, the men of came after daylight. T h e CCB infan-
the tank company became jittery. trymen were ready. Using white phos-
Small arms fire shortly after midnight phorus mortar shells effectively and sup-
announced the arrival of the second ported by the providential appearance
column. When an enemy shell struck of a flight of P–47's, they held their
an ammunition truck and set it ablaze, ground. When the attack collapsed,
the tank company commander reached several hundred Germans surrendered.
a quick decision. His position illu- Meanwhile, General Dager had dis-
minated, lacking infantry protection for covered the abandonment of the bridge
his tanks, and outnumbered by his pris- on the Granville road and ordered the
oners, he ordered withdrawal. With- tank company commander to return.
out having lost a man or a tank, the T h e company reached its former posi-
company abandoned several hundred tions on 31 July, about the same time
prisoners and the Granville road bridge that advance units of CCA were arriving
to move eastward to the Sée River bridge on the scene. When the German artil-
on the Villedieu-les-Poëles road. lery pieces on the bluff opened fire on
Over the unguarded bridge the Ger- CCA, tankers engaged them while
mans, before daylight on 31 July, en- armored infantrymen crossed the river,
tered Avranches in considerable num- mounted the bluff, and captured the
bers. Some emplaced several artillery Pieces.
pieces on the northwest edge of the By the afternoon of 31 July General
Avranches bluff to dominate the bridge Dager was sure that the Germans at
and the Granville road. Others in a Avranches had actually been seeking an
column of trucks, horse-drawn wagons, escape route and not attempting to re-
and tracked vehicles turned eastward capture Avranches. Dager considered
and disappeared into the darkness, the town secure.46 He directed CCA to
headed toward Mortain. Still others move on to the other task-seizing the
moved toward the southern exits of main bridge across the Sélune at Pontau-
Avranches, where they bumped into bault, a secondary bridge at Ducey, and
armored infantrymen of CCB, who were two dams several miles southeast of
outposting the southern approaches to Avranches. While the bridges were of
the city. Surprised, both American and prime importance, the dams were hardly
Germans opened fire. In the confused less so. If the Germans destroyed the
fight, the action of one machine gunner, water gates and flooded the Sélune, an
Pvt. William H. Whitson, was a decid- immediate advance would be out of the
ing factor. Before he was killed, he question.
destroyed nearly 50 Germans and more T h e CCA commander, Colonel
than 20 light vehicles with his .30 -caliber Clarke, divided his troops into four task
gun.45 forces. He directed each to one of the
45Pvt. Whitson was posthumoilsly awarded the 46For his leadership, General Dager was awarded
DSC the DSC.
320 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
four objectives, which were to be secured dam objective after overcoming minor
before nightfall that day, 31 July, and resistance. A third was well on its way
ordered the forces to bypass resistance. to taking the other dam after plunging
There was no information about the through a series of small roadblocks,
enemy, nor was there time to recon- knocking over several German motor-
noiter. With speed the important ele- cyclists, destroying a few enemy tanks,
ment, the task forces planned no special running a gantlet of exploding shells in
tactical dispositions. to provide advance a destroyed ammunition dump, and
or flank security. Since there w a sn o finally capturing a company of German
time to obtain air support liaison parties infantrymen who walked into the task
for the individual task forces, fighter- force outposts on the assumption they
bomber pilots without direct commu- were German positions.
nication to the tankers found their own It seemed illogical to expect the Pon-
targets and kept track of progress on the taubault bridge, four miles due south of
ground by the bright cerise panels on Avranches, to be captured intact. If
the rear decks and the white painted the bridges at Avranches still stood
stars on the tops of the tanks. through German oversight, it was un-
One task force took Ducey after likely that the same mistake would be
several short skirmishes and outposted made again. American reconnaissance
the bridge there. Another secured its pilots nevertheless had reported on 30
BREAKTHROUGH BECOMES BREAKOUT 321
DESTROYED
ENEMYVEHICLESCLUTTERINGA STREETIN AVRANCHES
July that the Pontaubault bridge was sites over the Sée River (two bridges at
apparently in good condition and un- Avranches and one at Tirepied, five
guarded. As late as the afternoon of 31 miles to the east) and four over the
July, pilots still failed to detect any Sélune-easily enough routes to enter
German troops near the bridge.47 Brittany. With the division in position
As a matter of fact, the Germans were to continue south, General Middleton
trying to get into position to contest the ordered the 6th Armored Division,
Pontaubault bridge. They were too which had cleared Granville of scattered
late. As a task force of the 4th Divi- resistance and moved to the la Haye-
sion’s CCA swept across the bridge in Pensel-Sartilly line, to relieve the 4th at
the late afternoon of 31 July and out- Avranches and Pontaubault. He also
posted the important road intersections dispatched another regimental combat
immediately south of it, enemy vehicles team of the 8th Division to the vicinity
approached from the west. Tank and of Avranches and sent artillery and anti-
artillery fire quickly dispersed them. aircraft units to guard the critical roads
T h e action completed by the 4th and bridges.48
Armored Division by the morning of 1 48VIII Corps G–3 Jnl, entries 1525 and 1955,
August gave VIII Corps three crossing 31 Jul; see Charles de la Morandière, “L’Angoisse
de Granville,” and Mme. Paule Mortgat-Lhomer,
47VIII Corps G–3 Jnl, entries 1330 and 1430. “Les Alliés aux Porta d’Avranches,” in Herval,
31 Jul. Bataille de Normandie, I, 188–200, 201-07.
322 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
That little stood in the way of con- plies-guns, tanks, and trucks–littered
tinued advance was clearly evident. T h e the countryside as German units fled
4th and 6th Armored Divisions together south and east, and west into Brittany.
had taken more than 4,000 prisoners on So great was the destruction in the VIII
31 July. T h e 79th and 8th Divisions, Corps zone that “hundreds of dead
moving behind the armor on secondary horses, cows, and pigs [and the] stench
roads, had done little more than process and decay pervading” were judged
about 3,000 additional prisoners, all “likely menaces to water points and
willing to be out of the war. In con- possible bivouac areas.” 49
trast with these figures, casualties of the T h e facts were obvious. T h e Ger-
VIII Corps from 28 through 31 July man defenses in the Cotentin had
totaled less than 700. crumbled and disintegrated. The
Fighter-bomber pilots continued to Americans on the last day of July 1944
wreak havoc on the retreating enemy possessed and controlled the last natural
columns. Destroyed enemy vehicles defensive line before Brittany. From
along the roads continued to constitute the German point of view, the situation
the chief obstruction to ground opera- had become a “Riesensuuerei)”–one hell
tions. One pilot counted seventy of a mess.50
vehicles burning during the night of 30 49VIII Corps Engineer Recon Rpt, 31 Jul, VIII
July in the Vire-Laval-Rennes-Avran- Corps G–3 Jnl and File; FUSA Msgs, 31 Jul, 30th
ches region. Everywhere in the Coten- Div G–3 Jnl File and 4th Armd Div G–3 JnI
and File.
tin German disorganization was ramp- 50 Telecon, Kluge and Blumentritt, 1023, 31 Jul.
ant. Abandoned equipment and sup- OB WEST KTB, Anlage 966.
CHAPTER XVII
sion, and in accord with a single pur- to regain St. Lô), the 2d SS Panzer Divi-
pose. 11 sion had been strong, confident, and
At the beginning, German intelligence aggressive.13 Together, the two ar-
had failed. Radio interception had mored divisions comprised a force in
revealed significant changes in American being that could have had a serious effect
dispositions during the week preceding on COBRA.
COBRA,but these were not reflected in Kluge had suggested to Hausser that
the reports that reached army group and he pull his two panzer divisions out of
theater headquarters. They did not the line, replace them with infantry, and
even reach Hausser.12 conserve them for mobile action against
More important than the lack of American penetrations of the defensive
advance warning on COBRAand perhaps line. Hausser, on the other hand, had
even more significant than the disparity been reluctant to deprive his static
in numbers of troops controlled by the defense of armor. He believed that
opponents were Hausser's dispositions "tanks formed the backbone of the posi-
before COBRA,which had largely pre- tion; built into the ground, they served
determined his initial reaction. From as antitank guns and as armored machine
the night of 13 July, when American guns." 14 He had consequently held the
pressure against the L X X X I V Corps left armored divisions in place.
began to diminish, Hausser was increas- As a result, instead of having the in-
ingly free to regroup his forces because fantry absorb the shock of the COBRA
except for minor action the fighting in assault and having an armored reserve
the Cotentin came to an end with the capable of counterattack, Hausser had
fall of St. Lô on 18 July. A week of so disposed his troops that the Amer-
poor weather conditions before COBRA icans knocked out one of the two panzer
gave Hausser further respite. In all, divisions in the COBRAbombardment-
he had about ten days to reshuffle his Panzer Lehr was immediately eliminated
forces in the Cotentin. T h e equivalent as a potential threat. T h e 2d SS Panzer
of nearly seven infantry divisions, these Division, though more fortunate than
forces had numbered about 2 1 , 0 0 0 com- Lehr in escaping bombardment, could
bat effectives. T h e infantry was in- not be extricated from the front in time
capable of rapid movement, but Haus- for a decisive counterattack role. Once
ser had two panzer divisions that were the Americans broke through, their
highly mobile. Even though Panzer mechanized and motorized troops easily
Lehr had not been at top strength (it outmaneuvered German infantrymen
had been unable-even with the support and paratroopers who comprised Haus-
of its attached parachute regiment-to ser's immediate reserves, forces that were
launch an attack east of the Vire River sadly deficient in transportation facili-
ties. Without additional assembled
11See Hodgson, R–58; MS # B–723 (Gersdorff) reserves, Hausser could not close the gap
is a valuable source.
12
Seventh Army KTB, 22–24 Jul; OB WEST
KTB, Anlagen IC Anlageband II,, Feindlagekarten 13Hechler, The Enemy Build-up Prior to Opera-
1.VII.-31.XlI.44, Annexes 27 and 28; MS # B–464 tion COBRA;MS #159 (Stueckler) .
(Ziegelmann) . 14MS # A-903 (Bayerlein) .
T H E “INCALCULABLE” RESULTS 327
that developed between the LXXXIV Hausser allowed it to remain under the
and II Parachute Corps. control of the II Parachute Corps.
By the very terrain his troops oc- Thus, when Choltitz shortly after the
cupied, Hausser might have visualized COBRAbombardment ordered Panzer
his task as the maintenance of a resilient Lehr to man a designated line to the
defense. He might have envisaged a rear, the consequence was that Lehr had
gradual hard-fought withdrawal, if neces- neither contact with the 352d nor an
sary, to the Avranches–Vire-Caen line anchor on the Vire River. Both units
(which Rundstedt and Rommel had dis- had floating flanks. When the 352d
cussed around the end of June), for such withdrew a day later to anchor the flanks,
a withdrawal would have been in accord Panzer Lehr had been further jostled by
with the defensive concept in Normandy. the COBRAexploitation and was beyond
Eberbach, in contrast, could not with- salvation
draw his Panzer Group West and retain Kluge shared in the accountability for
for the forces in Normandy the same defeat. Concerned with the Panzer
conditions of warfare. Despite the im- Group West sector and worried about
possibility of his even considering a the positions south of Caen, he had failed
withdrawal and despite his lack of in- to note Hausser’s inadequate prepara-
tention to withdraw, Eberbach had con- tions for defense. It should have been
structed alternate positions to the rear. clear to him that Hausser had not
Hausser, who could have justified a grasped the role of the Seventh Army in
withdrawal and who could have given the defense of Normandy.16 Yet Kluge
u p ground without endangering the was preoccupied with the British threat
forces of Army Group B, had failed to to Falaise, and he did not remark
prepare even rally points to the rear. Hausser’s failure to comply with his in-
Though Hausser had not designated structions on creating armored reserves.
alternate positions, Choltitz was suffi- Kluge criticized Hausser explicitly
ciently security conscious-perhaps sim- soon after COBRAbegan for his em-
ply cautious enough-to do so on his ployment of the 2d S S Panzer Division.
own authority. Afraid to appear a He condemned Hausser’s helplessness in
defeatist in Hausser’s eyes, Choltitz did the face of communications difficulties.
not tell him of the alternate positions. He thought that Hausser was permitting
T h e relationship between the two com- inefficiency among army staff members,
manders was founded on a lack of particularly his chief of staff, General-
mutual trust, co-operation, and under- major Max Pemsel, who, Kluge felt,
standing that bred confusion. When would hamper Hausser’s influence on
Choltitz had marked a line of defense to
the rear, he had been responsible for the
15See MS # B–418 (Choltitz); MS # B–489
defense of the Cotentin from the west (Ziegelmann); MS # P–159 (Stueckler); MS # B-
coast to the Vire River. After the fall 179 (Hausser); P z Lehr Div FO, 23 Jul, Pz Lehr
of St. Lô, when the 352d Division with- Div Ib K T B , Allg. Anlagen, Annex 241.
16see Hausser’s Est of the Situation, 19 Jul, and
drew behind the Vire River west of St. Kluge’s forwarding letter, 21 Jul, AGP B Ia
Lô and took positions on the west bank, Lagebeurteilungen und Wochenmeldungen.
328 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the course of the battle. 17 He thought forces near Percy, Hausser removed op-
it necessary to restrain Hausser’s request position to an American advance down
to withdraw, and he had insisted on the west coast of the Cotentin.
withdrawal only for the purpose of gain- Kluge’s countermand of Hausser’s or-
ing reserves. On the morning of 28 der had little effect because of inade-
July he remarked that Hausser and Pem- quate communication facilities. A re-
sel were obviously not masters of the sult was that Hausser’s act brought to a
situation and that he had just about de- head Kluge’s dissatisfaction with the
cided to relieve at least Pemsel.18 That Seventh Army leadership. T h a t eve-
same morning he sent his son Guenther, ning, though apparently without au-
a lieutenant colonel who was his aide, thority to relieve Hausser, who was one
to the Seventh Army sector as his per- of Himmler’s SS commanders, or per-
sonal representative. haps not daring to, Kluge replaced
T h e climax of Kluge’s doubt came on Pemsel with Gersdorff; Choltitz, the
the question of Coutances. Though LXXXIV Corps commander, with Gen-
Kluge considered closing the gap in the eralleutnant Otto Elfeldt.20 Kluge must
Seventh Army center vital, he felt that have regretted that Hausser still com-
retention of Coutances was even more manded the Seventh Army on the follow-
important. When Pemsel assured ing day, for again he countermanded
Kluge on 28 July that strong rear-guard Hausser’s order committing the XLVII
action north of Coutances would keep Panzer Corps to defense between Tessy
the Americans out of the city and pre- and Gavray.
vent them from launching a major effort By the time that Kluge took an active
along the coast, Kluge was certain that part in the Cotentin operation, the bat-
Hausser understood the significance of tle was lost. Even though he drew upon
Coutances–that loss of Coutances would Eberbach’s Panzer Group West reserves
open the door to an American drive that in an attempt to stem the tide of events,
might outflank the counterattack about he did so with reluctance, not because
to be launched in the army center by GOODWOOD xhausted those oper-
the XLVII Panzer Corps.19 His sur- ational reserves concentrated south of
prise bordered on shock when he re- Caen, but because in the midst of the
ceived word that evening of Hausser’s COBRAdeluge he still believed that the
plan to have the LXXXIV Corps in the decisive action would take place on the
Coutances area escape American encir- eastern flank near Caen. Kluge was,
clement by attacking southeast, rather of course, mistaken.
than by withdrawing south along the German errors were only part of the
coast. By virtually abandoning Cout- story. T h e breakout also illustrated the
ances and projecting a concentration of magnificent abilty of American com-
manders to take advantage of the op-
17 Telecon, Kluge, Pemsel, and Tempelhoff, 1845. portunities and transform a limited en-
26 Jul, AGp II K T B . velopment in process to a breakthrough
18Telecon, Kluge to Warlimont, 0925, 28 Jul, that became a breakout.
AGp II KTB.
19Telecon, Kluge and Pemsel, 1640, 28 Jul,
AGP B KTB. 20Hodgson, R–40.
T H E “INCALCULABLE” RESULTS 329
Lessay and Périers and despite the [COBRA] plan had conceived [of as] . . .
ability of German forces at Marigny to a holding and mopping-up period, be-
keep the COBRAmain effort toward came a vigorous attack period.” 22 Gen-
Coutances from reaching fruition, Gen- eral Corlett’s XIX Corps had blunted
eral Bradley exploited and deepened a the enemy’s planned counterattack at
nascent disorganization of the enemy as Tessy and had thereby destroyed Ger-
disastrous as that caused by the heavy man hopes of quickly re-establishing a
bombers, as compelling as the effect of defensive line in the Cotentin. Gener-
the American ground attack. al Collins’ rapid reorganization of the
With the chief COBRApremise invali- VII Corps and the spectacular thrust of
dated because the Germans had eluded 3d Armored Division task forces toward
not only the principal COBRAenvelop- St. Pois and to Brécey had denied the
ment to Coutances but also the sub- Germans the vital terrain about Ville-
sidiary thrust, the Americans closed dieu-les-Poëles. General Patton’s modi-
another trap with alacrity around Ron- fication of the VIII Corps attack by in-
cey. Hausser’s premature anticipation serting twin armored columns and the
of the encirclement of his west coast sensational success of General Wood’s
forces-a maneuver that was never actu- 4th Armored Division had exploded the
ally completed-and his order for the nightmare of static warfare that had
troops on the left to attack toward the haunted the Americans so long in the
southeast would have had little effect on Cotentin.
the ultimate result if American troops T h e British and Canadian contri-
had not been in place to block them- butions to the development of the break-
in particular the 2d Armored Division out are difficult to judge. There is no
and General White’s CCB, which had doubt that General Montgomery had
displayed a ruthlessness in its destructive worried Kluge in the Caen sector. By
capacity. T h e German hold on the creating uncertainty in the mind of the
Cotentin west coast broken and the way German field commander, Montgomery
thereby open not only to an encircle- had added to and deepened the surprise
ment of the LXXXIV Corps left but that accompanied the American oper-
also to the much more serious encircle- ation. Except for two armored di-
ment of the entire German defensive visions that had moved to the American
line in France, the Americans again zone to oppose the post-COBRA exploi-
acted with dispatch. tation, Montgomery had tied down the
With the Germans themselves having strength of Panzer Group West, which
largely planted the seeds of their own still guarded the vital approaches to
destruction, “it was only necessary for Falaise. Whether General Montgomery
the First Army to take advantage of the had visualized it so, or whether he was
disorganized state of the enemy.” Gen- aware of the historical example, the
eral Bradley had not been at all hesitant breakout in Normandy from a larger
about issuing his orders for the
post-COBRA exploitation. “Consequent-
22 First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I ,
ly, the ensuing period, which the 106–07.
T H E “INCALCULABLE” RESULTS 331
units had made a constant effort to over- headquarters to transmit their orders to
run German outposts before they could subordinate units or to receive new in-
relay information on American progress. structions from higher headquarters.29
T h e hedgerow cutter, developed to give Artillery had played a comparatively
armor mobility in the hedgerow country, minor role. Only the armored hat-
was of little tactical value in the break- teries accompanying the advance units
out, except possibly as a morale factor had been called upon to eliminate the
to the troops, since the tanks advanced occasional resistance that small German
on the roads, not cross-country. groups had hurriedly organized. Artil-
Taking light casualties, U.S. troops lerymen had fired their machine guns
felt their morale soar as the opposition more often than their howitzers. T h e
melted. T h e sight of German prisoners question of adequate artillery ammuni-
in large numbers, “SO happy to be cap- tion supplies had vanished, and even
tured that all they could do was giggle,” though rationing had remained in effect
dimmed unhappy memories of the bat- throughout the month, it had no effect
tle of the hedgerows.26 T h e absence of on the small expenditures that had been
an established enemy line and the re- necessary.30
placement of the formerly well-prepared Although the method of supplying
defensive positions with hastily dug the forward troops changed somewhat,
trenches and ill-constructed emplace- General Collins later recalled “no real
ments brought exultation to American supply difficulties that hampered the
troops. T h e abandoned, wrecked, and actual operation.” 31 Combat units car-
disabled enemy vehicles that littered ried more than their regular allowances
the roads were much less troublesome of gasoline, usually double the amount.
obstacles than well-manned strongpoints With kitchens left in the rear in increas-
or villages and towns that had been both ing numbers, the combat troops for the
objectives and obstacles.27 T h e 15,000 most part ate cold K rations or heated
engineers who had participated in COBRA their own 10- in -1 rations. Distances
had performed with distinction their between depots and the front-line units
primary effort of keeping the main increased. Sometimes tanks or armored
routes open, thereby enabling over cars escorted supply columns to assure
100,000 combat troops to pour through their safety. Facilities for handling pris-
a gap not more than five miles wide.28 oners had suddenly become over-
T h e resulting situation had become so burdened, and the First Army estab-
fluid that it had often been difficult for lished two “holding enclosures” several
miles behind the front as temporary
26 83dDiv G–2 Per Rpts 30 and 32, 27 and 28 Jul. prisoner installations until Communica-
27 3 d A r m d D i v CCB A A R , Jul. By 2 August,
the First Army Ordnance Section possessed, in part, 29See, for example, 1st Div G–3 Jnl, entry 2300,
the following captured materiel: 75 Mark IV, 25 28 Jul.
Mark V, and 27 Mark VI tanks; 22 77-mm., 20 30Gen Bd USFET Rpt on Ammo Supply for
76-mm., and 9 88-mm. assault guns. FUSA Ord FA, Study 58, File 4 7 1 / 1 ; Gen Bd Arty Rpt, App.
Office, Consolidated Rpt of Captured Tanks and C; VIII Corps AAR, Jul; Koyen, Fourth Armored
Assault Guns, 2 Aug, FUSA G–2 Jnl and File. Division, p. 25.
28 CI 344 -A (Engrs in the Breakthrough of 31Ltr, Collins to Hechler, 7 Dec 45, as cited
VII Corps). in Hechler, VII Corps in Operation COBRA,p. 16.
T H E “INCALCULABLE” RESULTS 333
tion Zone guards could march the cap- From 25 through 31 July, the IX Tac-
tives to the invasion beaches for transfer tical Air Command flew 9,185 sorties
to England.32 and dropped 2,281 tons of bombs, in ad-
T h e wretched weather that earlier dition to making 655 reconnaissance
had hampered operations in Normandy sorties. T h e air command’s planned
had vanished. With the launching of distribution of its resources on 28 July
COBRA,“the weather turned fair, and was representative of the distribution
the last days of July were characterized for the period: 7 percent of available
by brilliant sunshine and warm tempera- aircraft were to provide assault area
tures.” 33 This, perhaps as much as cover, 7 percent to perform offensive
anything, had insured the success of the fighter sweeps, 7 percent to execute
breakout, for it had permitted a most armed reconnaissance beyond the for-
heartening development in the close ward troops, 7 percent to be held in re-
and effective co-operation between the serve to fulfill air request missions com-
pilots of the fighter-bombers and the ing directly from the corps, 14 percent
tankers leading the ground forces. to attack targets as directed by the
From 26 July through the end of the Ninth Air Force, 14 percent to fulfill
month, over 400 support missions were close support missions requested by the
flown over First Army spearheads. In First Army, 22 percent to escort medium
the VII Corps sector alone, fighter- bombers on attack missions, and 22 per-
bomber pilots claimed to have destroyed cent to perform armored column cover.
362 tanks and self-propelled guns, dam- It was later computed that from 25
aged 216; and to have destroyed 1,337 through 28 July, 2,926 aircraft had
other vehicles and damaged 380. In dropped 5,961 tons of bombs, and 1,964
addition, they attacked horse-drawn artillery pieces of all caliber (exclusive
wagons, gun positions, trains, ware- of tank guns) had fired 4,089 tons of
houses, road junctions, railroad and shells on the First Army front. 35
highway bridges, troop concentrations, Armored column cover, begun on 26
enemy aircraft, and one ammunition July, had been a vital-and perhaps es-
dump. In one day alone, the critical sential-factor in the American success
day of 26 July, fighter-bomber pilots at the end of the month. Relays of four
claimed to have destroyed or damaged fighter-bombers armed with bombs or
85 tanks and 97 motor vehicles and to rockets had flown in half-hour shifts
have attacked 22 gun positions. Pilots over the head of each armored column.
also had sought to hamper the night
movement of enemy troops by dropping 106; [George], Ninth Air Force, pp. 125, 135;
during the day near important cross- Bradley, Effect of Air Power, p. 103; VII Corps
roads-particularly near Coutances and AAR, Jul; Results of Armed Column Cover and
Armed Recon in Connection with COBRAon 26 JuI.
Gavray–delayed-action bombs timed to Air Opns Summary, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl and File.
explode during the night.34 35[George], Ninth Air Force, p. 129; FUSA
and IX TAC Air Opns Summary for 28 Jul, 30th
32First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I , Div G–3 Jnl and File; SHAEF to Mil Mission,
93–96. Moscow, S- 79098, 14 Feb 45, SGS SHAEF File
33VIII Corps AAR, Aug. 380.01/1, Vol. II, Exchange of Info Between Allies
34First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, and Russia.
334 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Air support personnel riding in the for- “I’ll make a try,” the pilot would reply.
ward tanks of the column maintained After making a pass, the pilot would
liaison with the pilots by means of very call, “I found him. But you’re too
high frequency (VHF) radio sets in- close for me to bomb safely. Back up
stalled in the tanks. T h e planes thus a short distance, and I will go after him.”
were able to act as the eyes of the ground It was simple; it was effective. The
forces, to give advance warning of im- phrase “thanks a lot” frequently sound-
pending threats and detailed informa- ed over the radio channels.38
tion of the enemy’s dispositions. They July had been a month of opposites
were also able to attack targets far ahead in combat experience. Until 25 July
of the tank colunms. T h e results ob- foot troops had made slow, costly ad-
tained “by the employment of the tank- vances against stubborn hedgerow de-
air team in mobile fast moving situ- fenses; casualties had been high, and
ations,” commanders later recognized, gains had been measured in yards.
had been “an outstanding achievement After 25 July armored formations had
in air-ground cooperation and repre- made rapid advances against a defeated,
sent[ed] the development of an unbeat- disorganized, and demoralized enemy;
able combination.” 36 casualties had been light, resistance spo-
Careful and detailed planning for radic. T h e inception of COBRAhad
air-ground co-operation had been nec- marked the change.
essary. Tank markings were repaint- Several days after the commencement
ed. Army liaison officers at airfields of the COBRAattack, General Marshall
briefed pilots on air support missions had requested General Eisenhower to
to familiarize them with the situation send him information on General Brad-
on the ground and interrogated them ley’s offensive, which he had learned
upon their return from missions to se- about from an unexplained radio ref-
cure information valuable to the ground erence to COBRA, “whatever that was.” 38
components. An important factor that By the end of July there was little ques-
had served to bring about the “closest tion of what COBRAwas or what it had
possible coordination” between the First done. After one week of action, U.S.
Army and IX TAC staffs was that the troops held a line from Pontaubault
air staff and the air representatives of eastward through Brécey and St. Pois
the army staff were lodged under the to a point several miles north of the
same roof.37 town of Vire. T o be sure, the front line
T h e heart of the operation, however, was held only by advance spearheads; the
lay in the radio dialogue between the bulk of the First Army was still concen-
pilots and the tankers. ‘‘I am receiving trated fifteen to twenty miles to the
fire from an enemy tank nearby,” a north. Nevertheless, the Allied forces
tanker would report; “can you get him?”
had definitely seized the initiative, and reach. T h e prospects for the future
there seemed to be no reason why they were unlimited.40
should relinquish it, particularly since
the enemy disorganization was still un-
resolved. Brittany was at hand and Jul,40 Ltr,
Pope
Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD-12493, 30
Files; First U.S. Army, Report of
Paris and the Seine had come within Operations, I, 112.
PART FOUR
BREAKOUT INTO
BRITTANY
CHAPTER XVIII
front while intermediate rally lines and the principal ports of Brittany-St. Malo,
new defensive positions were being or- Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire—were
ganized in the rear. T o organize new threatened. (See Maps I, VIII, XII.)
defenses in protection of Germany and Having been vexed by the failure of
to await the fruition of new production the Cherbourg garrison to hold out as
and troop training schedules, Hitler long as he expected, Hitler tried to make
needed six weeks at the least, ten weeks certain that his fortress commanders in
at the most. T o gain the time he Brittany and in the Pas-de-Calais would
needed, he struck two blows at the Allied not similarly disappoint him. Hoping
logistical apparatus. He ordered all to deny the Allies the ports he recognized
withdrawing troops to destroy transporta- as vital to the success not only of OVER-
tion facilities in France-locomotives, LORD but also of the entire Allied cam-
railway lines, marshaling yards, machine paign in western Europe, Hitler spe-
shops, and bridges-a plan already cifically ordered the fortresses held “to
abetted by Allied bombardment. And the last man, to the last cartridge.” Al-
he ordered his fortress policy into effect though this Hitlerian phrase was later
to deny the Allies the major ports they to become trite and even farcical, it was
needed and to retain for the German a serious manifesto. Hitler’s argument
Navy bases for submarine warfare was that, since the forces guarding the
against Allied shipping.2 fortresses were static troops, they could
In 1943 OKW had designated as not be employed effectively in the war
fortresses all the Atlantic harbors that of movement the Americans were certain
had been extensively fortified. To each to initiate in August. Since they could
was assigned an especially dependable not conduct mobile operations, they
commander who took an oath to defend were to fight to the finish within the
his fortress to the death. Among the ports, destroying the harbors in the
fortresses were the port cities Dun- process. T h e garrison forces would thus
kerque, Calais, Boulogne, Le Havre, not only destroy the base of the logistical
Cherbourg, St. Malo, Brest, Lorient, and machinery-ports of entry-that the Al-
St. Nazaire.3 Of these, Cherbourg had lies had to erect in order to wage effective
fallen in June, and at the end of July, war, they would also tie down Allied
as American troops seized Avranches and forces that might otherwise be used in
Pontaubault at the base of the Cotentin, the decisive battle inevitably to be fought
on the western approaches to Germany.
At OB WEST, this policy was mark-
2Hitler Conf, “Besprechung des Fuehrers mit edly unpopular. Feeling that Hitler’s
Generaloberst Jodl am 31.7.1944,” in captured
German documents; Jodl diary, 31 Jul; Der Westen implementation of the fortress policy
(Schramm); MS # – 731 (Fahrmbacher); Pogue, meant the inevitable loss of from 180,000
Supreme Command, pp. 201–03; Blumenson and to 280,000 men and their equipment,
Hodgson, “Hitler Versus his Generals in the West,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December, 1956). the OB WEST staff believed that the
Hitler enunciated his fortress policy in Hitler static troops in the Pas-de-Calais area at
Directive # 40, 23 March 1942, translated in Ap- least-assuming that the groups in Brit-
pendix C to Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, pp.
459–63.
tany were already lost for future opera-
3 OB WEST, a Study in Command, I, 22. tions-could be used to better advantage
PLANS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROBLEMS 341
in reinforcing the new defensive posi- mans learned that U.S. forces were mov-
tions to be erected in the rear of the ing freely south of Pontaubault. By
Normandy front. But since Kluge was noon they had reports that Americans
in command of Army Group B as well as were in Pontorson and Dol-de-Bretagne
of OB WEST and since he was in and that two batteries of a German as-
actuality giving most of his attention to sault gun brigade committed against the
tactical affairs at the army group level armored spearheads had been destroyed,
and below, OB WEST exerted no vital principally, they thought, by fighter-
influence on operations. For all prac- bombers.6 By evening there was no
tical purposes it had become a message hope of stopping the influx of American
center that transmitted orders and re- troops into Brittany.
ports up and down the chain of com- Although Kluge was aware of the
mand. More to the point, whatever OB meaning of these events, Hausser, the
WEST’S recommendations, Hitler had Seventh Army commander, tried to mini-
already made his decision. He told mize the gravity of the situation by
Kluge to pay no attention to the U.S. maintaining that “only armored ele-
forces entering Brittany.4 Instead, ments have broken through [and that]
Kluge was to devote his efforts to stem- so far there has been no exploitation of
ming the American threat eastward to- the breakthrough with massed forces.”
ward the Seine. He admitted that several columns of
During the early hours of 1 August, American tanks, with sixty tanks in each
Kluge had asked Hitler’s permission to column, had been reported near Ville-
bring the 2d Parachute Division east- dieu-les-Poëles, and that “they must
ward from Brest and the 319th Infantry be somewhere in the area south of
Division from the Channel Islands of Avranches.” Despite this, he still felt
Jersey and Guernsey to the mainland to that he could stabilize his part of a front
deny the Americans entry into Brittany. between Avranches and Caen.
Hitler refused to evacuate the Channel Kluge evaluated the situation more
Islands but granted permission for Kluge realistically. Although he was talking
to use the 2d Parachute Division. Al- to Hausser, he seemed to be speaking
though the paratroopers started to move more to himself: “We have got to stop
eastward, it soon became apparent that the flow [of American forces] from
they would be too late to affect develop- Avranches southward.” This was his
ments in Brittany. Threatened with principal concern. Figuring that the
isolation from Brest by a U.S. armored 2d Parachute Division would have to
division, the paratroopers slipped back fight in Brittany and could not therefore
into the port city.5 be used to bolster the front in Nor-
By midmorning of 1 August, the Ger- mandy, Kluge turned his attention to
4 OB WEST K T B , 1 Aug, Anlage 1050; Der
the problem of securing additional Ger-
Westen (Schramm), p. 79; OB WEST, a Study in
Command, I, 1, 118ff.
5Kluge Telecon, 0230, 1 Aug, A G p B K T B ;
H. B. Ramcke, Fallschirmjaeger, Damals und 6Telecons, Speidel and Gersdorff, 1020, 1 Aug,
Danach (Frankfurt: Lorch-Verlag, c. 1951), pp. AGP B K T B , and Tempelhoff and Zimmerman,
30–46; Hodgson, R– 58; see below, Ch. XX. 1155, 1 Aug, OB WEST K T B , Anlage 999.
342 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
man units from other places in the west groups, engineers, and Navy and Air
to help stabilize the Normandy front. 7 Force personnel.9 T o reinforce them
With OB WEST, Army Group B, and came units and stragglers fleeing from
the Seventh Army in no position to look Normandy-in particular the 77th and
after Brittany, the task devolved upon 91st Divisions, which carried with them
the X X V Corps. Designated the com- assorted remnants of once-proud outfits.
mander of the forces in Brittany, These headed for the St. Malo area,
Fahrmbacher, the XX V Corps com- whence Fahrmbacher dispatched the
mander, was delegated the job of direct- 77th toward Pontaubault and the 91st to
ing what was to become the battle of defend Rennes.10
the fortresses, a campaign independent As Fahrmbacher understood the for-
of the action developing in Normandy.8 tress policy, the fortress commanders of
Fahrmbacher, who, as the temporary St. Malo, Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire
L X X X I V Corps commander, had met were to protect the submarine bases,
the Americans in the Cotentin in June, prevent the Americans from using the
was ill-prepared to face them again in ports, and contain as much of the Ameri-
Brittany. Of the army field forces of can force as possible. Although each
100,000 troops in Brittany at the be- fortress commander had no garrison
ginning of June, less than one third re- troops organized as such under his direct
mained at the end of July. T h e others, control, he commanded all the units and
the best-armed and best-trained units, individuals of all the services within the
had been sent to Normandy- the 3d and fortress. T h e commanders of the field
5th Parachute Divisions, the 77th, 353d, force troops had charge of activity out-
and 275th Infantry Divisions, and two side the fortresses. Only after they were
mobile kampfgruppen of regimental forced to retire within the limits of the
size (from the 265th and 266th Divi- fortresses did they come under the con-
sions), Since the 319th Division on the trol of the fortress commanders.
Channel Islands would not see action on Fortification of the port cities had
the mainland, the defenders of Brittany begun in 1942 in response to the major
consisted of the 2d Parachute Division threat of Allied invasion from the sea.
and the static 343d Infantry Division T h e main construction work had at first
near Brest, weak elements of the static been concentrated on the submarine in-
266th Division (perhaps in regimental stallations, then on headquarters and
strength) near Morlaix, and the remain- battery positions for coastal artillery and
ing parts of the static 265th Division at flak, next on combat installations at pos-
Lorient, St. Nazaire, and Nantes. Aug- sible landing points, and finally on the
menting these troops were antiaircraft land front proper. So much time, ef-
batteries, coastal artillery units, antitank fort, and concrete had gone into the
Atlantic Wall installations, which, at the the Germans little. After the first few
insistence of the Navy, had been faced days of August there was no unified
toward the sea, that the land front, ac- command. All the German troops who
cording to Army planners, was neglected. could, abandoned the interior and scur-
T h e fortress commanders who faced the ried into the fortresses, where they
Allied ground forces in August 1944 be- awaited the inevitable opening of siege
lieved their landward defenses far from operations.
adequate.
Upon reports that the Americans had A New Army
invaded the interior of Brittany and that
armored columns were racing toward the Behind the armored spearheads push-
port cities, Fahrmbacher and his XXV ing into German-held territory was an
Corps headquarters moved on 3 August Allied strength on the Continent that
from Pontivy to Lorient. Four days had almost reached organizational matu-
later, on 7 August, when Kluge ordered rity. General Crerar's First Canadian
Fahrmbacher to take command of Brest, Army had become operational under the
Fahrmbacher did not carry out the order control of General Montgomery's 21
because land contact between Lorient Army Group on 23 July, and it was ap-
and Brest had already been cut, because parent then that General Patton's Third
no preparations had been made for sea Army would soon have to become active.
communications, and because he felt T h e build-up was fattening the First
that the fortress commander of Brest Army almost to unreasonable propor-
was competent to conduct his own in- tions, and the broad scope of OVERLORD
dependent defense. Nor did Fahrm- operations foreshadowed the early need
bacher exercise control over the action of a U.S. army group. If American
developing around St. Malo; he had no troops entered Brittany and drove west-
way of doing so. Though the XXV ward as contemplated, they would
Corps remained nominally in control of diverge from British, Canadian, and
operations in Brittany, for all practical other U.S. forces oriented eastward to-
purposes it directed only the forces in ward the Seine. An American army
Lorient and St. Nazaire. Subordination group in control of the American thrusts
of the St. Nazaire garrison lasted only a eastward and westward would simplify
brief time—until U.S. troops encircled problems of command control and logis-
and isolated both Lorient and St. tics. 11
Nazaire. Reduced to a nonessential As early as mid-July, when the plans
role in Lorient, Fahrmbacher and his for creating an American army group
corps headquarters found an opportu- still were indefinite and American forces
nity to assume real command status
when the fortress commander of Lorient
was injured around 10 August by a 11SHAEF Memo, Command and Organization
mine. Fahrmbacher then took his place After D Day—OVERLORD, 21 AGp/ 20657 / 1 /G
and functioned in that capacity. (Plans), 30 May; SHAEF/17100 / 5 / 0pns (A),
1 Jun; ETOUSA Ltr, Organization and Comd of
Appointing Fahrmbacher commander U.S. Forces, 6 Jun. All in SHAEF G–3 Opns File
of the forces in Brittany thus had availed A322/011 /1.
344 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
were far from Brittany, the growing eral Patton’s Third U.S. Army came to
number of divisions under First Army life. 16
control had prompted General Bradley T h e most flamboyant personality in
to recommend (with Montgomery’s the Allied camp was without question
concurrence) that the 12th Army Group General Patton. Commander of assault
and Third Army headquarters become troops in the North African landings in
operational as soon as COBRAwas com- November 1942, leader of the II Corps
pleted, regardless of the progress in Tunisia, organizer and commander of
achieved in COBRA. 12 ticipating the Seventh U.S. Army in Sicily, Patton
General Eisenhower’s approval, Bradley had been designated the Third Army
informed Generals Hodges and Patton commander in the spring of 1944. In-
that the change in command would be tensely sensitive, at times overbearing,
made during the COBRAoffensive and always temperamentally dramatic, a con-
“without any appreciable halt in the troversial figure recognized as one of the
attack provided everything is going well; outstanding field commanders in the
. . . we will not halt the advance to U.S. Army, Patton was able to exert “an
reorganize.” 13 General Eisenhower ap- extraordinary and ruthless driving
proved Bradley’s recommendation and power . . . at critical moments.” He
authorized him to set the date for the had “demonstrated [his] ability of
change. At the same time he made getting the utmost out of soldiers in
clear his desire that Montgomery con- onsive operations.” 17
tinue to act as the Allied ground forces Closely associated with the develop-
commander until SHAEF moved to the ment of tanks and armor doctrine, a
Continent and he, Eisenhower, assumed cavalryman by temperament, tradition,
personal command of the Allied ground and training, and at the same time a
forces.14 profound student of military history,
At noon, 1 August, as armored General Patton typified the tenets of
columns streamed beyond Pontaubault, daring and dash. If he seemed to be
the 12th Army Group, under General reckless and impetuous, he was also bold
Bradley’s command, became opera- and imaginative, favoring “a good plan
tional.15 General Hodges assumed com- violently executed now” rather than “a
mand of the First U.S. Army, and Gen- perfect plan next week.” Like Napo-
leon, he believed that war was “a very
simple thing.” Its determining char-
12Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 19 Jul, with hand- acteristics were “self-confidence, speed,
written endorsement by Montgomery, 20 Jul, Gen
Bd Rpts File 322/011, Box 47, Item 50.
and audacity.” 18 During the month of
13FUSA Memo, Bradley to Hodges and Patton, August, Patton and his army-whose
21 Jul, 12th AGp File 371.3, Mil Objectives.
14SHAEF Ltr, Comd and Organization, U.S.
Ground Forces, 25 Jul, SHAEF/ 17100 / 5 /0pns (A), 16 ADSEC continued to be the direct agency of
SHAEF G–3 File Opns A-322/011.1; SGS SHAEF supply for the combat forces, but Lt. Gen. John
War Diary, 25 Jul. C. H. Lee’s Communication Zone headquarters
15Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen; was fast getting established on the Continent.
G–1, Col. Joseph J. O’Hare; G–2, Brig. Gen. Edwin 17Ltrs, Eisenhower to Marshall, 29 and 30 Apr,
L. Sibert: G–2. Brig. Gen. A. Franklin Kibler; G–4, cited in Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 166.
Brig. Gen. Raymond G . Moses. 18 Patton, War as I Knew It, p. 354
PLANS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROBLEMS 345
members modeled their behavior on that forces immobile because they were ex-
of their chief—were to find a situation pecting Patton’s appearance on the Con-
perfectly suited to the expression of their tinent outside Normandy. They could
principles of combat.19 construe his unexplained absence only
Partially as a result of the personali- as signifying that another Allied invasion
ties of the commanders, the headquar- of western Europe would take place.21
ters of the First and Third Armies func- T h e Germans knew that Patton had
tioned in slightly different ways. T h e more combat experience than Bradley;
difference was evident only by com- they were conscious that he outranked
parison. T h e First Army tended to be Bradley in grade. Respecting Patton as
more methodical and meticulous in staff a dangerous opponent, they logically ex-
work, and required more reports from pected the Allies to use him to head
subordinate units. More planning was the main U.S. forces in western Europe,
committed to paper in the First Army, which evidently had not yet appeared.22
whereas informal briefings and conversa- T h e Third Army arrived on the scene
tions frequently sufficed in the Third. in the midst of an extremely fluid situa-
Yet in both armies the work of the staff tion. By taking command of VIII
members was neither underrated nor Corps, which on 1 August was rapidly
unappreciated. Long hours of patient approaching Brittany, Patton assumed
staff work often preceded a daring deci- control of a going concern. Behind the
sion or brought a brilliant idea to matu- front, XV Corps headquarters, which
rity and reality. T h e many anonymous had arrived in France on 15 July, and
staff officers who toiled in relative obscu- XX Corps headquarters, which had ar-
rity, not only on the army level but on rived on 24 July, were ready for action.
all echelons of command, made it pos- T h e XII Corps headquarters was staging
sible for the military leaders of World the movement of Third Army units from
War II to direct the complex operations England to the Continent and process-
with such apparent ease. ing them from the beach forward; part
T o enhance the FORTITUDE decep- of the headquarters reached Normandy
tion-the Allied threat of a landing on on 29 July, the remainder on 7 August.23
the Pas-de-Calais—General Eisenhower T o give close air support to the Third
forbade publicity on Patton’s entrance Army, Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland’s
into battle.20 T h e Germans were still XIX Tactical Air Command, which had
being tricked into keeping a consider- been operating as part of the IX TAC,
able number of their Fifteenth Army became operational. T h e transfer from
19The Third Army general staff consisted of England to France of the headquarters
Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, chief of staff Col. Fred- of the British Second Tactical Air Force
erick S. Matthews, G–1; Col. Oscar W. Koch, G–2; and of the U.S. Ninth Air Force—moves
Col. Halley G. Maddox, G–3; Col. Walter J. Mul-
ler, G–4. See Hugh M. Cole, T h e Lorraine Cam-
scheduled to be completed in the first
paign, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD
WAR II (Washington, 1950), Chapter I, for a 21JIC (44) 345 (O) (Final), German Apprecia-
detailed discussion of the Third Army command tion of Allied Intentions in the West, 7 Aug, JIC
and staff. Papers, 1944, Pogue Files.
20
Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD– 12493, 30 Jul, 22OB WEST, a Study in Command, pp. 55ff.
Pogue Files. 23TUSA AAR, I, 7, 12.
346 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
plete dependence on the railway that Allied hands, convoys could sail around
linked Brest with the interior of France, Brittany to the Quiberon Bay area with-
a railroad the Germans would most prob- out hindrance from German warships
ably have destroyed and one that based at Brest. Although doubts had
would be difficult to repair. With the been expressed in July that the Allies
Allies in possession of Quiberon, it could obtain the major ports quickly
would not be necessary to rely so heavily and although there appeared an increas-
on the original landing beaches in Nor- ing reluctance to undertake the com-
mandy, which were expected to be use- plicated engineering necessary to utilize
ful only until autumn. Furthermore, Quiberon, the Allies at the beginning of
protective bridgeheads south of the Loire August still felt that they needed Brit-
River, the southern boundary of the tany and its port facilities.27
OVERLORDlodgment area, would be
needed in order to utilize Nantes and Personalities and Concepts
St. Nazaire, but would not be necessary
for Quiberon Bay. On this basis, the It had long been planned to turn the
Americans decided that instead of secur- VIII Corps westward into Brittany as
ing Nantes and St. Nazaire first, they soon as the Americans reached the base
would drive at once to seize the Qui- of the Cotentin at Avranches. In mov-
beron area. As early as 13 May, the 1st ing toward Rennes and St. Malo, VIII
Army Group had instructed the Third Corps was to precede other units of the
Army to prepare plans for this opera- Third Army, which would clear the
tion.26 “whole of the Brittany Peninsula.” 28
Despite plans for using Quiberon Bay General Bradley thus ordered Patton to
to handle large freight tonnages, the drive south from Pontaubault to seize
Allies were still interested in the major Rennes and Fougères, then turn west-
ports of Brittany, Brest in particular. ward to secure St. Malo, the Quiberon
Possession of Brest would enable per- Bay area, Brest, and the remainder of
sonnel and vehicles coming directly from Brittany, in that sequence. T h e Com-
the United States to be landed there munications Zone was alerted to the
without waiting for the Quiberon com- task of opening and developing the ports
plex to be built. Also, with Brest in of St. Malo, Quiberon Bay, and Brest as
soon as possible after their capture.29
26Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 186-88, Before the invasion, it had been
285-97; SHAEF/ 17100/35 Opns, NEPTUNE, Sum- thought necessary to divert a sizable U.S.
mary of Jt Opns Plan, Phase II, 25 Apr, SGS
SHAEF File 381, OVERLORD, I (a); SHAEF/17100/ force to capture the Breton ports, and
35/Opns, NEPTUNE, Summary of Rev Jt Opns plans had been formed to deploy not
Plan–U.S. Forces for Phase II of Opn OVERLORD,20
May, and SHAEF/ 17100/35/Opns, NEPTUNE, Sum- 27 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support,
I, 468-74.
mary of Third U.S. Army Outline Plan, 22 May, 2821 AGp Dirs, M-510 and M-515, 10 and 27
both in EUCOM Files, Box 3; Capt Albert Norman, Jul; Ltr, Montgomery to Bradley, Dempsey, Patton,
The History of 12th Army Group (Third Draft), and Crerar, M-512, 21 Jul.
MS, Hist Br, AG Sec, 12th AGp [27 Jd 45], pp. 2912th AGp Ltr of Instrs 1, 29 Jul. The 12th
349-56, 12th AGp File, Box 27; Interv by Pope Army Group orders are conveniently reproduced
with Maj Gen K. R. McLean, 11–13 Mar 47, Pope as Annex 4 of the 12th Army Group History and
Files. also in Annex 1 of the Third Army AAR.
348 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
only the VIII Corps but also the XV, Next, he would clear Brittany by seizing
and possibly even the VII and XX.30 the central plateau of the peninsula. In
When German disorganization seemed so doing, he would liberate a vast region
so thorough, the opportunity of seizing of France, open interior lines of com-
Brittany with smaller forces became munication, and reduce the enemy de-
feasible. fenses to isolated pockets along the coast.
Specifically, General Patton planned With the Germans penned into a few
to drive southwest from Avranches port cities, it would be relatively easy to
through Rennes to Quiberon Bay in force their capitulation. Once the ports
order to cut the Brittany peninsula near were in American hands, the Third
its base and prevent the reinforcement Army would be free to turn east, where
or escape of German forces thus isolated. the decisive battle of the European cam-
paign would obviously be fought.
30
TUSA AAR, I, 13; SHAEF/ 17100 / 35 /Opns, Thus, Patton visualized his primary mis-
NEPTUNE, Summary of Third U.S. Army Outline
Plan, 22 May, EUCOM Files, Box 3; 83d Div Min of
sion as clearing the peninsula, his in-
Mtg, 0900 30 Jul, 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File. cidental mission as securing Quiberon
PLANS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROBLEMS 349
Bay and Brest first and the other ports Unlike General Bradley, General
later, his eventual mission as driving Patton considered the capture of St.
eastward toward Paris and the Seine.31 Malo incidental to the entire Brittany
Patton’s method for securing Brittany campaign. He did not specifically assign
was to unleash armored columns in the it as an objective to any of his forces.
peninsula. T h e 4th Armored Division And he apparently influenced Bradley
was to drive through Rennes to Qui- to the extent that Bradley agreed St.
beron. T h e 6th Armored Division was Malo could be bypassed and contained
to go all the way to Brest. A third if its reduction appeared to require too
column, formed by activating a provi- many forces and too much time.34
sional unit called Task Force A under What emerged was a concept quite
the command of Brig. Gen. Herbert L. different from that which had governed
Earnest, was to advance to Brest to operations in the Cotentin. Patton saw
secure the vital railroad that follows his immediate objectives far in advance
generally the north shore.32 of the front, for his intent was to slash
If Brest was to prove of value as a pori forward and exploit not only the mo-
of entry, the double-track railway link- bility and striking power of his armored
ing it to Rennes had to be in good con- divisions but also the German disorgan-
dition. Since the railroad crosses several ization. 35 Prone to give his subordi-
big bridges that can not be quickly or nates free rein, Patton expected them to
easily replaced or repaired, Task Force A exercise independent judgment and
was to capture the bridges before the tactical daring. Confident of the ability
Germans could demolish them. That of armor to disrupt enemy rear areas and
Patton considered this an important mis- to sustain itself deep in enemy territory,
sion was clear when he requested Gen- and conscious of the weak and disorgan-
eral Grow of the 6th Armored Division ized opposition, he felt that the ultimate
also to keep an eye out for the bridges objectives were immediately pertinent
along the railroad, particularly the one and attainable. There ‘seemed little
at Morlaix.33 point in slowly reducing Brittany by
carefully planned and thoroughly super-
31TUSA FO 1, 4 Aug (confirming verbal orders, vised operations unraveled in successive
1 Aug), AAR, I, 16, and Ltr, Confirmation of
Verbal Orders Issued 2 Aug 44, 4 Aug; T F A AAR
phases. As a result, Patton granted his
and Jnl, Aug. T h e Third Army orders are con- subordinates a freedom of action that
veniently reproduced in Annex 2 of the Third permitted the division commanders to
Army AAR. be virtually independent.
32T h e principal components of Task Force A
were the 15th Cavalry Group and the 6th Tank With this concept of warfare that
Destroyer Group, both supported by attached en- stressed taking advantage of the breaks,
gineers and operating under the headquarters of General Patton required constant knowl-
the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade. T h e brigade had
been activated in 1942 as a tactical headquarters, edge of front-line changes. T o get it,
but, upon its assignment to the Third Army in
1944, it had been transformed into the army tank Ltr, Confirmation of Verbal Orders Issued 2 Aug,
destroyer staff section. On 1 August it was again 4Aug; T F A FO 1, 2 Aug; Interv by author with
given command status and attached to VIII Corps. Gen Grow.
331st Tank Destroyer Brigade History, 24 Nov 3412th AGp Dir for Current Opns, 2 Aug.
42–31 Dec 44; VIII Corps FO 9, 1600, 1 Aug; TUSA 35 TUSA AAR, I, 1618.
AKOUT AND PURSUIT
he renamed the 6th Cavalry Group of VIII Corps from First to Third Army
(Col. Edward M. Fickett) the Army In- brought changes in staff procedures,
formation Service and transformed it communications, and supply, but these
into a communications unit. A varying were minor problems when compared to
number of reconnaissance platoons the exigencies that emerged in rapid suc-
(each usually with two officers, twenty- cession as a result of the change from
eight men, six armored cars, and six the positional hedgerow warfare in the
jeeps) formed into troops under two Cotentin to wide-open exploitation in
squadrons were to report the activities of Brittany.
combat units down through battalion General Middleton’s plans for Brit-
size. T h e reconnaissance platoons were tany grew out of the premises that had
to funnel G–2 and G–3 information governed the action in the Cotentin:
through troop headquarters to squadron orderly advances were to be made to
and group. T h e latter would co-ordi- specific objectives by units developing
nate and condense the information into a compact fighting front. In conform-
teletype messages and send it directly to ance with this manner of operation, he
the army advance command post. planned to send two columns into Brit-
Known as Patton’s “Household Cavalry” tany-two armored divisions abreast,
and required to bypass normal com- each followed by an infantry division-
munications channels, the 6th Cavalry the same formation employed so suc-
Group was to provide a means of con- cessfully during the post-COBRAexploita-
tact between far-flung forces engaged in tion to Avranches. T h e 4th Armored
diverse missions and the army command Division, followed by the 8th Division,
post, which was sometimes to be as much was to move southwest from Pontaubault
as a hundred miles behind the front.36 and capture Rennes; the 6th Armored
It thus happened on occasion that, Division, supported by the 79th Divi-
though corps and divisions monitored sion, was to strike westward from Pon-
the messages, the army staff was better taubault and seize in turn Pontorson,
informed on a particular situation than Dol-de-Bretagne, and Dinan. Once
the corps directing the operation. these objectives were secured, General
In Brittany, the corps commander in Middleton would send his columns on
immediate charge of operations, General to Quiberon and St. Malo, respectively.
Middleton, methodical and meticulous, St. Malo, Middleton believed, was his
found himself in a whirlwind that “immediate task” in Brittany.37
threatened to upset his ideas of orderly T h e commanders who were to lead
and controlled progress. T h e transfer the spearheads into Brittany regarded
themselves as belonging to the Patton
school of thought. They seized upon
36TUSA AAR, I, 5; Interv with Lt Col Samuel the situation of exploitation with relish.
M. Goodwin, Executive Officer, 6th Cav Gp, Hosp
Intervs, IV, GL-93 (321), ML–4235. Between 1 Generals Grow and Earnest, who were
August and 10 October, the reconnaissance pla-
toons lost 1 officer and 57 men. Twenty-eight were
casualties of enemy action, the remaining 30 vic- 27VIII Corps AAR, Aug, Opns Instrs, 31 Jul
tims of traffic accidents. Montgomery used a similar (confirming fragmentary verbal orders, 31 Jul) ,
communications system called Phantom. and FO 9, 1600, 1 Aug.
PLANS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROBLEMS 351
to pass near St. Malo, for example, made Although Middleton wanted to move
no plans to capture the city, Earnest his command post into Brittany and
closer to his far-flung units, the Third
going so far as to tell his staff, with some
exaggeration, that they would go by it Army staff was most anxious for him
without even looking at it.38 not to displace the corps headquarters
Generals Wood and Grow in par- beyond the limited range of field tele-
ticular felt toward General Patton, who, phones. Middleton complied. Com-
like them, was a tank officer, an affinity
munications between the army and the
they could not feel toward General Mid- corps headquarters thus remained satis-
dleton, bred in the infantry. They were factory, but this state of affairs was not
convinced they understood better what duplicated below the corps level. As
Patton expected. Their units had been early as 2 August, General Middleton
relatively untouched by the depressing remarked that contact with the armored
combat in the hedgerows and had not divisions was “practically nil.” 39
sustained the heavy losses that were With the corps units stretched over
normal in the Cotentin. Having thrust a vast area and moving rapidly, signal
victoriously to Avranches in the last days
communications broke down almost
of July, they believed they had accom- completely. “The expensive signal
plished what other units had not been equipment at the disposal of the Corps,”
able to do. Having led the U.S. forces General Middleton later wrote, “was
from the breakthrough into the break- never designed apparently for a penetra-
out, the division commanders and their tion and pursuit of the magnitude of the
units became infected with an enthu- Brittany operation.” 40 It was impos-
siasm and a self-confidence that were sible to install or maintain wire com-
perfectly suited to exploitation but munications over such distances. Dur-
proved to be a headache to those who ing the night of 3 August, the few corps
sought to retain a semblance of control. signal lines to forward units that did
A naturally headstrong crew became exist were bombed out by German
rambunctious in Brittany. planes, as were the wires to the army
headquarters. For about eight hours,
Problems while the lines were being repaired, the
corps headquarters existed in a virtual
Control was one of the major prob- vacuum, able to exercise only the most
lems of the Brittany campaign, and dis- limited influence on operations.41
tance added to the problem. T h e VIII Although communications with both
Corps command post was located north armored divisions were strained, they
of Avranches, and General Middleton were particularly weak in the case of the
was able to displace forward to a point 6th Armored Division, which had dis-
several miles south of that city only on
4 August. By then the combat com- 39Telecon, 6 Aug, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl; VIII
ponents of the corps were scattered, out Corps Sitrep, 2 Aug.
of sight and virtually out of hearing. 40VIII Corps AAR, Aug.
41Msg, VIII Corps Sig Officer to G–3, 0040, 4
Aug; Memo, Rpt of Evenings Activities, 4 Aug. Both
38TF A AAR and Jnl, Aug. in VIII Corps G–3 Jnl.
352 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
appeared in a cloud of dust on the roads ment was unreliable, and contact was
to Brest. Since Signal personnel were not established for several days.43
unable to lay telephone cables fast With radio teletype nonoperational,
enough and far enough, the division with high-power radio erratic, and with
depended to a large extent on the high- wire and cable lacking, communications
powered SCR– 399 long-distance radio, devolved upon messengers who traveled
which proved unsatisfactory. As many long distances by jeep. Sometimes a
as eight different transmitters working round trip between division and corps
on the assigned corps frequency were headquarters took the better part of a
often heard at the same time. With the day. Messengers were excellent targets
corps radio communications net so for bypassed enemy groups and individ-
jammed and signals so faint because of ual snipers in the far-reaching no man’s
distance, the division had to wait for land between the corps and division
radio time. Often a code group had to command posts, and they had to have in-
be repeated six to ten times to insure ac- genuity, patience, and luck. An offi-
curate reception.42 cer courier, Capt. Hans H. Marechal,
A corps cable teletype team had been who started from the VIII Corps com-
attached to the 6th Armored Division in mand post for the 6th Armored Division
the Cotentin, but it had been unable to headquarters about noon one day pro-
keep up with the rapid advance and ceeded through Antrain and beyond
was replaced in Brittany by a radio tele- Loudéac until French civilians warned
type team using very high frequency him that several hundred Germans with
beam antenna equipment. T h e new a few tanks still held a town ahead.
team was instructed to beam its equip- Detouring south to Pontivy, the captain
ment on a prominent hill near Avran- met and joined a convoy of gasoline
ches, where the corps expected to place trucks going to the division. A de-
a receiving station on 1 August. Be- stroyed bridge caused another change in
cause the enemy still was ensconced on route. At the town where the division
the hill and because German planes command post had last been reported,
were attacking U.S. troops and installa- Marechal learned from civilians that the
tions in the Avranches area, the corps division had moved on to another town.
Signal section set up its receiving station Eventually, he found a solitary military
near Brehal instead. Without knowl- policeman who was awaiting the arrival
edge of the change of location, the divi- of the division trains. T h e convoy
sion radio teletype team beamed on the halted, but Marechal continued alone in
wrong place. Had the distance between search of the division command post.
sender and receiver been shorter, the Another reported pocket of enemy forced
correct location would have easily been another detour, and then he was “off
found, but beyond fifty miles the equip- the map.” Noticing tank tracks in the
road, he followed them and reached the
42Ltr, Lt Col William J. Given to Gen Grow,
12 Jan 53, OCMH Files; 146th Armored Signal 43Interv with Col Claude E. Haswell, Third
Company, The Signal Circuit (Luxembourg, 1945), Army Sig Sec Executive Officer, 1st Lt Richard
p. 7. Stockton’s Hosp Intervs, ML– 2234.
PLANS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROBLEMS 353
tions in the interest of exploitation, the get lost or hit.” 50 Supply depots re-
division commanders found it difficult mained north of Avranches during the
to understand why their messages to early part of the month, and gasoline
corps were apparently being ignored, and ammunition convoys added to
why they received so little assistance traffic complications in the Avranches
and guidance. Needing to react quickly bottleneck. Convoys had to have armed
to fast-changing situations, they could escorts because of hostile pockets along
hardly wait for orders, which might be the lines of communication in Brittany.
out of date by the time they arrived. As At first, 40 -mm. antiaircraft batteries
General Wood, the 4th Armored Divi- were used for escort duty. Later in the
sion commander, later recalled, “The month the 54th Antiaircraft Brigade as-
situation at the time was . . . extremely sumed the task of guarding the supply
fluid. I had to make decisions on my routes with the aid of members of the
own responsibility, since there were no French Forces of the Interior (FFI).
orders from higher authority. Of T h e FFI in Brittany was a sizable
course, everything went ‘according to force numbering about 20,000 armed
plan,’ but at that time no one in the memrs. 5DuringJuly preparations
higher circles had [yet] discovered just had been made in London to activate a
how . . . the plan [fitted] . . . the events. unified command to direct this large and
. . . We were moving on our own. We dispersed but potentially strong under-
could not wait for directions or objec- ground force. General Koenig had
tives to be passed down from higher designated Col. Albert M. Eon as the
authority.” 49 commander of all the FFI in Brittany
Supplies were secured on the basis of and had taken him to visit General
expediency. Because of the develop- Montgomery’s 21 Army Group head-
ment of the main stream of the European quarters in Normandy, where the army
campaign outside Brittany, the VIII group chief of staff, Major-General Sir
Corps was semi-independent. A tactical Francis de Guingand, had briefed both
headquarters, it had to assume certain French officers on future operations.
administrative and logistical responsi- T h e French leaders learned that the
bilities. Permanent supply dumps were
out of the question because the break- 60 Interv with William M. King, 44th Armd Inf
Bn, 6th Armd Div, Hosp Intervs, II, ML–2235,
through had never stopped. “Within GL–93 (104) .
a couple of days [we] were passing out 61TUSA AAR states that the FFI membership
rations like Santa Claus on his sleigh, in Brittany numbered about 30,000, but the Jour-
nal des Marches et Operations du Commandement
with both giver and receiver on the des F. F. I. en Bretagne (4 juillet au 10 septembre
move. . . . T h e trucks were like a 1944) (hereafter cited as Journal des Marches)
band of stage-coaches making a run gives the figure used above. The Journal was sub-
mitted as an after action report by the commander
through lndian country. We got used of the FFI in Brittany, Col. Albert M. Eon, and
to keeping the wheels going, disregard- the manuscript is in the files of the Section His-
ing the snipers, and hoping we wouldn’t torique de l’Armeé Française. Lieutenant Colonel
Lugand, Maj. Jean Vial, and Capt. Andre Méric of
the French Army historical section kindly made
this source and others available to the author in
49 Ltr, Wood to OCMH, 24 Mar 54, OCMH Files. the summer of 1953.
PLANS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROBLEMS 355
Americans planned to penetrate Brit- the following night, ten American glid-
tany along two principal axes—Dinan– ers towed by British aircraft were
Brest, and Avranches–Rennes–Redon— landed between Vannes and Lorient to
and they hoped to be of assistance. bring in armored jeeps, weapons, and
The Allies had planned to promote ammunition to support local FFI troops
intensified FFI activities in Brittany only who were ready to take the Vannes air-
after trained guerrilla leaders, arms, am- field. On 6 August the FFI command
munition, and supplies had been made contact with a U.S. armored patrol
dropped into the area. This program and learned that the Americans, with the
was to have been completed about the assistance of local French Resistance
time U.S. troops made their appearance groups, had already cleared a large part
on the peninsula, but American exploita- of the peninsula.52
tion was so rapid that the FFI had to T h e weather had turned hot and dry
begin operating before the program in August, and mechanized columns
could be fully realized. raised clouds of grit and dust as they
General Bradley’s 12th Army Group drove over the sun-baked earth. Sun
assumed command of the FFI in Brit- glasses became precious possessions,
tany on 29 July and placed it under the goggles a necessity. Overhead, the clear
control of the Third Army. Plans were weather gave perfect visibility for Allied
made to parachute a small reconnais- fighter-bombers.
sance party into Brittany during the As fluid as the situation was to be-
night of 2 August to establish a com- come in Brittany, the immediate pre-
mand post for Colonel Eon, but poor liminary to it was quite the opposite.
weather conditions forced cancellation Getting troops out of Normandy and
of the drop. On 3 August the British into Brittany was a difficult problem.
Broadcasting Corporation radioed a In the coastal sector of the Cotentin
coded message to the FFI in Brittany to there were only two main highways
begin general guerrilla activities short running southward, and debris, dead
of open warfare. Because American animals, and wrecked vehicles, as well
troops had already sped beyond Dinan as mines, obstructed traffic, while de-
and Rennes by 4 August, General stroyed villages and damaged towns
Koenig requested Colonel Eon to para- blocked it. Bulldozers had had to clear
chute into Brittany with his staff, take lanes through rubble in some places—
command of Resistance operations at particularly in Avranches —before
once, and assume an initial mission of normal military traffic could pass. Con-
seizing and securing high ground north vergence of the two highways at Cou-
of Vannes in the Quiberon Bay area. tances and again at Avranches posed ad-
Although some French officers, includ-
ing Eon, had had no jump experience,
the command group parachuted into 52Journal des Marches; 6th Armd Div Msg to
Brittany during the night of 4 August. VIII Corps G–2, 1410, 3 Aug; TUSA 11th Spec
At the same time, 150 men were dropped Force Detachment Ltr, Resistance Activities and
Plans (Brittany), 4 Aug; TUSA Memo to VIII
in the Morlaix area to seize and preserve Corps. 5 Aug; Msg. Middleton to Grow, 1405, 5
the railroad trestle bridges there. On Aug.
356 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
On the afternoon of 1 August, Gen- With the fluid situation and precarious
eral Wood’s 4th Armored Division communication emphasizing the need
thrust southwestward from Pontaubault for initiative on the division level, Gen-
toward Rennes, the capital of Brittany. eral Wood felt that he had wide latitude
On the eastern edge of the province, at in interpreting and executing his assign-
the base of the peninsula, and about ment.1
midway between the north and south From Pontaubault the 4th Armored
shores, Rennes is the commercial center Division’s CCA raced forty miles south-
that links Brittany to the interior of west on the afternoon of 1 August, reach-
France. A city of over 80,000 inhabit- ing the northern outskirts of Rennes by
ants, Rennes is the hub of an extensive early evening. There the advance
road network. No less than ten main guard struck surprisingly strong opposi-
highways converge there. Sixty miles tion. An assault by a company of
southwest of Rennes are Vannes and armored infantry supported by twenty-
Quiberon. Sixty miles south by south- five Sherman tanks failed to penetrate
west is St. Nazaire. Sixty miles due the enemy positions, and the leading
south is Nantes. To the southeast are units of CCA withdrew several miles
Châteaubriant and Angers, towns on under the cover of smoke to organize a
the roads to Orleans, Chartres, and even stronger attack. 2
Paris. (Map VIII) Two Luftwaffe companies manning
For the 4th Armored Division, Rennes 88-mm. antiaircraft guns in defense of
was about the halfway point between the Rennes airport had stopped CCA.
Avranches and Quiberon. Whether In support of the antiaircraft gunners
Rennes was to be a stopover, as General were perhaps a hundred infantrymen
Middleton, the VIII Corps commander, with eight machine guns and three anti-
expected, or whether the 4th Armored tank guns. Elsewhere in the city were
Division was to continue to the south- a few troops from a naval torpedo and
west in a rapid drive to Quiberon, as spare parts depot and a company of in-
General Patton anticipated, was not fantry. Although the city had not been
quite clear. T h e corps commander 1 VIII Corps Opns Instrs, 31 Jul (fragmentary
had instructed General Wood only to verbal orders), and FO 9, 1600, 1 Aug; Ltr, Wood
take Rennes, but when the Third Army to OCMH, 24 Mar 54, OCMH Files. Unless other-
took control, Patton ordered Wood to wise indicated, all messages in this chapter are
from the VIII Corps G–3 Journal and File.
go beyond Rennes to Quiberon in order 2 4th Armd Div AAR, Aug; Koyen, Fourth
to seal off the entire Brittany peninsula. Armored Division, p. 21.
358 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
critical terrain, the 8th Division was maneuver that would place the 4th
to act as a clearing force in order to Armored Division in position to drive
prevent the 4th Armored Division from eastward rather than westward, the divi-
getting unnecessarily involved in action sion would be able to make a more vital
that would neutralize its mobility and contribution to victory. Instead of be-
striking power. On 2 August General ing relegated to a subsidiary role in
Middleton reattached to the armored Brittany, which might become the back-
division the 13th Infantry, which had wash of the war, the division would join
been attached to General Wood’s com- the main Allied force for the kill.
mand in Avranches but which had since T h e proper direction, General Wood
reverted to parental control. T o move believed, was eastward to Chartres. 7
the infantry, the corps commander also How best to do this was the question.
made available four Quartermaster truck Since part of the 8th Division was
companies he had secured from Third coming forward from Avranches to as-
Army. Early that evening the regiment sault Rennes, General Wood decided
began advancing toward Rennes.6 the 4th Armored Division should bypass
Meanwhile, after the 6th Armored the city. T h e armor could not bypass
Division passed through Avranches and Rennes on the east without overstepping
Pontaubault for its drive toward Brest, the corps boundary, so Wood ordered it
the remainder of the 4th Armored Divi- to make a wide arc around the western
sion had moved south of Pontaubault edge of the city, an arc wide enough to
on 2 August and assembled north of avoid the Rennes defenses. T h e divi-
Rennes. There the whole division sion would arrive south of Rennes with
awaited supplies, services, and reinforce- the heads of its columns facing eastward.
ment. T o keep the Germans off Châteaubriant, thirty miles southeast of
balance, Wood launched a series of small Rennes, would be the next logical objec-
infantry attacks during the day. tive, and forty miles east of Château-
Learning on the evening of 2 August briant the city of Angers on the Loire
that the 13th Infantry was en route to River would come within armored
Rennes, General Wood conceived a range.
spectacular idea. It already seemed It seemed to General Wood that this
evident to him that the main action in maneuver still would accomplish the im-
western Europe would take place not portant parts of his mission. T h e initial
in Brittany but in central France. Few drive would encircle Rennes and isolate
enemy forces remained in Brittany, so it on three sides. At the end of the
why proceed westward to the Atlantic movement, the division would be half
ocean and a dead end? Securing Ren- way between Rennes and Nantes and
nes was important. Blocking the base thus constitute a blocking force along
of the Brittany peninsula south of the base of the Brittany peninsula. If
Rennes was important too. If these the maneuver were carried through to
missions could be combined with a its logical conclusion and the 4th
6 8th Div AAR, 8 Jul– 4 Aug, and Msg, 2200, 2
Armored Division went to Angers, the
Aug; VIII Corps Msg to Officer in Charge of Truck
Co’s Furnished by Third Army, 2 Aug. 7 Ltr, Wood to OCMH, 24 Mar 54.
360 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
and Derval in a matter of hours, he noti- could not be in position to assault the
fied Middleton that he was planning to city from the north the next day. T h e
push one column to Châteaubriant. regimental commander therefore re-
Three hours later he reported with some quested a postponement until the morn-
exaggeration that Rennes was entirely ing of 4 August so that he could plan
surrounded, that the city was apparently and execute a co-ordinated attack to-
in the process of being demolished by gether with armored elements still north
the Germans, and that his columns were of Rennes. Impatient to capture Ren-
ready to move on Châteaubriant that nes, General Wood insisted that the in-
night. Requesting orders, he recom- fantry attack on the afternoon of 3 Au-
mended Angers as his next objective. gust. In compliance, the leading infan-
Half an hour later, he informed Middle- try battalion launched the attack from
ton that he was starting to move toward route column march formation. In the
Châteaubriant and might even take face of small arms, automatic weapons,
Angers. Suddenly, however, he ac- and antiaircraft fire, the battalion forced
knowledged receipt of “a new mission: an entrance into the northeastern out-
. . . blocking enemy retreat from Ren- skirts of Rennes.14
nes.” 12 Their defensive positions penetrated,
Whether receipt of Middleton’s in- their casualties at 60 dead and 130
struction to secure Rennes prompted wounded, and the city almost encircled
Wood’s sudden acknowledgment or not, by U.S. armored units, the Germans pre-
the fact was that Wood needed Rennes pared to depart Rennes. Hausser, the
before he could proceed eastward–not Seventh Army commander, gave permis-
only to eliminate a threat to his poten- sion at 2300 for withdrawal during the
tial left rear but also to open a supply night. After burning supplies and in-
route for his division. He therefore stallations, the garrison of about 2,000
halted his columns and directed them Germans left at 0300, 4 August. In two
to turn northeastward to block the march groups, both with motorized and
escape routes southeast of Rennes while foot troops, they moved along small
the attached 13th Infantry attacked the roads and cross-country, reaching St. Na-
city from the north. Pushing a dozen zaire five days later. They encountered
miles or so east and northeast of Bain-de- practically no Americans because Ameri-
Bretagne and Derval, the heads of the can troops were racing along the main
combat commands on 4 August cut the highways.15
main roads southeast of Rennes and T h e 13th Infantry marched into Ren-
captured and destroyed some of the nes on the morning of 4 August and ac-
German units squeezed out of the city cepted the kisses and wines of the liber-
by pressure from the north.13 ated inhabitants. On the heels of the
Hurrying toward Rennes during the regiment came the remainder of the 8th
night of 2 August, the 13th Infantry Division, which earlier had expected to
follow the 6th Armored Division to
12Msgs, Wood to Middleton, 1315, 1555, 1630,
1821, 3 Aug.
13 TheArmored School, Armor in the Exploita- 1413th Inf AAR, Aug.
tion. pp. 26-27. 15MS # B–731 (Fahrmbacher) .
362 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Brest. Reassuming control of the 13th he radioed the corps commander during
Infantry, General Stroh took responsi- the night of 3 August. “Reply urgent
bility for providing security for Rennes. repeat reply urgent.”
Deployed to block all entrances into the Deciding that it was time to see the
city, the 8th Division became the VIII division commander and make sure he
Corps reserve.16 understood the situation, Middleton
Meanwhile, General Middleton had drove to Wood’s headquarters on 4 Au-
been pondering the proper mission of gust. 18
the 4th Armored Division. Though Wood threw his arms around the corps
tempted to send it eastward toward Châ- commander in welcome.
teaubriant, he could not ignore Qui- “What’s the matter?” Middleton asked
beron Bay. Yet the entire situation- with dry humor. “Have you lost your
not only in Brittany but all along the division?”
Allied front—wasin a state of flux. All “No!” Wood replied. It was worse
sorts of changes in the Allied plan were than that. “They”-meaning the Allied
being rumored, and it seemed possible command–“they are winning the war
that the campaign might sweep so irre- the wrong way.”
sistibly eastward as to drag with it the Though Wood almost persuaded the
entire VIII Corps. With this in mind, corps commander that he ought to be al-
Middleton made a compromise decision lowed to go to the east without restric-
on the evening of 3 August. He or- tion, the result of the personal confer-
dered Wood to block the bridges on the ence was a compromise. Without dis-
Vilaine River from Rennes to the arranging his dispositions oriented east-
coast.17 T h e Vilaine flows generally ward, Wood agreed to block all the
southwestward from Rennes and emp- roads south of Rennes, to dispatch part
ties into the ocean about half way be- of one combat command westward to
tween St. Nazaire and Vannes. Two secure the Vilaine River bridges near
main highways cross the river—one at Redon, and to make maximum use of
Redon, the other at la Roche-Bernard. reconnaissance units to secure the Vi-
By blocking the bridges at these towns laine River line.19
and elsewhere, the 4th Armored Divi- T h e same day VIII Corps issued a
sion would seal off the Rennes–Qui- list of the missions assigned to its com-
beron area. At the same time the di- bat components. T h e list confirmed
vision would also be ready to continue the arrangements decided upon by Mid-
toward the east should that course of dleton and Wood. Sent to the Third
action become desirable and possible. Army headquarters as a routine matter,
General Wood failed to get Middle- the information did not escape the sharp
ton’s message. “Have received no mis- glance of Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, the
sion repeat have received no mission,” army chief of staff. He immediately
168th Div AAR, 8 Jul– 4 Aug; VIII Corps G–3 18Msg, Wood to Middleton, 0310, 4 Aug, and
Jnl, 2-4 Aug; Msg, Evans to Wood, 2040, 3 Aug; penned notation by member of the VIII Corps
VIII Corps FO 9, 1600, 1 Aug; VIII Corps Msgs to G–3 Sec on the msg.
4th and 6th Armd Divs, 1645, 2 Aug. 19Review Panel Min, OCMH; 9 May 56; Msg,
l7 Msg, Evans to Wood, 2040, 3 Aug. Wood to Middleton, 1610, 4 Aug.
RENNES, LORIENT, AND NANTES 363
move toward Chartres . . . would have to wait until the corps got around to his
been of immense value,” he could not particular problem.33
understand why the powerful mobile Despite this gloomy outlook, a spark
forces under his command were allowed of hope remained for the 4th Armored
to stand before a fortress city.30 Division. Patton had told Middleton
What Wood did not know was that to send some troops to Nantes to relieve
the forces in Brittany had become step- an American task force containing the
children. As he had expected, the main Germans in that port city. Though
action of the European campaign was Patton expected Middleton to dispatch
developing east of Brittany, and Patton troops from the 8th Division at Rennes,
and Middleton lacked sufficient resources Middleton preferred to keep the 8th
to develop the Brittany operation as they where it was so he could use it to rein-
wished. Yet as soon as Middleton force the attack against St. Malo if neces-
received Wood’s request for a decision sary. Middleton therefore called upon
on the 4th Armored Division’s future the 4th Armored Division. He in-
course of action, he replied, both by structed Wood to contain Lorient and
radio and by liaison plane, instructing remain immobile, but he also told him
Wood not to get involved in a battle at to send a combat command eastward
Lorient.31 At the same time he for- from Lorient to Nantes. An American
warded Wood’s request to Patton, hop- unit was guarding Nantes, but Middle-
ing thereby to get clarification of the ton did not know which one it was or
entire Brittany situation and the future exactly where it was. Wood was to
role of the VIII Corps.32 locate and relieve the unit at Nantes.
At a conference late on 8 August, Pat- Middleton suggested that Wood send
ton informed Middleton that the VIII some cavalry along to enable the com-
Corps still had the job of clearing the bat command to scout the Loire River
Brittany peninsula. Securing the ports east of St. Nazaire and Nantes and
of St. Malo and Brest had priority make contact with U.S. troops at Angers.
over the capture of Lorient. Thus, T h e general situation, he added, looked
Wood would have to contain Lorient good .34
until St. Malo and Brest were taken. Good was hardly the word for it.
Only then could the far-flung forces of Wood had wanted to go to Angers five
the VIII Corps in Brittany be assembled days earlier. He sent Colonel Clarke’s
to help Wood “take Lorient out of the CCA on the eighty-mile move to Nantes
picture.” T h e difficulty was that Mid- on the morning of 10 August. On the
dleton could not do everything at the following day CCA relieved a battalion
same time. Given the forces at his dis- of the 5th Division on the outskirts of
posal and his widely separated objectives, the city. That night, heavy explosions
he could do no more than proceed from in Nantes indicated that the Germans
one task to another. Wood would have were destroying dumps and installations.
French civilians reported the enemy had effectively exploited a fluid situa-
withdrawing. Clarke therefore asked tion by using speed and surprise. Hav-
Wood’s permission to enter Nantes with ing made a reputation in the Cotentin,
light forces. the division expanded it in Brittany.
Earlier, when Middleton had alerted During the first twelve days of August,
Wood for the mission of driving to the 4th Armored Division took almost
Nantes, he had ordered him categor- 5,000 prisoners and destroyed or cap-
ically: “Do not become involved in fight tured almost 250 German vehicles.
in city. Merely prevent any enemy Against these figures, the division lost 98
movement to north.” Four days later, killed, 362 wounded, 11 missing; 15
with a combat command at the gates of tanks and 20 vehicles.36
the city, the opportunity to take Nantes Despite the impressive achievement
easily was too tempting to resist. Wood represented by the number of the enemy
gave Clarke permission to attack. Dur- destroyed and the amount of the ter-
ing the afternoon of 1 2 August, helped ritory liberated, the 4th Armored Divi-
by men of the FFI, who led the troops sion had not taken the port city assigned.
safely through mine fields, CCA stormed Had Middleton and Wood been intent
the city and captured it.35 on securing Quiberon, the division
Securing Nantes was like getting might have arrived at Lorient a day or
one’s foot in the door. Wood’s persist- two earlier and perhaps have been in
ent efforts to drive to the east were about time to capture the fortress simply by
to succeed. A day later, on 13 August, smashing a way into the streets of the
the 4th Armored Division passed from city; indeed, a serious effort launched
the control of the VIII Corps, and on 15 immediately after the arrival of the divi-
August Wood handed over the respon- sion might still have taken the fortress.
sibility of containing Lorient to the 6th In mid-August, as the Germans in
Armored Division. By that time only western Europe seemed to be in the
a handful of 4th Armored Division process of complete disintegration, the
troops remained at Lorient, impatient failure to take Lorient and Quiberon
for the relief that would permit them to seemed less important than it would have
join the bulk of the division Wood had seemed in July. By late September,
already sent out of Brittany. General Lorient and Quiberon were quite for-
Wood had finally gotten a mission he gotten. “Looking at it with hindsight,”
wanted. T h e 4th Armored Division General Middleton said many years
was driving eastward. afterward, “Wood was right, of course.
During the first two weeks of August, But the high command at the time was
the 4th Armored Division had displayed absolutely right in . . . [wanting] the
a constant and consistent aggressiveness. ports.” 37 Wood’s trouble was wanting
It had performed like cavalry-slashing, to do the right thing at the wrong time.
side-slipping, and pushing forward. It
35Evans to Wood, 8 Aug; Memo, Evans for BCT, 364th Armd Div AAR, Aug; Koyen, Fourth
5th Div, 8 Aug; The Armored School, Armor in Armored Division, p. 26.
the Exploitation, p . 30; 4th Armd Div AAR, Aug. 37 Min of Review Panel, OCMH, 9 May 56.
368 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
T h e 4th Armored Division had devel- of the division could say with profound
oped to a high degree of proficiency a feeling of the Germans, “They’ve got us
reckless ardor for pursuit of a defeated surrounded again, the poor bastards.”39
enemy. T h e esprit de corps of the On the crest of a mounting wave of
troops matched the supreme confidence optimism the 4th Armored Division
of the division commander. It was turned eastward and drove out of Brit-
stimulating to operate deep in enemy tany in search of further opportunities,
territory and report that over a thousand its commander sure at last that he was
enemy soldiers were ready to surrender heading in the right direction.
but that the division lacked “the time
or the means to collect them.” 38 It was 38TUSA Memo, Situation as of 0600, 6 Aug.
heady to have such assurance that men 39Koyen, Fourth Armored Division, p. 13.
CHAPTER XX
“Take Brest”
While the 4th Armored Division was In armored division practice, CCR
performing its feats in Brittany, the 6th was often considered more suitable for
Armored Division also was executing a defensive than for offensive missions,
spectacular movement. On the after- primarily because it had less command
noon of 31 July the VIII Corps com- tanks, radio equipment, and personnel
mander, General Middleton, ordered than the other combat commands. By
General Grow’s division to relieve the sending CCR ahead, General Grow in-
4th Armored Division’s CCA in the dicated his intention to pass Combat
Sélune River bridgehead at Pontaubault. Commands A and B through CCR at
(See Map VIII.) Pontaubault whenever he renewed the
Convinced that exploitation beyond offensive. However, CCR was just mov-
Pontaubault was in order, but not know- ing forward when Grow received word-
ing whether Middleton intended to shortly before dawn, 1 August–to pro-
move at once into Brittany or to con- ceed at once through Pontaubault and
solidate his forces first at the base of the move westward into Brittany through
Cotentin, Grow asked Middleton
whether the 6th Armored Division was
to go beyond Pontaubault immediately.
Thomas A. Bruce (comdr of 128th FA Bn), 7
T h e answer was no. Satisfied that a Jan 53. Ltrs, Gen Grow to Author, 26 and 27
day or two would pass (while other units Apr 54; Lt Col William J. Given (Sig Officer) to
of the corps arrived at Avranches) before Gen Grow, 12 Jan 53; Mr. Ernest W. Mitchell
the exploitation commenced, Grow dis- (G–2) to Gen Grow, 5 Mar 53. Memo, Gen Grow
to Author, n.d. Comments by Lt Col Eugene J.
patched Combat Command R (CCR), White, n.d. All in OCMH Files. See also, [Maj.
commanded by Col. Harry F. Hanson, Gen. Robert W. Grow], Brest to Bastogne, the
Story of the 6th Armored Division (pamphlet,
to outpost the Pontaubault bridgehead.1 Stars and Stripes, Information and Education Divi-
sion, Special and Information Services, ETOUSA,
Paris, c. 1945); [Lt. Robert J. Burns, Jr., and Lt.
1 The sources for this chapter are: The invaluable John S. Dahl], The 68th Tank Battalion in Com-
msgs in the VIII Corps G–3 Jnl and File (all msgs bat (Minden, Nebraska: Warp Publishing Co.,
cited are from this source unless otherwise noted). 1945); [Lt. Elmer J. Gruber], A History of the
[Burk], Combat Record of the Sixth Armored 212th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in the
Division, pp. 6ff. Robert W. Grow, “An Epic of E.T.O. (n.p., n.d.); [Maj. Samuel R. Ross, Editor-
Brittany,” Military Review, XXVI, No. 11 (Febru- in-Chief], Battle Book: a Combat History of
ary, 1947), pp. 3–9. Author’s Intervs with former Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division
6th Armd Div personnel: Gen Grow 18, 19, 31 Dec Artillery, 6th Armored Division (Apolda, Germany:
52, 3 Jan 53; Mr. Michael J. Galvin (G–3), 6 Jan Rob. Birkner, 1945) ; Overseas Pictorial History of
53; Col Glen C. McBride (CofS), 19 Feb 53; Col Headquarters Battery, 231st Armored Field Artil-
Donald G. Williams (Engr), 16 Jan 53; Lt Col lery Battalion (Germany, 1945).
370 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
PONTAUBAT BRIDGEover the Selune River, one of the few bridges left
intact by retreating Germans.
ments, the 603d Tank Destroyer Battal- out critical bridges, while all the com-
ion, and the 777th Antiaircraft Artillery bat commands and the division trains
(Automatic Weapons) Battalion.3 had to use the lone available highway
Before General Grow could concen- toward Brittany. During one forty-
trate on his final objective, he had to hour period, the 777th Antiaircraft
move his division through Avranches Battalion knocked out eighteen of forty
and into Brittany and get his troops enemy planes that appeared over
organized into two parallel columns Avranches and Pontaubault.
poised for offensive action.4 Beyond the bottleneck, the first ter-
Getting through the Avranches bottle- rain obstacle where the enemy might
neck was no mean achievement. On logically be expected to defend was the
both 1 and 2 August German planes Couesnon River, the border of Brittany.
strafed the columns and tried to knock Suspecting that the enemy would
attempt to deny the crossing at Pon-
3VIII Corps Opns Instrs (fragmentary verbal torson, General Grow split his division
orders), 3 1 Jul, Msg, 1 Aug, and FO 9, 1600, 1 Aug. into two columns immediately south of
4 Maj. Homer H. Hammond, T h e Operations of Pontaubault, sending Hanson’s CCR to
the 6th Armored Division in the Brittany Peninsula,
Thesis, Officers’ Advanced Course (The Infantry Pontorson and Taylor’s CCA south-
School, Ft. Benning, Ga., 1946–47) (hereafter cited westward to the Couesnon crossing at
as Hammond, 6th Armored Division); see also Antrain, seven miles south of Pontorson.
[Committee 9], Super Sixth in Exploitation (6th
Armored Division, Normandy to Brest) , Operation Read’s CCB followed CCR. Once
COBRA,Research Report, Officers’ Advanced Course across the Couesnon at Pontorson and
(The Armored School, Ft. Knox, Ky., May 1949) Antrain, CCB might pass through CCR
(hereafter cited as [Committee 9], Super Sixth) , an
excellent source that includes good material on
on the morning of 2 August, whereupon
logistics, intelligence, and administration. the 6th Armored Division would have
372 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
staff officers and commanders (some fell reached Grow, who was observing Tay-
asleep during the conference) that Grow lor’s attack at Mauron, and handed him
postponed the advance until noon of 3 a penciled note on a sheet of scratch
August. T h e delay not only would per- paper. “Protect your front,” Middleton
mit several additional hours of rest but instructed, “and concentrate so that we
also would enable the cavalry reconnais- can move in on St. Malo tomorrow.”
sance squadron to take its proper place Middleton had decided that he needed to
at the front and on the flanks of the take St. Malo at once. General Earnest’s
columns, a procedure impossible to this Task Force A and a portion of General
point because of the speed of the com- Macon’s 83d Division were in the St.
mitment into Brittany and the traffic Malo area; General Grow was to take
congestion near Avranches. command of these forces, add the weight
T h e division shoved off at noon, 3 of his 6th Armored Division, and launch
August, with the cavalry troops where a co-ordinated attack on the port city.12
they belonged. Taylor’s CCA drove fif- General Grow’s reactions were con-
teen miles to the west, missed a turn at a flicting. How was he going to get to
crossroads, and ran into organized resist- Brest by Saturday if he was diverted to
ance near Mauron. Deciding that it Dinan and St. Malo? He first protested
would be more difficult to reverse direc- the corps order by radio and by officer
tion in order to regain the correct route, courier and requested reconsideration of
Taylor attacked to eliminate an esti- the changed mission. He then obeyed.
mated enemy force of 250 men so that “Mission changed,” he radioed his chief
he could reach his original route of ad- of staff. CCA was to assemble near
vance by side roads. After a three-hour Mauron. CCB was to turn north to out-
fire fight, the Mauron defenses were re- flank Dinan, and CCR was to be ready
duced. to move north against Dinan.13 Unable
Meanwhile, Read’s CCB drove west to reach CCB by radio, Grow pursued
from Bécherel, detoured several miles the combat command in his armored
to the north to avoid the tail of CCA car. Although he toyed with the idea of
at Mauron, and gave impetus to the at- letting CCB continue westward alone,
tempts of a small group of Germans near he decided that this would violate the
Broons to flee. After having moved spirit of the corps order.
virtually unopposed for more than thirty After stopping CCB several miles
miles that day, CCB received an in- short of Loudéac, General Grow changed
explicable order to halt, an order doubly his scheme of maneuver. On the chance
incomprehensible since Grow had that that Middleton might accede to his re-
day switched CCR onto CCB’s trail.
T h e explanation lay in word from
12Memo, Middleton for Grow, recorded in the 6th
General Middleton, who had radioed Armd Div G–3 Journal as having arrived “No
General Grow, “Do not bypass Dinan time 3 Aug.” T h e actual message is missing from
and St. Malo. Message follows by cour- the file. It has been reconstructed through in-
terviews with General Grow and Colonel McBride.
ier.” 11 T h e messenger from corps 13Msg, Grow to Middleton, 3 Aug, VIII Corps
11Msg, Evans LO Grow, 1345, 3 Aug; 6th Armd G–3 Jnl File ( 4 Aug) ; Msg, Grow to McBride, 1700,
Div G–3 Jnl, entry 1615, 3 Aug. 3 Aug, 6th Armd Div G–3 Jnl.
“TAKE BREST” 375
quest and rescind the diversion to Dinan, controlling an outburst of anger with
Grow determined to keep CCB where it difficulty.
was, ahead of the division and on the “What in hell are you doing setting
road to Brest. Since the CCA head- here?” he demanded of General Grow.
quarters was closer to Dinan and since “I thought I told you to go to Brest.”
an excellent highway led northward for Grow explained that his advance had
thirty miles from Mauron to Dinan, been halted.
Grow formed a special task force from “On what authority?” Patton rasped.
CCR troops, placed Taylor’s CCA head- “Corps order, sir,” Grow said.
quarters in command of it, and sent it T h e division chief of staff had already
north toward the new objective.14 put his hand into the pocket of his shirt.
T h e officer courier who had gone to Grow had given him the note he had
the corps headquarters to request recon- received from Middleton and had asked
sideration of the changed mission re- him to get it into the division message
turned late that night and reported, file. T h e chief of staff still had it in
“The answer was no.” T h e disappoint- his pocket. He handed it to Patton.
ment at the division headquarters was T h e three officers watched Patton read
so bitter that the G–3 section pub- Middleton’s note. When he finished,
lished the “Results of Operations” as he folded the paper and put it into his
“None.”15 pants pocket. “And he was a good
T h e division headquarters on the doughboy, too,” Patton said quietly as
morning of 4 August was developing an though talking to himself. Then he
attack plan for action against Dinan looked at Grow, “I’ll see Middleton,”
when, around 1100, General Patton ar- he said. “YOU go ahead where I told
rived unannounced at a wheat field near you to go.”
Merdrignac where the headquarters was
located.16 General Grow, who had just One hundred miles east of the 6th
come out of his tent, saw the army com- Armored Division, the VIII Corps head-
mander’s jeep turn into the field and was quarters, toiling under the handicap of
pleasantly surprised. T h e division chief its communications problem with the
of staff, who was walking across the field divisions, was only vaguely aware of de-
toward General Grow, was nearby when velopments at the front.
Patton got out of his jeep. T h e division On 2 August, when Grow had ordered
G–3 emerged from his operations tent his northern column (CCB) to bypass
in time to hear Patton’s first words. Dinan, he had notified the corps of his
T h e army commander appeared to be action. T h e corps noted that the
armored division “pursuant to verbal
orders Army Commander bypassed
14Msg, Grow to Middleton, 1910 3 Aug. Dinan and is proceeding S and W.”
156th Armd Div G–3 Per Rpt 7 [4 Aug]; see
also Msg, Grow to Middleton, 0330, 4 Aug [Sitrep Later, news came that contingents of the
10]. division were in Dinan. Apparently on
16On the Dinan attack details, see Ltr, no head- the basis of this information, the Third
ing, 0730, 4 Aug; Grow to CO, Combat Team, 83d
Div, 0525, 4 Aug, and entry 1007, 4 Aug. All in Army believed that the division had
6th Armd Div G–3 Jnl and File. “passed through Dinan.” When Gen-
376 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
eral Earnest’s Task Force A encountered evening Middleton withdrew even this
enemy tanks and infantry near Dinan request. “I wanted you to assist in
on the following morning (3 August), capture of St. Malo,” he informed Gen-
it was reasonable for Middleton-who eral Grow. “However it is apparent
believed that the 6th Armored Division that your advance precludes this . . . .
had been through there on the previous Continue your original mission.” 18
evening and consequently could not be Shortly after midnight, when the
far away-to order Grow to “assist Task Third Army G–3 telephoned to ask
Force A at that point.” As indications whether the 6th Armored Division had
of enemy build-up in the Dinan-St. really been diverted toward St. Malo,
Malo region increased, Middleton began the VIII Corps G–3 assured the caller
to experience a growing uneasiness. that the division was proceeding toward
Though the 83d Division had begun Brest. T h e assurance was wishful.
to advance toward Pontorson, it could T h e corps had had only the briefest of
not possibly get there for another day. contacts was with the division when the
Learning that the 6th Armored Division division courier had arrived to transmit
had in reality bypassed Dinan, Middle- General Grow’s request for reconsidera-
ton diverted it from its Brest run. His tion of his mission. But the courier
explanation: “We are getting too had departed hastily without learning
strung out. We must take Dinan and that the original mission was again in
St. Malo before we can proceed.” 17 force. Since then no word had come
What appeared unreasonable to Grow from the division, no acknowledgment
was reasonable from Middleton’s point of the restoration of the old mission, no
of view. information on General Grow’s inten-
Later on 3 August, when the pilot of tions or activities. Several hours after
a light artillery plane reported the loca- daylight, 4 August, a message finally
tions of the 6th Armored Division col- came. “Urgently recommend no change
umns, General Middleton realized that in division mission [toward Brest],”
the armor had advanced much farther General Grow had radioed the previous
beyond Dinan than he had thought. evening. “Both of my commands far
When he learned of the imminent ar- beyond St. Malo. . . . would take another
rival of infantry troops in the Dinan-St. day to attack Dinan from west.” 19
Malo sector, he changed his message to T h e corps tried again. “Proceed on
Grow from an order to a request. original mission toward Brest,” Middle-
“Task Force ‘A’ and 83d Division will ton radioed. Soon afterwards the corps
attack St. Malo tomorrow,” he radioed received another message from the divi-
Grow. “Can you participate with one sion, but it was no acknowledgment.
combat command . . . ?” Later that “[Original] Mission changed,” read the
It was not long before the Household of a turtle. After a conference with
Cavalry announced, “Brest is ours.” Patton, Middleton radioed Grow to de-
Not long afterwards came the correction, velop the situation wherever he was,
“Brest was not ours,” and it would whether “in front of or in Brest.” If
“probably not fall until Grow could not capture and secure Brest
His patience gone, Middleton rapped without help, Middleton wrote,
out a message to Grow. “This head- . . . then we will reinforce you with the
quarters has no information as to your necessary force. As for me, I do not want
present positions,” he wrote. “Radio you to become too involved so that you
this headquarters at once.” 26 cannot take care of yourself. However, I
But communications difficulties pre- feel that the situation at Brest should be
cluded the regular flow of information. clarified before [additional] troops are sent.
Furthermore, at this time no one can say
Corps could only guess what was hap- what should be sent. . . . While supply and
pening. Estimates of enemy intentions evacuation is an Army function, yet if I
were vaguely optimistic but of little real can assist you in these matters do not hesi-
value. T h e corps G–2 reasoned that, tate to call.28
considering the highly disorganized state After that there was little for Middle-
of the enemy, the disruption of German ton to do except to wait and hope for
supply operations, the lack of reserves, the best.
and the growing activity of the FFI, the
Germans in Brittany could do no more In the wheat field near Merdrignac,
than offer a “spotty and sporadic [de- near noon on 4 August, Patton’s un-
laying action] culminating in a short expected arrival at the 6th Armored
token defense of the city of Brest.” 27 Division command post had virtually
Whether this was true or false, whether coincided with the receipt of corps
the 6th Armored Division was inside permission for the division to continue
Brest or still outside, whether it was toward Brest.29 It did not take long
heavily engaged, in danger of being de- for General Grow to flash the news to
stroyed and needful of help, or having an all subordinate commands: “Division
easy time taking and securing the port proceeds at once on original mission to
were vital questions that could not be Brest. Dinan will not (repeat not) be
answered until word came from General attacked.”30 Assured that all units had
Grow. received the re-orientation westward,
On the other hand, it seemed to corps Grow wired Middleton that he would
that the strong fortifications known to move early that afternoon.31 Actually,
exist around Brest would make the effort however, it took the division most of
of a single armored division seem like the afternoon to get ready. T h e effect
the impact of an insect against the shell
28 Memo (by radio), Middleton for Grow, 6 Aug.
25TUSA Info Serv with 6th Armd Div Msg, 1120, 29 Msgs, Evans to Grow, 0915 and 1100, 4 Aug,
6 Aug; TUSA Info Serv Msg, Satterfield to VIII 6th Armd Div G–3 Jnl (Delayed Msgs due to
Corps, 1330, 6 Aug. radio silence received 4 Aug) ; TUSA Info Serv
26Msg, Middleton to Grow, 1720, 6 Aug. Detachment to 6th Armd Div, 1145, 4 Aug.
27VIII Corps G–2 Per Rpt 49, 3 Aug; see also 30Radio signed Galvin, 1125, 4 Aug.
G–2 Per Rpt 51, 5 Aug. 31Msg, Grow to Middleton, 1230, 4 Aug.
“TAKE BREST” 379
of the abortive diversion toward Dinan not only acted as guides and information
was to delay the thrust on Brest almost agents but also harassed and hurried the
a day. departure of small German garrisons
While the division made preparations, from the interior towns.
Patton told Grow that he had come for Learning from the FFI that about two
three reasons: he had wanted to see how thousand German paratroopers had de-
the unit was functioning, he had some stroyed the bridges at Carhaix and were
information to impart, and he wanted to preparing to defend there, General Grow
discuss supply, particularly gasoline. ordered the columns to bypass that town
He admitted that he was pleasantly sur- on north and south. Avoiding en-
prised to find the division so far into tanglement there on the morning of 5
Brittany. 32 He revealed that the divi- August, both columns drove toward
sion would have no infantry support Huelgoat, less than forty air miles from
until later since the 83d Division would Brest. As it began to seem likely that
have to knock out St. Malo before pro- the division would be in the port city
ceeding to Brest. Finally, he said he by nightfall and win General Patton’s
was planning to send gas forward for wager with Montgomery, about five
the division on the following day and hundred Germans with artillery and
asked where Grow wanted it delivered. tanks stopped the advance near Huel-
Looking at the map, Grow selected the goat. Mined defiles, heavily wooded
town of Pontivy, twenty-five miles west areas, and the presence of Germans in
of the leading division troops. T h e good defensive positions forced the
army commander was momentarily division into an engagement that lasted
startled. Designating a supply point several hours.33 T h e units finally
ahead of the combat troops rather than cleared the enemy and prepared for
behind them indicated that Grow in- what was hoped would be the final dash
tended to advance so fast and so far that to Brest.
Pontivy by the following day would be Pursuing interior routes and piloting
a rear area suitable for a supply dump. his columns between Morlaix and Landi-
Patton grinned. “You’ll get your gas visiau, which he had been apprised were
there,” he promised. occupied by the Germans, General Grow
Because destroyed bridges and mined pushed his troops forward on the morn-
fords near Loudéac and Pontivy tem- ing of 6 August. Read’s CCB moved
porarily delayed the parallel armored rapidly north, then west, and struck a
columns early on the evening of 4 Au- strong roadblock six miles south of Mor-
gust, General Grow took advantage of laix, obviously an outpost position.
a full moon and clear weather to order a After sustaining several casualties, CCB
night march. There was no opposition. withdrew and bypassed the resistance.
Members of the FFI became bolder and That evening, when reconnaissance
33Sec Byrd, 15th Tank Battalion, pp. 29–31. 2d
32An aide who accompanied Patton later in- Lt. James I. Durden of the 15th Tank Battalion,
formed Grow that Patton had had to discard several who was killed when he went forward on foot to
maps during his trip to the division command clear a mine field under enemy fire and lead drivers
post. Each time he ran off one map sheet onto along safe paths, was posthumously awarded the
another was an occasion for jubilant profanity. DSC.
380 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
troops encountered opposition at Lesne- General Grow felt that he had a good
ven—fifteen miles from Brest—a French chance of taking Brest. German morale
volunteer delivered a surrender ultima- was extremely low. T h e division ad-
tum to the German garrison at Lesneven. vance had so disrupted German com-
No reply came, and the combat com- munications that local commanders
mand attacked, drove the enemy out, probably had little if any knowledge of
and took possession of the town. the situation. Because German strength
Taylor’s CCA, in contrast, advanced in Brittany had been drained away into
slowly over devious country lanes not Normandy, what remained was of mis-
marked on maps available to the troops. cellaneous nature and low caliber.
By nightfall the command was between Although the 6th Armored Division had
Morlaix and Landivisiau. Hanson’s no accurate information on how many
CCR, which had switched routes near Germans defended Brest, a number in
Huelgoat to follow CCA, changed again excess of 3,000 hardly seemed likely.
to reinforce the faster moving CCB. They were probably capable of fighting
Although the 6th Armored Division delaying action on the radius of a fifty-
was in the vicinity of Brest by the eve- mile circle around Brest and drawing
ning of 6 August, it was hardly in posi- back gradually into the fortress. Re-
tion to attack or even to demonstrate membering that Granville, the first im-
against the objective. How strong the portant division objective in the Coten-
city defenses were and what the Ger- tin, had surrendered to a tank platoon,
mans intended to do were yet to be General Grow decided that a show of
discovered. force might satisfy the German require-
Earlier that day an American fighter- ments of honor and bring about the
bomber had appeared over the division surrender of Brest. He ordered Read’s
column and the pilot had radioed Pat- CCB, which was closest to the city, to
ton’s request for information: “What move against Brest the next morning,
is situation in Brest? Where are your 7 Aug3
forces? . . . Does 6th Armored Division Attacking southwest from Lesneven,
need Infantry assistance?” Grow an- CCB bypassed Plabennec on the north.
swered that he thought Brest would be After destroying a large antiaircraft
defended and that he needed an infantry warning system and observation post
division to support his attack on the near Milizac, the combat command came
city. This was what had prompted the under severe fire from artillery pieces in
instruction that Grow was to develop his Brest. Seven miles north of the city,
situation “in front of or in Brest” until CCB had struck the hard shell of the
further clarification of the situation per- fortress.
mitted sending additional troops to Meanwhile, on 7 August, the remain-
Brest. 34 Until then, the 6th Armored der of the division arrived in the Brest
Division was to go it alone. area. CCR in late afternoon reached
the vicinity of Gouesnou, about four
34Msg, Weyland to Grow, 1210, 6 Aug; Msg,
Grow to Weyland, 1250, 6 Aug; Memo (by radio),
Middleton for Grow, 6 Aug; Msg, Patton to Grow
(via plane), 1820, 6 Aug. 356th Armd Div G–2 Per Rpt 9, 6 Aug.
“TAKE BREST” 381
miles north-northeast of the center of tion of each port city would be a difficult
Brest. CCA moved to the vicinity of task requiring heavy artillery and a force
Guipavas during the evening and night, of perhaps one armored and two in-
but not as far toward Brest as Grow fantry divisions. With only four divi-
would have liked. Deployed in three sions under his control, Middleton
columns and from four to seven miles visualized protracted operations ahead,
from the center of the city, the 6th particularly since he felt that the in-
Armored Division was in contact with creasing importance of developments east
the Brest defenses. of Brittany might rob him of some of his
It was apparent by this time that the resources. Proceeding with his program
Germans intended to defend and that of reducing the German port cities one
they had adequate means to do so. by one, with St. Malo first on the agenda,
Heavy artillery fire harassed the divisionhe could do little to aid his forces else-
throughout 7 August, serving notice that where; but at the same time he expected
the element of surprise had been re- little from them.37
moved.36 T o take the fortress, the divi- General Patton, who felt that his
sion would have to stage a full-scale Household Cavalry gave him a better
attack. Needing a day to reorganize for knowledge of what was happening in
a co-ordinated effort, Grow decided to Brittany and who had received word that
give the German garrison one more Grow planned to attack Brest, decided
chance to surrender. If the Germans that the 6th Armored Division ought to
were planning only a token defense, per- have some reinforcement. He there-
haps a surrender ultimatum might fore ordered Middleton to move an in-
produce the desired result. While the fantry battalion of the 8th Division from
division prepared an attack for 9 August, Rennes to Brest. Early on the after-
the G–2 and a German-speaking master noon of 8 August, a battalion started
sergeant drove toward the enemy line westward to join the 6th Armored Divi-
on the morning of 8 August in a jeep sion.38
draped in white sheets and flying a flag Soon afterwards, a report came to army
of truce. announcing that a large German force
was moving toward Brest from the north-
From the corps perspective, the situa- east.39 If this were true, the 6th Ar-
tion appeared to be quite different: the mored Division was about to be squeezed
evidence pointed to a strong defense of and crushed between the moving farce
Brest. A hard-fought battle had de- and the Brest garrison. Concern over
veloped at St. Malo. Captured over- the potential fate of the division was
prints of the Lorient fortifications and intensified by the inadequate communi-
the experience of the 4th Armored Divi- cations.
sion showed strong defenses there.
Why should the Germans give only 37Memo, Evans for Maddox, 7 Aug.
token opposition at Brest? General 38 TUSA Info Serv Patrol Msg, received at VIII
CP 1156, 8 Aug: TUSA Memo to VIII Corps,
Middleton was certain that the reduc- Corps
8 Aug: VIII Corps Memo to 8th Div, 8 Aug; 6th
Armd Div G–3 Jnl, entry 0410, 8 Aug.
36 6th Armd Div G–2 Per Rpt 10, 7 Aug. 39TUSA Info Serv Msg, 1350, 8 Aug.
382 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Although additional Signal equipment cured the division message, and radioed:
had been sent to the division, the pres- “See you tomorrow, get a longer field.”
ence of scattered groups of enemy Meanwhile, at corps headquarters, it
soldiers in the division area delayed its appeared likely that the anticipated Ger-
use. German patrols similarly prohib- man squeeze play against the 6th Ar-
ited establishment of a landing strip mored Division soon might develop.
for liaison planes. On General Grow’s When radio silence, imposed by General
suggestion, a liaison plane from the corps Grow to cloak his intentions before
appeared over the division command Brest, was momentarily lifted on the eve-
post on 7 August, and the pilot dropped ning of 8 August, a cryptic message by
a note on a panel laid out in a field. high-powered radio informed corps that
He then circled the area in a vain at- the division command post was “under
tempt to discover a meadow large attack, codes in danger, may destroy.”
enough to land on, for the terrain re-
sembled the small hedgerow-enclosed At Brest, on the morning of 8 August,
fields of the Cotentin. After requesting a four-man German patrol guided the
by radio that the division bulldoze out white-draped American jeep bearing M.
one hedgerow to create a landing space Sgt. Alex Castle and the 6th Armored
the size of two fields, the pilot picked up Division G–2, Maj. Ernest W. Mitchell,
a division message held aloft between toward an outpost position. At the out-
lance poles, “waggled his wings, and post, a German lieutenant blindfolded
went home with some flak on his tail.” 40 the two emissaries before taking them
Because the hedgerowed fields were into the city. When the blindfolds were
terraced, it was difficult to find two ad- removed, Mitchell and Castle found
jacent open spaces with the same floor themselves in an underground command
level. After discovering a surface suit- post, face to face with several German
able for a landing strip, the Signal of- officers seated at a table.
ficer borrowed a bulldozer from the One German raised his hand and
engineers early on 8 August and cut said, “Heil Hitler.” After a momentary
down a hedgerow. Shortly after he hesitation, Mitchell saluted. Presum-
released the dozer, the area he had se- ing the German to be the senior com-
lected for the landing strip came under mander, Mitchell handed him General
severe artillery shelling. Judging the field Grow’s surrender ultimatum. When
unsafe for a landing, he arranged another the German denied knowledge of Eng-
pickup and drop by the plane expected lish, Castle translated the paper aloud:
from corps. Although the shelling had
ceased when the plane arrived, the pilot HEADQUARTERS 6TH ARMORED DIVISION,
inspected the field from the air and de- Office of the Commanding General, APO
cided he needed still more space for a 256, US Army, 8 August 1944, MEMORAN-
DUM To: Officer Commanding German
landing. He dropped his message, se- Forces in Brest.
1. The United States Army, Naval and
406th Armd Div Msg, sent 2139, 6 Aug, received Air Force troops are in position to destroy
at VIII Corps CP, 0410, 7 Aug; Ltr, Given to the garrison of Brest.
Grow. 2. This memorandum constitutes an op-
“TAKE BREST” 383
portunity for you to surrender in the face T h e attack was to be made by CCB in
of these overwhelming forces to represent- the center and by Taylor’s CCA on the
atives of the United States Government left, with the four artillery battalions’ in
and avoid the unnecessary sacrifice of lives.
3. I shall be very glad to receive your position to support both columns.42
formal surrender and make the detailed ar- Chances of success apeared reasonably
rangements any time prior to 1500 this good. It was true that nearly every vil-
date. The officer who brings this memo- lage on the outskirts of Brest was gar-
randum will be glad to guide you and neces- risoned by a few Germans with antitank
sary members of your staff, not exceeding
six to my headquarters. guns, that the entrances into some were
R. W. GROW barred by roadblocks of steel rails, log
Major General, USA barricades, or tetrahedrons, and in some
Commanding cases concrete pillboxes, and that fox-
holes had been dug along all the roads
T h e German commander said he could leading into Brest. However, the sig-
not surrender. Mitchell asked whether nificant facts seemed to be that the di-
he understood what that meant. T h e vision was in contact along a line from
German said he did. Mitchell took back Milizac through Gouesnou to Guipavas,
the ultimatum. T h e German com- apparently the outer defenses of the city,
mander heiled, Mitchell saluted. T h e and that the enemy had only three or
two Americans were blindfolded and four thousand soldiers, augmented by
driven back to the outpost, where the an unknown number of naval forces.43
bandages were removed, and Mitchell T h e attack was not to be made as
and Castle re-entered their lines and re- scheduled. Since shortly before noon on
ported that the bluff had failed.41 8 August, disturbing reports had been
With no alternative but to attack the coming from rear outposts. Scattered
city, General Grow requested heavy air enemy soldiers in stray vehicles had ap-
support for the following day, 9 August. peared suddenly, from nowhere it
He wanted a continuous air attack for seemed. Several unit commanders com-
a minimum of three hours by waves of plained throughout the day that troops
planes striking heavy guns, large oil of other commands were firing indis-
tanks, and troop concentration areas. criminately and endangering their men
Planning to attack with two columns yet investigation failed to disclose the
moving against the northeastern portion source of the fire. T h e commander of
of the city, Grow shifted Read’s CCB the division trains, approachingLes
headquarters from the northern to the neven, reported that he was unable to
central column to take control of the enter the division rear area because of
troops that had been under CCR. Han- small arms and artillery fire, evidently
son’s CCR headquarters moved to the from the rear of the combat commands
right and assumed control of the units deployed before Brest. These unac.
that had comprised Read’s column. countable reports were explained date
41Ltr, Mitchell to Grow, 5 Mar 53; Abendmel- 42Msg, Grow to Middleton, 1500, 8 Aug, 6th
dung, 8 Aug, OB WEST K T B , Anlage 1217; the Armd Div G–3 Jnl; Msg, Middleton to Crow, 0140,
ultimatum is reproduced in Grow, “An Epic of 9 Aug.
Brittany,” Military Review, XXVI, No. 11, p. 3. 436th Armd Div G–2 Per Rpt 11, 8 Aug.
384 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
that afternoon when a battery of the Because wires linking the division
212th Armored Field Artillery Battalion command post to subordinate units had
captured Generalleutnant Karl Spang, been cut and because silence was being
commander of the 266th Division, and maintained, General Grow dispatched a
several of his staff. From documents handwritten field order to his subordi-
they carried, the 6th Armored Division nates by messenger. Acknowledgment
learned that the 266th, after having con- returned at once from CCB and CCR,
tributed forces to the Dinan and St. but none came from CCA. Not until
Malo garrisons, was moving from Mor- later was it discovered that a message
laix to Brest to consolidate its remain- center sergeant had neglected to deliver
ing forces with the Brest garrison. the order to General Taylor. Fortu-
Spang, whose capture was his first in- nately, the incoming Germans did not
timation that U.S. troops were “any- strike CCA but blundered into the other
where in the area,” had preceded his two combat commands.
unit in order to insure proper reception Skirmishes resulting from tentative
facilities for his men. By evening the probing contacts made during the night
situation that had been building up all developed on 9 August into a full-scale
day came to a head. T h e 266th Divi- engagement. Read’s CCB carried the
sion, a static unit of perhaps regimental the main burden, Hanson’s CCR con-
strength, was in contact with the armored tributed hardly less, and Taylor’s CCA
division rear. 44 attacked later in the day. A group of
Threatened from the rear at nightfall fighter-bombers joined the action by
as troops of the 266th stumbled into the blasting an enemy column near Les-
armored division’s outposts, General neven. By evening the 6th Armored
Grow canceled the attack on Brest and Division had taken almost a thousand
instructed his subordinate commanders prisoners and estimated that it had de-
to leave screening forces facing the port stroyedhalf of the enemy unit.45
city. Reconnaissance troops were to It took another day for the division to
seal off the exits to prevent the German clear the area and gather in those of the
garrison from sallying out to meet the 266th who did not manage to reach
266th. T h e combat command columns Brest by devious routes. After estab-
wereto reverse in place and drive gen- lishing a cordon around the landward
lly
northeast
era toward Plouvien in order side of Brest, the bulk of the 6th Ar-
to destroy the unsuspecting Germans, mored Division settled down into a
who ,were approaching in route march somewhat stable situation, beyond ob-
formation. Meanwhile, since the divi- served enemy artillery range. T h e di-
sion headquar might be overrun, sev- vision trains bivouacked. T h e infantry
eral soldie were posted at the electric battalion of the 8th Division arrived.
code machines to destroy them with Task Force A appeared briefly near Les-
thermite canistersif necessary.
446th Armd Div G–2 Per Rpt 12, 0800, 9 Aug; 46Msg, Grow to Middleton, 1800, 9 Aug, 6th
AGp B Sitrep, 1715, 7 Aug, AGp BIa Letzte Mel- Armd Div G–3 Jnl; Msg, Grow to Middleton, 1910,
dung, 8.v.– 10. viii.44. 9 Aug.
“TAKE BREST” 385
neven before proceeding on another mis- resources were needed: artillery to neu-
sion. A new airfield site was cleared, tralize the guns in Brest and permit an
and regular courier service by planes advance through the outer defenses, in-
commenced. T h e division radio tele- fantry and a strong engineer attachment
type team erected a double-height an- to attack the city proper, and fighter
tenna and secured satisfactory contact and medium bomber support to assist
with corps headquarters. the assault troops and reduce the inner
Meanwhile, General Grow still pon- defenses. Still hoping he could event-
dered how to secure Brest. It was ob- ually take Brest, General Grow requested
vious that the defenses were much a complement of heavy artillery. Until
stronger than he had anticipated. T h e he received that, there was little he could
outer defense line barred swift entry, do but continue to develop the outpost
and the expectation of strongpoints defenses. Enemy artillery was “much
within the city foreshadowed vicious too strong” for anything more.47
street fighting. Artillery positions across Unfortunately for Grow’s hopes, the
the bay from Brest were out of reach corps’ heavy artillery was engaged at
of an armored attack across the land- St. Malo, and not until that port fell
ward approaches. T h e entire Brest would infantry and artillery become
complex appeared beyond the capabil- available for an attack on Brest. T h e
ities of an armored division reinforced 83d or the 8th Division, perhaps both,
only by an infantry battalion. Yet a would then move west to join the 6th
glimmer of hope came from the uncer- Armored Division. Until then, Gen-
tainty that no one seemed to know ex- eral Middleton advised,
actly how many Germans defended the
I believe it unwise to become too in-
port. volved in a fight at Brest unless you feel
If a small German force held the city, reasonably sure of success. I prefer that
it was possible that an armored drive in you watch the situation and wait until an
strength might overwhelm the defenders. infantry division arrives. Heavy artillery
T o secure a good jump-off place for an will arrive with the infantry division.48
attack, Grow planned to secure the high Any hope that General Grow had of
ground near Guipavas, which seemed taking Brest vanished on the evening of
to be a soft spot. From the high ground, 12 August when he received word to
his artillery could support without dis- contain the city with one combat com-
placement a division attack all the way mand while relieving the 4th Armored
into the city. Division at Lorient and Vannes with the
Efforts by CCA and the attached in- others. Leaving CCA and the battalion
fantry battalion on 11 and 12 August to of the 8th Division–about 4,000 troops-
secure the terrain near Guipavas failed.46
It gradually became clear that additional
47Msg, Grow to Middleton, 1330, 11 Aug, received
at VIII Corps CP, 1755, 11 Aug.
48 Msg,Middleton to Grow, 2135, 11 Aug; see
46 See Sgt. Joseph D. Buckley, A History of the also, Msg, Galvin to McBride, 1400, 11 Aug, 6th
50th Armored Infantry Battalion (Frankfurt: Baier Armd Div G–3 Jnl; Memo, Col. Evans to Col.
and Wurm, c. 1945.), pp. 24–27. Thomas J. Cross, 11 Aug.
386 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
at Brest, he completed the relief at Lor- aged by the static mission of containment
ient and Vannes on 14 August.49 with which he was charged. Despite
In advancing to Brest, the division had his repeated recommendations that the
lost about 130 killed, 400 wounded, and FFI be assigned the task of guarding the
70 missing. Destroyed or damaged com- port cities so that the division might be
bat vehicles totaled 50, other vehicles free for more active and more compatible
62, guns 11. In contrast, the division missions, the unit remained in Brittany
had taken 4,000 prisoners. 50 for another month, guarding Brest, Lor-
Looking back after the war on the ient, and Vannes. T h e value of armor
campaign, General Grow said he had had been proved but was then, he felt,
been elated by the performance of his disregarded.
division in penetrating two hundred One galling question remained: Could
miles into Brittany, the most extended the 6th Armored Division have taken
independent operation by a single di- Brest if it had arrived there sooner?
vision in the European theater. T h e Having been assured by the FFI that
6th Armored Division had cleared the Brest would probably have fallen had it
greater part of the peninsula, the proof been attacked in strength a day or two
being that before the end of the second earlier, General Grow could not forget
week in August lone travelers covered the Dinan diversion, which had delayed
long distances in the interior with no the division about twenty-four hours;
thought of danger. In addition to de- the slow approach of CCA into the Brest
stroying what remained of the 266th Di- area, which had made it necessary for
vision in Brittany, the 6th Armored Di- CCB to attack alone on 7 August; and
vision had driven the other German the movement of the 266th Division
troops in its sector into a “self-imposed from Morlaix, which had prompted can-
prison.” T h e division “had per- cellation of the concerted attack planned
formed:’ General Grow was convinced, for 9 August. With complete surprise
“the greatest cavalry-type operation of in Grow’s favor, a show of strength, he
the war. . . [and] had proved the sound- felt, might have been sufficient to per-
ness of the . . . mechanized division and suade a vacillating commander with
the hard months of training.” T h e role weak forces to capitulate.51
of the cavalry in exploitation and the This attractive thesis was supported
value of mobility on the battlefield, he by the fact that only the 343d Division,
felt, had been restored by the display of some cadre companies, relatively weak
speed, initiative, and boldness that were artillery, and two batteries of coastal ar-
the basic cavalry characteristics inherited tillery were available at the beginning
by armored troops. of August to defend the fortress against
Disappointed, naturally, because he attack from land or sea. T h e presence
had not taken Brest, Grow was discour- of many civilians in the city complicated
the defense. T h e Germans could count
49Msg, Middleton to Grow, 1645, 12 Aug, received on a garrison of only 15,000 men at max-
at 6th Armd Div CP, 2350, 12 Aug; Msg, Read to
Grow, 2130, 13 Aug; Msg, Grow to Middleton, 51Grow, “An Epic of Brittany,” Military Review,
2220, 14 Aug. All in 6th Armd Div G–3 Jnl. XXVI, No. 11, pp. 3-9; [Committee 9], Super Sixth,
506th Armd Div G–2 Per Rpt 15, 12 Aug. p. 108.
“TAKE BREST” 387
the size of the fortress complex, and Hit- tained a flexible screen around the front
ler’s orders to resist to the last man were and flanks that was retracted from or de-
more than sufficient to keep a lone ar- flected around resistance too strong to
mored division from taking the largest overcome. A forward observer travel-
port in Brittany.55 Even though the ing with the head of a column could
VIII Corps G–2 as late as 12 August have artillery fire on a target as soon as
estimated that only 8,000 men defended the self-propelled pieces could drop their
Brest, he recognized that its defenses ammunition trailers. Casualties were
were far stronger than he had earlier moved forward with the division until
judged. 56 It should have been obvious convoys could be organized for evacua-
much sooner. By mid-July, SHAEF tion. Prisoners were also carried along
had concluded that the Brest garrison until they could be turned over, against
was likely to number at minimum 17,000 their vehement protests, to the FFI, “who
troops. T h e numerous defensible river seemed only too glad to accept the re-
valleys between Morlaix and Brest, the sponsibility for their care.” 58 Tanks
perimeter defenses at Landivisiau, Les- and armored cars sometimes escorted
neven, and Landerneau, the landward supply vehicles, and the division band
fortifications of Brest, and the numerous defended valiantly a supply dump near
antiaircraft emplacements all argued Carhaix and prevented its capture by
against painless possession of a port that a small German force. T h e army had
was as vital to Hitler as to the Allies.57 established a gasoline dump at Pontivy,
Although Patton lost his five-pound bet but the division had to go all the way
with Montgomery, the fact was that back to Avranches for other supplies.
merely in pinning the vastly superior T h e necessity for speed had prompted
German force at Brest against the sea, the division to disregard danger from
the 6th Armored Division had achieved mines; only a few times, principally at
success. fords, had mines been encountered. In
A fluid front, fast-moving columns, retrospect at least, the campaign seemed
and a rapidly lengthening line of com- to have been “a routine operation” that
munication had lessened corps control, had been aided by extremely favorable
had emphasized the necessity of indi- weather.59
vidual initiative and judgment, impro- Yet it was a spectacular achievement,
visation and calculated risk. With no an exhilarating accomplishment that
defined front except the direction in went virtually unnoticed because of ac-
which the division was going, the cav- tion elsewhere on a much larger scale.
alry reconnaissance squadron had main-
58 Hammond, 6th Armored Division.
55See [Committee 9 ], Super Sixth, p. 151. 59 See Combat History of the 128th Armored
56VIII Corps G–2 Weekly Per Rpt 8, 12 Aug. Ordnance Maintenance Battalion (Wiesbaden,
57 App. A to PS SHAEF (44) 29 (First Draft), Germany: Wiesbaedner Kurier-Wiesbaedner Verlag,
16 Jul, SHAEF G–3 File 24533/Opns, Future Opns. 1945) pp. 21–26.
CHAPTER XXI
the south and continue westward. He the regiment alone or the entire division,
requested VIII Corps to send infantry according to the way the situation devel-
to reduce the bypassed Dol defenses.3 oped, could follow the 6th Armored Di-
Interested in the strength of the St. vision to Brest. T h e 330th Infantry
Malo defenses, General Middleton in- reached Pontorson that afternoon and
structed Earnest to probe northward to- continued to Dol. Extensive defensive
ward St. Malo even as he drove westward positions around Dol, including wire
toward Dinan. Beyond Dol-de-Bre- entanglements and antitank ditches,
tagne, Earnest therefore split his column. prompted the regiment to delay its at-
T h e heads of both columns struck de- tack until the morning of 4 August, but
fensive positions about seven miles west then the town was quickly secured.5
of Dol, near Miniac. Some disorder oc- Although the 330th Infantry moved
curred among U.S. troops engaging in west beyond Dol-de-Bretagne for several
combat for the first time, but Earnest miles without meeting resistance on 4
quickly restored discipline and directed August, Task Force A pushing north
his cavalry to dismount and launch an that afternoon toward Châteauneuf-
infantry attack. Enemy resistance was d’Ille-et-Vilaine encountered severe op-
quickly broken, but as the task force position, including fire from coastal guns
tried to push toward St. Malo, increas- and naval vessels in the St. Malo area.6
ingly heavy resistance developed south By this time a decision had to be made
of Chiteauneuf-d’Ille-et-Vilaine. on St. Malo. General Bradley at first
Since the strong enemy forces defend- had specifically ordered the capture of
ing the St. Malo–Châteauneuf–Dol area St. Malo. When General Patton made
might involve Task Force A in an action no provision for its capture, Bradley had
that would prevent a rapid westward more or less acquiesced in Patton’s con-
drive, General Earnest radioed for help. cept of clearing the entire peninsula be-
Aware that the VIII Corps had alerted fore getting involved in siege operations
the 83d Infantry Division for action in at the port cities. General Middleton,
Brittany and believing that the 6th Ar- however, was becoming increasingly con-
mored Division was not far away, he cerned over the large concentration of
called upon both the corps and the ar- German troops in the St. Malo area.
mored division in the hope that one Bypassing the strongpoint in favor of
would respond. “Please reply, need ur- more distant and alluring goals would
gent,” he radioed. “Rush troops.” 4 not eliminate what might develop into
Infantrymen were in fact approach- a threat against the long lines of com-
ing Dol-de-Bretagne on the afternoon of munication that would have to be estab-
3 August, for early that morning Mid- lished in Brittany. Allowing strong
dleton had ordered the 83d Division to German forces to remain active at St.
hurry a regiment to Pontorson so that Malo would be like permitting a sore
to develop into a cancer. Middleton Task Force A. If St. Malo fell at once,
favored immediate surgery.7 Middleton would attach a motorized in-
General Middleton’s inability to ob- fantry battalion of the 83d Division to
tain the 6th Armored Division to help Task Force A and send Earnest off to
Task Force A and the 330th Infantry fulfill his original mission.9
prompted him to give the assignment of T h e result of the attack on 5 August
capturing St. Malo to General Macon proved that the reduction of St. Malo
and the 83d Division. Then Middleton would take some time. Unwilling to
learned that Patton was unwilling to let hold Task Force A any longer, Middle-
more than one regiment of the 83d ton ordered Earnest to break contact
participate in the attack, for Patton be- during the night of 5 August and on the
lieved that the Germans would make following morning to continue his mis-
only a token defense of St. Malo. Pat- sion of sweeping Brittany’s north shore.
ton wanted the 83d Division to follow In exchange for a platoon of tank de-
the 6th Armored to Brest and Task stroyers that Earnest left with the 83d
Force A to sweep the Brittany north Division, he secured a motorized infan-
shore.8 try battalion and a battery of 105-mm.
Developments in the St. Malo region howitzers. A medical collecting com-
on the morning of 4 August seemed to pany from corps would join the task
support Patton’s view, since Germans force on 8 August.10 In the matter of
manning outpost positions that com- time, the effect of the diversion to St.
prised the outer defenses of the St. Malo Malo on Task Force A was double that
fortress withdrew north toward Châ- imposed on the 6th Armored Division;
teauneuf, a move that appeared to pre- it delayed Earnest’s westward drive about
sage a show of force before capitulation. forty-eight hours.
T h e experience of Task Force A that
afternoon led to quite the opposite con- Sweeping the North Shore
clusion. T h e Germans had evidently
withdrawn to consolidate and strengthen Slipping out of the St. Malo area dur-
their defenses. Whatever the German ing darkness, Task Force A bypassed
intentions, it was obvious that the Amer- Dinan on the south and moved westward
icans needed additional troops around St. on 6 August toward St. Brieuc, thirty
Malo. miles from Dinan.11 Contact was made
Hoping that immediate, resolute ac- that afternoon with FFI groups com-
tion might achieve the desired result, manded by Colonel Eon, who was al-
Middleton ordered Macon to bring the ready in possession of St. Brieuc. Task
entire 83d Division into the area to make Force A found the three bridges near
a co-ordinated attack in conjunction with the town intact, and General Earnest de-
7 12th AGp Ltrs of Instr 1 and 2, 29 Jul and 3 tailed an engineer company to guard
Aug; see above, Ch. XVII. Middleton may have
discussed this with Bradley when the army group 9VIII Corps Msg, 4 Aug.
commander visited the corps command post on 2 10Msg, Middleton to Earnest,. 5 Aug; VIII Corps
August. See Bradley, Soldier’s Story, pp. 362-63. Msg, 2400, 5 Aug, and AAR, Aug; TF A FO 3,
8 Msg, Middleton to Macon, 4 Aug; 83d Div G–2, 1159, 5 Aug.
G–3 Jnl, entries 11 io and 1130, 4 Aug. 11Msg, Earnest to Middleton, 1330, 6 Aug.
392 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ing from England was to be unloaded.18 tioned Earnest against forming a Franco-
German strongpoints had earlier com- American force under a single com-
manded the beach, but only mines and mander. French and Americans were
angle-iron obstacles remained. Earnest’s to share the profits of the venture, the
troops met no opposition as they ex- Americans to get the prisoners, the FFI
tended their control over St. Michel-en- the captured arms and equipment.20
Grève on 1 1 August. Three LST’s hove T h e extent of the German opposition
into sight that day and prepared to un- soon drew Task Force A into what de-
load supplies. T o insure security for veloped into a four-day engagement.
supply operations, the task force pa- After reducing a strongpoint near Léz-
trolled the coastal region, cleared dis- ardrieux (three miles west of Paimpol)
organized German troops from the area, and taking 430 prisoners, the Americans
and took more than a thousand pris- and the French launched an attack
oners; losses totaled 25.19 against Paimpol, cleared the town by
Middleton considered recalling Task noon, 1 7 August, and captured more
Force A to St. Malo, but the FFI com- than 2,000 prisoners and much equip-
mander, Eon, persuaded him otherwise. ment. At the same time, a reinforced
A German garrison near Paimpol still battalion of the 8th Division in an inde-
held coastal forts overlooking the western pendent action on 15 August cleared the
approaches to the bay of St. Brieuc, Cap Fréhel area, midway between Dinan
thereby denying the Allies use of the and St. Brieuc, by firing a few white
St. Brieuc port and allowing the Ger- phosphorus rounds of 4.2-inch mortar
mans to furnish the Channel Island and rounding up 300 prisoners.
troops with foodstuffs procured on the T h e north shore had been swept clear,
mainland. Eon proposed to clear the an achievement that belonged largely
Paimpol area and requested a display to Task Force A. T h e task force had
of American force during his attack. secured a useable communications net
Middleton gave Eon a thousand gallons between Dinan and Landivisiau. Al-
of gasoline to transport about 2,500 FFI though the railroad was of little worth
troops and instructed Earnest to send because the port of Brest was not in
along a few armored cars, some tank de- American hands, the Task Force A op-
stroyers, and perhaps a battery of artil- eration was significant in a later context.
lery. Expecting the FFI to carry the T o a large extent it made possible the
brunt of the combat, Middleton cau- logistical support for the major effort
subsequently to be exerted to capture
18TF A FO 6, 2400, 8 Aug, and Jnl, entry 2100,
9 Aug; Msg, Middleton to Earnest, 1710, 9 Aug; Brest.
Msg, Middleton to Earnest, 1810, io Aug, TF A
Jnl; see 21 AGp, Dir M-515, 27 Jul. “ T o the Last Stone”
19App. A to PS SHAEF (44) 29 (First Draft),
16 Jul, SHAEF G–3 File 24533/0pns, Future Opns;
Memo, Evans to Earnest, 12 Aug; Roland G. Rup-
When Task Force A departed the St.
penthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, Vol. II, Malo area to sweep the Brittany north
UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II (Wash-
ington, 1959) , Ch. 11; TF A Opns 1 Aug-22 Sep, a 20Msg, Middleton to Earnest, 1530, 14 Aug;
preliminary MS, OCMH Files; ETOUSA Engr Hist Journal des Marches; see Memo, “JTR” [Col John
Rpt 10. R. Jeter] to Evans, 15 Aug.
394 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
shore, the 83d Division stayed to com- for those forces. Used by the Germans
plete the task already begun. Few as a naval base for coastal operations
Americans suspected at the beginning of and as a supply base for the Channel
August that St. Malo would be difficult Islands, St. Malo could accommodate
to take, for the rapidity of the advance medium-sized vessels and had facilities
into Brittany had brought a heady op- to unload cargo at the rate of a thousand
timism. Yet studies made in England tons a day. Although naval planners
before the invasion indicated that there had informed General Eisenhower “that
were strong defenses at the harbor, and we are likely to be disappointed in its
contact with the defenders in the early possibilities as a port,” Bradley ordered
days of August should have confirmed St. Malo taken.23
the fact that the Germans would make a T o American commanders studying
determined stand there. Not until 5 their maps, the Avranches–St. Malo area
August, however, did American com- was much like the Normandy coastline
manders acknowledge that the Germans where the OVERLORD landings had been
were capable of stubborn defense. By made. T h e Bay of Mont St. Michel
then, General Middleton and the VIII resembled in miniature the shape of the
Corps, and particularly General Macon Bay of the Seine. T h e St. Malo pen-
and the 83d Division, were aware that insula appeared to be the Cotentin Pen-
they had a nasty job ahead of them.21 insula seen through the wrong end of
Originally alerted for action against a telescope. T h e harbor of St. Malo
Rennes and Quiberon or against Brest, was a smaller version of Cherbourg.
Macon had supported Task Force A at T h e Rance River estuary provided a
St. Malo with one regiment, hoping west coast for the St. Malo peninsula as
thereby to sweep aside the allegedly in- the ocean did for the Cotentin. At the
significant opposition at the port. T h e base of the Rance estuary, Dinan was in
resistance that developed soon changed the same relation to St. Malo as Av-
these plans, and by 5 August the en- ranches was to Cherbourg.
tire division was committed there.22 A picturesque port, St. Malo was the
(Map I ) birthplace of Jacques Cartier and the
At first wanting St. Malo immediately, home of the privateers who had harassed
later agreeing to bypass and contain the English shipping for three centuries.
port if its reduction required “too large Across the Rance River, more than a
a force and too much time,” General mile to the west, the beaches of Dinard
Bradley finally decided that with Amer- had been a favorite with British tourists.
ican troops dispersing to the far corners T h e defenses protecting both towns com-
of Brittany the St. Malo harbor would prised the fortress complex of St. Malo.
be valuable as an auxiliary supply port Although Frenchmen warned that
about ten thousand German troops gar-
21 VIII Corps AAR, Aug, and G–2 Per Rpts 48, risoned the fortress, American estimates
49, and 51. dated 1, 3, and 5 Aug. of German strength varied between three
2 2V I I I Corps FO’s 9 and io, 1 and 2 Aug, G–3
Memo, 0630, 3 Aug, and G–2 Rpt, Beaches South of
Vannes, n.d.; Min of Mtg. 0900 30 Jul, 83d Div 28Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 10Jul, SGS
G–2, G–3 Jnl. SHAEF File 381, OVERLORD,I (a) .
ST. MALO AND T H E N O R T H SHORE 395
MAP 11
and six thousand. As late as 12 August the garrison became known after the
VIII Corps was accepting the figure of battle, some Americans began to feel
five thousand, even though in actuality that the haste displayed in getting the
more than twelve thousand Germans Brittany exploitation under way had
occupied St. Malo and Dinard, with enabled the Germans to build up their
about two thirds of that number on the St. Malo forces. In bypassing the port
St. Malo side of the Rance.24 and its approaches, the Americans per-
When the true numerical strength of mitted numerous small garrisons in the
surrounding countryside, as well as strag-
2 4TF A FO 2, 1159, 4 Aug; 83d Div FO’s 21 and glers from the Cotentin, to take refuge
22, 1800, 4 Aug, and 0100, 6 Aug, and Annex 1 to
G–2 Per Rpt 44, 16 Aug; G–3 Per Rpt 33, 1600, 5
in the fortress. T h e absence of Allied
Aug; VIII Corps G–2 Weekly Per Rpt 8, 12 Aug. naval patrols offshore had allowed rein-
396 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
forcement and supply to be brought into that was to be the preliminary action for
the harbor from the Channel Islands. a swift thrust to Dinard. Though the
T h e growth of the garrison, which could battalion crossed the river, the men un-
not have occurred had the Americans covered such strong resistance on the
thrust rapidly to the port upon entering west bank of the Rance that Macon
Brittany, made reduction of the town quickly recalled them. Adding impetus
a major task. to this decision was the discovery by the
Though estimates of German strength 331st Infantry, in the right of the divi-
were incorrect, American intelligence sion sector, of a much easier approach
was right in its growing realization that to St. Malo. Moving north in the area
the enemy in St. Malo firmly intended east of Châteauneuf toward Cancale, on
to resist. T h e garrison commander had the east coast of the St. Malo peninsula,
rejected a proposal by French civilian the 33 1st encountered light covering
officials that he surrender in order to forces defending canals, roadblocks, and
save the nearby towns from damage. He mine fields. What the Germans were
had announced that “he would defend covering was their consolidation of forces
St. Malo to the last man even if the last on the main defense line of St. Malo.
man had to be himself.” 25 That he That evening, 5 August, as Task Force
could make a strong fight in support of A prepared to slip away to fulfill its
his boast soon became evident. original mission, the German com-
In early August outposts between Dol- mander prepared a last-ditch defense.
de-Bretagne and Dinan were withdrawn As part of this activity, the fortress com-
to the Châteauneuf–St. Benôit-des-Ondes mander abandoned Cancale, which was
line, which consisted of antitank obsta- occupied by the 331st Infantry on the
cles and guns, roadblocks, wire entangle- following morning and immediately sur-
ments, mine fields, and machine gun em- veyed for use as a port for landing craft.
placements. Although the co-ordinated T h e German commander also abandoned
attack, launched on 5 August by the 83d Dinan, which was surrounded on the fol-
Division and Task Force A (the latter lowing day by FFI troops who reported
alone taking 655 prisoners), pierced this that several hundred Germans were will-
line and secured Châteauneuf, the stub- ing to surrender, but only to Ameri-
born opposition gave advance notice cans.27 By then, the 83d Division was
that the defense would stiffen as the Ger- attacking toward St. Malo with three reg-
mans drew more closely around St. iments abreast-the 329th on the left,
Malo.26 the 330th in the center, and the 331st
Hoping to outflank and isolate the St. on the right-and was in contact with
Malo defensive complex, General Macon the main defenses of the St. Malo for-
on 5 August sent a battalion of the 329th tress.
Infantry across the Rance in assault boats On the St. Malo side of the Rance, the
to cut the Dinan–Dinard road, a move fortress encompassed three communities
on the western tip of the peninsula. In
2583d Div G–2 Per Rpts 32 and 33, 1800, 4
Aug, and 1600, 5 Aug. 27 Msg, Macon (signed [Lt Col Robert W.] Hart-
2683d Div FO 21, G–2 Per Rpt 32, 1800, 4 Aug, man) to Middleton, 6 Aug; 83d Div G–3 Per Rpt 5,
and AAR, Aug. 1200. 7 Aug.
ST. MALO AND T H E NORTH SHORE 397
the center was the walled town of St. but the fortifications of St. Malo were
Malo, originally an island accessible from not finished. Permanent coastal guns,
the mainland only at low tide. Guard- for example, had not been installed in
ing the landward entrance into town the Citadel, and only half a dozen field
was the fifteenth century château of Anne pieces, still with wheels, stood provision-
of Brittany. Protecting the town from ally behind the firing apertures. T h e
seaward invasion were thick ramparts Germans had planned to dig an enor-
of stone. East of St. Malo and adjacent mous antitank ditch across the St. Malo
to it was the relatively modern suburb peninsula from the Rance to the sea
of Paramé, where bourgeois homes and and fill it with water, but the excavations
resort hotels lined broad boulevards. were far from complete. Another weak-
South of St. Malo and across the harbor ness of the fortress was that it faced sea-
was the fishing port of St. Servan-sur- ward against an expected Allied inva-
Mer. Not really on the ocean but on sion from the sea. Barbed wire and
the Rance River estuary, St. Servan was other obstacles decorated the beaches.
the ferry terminus for the regular boat Despite these deficiencies, the Ger-
runs to Dinard. Dug into a rocky mans were able to adjust quickly to a
promontory on a peninsula between St. threat from the landward side of St.
Malo harbor and the port of St. Servan Malo. Enabling them to do so was a
was a casemented fort called the Citadel, ring of strongpoints that barred the
the headquarters of the German com- ground approaches. T h e most impor-
mander. tant were the coastal Fort la Varde, east
Although the Germans at St. Malo and of St. Malo; the strongpoint of St. Ideuc,
Dinard were fighting with their backs to on the eastern edge of Paramé; and po-
the sea, they had powerful support from sitions on St. Joseph’s Hill, in the south-
artillery placed on the small island of east outskirts of St. Malo. T h e defense
Cézembre, not quite three miles off- installations were mutually supporting,
shore. T h e Channel islands of Jersey, and underground wires assured tele-
Guernsey, and Alderney could furnish phonic communication among the prin-
the St. Malo fortress supplies by water cipal garrisons. Stores of supplies, am-
and receive German casualties.28 munition, water, and food, had been
Hundreds of volunteer and impressed stockpiled in preparation against siege.
Todt workers had poured tons of con- As judged by OB WEST, the St. Malo
crete over steel for more than two years, fortifications were the most advanced of
any fortress in the west.29
28Msgs, Macon to Middleton, 2120, 9 Aug, and T h e commander of St. Malo, Col.
1830, 11 Aug. R. Fouque, La Cité, Bastion de la Andreas von Aulock, was somewhat dis-
Forteresse de Saint-Malo (n.p., 1945) (hereafter appointed to have been relegated to a
cited as Fouque, La Cité), contains the best de-
scription of the St. Malo fortress, the best account static fortress, for he would have pre-
of the activities of the relatively few French who ferred to gain striking offensive victories
remained there during the battle, and the clearest for his Fuehrer. Yet whether he under-
narrative of German conduct. See also Dr. Paul
Aubry, L’Agonie de Saint-Malo (Rennes, 1945) and
stood the strategic importance of Hitler’s
La Ruée sur Saint-Malo (Rennes, 1947) for the
events that occurred within the fortress. 29OB WEST, a Study in Command, 11, 9.
398 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
fortress policy or not, he prepared to do manded several small armed vessels that
what was required of him. A veteran would have to maneuver in St. Malo
of Stalingrad who promised to make his waters. Since these boats constituted a
defense of St. Malo “another Stalingrad,” legitimate military target, he could not
Aulock stated, “I was placed in com- declarethe townan open city.31
mand of this fortress. I did not request Two days later, during the early eve-
it. I will execute the orders I have re- ning of 5 August, a long line of French
ceived and, doing my duty as a soldier, men, women, and children departed St.
I will fight to the last stone.” 30 Malo in compliance with Aulock’s order
Aulock, who had always been correct and entered American lines. Displaying
in his official relations with the French, white handkerchiefs and flags, carrying
could not understand why the inhabit- suitcases and pushing carts, most of the
ants of St. Malo regarded him as an en- French population had left their homes
emy. For their own good, he had sug- reluctantly.
gested soon after the Allied landings in When American troops on 6 August
Normandy that the French evacuate the came within range of the artillery on
town, which was sure to be a battlefield. the island of Cézembre, German guns
Despite Allied air bombardment on 17 opened fire. One of the first shells
July and again on 1 August, very few struck the spire of the St. Malo cathedral.
families had departed. T h e approach T h e steeple toppled over, a bad omen,
of U.S. ground forces prompted Aulock the French believed. Later in the day
to clear his decks. Calling several town fires broke out in the town. French-
officials into conference on 3 August, men soon became convinced that the
he informed them that they were fine fel- Germans had inadvertently spilled gaso-
lows but that he preferred to have them line while burning codes and documents
“in front of me rather than behind my and that the few SS troops of the garri-
back.” Furthermore, since he wished son with deliberate malice not only re-
to spare the population harm from the fused to permit fire fighters to put out
battle about to commence, most of the the blaze but started others. T h e Amer-
civilians had to go. icans unintentionally assisted by cutting
T o French requests that he save his- the town’s water supply in hope of en-
toric St. Malo from destruction by de- couraging German surrender, a hope
claring it an open city, Aulock answered concurred in by the mayor of St. Servan-
that he had referred that question to sur-Mer, who had volunteered the neces-
Kluge, who had transmitted it to Hitler. sary information on the location of the
Hitler had replied that in warfare there water valves. On the following morn-
was no such thing as a historic city. ing, 7 August, the Germans added to
“You will fight to the last man,” he had the holocaust by setting off prepared
ordered. As added justification to help demolitions that destroyed the port com-
the French comprehend Hitler’s deci- pletely-quays, locks, breakwaters, and
sion, Aulock explained that he com-
31As it turned out, the few vessels were quite un-
important in the military action that developed.
30 Fouque,La Cité, pp. 33-34; see also pp. 25, Fighter-bombers soon drove them from the St.
44–45, and Plate 7. Malo waters.
ST. MALO AND T H E NORTH SHORE 399
harbor machinery. For a week, as the Robert T. Foster) could not even ma-
town burned, a pall of smoke hovered neuver into position for an actual as-
over the St. Malo battlefield.32 sault. T h e only genuine hope of suc-
In contact with the main defenses of cess rested with sustained artillery fire.
the St. Malo fortress by the afternoon of While division and corps battalions de-
6 August, the 83d Division attacked po- livered concentrated shelling, the infan-
sitions forming a semicircle from the try tried to inch up the hill. Not the in-
Rance to the sea. Belts of wire, large fantry progress, which was infinitesimal,
mine fields, rows of steel gates, antitank but constant and severe artillery and
obstacles, and ditches were protected by tank destroyer pounding for two days
machine gunners in pillboxes. Though finally produced results. On 9 August
the attack involved co-ordinated action more than 400 Germans on St. Joseph’s
by all three regiments and utilized air Hill laid down their arms and marched
power and artillery, advances were mark- out under a white flag.35
edly limited. Any last illusions that the T h e elimination of St. Joseph’s Hill
battle might be swiftly terminated van- enabled the troops on both flanks to
ished.33 T o reinforce the 83d Division, surge forward rapidly. On the right,
General Middleton drew upon the 8th Colonel York’s 33 1st Infantry drove
Division at Rennes for an infantry regi- northward through Paramé to the sea,
ment (the 121st) and a medium tank cutting off the enemy garrisons at St.
company, which he attached to Macon’s Ideuc and la Varde. On the left, Colo-
command; took a battalion of the corps nel Crabill’s 329th Infantry moved
artillery that had been attached to the through St. Servan to the very gates of
79th Division and ordered it into the the Citadel.
St. Malo area; and requested increased By 9 August, after five days of attack,
air support.34 the 83d Division had eliminated the ma-
On 7 August the three organic regi- jor strongpoint on St. Joseph’s Hill,
ments of the 83d Division renewed the had knocked out many individual bunk-
attack toward St. Malo after a fifteen- ers and pillboxes, had captured about
minute artillery preparation. In the 3,500 prisoners, and was in possession
center of the division sector the German of St. Servan and Paramé.36 Yet for all
strongpoint on St. Joseph’s Hill, tested this real achievement, resistance at St.
on the previous day, continued to hold. Ideuc and la Varde, in the walled town
Guns emplaced in a granite quarry on of St. Malo itself, and fire from the Cit-
the hill, cavelike troop shelters hewed adel continued undiminished, while sup-
out of rock, and the dominating ground porting fires from Dinard and Cézembre
itself gave the German defenders such rained down with telling effect.
advantages that the 330th Infantry (Col.
The Reduction of Dinard
32Aubrey, L’Agonie de Saint-Malo, pp. 49-50; 83d
Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, entry 0945, 8 Jul. Though ground forces alone could
33See 83d Div G–2 Per Rpt, 1600, 6 Aug. only shell the Ile de Cézembre with ar-
34Msg, Middleton to Stroh, 5 Aug; Msg, Middle-
ton to Jeter, 1200, 6 Aug; Msg, Macon to Middleton, 35330th Inf G–3 Rpt, 1130, 9 Aug.
0035, 6 Aug; VIII Corps Msg, 6 Aug. 36Msg, Macon to Middleton, 1535, 9 Aug.
400 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
tillery, Dinard was approachable by land. Despite the support of strong artillery,
On 7 August, while the 83d Division mortar, and tank destroyer fire, the rest
was launching its attack on St. Malo, the of the 121st Infantry could not break
121st Infantry (Col. John R. Jeter) had through to the battalion. Discourage-
crossed the Rance to destroy the Dinard ment and tragedy marked the efforts.
garrison.37 Colonel Jeter dispatched a T w o artillery planes, after successfully
small force to take the surrender of the dropping blood plasma to the 3d Bat-
enemy force at Dinan, which had prom- talion, locked wings and crashed, their
ised the FFI to capitulate to the Amer- pilots and observers killed. A third
icans. Turning north from Dinan, the plane was shot down by enemy fire.
main body of the 121st Infantry soon Two other planes flying observation mis-
came under heavy artillery fire. sions in support of the isolated unit col-
T h e 121stInfantry quickly discovered lided and crashed.38
that every usable road to Dinard was The isolation of the 121st Infantry’s
barred by roadblocks of concrete, rock, 3d Battalion confirmed General Ma-
felled trees, and barbed wire, each cov- con’s impression that in general the reg-
ered by camouflaged strongpoints iment’s performance west of the Rance
manned by from twenty to eighty men had been far from brilliant, but only
armed with a high proportion of auto- on 9 August, when St. Joseph’s Hill fell,
matic weapons. T h e Germans also had was General Macon able to turn full
constructed underground pillboxes and attention to the situation. When the
iron rail fences, strung double-apron capitulation of St. Joseph’s Hill enabled
barbed wire and concertina entangle- the 83d Division to occupy St. Servan
ments, and laid extensive mine fields. and Paramé, Macon decided to reorgan-
T h e pillboxes seemed unaffected by ize his forces, reshape the battle, and give
American artillery fire. German ma- priority to the reduction of Dinard.
chine gun, small arms, mortar, and ar- Eliminating the Dinard garrison, a
tillery fire harassed every American at- task General Macon judged to be rela-
tempt to blast passageways through the tively easy, would serve four purposes:
other obstacles. it would stop part of the effective artil-
T h e 1 s t Infantry’s advance was pain- lery fire that came from across the Rance;
fully slow. On the afternoon of 8 Au- it would block the possibility that Ger-
gust, the 3d Battalion entered the village man troops might escape from the St.
of Pleurtuit, less than four miles from Malo fortress westward toward Brest; it
Dinard. In the process it had reduced would release the isolated battalion of
three pillboxes by close-in engineer and the 121st Infantry; and it would make
infantry action. As the troops moved possible the return of the 121st to its
into the village, several German tanks parent organization for possible partici-
came in from the flanks and cut behind pation in a strong attack against Brest,
the battalion. Re-establishing a pre- an operation then under discussion.
viously destroyed roadblock, German in-
fantrymen isolated the unit. 38VIII Corps G–2 Per Rpt 56, 2400, 10 Aug, and
37The following account is largely from’ the 121st G–2 Weekly Rpt 8, 12 Aug; 83d Div FO 23, 2240, 6
Inf AAR, Aug. Aug.
ST. MALO AND T H E NORTH SHORE 401
T o help the 121st Infantry take Din- the resistance we are meeting south of
ard, General Macon first reshuffled his Dinard is more determined than I an-
organic forces by replacing the 331st ticipated.” 40
Infantry in the Paramé sector with the T h e defense of Dinard was in the cap-
330th and moving the 331st across the able hands of Colonel Bacherer, who
Rance to reinforce the 121st. Finally, commanded a kampfgruppe composed
he took personal command of the Din- in the main of remnants of the 77th Di-
ard operation.39 vision, veterans of earlier fighting in the
On 11 August, when General Macon Cotentin. Creating their own field ex-
got a co-ordinated attack on Dinard un- pedients to augment the existing forti-
der way, physical contact with the 3d fications of the Dinard portion of the
Battalion, 121st Infantry, still had not St. Malo fortress, the men fought ably.
been established. T h e advance through T o a surrender ultimatum from General
the strongly fortified and stubbornly Macon, Bacherer replied defiantly:
defended area continued painfully slow. “Every house must become a fortress,
T h e climax of a discouraging day came every stone a hiding place, and for every
in the evening when a counterattack was stone we shall fight.” 41
repulsed with difficulty. “I want Mon- Despite the excellence of the German
arch 6 [General Middleton] to know,” positions and the will to resist, the Ger-
a somewhat chastened General Macon mans could not indefinitely withstand
radioed to the corps headquarters, “that the pressure of two regiments plus the
increasing power of a growing number
38 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, entries 1110, 1440, and of corps artillery battalions in support.
1800, 9 Aug, and FO 24, 0200, IO Aug. The 330th
Infantry, which had detached a battalion for duty On the afternoon of 1 2 August, the 331st
with Task Force A, took control of a battalion and
an additional rifle company of the 331st; the 331st 40 Msg, Macon to Evans, 1400, 11 Aug.
took a battalion of the 330th under its control. 4183d Div G–2 Per Rpt 40. 1600, 12 Aug.
402 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Infantry broke through the German line striking the turret and killing the crew.43
around- Pleurtuit. After destroying five With Pleurtuit in hand, the two regi-
bunkers by demolition and assault, ments continued their attack on 13 Au-
knocking out an 88-mm. gun and sev- gust, slowly and systematically reducing
eral vehicles, and taking more than a individual pillboxes. By the afternoon
hundred prisoners, the regiment at last of 14 August both regiments had entered
made contact with the isolated battalion Dinard and its suburbs. T h e operation
of the 121st.42 was completed on the following day with
Through three days of isolation, the the clearing of Dinard and the nearby
battalion had retained its integrity in villages of St. Lunaire and St. Briac-sur-
the face of several counterattacks Mer. Bacherer’s headquarters, located
launched with artillery support. Sur- in a small fort equipped with running
prisingly, losses were not so high as had water, air conditioning, food, and facil-
been feared—31 killed, 106 wounded, ities to withstand siege, was captured.
and 16 missing. T h e kind of courage Surrender of the Dinard garrison added
that had sustained the battalion was ex- almost four thousand prisoners, includ-
emplified by a heroic act on 9 August, ing Bacherer, to the Allied bag.
not long after the force was isolated. When General Middleton remarked
No sooner had an artillery shell struck that the 121st Infantry didn’t appear to
the battalion command post, killing the have done much, the 83d Division chief
operations and motor officers and seri- of staff explained, “It is hard to tell what
ously wounding the operations sergeant they have been up against. Sometimes
and a radio operator, than a German those things go very slow for a while
tank appeared five hundred yards away. then all of a sudden they break. . . .” 4 4
Opening fire, the tankers killed several T h e fact was that one regiment had not
men. For a moment it appeared that been enough west of the Rance but two
the battalion headquarters might be an- had been able to do the job.
nihilated. Taking matters into his own
hands, Pvt. Francis A. Gardner of the Siege Operations
Headquarters Company ran toward the
tank with a bazooka. Though his first While General Macon had personally
rocket missed, a 57-mm. antitank gun directed the attack on Dinard, the as-
firing at the same time immobilized the sistant division commander, General
tank by a hit on the treads. As the Ger- Ferenbaugh, had taken control of the
man crew started to abandon the dis- two remaining regiments of the 83d Di-
abled tank, Gardner fired a second time, vision. T h e objectives still to be re-
duced were the walled city of St. Malo,
the Citadel, and the strongpoints of St.
42Two members of the 121st Infantry, T. Sgt.
Milford W. Wilson, who boldly diverted enemy fire
Ideuc and la Varde. Ferenbaugh con-
to himself to cover his squad’s withdrawal, and
Capt. Arthur W. Kaiser, who led his company 45Annex 1 to 121st Inf AAR, Aug, Summary of
through mine fields, barbed wire, tank barriers, and Action of 3d Bn 121st Inf from 7 Aug to 12 Aug 44,
artillery and machine gun fire to assault enemy 4 Sep.
positions with bayonet and grenade, were post- 44Telecon, Gen Middleton and Col Samuel V.
humously awarded the DSC. Krauthoff, 1440, 13 Aug.
ST. MALO AND T H E NORTH SHORE 403
centrated first on the lesser strongholds, machine guns and 20-mm. pieces and
St. Ideuc and la Varde, which were small, overlooking the battle area was the chi-
mutually supporting forts. St. Ideuc teau of St. Malo at the far end of the
in actuality was an outer defense posi- causeway. T h e thick walls of the châ-
tion for la Varde, which was on the teau, designed to withstand medieval
coast. German artillery at Dinard and siege, proved effective against the en-
Cézembre could fire in support. gines of modern war.
On 9 August, while the 329th Infan- T h e immediate objective of the bat-
try patrolled and policed the towns of talion attack was the Casino at the near
St. Servan and Paramé and prepared to end of the causeway. After two days of
attack the Citadel, the two battalions un- small unit action, the battalion in the
der the 330th Infantry headquarters at- late afternoon of 11 August took the
tacked toward St. Malo and St. Ideuc. blasted and tattered Casino. T h e chi-
For three days artillery pounded St. teau was less than a thousand yards away,
Ideuc and infantry and engineers op- but the intervening space was as exposed
erated against individual pillboxes and as a table top.
bunkers. In the late afternoon of 12 Although guns then pummeled the
August, after a final burst of concen- château for two days, even high velocity
trated artillery fire and an infantry as- shells from 3-inch tank destroyer guns
sault, the 160 surviving defenders ca- and 8-inch shells from artillery guns
pitulated. Without pause the assault and howitzers seemed to have little ef-
battalion moved toward la Varde, and on fect. Neither did air attack by heavy
the following evening, 13 August, cap- and medium bombers produce any ap-
tured the fort. Little more than a hun- parent result. German machine gun
dred Germans filed out in surrender. fire from the château walls remained too
Meanwhile, the other battalion under devastating for infantry alone to cross
the 330th Infantry, with an additional the causeway, and mine fields prevented
rifle company, had been attacking to- tanks from approaching.45
ward the town of St. Malo. T o gain As the fighting had progressed, the
entrance into the walled town, the troops fires within the St. Malo ramparts had
had to secure the Paramé–St. Malo cause- become a raging inferno. Flame and
way. T h e attack thus took place across smoke obscured many of the defensive
an area that funneled the troops toward positions. T o allow about a thousand
the narrow causeway strip. Supported French civilians still inside the walls to
by tanks and tank destroyers, the infan- escape the conflagration, a truce was
trymen systematically reduced pillboxes concluded for several hours during the
and bunkers, measuring their progress afternoon of 13 August. These and
by streets. T h e avenues of Paramé be- about five hundred hostages and in-
came thoroughfares for bullets and ternees, who had been held at a tiny
shells, and engineers dynamited passage- French-built fort offshore, entered Amer-
ways from house to house to enable the ican lines. T h e blaze had no effect on
infantrymen to fight forward from one the German garrison in the château, for
building to another.
Manned by a small garrison employing 45330th Inf Rpt, 1220, 12 Aug.
404 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ARTILLERYMEN
FIRING3-INCHGUN ON GERMANDEFENSES
IN ST. MALO
the château had its own fireproof walls ter, discouraging engineers from placing
separating it from the burning town. demolition charges against the walls.
With St. Ideuc and la Varde reduced Despite their virtually impregnable po-
by 13 August, the entire 330th Infantry sition, the prodding of American artil-
gathered to assault St. Malo on the morn- lery fire and the obvious hopelessness of
ing of 14 August. As artillery intensi- continued resistance finally prompted
fied its shelling and fired smoke and high surrender that afternoon. Prisoners to-
explosive against the château walls, an taled 150.46
infantry battalion surged across the With this surrender, all organized re-
causeway, past the château and into the sistance on the north shore of the St.
walled town. There were few enemy Malo peninsula came t o an end. On
troops in the charred and still burning two small islands several hundred yards
buildings, and these were quickly offshore, tiny forts, Fort National and
rounded up. T h e defenders in the
château, however, still held out, and 46330th Inf S-3 Rpt, 1800, 14 Aug; 83d Div G–2,
their machine guns continued to chat- G–3 Jnl, entry 1815, 14 Aug.
ST. MALO AND T H E NORTH SHORE 405
STREETFIGHTING
IN ST. MALO
Grand Bey, each comprising several tion of the Citadel, which was supported
blockhouses, had to be investigated. At by fire from the island of Cézembre.
low tide on 16 August a rifle company of Although there was no longer any pos-
the 329th Infantry marched across the sibility of using the destroyed port of
sand to Fort National and found it un- St. Malo, the resistance had to be elimi-
occupied. T h e same company then as- nated to keep the Citadel and Cézembre
saulted Grand Bey. “Went in under garrisons from interfering by fire with
a smoke screen, took them by surprise, Allied shipping to Granville and Can-
tossed a few hand grenades, and they cale. Continued opposition from them
gave up.” About 150 Germans surren- would give courage to the small isolated
dered. 47 German groups in Brittany that still re-
All this activity was either preliminary fused to surrender, while capitulation
or tangential to the main task, reduc- might have the effect of softening the
4783d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, entry 1555, 16 Aug; will to resist at Lorient and Brest. Also,
329th Inf Msg and Sitrep, 16 Aug. complete reduction of the St. Malo com-
406 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
plex would free the 83d Division for prised the armament-the weapons were
employment elsewhere.48 mutually supporting. In the event that
invaders would manage somehow to scale
The Citadel the walls, weapons were fixed to cover
the interior court. T h e walls shielding
Since reduction of Cézembre required the defenders were of concrete, stone,
an amphibious landing and naval sup- and steel, so thick that they were virtu-
port, the immediate problem facing ally impervious to artillery and air bom-
General Macon was how to take the bardment. Inside the fort, aeration and
Citadel. Dug deeply into the ground, heat ducts, a vast reservoir of water, a
the Citadel was the heart of the fortress large amount of food and supplies, and
complex.49 T h e rocky promontory a subterranean railroad to transport am-
where it was located was a natural de- munition and heavy equipment facili-
fensive position, as indicated by remain- tated the ability to withstand siege.
ing vestiges of fortifications built by the Blocking the landward approaches were
Gauls to protect the long since vanished barbed wire, four lines of steel rails
village of Aleth. A French fort erected placed vertically in cement, and an anti-
there in the mid-eighteenth century pro- tank ditch. Periscopes emerging from
vided the foundation for extensive con- the ground level roof of the interior fort
struction undertaken by the Germans provided observation. T o improve vis-
in 1942 with Polish, Belgian, Czech, ibility and fields of fire, the Germans
French, Dutch, Algerian, and Spanish had knocked down several houses in St.
workers laboring voluntarily or other- Servan, and only the pleading of the
wise for Todt. mayor had saved a twelfth century
A casemated strongpoint of connected church from a similar fate. Personifying
blockhouses, the Citadel was effective the strength of the Citadel was the com-
against an approach from almost any mander, Aulock, who was determined to
direction. Where the guns of the Cit- bring credit to himself and his forces.
adel could not fire, pieces at Dinard and According to prisoners, resistance con-
Cézembre could. Although the fire tinued “only because of Colonel von Au-
power that the fort could deliver was lock.” 50
not overwhelmingly impressive-half a As early as 5 August, General Macon
dozen field pieces (the largest of 105-mm. was aware that it would be difficult to
caliber), several mortars, and perhaps take the Citadel. When the corps G–3
eighteen or twenty machine guns com- suggested “Why don’t you take 155’s and
blow it off the map?” the division G–3
49
Telecon, Middleton to Krauthoff, 1440, 13 answered, “I don’t believe we can.” 51
Aug, 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl and File; VIII Corps He was speaking with more truth than
G–2 Per Rpt 60, 2400, 13 Aug, and G–3 Per Rpt
61, 14 Aug. he perhaps realized.
49The best description of the Citadel is found in T h e obvious strength of the St. Malo
Fouque, La Cité, pp. 7–25. See also VIII Corps
G–2 Per Rpt 56, 2400, 10Aug, and G–2 Weekly Per 5083d Div G–2 Per Rpt 35, 1600, 7 Aug.
Rpt 8, 12 Aug; ETOUSA Engr Hist Rpt 10, Com- 51 83dDiv G–2 Per Rpt 33, 1600, 5 Aug; Telecon,
bat Engineering (Aug, 45) ; [George], Ninth Air Evans and Boyle, 2318, 6 Aug, 83d Div G–2, G–3
Force, pp. 203, 219. Jnl and File.
ST. MALO AND T H E NORTH SHORE 407
fortress, and particularly of the Citadel, nately for Middleton, higher headquar-
prompted General Middleton to move ters deemed objectives elsewhere of more
heavy artillery of the corps into position importance. 55
to support the 83d Division attack. Be- Since direct measures to reduce the
fore the battle ended, ten artillery bat- Citadel seemed to have failed and since
talions, including 8-inch guns, 8-inch an all-out infantry attack would be
howitzers, and 240-mm. howitzers, were costly, the 83d Division turned to subter-
pounding the St. Malo defenses.52 Yet fuge. A loudspeaker manned by the
the uncertainty of ammunition ham- corps Psychological Warfare Service unit
pered operations. Fire plans were often attempted without success to persuade
curtailed. N o artillery preceded an in- the Germans to lay down their arms.
fantry attack launched on 9 August, for Engineers explored the sewage system of
example, and on the following day the St. Malo in the vain hope of discovering
stockpiles of shells were so low that only at least one conduit close enough to the
five rounds per piece were available. Citadel to place a decisive demolition
For several days, some of the battalions charge. A captured German chaplain
fired four rounds per gun per day. was permitted to visit the Citadel to ask
Though ammunition shortages were Aulock to give up. T h e chaplain re-
troublesome, the lack of apparent ef- turned with the report that Aulock re-
fect against the enemy position was de- fused to surrender because he was “a
pressing. T h e walls of the Citadel were German soldier, and a German soldier
too thick to be breached by fire, the does not surrender.”
enemy pieces too well protected by case- T h e mayor of St. Servan-sur-Mer sug-
matesto be knocked out.53 gested confidentially that a French lady
Air attack was similarly ineffective. who knew Aulock rather well might
Fighter-bombers gave excellent assistance persuade him to lay down his arms and
when the infantry attacked smaller come out. Contact would not be dif-
strongpoints, but they were unable to ficult, he revealed, because a line still
make an impression on the Citadel. connected the Citadel and the St. Servan
Though two groups of medium bomb- telephone office. Although the unortho-
ers attacked the Citadel with 1,000- dox nature of this suggestion at first
pound general purpose bombs, these, prompted hesitation on the part of U.S.
too, seemed to have no effect.54 As- commanders, the lady rang up the
sured by personal inspection that drastic Citadel anyway. Though Aulock would
measures were necessary to reduce the not come to the phone in person, he
Citadel, General Middleton requested informed the lady through a subordinate
a high-level bombardment by heavy that he had other things on his mind.56
bombers in a mass attack. Unfortu-
52Memo, Evans for Maddox, 7 Aug. 55VIII Corps G–3 Jnl, entries 1030 and 1500, 10
5383d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, entries 0015, 9 Aug, Aug.
0935 and 1510, 10 Aug; Msg, Macon to Evans, 56 Rpt of Maj Marcus, MC, on Mission Behind
1400, 11 Aug. German Lines, St. Malo, n.d., 83d Div G–2, G–3
54 83d Div AAR, Aug, and Msg, 1100, 6 Aug; Jnl File, Aug; 83d Div AAR (7 Aug); 329th Inf
TUSA Info Memos, 5 and 7 Aug; VIII Corps Arty AAR (10 Aug); ETOUSA Engr Hist Rpt 10: Fou-
(Air OP) Msg, 1350, 5 Aug. que, La Cité, p. 58.
408 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the port of St. Malo useless to the Ameri- T h e efforts of the division during this
cans. He had held up an entire division period had nevertheless been strenuous
and substantial supporting forces for al- and, as a measure of rest and rehabilita-
most two weeks and thus had prevented tion, the troops received a different type
the VIII Corps from taking decisive ac- of mission. Originally scheduled to
tion against the fortress ports of Lorient help in the reduction of Brest as soon as
and Brest. St. Malo was captured, the 83d Division
T h e surrender of the Citadel cleared instead took responsibility for the “back
the St. Malo–Dinard sector with the ex- area” of the Rennes–Brest supply line
ception of the garrison on the island of and eventually patrolled Brittany as far
Cézembre. T h e 83d Division had com- south as the Loire River. As the divi-
pleted an impressive action. As against sion dispersed throughout the area south
comparatively light losses, the division of Rennes in a welcome respite after the
had taken more than ten thousand close-in siege action, two infantry bat-
prisoners.64 talions of the 330th—one at Dinard and
64 83d Div Annexes 1 and 2 to G–2 Per Rpt 44, the other at St. Malo, both aided by the
16 Aug. FFI—policed the coastline and guarded
ST. MALO AND THE NORTH SHORE 411
against German infiltration from Cézem- proaches to Granville and Cancale. Its
bre.65 coastal guns had been out of range of
Cézembre the 83d Division artillery pieces during
the early part of the battle, and its fire
Four thousand yards offshore, the tiny had been a nasty source of harassment.
island of Cézembre, half a mile long T h e division had requested the island
and a quarter of a mile wide, by blasted “as quickly as we can and as
its position opposite the mouth of the often as we can,” and the VIII Corps
Rance River controlled the deep water had promised to “work on it from the
channel to St. Malo and the sea ap- air and naval angle.” Bombers attacked
the island during the night of 6 August
65Memo, Evans for Cross, 11 Aug; Memo, Middle- and again on 1 1 August, but naval gun-
ton for Macon, 14 Aug, 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl File;
VIII Corps G–3 Per Rpt 61, 14 Aug, and Msg, 2300,
fire did not become available until
15 Aug; 83d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, entries 2253, 15 much later. Meanwhile, the corps had
Aug, 0955, 16 Aug, 1132, 16 Aug, and 2050, 17 Aug; brought heavy artillery into the St. Malo
Notes by General Ferenbaugh on Middleton-Macon
conversation at St. Servan, 16 Aug, dated 17 Aug;
area, and from 9 August on the pieces
Additional Notes from Middleton, 1000, 18 Aug. shelled the island to prevent interference
412 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
BOM
G
OF ILE DE CÉZEMBRE, OFF ST. MALO
with the ground action on the main- name. Neither arrogant nor boastful,
land.66 the German commander stated that the
T h e thirty-five planes diverted to last order he had received from higher
Cézembre from the attack on the Citadel headquarters instructed him to maintain
on 17 August created huge columns of his defense. Until he received a coun-
smoke with their napalm bombs.67 termanding order, he would continue to
Hoping that fires started by the bom- do just that. Informed that the main-
bardment would intensify the adverse ef- land was completely under American
fect Aulock’s capitulation was sure to control, he declared that he did not un-
have on the garrison, and expecting that derstand how that changed his situation.
both factors would enlist a readiness to Reminded that Aulock had surrendered
quit Cézembre, General Macon author- the day before, he countered that he had
ized Maj. Joseph M. Alexander and two not exhausted his ammunition on Cé-
enlisted men, as well as an accredited zembre. After a courteous conversation
civilian motion picture cameraman, to lasting fifteen minutes, the Americans
demand that the Germans relinquish the were escorted back to the beach and
island. On 18 August the party rowed helped to launch their boat for the re-
across the St. Malo bay. At Cézembre, turn trip.68
a noncommissioned officer met the boat According to Alexander’s observations,
and conducted Alexander and his inter- Cézembre was a shambles. Shelling and
preter to the fortress commander, a bombardment had demolished or badly
lieutenant colonel who did not give his damaged the few houses and buildings,
destroyed a narrow-gauge railway de-
6683d Div G–2, G–3 Jnl, entries 1841 and 2035, signed to carry ammunition from the
6 Aug, and 0930, 9 Aug; [George], Ninth Air Force,
p. 220.
67 83d Div G–3 Per Rpt 45. 1600, 17 Aug; 68 Ltr, Alexander to Macon, Rpt of Parley on
[George], Ninth Air Force, p. 174. Isle de Cézembre, 18 Aug.
ST. MALO AND T H E NORTH SHORE 413
beach to gun positions, created large 8-inch, and 240-mm. shells at embrasures,
craters, and exploded an ammunition portholes, and tunnel entrances. After
dump, scattering shells and debris this display of power, another demand
throughout the island. About three for surrender was transmitted to the
hundred men comprised the garrison. garrison. Again the German com-
From tunnels dug into rock, the men mander replied that he lacked permis-
manned those coastal guns that still func- sion to surrender.71
tioned.69 On the following day, 2 September, as
No further effort was made immedi- the 330th Infantry prepared to make an
ately against Cézembre. A week later, amphibious assault on Cézembre, the
when preparations were being completed garrison raised a white flag. T h e land-
for a strong attack against Brest, higher ing craft immediately conducted troops
headquarters decided to eliminate the to the island and evacuated 1 German
nuisance of Cézembre. T h e 330th In- officer, 320 men, and 2 Italian officers.
fantry headquarters returned to St. Malo Although the fortifications had been
to direct training for an amphibious severely damaged, the reason for the
operation. Arrangements were made capitulation was a shortage of water-the
for assault boats and special equipment. distilling plant had been destroyed.72
Softening up operations commenced on So ended the battle of S t . Malo, a
30 August when two groups of planes battle that had been unexpected in its
bombed the island. On 31 August inception, in its difficulty, and in its
twenty-four P–38’s dropped napalm and duration. German troops, although iso-
three hundred heavy bombers struck lated, had demonstrated convincingly
with high explosive. Several 8-inch the value of military discipline in carry-
howitzers and guns shelled the island ing out the Fuehrer’s will. An action of
“day and night” with particular effort local significance by mid-August, a rear
to destroy water tanks. Another parley area operation more than a hundred
with the island commander disclosed miles behind the front, the combat
“that he will fight to the last drop of nevertheless fulfilled Hitler’s strategic
water.” 70 design.
Faced with this attitude, the Allies in- From the American point of view, the
creased their pressure on 1 September. results of the Brittany campaign pro-
Medium bombers of both the IX duced mixed reactions. August had
Bomber Command and the RAF Bomb- come in like a whirlwind, gone out in
er Command opened an aerial assault a calm. T h e 4th Armored Division had
that ended with thirty-three P–38’s seized Rennes by 4 August, had con-
dropping napalm. A British warship,
H.M.S. Warspite, fired salvos of 15-inch
71 330th Inf AAR’s Aug and Sep, 44; [George],
armor-piercing projectiles. Field artil- Ninth Air Force, p. 174; Msg, ANCXF to SHAEF,
lery from the mainland fired 155-mm., 2215, 28 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORD
Plng; 12th AGp Memos for Gen Kibler, 29 Aug,
12th AGp File 371.3, Mil Objectives, I.
69See 330th Inf AAR (2 Sep) . 72 330th Inf AAR, Sep; [George], Ninth Air
70Memo, Lt Col Frederick G. Cain for Col Evans, Force, p. 221; 12th AGp Immed Rpt 49, Organiza-
31 Aug. tion and Effect of Heavy Arty, 9 Sep.
414 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ST. MALOPRISONERS
MARCHING
OFF TO INTERNMENT
it. T h e major ports of Brittany could effort at Brest at the end of August,
not be used. St. Malo was destroyed logistical planners were by then looking
beyond hope of immediate repair. elsewhere for major ports of entry.
Nantes was demolished. Brest, Lorient,. Failure to have attained the strategic
and St. Nazaire were occupied by enemy goals of the operation did not appear ter-
forces in naturally good defensive posi- ribly important in mid-August. Events
tions bolstered by extensive fortifica- occurring farther to the east had long
tions. Construction of a harbor at since relegated the action in Brittany
Quiberon Bay could not be started. to secondary status. T h e eastern devel-
T h e logistical fruits of the action were opment of the breakout was overflowing
the minor harbors of Cancale and St. Normandy into the ancient provinces of
Michel-en-Grève and the railway from Anjou and Maine and promising to
Rennes to Morlaix. Although the VIII bring the campaign in western France
Corps gathered its forces for a mighty to a climax.
PART FIVE
Week of Decision
As operations had begun in Brittany German military organization even to
during the early days of August, Allied the highest levels. Soviet advances sent
and German commanders were making his Eastern Front reeling, but because
decisions that markedly altered the construction had been started in July
development of the campaign. T h e im- on a new defense line stretching from
mediate consequence of the decisions on East Prussia to the Carpathians, Hitler
both sides decreased the importance of hoped that his forces would somehow
Brittany. Normandy remained the stage hold. His main concern lay in the west,
for continuing action that would soon for he had long considered the west the
become vital. vital sector of what had become, at least
for the moment, a defensive war.
T h e German Decision T h e breakthrough on the Western
Front posed the ominous possibility that
T h e seriousness of the German situa- the Germans might have to withdraw
tion at the time of the American break- from France. With France lost, the
through to Avranches was not lost on threat of Allied penetration of the Ger-
Hitler.1 T h e Balkans and Finland man homeland would become im-
were about to be lost, and there were mediate.
indications that Turkey might soon enter T h e Seine River, with its deep bends
the war against Germany. Hitler con- and twists, was difficult to defend and
sidered these events as a kind of external could be no more than a temporary rally-
defection over which he had little con- ing position, but between the Seine and
trol. T h e Putsch o f July 20th, on the the Rhine were a number of historic
other hand, was an internal defection water obstacles where the Germans could
that threatened him personally, and he hope to stop the Allies short of the Ger-
was increasingly uneasy over the feeling man border. T o utilize the water bar-
that disloyalty had permeated the entire riers, Jodl sketched a major defensive
belt across Belgium and France (and
1The following is from: OKW Bespechung des into northern Italy) that consisted of
Fuehrers mit Generaloberst Jodl am 31.7.1941. in two lines: the Somme–Marne–Saône
der Wolfschanre; Der Westen (Schramm) ; Memo
for Rcd, Warlimont to Eberbach, 3 Aug, Fifth River line, and the Albert Canal-Meuse
Panzer Army KTB, Annex 248; MS # C-099c River line, both anchored on the Vosges
(Warlimont); Jodl Diary; OB WEST, a Study in Mountains.
Command, pp. 46-47; Bauer, Organization of the
German Defenses in the West in the Fall of 1944 Behind these lines were the per-
(1936–44) , MS R–20. manent fortifications of the West Wall
420 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
(Siegfried Line), protecting the ap- possible in the west. On the debit side,
proaches to the German border. Al- failure to stabilize the front in Normandy
though neglected for four years and would—because of Allied air superior-
partially dismantled, the West Wall in ity-involve the German forces in mobile
the summer of 1944 was not a negligible warfare under unfavorable conditions.
defensive factor. Late in July Jodl Reluctant to accept the hazards of
ordered the West Wall repaired and re- mobile warfare in these circumstances
armed and the river lines in France and needing time to prepare rearward
prepared for defense. T h e Todt Organ- defenses, Hitler decided to take the risks
ization was to cease work on the Atlantic and continue to fight in Normandy.
Wall and commence construction of Since the war in western Europe had
defensive positions along the newly pro- reached a critical stage, he took respon-
jected lines inland. Authority was sibility for the battle upon himself.
granted to impress civilians for work on Creating a small staff taken from mem-
roads and defenses in Belgium and bers of the OKW planning section
France. (WFSt) to help him, Hitler sought to
In addition to the erection of defensive recreate the conditions of static war-
positions, Hitler enunciated on the last fare while at the same time preparing
day of July a two-point policy directed to withdraw in the event of failure.
against Allied logistics. He ordered his By this move, Hitler in effect assumed
forces to deny the Allies ports of entry the functions of theater commander and
on the Continent and, if a withdrawal filled the virtual vacuum in the chain
from France became necessary, to de- of command that had existed since Rom-
stroy the transportation system there by mel’s incapacitation and Kluge’s assump-
demolishing railroads, bridges, and com- tion of dual command of Army Group
munications. B and OB WEST. Ordering Kluge to
Though withdrawal from France was close the gap in the left portion of the
extremely undesirable, Hitler foresaw German defenses and to anchor the front
the possible necessity of it. He in- on Avranches, Hitler forbade the com-
dicated as much by ordering the move- manders in the field to look backward
ment of some units out of the Balkans toward defensive lines in the rear.
and Italy for defense of the homeland, As seen by the staff of OB WEST, the
thereby accepting the probability of los- situation in Normandy at the beginning
ing the Balkans immediately and the of August, while critical, could have been
calculated risk of having to withdraw in worse.2 T h e recent appearance on the
Italy to the Alps. Hitler also quickened Continent of Canadian units and other
preparations for raising a reserve force formations that had been thought to be-
within Germany. long to Patton’s army group, and the
Stabilizing the Normandy front ap- commitment in Normandy of ever-grow-
peared the only alternative to with- ing numbers of close-support planes in-
drawal from France. On the credit side, dicated that a second large-scale Allied
a front line in Normandy would be the 2 OB WEST, a Study in Command, pp. 55ff:
shortest and most economical of any OB WEST KTB, 30 JuI, and Anlage 943.
WEEK OF DECISION 421
strategic landing in western Europe was able reaction in Italy that might lead to
no longer likely. Also, the Allied break- the loss of a region valuable to the Ger-
out from the limited continental lodg- man war economy, withdrawals on other
ment and the development of mobile fronts to project the homeland.
warfare underscored the fact that the T h e other alternative was to stabilize
Allies no longer needed to make another the front in Normandy. T o do so, the
landing. T h e knowledge that the Ger- breach at Avranches would have to be
mans in Normandy already faced the closed, a step that appeared tactically
bulk of the Allied forces in western feasible at the beginning of August. If
Europe was somewhat of a relief. the gap were not closed, there would be
Two possibilities seemed in order. an unavoidable crisis on the front, for
T h e first was the more cautious: to the likelihood of being able to pull back
break off the battle in Normandy and across the Seine at that late date would
withdraw behind delaying action to the be slim.
Seine while Army Group G evacuated As events developed, Hitler left O B
southern France. This would have the WEST no choice. He ordered the
virtue of saving the main body of Ger- forces in the west to continue fighting
man troops, though admittedly at the in Normandy even as Kluge was already
expense of heavy losses, especially in trying to remedy the situation at
materiel. Eberbach later claimed that, Avranches.
when Warlimont visited the front about Although all of Kluge’s available
1 August, he, Eberbach, suggested an forces in Normandy were committed by
immediate withdrawal to the Seine, a the first day of August, one armored
recommendation Warlimont rejected as and six infantry divisions were on the
being “politically unbearable and tac- way to reinforce the front. T h e 84th
tically impractical.” 3 and 85th Divisions were moving from the
OB WEST could understand OKW’s Pas-de-Calais toward Falaise. T h e 89th
reluctance to withdraw, for pulling back Division had just crossed the Seine
to the Seine would more than likely be River, and the 331st Division was in the
the first step toward retirement behind process of being ferried across. Parts of
the West Wall. If the Germans did the 363d Division were already in the
not succeed in holding the relatively Seventh Army rear and were being com-
short front in Normandy, then only at mitted in the LXXXIV Corps sector.
the West Wall-another relatively short From southern France came the 708th
defensive line that could be reinforced- Division, which was crossing the Loire
was there a prospect of success.The con- River near Angers, and the 9th Panzer
sequences of such a decision would be Division, which was moving toward the
hard to accept-surrender of France with Loire for eventual assembly near Alen-
all the political and economic implica- çon. Whether all would get to the front
tions of it, loss of long-range projectile in time to be of use before the situation
bases along the Pas-de-Calais, unfavor- in the Avranches sector deteriorated
completely was the vita€ question. It
appeared that at least three divisions, the
3 MS # A-922 (Eberbach) 363d, the 84th, and the 89th, would be
422 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
available at Avranches during the first Avranches, and the weak 91st Infantry
week in August. 4 (Map IX) Division was at Rennes.5
Except at Avranches, the situation Since the Seventh Army (or any other
along the front was far from desperate. outside ground headquarters) could not
Eberbach’s Panzer Group West, which exercise effective command of the X X V
was to change its name on 5 August to Corps in Brittany, Kluge placed the
the Fifth Panzer Army, was actively corps directly under Army Group B as a
engaged only in one sector. The matter of administration. Writing off
L X X X V I Corps, the I SS Panzer Corps, the X X V Corps in this manner in ac-
and the L X X I V Corps controlled quiet cordance with Hitler’s orders emphasized
zones, as did the LVIII Panzer Corps the floating nature of the Normandy left
headquarters, recently brought up from flank. T h e weak forces at Rennes were
southern France. Only the II SS Panzer obviously unable to offer sustained resist-
Corps was fighting hard by 2 August, ance. A large opening between the Sée
having committed all three of its divi- and Loire Rivers invited American ex-
sions against the British attack launched ploitation eastward toward the Paris-
on 30 July south of Caumont toward the Orleans gap.6 T o cover the gap thus
town of Vire. exposed, Kluge on 2 August ordered the
Hausser’s Seventh Army front, on the First Army to extend its control north-
other hand, was hard pressed. In a nar- ward from the Biscay coast of France to
row sector just east of the Vire River, the Loire River, take command of the
the II Parachute Corps had only the 3d forces along the Loire, and hold bridge-
Parachute Division to defend the town heads on the north bank at the crossing
of Vire. West of the Vire River to the sites between Nantes and Orleans. On
Forêt de St. Sever, the XLVII Panzer the same day Kluge also ordered the
Corps controlled the 2d Panzer Division LXXXI Corps headquarters to hurry
(which had absorbed the 352d Division) south from the coastal sector between
and the 2d SS Panzer Division (which the Seine and the Somme Rivers to take
had absorbed the remnants of Panzer control of the arriving 708th Infantry
Lehr and the 17th SS Panzer Grena- and 9th Panzer Divisions on a refused
diers,). On the left, L X X X I V Corps Seventh Army left flank in the Dom-
directed the 353d Division and the 116th front–Alenqon sector.7 With these
Panzer Division on a front from the St. measures taken, Kluge turned his atten-
Sever forest to the Sée River. Provi-
sional units, formed from remnants and 5Situation Maps, 3 and 4 Aug, LXXXI Corps
Anlagen zum KTB, I. Teil (Karten), 2.-24.VIII.44
stragglers (including the 5th Parachute (CRS 61 659/9); MS # B–741 (Ziegelmann); MS
Division) and operating under the staff # A–894 (Gersdorff); MS # B–445 (Krueger);
of the 275th Division, covered the gap MS # B–179 (Hausser); AGp B KTB, 1 Aug:
Hodgson, R-54 and R-58.
south of the Sée River and east of 6 A corridor devoid of major natural obstacles,
bounded by the Seine and the Loire Rivers.
4 Telecons, Kluge and Speidel, 1025, 1 Aug, 7 MS # B–732 (Hold) ; MS # B–807 (Kuntzen) ;
Gersdorff and Helmdach, 1055, 1 Aug, Tempelhoff Msg, Seventh Army to LXXXl Corps, 3 Aug,
and Zimmerman, 1230, 1 Aug, AGp B KTB; LXXXI Corps Befehle H Gr u. Armee; Telecon,
Tempelhoff Telecon, 1220, 1 Aug, AGp, B KTB; OB Gersdorff and Wiese, 0945, 4 Aug, LXXXl Corps
W E S T KTB, 1 Aug. KTB.
WEEK OF DECISION 423
tion to regaining Avranches as the new This plan accepted, Kluge directed
anchor point of the defensive line in Hausser to launch an attack with the
Normandy. XLVII Panzer Corps, using the 2d SS,
If Avranches were to be regained, a the 2 d , and the 116th Panzer Divisions
counterattack had to be launched im- in an initial effort and the 1st SS Panzer
mediately. Where to get the troops for Division as an exploiting force. T h e
it was the problem, and Hitler provided divisions were to be relieved from the
the solution. On 2 August, in ordering line by 6 August through withdrawal to
a strong armored counterattack, Hitler a shorter front.10
authorized a slight withdrawal to a While the LXXIV and II SS Panzer
shorter line (Thury-Harcourt through Corps in the Panzer Group West sector
the town of Vire to the western edge of prepared to withdraw during the night
the Forêt de St. Sever). A shortened front of 3 August in order to disengage the 1st
and the arrival of new units would give SS Panzer Division, Hausser planned
Kluge the means with which to counter- to disengage the other three divisions
attack to Avranches.8 from his Seventh Army front by execut-
Specifically, Hitler first thought of dis- ing a three-phase withdrawal. T h e 2 d ,
engaging the II SS Panzer Corps (the 2d SS, and 116th Panzer Divisions were
9th SS, the 10th SS, and the 21st Panzer to be pulled out of the line in that order
Divisions) for the counterattack, but on three successive nights starting 3
Kluge felt this impossible because of the August and assembled in the area east of
British pressure south of Caumont. Mortain by 6 August. T o make this
Kluge recommended that the XLVII possible, the II Parachute Corps was to
Panzer Corps, which was nearer the crit- extend its responsibility to the west to
ical sector, make the effort with the 2d take control of a regiment of the 353d
and 2d SS Panzer Divisions reinforced at Division, and the LXXXIV Corps was
first by the LXXXIV Corps’ 116th Pan- to integrate the arriving 363d and 84th
zer Division and later by the incoming Divisions into its front. The XLVII
9th Panzer Division (after the latter Panzer Corps, which was to direct the
moved from Alençon to Sourdeval near attack, received the 275th as left flank
Mortain). Since there was some ques- cover. With three armored divisions
tion whether the 9th would arrive in moving abreast in an initial assault and
Alençon in time to participate, Kluge a fourth ready to exploit initial success,
suggested that additional armor be the XLVII Panzer Corps commander,
secured by pulling the 1st SS or the 12th Funck, was to attack after dark on 6
SS Panzer Division out of the Caen sec- August without artillery preparation.
tor where the British appeared to have
become quiet, a risk that Eberbach had
agreed to accept. Jodl approved Kluge’s
3 Aug, Kluge and Eberbach, 1135, 3 Aug, and
proposals.9 Kluge and Jodl, 1210, 3 Aug, AGp B K T B .
8 Der Westen (Schramm) , p. 79; O B W E S T KTB, 10Telecon, Kluge and Hausser, 1615, 3 Aug,
entry 2330, 2 Aug, and Anlage 1050; Telecon, Kluge AGp B K T B ; Kluge to Jodl, 1745, 3 Aug, O B
and Buttlar-Brandenfels, 1035, 3 Aug, AGp B KTB. WEST K T B , and Anlage 1068; AGp B Opera-
9Telecons, Kluge and Buttlar-Brandcnfels, 1035, tionsbejehle, 3 Aug.
424 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
T h e only unit immediately available for cedures throughout the U.S. Army gave
this mission was the 79th Division, units flexibility. Throughout the cam-
whose leading regiment was already at paign a brief telephone call was enough
Pontorson on a projected move to follow to set into motion an apparently com-
the 6th Armored Division westward to plicated change.
Brest. Reversing the direction of the T o secure Fougères, reconnaissance
79th Division “pursuant to instructions troops of the 79th Division moved on
of army group commander,” Middleton the heels of a 106th Cavalry Group pa-
ordered occupation of Fougères before trol into the town. T h e division oc-
dark, 2 August, and establishment of cupied Fougères in force on the morn-
contact with the 90th Division at Lou- ing of 3 August and established contact
vigné-du-Désert.25 It was this set of in- with the 90th Division on the north.28
structions from General Bradley that As the 106th Cavalry Group (assigned
prompted the halt of the 5th Armored to the XV Corps) continued to screen
Division north of the Sée River.26 the area between Fougères and Rennes,
Patton had acted simultaneously with apprehension over the VIII Corps left
Bradley to close the gap, the difference flank vanished.29 T h e VIII Corps drove
being the choice of the unit. Sending the westward into Brittany, but the XV
79th instead of the 5th Armored brought Corps, in contrast with earlier OVERLORD
quicker action at Fougères and lessened plans, faced to the southeast.
traffic congestion around Avranches, but T h e orientation of XV Corps to the
it also temporarily brought some com- southeast reflected the reaction of the
plications to both the VIII and the XV American high command to the changed
Corps. T h e 79th Division replaced the situation brought about by the breakout.
83d on the corps troop list, and the im- T h e 90th Division on the left and the
mediate result was some confusion: the 79th on the right held a defensive line
XV Corps headquarters had “no wire to from Juvigny to Fougères, facing away
either division—90th Inf Div has no wire from Brittany, while the 5th Armored
to anybody—79th Inf Div seems to have Division prepared to move south through
wire (only) to VII Corps”; and the 83d Avranches toward the corps right flank.30
Division for a short time was simulta- In a sense, it was a fortuitous deployment
neously attached to two corps—VIII and that was to prove fortunate. For as the
XV—that were going in opposite di- corps reached these positions, thinking
rections. 27 Yet the shift was made with on the higher echelons of command
relative ease, primarily because uni- crystallized. T h e result altered a basic
formity of training and of staff pro- concept of the OVERLORD planning.
25VIII Corps Msg, 2 Aug, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl 2879th Div AAR, Aug, and Tel Msg, 1030,
and File; VIII Corps FO 10, P Aug, and Sitrep 95, 3 Aug, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl and File; Wyche Diary.
2 Aug; XV Corps G–3 Notes, 2 Aug. 29TUSA Msg, 1200, 3 Aug, and VIII Corps Msg,
26TUSA Msgs, 2 Aug, XV and VIII Corps G–3 2105, 4 Aug, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl and File; XV
Jnls and Files. Corps G–3 Per Rpt 2 and Memo, 3 Aug.
27XV Corps G–3 Sec Memo and Notes of Mtg at 30XV Corps G–3 Per Rpt 2, 3 Aug, and Plan
G–3 Sec, 031400 Aug, 3 Aug; 83d Div G–2, G–3 of XV Corps Defense Between Fougères and La
Jnl and File, 2-3 Aug. Sée River, 4 Aug.
430 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the Breton ports, one of the most vital Bradley would “so manhandle the west-
strategic objectives of the OVERLORDern flank of the enemy’s forces” that the
plan, before winter weather precluded Allies would create “virtually an open
further use of the invasion beaches. [enemy] flank,” and he predicted that
Now the planners were confident that a the Allies would then be able to exercise
small force, one American corps of per- almost complete freedom in selecting
haps an armored division and three in- the next move. He would then “con-
fantry divisions, “might take about a sider it unnecessary to detach any large
month to complete the conquest.” T h e forces for the conquest of Brittany,” and
remainder of the Allied forces could would instead “devote the greater bulk
turn to the other, more profitable oppor- of the forces to the task of completing
tunities: “round up” the Germans west the destruction of the German Army, at
of the Seine, drive them against the least that portion west of the Orne, and
river, destroy them within the limits of exploiting beyond that as far as [pos-
the lodgment area, and, by seeking sible].’’ He did not mean to write off
such distant objectives as Paris and Or- the need for the Breton ports, but secur-
leans, prepare to cross the Seine River.35 ing both objectives simultaneously, he
These speculations slighted a funda- believed, would now be practical. 37
mental factor that had governed OVER- On the same day, 2 August, General
LORD planning until that time: the be- Bradley was still thinking along the lines
lief that the Allies needed the Breton of the original OVERLORD plan. Pat-
ports before they could move outside ton’s forces then entering Brittany were
the confines of the lodgment area. still executing the American main effort,
Montgomery’s planners had weighed the and the entire Third Army was eventu-
logistical merits of gaining Brittany ally to be committed there to secure the
against the tactical opportunities created ports. T h e St. Hilaire-du-Harcouët-
by COBRAand by arguing for the latter Fougères–Rennes line, in the process of
presented a radically different conclu- being established by the XV Corps, was
sion. Until that moment the impor- no more than a shield to prevent inter-
tance of the Breton ports could hardly ference with the Third Army conquest
have been exaggerated, for the very suc- of the Brittany peninsula. 38 On the
cess of OVERLORD had seemed predicated following day, 3 August, Bradley changed
on organizing Brittany as the principal the entire course of the campaign by an-
American base of operations.36 nouncing that Patton was to clear Brit-
General Eisenhower reflected the tany with “a minimum of forces”; the
changing attitude toward the question primary American mission was to go to
of Brittany on 2 August. He believed the forces in Normandy who were to
that “within the next two or three days” drive eastward and expand the conti-
nental lodgment area.39 Brittany had
become a minor prize worth the expense direction in which Haislip was to move-
of only one corps. “I have turned only south, south or east.44
one American Corps westward into Brit-
tany,” General Montgomery stated on “Don’t Be Surprised”
the following day, “as I feel that will be
enough.” 40 Had logistical planners not Exclusive of Brittany, the mission out-
insisted that the ports were still needed, lined for the Third Army by General
even fewer forces might have been com- Bradley on 3 August had both offensive
mitted there.41 Several days later, when and defensive implications. General
heavy resistance had been discovered at Patton was to secure a sixty-mile stretch
the port cities, Montgomery resisted of the north-south Mayenne River be-
“considerable pressure” to send more tween Mayenne and Château-Gontier
troops “into the peninsula to get the and to seize bridgeheads across the river.
ports cleaned up quickly,” for he felt He also was to protect his right flank
that “the main business lies to the along the Loire River west of Angers,
East.” 4 2 part of the southern flank of the OVER-
The new broad Allied strategy that LORD lodgment area.45
had emerged concentrated on the pos- Because this task was too great for the
sibility of swinging the Allied right flank XV Corps alone, General Patton brought
around toward Paris. T h e sweeping in the XX Corps to secure the Mayenne
turn would force the Germans back River south of Château-Gontier and to
against the lower reaches of the Seine protect the Loire River flank. While
River, where all the bridges had been the XV Corps was to drive about thirty
destroyed by air bombardment. Pushed miles southeast to the water line be-
against the river and unable to cross tween Mayenne and Château-Gontier,
with sufficient speed to escape, the Ger- the XX Corps was to move south toward
mans west of the Seine would face poten- the Loire. Although Patton assigned
tial destruction.43 no further objectives, he was thinking
Because the XV Corps was already of an eventual Third Army advance
around the German left and oriented forty-five miles beyond Laval to le
generally eastward, General Haislip Mans-to the east. When, by which
drew the assignment of initiating the unit, and how this was to be done he did
sweep of the Allied right flank. T h e not say, but the obvious presumption
remaining problem was to resolve from that the XV Corps would continue east-
somewhat conflicting orders the exact ward beyond the Mayenne River was
not necessarily correct. “Don’t be sur-
morning, against no opposition, the di- wrong. By this time the reconnaissance
vision crossed the river and entered battalion of the 9th Panzer Division and
Laval in force—one infantry battalion parts of the leading regiment of the
being led across a dam by French police- 708th Infantry Division had reached the
men, two battalions crossing the river vicinity of le Mans. Instead of holding
on an engineer footbridge, another pad- these units and allowing the remaining
dling across on rafts and in boats found portions of both divisions to assemble,
along the west bank, and two battalions the LXXXI Corps committed the small
being ferried across by engineers who forces at once. T h e premature and, in
had rushed up assault boats. A tread- the opinion of the Germans, disgraceful
way bridge spanned the river shortly capitulation at Laval made necessary the
after midnight, and a floating Bailey immediate evacuation of administrative
bridge was opened to traffic at noon, 7 personnel from le Mans, long the loca-
August.53 tion of the Seventh Army headquarters.
Even before the capture of Laval, it With Laval lost, the Germans had to ex-
had become obvious that only insignifi- pect an American thrust along the
cant and disorganized forces opposed the Laval–le Mans highway and a subse-
XV Corps.54 As soon as Mayenne fell quent threat to Seventh Army and Army
on 5 August, Patton received permission Group B rear installations and supply
to send the corps on to le Mans. T h e dumps. Hastily trying to build up a
corps axis of advance thus changed from front to deny the important center of
the southeast to the east.55 Empha- le Mans, the LXXXI Corps dispatched
sizing that action during the next few units of the 708th Division (arriving on
days might be decisive for the entire cam- foot and with horse-drawn vehicles) and
paign in western Europe, Haislip urged the 9th Panzer Division reconnaissance
his commanders “to push all personnel battalion west toward the Mayenne
to the limit of human endurance.” 56 River line as soon as they arrived.
This was not idle talk, for the corps had These advance components were to col-
a large order to fill. T o take le Mans lide with American columns near Aron
the corps, with both flanks open, would and Evron in true meeting engage-
have to advance across forty-five miles m e n t s . 58
of highly defensible terrain, cross a ma- Since the 79th Division was still in
jor military obstacle in the form of the the process of seizing Laval, the task of
Sarthe River, and capture a city of initiating the XV Corps attack to le
75,000 population that the Germans pre- Mans devolved upon the 90th. Ac-
sumably not only intended to defend corded use of the main Laval–le Mans
but also had had ample time to fortify.57 highway, General McLain planned to
T h e presumption was not altogether move the bulk of the division southeast
from Mayenne to the highway, then
5379th Div AAR, Aug. eastward to le Mans behind Task Force
54 SeeXV Corps Rpt, 1800, 5 Aug. Weaver, which was to drive along a
55TUSA Dir, 5 Aug (confirming tel orders, 1640,
5 Aug); 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs 3, 6 Aug.
56XV Corps Dir to Div Comdrs, 1045, 6 Aug. 58MS # B–807 (Kuntzen) : MS # B–725 (Gers-
57XV Corps AAR, Aug. dorff).
436 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
more direct route southeast from Ma- enemy in the Aron–Evron sector and to
yenne to the objective.59 General Wea- protect the division and corps left flank,
ver, again in command of the division reversed the direction of his column,
spearhead, divided his force into two and followed Barth’s route of the pre-
columns for an advance over parallel vious day as far as Montsûrs. Instead
roads. One column, under his personal of turning eastward at Montsûrs, Weaver
command, was to proceed on the left continued to the south. Clarke’s 358th
through the towns of Aron and Evron.60 Infantry, approaching Montsûrs in
T h e other column, commanded by Colo- column from the west, waited for
nel Barth, was to move through Mont- Weaver to clear the village before pro-
sûrs, Ste. Suzanne, and Bernay. 61 ceeding eastward toward Ste. Suzanne in
Barth’s column on the right encoun- support of Barth.
tered only slight opposition on 6 August Weaver, moving south, reached the
in moving southeast from Mayenne village of Vaiges on the main Laval–le
about twelve miles to Montsûrs, then Mans highway. There he intended to
turning east and proceeding ten miles turn east to parallel Barth’s movement,
farther to the hamlet of Ste. Suzanne. not on Barth’s left as originally planned,
There, that evening, the column struck but on his right. Weaver had to change
determined opposition and halted. his plan when he discovered that Bacon’s
In contrast with the excellent advance 359th Infantry had already entered
of Barth’s force, Weaver’s column had Vaiges from the west and was proceed-
hardly departed Mayenne before meet- ing along the Laval–le Mans highway
ing a strong German armored and in- toward the division objective, clearing
fantry force at Aron. Engaging the opposition that had formed around road-
enemy in a fire fight that lasted all day, blocks.
Weaver’s troops were unable to advance. Refusing to be shut out of the action,
Meanwhile, the remainder of the 90th but unwilling to risk traffic congestion
Division was approaching or crossing the likely if his and Bacon’s troops became
Mayenne River in two regimental intermingled, Weaver led his column
columns-the 358th (Colonel Clarke) on northeast from Vaiges, aiming to insert
the left and the 359th (under Col. his column between Barth’s and Clarke’s
Robert L. Bacon) on the right. on the north and Bacon’s on the south.
Checked at Aron, Weaver on the He would thus add a third column to
morning of 7 August left contingents of the eastward drive toward le Mans.
the 106th Cavalry Group to contain the Several miles northeast of Vaiges, how-
ever, at the hamlet of Chammes between
5990th Div Mission Order, 1030, 6 Aug.
60This column consisted of the Reconnaissance Vaiges and Ste. Suzanne, Weaver again
Troop (less a platoon), a platoon of medium tanks, was thwarted, this time by the same
a battalion of the motorized 357th Infantry, and enemy force opposing Barth at Ste.
an artillery battalion.
61Colonel Barth’s column included the motorized Suzanne.
357th Infantry (less a battalion), two medium tank Barth, in the meantime, had sustained
platoons, a reconnaissance platoon, two artillery and repelled a tank-supported counter-
battalions, a tank destroyer company, a platoon of
antiaircraft automatic weapons, and, as rear guard.
attack launched from St. Suzanne.
a battalion of the 359th Infantry. American artillery fire effectively stopped
WEEK OF DECISION 437
the Germans, but in wooded terrain With both columns several miles west
south of the Ste. Suzanne–Bernay road of le Mans by 8 August, General McLain
the enemy continued to resist. Soon halted the advance, terminated the task
after Weaver’s arrival, however, the op- force organization, and prepared to at-
position slackened. tack the city. That night Clarke’s 358th
As enemy fires diminished and Ameri- Infantry crossed the Sarthe River north
can artillery shelled the Germans, Barth of le Mans to cut the northern exits of
rushed his motorized column past the the city. On the morning of 9 August,
wooded area southeast of Ste. Suzanne, after shelling a German force observed
passed through Bernay that night with- escaping to the east and capturing fifty
out stopping, and on the morning of prisoners, the troops moved into the
8 August struck an enemy defensive posi- northern outskirts of the city. Barth’s
tion only a few miles west of le Mans. 357th Infantry also crossed the river dur-
Weaver left a small containing force at ing the night of 8 August, entering le
Chammes, moved south to the Laval–le Mans on the following morning.63
Mans highway, turned east, passed Troops of the 90th Division made con-
through Bacon’s troops, and slammed tact with part of the 79th Division,
down the road, reducing small road- which had secured its portion of le Mans
blocks at virtually every hamlet. Early on the previous afternoon.
on 8 August, Weaver, too, was only a T h e 79th Division had started its
few miles from le Mans. drive east from Laval on the morning
As Barth and Weaver swept by the of 7 August as 106th Cavalry troops and
German forces in the forest southeast of Colonel Wood’s motorized and rein-
Ste. Suzanne, Clarke on the north and forced 313th Infantry moved through
Bacon on the south mopped up de- the area immediately south of the main
moralized remnants and stragglers. Al- Laval–le Mans highway. Clearing small
though the Americans had judged that groups of Germans, the task force ad-
only minor enemy forces had been pres- vanced more than half the distance to
ent in the Evron area, the 90th Division the objective. T o give the attack added
took 1,200 prisoners and destroyed in impetus on 8 August, General Wyche
large part the reconnaissance battalion motorized Lt. Col. John A. McAleer’s
of the 9th Panzer Division and a regi- 315th Infantry and passed it through the
ment of the 708th Division. T h e suc- 313th. T h e new spearhead unit surged
cess of the approach march to le Mans forward, dispersing sporadic resistance,
was attributable in great measure to the and the leading troops detrucked on the
aggressive persistence of General Weaver, southwest outskirts of le Mans that after-
who had not permitted his troops to be noon. Concluding an outstanding ex-
pinned down by opposition. T h e re- ploitation effort, troops of the 79th Divi-
sult left no doubt that the same 90th eral McLain was awarded the Bronze Oak Leaf
Division that had stumbled in the Cluster to the DSC. General Eisenhower later
Cotentin was now a hard-hitting out- credited General McLain with making the 90th a
first-class fighting outfit. Eisenhower to Marshall,
fit. 62 25 Aug, cited in Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 278.
62For his part in transforming the division and 63 90th Div AAR, Aug; 12th AGp Immed Rpt 76,
inspiring the troops during the above action, Gen- Aggressive Pursuit by a Task Force, 10 Oct.
438 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
sion crossed the Sarthe River and found the Quartermaster company and
reached the center of le Mans, by 1700 had the trucks loaded, but traffic con-
on 8 64 The Seventh
August. Army gestion prevented the vehicles from
headquarters troops were gone. getting to the division that day. Not
The 5th Armored Division had also until the early morning hours of 7 Au-
had a hand in the advance. Com- gust did they arrive. Uncertain whether
manded by Maj. Gen. Lunsford E. the Third Army could establish and
Oliver, the 5th Armored Division on maintain supply points at reasonable
6 August had moved south against light distances behind armored forces in deep
resistance past Avranches and through exploitation and unwilling to risk a re-
Fougères and Vitré. At the village of currence of the gasoline shortage, Oliver
Craon, opposition at a destroyed bridge provided the division with an opera-
temporarily halted a combat command, tional fuel reserve by attaching a platoon
but quick deployment dispersed the Ger- of the Quartermaster company to each
mans and aggressive reconnaissance se- combat command.
cured a bypass crossing site. By evening General Oliver need not have worried.
the division was at the Mayenne River T h e organic trucks of the division were
at Château-Gontier on the corps right released by the infantry and returned to
flank. There, the division faced the the 5th Armored area early on 7 August.
serious problem of how to cross the river At the same time, the Third Army
in the face of an acute shortage of gaso- moved 100,000 gallons of gasoline to
line. Cossé-le-Vivien, several miles south of
Several days earlier, on 4 August, Gen- Laval, whence 5th Armored Division
eral Haislip, the corps commander, had trucks transported it across the Mayenne
directed the 5th Armored Division to River to Villiers-Charlemagne. Here
unload fuel and lubricants from a the division quartermaster established a
hundred of its organic trucks so that the Class III dump. A platoon of the divi-
trucks might be used to motorize the sion Engineer battalion protected the
two infantry divisions. Although Hais- supply point until the division civil af-
lip had intended to return the vehicles fairs section obtained sufficient numbers
before committing the armor, he had of the FFI for guard duty.
been compelled instead to replace them Gassed u p on the morning of 7 Au-
with a corps Quartermaster truck com- gust, the 5th Armored Division crossed
pany on the night of 5 August. T h e the Mayenne River after eliminating the
division commander, General Oliver, in- Château-Gontier garrison (about a com-
structed the truck company to draw pany strong), repairing the damaged
gasoline at any army Class III truckhead bridge there, and constructing several
north of Avranches and to join the bridges south of Château-Gontier. Gen-
armored division south of Avranches on eral Haislip had instructed General
the following morning. When the Oliver to advance on le Mans echeloned
trucks failed to appear, Oliver sent an to the right rear of the 79th Division,
officer back to locate them. T h e officer but had also authorized him to use all
possible routes in the corps zone, pro-
6479th Div AAR, Aug. viding he did not interfere with the in-
WEEK OF DECISION 439
fantry divisions. If the infantry en- apart. By 8 August more than two
countered opposition strong enough to hundred miles separated the 6th Ar-
retard progress seriously, the armor was mored Division of the VIII Corps at the
to move to the head of the corps attack. gates of Brest and the XV Corps at le
This was not necessary. T h e 5th Mans.
Armored Division reached the Sarthe Less than one hundred miles east of
River south of le Mans on the evening of le Mans lay the final 12th Army Group
7 August and crossed during the night. objective designated by the OVERLORD
Sweeping through some opposition on plan, the eastern edge of the OVERLORD
8 August, the armor bypassed le Mans lodgment area, an area roughly between
on the south, swung in a wide arc, and Paris and Orleans. With le Mans oc-
moved around the eastern outskirts of cupied so easily there seemed to be few
the city. By midnight of 8 August, the German forces to restrain further Third
converging attacks of the three divisions Army advance toward its part of the ob-
had closed all exits from le Mans and in- jective, the Paris–Orléans gap. Yet, this
fantrymen were clearing the streets of advance was not to be, for the moment
the city.65 at least; a new goal appeared more de
In four days, from 5 to 9 Angust, sirable.
General Haislip’s XV Corps had moved The XV Corps advance to le Mans
about seventy-five miles–from the St. had in one week moved an enveloping
Hilaire–Fougères line to le Mans—an right flank eighty-five air miles southeast
extraordinarily aggressive advance at of Avranches and was well on its way to
little cost. Extremely light casualties outflanking the German armies west of
contrasted well with a total of several the Seine River, or had already done so.
thousand prisoners.66 T h e immediately If the basic purpose of military opera-
apparent achievement of Haislip’s ex- tions was to close on advantageous terms
ploitation was that the XV Corps had with the enemy and destroy him, and if a
frustrated German plans to organize favorable moment for a move of this
strong defenses at Laval and le Mans. kind appeared, purely geographical ob-
But soon an even more spectacular result jectives receded in importance. T h e op-
would become obvious. portunity for a decisive victory seemed
During the first week of August the doubly propitious, for the Germans in
Third Army headquarters had been serv- making a bid to regain the initiative in
ing two bodies with one head. Two the battle of France had played into
distinct fronts had been advancing in American hands.
opposite directions, moving ever farther General Bradley was ready to act, and
in his new decision the XV Corps had an
important role. “Don’t be surprised,”
655th Armd Div AAR, Aug. Patton had earlier warned Haislip. In-
66The 90th Division, for example, sustained less stead of going farther east from le Mans,
than 300 casualties during the first ten days of
August and took more than 1,500 prisoners. 90th the XV Corps turned north toward
Div AAR, Aug. Alençon.
CHAPTER XXIII
of his reserves,” the enemy appeared in- line east of Avranches were lost, regain-
capable of halting a First Army advance.6 ing Avranches would avail little. At
If eight divisions were shifted from the the same time, the assembly areas for the
Fifteenth Army, the Germans could per- forces that were to launch the counter-
haps continue to fight along a general attack had to be protected. To ac-
line from Rennes through Mortain, complish these tasks was to prove diffi-
Falaise, and Trouville and thus prevent cult, for the Germans had relatively few
the emergence of Allied forces from troops in Normandy at the beginning of
Normandy. Otherwise, there could only August. (See Map IX.)
be abandonment of the “no retreat” Losses had been exceedingly high
policy. Beyond that, it was possible among the divisions in contact with the
even to foresee complete German col- Allies during June and July. Hausser,
lapse in the very near future. “Only the Seventh Army commander, counted
discipline,” the First Army G–2 wrote, eight divisions that had practically been
destroyed in the Cotentin during the
and habit of obedience to orders keeps the month of July alone: Panzer Lehr, 5th
front line units fighting. It is doubtful
that the German forces in NORMANDY can Parachute, 17th SS Panzer Grenadier,
continue for more than four to eight weeks and 91st, 352d, 275th, 243d, and 77th
as a military machine. One more heavy Infantry Divisions. 8 This did not take
defeat such as the recent breakthrough into account the 16th Luftwaffe Field
battle which commenced 25 July will most Division and the 326th Division, an-
probably result in the collapse of the forces nihilated near Caen and Caumont, re-
now at the base of the CHERBOURG Penin-
sula. Surrender or a disastrous retreat will spectively. It did not include the divi-
be the alternative for the German forces. sions in Brittany and on the Channel
In the next four to eight weeks the current Isles that had to be written off as far as
situation may change with dramatic sud- the Normandy front was concerned: the
denness into a race to reach a chaotic Ger- 2d Parachute, the 343d and 319th In-
many.7
fantry Divisions, and parts of the 265th
So optimistic an assessment, though com- and 266th. Nor did it mention that the
pletely warranted, was not to endure for 21st, 9th SS, 10th SS, and 12th SS Panzer
long once the character of German re- Divisions had been badly crippled in the
sistance on the immediate First Army Caen and Caumont sectors. Only a few
front was manifest. divisions of Eberbach’s Fifth Panzer
Army, the weak 3d Parachute and 353d
T h e German Task Divisions (the latter temporarily pre-
sumed lost during COBRAand now re-
In planning a counterattack to regain duced to kampfgruppe size) of Hausser’s
Avranches and restabilize their Nor- Seventh Army, and the armored divi-
mandy defenses, the Germans had to sions scheduled to launch the Avranches
stiffen their resistance in order to pre- counterattack still retained combat ef-
serve the conditions under which a coun- fectiveness. Like all the troops in Nor-
terattack was possible. If the defensive mandy, these too had suffered from
6FUSA FO 3, 1 Aug.
7 FUSA G–2 Est 13, 1 Aug. 8 M S# B–179 (Hausser)
OPPORTUNITIES AND INTENTIONS 443
uninterrupted combat, inferior equip- sions out of the line without upsetting
ment, inadequate materiel and supplies, the precarious defensive balance. In
and Allied air superiority. Though the this the corps depended heavily on the
men were still fighting grimly, com- kampfgruppe of the 353d Division. On
manders were concerned lest the will to the extreme left, under LXXXIV Corps
resist suddenly vanish.9 control, remnants of the 5th Parachute
Two infantry divisions were scheduled and 275th Divisions held weak blocking
to reinforce the battered units holding positions south of the Sée River near
the Normandy left flank and also to re- Juvigny. 11
lieve the armored divisions scheduled During the first week of August, five
to counterattack. T h e 363d moved factors gave the German commanders
through Tinchebray during the first days pause. First, they often doubted that
of August and into the Brécey–Vire line they could prevent the counterattack as-
to relieve the 2d and the 2d SS Panzer sembly areas from being overrun. Sec-
Divisions by 5 August.10 T h e 84th, ond, they wondered whether the transfer
supposed to relieve the 116th Panzer of armored divisions (the 2d and the
Division, was committed on 2 August in 114th at the end of July, and the pend-
defense of the Sourdeval sector and be- ing transfer of the 1st SS in August) from
came engaged in such violent combat Eberbach’s forces would so weaken the
that it was unable to accomplish the re- right wing that the British and Cana-
lief as quickly as hoped. dians would be able to effect a penetra-
Despite heavy pressure exerted by the tion south of Caen. Third, they were
First U.S. Army, the Seventh Army man- aware of the threat of encirclement by co-
aged, by stubborn resistance and skillful ordinated British and American drives
withdrawal, to retain a defensive line to the town of Flers–the British by a
that, while not solid, was at least cohe- continuation of the southeastward thrust
sive. The XLVII Panzer Corps head- from Caumont, the Americans by a
quarters gave up responsibility for the northeastward thrust from Fougéres
center to prepare for the counterattack, through Domfront. Fourth, they were
and the II Parachute and the LXXXIV concerned with the threat to the Army
Corps together fought along the Brécey– Group B rear posed by American forces
Vire line. On the right (east), the driving toward le Mans. Fifth, they
II Parachute Corps, controlling only the worried that loss of high ground around
3d Parachute Division (reinforced by a Mortain–excellent terrain from which
regiment of the 5th Parachute Division) to launch offensive action–might inhibit
defended the town of Vire. On the left, the counterattack toward Avranches.
the LXXXIV Corps had the more com- These thoughts added to the burdens of
plicated job of getting the armored divi- the holding battle immediately preced-
ing the counterattack.12
9 MS # B–179 (Hausser); MS # B–725
(Gersdorff) .
10On how the movement of the 363d Division 11MS # B–346 (Blauensteiner); MS # E–725
was consistently harassed by air attack, see Leigh- (Gersdorff) ; MS # B–179 (Hausser).
Mallory, “Despatch,” Fourth Supplement to the 12MS # B–725 (Gersdorff); MS # B–179
London Gazette of December 31, 1946. p. 63. (Hausser) ; MS # B–722 (Gersdorff) .
444 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
of St. Pois, Barton had to advance about the left strove to gain Hill 232, the 2 2 d
six miles and seize three objectives, each Infantry in the center attacked the town
two miles apart: the town of St. Pois, of St. Pois, and the 8th Infantry on the
Hill 2 1 1 , and a bridgehead across the right drove on Hill 211. T h e going
Sée River at Chérencé-le-Roussel. 19 Al- was difficult against the guns of the
though General Collins contemplated 116th Panzer Division, and by evening
sending the 4th Division beyond the objectives were still not secured.
Chérencé-le-Roussel to the high ground When the attack was halted and orders
north of Mortain in the Gathemo–Sour- given to dig in for the night, the rifle
deval area, the stubborn resistance in the company officers of a battalion of the
St. Pois sector disrupted this plan. 20 8th Infantry requested and secured per-
T h e 116th Panzer Division had been mission to continue as a measure of re-
hastily withdrawn from the line near spect for their commander, Lt. Col.
Tessy on 1 August to counter the Ameri- Erasmus H. Strickland, who had been
can thrust toward Brécey, and this force wounded that day. T h e assault carried
had been committed in time to halt CCB to the crest of Hill 211, and at dawn,
and the 4th Division.21 5 August, the regiment was ready to
Impatient to get the three objectives repel the strong but obviously final Ger-
so that the 4th Division might go into man counterattack.
reserve for rest as promised, General Although St. Pois technically re-
Barton applied at St. Pois a lesson mained in German hands that morning,
learned at Villedieu. On 3 August he the town was virtually encircled. T h e
sent a task force of infantry and armor Germans began to withdraw to the south-
to bypass St. Pois on the west. Moving east to protect Sourdeval. From the
about five miles “without firing a shot,” hills around St. Pois, men of the 4th
the task force crossed the Sée River at Division hastened the enemy’s departure
Cuves, four miles west of Chérencé-le- by bringing down artillery fire and call-
Roussel. On the following day CCB ing in fighter-bombers to attack the
and attached infantry fought eastward columns. T h e cannon company of the
from Cuves along the south bank of 8th Infantry fired 3,200 shells and
the Sée River, then crossed the river burned out three howitzer tubes, the
again at Chérencé-le-Roussel and estab- 4.2-inch mortar company depleted all its
lished a bridgehead on the north bank ammunition stocks, and the 81-mm.
of the Sée. While the task force was mortars expended 3,000 rounds.22
thus outflanking and enveloping the T h e division mission completed by the
enemy, three regiments of the 4th Divi- end of 5 August, General Barton re-
sion attacked abreast from the northwest leased CCB to control of the 3d Armored
toward St. Pois. T h e 12th Infantry on Division, assembled the 4th Division at
St. Pois in the VII Corps reserve, and
looked forward to giving his troops four
19VII Corps FO 7, 1 Aug.
20VII Corps Opns Memo 55, 3 Aug (confirming 224th Div Spec Opn Rpt, St. Pois; 4th Div G–3
oral orders, 2 Aug) . Jnl, 4–5 Aug. Pvt. Joseph J. Giordano of the 8th
21 MS # B–725 (Gersdorff) ; Hosp Intervs, Infantry was awarded the DSC for heroic action
GL-93 (316), IV. on 5 August.
448 BREAKOUT AND PURSUlT
or five days of rest, replete with “hot vision objective, General Eddy secured
showers, hot food, USO shows . . . Red General Collins’ approval for a wide
Cross doughnut girls.” 23 flanking attack. H e sent a regiment
Like the 4th Division, General Eddy’s westward through Villedieu-les-Poëles,
9th Division encountered strong opposi- southward through Brécey, eastward
tion. Moving from a rest area to as- through Chérencé-le-Roussel, and then
sembly near Villebaudon on 1 August, northeastward to Gathemo to encircle
the 9th Division prepared to advance the German troops in the St. Pois–St.
twenty miles to high ground north of Sever-Calvados sector. Contact with the
Mortain against what appeared to be two regiments attacking south would
disorganized enemy forces.24 Two regi- complete a two-pronged squeeze play
ments abreast gained ten miles in two ending at Gathemo.26
days, a rapid advance for the difficult Directed through the 4th and 1st Divi-
terrain, but then progress slowed as sion sectors, on 5 August the 39th In-
they moved through hilly hedgerow ter- fantry of the 9th Division passed through
rain well defended by the 353d Division the 4th Division bridgehead held by
reinforced by the remnants of the 352d tanks and infantry at Chérencé-le-Rous-
Division and a small task force of the sel and attacked toward the northeast.
6th Parachute Regiment. T h e 9th Divi- Although stiff resistance prevented prog-
sion advance was tedious in the face of ress, other contingents of the ,division
numerous mines and strong delaying discovered a soft spot. T h e 60th Infan-
forces at roadblocks and on critical ter- try moved with surprising rapidity
rain features. As the division threat- through the Forêt de St. Sever against
ened the Forêt de St. Sever, which con- occasional artillery and mortar fire.
cealed troops and semipermanent supply That afternoon, a battalion temporarily
installations, resistance stiffened. T h e gained possession of the crossroads vil-
newly arrived 394th Assault Gun Bri- lage of Champ-du-Boult, two miles
gade, which had come forward to partici- northwest of Gathemo, though a coun-
pate in the counterattack, was subordi- terattack by the 353d Division reserve
nated to the LXXXIV Corps to protect supported by the 6th Parachute Regi-
the Forêt de St. Sever, and the brigade’s ment drove the battalion out.27
heavy artillery concentrations and anti- Continuing the attack on 6 August,
tank rockets further slowed the 9th Divi- the 9th Division regained Champ-du-
sion attack.
25 Boult in the north and increased the
I n order to speed the movement of the threat to Perriers-en-Beauficel in the
9th Division to the Sée River and be- south. With only three miles separating
yond to Gathemo, the immediate di- the two division hooks, General Collins
anticipated quick consolidation. As he
23VII Corps Notes for CofS, 4 Aug, VII Corps
G–3 Jnl and File; Col. Gerden F. Johnson, History
began to plan the movement of the 9th
of the Twelfth Infantry Regiment in World War to the south to cover the eastward thrust
II (Boston, 1947), p. 168.
24VII Corps FO 7, 1 Aug; 9th Div FO 15, 2 26VII Corps Opns Memo 57, 4 Aug, and Notes
Aug, and AAR, Aug. for CofS, 4 Aug.
25MS # B–725 (Gersdorff) ; FUSA G–2 Per Rpt 279th Div and 39th Inf AAR’s, Aug; MS #
49. 29 Jul. B–725 (Gersdorff) .
OPPORTUNITIES AND INTENTIONS 449
of the XV Corps to le Mans, the Ger- southeastward toward the town of Vire.30
mans counterattacked. 28 As the 30th Division settled down at
During the first six days of August, Tessy for several days of rest, the 28th
General Collins had faced contrasting and 29th Divisions, each with an at-
situations on his corps front. On his tached combat command of the 2d Ar-
right, he had essentially the same op- mored Division, attacked abreast from
portunity for exploitation enjoyed by the Percy–Tessy line in what was hoped
the Third Army's XV Corps, yet he had would be pursuit of a defeated enemy.31
been bound to the First Army and its Difficult terrain and stubborn resist-
requirements and consequently was un- ance transformed the hoped-for pursuit
able to capitalize on the fluid situationinto a protracted fight. T h e action of
there. With the exception of the 1st the 28th Division, which was manifest-
Division, the VII Corps components had ing the usual characteristics of a unit
taken part in combat that resembled the newly committed to combat, complicated
earlier battle of the hedgerows. Stub- the picture. On the first day of attack
born resistance, skillful withdrawal, andthe division sustained almost 750 casual-
effective delaying action in bocage ter- ties, and not until the attached CCB
rain had resulted in a slow and hard moved to the front to lead the advance
advance. Whereas the 1st Division sus- did the troops begin to move with any
tained less than 250 casualties between assurance and competence. Two days
2 and 7 August, the 3d Armored Divi- later, on 4 August, the 28th captured St.
sion lost almost 300 men, the 4th Divi- Sever-Calvados, eight miles southeast of
sion 600, and the 9th Division nearly Percy. At the same time the 29th Divi-
850.29 Although the figures hardly ap- sion, with CCA attached, reached posi-
proached the intensity of losses in July,tions northwest of the town of Vire after
they indicated clearly a major differencehard fighting.32
in the character of the opposition met on General Gerow's V Corps had also
different sectors of the front. been moving toward Vire from the
north. T h e corps objective was a line
T h e Battle for Vire several miles north of Vire where the
corps was to be pinched out by the con-
Hard slugging characterized combat verging advances of the adjacent forces.
all along the remainder of the First By 1 August theBritish on the left had
Army front. On the immediate left of already pinched out the 5th Division,
the VII Corps, the XIX Corps had been and General Irwin prepared to join the
occupied for five days in smashing Ger- Third Army. T h e two remaining divi-
man attempts to re-form a defensive line sions of the V Corps, the 35th and the 2d,
from Tessy to the Cotentin west coast, crossed the Vire-Souloeuvre River line
but on 2 August, with Tessy finally cap- 30FUSA FO 2, 28 Jul.
tured, General Corlett began to drive 31 Sgt. Harold B. Cordes of the end Infantry,
which was still attached to the 2d Armored Divi-
sion, was awarded the DSC for heroic action on
28VII Corps Opns Memo 59, 7 Aug (confirming 2 August.
oral orders 6 Aug) . 3228th and 29th Div AARs Aug; [Ferriss],
29 FUSA Daily G–1 Rpts, Aug. Notes.
450 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
on 2 August and pushed south with the out. General Hodges modified these
intent of “maintaining strong pressure plans when increasing emphasis was
against the enemy and insuring contact placed on maintaining unrelenting pres-
at all times.” 33 sure on the enemy. Instead of allowing
T h e Germans were withdrawing be- the V Corps to remain idle just north of
hind strong rear-guard action and were Vire, Hodges designated Tinchebray,
using the terrain advantageously, but eight miles southeast of Vire, as the
General Gerow still hoped to gain next V Corps objective. T o replace the
enough momentum to go beyond his departing 35th Division, he at first gave
designated limit of advance. He re- Gerow the 30th Division but, when he
quested permission from General Hodges sent the 30th to Mortain instead, he sub-
to capture the town of Vire if the pros- stituted the 29th for it. After Vire was
pect became feasible. T h e army com- captured, the 29th Division would pass
mander at first agreed, but on second to V Corps control. Since the new V
thought refused because he was unwill- Corps sector would be narrow, Gerow
ing to chance the confusion that might was to attack with the 2d and 29th Divi-
result from intermingling XIX and V sions in column to capture Tinchebray.
Corps forces.34 T h e XIX Corps would continue south-
T h e 2d and 35th Divisions reached ward from Vire toward Domfront and
their objectives by 5 August, the former Mayenne to cover the northern flank of
having sustained nearly goo casualties in the XV Corps (which was driving east-
the process, the latter almost 600.35 As ward toward le Mans) and also to cut
General Baade prepared to take his 35th off and encircle the enemy forces in the
Division, which was no longer in contact St. Pois–Gathemo area.36 But before
with the enemy, out of the sector to join these plans could be put into effect, the
the Third Army, Maj. Gen. Walter M. town of Vire had to be taken. T h e task
Robertson’s 2d Division established de- fell to the 29th Division and its attach-
fensive positions north of the town of ment, CCA of the 2d Armored Division.
Vire. Vire, an old fortified town of 8,000
T h e XIX Corps, according to General inhabitants, is built on hills dominating
Bradley’s post-COBRA instructions, was to the Norman bocage and is the center of
have driven southeastward through Vire several converging roads. T h e town
toward Tinchebray, thereby cutting overlooks the Vire River and a tributary,
across the V Corps front and pinching it the Vaux de Vire. Long a religious and
artistic center, it was by virtue of its
location a military prize. T h e towns-
33FUSA FO 3, 1 Aug; V Corps FO 1 7 , 1 Aug.
Capt. William C. Miller of the 35th Division was people in 1944 came to regard their pri-
awarded the DSC for heroic action on 2 August. vations of that year as a double agony.
34 V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 158; Conf T h e Allied aerial bombardment of 6
Notes, Gerow and Irwin, 31 Jul, 5th Div G–3 Jnl
and File. June, part of the attempt to hamper Ger-
35FUSA Daily G–1 Rpts, Aug. Pfc. Joseph A. man troop movements at the time of the
Elwell of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, who
volunteered to remove mines blocking the advance,
and Pfc. Lawrence Georgeatos of the 38th Infantry 36FUSA FO’s 4 and 5, 4 and 5 Aug; V Corps
posthumously received the DSC. Operations in the E T O , map on p. 162.
OPPORTUNITIES AND INTENTIONS 451
invasion, had nearly destroyed the town; for alternate sites found the ground too
the actual struggle for the town by the soft for tanks to ford the stream.
ground forces in August reduced the Other tanks had better luck. They
town to rubble. Late in July, as the secured Hill 219, west of Vire, against
sound of artillery came increasingly slight opposition and gave the Ameri-
closer, the citizens were hardly reassured cans terrain that was extremely favorable
when German troops urged them not to for offensive action against the town.
be afraid. “We’ll defend your town Since the presence of CCA tankers and
house by house,” they promised.37 infantrymen on Hill 219 constituted a
The LXXXIV Corps’ indefatigable serious threat to the German defense,
kampfgruppe of the 353d Division, sup- strong counterattacks were launched
ported by elements of the 363d Division, from Vire throughout the day. T h e
and the II Parachute Corps’ 3 d Para- American positions became so precarious
chute Division were responsible for the that General Gerhardt that evening dis-
town. Roadblocks covered by antitank patched the 116th Infantry as reinforce-
guns and excellent positions on dominat- ment.
ing ground comprised the defenses.38 T o reach Hill 2 19, the 116th Infantry
T h e battle for Vire started on 5 Au- moved in three battalion columns,
gust when 29th Division tanks and infan- the men of each advancing single file
try drove down the Tessy-Vire highway. through the hedgerowed fields, the
Any hope that the Germans would columns about a field apart. Isolated
abandon Vire vanished quickly, for they groups of Germans concealed in scattered
gave immediate notice of their inten- farmhouses and foxholes and along the
tions by striking the spearhead of the hedges were quickly eliminated. T h e
U.S. attack, the 2d Armored Division’s regiment reached the crest of Hill 219
CCA, at Martilly, less than a mile from late on the night of 5 August. By the
the center of the city. A tank company following morning it was evident that
assembled nineteen tanks in two fields this was the best jump-off point for an
beside the highway in preparation for assault against Vire.
crossing the Vire at a stone bridge. No By that time General Corlett had
sooner were the tanks assembled along reached the conclusion that it would be
the hedgerow perimeters of the fields unprofitable to continue to employ the
than enemy artillery knocked out ten 2d Armored Division’s combat com-
tanks with a disastrous concentration of mands to spearhead the infantry divi-
fire. Although the remaining tanks sion’s attacks. T h e broken terrain and
moved out at once in an attempt to cross the lack of a good road net made the
the Martilly bridge, continuing fire from area basically unsuitable for armored
dominating ground knocked out four operations. T h e corps commander felt
additional tanks and prevented the cross- that the tanks could add little to infantry
ing. Reconnaissance parties searching capabilities, in fact they actually clogged
the few available roads and impeded the
37André Letondot, “La Double Agonie de Vire,” infantry advance. Furthermore, during
in Herval, Bataille d e Normandie, I , 288.
38MS # B–725 (Gersdorff); MS # B–346
the five days between 1 and 6 August,
(Blauensteiner) . the combat commands had sustained
452 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
about 450 casualties, a large number for played individual initiative and judg-
armored troops and not commensurate ment and worked efficiently in small
with the gains.39 Feeling that the groups to clear the town. Prisoners
armored division could be employed constituted a problem in the darkness,
better elsewhere, General Corlett in- and many escaped after capture. By
structed General Brooks to move the dawn of 7 August the regiment had
2d Armored Division off the roads in secured Vire and had set up blocking
order to let the 28th and 29th Divisions positions on five roads leading east and
pass through. T h e armored division- south from the town. T h e 29th Divi-
with the exception of CCA on Hill 219, sion officially reported the capture of
designated now as the XIX Corps Vire, as the Germans systematically be-
reserve–assembled and prepared to move gan to shell the town.
into the VII Corps zone. Meanwhile, T h e 29th Division sustained nearly a
the 28th Division made ready to con- thousand casualties while advancing the
tinue southeastward to Gathemo and ten miles from Tessy through Vire, in
beyond, and the 29th Division completed the process achieving its third major vic-
preliminary consolidation for the assault tory in less than a month: St. Lô, Tessy,
on Vire. and Vire.40 Yet the gain of twenty
Just before dark on 6 August, the miles from St. Lô to Vire must have
116th Infantry descended the steep east seemed to the troops hardly fair com-
slope of Hill 219. T h e men moved in pensation for so much weariness and
single file through dense underbrush pain.
and over thick outcroppings into a nar- T h e First Army achievements during
row ravine at the bottom of the hill. the first six days of August were some-
They were more interested in speed what inconclusive even though the
than in concealment, for the Germans objectives deemed essential for con-
did not wait long before beginning to tinued operations–Mortain and Vire-
shell the route of advance. Protected were in American possession and even
to a degree by the sharp angle of declivity though undiminished pressure had
and the narrowness of the gully, the forced a withdrawal that the enemy, by
assault troops crossed a shallow stream his determined resistance, had demon-
at the bottom of the hill and climbed the strated he was unwilling to make. By
opposite wall of the ravine. Rushing in capturing the Forêt de St. Sever the
small groups across a shell-pocked sec- Americans denied the Germans excellent
ondary road, the troops ran up a gently observation and cover and came into con-
sloping hill and into the town of Vire. trol of an extensive road net.41
Buildings set ablaze by artillery threw Despite these accomplishments, the
a pall of smoke over the town, and piles First Army was still short of its objec-
of rubble blocked the streets. T h e tives in the Sourdeval area, and a twenty-
exercise of command even at company mile gap lay open in the right portion of
level was difficult during the street fight-
ing, but men of the 116th Infantry dis- 40FUSA Daily G–1 Rpts, Aug.
41See V Corps G–2 Tactical Study of the Terrain,
39 FUSA Daily G–1 Rpts, Aug. 30 Jul, V Corps G–3 Jnl and File.
OPPORTUNITIES AND INTENTIONS 453
CLEARING
OPERATIONS
IN VIRE
the army front between the 1st Division have difficulties in its own zone, the XIX
at Ambriéres-le-Grand and the 30th Corps rate of advance improved, and
Division at Mortain. Stubborn resist- the original boundaries remained in
ance in the Sourdeval-Gathemo salient effect.
despite a developing American threat of Determined enemy resistance in the
encirclement perplexed American com- center, evidence of increasing strength
manders. General Hodges on 4 August among German forces, and the gap in
thought there might be some German the VII Corps zone promoted caution
strength coming west toward the salient on the part of the First Army. It was
and in order “to stop them as short as this that had kept the First Army from
possible” he had approved a suggestion exploiting the fluid situation on the
made by General Collins. I n view of German left “with impunity” as had the
the slow XIX Corps advance south from Third.42
Tessy, Collins proposed to push the VII T h e failure to eliminate the opposi-
Corps almost due east to Gathemo and
thus intrude on the XIX Corps zone. 42FUSA Rpt of Opns, p. 4; Sylvan Diary, 4
However, the VII Corps continued to Aug.
454 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
tion that had crystalized around Sour- ish nevertheless secured a foothold on
deval was like an ominous cloud mar- the slopes of the high ground. On 5
ring an otherwise clear summer sky. August Dempsey broadened his attack,
Optimism obscured some of the cloud’s and two days later the 1 2 Corps crossed
meaning. T h e cloud actually fore- the Orne River between Mt. Pinçon and
shadowed a storm. Caen, securing a shallow bridgehead.
Meanwhile, the 2d Canadian Corps
Montgomery’s Intentions of the First Canadian Army had
mounted several holding attacks in the
British troops had also threatened the Caen sector to prevent the Germans
town of Vire during the first week in from shifting reinforcements to other
August as the 8 Corps of the Second sectors under Allied attack. Even as
British Army right flank continued the General Crerar thus sought to divert the
drive south begun from Caumont on 30 Germans, his main concern was to pre-
July. Although patrols of the 11th pare a major effort to be launched south
Armoured Division had reached a point of Caen toward Falaise.44
a little more than a mile north of Vire Plans for a major attack from Caen
on 2 August, antitank fire by the 3d toward Falaise revealed the development
Parachute Division forced a withdrawal. of General Montgomery’s intentions.
On the following day paratroopers, T h e strategic decision reached by the
aided by parts of the 9th and 10th SS Allies early in August involved a drive
Panzer Divisions under II SS Panzer to the Seine, but the first step toward the
Corps control, counterattacked exposed Seine was the clearance of the area west
British flanks and encircled a small of the Orne. General Eisenhower had
armored force, causing the armor to halt pointed this out as early as 31 July when
temporarily.43 T h e 1 1th Armoured he wrote: “With the Canadian Army
then resumed the attack toward the fighting intensively to prevent enemy
southeast and advanced through le Bény- movement away from the Caen area,
Bocage, across the Vire–Condé-sur- Dempsey’s attack coupled with Bradley’s
Noireau road, and into position to will clean up the area west of the Orne
threaten Tinchebray and Flers by 6 once and for all.” 45
August. (See Map IX. ) Several days later, General Mont-
T h e 30 British Corps, in the center of gomery was thinking beyond the Orne.
General Dempsey’s army, had struck By 4 August he felt that the enemy front
southeast on 30 July from the vicinity was “in such a state that it. could be
of Villers-Bocage toward Thury-Har- made to disintegrate completely.” H e
court and the Orne River. Stubborn had concluded that “the only hope” the
resistance and rugged terrain centering Germans had of saving their armies was
on the thousand-foot height of Mt. Pin- a “staged withdrawal to the Seine.” By
con denied rapid advance, but the Brit- swinging the Allied right flank “round
43 MS # B-346 (Blauensteiner); MS # B-840 44 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp.
(Eberbach) ; Answers by the CG, 11th Armd Div, 140–50; Stacey, Canadian Army, p. 195.
to Questions by Hist Sec USFET, 6 Nov 45, ML- 46 Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, FWD–12505.
225 1 . 31 Jul, SGS SHAEF File 381, OVERLORD, I (a).
OPPORTUNITIES AND INTENTIONS 455
south of Mortain–between the town and culties, some commanders felt that the
St. Hilaire-would not only broaden the tactical situation between 4 and 6 Au-
front and tend to dissipate the limited gust had actually developed more favor-
forces available but would also commit ably than might have been expected.
the armored assault force to a poor road T h e II SS Panzer Corps and the II Para-
net. T h e best route to Avranches, they chute Corps had eased, at least tempo-
argued, was the most direct route, since rarily, the crisis along the army bound-
it had the added advantage of keeping ary near Vire. Although Hausser had
the attackers on the dominating terrain to keep the 116th Panzer Division com-
north of Mortain. Despite the comple- mitted defensively, he had pulled the
tion of the attack preparations, it took 2d SS and 2d Panzer Divisions out of the
the persuasion of Hausser’s chief of staff, line without breaking the connected
Gersdorff, to reassure Kluge that the front between the Sée River and Vire.
plans about to be executed were prob- T h e German field commanders never-
ably the better, particularly since a theless agreed that the attack had to be
thrust toward St. Hilaire would more launched as soon as possible in order to
than likely result in road congestion.2 regain operational initiative before new
It was a late hour to be thinking of developments further complicated the
altering plans, for the preattack situa- situation.
tion was becoming increasingly danger- Accepting the tactical necessity of exe-
ous, and an immediate effort was neces- cuting the plans at once as scheduled,
sary to bolster the left flank before the Kluge was rather disconcerted by several
lines there disintegrated completely. calls from Hitler on 6 August. Since
Even though the front had been con- 2 August, when Hitler had issued the
tracted to the Chérencé-le-Roussel- original order, there had been neither
Champ-du-Boult-Vire line, there was instruction nor interference from higher
no telling how much longer the headquarters. Kluge had interpreted
LXXXIV Corps could successfully hold his conversation with Jodl on 3 August
on to the designated assembly areas and as authority to command all the German
the high ground around Mortain. forces in the west (including the Navy
American occupation of Mortain was a and the Air Force) and as clearance for
serious setback that threatened to nullify attacking as he wished. Accepting the
these important attack prerequisites, responsibility along with the freedom
and the American capture of Laval on granted to deal with the American
6 August endangered the supply bases breakout and enjoying the implicit con-
near Alençon and le Mans. fidence thus accorded him, Kluge had
Despite the disadvantages and diffi- arranged to have an advance command
post set up west of Alençon so that he
2 Telecon, Gersdorff and Kuntzen, 1115, 6 Aug, could personally supervise the attack.
LXXXI Corps KTB; Telecons, Gersdorff and Suddenly however, on 6 August just a
Kluge, 1025 and 1045, 6 Aug, AGp B K T B ; MS # few hours before the attack was to begin,
B–179 (Hausser): MS # B–729 (Gersdorff). The
two latter documents and Hodgson, R–58, are when Kluge was already committed to
basic sources for this chapter. launching the effort that night, Hitler
THE MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK 459
intelligence agency, informed Kluge that return, to drive into an extremely ex-
the Allies had recognized the shift of his posed enemy area and thereby to change
troops for what it was. Uncertain of the situation completely.” 8 The Av-
the ability of the German defenses to ranches counterattack, as the Germans
hold much longer and fearing that the called it, was to be the decisive blow
Allies would bomb his assemblies out of sought since the invasion, the master
existence, Kluge persuaded Hitler to let stroke of strategic significance that was
the attack go as planned even though it to destroy Operation OVERLORD.T h e
meant that he could not use the ad- first step in that direction was to divide
ditional armor Hitler had made avail- the First and Third U.S. Armies at Av-
able.6 ranches. Once this was accomplished,
Only with great reluctance did Hitler further measures were to roll up the
permit the attack to be launched. De- Allied front. Choltitz, the former
siring the most massive blow that could LXXXIV Corps commander who was
be assembled, he was not convinced that being briefed by Hitler for a new assign-
the counterattacking force was as strong ment, recalled later that Hitler expected
as it could have been. He accepted the offensive to throw the Allies back
Kluge’s recommendation nevertheless, “into the sea.”9
and issued specific instructions for the T h e field commanders did not share
conduct of operations once Avranches Hitler’s conviction. Kluge had not sus-
was captured. He directed that Eber- pected that Hitler anticipated such ex-
bach take command from Hausser at alted results. Hausser, who considered
Avranches and swing from there to the the task of regaining Avranches relatively
northeast into the First U.S. Army flank, easy, felt that holding Avranches after
thereby disrupting and nullifying the taking it would be the difficult part of
American breakout. T o insure compli- the assignment, to say nothing of launch-
ance, Hitler dispatched the chief of the ing a further attack to the northeast.
OKW Army staff, General der Infanterie T h e result of the conflicting intentions
Walter Buhle, to the west by plane. 7 was what became known to the Ameri-
Hitler’s intention, which had crystal- cans as the Mortain counterattack, a
lized too late to affect the initial attack, drive launched in some uncertainty but
was clear in the order he issued on the with Avranches clearly defined as the
following day, 7 August, after the attack objective. (Map X )
was under way. “The decision in the
Battle of France,” he wrote, “depends The Attack
on the success of the [Avranches] at-
tack. . . . T h e C-in-C West has a T h e first echelon of the attacking
unique opportunity, which will never force was to be composed of three ar-
mored divisions moving westward
6 Telecons, Kluge and Blumentritt, 1600, 6 Aug, abreast toward an initial objective along
Kiuge and Buttlar-Brandenfels. 1650, 6 Aug, and
Zimmerman and Templehoff, 1905, 6 Aug, A G p 8Quoted in Msg, AGP B to Fifth Pz A , 7 Aug,
B K T B ; Telecon Jodl and Zimmerman, 1900, 6 Fifth Pz A K T B , Anlage 275; O B W E S T K T B , 7
Aug, O B W E S T K T B . Aug, and Anlage 1176.
7Der Westen (Schramm) , p. 83. 9 Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten, pp. 222-23.
T H E MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK 461
the Brécey–St. Hilaire road. T h e 116th weak, for only elements of two U.S. di-
Panzer Division on the right was to at- visions, the 3d Armored and the 30th
tack without prior assembly and strike Infantry, had been identified in the at-
along the north bank of the Sée River tack zone, as was the actual case.
toward Chérencé; it was to be echeloned Against them were concentrated be-
to the right rear to protect the north tween 120 and 190 German tanks poised
flank. Making the main effort in the for the surprise attack. Once Av-
center, the 2d Panzer Division (rein- ranches was captured, a newly arriving
forced by a panzer battalion each from infantry division, the 331st (scheduled
the 1st SS and the 116th Panzer Divi- to be at Tinchebray by 9 August), would
sions) was to thrust along the south bank be committed between the XLVII Pan-
of the Sée, using the St. Barthélemy- zer Corps and the LXXXIV Corps in or-
Reffuveille road as its principal axis of der to regain Brécey.10
advance. T h e 2d SS Panzer Division On the debit side of the ledger, the
(reinforced by the 17th SS Panzer Grena- assembly of the counterattack forces had
dim, a division reduced by combat to been made in great haste, at night, and
regimental strength) was to attack on with great difficulty. Units had as-
both sides of Mortain; it was to be eche- sembled while in almost constant con-
loned to the left to cover the open south tact with Allied forces. In some in-
flank. Following the first echelon stances, they had been compelled to fight
closely, the 1st SS Panzer Division (less their way to assembly points while in
an armored infantry regiment and a danger of being encircled. There was
tank battalion, which remained with the no distinct boundary between moving
Fifth Panzer A r m y ) was to exploit initial into position and jumping off in attack.
success and capture Avranches. T h e Many units had already taken heavy
reconnaissance battalion of Panzer Lehr losses before the attack started. I n con-
was to patrol the deep south flank. T h e trast with the usual daily personnel losses
LXXXI Corps was to block a possible that averaged about 3 percent of those
American thrust toward Alençon. units in contact, German casualty re-
T h e situation on the evening of 6 Au- ports for 6 August inexplicably attained
gust was judged favorable. With regard heights of 30 and 40 percent. T h e
to weather, a vital factor, forecasters had meaning of the casualty figures was ob-
predicted fog for the following morning, scure to the Germans, for although it
a desirable condition for the attack. If indicated the urgent necessity of getting
the fog cleared later in the day, the Luft- the counterattack under way before at-
waffe was prepared to furnish aerial sup- trition sapped the strength of their
port in strength. T h e commander of forces in Normandy, the fact that the
the fighter plane contingent in the west 353d Division (kampfgruppe size) and
had visited the Seventh Army command 363d Division had together knocked out
post on 6 August to inform the ground 28 American tanks on 6 August indi-
troops that three hundred operational cated that the German units, though
planes in France had been gathered to
provide cover for the counterattack the
next day. Ground opposition seemed 10See MS # C–017 (Speidel)
462 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
severely reduced, were still combat ef- that the commander of the 116th had
fective. 11 failed to comply with orders. He re-
At H Hour-2200, 6 August–Hausser quested that Schwerin be relieved.
received a phone call from Funck, the Hausser was inclined to agree with
X L V I I Panzer Corps commander, who Funck that the news of both incidents
wanted the attack postponed. Two fac- was serious, but he was unwilling to
tors, Funck felt, made this necessary. postpone the attack. Hausser’s only
First, the advance eIements of the rst SS concession was to delay the jump-off
Panzer Division (the exploiting force) until midnight to give the rst SS Panzer
were only beginning to reach Tinche- Division two more hours to come for-
bray, even though the division com- ward. He did nothing about Schwe-
mander had promised to be ready to rin. 12
cross the line of departure in strength T h e attack started shortly after mid-
a good six miles farther west around night without an artillery preparation.
2 3 0 0 . Obviously, the division would T h e 2d SS Panzer Division on the left
not be able to reach its assigned position attacked in two columns, overran Mor-
in time. Nor would it be able to detach tain from both sides and captured the
an armored battalion in time to rein- town, then advanced toward high ground
force the 2d Panzer Division as planned. west of Mortain and to the southwest
T h e reasons for the delay in arrival were toward St. Hilaire. There was no signif-
several: the 89th Division had been slow icant American opposition, and by noon
in relieving the rst SS on the Fifth Pan- of 7 August 2d SS Panzer troops held
zer Army front; traffic congestion and blocking positions about half way be-
Allied air attacks had harassed the ap- tween Mortain and St. Hilaire, thereby
proach march; and finally, a piece of protecting the southern flank of the
pure bad luck, the panzer battalion attack. A thrust to St. Hilaire and a
hurrying toward the 2d Panzer Division direct threat to Avranches from the
had been moving through a defile in southeast seemed simple except for the
close formation when a crashing Allied 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry, ensconced
fighter-bomber fell on the lead tank, and encircled on Hill 3 1 7 immediately
blocked the entire battalion, and forced east of Mortain. This contingent, with
the tanks to back up and turn around unexcelled observation of the 2d SS Pan-
in constricted space. zer zone south and west of Mortain,
T h e second factor that Funck brought called for artillery fire on the division
to Hausser’s attention was the attitude and thus pinned the troops down, pre-
of the commander of the 116th Panzer venting further advance.13
Division, Generalleutnant Gerhard Graf T h e 2d Panzer Division, making the
von Schwerin, who had not dispatched
12Telecons, Wisch and Gersdorff, 1630, 6 Aug.
the tank battalionhe was supposed to and Funck and Hausser, 2200, 6 Aug, Seventh
furnish the 2d Panzer Division. This Army Tel Msgs; MS # B–017 (Voigtsberger); MS
was not the first time, Funck explained, # A–918 (Gersdorff).
13 Telecon, Gersdorff and Speidel, 1515, 7 Aug,
and Gersdorff Telecon, 1200, 7 Aug, AGP B KTB;
11Telecon, Gersdorff and Lt Col Guenther von MS # P–159 (Sueckler) ; see Jules and Gilles Buis-
Kluge, 2100, 6 Aug, Seventh Army Tel Msgs. son, Mortain et sa Bataille, pp. 74ff.
T H E MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK 463
main effort in the center, got only half attacked on exceedingly narrow fronts,
of its troops off during the early hours of their spearhead wedges in unfavorable
7 August, the column on the right mov- positions at le Mesnil-Adelée and east
ing along the south bank of the Sée. of Juvigny were especially vulnerable to
Despite the failure of a tank battalion of counterattack. American artillery and
the 116th Panzer Division to appear for antitank pieces located north and south
attachment, the armored column moved of the Sée River struck the points of the
off, achieved surprise, and rolled through German columns and kept the units im-
le Mesnil-Tôve to le Mesnil-Adelée. mobile for the rest of the day.14
There, some elements turned north to T h e north flank along the Sée was
protect the flank against a possible open, and it gave the German command
thrust from Chérencé, while the main particular cause for concern because the
body continued west toward the Brécey- 116th Panzer Division had failed to at-
St. Hilaire road. Shortly after daybreak, tack. Schwerin had been threatened
7 August, just west of le Mesnil-Adelée with encirclement by American attacks
and three miles short of the initial objec- toward Gathemo and Chérencé, and he
tive, the column encountered resistance had simply withheld the attack order
that forced a halt. from his subordinates. He had no con-
T h e left column of the 2d Panzer Divi- fidence in the ability of the 84th Di-
sion delayed attacking until dawn of 7 vision, which was relieving him, to hold
August, when the panzer battalion of the against the American pressure, and con-
rst SS finally joined and completed the sequently felt that he could neither de-
assault formation. T h e column then tach a tank battalion to the 2d Panzer Di-
advanced easily through Bellefontaine. vision nor launch the attack toward Av-
Strong antitank fire at St. Barthélemy ranches. Also, Schwerin had apparently
made an organized effort necessary in lost hope for victory. Involved in the
order to reduce the opposition. T h e conspiracy of July 20th, he was one of
advance then continued almost to the field commanders who were to have
Juvigny before being stopped. negotiated with the Allies for an armi-
With the 2d Panzer Division bogged stice. No matter whether tactical or
down short of the initial objective, Funck political factors were more important to
committed the rst SS Panzer Division Schwerin, his failure to participate in
through the 2d Panzer units in mid- the Avranches counterattack was a fla-
morning, hoping thereby at least to gain grant case of disobedience. At 1600, 7
Juvigny. T h e restricted road net, August, Hausser and Funck relieved him
limited maneuver room, and American of command and replaced him with
resistance on the ground and in the air Funck’s chief of staff, Col. Walter Rein-
balked further progress. With tank hard. Thirty minutes later the division
losses skyrocketing, Funck halted the
attack around noon and instructed the
troops to dig in. 14Telecons, Ziegelmann and Lt Col Guenther
Because both columns of the 2d Pan- von Kluge, 0430, 7 Aug, Gersdorff Telecon, 0915, 7
Aug, and Gersdorff and Speidel, 1515, 7 Aug, A G p
zer Division and the reinforcing column B K T B ; MS # A-904 (Luettwitz); MS # A-918
of the rst SS Panzer Division had (Gersdorff)
464 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
finally jumped off. T h e troops made commitment of the rst SS Panzer Di-
no progress.15 vision north of Mortain rather than
Instead of a well-massed, co-ordinated southwest toward St. Hilaire, where
effort, only three of the six assault col- American opposition had been absent.
umns-the 2d SS Panzer Division and It also seemed to him that the attack had
one column of the 2d Panzer Division- been launched prematurely, hastily, and
had jumped off on time. T h e attack carelessly. If Kluge had waited until
had achieved surprise, and the armored the 9th SS, 10th SS, and 9th Panzer Di-
troops had rolled forward about six visions had been assembled for a truly
miles. When the day dawned clear, massive effort, Hitler felt, the attack
without the anticipated fog, the ground more than likely would have brought
troops, who were experienced in Nor- better results. Deciding that he could
mandy and knew what to expect from no longer entirely rely upon Kluge, he
Allied air superiority, began to dig in. took a more direct role in the operations.
At that moment the advance came to a Still under the impression that the
halt, and the commitment of the 1st SS situation offered him a unique oppor-
Panzer Division availed nothing. Heavy tunity for disrupting the Allied break-
American artillery fires indicated that out and eventually destroying the Allied
surprise was already gone. When Allied beachhead, Hitler determined to con-
planes came out in force to bomb and tinue the attack to Avranches. “I com-
strafe the armored columns, the troops mand the attack be prosecuted daringly
were already under cover, their vehicles and recklessly to the sea,” he wrote that
under camouflage, but British Hurri- afternoon. He ordered that, “regard-
canes and Typhoons firing rockets never- less of the risk,” the II SS Panzer Corps
theless struck awe into the German for- (with the 9th SS and the 10th SS Panzer
mations. As for the mighty German air Divisions and either the 12th SS or 21st
effort promised, the fighter planes that Panzer Division) be withdrawn from the
got off the ground near Paris did not get Fifth Panzer Army line and committed
much beyond their airfields. Allied in the Avranches sector “to bring about
squadrons engaged them at once, and the collapse of the Normandy front by
not a single German plane reached Mor- a thrust into the deep flank and rear of
tain that day.16 the enemy facing Seventh Army.” T o
By late afternoon, 7 August, it ap- consummate what to him had become
peared to Hitler that Kluge had dis- the master stroke of the western cam-
played poor judgment in allowing the paign, “Greatest daring, determination,
15Telecons, Funck and Hausser, 2200, 6 Aug,
imagination must give wings to all eche-
Gersdorff and Reinhard, 1800, 7 Aug, Gersdorff lons of command. Each and every man
and Hausser, 1540, 7 Aug, Gersdorff and Speidel, must believe in victory. Cleaning up
1940, 7 Aug, Seventh Army T e l Msgs; Gersdorff
and Speidel, 1515, 7 Aug, Kluge and Hausser, 2150,
in rear areas and in Brittany can wait
7 Aug, A G p B K T B ; MS # B–017 (Voigtsberger); until later.” 17
E T H I N T 17 (interview with Schwerin); MS # C-
017 (Speidel); MS # B–721 (Speidel) . 17 Quoted in Msg, A G p B to ‘Fifth Pz A , 7 Aug,
16Telecon, Blumentritt and Gersdorff, 1940, 7 Fifth Pz A K T B , Anlage 275; Der Westen
Aug, Seventh Army Tel Msgs; MS # P–169 (Stueck- (Schramm) , p. 83; O B WEST KTB, 7 Aug, and
ler) ; see Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 208, n. 48. Anlage 1176; see also MS # A–918 (Gersdorff) .
T H E MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK 465
Kluge had already concluded that the Transmitting Hitler’s order to Haus-
attack had failed. His judgment was as ser, Kluge informed him that the 10th
much influenced by developments on SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were to
the northern and southern flanks of the arrive in the Seventh Army sector on 8
Seventh Army as by the progress of the August and be committed soon after-
attack itself. American pressure had wards toward Avranches under the
not ceased, and renewed threats from the LVIII Panzer Corps headquarters, which
north at Gathemo and from the south had recently come up from southern
at Barenton posed unpleasant thoughts France. As soon as the corps assembled
that the Seventh Army spearheads di- its two SS panzer divisions, the Seventh
rected toward Avranches might be en- Army would continue the attack with-
circled and destroyed. T h e wiser course out regard to the northern and southern
of action, he began to think, might be flanks. Until the new attack was ready,
to withdraw.18 the positions reached by the forward
A call from Eberbach on the after- elements were to be held. T h e last re-
noon of 7 August added to Kluge’s con- maining elements of the 1st SS Panzer
cern. It also reinforced his feeling that Division (including twenty-five assault
withdrawal from Mortain might be in guns), which had become available for
order. Eberbach was troubled by the use that evening, moved into a line that
weakness of his thinned-out defense- had suddenly, if only temporarily,
lines covering the approaches to Fa- changed from offense to defense.
laise—and asked for reinforcement. Hausser, too, admitted failure on 7
Kluge diverted the incoming 331st Di- August. He ascribed the causes to the
vision toward the Fifth Panzer Army Allied air superiority, the immobility
front and was considering sending units of the 116th Panzer Division, and a
from the Seventh Army when Hitler’s stronger than expected American re-
order arrived to announce that the effort sistance. Although additional striking
toward Avranches was to continue. forces augmented the chances of regain-
Kluge virtually apologized when he ing Avranches, continuing threats to the
phoned Eberbach to tell him that Eber- army’s flanks increased the chances of
bach not only would get no additional disaster. But since Hitler felt that the
strength but would lose two panzer di- outcome of the war depended on an-
visions at once and a third armored di- other attack toward Avranches, there
vision eventually. “I foresee that the was no choice.20
failure of this [continued] attack [to
Avranches],” he told Eberbach, “can T h e American Reaction
lead to collapse of the entire Normandy
front, but the order [from Hitler] is so T o the Americans who felt the force
unequivocal that it must be obeyed.” 19 of the counterattack toward Avranches,
there was little impression that the Ger-
18 See, for example, Telecon, Kluge and Kuntzen, mans had been clumsy in launching
0730, 7 Aug, LXXXI KTB.
19Telecon, Kluge and Eberbach, 2140, 7 Aug,
Fifth Panzer Army K T B ; AGp B Forward CP Tel 20Seventh Army Tel Jnl, entry 2200, 7 Aug; see
Log (entry 2000, 7 Aug) , AGp B K T B . OB W E S T K T B , 7 Aug, and Anlage 1184.
466 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
their effort. Accompanied by surprise, Collins, who like the entire Allied com-
the attack raised the specter of catas- mand at the time was thinking in terms
trophe. Loss of Mortain was a serious of the offensive, expected to move the
blow. corps beyond Mortain in short order.
A town of 1,600 inhabitants, Mortain While the 4th Division remained in
is at the foot of a rocky hill rising just corps reserve near St. Pois, the 9th Di-
to the east—Hill 317. T h e hill is the vision was to attack through Gathemo
southern spur of wooded highland, con- and Sourdeval, and the 30th Division
vulsed and broken terrrain around Sour- was to push east toward Barenton and
deval called by tourist bureaus “la Domfront. There was no intimation
Suisse normande” (Norman Switzer- that a German counterattack would up-
land). Near the juncture of the ancient set these plans.22
provinces of Normandy, Brittany, and Questions had been raised a week
Maine, Hill 317 provides a magnificent earlier–“Will the enemy counterattack
view of the flat tableland to the south against the VII Corps south of the Sée
and west–the Sélune River plain, which River? . . . Will the enemy counter-
is crossed by ribbons of road and stream. attack against the left flank of the Corps?
Domfront, fifteen miles eastward, and . . . Where and in what strength will
the bay of Mont St. Michel, twenty miles the VII Corps encounter organized re-
to the west, are visible on clear days. sistance?’’ But the answers were as anti-
After the 1st Division had entered Mor- climactic as they appeared obvious.
tain without difficulty on 3 August, the T h e corps G–2 estimated 5,400 combat
VII Corps commander, General Collins, effectives in opposition; a parachute di-
inspected the positions and pointed to vision and an infantry division, each
the high ground east of Mortain. with 1,000 combat effectives, were the
“Ralph,” he told the 1st Division com- strongest units he believed to be on the
mander, “be sure to get Hill 317.” corps front.23 T h e Germans could
“Joe,” General Huebner replied, “I al- hardly offer serious resistance. T h e
ready have it.” 21 stubborn opposition in the Villedieu-les-
On 6 August the 30th Division oc- Poëles and Gathemo sectors during the
cupied Mortain to free the 1st Division first days of August was apparently
and its attached CCA of the 3d Armored nothing more than rear-guard action
Division for displacement south to Ma- covering a general withdrawal.
yenne and exploitation east toward T h e 30th Division, because of traffic
Alençon. Although the 1st Division snarls, did not reach Mortain until six
was then rather far from VII Corps or seven hours after the planned time,
supply dumps (too long a run, General and General Hobbs took responsibility
Collins thought, for effective supply), for the sector at 2000, 6 August, four
hours before the German counterattack
21Collins’ Talk at the Armored School, 19 Jan started. His primary mission was to de-
48. The last German in Mortain trying to escape
was killed by a French policeman armed with a 22V I I Corps Notes for CofS, 6 Aug, Opns Memo
nineteenth century rifle and one bullet. Jules and 59, 7 Aug (confirming oral orders, 6 Aug), and
Gilles Buisson, “Les Combats de Mortain,” in Her- G–2 Summary, 1800, 6 Aug.
val, Bataille d e Normandie. I . 229. 23VII Corps FO 7, 1 Aug, and Incl 3.
T H E MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK 467
fend the front from St. Barthélemy VII Corps disseminated a warning that
through Mortain to Barenton. Since the Germans might counterattack near
the first two villages were in American Mortain within the next twelve hours.
hands, he set out to take the third. Be- Pilots had seen concentrations of Ger-
cause a small task force (attached tanks man armor north and east of Sourdeval,
from CCA of the 3d Armored Division) forces thought to belong to the 1st SS,
of the 1st Division was to have taken 2d, and 116th Panzer Divisions. If
Barenton that evening, Hobbs sent an these units made a westward thrust to
infantry battalion (less one company Avranches, they would cut the communi-
but augmented by a company of medium cations of those American forces operat-
tanks and a reconnaissance platoon) to ing south of the Sélune River. Until
relieve the armor at Barenton. Soon the threat either developed or vanished,
after this force departed Mortain, enemy the 30th Division was to postpone send-
aircraft strafed the column, destroyed ing a regiment to Domfront; Hobbs was
several trucks, caused twenty-five casual- to move a battalion south of the Sélune
ties, and delayed the advance for an to protect communications with the 1st
hour. Being attacked by German Division; he was also to reinforce his
planes was a rather rare occurrence, but troops on Hill 317 east of Mortain.26
it did not necessarily signal portentous This, too, came too late.
events; the column continued. When Activity on 7 August opened in the
the men of the 30th Division made con- 1st Division zone near Mayenne during
tact with CCA near Barenton, they the early minutes of the day. Recon-
learned that the armored troops had naissance troops of the 9th Panzer Di-
held the village but briefly before being vision launched an attack that seemed
expelled. Joining forces, the two units for a few hours as though it might de-
prepared to attack Barenton on the velop into something serious. Though
following morning, the 7th.24 Americans later connected this with
General Hobbs was also to attack to- the Mortain counterattack, the action
ward Domfront, and he planned to send around Mayenne was local in nature and
a reinforced infantry regiment there on unrelated, except perhaps most tenu-
7 August. His G–2 also raised ques- ously, to the major effort around Mor-
tions: Would the Germans defend high tain.
ground north of Barenton, high ground The German forces attacking at Mor-
east and north of Domfront, or the road tain entered the 1st Division sector
to Domfront? Would the Germans southeast of Barenton four and a half
counterattack between Chérencé-le-Rous- hours afterwards, about 0430, when six
sel and Mortain? 25 The questions came tanks and supporting infantry of the 2d
somewhat late. SS Panzer Division broke through a
Around midnight of 6 August, the screen maintained by the 4th Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron attached to
2430th Div G–3 Per Rpt 54, 0200, 7 Aug; see
Hewitt, Story of 30th Division, pp. 56–57; Sylvan
Diary, 6 Aug. 26Telecon, Collins with Huebner and Hobbs,
2530th Div FO 2, 0030, 7 Aug, and Intel Sum- 0038, 7 Aug; see VII Corps AAR, Aug; Hewitt,
mary, 0400, 7 Aug. Story of 30th Division, p. 54.
468 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
of the division, the regiment was attack- field trains and ammunition dumps
ing northeastward from Chérencé to nearby had been overrun and set afire.
make contact with the 47th and 60th The regimental commander had taken
Regiments pushing southeastward in the his first action at 0250, 7 August, when
Gathemo area. At midnight, 6 August, he instructed one of the infantry bat-
the Germans still held the intervening talions to switch its antitank defenses
ground about Perriers-en-Beauficel. toward the south to protect the rear.
Shortly after midnight a forward ob- Thirty minutes later he directed his re-
server of the 26th Field Artillery Bat- serve (an infantry company and several
talion, which was supporting the 39th tank destroyers) to attack south from
Infantry, heard tanks moving westward Chérencé to le Mesnil-Tôve in order
along the road between St. Barthélemy to cut behind the German spearhead.
and Chérencé. T h e tank motors did When the attack made no headway out
not sound like Shermans. After estab- of Chérencé, it became apparent that the
lishing the fact that no American tanks Germans had cut directly across the regi-
were operating there, the artillery bat- mental axis of communication. All
talion, upon data furnished by the ob- three infantry battalions were north of
server, began to fire at a range of five the German penetration. T h e regi-
thousand yards but soon reduced it to mental command post, the cannon com-
only a thousand. By 0150, 7 August, pany (less one platoon), the antitank
not only the artillery battalion but also company (less two gun platoons), and
the infantry regiment was sure that a the firing batteries of the 26th Field
German armored column was moving Artillery Battalion were south of the
west toward le Mesnil-Tôve. German column.28
A platoon of the regimental cannon T h e German attack struck the 30th
company in le Mesnil-Tôve concluded Division more directly. T h e 2d SS Pan-
that the Germans were already too close zer Division surged through Mortain,
for effective defense. Dismantling their knocked out roadblocks manned by Col.
guns and disabling their vehicles, the Hammond D. Birks’s 120th Infantry
troops abandoned the village and re- north and south of the village, overran
joined the infantry. So that German the 2d Battalion command post in Mor-
activity might be reported accurately, tain and drove the staff into hiding, and
the platoon leader stayed behind. After isolated the rifle battalion on Hill 317.
verifying the fact that at least twenty T h e battalion, reinforced by a company
enemy tracked vehicles were moving of the 3d Battalion, had split a rifle com-
westward, he reported thirty-five more pany three ways to establish two road-
vehicles in the vicinity, including per- blocks north of Mortain and one south
sonnel carriers from which infantrymen of the village. One roadblock north of
were unloading. At the same time, Mortain, augmented by a few antitank
word came from the regimental switch- guns, remained in action and accounted
board at le Mesnil-Tôve that the village for over forty enemy vehicles and tanks
was under machine gun fire, that all 28 39th Inf and 9th Div AAR’s, Aug; Hewitt,
American troops had departed, and that Story of 30th Division, p. 57.
470 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
during the next few days. Two road- sector, penetrated four miles behind the
blocks were destroyed at once, the sur- 30th Division front, threatened to drive
vivors making their way to the sur- uncontested to Avranches, and might
rounded hilltop to join the three rifle attain St. Hilaire and Ducey without
companies, the heavy weapons company, interference. Unperturbed an hour
and the several antitank pieces that oc- and a half later, he promised that the
cupied the most important terrain in penetration would be cleaned up at the
the Mortain sector. first light of day. Passing these reports
Near St. Barthélemy, the Germans to the First Army, a staff officer at the
overran two companies of Lt. Col. Wal- VII Corps headquarters added that the
ter M. Johnson’s 117th Infantry, sur- penetrations appeared to have been
rounded a battalion headquarters, and made by “uncoordinated units attempt-
threatened the regimental command ing to escape rather than aggressive
post four hundred yards away. A pa- action.” Everyone on the lower eche-
trol checking the outpost defenses of the lons, it appeared, was confident that the
regimental headquarters had suddenly attacks “would be rapidly taken care
been confronted by about fifty Germans. of.” T h e army headquarters was under
T. Sgt. Harold V. Sterling engaged the the impression that the disturbance was
enemy while four companions maneu- a local infantry counterattack that was
vered to safety. Then all five men con- repulsed without difficulty. Not until
ducted a fire fight for one hour until the coming of dawn was it obvious that
reinforcement arrived and the German the German effort was serious, “heavier
group withdrew. In the belief that than was first thought, but . . . under
moving the regimental headquarters control.” 30
might have an adverse effect on morale, At daybreak on 7 August, Generals
Colonel Johnson stayed to direct the Hodges and Collins were highly con-
battle in his sector, although he was scious of the fact that the German coun-
virtually encircled.29 terattack at the least threatened the VII
Despite these initial blows, the 30th Corps, at the most menaced the entire
Division made no report to higher head- bridgehead south of the Sélune. If the
quarters of the counterattack until 0315, German forces north of Mortain thrust
7 August, when German tanks were al- northward across the Sée River, they
ready in possession of Mortain and had might run riot through the corps rear
reached a point four miles west of St. area, destroying supply installations and
Barthélemy near le Mesnil-Tôve. Still nullifying in great part the exploitation
the division G–3 was “not yet greatly of 31
COBRA.
concerned,” even though he admitted Fortunately the 4th Division, in corps
that the Germans had cut behind the reserve and anticipating several days of
39th Infantry in the Chérencé—Gathemo rest and recreation, had reacted in a
positive manner during the early morn-
29CI 96 (30th Div, 6-12 Aug) . Sergeant Sterling
received the DSC, as did Pfc. Clifford W. Buzzard 3030th Div Msgs, VII Corps G–3 Jnl and File;
and Pvt. Frank D. Joseph, Jr., who destroyed two Telecons, 0400, 0520, and 0700, 7 Aug, FUSA G–2
enemy tanks with a bazooka and two rounds of Jnl and File; Sylvan Diary, 6 Aug.
ammunition. 31 VII Corps AAR, Aug.
T H E MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK 47 1
ing hours. T h e 4th Division Artillery forced Hobbs to commit CCB in that
was placing a large volume of fire on area.
German movements south of the Sée, By chance, an extra unit seemed to
and General Barton had assembled his materialize out of thin air. T h e 2d
troops for immediate commitment. By Armored Division (less CCA, which re-
0530 Barton was able to assure the corps mained near Vire) had departed the
commander that the Germans did not XIX Corps sector shortly after midnight,
seem to be trying to go north of the Sée 6 August, leaving St. Sever-Calvados and
and that if they did, the 4th Division moving to Villedieu-les-Poëles, then
was ready.32 south through St. Pois toward Chérencé-
Though reassured about the situation le-Roussel and Mayenne with the inten-
along the Sée River, General Collins was tion of supporting or accompanying the
far from satisfied with the southern por- 1st Division in an advance toward Alen
tion of the corps zone, that part along çon. As the leading units of the ar-
the Sélune River. There was little to mored column approached Chérencé on
arrest German movement between St. the morning of 7 August, they began to
Hilaire and Barenton, and the enemy receive artillery fire from across the Sée.
was already established in that area. T h e column stopped, but not for long,
Only two men of the 120th Infantry In- for General Collins seized upon the
telligence and Reconnaissance Platoon troops to plug the hole on the corps
had returned from an ambush near Ro- right. 34 Meanwhile, the armor had pro-
magny, just southwest of Mortain. If vided temporary stability for the 39th
Collins recalled the 1st Division from Infantry of the 9th Division at the Sée
Mayenne to close the St. Hilaire gap, he River.
would create a similar opening at Ma- Backtracking from Chérencé, the ar-
yenne. In quest of additional forces to mored column moved west several miles
plug the hole, which was inviting the to get out of range of the enemy shell-
Germans to drive to Ducey and wrest ing, crossed the Sée, marched to St. Hi-
the vital Pontaubault bridgehead from laire, and that night took positions near
American control, he called upon CCB Barenton. So that “one man would be
of the 3d Armored Division (relieved in command of everything at Barenton,”
the previous afternoon from attachment General Brooks, the 2d Armored Di-
to the 4th Division and assembled south vision commander, assumed control over
of the Sée River in the 30th Division the troops of the 30th Division and of
rear). He attached the combat com- the 3d Armored Division’s CCA, which
mand to the 30th Division and told Gen- had unsuccessfully tried to secure the
eral Hobbs “to handle the situation S W village that day.35
of Mortain with it.” 33 T h e more im- Because the 2d Armored Division
mediate necessity of meeting the German could not alone close the gap, General
main effort north of Mortain and along
the south bank of the Sée, however, 34Msg, Collins to Hobbs, 0042, 7 Aug, 30th Div
G–3 Jnl and File; FUSA Sitrep 125, 7 Aug.
324th Div AAR, Aug. 35Telecons, Collins and Hobbs, 1720, 7 Aug,
33Telecon, Collins and Hobbs, 0755, 7 Aug, 30th Collins and Brooks, 2125, 7 Aug, 30th Div G–3 Jnl
Div G–3 Jnl and File. and File.
472 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Bradley gave General Collins the 35th but were less suitable for defense.
Division, recently released from the V Large-scale maps showing the terrain in
Corps to join the XX Corps of the Third detail did not become generally avail-
Army in the Fougères–Vitré area. able until several days later, and for the
While still under XX Corps control and most part the lower echelons used
with some understandable confusion of crumpled maps that 1st Division men
orders and plans, the 35th Division, hav- had pulled out of their pockets and off
ing planned to attack south with the their map boards and passed along be-
Third Army, advanced that evening fore departing. T h e 30th took over the
northeast toward St. Hilaire with the telephone wire nets left in place and
eventual objective the Mortain–Baren- found it so difficult to repair breaks in
ton road south of Hill 317. 36 the unfamiliar system that the division
Thus, less than twenty-four hours eventually laid its own wire. Although
after the Germans attacked, the VII the defensive positions could have been
Corps had a strength of seven divisions- better, the main drawback was that the
five infantry and two armored (less one division had not had sufficient time to
combat command).37 Still another was become properly oriented. Nor was the
alerted for possible shift from the Third division at full strength in meeting the
Army should the Germans effect a more counterattack. Nearly eight hundred
serious penetration. replacements, which had joined only a
Meanwhile, the 30th Division was few days before, were hardly assimilated.
battling desperately at some disadvan- Two of the nine infantry battalions were
tage. Before coming to Mortain, the absent: one had been dispatched to Bar-
30th was to have become part of the V enton on the evening of 6 August, the
Corps, and plans and reconnaissance other had been attached to the 2d Ar-
had been made toward that end. When mored Division near Vire. T h e men of
the division was abruptly shifted into the remaining seven battalions were
the VII Corps sector, there was no time tired after their march from Tessy to
for real reconnaissance. With little Mortain on 6 August and soon reached
knowledge of where neighboring units a condition “of extreme battle weari-
were located and practically no informa- ness.’’ 38
tion on enemy dispositions, the 30th General Hobbs at first tended to mini-
hastily took over the positions held by mize the importance of what seemed to
the 1st Division. Shallow foxholes and him to be only a German demonstration.
field artillery emplacements far forward He was concerned somewhat about a
in offensive formation were adequate to possible breakthrough southwest of Mor-
accommodate a unit pausing temporarily tain to St. Hilaire, but the corps com-
mander, who was making arrangements
3635th Div AAR, Aug, and FO 13, 2000 7 Aug to block the gap there, directed Hobbs
(issued verbally 1845, 7 Aug) ; Notes for General
Hobbs, 1249, 7 Aug, and Telecon, Collins and to the more immediate problem in the
Hobbs, 1550, 7 Aug, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File. Juvigny area. Collins ordered Hobbs to
37The 35th Division remained officially under
XX Corps control until midnight, 8 August, but 38 Telecon, Hobbs, Stephens, and Col Robert G .
tactically its action was an integral part of the McKee, 1805, 9 Aug; Hewitt, Story of 30th Division,
VII Corps operation. pp. 54-55; Ruppentbal Notes, ML–2185.
T H E MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK 473
furnish four medium tanks to protect of Mortain toward St. Hilaire, and re-
the corps wire teams so that telephone capturing Mortain to re-establish contact
lines could remain operative and the with the isolated and surrounded bat-
corps be kept informed of developments talion. Against the penetration north
as they occurred. He instructed Hobbs and northwest of Mortain, Hobbs
to report hourly on the situation at ordered Col. Truman E. Boudinot’s CCB
Juvigny, by radio if other communica- of the 3d Armored Division (attached
tions were not functioning. to the 30th Division) and Col. Edwin M.
Apparently feeling that Hobbs did not Sutherland’s 119Infantry to drive north-
fully appreciate the implications of the east and northwest from Reffuveille and
attack, Collins told him to take the coun- Juvigny, respectively, toward le Mesnil-
terattack seriously. Hobbs protested Adelée. He instructed the 117th Infan-
that he already had committed all his try to take St. Barthélemy then drive
infantry and engineers and was without northwest to le Mesnil-Tôve. T h e two
a reserve, surely indication enough that infantry regiments and the combat com-
he was serious. Yet when Collins at- mand, working closely together, estab-
tached a regiment of the 4th Division to lished a cohesive front on 7 August and
the 30th, Hobbs said he didn’t think he commenced attacking generally north
needed it, everything was going fine. toward the Sée River. T o close off the
Surprised, Collins decided to “play it opening that led to St. Hilaire, Hobbs
safe” and give Hobbs the regiment “any- could do little except hope that the 35th
way” as an immediate reserve.39 Division would arrive quickly. T h e
By noon of 7 August, intelligence of- 120th Infantry launched repeated com-
ficers estimated that the German forces pany attacks in efforts to regain Romagny
behind American lines consisted of five and cut the roads leading southwest, but
battalions of infantry, four of artillery, the Germans were unwilling to relin-
and two or three of tanks. There quish their positions. Until the 35th
seemed no question but that the Ger- Division exerted additional force and
mans had “launched a major counter- drove the Germans from the southwest-
attack to separate First and Third ern outskirts of Mortain, the isolated
Armies.” 40 Stopping the attack de- battalion on Hill 317 would remain en-
pended substantially on the 30th Divi- circled.
sion. Meanwhile, the battle raged in the
Hobbs had three main problems: 30th Division sector. T h e most serious
cutting off the penetration northwest of factor was the disorganization and isola-
Mortain, blocking the thrust southwest tion of small units. Communication
throughout the division zone was pre-
39Telecons and Msgs, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File, carious: wires were cut or shot out, and
7 Aug, in particular Hobbs and Lewis, 0900, infiltrating German troops and enemy
Collins, and Hobbs, 1140, 1150, 1550, 1600; 105th
Engr C Bn S–3 Rpt, 7 Aug; VII Corps Msg (signed
raiding parties menaced messengers and
Lt Col Bergin V. Dickey), 7 Aug, VII Corps G–3 command posts. T h e 823d Tank De-
Jnl and File. stroyer Battalion destroyed 14 enemy
4 0 FUSA G–2 Per Rpt 59, 8 Aug; Collins to
Huebner, 1745, 7 Aug, VII Corps G–3 Jnl and
tanks, 2 trucks, a half-track, 3 full-tracked
File. vehicles, 2 motorcycles, a staff car, and a
474 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
machine gun position before being over- end of the day was generally the same as
run by enemy infantry and losing 13 on 6 August. A few miles to the north-
wounded, 3 killed, 91 missing, and 11 of east, the other two regiments of the 9th
its 3-inch guns and prime movers. Division failed to make contact with the
“There were many heroes today,” the 39th, but they gained excellent hilltop
battalion commander reported, “both positions to assure the integrity of the
living and dead.” One battalion of the corps left. That evening General Col-
117th Infantry lost 350 men on 7 August, lins attached the 39th Infantry to the 4th
and enemy infiltrators were behind the Division, which was in contact with the
regimental lines “at several different regiment and able to support it.42
points.” But at the end of the day, even American artillery had responded to
though the troops were “very fatigued, the attack with liberal expenditures of
supply problems not solved, defensive ammunition, operating on the premise
sector penetrated,” the regimental com- that it was better to waste shells than
mander could state: “however key ter- miss a possible target. T h e weather was
rain feature still held.” 41 T h e 30th Di- excellent throughout the day, and in ad-
vision lost more than 600 men and much dition to the artillery observation planes
equipment on 7 August, but after the that pinpointed targets, fighter-bombers
initial shock of the counterattack, the roamed the area at will, destroying
troops held firm. enemy matériel and morale. T e n squad-
T h e situation was similar throughout rons of Typhoons of the RAF 2d Tactical
the corps zone. T h e 4th Division re- Air Force operating from airfields in
acted effectively with artillery fire, de- France flew 294 sorties in the Mortain
stroying during the afternoon of 7 Au- area. Of seventy enemy tanks estimated
gust a German column that tried to move to have made the original penetration,
across its front. T h e division, besides only thirty were judged to be in opera-
releasing a regiment for attachment to tion at the close of the day. On the
the 30th Division, moved a second regi- morning of 8 August, the estimate was re-
ment to Chérencé in support of the 39th duced to twenty-five still remaining be-
Infantry, which had been split in two by hind American lines. Prisoners taken
the initial penetration. Despite the pre- by the corps on 7 August numbered
carious situation of the 39th Infantry, 350.43
Colonel Bond in the early afternoon of Chance had played an important role
7 August moved those elements that were in the American reaction. T h e German
south of the German thrust around and decision to make the main effort north
through the 4th Division sector to rejoin of Mortain rather than south of it was
the infantry battalions on the north bank vital. T h e 4th Division was in the right
of the Sée. T h e regimental line at the place from which to bring flanking fire
41823d TD Bn Unit Rpt, 7 Aug; 117th Inf Unit
Rpt, 7 Aug. Lt. Col. Robert E. Frankland, com- 4239th Inf, 9th Div, and 4th Div AAR’s, Aug.
mander of a battalion that destroyed more than 43
Telecon, Hobbs, and Lewis, 1715, 7 Aug, 30th
fifteen German tanks, was awarded the DSC. A Div G–3 Jnl and File; FUSA. Sitrep 127, 8 Aug;
soldier of that battalion, Pvt. Peter Preslipsky, also 39th Inf, 30th Div, VII Corps AAR’s, Aug; Leigh-
received the DSC for destroying two tanks by Mallory, “Despatch,” Fourth Supplement to the
bazooka fire. London Gazette of December 31, 1946, p. 66.
T H E MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK 475
Encirclement
Envelopment from the North road was “arrow-straight,” rising “grad-
ually, sometimes almost imperceptibly,
Twenty-four hours after the Germans but steadily,” from little more than sea
counterattacked toward Avranches, the level to more than six hundred feet in
First Canadian Army, from positions height. “Up this long, smooth, danger-
three miles south of Caen, launched a ous slope the Canadians were to fight,”
massive attack southeast toward Falaise. across acres of waving wheat broken by
T h e timing was accidental, but it could an occasional village, a patch of woods,
hardly have been more fortunate. an occasional orchard—through an area
T h e Canadian attack had been in prep- where only an infrequent hedgerow or
aration for almost a week, its object at belt of trees lined the side roads.3
the least to wear down enemy units, at T h e ground was good for employing
the most to unhinge the German with- armor, but solidly built villages and the
drawal to the Seine that General Mont- woods provided defenders excellent nat-
gomery expected.1 T h e German thrust ural centers of resistance. Three Ger-
toward Avranches, changing the situa- man divisions—the 272d and 89th Infan-
tion, widened Montgomery’s perspective try and the 12th S S Panzer— manned two
on the role of the Canadian effort. T h e defensive lines in depth. Fifty 88-mm.
Canadian attack now became his main antiaircraft pieces, sited for antitank ac-
instrument of destruction. tion, supplemented about sixty dug-in
T h e Canadians were to “break tanks and self-propelled guns.
through the German positions astride the T o overcome these strong defenses,
road Caen-Falaise,” and advance toward General Crerar decided to combine over-
Falaise, twenty-one miles southeast of whelming air support with ground pene-
Caen.2 For the first fifteen miles the tration under the cover of darkness.
1 21 AGp Operational Situation and Dir, M–516, After a strike by heavy bombers, tanks
4 Aug; see above, Ch. XXII. were to lead the attack. Infantrymen
2 British Army of the Rhine, Battlefield Tour: riding in armored personnel carriers
Operation T O T A L I Z E , 2 Canadian Corps Opera-
tions Astride the Road Caen-Falaise: 7–8 August (self-propelled gun carriages specially
1944 (Germany: Printing and Stationery Service, converted for troop transport by Lt. Gen.
Control Commission for Germany, 1947) (hereafter G. G. Simonds, the corps commander,
cited as British Army of the Rhine, Operation
T O T A L I Z E ) , p. 9. The following account, except and later called Kangaroos), were to fol-
as otherwise noted, is taken from this source, which low the tanks and detruck at appropriate
gives a detailed report of plans, preparations, points to mop up.
intelligence, and execution, and includes excellent
maps; see also Stacey, Canadian Army,. pp. 188ff.;
and Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 154ff. 3 Stacey, Canadian Army, p. 188.
480 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Despite the changing purpose of the already on the move, but orders for the
offensive, the attack itself continued re- 9th SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions were
lentlessly, grinding down the LXXIV canceled. T h e latter remained south of
Corps and making necessary its reinforce- Caen to help stop the Canadians. Units
ment by elements of the II SS Panzer of the newly arriving 85th Division, in-
Corps. British forces pushed through a stead of being assembled at Tinchebray
region not particularly suited for offense, for eventual commitment near Brécey,
an area of rough terrain devoid of good were diverted immediately to the Falaise
roads. It was a slow, hard advance, sector. T h e Panther tank battalion of
destitute of glamor and newspaper head- the 9th Panzer Division and a rocket
lines, but it was inexorable, and it in- brigade, also scheduled to participate in
creased German concern over the way the attack toward Avranches, joined the
the situation was developing.8 defenses north of Falaise.10
T h e second attack toward Avranches
T h e German Dilemma was scheduled for the evening of 9 Au-
gust but, on the basis of the Canadian
T h e aerial bombardment on the night threat, Kluge that afternoon postponed
of 7 August and the estimate that six it. Developments on the American
hundred Canadian tanks were attacking front contributed to Kluge’s decision.
toward Falaise alarmed the German com- Attacks on 8 August by the V and XIX
mand in Normandy: Corps between Vire and Sourdeval had
“We didn’t expect this to come so strained the II Parachute and LXXXIV
soon,” Kluge told Eberbach, “but I can Corps and had ripped the 363d Division
imagine that it was no surprise to you.” to such an extent that the Seventh Army
“No,” Eberbach said, “I have always was trying to accelerate the arrival of the
awaited it and looked toward the morrow 331st Division into the line. Perhaps
with a heavy heart.”9 worse, U.S. pressure had compelled the
T h e moment was particularly dark be- XLVII Panzer Corps during the night
cause Kluge, in compliance with Hitler’s of 8 August to pull back slightly the
order for a second and stronger attack 2d Panzer Division’s most advanced
toward Avranches, had started to move wedge of the counterattack forces near
three armored divisions out of the Fifth le Mesnil-Tôve and Chérencé. Even
Panzer Army sector toward the Mortain more threatening was the attack of the
area. T h e 10th SS Panzer Division was 2d Armored Division against the deep
southern flank of the 2d SS Panzer Divi-
8Second British Army Opns, 21 Jul-9 Sep 44, a sion at Barenton. Finally, the capture
chronological rcd submitted to Hist Sec USFET by of le Mans and the possibility of an
Maj. D. P. Draycott, G (Ops) Rcds, Hq BAOR, American attack northward to Alençon
2 Nov 45, and Info furnished Hist Sec USFET by
21 AGp, 9 Aug 45, ML–2251; MS # B–840
tied down the LXXXI Corps and pre-
(Eberbach) . vented the 9th Panzer Division from
9 Telecon, Kluge and Eberbach, 2100, 8 Aug,
Fifth Pz A K T B ; see also, Account by Brigadefuhrer
Kurt Meyer, Commander, 12th SS Panzer Division,
in British Army of the Rhine, Operation TO- 10OB WEST, AGp B , and Fifth Pz A K T B ’ s ,
T A L I Z E , p. 101. 8 and 9 Aug.
482 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
adding its strength to the second attempt Corps, basically the striking force, re-
to gain Avranches. 11 tained control over the 1st SS and 2d
T h e second effort was to have been Panzer Divisions, the German com-
made over the same terrain as the first, manders in Normandy felt that a re-
but this time with two corps moving newed effort might still succeed if certain
abreast: the X L V I I Panzer Corps (with conditions were met: if the positions
four armored divisions—1st SS, 2d SS, north of Falaise remained stable, if a
2d, and 116th) and the LVIII Panzer strong defense could be established north
Corps (with the 9th SS and 10th SS of Alençon to protect the ammunition
Panzer Divisions, as well as the Panther and gasoline dumps nearby, if the
tank battalion of the 9th Panzer Divi- Panther battalion and a rocket brigade
sion). T h e attacking corps were to have newly made available could be moved
been supported by two rocket brigades quickly to the Seventh Army sector, and
and reinforced later by the 12th SS if Eberbach, designated by Hitler to take
Panzer and 85th Infantry Divisions.12 command of the renewed effort toward
Continued Allied pressure and the Avranches, could have a few days in
threats to the flanks made it necessary to which to unscramble the assault forces
divert an increasing number of elements and reassemble them for the attack.13
designated for the attack to defensive Hitler, who issued a new order that
missions. T h e 116th, 2d SS, and rem- day, 9 August, was convinced that Eber-
nants of Panzer Lehr moved to the bach could achieve success if lie avoided
L X X X I V Corps to support the 363d and the mistakes of the first attack, which
353d Divisions between Vire and Sour- Hitler considered to have been launched
deval; the L V I I I Corps (with the 10th “too early, too weak, and in unfavorable
SS Panzer Division) was inserted at weather.” T o insure proper timing,
Barenton to relieve the weak 275th Divi- Hitler reserved for himself the designa-
sion (which moved to the Fifteenth tion of H Hour. Meanwhile, Eberbach
Army area for reconstitution) and pro- was to prepare to attack southwest from
tect the long 2d SS Panzer Division flank. the vicinity of Domfront, then north-
T h e emphasis turned unmistakably to west to the ultimate objective, Avran-
defense. ches. T o protect Eberbach’s left flank,
Despite postponement of the second LXXXI Corps was to follow the two as-
attempt to drive toward Avranches and sault corps echeloned to the left rear.
despite the fact that the X L V I I Panzer Recognizing that Allied pressure had to
be resisted particularly at Falaise, Hitler
11MS # B–179 (Hausser) and MS # B–725 ordered sufficient antitank weapons,
(Gersdorff) are basic sources for the following
section. For a vivid account of the movement of tanks, and assault guns, which were
the 331st Division from the Pas-de-Calais—move-
ment made difficult by Allied air attacks on rail 13 Telecons, Kluge and Jodl, 1500, g Aug, and
lines—see Leigh-Mallory, “Despatch,” Fourth Sup- Buhle and Jodl, 2210, 9 Aug, A G p B K T B ; Telecons
plement to the London Gazette of December 31, Kluge and Gersdorff, 1520, 9 Aug, and Tempelhoff,
1946, p. 63. Speidel, and Gersdorff, 1250, 9 Aug, Seventh Army
12 Seventh Army Order, Ia Nr. 640/44, 9 Aug, Tel Msgs; Seventh Army Est of the Situation,
L X X X I Corps Befehle H Gr u Armee; Speidel’s 10Aug, Msg, A G p B to O B WEST, 0200, 11 Aug,
Est of the Situation, 1000, 9 Aug, AGp B Opera- A G p B O p . Befehle, pp. 412–13; MS # B–445
tionsbefehle. (Krueger).
ENCIRCLEMENT 483
coming from the Fifteenth Army sector, Leaving command of the Fifth Panzer
diverted to the I SS Panzer Corps for a Army to Panzergeneraloberst Josef
strong stand at Falaise. Elsewhere along (Sepp) Dietrich, formerly the com-
the front, Hitler prohibited local coun- mander of the I SS Panzer Corps, Eber-
terattacks that might lead to serious bach, somewhat against his will, took
personnel losses; he also authorized with- command of Panzer Group Eberbach.
drawals to neutralize any penetrations His headquarters, formed for the express
the Allies might effect.14 purpose of making the second attack to
Although some commanders later Avranches on 1 1 August, was directly
called Hitler’s order “pure utopia” and under Army Group B . Eberbach as-
not in keeping with the situation on the sembled a skeleton staff of great ability
ground, the situation in the air, and the that included Lt. Col. Guenther von
supply situation—“the apex of conduct Kluge, the field marshal’s son, as chief
by a command [OKW] ignorant of front of staff, and Maj. Arthur von Eckesparre,
line conditions, taking upon itself the formerly Rommel’s G–4, as operations
right to judge the situation from East East officer. T h e command was nevertheless
Prussia”–the commanders facing the deficient in personnel and equipment
crisis in Normandy reorganized for a re- and could function only with the aid of
newed attempt.15 They planned to have the Seventh Army staff or a corps head-
the LXXXIV Corps pull the 116th quarters. Despite these handicaps and
Panzer Division out of the front for as- the additional one of Eberbach’s pes-
sembly; they hoped to withdraw the 84th simism, the provisional headquarters be-
Division to a shorter line east of Perriers- gan to plan the attack in detail.16
en-Beauficel; they instructed the XLVII It did not take Eberbach long to con-
Panzer Corps to withdraw the 2d Panzer clude that he could not attack on 11Au-
Division somewhat and pull out the 1st gust. He felt that he would probably
SS Panzer Division for assembly. T h e have to commit part of his attack forces
1st SS and 116th Panzer Divisions were to protect his assembly areas and thus
then to be concentrated in forward as- would not be able to assemble his troops
sembly areas under LVIII Panzer Corps by that date. Judging that only 77
to provide impetus for the new attack. Mark IV and 47 Panther tanks were
T h e Seventh Army also expected to re- available for the attack, he wanted more.
ceive the 9th Panzer Division’s Panther He also requested vehicle replacements
battalion and two mortar (werfer) bri- and additional ammunition and POL
gades to bolster the second effort. T h e supplies. All this would take time.
new attack was to be launched, as Hitler Most important, however, Eberbach be-
wished, under Eberbach’s command and lieved that because of Allied air superi-
from the Mortain–Domfront area toward ority he could attack only after dark and
St. Hilaire and eventually Avranches. in early morning when ground fog might
14Telecon, Jodl and Blumentritt, 1745, 9 Aug, provide concealment. At best, his move-
OB W E S T K T B ; Hitler Order, 2300, 9 Aug ments would be restricted to the six
(WFSt/Op. Nr. 77280/44 g.Kdos. Chefs.), quoted
in Msg from AGp B to the armies, 1130, 10 Aug, 16Msg, AGp B to OB WEST and Seventh Army,
AGp B Fuehrer Befehle. 1815, 9 Aug, AGp B K T B ; see OB WEST, a Study
15Quote is from MS # B-725 (Gersdorff) . in Command, p. 132; MS # A-922 (Eberbach) .
484 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
hours between 0400 and 1000. If his wanted clarification on why Eberbach
assault forces failed to reach their ob- could not mount his attack toward
jective during that period, the events at Avranches before 20 August. He wanted
Mortain would be repeated-his troops to know what Funck, the commander of
would be smashed by Allied air and the XLVII Panzer Corps, thought of re-
artillery. T o attack after nightfall, he suming that attack. Hitler interpreted
needed the light of the waning moon, Kluge’s suggestion as meaning an attack
not to be had until 20 August. At that to regain le Mans and asked when, with
time also, according to meteorologists, what forces, and from where such an
the weather would change and become attack could be launched. Finally, he
unfavorable for aerial activity. Thus asked when the 11th Panzer Division, if
20 August, not 11 August, in Eberbach’s he ordered it moved from southern
estimation, was the best date for launch- France, could reach the Loire River near
ing the new attack toward Avranches.17 Tours so that it could support an at-
While Eberbach was coming to his tack on le Mans-for if another attack
conclusions, a new threat developed. toward Avranches could not be mounted
Just as it appeared that the Canadian before 20 August, Hitler conceded, an
attack on the north flank was halted, the attack against the U.S. XV Corps “must
Americans on the south flank “unmis- perforce be carried out before that
takably swerved” north from le Mans time.” 19
toward Alençon. As Kluge evaluated Before he answered Hitler’s questions,
the situation on the evening of 10Au- Kluge phoned Eberbach. T h e com-
gust, if the changed direction of the XV manders were in agreement that a new
Corps drive was connected with the attempt to gain Avranches was out of
Canadian effort toward Falaise, he faced the question, at least for the moment.
the threat of double envelopment. T h e obstacles to a renewed drive toward
Furthermore, the weak forces of the Avranches were not only the strong op-
LXXXI Corps could not possibly protect position at Mortain and the unrelaxed
the army group on the southern flank. pressure elsewhere along the front but
Nor could the LXXXI Corps keep the also the uncomfortable thought that the
vital Alençon–Flers line open. Instead Canadians attacking south toward Falaise
of continuing the attack toward Av- and the Americans attacking north to-
ranches, Kluge thought it “worth con- ward Alençon seemed to be converging
sidering whether the spearheads of the on a common point. If the Allied forces
enemy columns driving north should not joined, the major part of the German
be smashed by a . . . swiftly executed forces would be encircled. T h e Cana-
panzer thrust.” He requested Jodl to dian and American spearheads had to be
get a decision on this matter from blunted immediately, and since the
Hitler. 18 Canadians were apparently stopped, ac-
Hitler replied with queries. He tion ought to be taken against the Ameri-
17Pz G p Eberbach Ltr, la Nr. 2/44 g.Kdos.,
10 Aug, OB W E S T , Anlagen, Incl to Annex 1458.
18Kluge to Jodl, 10Aug, A G p B Lagebeurteilun- 19
Telecon, Blumentritt and Speidel, 0200, 11 Aug,
gen, Wochenmeldungen. AGp B K T B .
ENCIRCLEMENT 485
cans, who threatened the vital supply be taken in that area. Kluge needed
installations around Alençon.20 more armor there. T h e only practical
Kluge informed Hitler to this effect way to get armor was to pull three di-
an hour and a half later. All com- visions out of the line—the 116th that
manders agreed, Kluge said, that the night, the 1st SS and 2d Panzer Divisions
prospect of continuing the attack to during the following night. These
Avranches was unfavorable because the units could be released only if the
enemy had reinforced, surprise had been Seventh Army salient at Mortain were
lost, and the attacking force needed time reduced by withdrawal to the east. This
to bring forward more troops, tanks, meant abandoning hope of a break-
gasoline, and ammunition, and required through to the sea at Avranches. A
certain weather conditions. There was clear-cut decision had to be made at
no possibility of fulfilling the necessary once. In Kluge’s mind, the decision
preattack requirements within a few could be only one thing: attack the XV
days. As for an attack against the XV Corps in the vicinity of Alençon with
Corps, Kluge would need at least two panzer divisions pulled out of the line
of the best panzer divisions, which he and bring additional infantry divisions
envisioned attacking from the vicinity of forward to launch an attack against the
Alençon. T h e direction of the attack XV Corps from east to west, thus stabi-
would depend on developments. He lizing the situation on the army group
hoped to make his approach march dur- left flank.22
ing the night of 1 1 August and attack on After further discussion with Jodl in
1 3 August with the hope of completing midafternoon, Kluge issued a written re-
the operation three days later. T h e port to Hitler and disseminated it to his
11th Panzer Division in southern France subordinate commands, probably as a
could not reach the area of operations in warning order subject to Hitler’s ap-
time to lend support.21 proval. In this report, Kluge projected
Kluge was again in touch with Hitler’s the following actions. T h e Seventh
headquarters at noon on 11 August. He Army was to withdraw its Mortain
had conferred with Hausser and Eber- salient that night. An attack force-
bach, and all three commanders were composed of the XLVII Panzer and
convinced that an attack on Avranches LXXXI Corps headquarters, the 1st SS,
had no prospect of success. T h e situa- 2d, and 116th Panzer Divisions, two
tion on the extreme southern flank of the werfer brigades, and possibly an addi-
army group was deteriorating so rap- tional panzer division—was to assemble
idly-the 9th Panzer Division, for ex- in the Carrouges area and prepare to at-
ample, was fighting near Alençon with tack during the early morning hours of
its back close to vital supply installa- 14 August, one day later than Kluge
tions-that immediate measures had to had originally contemplated. T h e at-
tack, with three divisions abreast, was to
20Telecon, Kluge and Eberbach, 0315, 11 Aug, be launched in a southeasterly direction
AGp B KTB; Kluge’s Est of the Situation, 10 Aug,
AGp B Lagebeurteilungen, Wochenmeldungen.
21Telecon, Kluge and Jodl, 0445, 11 Aug, AGp B 22
Telecon, Kluge and Jodl, 11 Aug, AGp B
Lagebeurteilungen, Wochenmeldungen. Lagebeurteilungen, Wochenmeldungen.
486 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
along the Lalacelle–la Hutte axis—gen- forcements and favorable weather for an-
erally a thrust starting northwest of other try at Avranches in compliance
Alençon and cutting across the le Mans- with Hitler’s wishes, Eberbach was to
Alençon road.23 make an effort to eradicate the American
Hitler’s response to Kluge’s report threat to Alençon. T o make this pos-
reached Army Group B headquarters late sible, the Seventh Army during the night
that evening. Acknowledging the new of 11 August began to withdraw eastward
set of circumstances that had come into from Mortain.25
being, Hitler, though reiterating his in-
tention to attack westward to the sea T h e Battle at Mortain
(this time by way of Mayenne), admitted
that “the serious threat to the deep T h e German withdrawal from Mor-
southern flank” of the army group re- tain on the night of 11 August brought
quired quick action. He therefore ap- the battle that had been raging there to
proved Kluge’s plan to have Eberbach an end. Until that time, although the
launch an attack with an armored corps Americans could mark an increasing im-
from the vicinity of Carrouges. But in- provement in their situation about
stead of an effort envisaged by Kluge as Mortain, no decisive result had been
an attempt to destroy the American achieved.
spearheads driving north toward Alen- General Hobbs, for example, had
çon, Hitler envisioned an attack against been variously elated and depressed.
the deep west flank of the U.S. XV “We are holding and getting in better
Corps, the axis of the thrust passing in a shape all the time,” he informed General
more southerly direction across the Sillé- Collins on 8 August. “It was precarious
le-Guillaume–Beaumont road. In order for a while . . . [but] we are doing
to disengage the necessary forces, Hitler everything in God’s power to hold.”
agreed to “a minor withdrawal of the Yet on the following day, when Hobbs
front between Sourdeval and Mortain.” wondered aloud whether his positions
He retained the 11th Panzer Division in might be “practically untenable,” Col-
southern France as the only mobile re- lins flared in exasperation: “Stop talk-
serve in the Nineteenth Army sector be- ing about untenable.” 26
cause Kluge assured him that it could Essentially, the battle was small unit
not reach the Normandy front in time combat, “infiltration and counter in-
to attack near Alençon, and perhaps be- filtration,” close-range fighting by splin-
cause he was apprehensive over the im- ter groups maneuvering to outflank, and
minent Allied invasion of southern in turn being outflanked, “a seesawing
France.24 activity consisting of minor penetrations
Thus, while the Germans awaited rein- by both sides,” operations characterized
by ambush and surprise and fought on a
23Msg, Kluge to Jodl (info to subordinate level often no higher than that of the
comds) , 1745, 11 Aug, AGp B Lagebeurteilungen,
Wochenmeldungen. 25See MS # A–918 (Gersdorff); OB WEST, a
24 Hitler Order, WFSt/Op. Nr. 772830/44, g.Kdos. Study in Command, p. 57.
Chefs., 11 Aug, quoted in AGp B Msg to the armies, 26Telecons, Collins and Hobbs, 1220, 8 Aug, and
0030, 12 Aug, AGp B Fuehrer Befehle. 2307, 9 Aug, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File.
ENCIRCLEMENT 487
paralyzed all German movements in the Divisions, had sustained about six hun-
area.38 dred casualties.40
T h e 2d Armored Division had made As heavy as American casualties were,
a similar contribution by attacking German losses were greater. T h e effect
northeast from Barenton toward Ger into of artillery and air power had been
the German left flank and rear. Em- particularly telling. One regiment of
ploying the small task force of the 3d the 2d Panzer Division had been an-
Armored Division’s CCA and the bat- nihilated near le Mesnil-Tôve. T h e
talion of the 30th Division already near 1st SS Panzer Division had had especially
Barenton, the 2d Armored Division had heavy tank losses. T h e 2d SS Panzer
attacked on 8 August and advanced three Division had been slashed by artillery
miles into the broken terrain of the fire called from Hill 317, by tank fire
Mortain forest. Although stiffening op- from the 2d Armored Division near
position had prevented capture of Ger, Barenton, and by air attacks that had
the armored division had kept a spear seemed particularly effective in its sector.
sticking into the enemy flank for four Allied tactical aircraft, somewhat ham-
more days, a constant threat hampering pered by early morning haze, flew from
German communications between Tin- midmorning to darkness, while Brig.
chebray and Sourdeval, disrupting for- Gen. James M. Lewis, the 30th Division
ward assembly areas between Sourdeval Artillery commander, alone massed more
and Ger, and forcing commitment of than twelve battalions of artillery to
the 10th SS Panzer Division elsewhere achieve devasting results. Between 1900
than toward Avranches.39 and 2000, 9 August, the 30th Division
On 12 August, with the 35th Division Artillery, for example, fired thirty ob-
beyond the Mortain–Barenton road and served and fully adjusted counterbattery
the 30th Division again in possession of missions, an imposing total for an hour’s
St. Barthélemy and Mortain, the costly activity and one that was later claimed
battle came to an end. T h e 30th Divi- as a record. Observation was excellent
sion alone had lost almost two thousand from both the ground and the air, and
men in six days. T h e 9th Division, artillerymen and pilots “just plaster [ed
fighting on the fringe of the Mortain the enemy] . . . all along the line.”
action, had sustained nearly a thousand Close to a hundred German tanks lay
casualties in closing the gap that had abandoned in the Mortain sector at the
separated the division from the 39th In- close of the battle.41
fantry. In protecting the Sée River line,
the 4th Division, which had contributed 40 VII Corps, 2d Armd Div, 4th, 9th, and 30th
a regiment each to the 9th and 30th Div AAR’s, Aug; Msgs, Brooks to Collins, 0830 and
0907, 8 Aug, VII Corps G–3 Jnl and File; VII Corps
38MS # B–445 (Krueger) . Opns Memo 60, 8 Aug (confirming oral orders,
39For heroism on 8 August, 2d Lt. Glenn H. 7 Aug); Collins’ Talk at the Armored School,
Warren of the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Bat- 19 Jan 48.
talion received the DSC. Capt. Thomas F. 41CI 96, 30th Div, 6–12 Aug; 30th Div FO 22,
Carothers and Pvt. William J. Draper of the 41st 1230, 9 Aug; Telecons, Gen Hobbs and Col Otto
Armored Infantry Regiment received the DSC for Ellis, 0823, 8 Aug, and Hobbs and Lewis, 1715,
heroism from 9 to 14 August and on 11 August, 7 Aug, 30th Div G–3 Jnl and File; Hewitt, Story
respectively. of 30th Division, p. 77; MS # B-725 (Gersdorff) .
ENCIRCLEMENT 491
WRECKED
GERMANARMORIN THE SOURDEVALAREA
At the outset of the attack, American T h e only effect of the Mortain coun-
officers had estimated that the enemy terattack was that it had “practically
seemed capable of driving a wedge to stopped the VII Corps advance.” Be-
Avranches “to rupture” the front and yond that, it had prompted some read-
make the position of the forces south of justment of forces in the Mortain-
Avranches “logistically untenable.” It Avranches area, but the rearrangement
was not long, however, before the “po- of units had no more than local signifi-
tential threat of a major counterattack” cance. What the counterattack might
vanished. T h e enemy had very quickly have accomplished seemed in retrospect
“been forced to abandon his ambitious to have been its only merit. Even had
effort . . . because of heavy tank casualties it succeeded in cutting the supply lines
from allied air attacks . . . and artillery to the Allied forces south of Avranches,
fire.” As early as 8 August, intelligence SHAEF was prepared to supply those
officers were optimistically considering forces with two thousand tons per day
what the Germans might do after the by air.43
current attack was defeated or con- Taken by surprise in newly occupied
tained.42
43VII Corps and FUSA AAR’s, Aug; Lt. Gen.
42TUSA G–2 Per Rpt 59, 9 Aug; FUSA G–2 Per Walter Bedell Smith, “Eisenhower’s Six Great Deci-
Rpts 60, 61, and 64, 9 10, and 13 Aug, and G–2 sions,” Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 218, No. 50
Est 14, 8 Aug: VII Corps G–2 Per Rpt 64, 8 Aug. (June 15. 1946), 18.
492 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
positions, the 30th Division had stood its that the Mortain counterattack had “ap-
ground and fought as hard as any unit parently been contained.” As he studied
was to fight in the European theater. the situation, he came to the further
“It isn’t very easy,” a staff officer wrote, conclusion that the Germans by attack-
“to tell the man in the front lines that ing had “incurred the risk of encircle-
the battle is going well when he’s still ment from the South and North,” and
up against that old combination of he acted at once to capitalize on the op-
machine guns, burp guns, mortars, 88s, portunity. 46
artillery, tanks—and terrain. . . . [But] In the presence of General Eisenhower
the battle is going well; [and] it’s worth who was visiting his headquarters on
saying.” 44 8 August, General Bradley telephoned
T h e battle had indeed gone well, not General Montgomery and secured ap-
only at Mortain but elsewhere on the proval for a bold course of action de-
First Army front. On the VII Corps signed to encircle the German forces
left, XIX Corps, after having attacked in west of Argentan and Falaise.47 What
the Sourdeval–Gathemo area (with the he proposed was a radical change–a go-
28th and 29th Divisions and CCA of the degree turn—in the 12th Army Group
2d Armored Division) and having sus- offensive axis. Instead of driving east-
tained more than 1,200 casualties in ward toward the Seine, the First and
three days of heavy fighting, finally Third Armies would wheel to the north
moved forward with relative ease on and attack toward the army group
11 August, and on the following day boundary, specifically toward the towns
made contact with the 30th Division of Flers and Argentan. (Map 14)
north of Mortain and pinched out the Since the towns were within the 21 Army
4th and 9th Divisions. On the First Group zone, the American armies would
Army left the V Corps, which had held advance only to the boundary, the east-
on firmly to the town of Vire with the west line generally from Mortain
2d Infantry Division while exerting pres- through Domfront and Carrouges to
sure toward the southeast, noted dimin- Sées. There, the American forces would
ishing German pressure on 1 2 August.45 be in a position to act as the southern
By that date, the Allies were maneu- jaw of a vise. Approaching the same
vering to trap the Germans who had line from the north, the British and
plunged unsuccessfully toward Av- Canadian forces between Tinchebray
ranches. and Falaise would, in effect, form the
other jaw. Closing the jaws on the
Concepts of Encirclement
4612th AGp Ltr of Instrs 4, 8 Aug.
As early as 8 August, General Bradley 47Bradley, Soldier‘s Story pp. 372, 374-75;
Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 158;
was confident that the reinforced VII Eisenhower, Crusade i n Europe, p. 275; Butcher,
Corps would hold at Mortain. He felt My Three Years W i t h Eisenhower, p. 636. For an
interesting speculative account of the command
4430th Div G–2 Notes for Co Comdrs, 10 Aug, decisions at Mortain, see O. G . Haywood, Jr..
30th Div G–3 Jnl and File. “Military Decision and Game Theory,” Journal of
45V Corps Operations in the E T O , pp. 163ff.; the Operations Research Society of America, II,
CI 85 (the Battle for Vire) ; [Ferriss], Notes. No. 4 (November, 1954), 371–85.
D. Jr.
Holmes,
MAP I4
494 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
army group boundary would entrap and and southeast of Domfrant and, together
crush the Germans in between. with its forces near Mayenne, it was to
Specifically, General Bradley ordered launch an attack northeast in the direc-
General Patton to “advance on the axis tion of Argentan. Meanwhile, V Corps
Alençon–Sées to the line Sees-Carrouges was to attack from the Vire area south-
prepared for further action against the eastward to Tinchebray. T h e effect of
enemy flank and rear in the direction of these moves would be to push the Ger-
Argentan.” This meant turning the XV man forces opposing First Army to the
Corps north from le Mans, and for this army group boundary. According to
purpose Bradley gave Patton another the erroneous interpretion of enemy in-
armored division. He also ordered the tentions by the First Army G–2, who was
35th Division, involved in the battle two days ahead of events, the Germans
around Mortain, to revert to the Third by 9 August were already “pulling back
Army “without delay,” but the division to avoid entrapment.” 49
was still needed by the VII Corps, and As for the Third Army, General Pat-
Bradley soon revoked this part of this ton felt that since the “purpose of the
order. operation is to surround and destroy the
General Bradley instructed General German army west of the Seine,” he had
Hodges to pivot on Mortain, advance to first to surround the Germans so that
the Barenton–Domfront line, and be their destruction would be inescapable.
ready to take further action northeast in He envisioned forces cutting through
the direction of Flers. Hodges was also the German rear on a relatively narrow
to eliminate the German salient in the front and encircling the enemy by mak-
Vire–Mortain–Ger area.48 ing contact with the Canadians on the
General Hodges issued his order the opposite Allied flank. This was the
day after Bradley’s instructions. T o task he gave XV Corps.50
eliminate the German salient around On 1 1 August—a day after XV Corps
Mortain, Hodges set up a converging attacked north from le Mans, the same
attack by the VII and XIX Corps. VII day that Kluge decided the Mortain
Corps, attacking generally eastward salient had to be reduced, and a day be-
along an axis through Mortain (south of fore the First Army began its new at-
a new temporary boundary with XIX tack-General Montgomery made known
Corps), was eventually to be pinched out his concept of encirclement. He based
by the advance of XIX Corps, which was his concept on the estimate that
attacking to the south through Sourdeval the bulk of the enemy forces were west
and Ger. This would wipe out the Ger- of a north–south line passing from Caen
man salient. XIX Corps was then to through Falaise, Argentan, and Alençon
assume control over its original zone and to le Mans. As the Canadians attacked
some of the forces of VII Corps and con-
tinue the attack east and northeast to- 49FUSA FO 6 and G–2 Est 14, 9 Aug.
ward Flers. VII Corps was to con- 50Memo, Patton for Gaffey, 8 Aug, VIII Corps
G–3 Jnl and File; TUSA Ltr of Instrs, Patton to
centrate its strength in the area south Haislip, 8 Aug, XV Corps G–3 Jnl and File, and
Dir, 10 Aug (confirming fragmentary orders,
4812th AGp Ltr of Instrs 4, 8 Aug. 8 Aug) .
ENCIRCLEMENT 495
toward Falaise and the XV U.S. Corps ary of the Canadian army sector. Mean-
attacked toward Alençon, the gap, while, the XV U.S. Corps was to advance
through which must come all German north from le Mans through Alençon
supplies and reinforcement from the to the army group boundary, which was
east, would narrow. “Obviously,” Gen- several miles south of Argentan along a
eral Montgomery stated, “if we can close line between Carrouges and Sées.
the gap completely, we shall have put T h e projected result would be a meet-
the enemy in the most awkard predica- ing of Canadian and American forces
ment.” (Map 15) just south of Argentan to encircle the
As the gap narrowed, the enemy was Germans who had concentrated the bulk
likely to react in one of two ways. He of their forces west of the Orne and a
might bring up additional divisions from sweeping advance by the British to herd
the east; or, more probably, he would the Germans into the Canadian and
try to move his armored and mobile American lines. T h e First U.S. Army,
forces eastward through the gap toward inferentially, would drive the Germans
ammunition and gasoline supplies. If in its zone into the path of the British
the Germans chose the latter course of advance. “It begins to look,” General
action, they would probably operate in Montgomery wrote, “as if the enemy in-
the general Domfront, Argentan, Alen- tends to fight it out between the Seine
çon area in order “to have the benefit of and the Loire. This will suit us very
the difficult ‘bocage’ country.” Their well. . . . Clearly our intention must be
purpose would be to hold off the Amer- to destroy the enemy forces between the
icans and withdraw on the Falaise–Vire Seine and the Loire.” Yet Montgomery
line. did not overlook the possibility that the
Expecting the Germans to mass enemy might successfully evade encircle-
stronger forces in defense of Alençon ment at Argentan. In that case, the
than of Falaise, Montgomery concluded Allies were to be ready to institute the
that it would be easier for the Canadians wider encirclement earlier projected to
to reach Argentan from the north than the Seine.51
it would be for the Americans to get What seemed perfectly apparent to all
there from the south. He therefore was that Allied occupation of Falaise and
ordered the First Canadian Army to con- Alençon would narrow to thirty-five
tinue its effort to capture Falaise, stat- miles the gap between the two flanks of
ing that it was “vital that it should be the German defensive positions. Since
done quickly.” T h e Canadians were the bulk of the German forces were west
then to drive south from Falaise to take of the gap and facing complete encircle-
Argentan. On the Canadian right, the ment, capture of the two towns would
Second British Army, turning to the left, cut two of the three main east-west roads
was also to drive toward Falaise by push- still in German hands and force the
ing forward its left wing. At the con- Germans to escape eastward, if they
clusion of the advance, the British would
occupy a north-south line between 51 21 AGp Gen Operational Situation and Dir,
Falaise and Argentan, the right bound- M–518, 11 Aug.
D. Holmes,Jr.
MAP 15
ENCIRCLEMENT 497
could, along the axis of the Vire—Flers— French Armored Division and ordered
Argentan highway.52 Haislip to lead with his armor, which
It seemed not altogether unlikely that would mean the 5th U.S. and the 2d
the opinion General Montgomery had French Armored Divisions. Much was
ventured in mid-June—that the Allies expected of the French troops, for they
might defeat the Germans between the were experienced in combat and eager to
Seine and the Loire—was about to be liberate their country. Commanded by
realized53
. Maj. Gen. Jacques Philippe Leclerc, the
division had fought in Africa before be-
Envelopment from the South ing brought to England in the spring of
1944 expressly to represent French forces
General Haislip’s XV Corps had taken in Operation OVERLORD. Re-equipped
le Mans on 8 August with the 5th with American materiel, the division
Armored and the 79th and 90th Infantry arrived on the Continent and assembled
Divisions, and soon afterwards it was just south of Avranches during the early
ready to drive north. T h e initial corps days of August. It had been alerted
objective, thirty miles north of le Mans, briefly for possible employment at Mor-
was the town of Alençon—the great cross- tain before being ordered to le Mans
roads of the Rouen–Bordeaux and Ren- where, on 9 August, it was attached to
nes–Paris highways. T h e final objec- the XV Corps.55
tive was eleven miles beyond Alençon, a To protect the XV Corps deep left
fifteen-mile stretch of the east—west road and rear, General Patton drew upon the
connecting the towns of Carrouges and 80th Division, newly arrived on the Con-
Sées. tinent and under the command of Maj.
In driving north along the le Mans- Gen. Horace L. McBride. T h e 80th
Alenqon–Argentan axis, XV Corps would Division was to clear the Evron area,
have both flanks open. On the right, where General Weaver’s 90th Division
elements of the 106th Cavalry Group task force had uncovered considerable
during the following few days would resistance while driving on le Mans. Few
roam almost at will and meet only the Germans remained, and the 80th carried
slightest resistance. On the left, a gap out its assignment without much trouble.
of about twenty-five miles would separate T h e few difficulties came mainly from
the corps from the closest American units the fluid situation prevailing on that part
at Mayenne.54 (Map 16) of the front. For several days the divi-
T o increase the striking power of the
XV Corps, Patton gave Haislip the 2d 55Principal sources for the operational activity
of the French division are Capitaine Even, “La 2e
5230th Div G–2 Notes for Co Comdrs, 11 Aug, D.B. de son Débarquement en Normandie à la
30th Div G–3 Jnl and File. Liberation de Paris,” Revue Historique de l‘Armée,
53 21 AGp Dir, M–502, 18 Jun. I (March 1952) (hereafter cited as Even, La 2e
54 XV Corps FO 3, 9 Aug; TUSA Ltr of Instrs, D.B.) , 107–32; and 2d French Armd Div G–3 Rpt,
Patton to Haislip, 8 Aug; 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs Operations de la 2ème D.B. Depuis le Jour ‘J’
4, 8 Aug; XV Corps Outline Narrative, 1–14 Aug: Jusqu’a la Prise de Strasbourg, ML-1051. See Cole,
see Xavier Rousseau, ed., La Bataille de Normandie Lorraine Campaign, p. 187 and n. 4, same page.
au Pays d’Argentan (Argentan, 1945–47) (hereafter Leclerc was the nom de guerre of Philippe François
cited as Rousseau, Bataille de Normandie), p. 19. Marie de Hautecloque.
498
encircled, and XV Corps, with two ecuted his plan. T h e three French
armored divisions in the line and two combat commands partially cleared the
infantry divisions (the 79th and 90th, forest and fought their way to within
which were following) in support, would sight of Ecouché and the Carrouges-
hold a strong shoulder between Alençon Argentan line.
and Argentan.63 When French troops usurped the
There seemed to be one serious Alençon–Sées–Argentan highway on 12
obstacle that might hinder the maneu- August, the 5th Armored Division, for-
ver: the Forêt d’Ecouves blocked the tunately, had already taken Sées. Un-
southern approaches to Argentan. If fortunately, a 5th Armored Division
the Germans were to prevent encircle- combat command north of Sées—at Mor-
ment, they had to keep a gap open be- trée, five miles southeast of Argentan-
tween Falaise and Alençon so that their had to postpone its attack toward Argen-
troops might withdraw eastward toward tan for six hours. Only after the French
Dreux and Paris. It was plausible then column cleared the road could gasoline
to expect the Germans to try to hold this trucks blocked south of Sées come for-
prominent terrain feature on the south- ward to refuel the command. T h e
ern shoulder of the gap.64 attack did not jump off until late after-
General Haislip had instructed Leclerc noon, and by then the Germans had
to pass west of the forest. But Leclerc interposed a new unit between the
decided to send one combat command armor and Argentan. T h e attack,
east of the woods, while another went which if launched six hours earlier might
through the forest and the third by- have resulted in capture of Argentan,
passed it on the west. He envisioned all made little progress.
three columns converging at Ecouché, a That day, 12 August, Panzer Group
town five miles southwest of Argentan Eberbach assumed command in the
on the final Carrouges–Argentan objec- Argentan sector. The XLVII Panzer
tive line. There was one drawback to Corps headquarters, having turned over
this plan: the combat command bypass- its responsibility at Mortain to the LVIII
ing the Forêt d’Ecouves on the right Panzer Corps, arrived at Argentan.
(east) would trespass on the main high- Since the LXXXI Corps headquarters
way from Alençon to Argentan through had been severed from its divisions in
Sées, which had been reserved for the the Argentan sector by the American
5th U.S. Armored Division. Leclerc attack and was out of contact with them,
nevertheless disregarded his division the XLVII Panzer Corps took control
boundary and Haislip’s order and ex- of the remnants of the 9th Panzer Divi-
sion in the Ecouves forest. When a
strong infantry battalion of the 116th
63XV Corps Opns Instrs, 2200, 11 Aug, cited in Panzer Division, which was moving from
XV Corps Narrative Outline, 1–14 Aug; Notes of
Mtg, 0730, 12 Aug, XV Corps CofS Jnl and File.
the Mortain sector, became available
64XV Corps G–2 Per Rpt 9, 0300, 12 Aug; early in the afternoon, the XLVII Pan-
Capitaine Jean Maigne, “Les Forces Françaises et zer Corps sent it toward Sées. T h e
la Jonction ‘OVERLORD-DRAGOON,’” Revue d’Historie
de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, No. 19 (July
battalion reached Mortrée in time to
1955), 17–33,
block the 5th Armored Division attack.
ENCIRCLEMENT 503
battalion, later, tanks; the infantry would gin to escape the Allied encirclement.
not arrive until the following day. T h e “If the front held by the [Fifth] Panzer
2d Panzer Division arrived in better con- Army and the Seventh Army is not
dition, but only at half strength; the withdrawn immediately,” he warned,
other half was to require an additional
and if every effort is not made to move the
day for the road march. With the forces toward the east and out of the
116th Panzer Division holding well at threatened encirclement, the army group
Argentan, Eberbach directed the 2d into will have to write off both armies. Within
the Ecouché area and committed the 1st a very short time resupplying the troops
SS in defense of the ground between with ammunition and fuel will no longer
be possible. Therefore, immediate meas-
Carrouges and la Ferté-Macé. Although ures are necessary to move to the east be-
these dispositions might have seemed fore such movement is definitely too late.
adequate on paper, their actual strength It will soon be possible for the enemy to
was slight. Eberbach estimated that fire into the pocket with artillery from all
the 1st SS had thirty tanks, the 2d sides.72
twenty-five, and the 116th fifteen. T h e Yet, contrary to expectations, the de-
9th Panzer Division had been practically fensive line at Argentan did hold. It
destroyed in the Forêt d’Ecouves. 71 held not because of German strength but
Thus, developments had forced Eber- because of a cessation of the American
bach to commit piecemeal the panzer attack. Early in the afternoon of 13
units that were earmarked as his striking August the XV Corps attack came to an
force in the more urgent task of bolster- abrupt and suprising halt. General
ing the badly shattered southern flank Bradley stopped further movement to
of Army Group B . On 13 August events the north. Patton had to inform Haislip
canceled Kluge’s plan to inflict a crush- not to go beyond Argentan. Haislip
ing blow on the U.S. XV Corps. was to recall any elements that might be
It was clearly apparent to the German “in the vicinity of Falaise or to the north
command that three weak panzer divi- of Argentan.” Instead of pressing the
sions would not be able to maintain for attack toward the Canadians, the XV
long, if at all, the slender defensive line Corps was to assemble and prepare for
established to oppose the XV Corps. further operations in another direc-
On the morning of 13 August Dietrich, tion.73
the Fifth Panzer Army commander,
stated officially for the first time what in
72 Telecon, Speidel, Wiese, Gause, and Dietrich,
retrospect all commanders later claimed
1035, 13 Aug, AGp B K T B .
to have thought-that it was time to be- 73Msg, Gaffey to Haislip (received at XV Corps
CP, 1415, 13 Aug), XV Corps CofS Jnl and File;
71Friedel Telecons, 1230 and 2140, 13 Aug, AGp Memo, Patton to Haislip, 13 Aug; TUSA Dir,
B KTB. 13 Aug.
CHAPTER XXVI
ter. Yet for all the hazards of error, American intelligence officers did not
Allied aircraft operated in the Argen- seem aware of Eberbach’s mission to
tan–Falaise area with excellent effect launch a massive attack against the deep
until 17 August, when the bomb line in XV Corps left flank, yet if Eberbach had
that sector was removed and close air been able to get it off, the attack would
support, at least officially, ceased.4 have struck exactly through a gap in the
Another reason contributing to Gen- American line. Between the 1st Divi-
eral Bradley’s reluctance to send Amer- sion troops firmly ensconced at Mayenne
ican troops beyond Argentan was his and French forces at Carrouges there
preference, as he later said, for “a solid was a gap of about twenty-five miles.
shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck American troops started to close the gap
at Falaise.” Although he afterwards on the morning of 13 August, but until
stated that he had not doubted the they actually did, a XV Corps advance
ability of the XV Corps to close the gap beyond Argentan to close the Falaise gap
(despite increasing resistance on the would have extended the Mayenne gap.
morning of 13 August), he had ques- Although General Bradley did not men-
tioned the ability of the corps to keep tion this fact in his later account, it was
the gap closed. Incorrectly believing reasonable for him to be concerned at
that elements of nineteen German divi- the time with the exposed position of
sions were already stampeding eastward the XV Corps.
through the gap, he thought it con- These reasons were sufficient to justify
ceivable that they would trample the General Bradley’s decision, but he may
thin line of American troops.5 also have felt he could not let the XV
Holding the XV Corps at Argentan Corps go to and beyond Argentan with-
conformed with General Bradley’s con- out exceeding his authority. Near
cept of destroying the enemy by closing Argentan the American troops were
two jaws, for at Argentan the XV Corps already across the army group boundary
formed the lower front teeth of a not and impinging on the 2 1 Army Group
yet solid mandible.6 Actually, the XV zone. Since General Montgomery com-
Corps was already in an exposed posi- manded the ground forces in France,
tion. Both flanks were open. There Bradley needed his consent to go farther.
were no German forces to speak of to Although Montgomery did not prohibit
threaten the right flank, but the situa- American advance beyond the boundary,
tion was quite the opposite on the left. neither did Bradley propose it.7
General Montgomery did not take the
4AAF III, pp. 253–54; 12th AGp Memo for Rcd initiative, probably because he thought
(Kibler), 18 Aug, ML-205. Leigh-Mallory (in his
“Despatch,” Fourth Supplement to the London the Canadians would close the gap from
Gazette of December 31, 1946, p. 66) stated that he
opposed the fixing of any bomb lines at all, for
he felt they restricted close air support, denied 7Kibler, the 12th Army Group G–3, recollected
fighter-bombers excellent targets, and allowed many long afterward that Bradley had telephoned Mont-
enemy troops to escape. He would have preferred gomery to ask permission to go beyond Argentan
a less cautious policy, which would have permitted and that Montgomery had refused (Answers to
fighter-bombers to attack identified targets at will. Questions by Lt Col Hugh M. Cole, 29 May 45,
5Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 377. ML-501), but Bradley denied ever asking (Bradley,
6See above, Ch. XXV. Soldier’s Story, p. 376).
508 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the north. Early in August he had ley wrote, he and Patton saw the Ger-
planned to have Patton’s Third Army mans reinforce the shoulders of the
make a wide envelopment to the Seine. Argentan–Falaise gap and watched the
Instead, Bradley had reacted to the Mor- enemy pour troops and materiel east-
tain counterattack by suggesting and ward to escape out of the unsealed
securing approval for a shorter envelop- pocket. It seemed to him and Patton,
ment-the right hook thrust by the XV Bradley remembered, that Dempsey’s
Corps to Argentan. T h e virtue of this British army by driving from the north-
maneuver was that it took advantage of west was accelerating German movement
the Canadian attack on 8 August toward eastward and facilitating German escape,
Falaise, an attack launched out of an en- actually pushing the Germans out of the
tirely different context. Juncture of the open end of the pocket, like squeezing a
two forces was implicit. Yet the Ameri- tube of tooth paste. “If Monty’s tactics
cans were at that time much farther from mystified me,” Bradley later wrote, “they
Argentan than the Canadians. Mont- dismayed Eisenhower even more. And
gomery, estimating that the Germans . . . a shocked Third Army looked on
would shift their defensive strength to helplessly as its quarry fled [while]
protect their southern flank against the Patton raged at Montgomery’s blun-
Americans, consequently felt that the der.” 10
Canadians, attacking from the opposite It was true that the Germans were
flank, could cover the shorter distance building up the shouders of the gap by
to Argentan more quickly.8 13 August, but by that date they were
Halting the XV Corps at Argentan not fleeing eastward to escape encircle-
seemed in retrospect to many command- ment. Either Bradley and Patton were
ers, Allied and German, to have been a anticipating what was soon to occur or
tactical error, a failure to take full ad- General Bradley’s memory was faulty by
vantage of German vulnerability.9 Gen- several days. If Patton, in a subordinate
eral Bradley, too, seemed afterwards role, could only rage, and if Bradley
to consider the halt a mistake, and he thought he might offend a sensitive
sought to refute criticism by placing the Montgomery, Eisenhower, who was in
responsibility for the halt on Mont- France and following combat develop-
gomery. I n that connection, he recalled ments, might have resolved the situation
that he and Patton had doubted had he thought it necessary to do so.
“Monty’s ability to close the gap at Yet General Eisenhower did not inter-
Argentan” from the north, and had vene. Interfering with a tactical deci-
“waited impatiently” for word to con- sion made by a commander who was in
tinue northward. While waiting, Brad- closer contact with the situation was not
Eisenhower’s method of exercising com-
mand. Long after the event, General
8 See 21 AGp Dir, M-518, 11 Aug; see above, Ch. Eisenhower implied that the gap might
XXV. On Montgomery’s overly optimistic estimate have been closed, which, he thought,
of the speed with which the Canadians would get
to Falaise, see Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, p. 417.
9See, for example, Patton, War As I Knew It,
p. 105. and MS # B–807 (Kuntzen) . 10Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 377.
T H E ARGENTAN–FALAISE POCKET 509
“might have won us a complete battle manders from the perspective of a later
of annihilation.” 11 vantage point was not so clear at the
If this had been clear to Bradley at moment of decision. Bradley himself
the time, he probably would have picked made the decision to halt, probably on
up the telephone and proposed to Mont- the basis of five tactical considerations:
gomery that the XV Corps proceed be- (1) Montgomery, the ground force com-
yond the army group boundary to make mander, had not moved the army group
contact with the Canadians. Yet to boundary, nor did he seem about to do
propose was, in effect, to recommend, so, and thus he appeared not to favor
particularly in a situation where Mont- further American advance. (2) On the
gomery and Bradley were both army evidence of the increasing resistance to
group commanders and where one was the XV Corps on the morning of 13
British, the other American. Because August, there was no certainty that
sending the XV Corps through and be- American troops could move through or
yond Argentan was risky, Bradley prob- around Argentan and beyond. (3) Since
ably felt he could not in good conscience the XV Corps was already in an exposed
recommend such a course of action with- position by virtue of the vacuums on
out reservation. Because Montgomery, both flanks, there was no point in closing
not Bradley, was the ground force com- the Argentan–Falaise gap at the expense
mander and thus the responsible com- of further exposing the corps, particu-
mander, Bradley, by so proposing, would larly by enlarging the gap on the left.
be saddling Montgomery with respon- (4) Intelligence estimates inclined to the
sibility for a course of action that Brad- incorrect view that the bulk of the Ger-
ley himself was, apparently, unwilling man forces had already escaped the
to recommend wholeheartedly. For pocket. (5) T h e Canadians were about
Montgomery would, more than likely, to launch their second attack to Falaise,
have felt impelled to accept the recom- an effort that, it was hoped, would get
mendation, given the circumstances of troops beyond Falaise to Argentan and
the command setup. Where the assump- preclude further American advance into
tion of risk was involved, finesse, good the 21 Army Group sector.
manners, and the subtleties of coalition
warfare required the responsible com- T h e Canadians at Falaise
mander to make the responsible decision
without prompting, and this only Mont- Despite Montgomery’s injunction for
gomery-or Eisenhower—could have speed in getting to Falaise and beyond
done. from the north, General Crerar, whose
What might have seemed clear to com- Canadian army had been stopped in the
Caen–Falaise corridor by 9 August, was
11
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 278-79;
unable to mount a full-scale operation at
Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 214. Montgomery’s
chief of staff, Major-General Sir Francis de once.12 While Crerar regrouped his
Guingand, believed that the Falaise gap might have
been closed if Montgomery had not restricted the 12Wilmot (Struggle for Europe, pp. 424-25) notes,
Americans by means of the existing army group “the evidence suggests that the thrust from the
boundary, “The Americans felt this [restriction] ,” north was not pressed with sufficient speed and
he wrote. Guingand, Operation Victory, p. 407. strength.”
510 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
forces and arranged for air support, he routes for traffic, could hardly determine
launched a diversionary action on his where the streets had been.15
right on 12 August in division strength, Though the Canadians had finally
hoping thereby to outflank German posi- reached Falaise, U.S. troops were still
tions along the Caen–Falaise road. On just south of Argentan. T h e gap had
14 August, as the diversion continued been narrowed, but fifteen miles still sep-
into its third day of difficult fighting arated the Allies. “Due to the extraor-
without substantial advance, he kicked dinary measures taken by the enemy
off his main effort. north of Falaise,” General Eisenhower
T h e main effort was “a concentrated, wrote to Marshall, “.. . it is possible that
very heavy blow on a decidedly narrow our total bag of prisoners will not be so
front,” much like the first attack seven great as I first anticipated.”16
days earlier, but it dispensed with artil-
lery preparation to gain surprise, used T h e Pocket Tightened
smoke to provide cover, and employed
a “short fierce stroke by medium T h e task of filling the hole on the XV
bombers.” 13 Smoke and dust made it Corps left flank belonged to the First
difficult for armor and infantry to main- U.S. Army, specifically to the VII Corps.
tain proper orientation toward the While the V and XIX Corps on the
objective, but two armored columns north exerted pressure on the Germans
bypassed the resistance astride the main by attacking, respectively, toward Tin-
road and approached the objective from chebray and Flers, the VII Corps on the
the northeast. More than 800 heavy south was to drive from Mayenne to the
bombers of the RAF and RCAF then northeast toward Fromental to cover the
dropped 3,700 tons of bombs in the XV Corps left flank. In the case of
area.14 Although several bomb loads each corps, the objective was the army
fell short of their targets and inflicted group boundary, which corresponded
almost 400 casualties and heavy equip- with the right flank boundary of the
ment losses on Canadian and Polish Second British Army. In advancing to
units, the attack advanced to within three the southeast, the British troops would
miles of Falaise on the first day. pass in turn across the fronts of all
With the Germans off balance, Cana- three First Army corps. (Map 17)
dian troops entered Falaise from the General Hodges had ordered the First
northwest on 16 August and cleared the Army to attack as early as 9 August, but
town by the end of the following day. not until the Seventh Army withdrew
Artillery shells and air bombardment from Mortain did the operation get
had transformed the town of William under way. On 12 August the V and
the Conqueror into a pile of rubble. XIX Corps initiated the attack. T h e
Bulldozer operators, trying to open VII Corps needed an additional day for
able to XX Corps was the 80th Division, T h e 80th Division field order for the
which had been clearing the Evron area. attack indicated the Argentan–Sées rail-
A day later, on 12 August, after tele- road line as its objective. T h e troops
phone conversations between staff offi- were to destroy hostile forces in zone and
cers of both headquarters, Third Army, “establish contact with XV Corps Armd
confirming the previous attack order, elms, when same cross Division front.”
changed the corps objective. T h e XX T h e overlay designated routes of advance
Corps was to advance only until it came to the objective. It also showed a route
in contact with the XV Corps around presumably to be taken by “Armd elms
Alençon (taken by the XV Corps that XV Corps”—these elements would enter
morning) or farther north, there to await the 80th Division zone from Alençon and
further orders.25 Completion of this move through the Forêt d’Ecouves to
mission would sweep clear the XV Corps Argentan, thereby cutting diagonally
left flank. across the XX Corps zone, which was
T h e XX Corps issued its field order oriented to the northeast. Like the
close to midnight. In an area between corps order, the division order made no
VII Corps on its left and XV Corps on mention of halting upon contact with
its right, XX Corps designated zones of XV Corps forces. Quite the contrary,
advance for two divisions to attack “rapid progress . . . is essential to the suc-
abreast, the 80th on the right, the 7th cess of the mission. Forces . . . will
Armored (recently arrived on the Con- advance without regard to progress of
tinent and hurrying toward le Mans) on forces to right and left.” 27
the left. Because the armored division T h e attack jumped off on 13 August,
would not arrive in the area until the and that afternoon the regiment on the
afternoon of 13 August, XX Corps right, the 318th Infantry, was hope-
ordered the 80th Division to initiate the lessly entangled with part of the 90th
attack at 0800, 13 August; the armor Division, which, under XV Corps com-
was to follow, pass through the 8oth, mand, was moving west of Alençon to
and take the lead. With two regiments protect the deep left flank of the corps.
abreast, the 80th was to attack from the Intent on its own mission, the 318th cut
Evron–Sillé-le-Guillaume area to capture across the 90th Division routes and
the Argentan–Sées line. T h e north- precipitated serious traffic congestion
easterly route of advance thus projected and heated argument. T h e 90th
cut directly across roads being used by ordered the 318th off the road. T h e
the XV Corps going north from Alençon 318th refused to move because it was
toward Argentan. Evidently through sure it was on the right road to its objec-
oversight, the XX Corps field order made tive. T h e 90th informed the 318th that
no mention of the Third Army instruc- another unit (under XV Corps com-
tion to hold the advance upon establish- mand) had already captured and was
ing contact with the XV Corps in the occupying the 80th’s objective. T h e
vicinity of Alençon or farther north.26 318th was adamant; its orders were clear
and it planned to carry them out. T h e
25Dir, Gaffey to Walker, 12 Aug.
26XX Corps FO 2, 2345, 12 Aug. 2780th Div FO 4, 0400, 13 Aug.
T H E ARGENTAN–FALAISE POCKET 515
90th radioed XV Corps headquarters. the area turned out also to be in the path
T h e 318th radioed 80th Division head- of the 90th Division advance. More
quarters. T h e XV Corps commander argument ensued until the regimental
sent an officer down to tell the 318th to commander wearily chose another
“get the hell off the road.” T h e 318th bivouac. On the following morning
retorted that it was under XX Corps General McBride went forward and per-
jurisdiction, then dispatched a cub plane sonally ordered both regiments back to
to division headquarters for help. Ele- the Laval-Evron area.32
ments of the French armored division By then the V, XIX, and VII Corps
arrived on the scene and compounded of the First Army were closing firmly to
the confusion.28 the army group boundary. When they
T h e regimental commander of the completed their moves, the Allied front
318th Infantry finally got a radio mes- resembled an irregular horseshoe vir-
sage through to the 80th Division head- tually encircling the major part of the
quarters. He informed General Mc- German forces in Normandy. Allied
Bride that the XV Corps had ordered troops held a line from the Canadian
him off the road, then said: “My mission positions at Falaise westward to the
requires speed. What is decision?” 29 British near Flers, then eastward to
What he did not know was that his mis- Argentan, thereby forming the Argen-
sion had become outdated by the rapid tan–Falaise pocket. Yet the Argentan–
development of events. T h e VII Corps Falaise gap still existed, and through the
had started to close the gap on the XV fifteen-mile opening the Germans were
Corps left that morning, and General to try to escape complete encirclement.
Bradley had decided to halt the XV
Corps short of Argentan. T h e com- T h e German Decision T o
mitment of the XX Corps on the XV Withdraw
Corps left proved unnecessary. In-
structed to regroup, the XX Corps at Pulling the German armored divisions
1300 had ordered the 80th Division to out of the Mortain sector to augment
concentrate in the Laval-Evron area.30 Panzer Group Eberbach near Argentan
General McBride therefore radioed the left the Seventh Army in a drastically
318th—and the 317th Infantry as well—to weakened condition. Corps strove to
“halt in place, clear road, bivouac maintain more than precarious contact
present position for night . . . and await with adjacent units, plugging holes in
further orders.” 31 the line with scanty local reserves from
This did not quite end the confusion. splinter divisions. Despite desperate ef-
T h e regiment went into bivouac, but forts to hold the line, the “undiminished
violence” of the V and XIX U.S. Corps
2880th Div AAR, Aug; XV Corps Memo, 13 Aug, attacks on 1 2 August forced the Seventh
80th Div G–3 Jnl File; Interv with McHugh,
Stockton’sHosp Intervs,III, GL–93 ( 23 5). Army to continue the withdrawal it had
29 Msg,318th Inf to 80th Div G–3, 1754, 13 Aug started from Mortain the previous night.
(received 1825), 80th Div G–3 Jnl.
30XX Corps FO 3, 1300, 13 Aug.
31 Msgs, McBride to 317th and 318th Inf Regts, 32Interv with McHugh, Stockton’s Hosp Intervs,
1845, 13 Aug, 80th Div G–3 Jnl. Vol. III, GL–93 (235) .
516 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Yet since Hitler was still obsessed with While these were extreme cases, the
the thought of attacking again toward over-all strength of Army Group B had
Avranches, Kluge could not order an un- declined markedly during the two
equivocal withdrawal eastward to escape months following the Allied invasion.
the threatening Allied encirclement.33 By 14 August the Germans in the west
Combat on the Seventh Army front had lost 3,630 officers, more than 151,000
assumed the character of delaying action. enlisted men, and 3,800 Osttruppen—a
T h e units fought only to gain time and total of almost 160,000 troops. On the
avoid annihilation. By their tactics surface, this compared favorably with
they sought to lure the Allies into time- the Allied battle casualties of approxi-
consuming reconnaissance and deploy- mately 180,000 by that date. T h e differ-
ment for attack, then they retired to the ence, however, was more than offset by
next position, usually during the night. the increasing number of Allied units
T h e Seventh Army continued to resist arriving on the Continent and by the
in this way, withdrawing rapidly weak- constant influx of Allied replacements.
ening units slowly but steadily through For the Germans, only 30,000 men had
successively shrinking fronts. On 13 arrived to replace losses in the west; only
August the destruction of telephone 10,000 more were on their way to the
wires by bombs and artillery intensified front.35 On the basis of this alone, the
feelings of insecurity, for throughout the German situation was hardly promising.
day the Seventh Army was out of com- Added to this was the increasing threat
munication with Panzer Group Eber- of Allied encirclement.
bach. For twenty-four hours personnel An order from Hitler arrived in the
at the Seventh Army headquarters won- west early on 14 August, and according
dered whether they were already cut off to him, “The present situation in the
and isolated. rear of the army group is the result of
Panzer Group Eberbach was also dras- the failure of the first attack on Av-
tically reduced in strength by 13 August. ranches.” Alluding to what seemed to
T h e 9th Panzer Division had only 260 the Germans to be a change in the di-
men, 12 tanks, and a few artillery pieces. rection of the XV U.S. Corps thrust from
T h e 1st SS Panzer Division had 352 men, the north to the west, Hitler advised of
8 self-propelled assault guns, and 14 the “danger that Panzer Group Eber-
Mark IV and 7 Mark V tanks. T h e 2d bach, which was committed much too far
Panzer Division, which had had 2,220 to the north, will again become involved
men, 5 self-propelled assault guns, and in a sterile frontal fight.” What he
9 Mark IV and 3 Mark V tanks on 1 1 wanted was an attack in Eberbach’s sec-
September, was considerably diminished tor, “in the Alençon–Carrouges area,”
two days later.34 in order to destroy the great part of the
33Principal sources are Hodgson MS R-58, and
MS # B-179 (Hausser), MS # B-346 (Blauen- 35OB W E S T K T B Lagebeurteilung, 14 Aug,
steiner), MS # A–918 (Gersdorff), MS # B-807 Anlagen, p. 1379. The Allied figure has been
(Kuntzen), MS # A–922 and MS # B-840 (Eber- estimated from the 12th Army Group, G–3 Report
bach) , MS # B-445 (Krueger) . 71, 2300, 15 August, and from the British Army
34Mittagmeldung, 15 Aug, OB WEST KTB, of the Rhine, Notes on the Operations of the 21
Anlagen, p. 1403. Army Group (Germany, October 1945).
T H E ARGENTAN–FALAISE POCKET 517
XV U.S. Corps. T h e 9th and 10th SS (two nights) to a shorter line roughly
Panzer Divisions and the 21st Panzer Di- through Flers. Kluge instructed Diet-
vision, he instructed, “can and must be rich to disengage the 11 SS Panzer Corps,
employed for this purpose.” This time with the 9th SS and 21st Panzer Di-
the reinforced Panzer Group Eberbach visions, in the course of the withdrawal
had to be committed far enough to the and to transfer those forces to Eberbach.
south to strike the deep left flank of the Then, during the evening of 14 August,
enemy and thus deny him the possibility Kluge departed his Army Group B com-
of launching a counterthrust into the mand post and went forward to see how
right flank of the panzer group as he had further compliance with Hitler’s order
done before. In order to free the three could best be carried out.37
designated panzer divisions for the at- Meanwhile, what had seemed like the
tack, Hitler admitted that contraction of beginning of stabilization on 13 August
the salient west of Flers could not be had deteriorated by the end of the next
avoided. Yet he warned Kluge that as day. T h e “great offensive” the Ger-
the front west of Flers was withdrawn to mans had expected on the Canadian
a shorter line, the enemy would bring front materialized. On a nine-mile
strong pressure to bear against the south front the Canadians made a breach in
flank between Domfront and Alençon. the German defenses astride the Caen–
T h e speed and the extent of the with- Falaise road for a depth of five to six
drawal to the shorter line near Flers, miles. On other parts of the front other
therefore, should depend on the amount penetrations occurred, the “most un-
of Allied pressure. Concerned also by pleasant” being the pressure of Ameri-
“anticipated landings” on the coast of can forces around Domfront. Ammuni-
southern France (actually to take place tion and gasoline shortages were getting
on the following day), Hitler advised more criticalby the hour.38
Kluge that “destruction of the enemy As Kluge drove toward Dietrich’s
near Alençon” was the immediate OB Fifth Panzer Army headquarters on the
WEST mission and that all further di- evening of 14 August, he found the roads
rectives from Hitler would depend on clogged with traffic and dispirited troops.
the course of the battle there.36 When he reached Dietrich’s command
If Hitler’s order failed to bring com- post, he learned firsthand that the de-
fort, it at least had the virtue of being pleted divisions of the panzer army were
positive. It authorized further with- too weak to react effectively to the sec-
drawal, and Kluge ordered the western- ond Canadian attack toward Falaise.
most forces to start a retrograde move- In view of the gravity of the situation
ment that was to take place in two stages on the I SS Panzer Corps front, the 21st
Panzer Division had to be diverted to
36Quoted in Msg, OB WEST to AGP B, 0445,
14 Aug, AGp B Fuehrer Befehle. In a letter to
Jodl written five days later, on 19 August, Blumen- 37
Telecons, Speidel and Blumentritt, 1110, 14
tritt stated that Kluge had been depressed by Aug, and Kluge and Speidel, 2330, 14 Aug, AGP
Hitler’s order, which by its detailed instructions B KTB; Kluge’s Order, 1810, 14 Aug, OB WEST
seemed to imply a lack of confidence in Kluge’s KTB, Anlagen, p. 1380.
ability to handle the situation. Blumentritt’s 38AGp B Tagesmeldung, 0200, 15 Aug, OB WEST
letter is extracted in OKW/222, 25 Aug. KTB, Anlagen.
518 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
reached the Dives River near Mézidon “I must emphatically state,” Blumen-
and St. Pierre. An immediate decision tritt said, “that I am in a difficult position
was required, and with Kluge still miss- as chief of staff when Kluge is not here.
ing Dietrich ordered a withdrawal to I have the most urgent request. As long
positions behind the Dives River.40 as Kluge is absent, someone must be ap-
Meanwhile, there was still no word on pointed by the Fuehrer to take charge.
Kluge’s whereabouts by 1830, when Blu- It could only be Hausser, Dietrich, or
mentritt, Kluge’s chief of staff at OB Eberbach.”
WEST, was talking to Jodl on the tele- Jodl seemed to incline toward Hausser.
phone. “The situation west of Argen- “I’ll be most grateful,” Blumentritt
tan,” Blumentritt declared, “is worsen- said, “for the quickest possible decision.
ing by the hour.” Implying that with- As far as I am concerned, I am cool as a
drawal from the pocket was becom- cucumber. But I must say that the re-
ing increasingly necessary, Blumentritt sponsible people on the front contem-
passed on the insistence of Dietrich, plate the situation as being extremely
Hausser, and Eberbach that “an over-all tense.”
decision has to be made.” Jodl stressed once more the essential
“If such a decision has to be made as prerequisite for any possible action in
a last resort,” Jodl replied, “it could only the future: an attack by Eberbach.
be to attack toward Sées to gain room “But,” he added with a touch of sarcasm,
so that other intentions can be carried “the only reports we receive are that he
out.” is unable to do anything.”
“I am duty bound,” Blumentritt said, Blumentritt overlooked the remark.
“to point out the state of the armored “If a new commander in the field is ap-
units.” All suffered from a great short- pointed by the Fuehrer,” he reminded
age of gasoline because of the difficulty Jodl, “he must be given a clearly stated
of transporting supplies westward into limited mission without any strings at-
the pocket. tached.” Only then would he be able
Jodl did not see the logic of this think- to estimate reasonably how he could ex-
ing. In order to break out of the en- pect to come out of the situation.
circling Allied forces, one had to attack. Otherwise, the Germans would probably
“We must speak frankly,” Blumentritt lose the best divisions they had. Time
said. If Jodl had in mind an attack was short—“it is five minutes before
with all available forces in order to bring twelve.” 41
out of the pocket—if at all possible—at An hour later Hitler placed Hausser
least part of the forces, this was a sound in temporary command of the forces un-
decision. But if the intention was to der Army Group B. 42 Later that night
carry out some other operation, such
was no longer feasible. 41Telecon, Blumentritt and Jodl, 1830, 15 Aug,
OB WEST K T B , Anlagen, p. 1420.
Jodl was not convinced. 42Though clearly the impetus for Hausser’s ap-
pointment came originally from Blumentritt, some
40 Tagesmeldung, 0230, 16 Aug, and Gause individuals on higher military and political
Telecon, 1915, 15 Aug, AGp B K T B . Dietrich also echelons apparently connected Kluge’s disap-
discreetly suggested his availability to command the pearance with the Allied invasion of southern
army group if Kluge did not turn up. France, which occurred the same day. Since the
520 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the 9th SS Panzer Division, which had Kluge’s reappearance on the evening
been moving behind the front toward of 15 August brought hope that a
the east before being intercepted by the weighty decision would be made. After
331st Division and put to use by the conferring with Hausser and Eberbach,
corps. Despite these discouraging con- Kluge returned to Dietrich’s command
ditions, Jodl, who telephoned shortly be- post where telephone communication
fore midnight to inquire about Kluge’s was better. There he remained during
whereabouts, held the opinion that no the night and the next day, in touch
matter how bad the situation seemed, it with Jodl, Blumentritt, and Speidel.
was necessary to attack to the east to His first act was to send a message to
broaden the open end of the pocket- Jodl. At 0200, 16 August, Kluge in-
“because it is impossible to get two formed Jodl that in his judgment-and
armies out the end of an intestine.” 47 he was supported by the army com-
Jodl could not see what was happen- manders-all the available armored
ing in the Panzer Group Eberbach sec- forces together were insufficient for a
tor. T h e roads were virtually impass- large-scale attack to improve the situa-
able; units were intermingled; move- tion in the army group rear. He felt
ments were frequently made under the that scanty POL supplies were a “de-
muzzles of long-range Allied artillery cisive” factor. He was discouraged by
pieces; tanks were repeatedly immobi- the “increasingly critical” south flank.
lized for lack of fuel; ammunition sup- He therefore recommended immediate
plies arrived erratically; the troops were evacuation of the western salient through
hungry and exhausted; communication the still existing Argentan–Falaise gap.
was almost nonexistent, except by radio. Hesitation in accepting his recommen-
Signs of disintegration appeared in cer- dation, Kluge warned Jodl, would result
tain formations, and straggler lines in “unforeseeable developments.” 50
picked up many more than the usual Kluge then waited for the decision
number of men. Divisions consisted of from Hitler on whether or not to with-
“a miserable handful of troops” that draw. At 1135, 16 August, he tele-
“never before fought so miserably.” 48 phoned Generalleutnant Hans Speidel,
An Army Group B staff officer, alluding his chief of staff at Army Group B , to be
to the retreat from Moscow in 1812, de- brought up to date on messages received
scribed the situation on the roads as by the headquarters. Not long after-
having “a Napoleonic aspect”; since the wards he talked on the telephone with
army group had no means with which to Blumentritt, who informed him of the
bring matters under control, could O B Allied landings in southern France.
W E S T help? 49 Blumentritt suggested that Kluge re-
quest OKW for a free hand in directing
47Telecon, Jodl and Speidel, 2310, 15 Aug, AGP
the withdrawal operation out of the
B KTB. See also Seventh Army Abendmeldung,
15 Aug, and Addenda, OB WEST KTB, Anlagen,
p. 1415.
4 8 MS # B-807 (Kuntzen) . 50 Msg, Kluge to Jodl, signed 0200, 16 Aug, in-
49Telecon, 1202, 15 Aug, OB WEST KTB, tercepted by II Fighter Corps at 1145, 16 Aug,
Anlagen, p. 1402. AGp B Op. Befehle, pp. 308-09.
522 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
pocket that had obviously become nec- would shortly arrive in the field. Pre-
essary.51 sumably it would give Kluge full free-
At 1245 Kluge telephoned Jodl and dom of action. Since Jodl had agreed
again set forth his estimate of the situa- that withdrawal was necessary, Kluge di-
tion. Unquestionably, Jodl admitted, rected Speidel to prepare immediately
the armies had to be withdrawn east- the draft of a withdrawal order for
ward. But it seemed to him that a with- Seventh Army. T h e Seventh Army was
drawal was feasible only if the escape to begin withdrawing on the following
opening were enlarged, and this could morning. Hausser was to pull two di-
be done only by an attack to the south- visions out of the front at once and dis-
east. patch them to the Fifth Panzer Army,
Kluge was direct and to the point. which had lost two divisions in two days
He believed it impossible to comply of fierce combat. The II SS Panzer
with Hitler’s wish as expressed in Hit- Corps headquarters was to be made sub-
ler’s directive to Hausser. An attack ordinate to Panzer Group Eberbach so
southeastward through Argentan and that Eberbach could exercise better con-
Sées was out of the question. “No mat- trol over the many splinter units assigned
ter how many orders are issued,” Kluge to him. How to get the Seventh Army
said, “the troops cannot, are not able to, back across the Orne was the most
are not strong enough to defeat the troublesome problem of the withdrawal.
enemy. It would be a fateful error to T h e movement of supplies westward into
succumb to a hope that cannot be ful- the pocket was already virtually impos-
filled, and no power in this world [can sible. Tanks were being abandoned for
accomplish its will simply] through an lack of fuel. T h e bridges over the Orne
order it may give. That is the situa- were not suitable for heavy traffic. Be-
tion.” cause antiaircraft protection was gener-
Jodl assured Kluge that he understood ally inadequate, Allied air attacks on
perfectly. A concise and clear directive massed vehicles at the Orne River cross-
from the Fuehrer, he said, would be sent ing sites could create insurmountable
to Kluge in the shortest possible time.52 difficulties. For these reasons it was nec-
Twenty minutes later Speidel tele- essary to provide for the strict regula-
phoned Kluge to report information to tion of traffic during the withdrawal.
the effect that a directive from Hitler T h e Seventh Army was to be charged
with this job. Since the most difficult
part of the withdrawal would be across
51Telecon, Kluge and Speidel, 1135, 16 Aug,
AGp B KTB; Telecon, Kluge and Blumentritt,
the Orne River itself, Kluge wanted a
1155, 16 Aug, OB WEST KTB, Anlagen, p. 1450. corps headquarters that had no other as-
Blumentritt and Speidel spoke on the telephone signment to take charge of traffic control
around noon and speculated on the withdrawal
movement. Speidel expressed the opinion, and
over the Orne; he designated the LVIII
Blumentritt was apparently in agreement, that the Panzer Corps for the task.53
withdrawal had to be carried out to the Dives An hour and a half later, at 1439,
River-Laigle line. Telecon, Blumentritt and
Speidel, 1210, 16 Aug, AGp B KTB.
52Telecon, Kluge and Jodl, 1245, 16 Aug, Fifth 53Telecon, Kluge and Speidel, 1305, 16 Aug,
Pz A KTB, Anlage 24. AGP B K T B .
T H E ARGENTAN–FALAISE POCKET 523
though Hitler’s directive had still not ar- River had been contemplated, and the
rived in the west, Kluge issued his with- necessity of holding the Falaise shoulder
drawal order. T h e armies were to with- of the gap was self-evident. While
draw behind the Orne River during two Jodl’s concept of enlarging the escape
successive nights, starting that night. corridor by Eberbach’s attack to the
Two divisions of the Seventh Army were southeast was theoretically sound, no
to be disengaged and dispatched to the means existed to carry out the attack.
Fifth Panzer Army as rapidly as possible Yet Hitler and Jodl both refused to ac-
to assist in the Falaise area. Panzer cept this hard fact despite irrefutable
Group Eberbach was to cover the with- evidence presented by the commanders
drawal by launching attacks in the Ar- in the field. By 16 August, with the
gentan area. Eberbach was to be ready loss of Falaise that day the most dramatic
to send two panzer divisions under II SS illustration of the shrinking pocket, the
Panzer Corps eastward to the Vimoutiers commanders found themselves not only
area, where it was to remain at the dis- virtually surrounded by a contracting
posalof the army group. 54 enclosure but also threatened with being
Two hours afterwards, Hitler’s order engulfed by crumbling walls. Further-
arrived. It authorized Army Group B more, their only escape route was in im-
to withdraw its forces that were west of minent danger of being blocked.
the Dives River. T h e movement east- T h e decision to withdraw having fi-
ward was to be made in two stages: nally been made, the Germans began to
across the Orne River, then across the pull out of the pocket after dark on 16
Dives. Junction with the LXXXI Corps August.
was to be made near Gacé. Hitler em-
phasized two requirements: Falaise had T h e Allied Decision to Close
to be strongly held as a “corner pillar,” the Pocket
and the Argentan–Falaise gap had to be
enlarged by an attack launched by Pan- Having halted the XV Corps just
zer Group Eberbach toward the south- south of Argentan on 13 August, Gen-
east.55 eral Bradley made another decision on
There was nothing in Hitler’s order the following day. Without consulting,
that had not previously been considered General Montgomery, he decided to re-
and discussed more than once in the tain only part of the XV Corps at Argen-
headquarters along the chain of com- tan while sending the rest to the east to-
mand. Withdrawal behind the Dives ward the Seine River (and across it if
possible), with Dreux the first objective.
54 AGp B Order, 1439, 16 Aug, AGp B Op. T h e reasons for Bradley’s action were
Befehle. Because it seemed that the large number clear. T h e apparent scarcity of enemy
of divisions could not be brought across the few forces between Argentan and the Seine
available Orne River bridges in two days’ time,
Kluge later amended his order to allow a third day
seemed to warrant a thrust to the eastern
if necessary. Telecon, Kluge and Speidel, 1700, boundary of the OVERLORD lodgment
16 Aug, AGp B K T B . area. There seemed no need to retain
55Telecon, Blumentritt and Speidel, 1645, 16 Aug, a large force at Argentan, for “due to the
AGP B K T B , Hitler Order, 1555 (?), 16 Aug,
OB W E S T K T B , Anlagen, p. 1457. delay in closing the gap between Argen-
524 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
direct increased pressure on the pocket Corps had already created a precarious
from the north. Among other instruc- situation on the German southern flank,
tions Montgomery relayed to Crerar’s where the 116th Panzer Division and ele-
chief of staff by telephone was a specific ments of the 2d SS Panzer Division (the
order: “It is absolutely essential that latter at le Bourg-St.-Léonard) were
both armoured divisions of the 2d Cana- holding the gap open. Units of both
dian Corps, i.e. 4th Canadian Armoured German divisions had attacked and taken
Division and 1st Polish Armoured Di- le Bourg-St.-Léonard on the previous
vision, close the gap between First Cana- day, only to be pushed off the ridge.
dian Army and Third US. Army. 1st But at dawn of 17 August they attacked
Polish Armoured Division must thrust again with infantry, armor, and artillery
on past T r u n to Chambois at all costs, well massed. Again they drove 90th Di-
and as quickly as possible.” 1 vision troops from the village and ridge.
Three things happened as a result. Heavy fighting continued throughout
First, east of the Dives, part of the the day, this time the Germans retaining
LXXXVI Corps left flank was forced possession of the high ground.
back behind the Viette River. Second, T h e situation there might have been
the two armored divisions of the 2d quite different had General Gaffey’s pro-
Canadian Corps, the 4th Canadian on visional corps launched its attack to seize
the right, the 1st Polish on the left, Chambois. But before Gaffey’s opera-
struck the weakened I SS Panzer Corps. tion could get under way, another officer
Advancing roughly parallel to the Dives appeared on the scene with authority to
River, the armored divisions broke take command of the forces on the Ar-
through the German line and reached gentan–Exmes line. He was General
positions little more than a mile from Gerow, commander of the V Corps.
the Trun–Vimoutiers highway, less than T h e V Corps, under First Army com-
two miles north of Trun. Third, an- mand, had been pinched out near Tin-
other penetration southwest of Falaise chebray on 15 August and had no further
presented a potential threat to the immediate combat mission. When Gen-
Seventh Army right rear. eral Montgomery made known by tele-
T o deal with these developments, ele- phone on the following day his intention
ments of the 2d SS and 9th SS Panzer Di- to close the pocket at T r u n and Cham-
visions of the II SS Panzer Corps, mov- bois, the availability of the V Corps
ing to Vimoutiers in army group reserve, headquarters made it an obvious choice
were committed against the Allied pene- to take charge of the divisions around
tration at Trun, and the Seventh Army Argentan. General Bradley therefore
was ordered to accelerate its withdrawal ordered General Hodges to send General
across the Orne River. Gerow to the southern shoulder of the
T h e departure of the II SS Panzer gap. General Patton, apparently not in-
formed of this arrangement, had mean-
1Canadian Mil Hq Hist Sec Rpt No. 146, Opns while sent General Gaffey to the area.
of the First Canadian Army in North-West Europe,
31 Jul-1 Oct 44 (hereafter cited as Canadian
Gerow, on the evening of 16 August,
Opns) , ML-2250. had received a telephone call instructing
530 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
him to report immediately, with several and secured the jump-off positions Ge-
key officers, to First Army headquarters. row wanted.2
He took eight officers with him. Travel- T h e German situation on the southern
ing in three jeeps, they reached their shoulder of the gap was further aggra-
destination shortly after midnight and vated that evening of 17 August, for the
found the tent that housed the war room 116th Panzer Division received orders to
a beehive of activity. relieve the 2d SS Panzer Division troops
Hodges and his chief of staff, Maj. near le Bourg-St.-Léonard so the latter
Gen. William B. Kean, informed Gerow could rejoin the II SS Panzer Corps at
that he (Gerow) was to assume com- Vimoutiers. T h e relief was accom-
mand at once of three divisions near Ar- plished during the night by committing
gentan and to close the Argentan–Falaise the last 116th Panzer Division reserve–a
gap. “Where are those divisions?” Ge- reconnaissance battalion about eighty
row asked. No one knew exactly. Nor men strong.
could anyone tell him anything about Meanwhile, Kluge had outlined and
the enemy situation there. made known his future intentions in a
Shortly after midnight, in the midst warning order to his army commanders.
of a heavy rain, Gerow and his staff de- T h e armies, after crossing the Orne
parted in search of the three divisions. River, were to fall back without delay
By daybreak on 17 August Gerow was to the Dives River–Morteaux–Trun–
in his new area. He set up a command Gacé-Laigle line. There Panzer Group
post in the Hôtel de France at Alençon Eberbach was to be disbanded. T h e
and located General Gaffey. Messages Seventh Army was to assume responsi-
to the First and Third Armies soon clari- bility for the front between the seacoast
fied the matter of command. Bradley and Laigle. T h e Fifth Panzer Army,
shifted the army boundary to place T r u n with Eberbach again in command, was
and Chambois in the First Army zone of to take the sector from Laigle to the vi-
advance. T h e provisional corps head- cinity of the Eure River just west of
quarters was disbanded. Because the V Paris.3
Corps Artillery was moving from Tin- Kluge was not to remain in command
chebray to the Argentan area on 17 Au- much longer. Model arrived on the
gust, Gerow postponed the attack toward 2 Interv by Col S. L. A. Marshall with Lt Gen
Chambois and T r u n until the following Leonard T. Gerow, 12 Sep 45, quoted in [Alpert],
morning. Notes; V Corps Operations in the E T O , pp. 181–86;
12th AGp Ltr and Ltr of Instrs, both 17 Aug; Msg,
For this attack General Gerow wanted Col James H. Hagan to Gen Haislip, 0750, 17 Aug,
the le Bourg-St.-Léonard ridge as the line and Memo, Hagan for Menoher, 0025, 17 Aug,
of departure. Though General McLain XV Corps CofS Jnl and File; Sylvan Diary, 16 Aug.
For their inspiring and heroic leadership at le
proposed to recapture the village and Bourg-St.-Léonard, Brig. Gen. William G. Weaver
ridge as part of his effort on 18 August, and Maj. Leroy R. Pond were awarded the Oak
Gerow insisted on having the high Leaf Cluster to the DSC, and Maj. Robert H.
ground before the attack. In compli- Schulz and Lt. Col. George B. Randolph were
awarded the DSC, the latter posthumously.
ance, the 90th Division attacked after 1 Kluge to Dietrich, Hausser, and Eberbach, 1430,
dark, re-entered the village at midnight, 17 Aug, AGp B Op. Befehle.
CLOSING T H E POCKET 531
Allied planes that pursued even individ- northern flank with the II SS Panzer
ual vehicles, the Seventh Army main- Corps ( 2 d SS, 9th SS, 12th SS, and 21st
tained discipline. Two circumstances, Panzer Divisions) and the southern flank
German commanders recalled later, with the X L V I I Panzer Corps ( 2 d and
aided them in their river crossing: in 116th Panzer Divisions).7
their opinion, the British “did not fol- Returning to his headquarters that
low up very vigorously from the west,” afternoon, Model reported his views to
and Allied planes concentrated their Jodl and requested their immediate re-
attacks on Trun, Chambois, and Vimou- ferral to the Fuehrer. Model’s appraisal
tiers rather than farther to the west over of the situation and discussion with his
the Orne.6 commanders led him to make four main
points. First, the outcome of the with-
Enter Model, Exit Kluge drawal operation and the prospect of
supplying the troops depended heavily
Early on 18 August, at 0600, Field on reducing the absolute air suprempcy
Marshal Model, the O B W E S T and of the Allies for the next few days
Army Group B commander-designate, Second, hard fighting on the ground
drove to the Fifth Panzer Army com- would be necessary during the with-
mand post near Lisieux to confer with drawal, but Model hoped to accomplish
Dietrich, Eberbach, and Hausser. Since the withdrawal according to the follow-
Hausser was unwilling to leave his ing timetable: during the night of 18
troops at that critical time, his chief of August, to the Falaise–Argentan road;
staff, Generalmajor Rudolf-Christoph during the night of 19 August, behind
Freiherr von Gersdorff, represented the Dives River; during the night of 20
him at the conference. All the con- August, to the Touques River–Laigle
ferees were in general agreement on line. He hoped also to be able
the measures that needed to be taken. to release certain armored units and
Above all, a front had to be re-estab- headquarters for assembly near the Seine.
lished, either one west of the Seine River Third, upon completion of the with-
or one along it, according to the way the drawal, the Seventh Army was to take
situation developed. T h e first attempt command of the sector from the sea
to stabilize the front was to be made to Laigle, inclusive; the Fifth Panzer
along the Touques River. T h e Seventh Army, under Eberbach, was to assume
Army, with Panzer Group Eberbach sub- responsibility for the sector between
ordinated to it for the withdrawal opera- Laigle and Paris. T h e First Army, mov-
tion, was to get out of the pocket as ing northeastward from the Atlantic
quickly as possible. T h e Seventh Army coast of France, was to take charge of the
had to be behind the Dives River on 2 0 Paris sector and the upper Seine River.
August and behind the Touques two Fourth, the troops were spent; no com-
days later. Panzer Group Eberbach bat performance of any kind could be
was to be responsible for protecting the
7 Min of Conf, 18 Aug, Fifth Pz Army K T B ,
6 M S # B–727 (Gersdorff) and MS # A–922 Anlage 34; Tempelhoff Telecon, 1050, 18 Aug, A G p
(Eberbach) . B KTB.
CLOSING T H E POCKET 533
expected from them unless certain Corps. Deep penetrations had occurred
minimum requirements were fulfilled. east and west of the Dives. East of the
Model listed the minimum require- river the Canadians were in possession
ments. He needed without delay 2 0 of T r u n and had advanced to the vi-
replacement battalions–4 for panzer cinity of St. Lambert, while a British
divisions, 6 for SS panzer divisions, and thrust along the Falaise–Argentan high-
i o for infantry divisions-plus 5 army way reached a point about halfway be-
engineer battalions. As an example of tween the two towns. T h e pressure
how depleted his units were, he planned from the south was generally contained,
to form four kampfgruppen from but along the eastern edge of the wood-
remnants of ten divisions-one kampf- land east of Argentan American forces
gruppe consisting of what remained of had unhinged the southern shoulder and
the 84th, 85th, 89th, and 271st Divisions threatened Chambois. By the end of
and comprising 1,200 men and 8 artil- the day, the gap on the eastern end of
lery batteries; another kampfgruppe con- the pocket appeared closed, though
sisting of the 276th, 277th, 326th, and presumably as yet only with weak
363d Divisions and totaling 1,300 men forces.9.
and 8 batteries; a third of the 3d Para- T h e most significant development had
chute Division, 1,500 men and 8 bat- occurred on the north flank in the zone
teries; and a fourth of the 353d Division, of the 2d Canadian Corps. T h e 4th
2,000 men and 6 batteries. Canadian Armoured Division took
He also needed immediate matériel Trun, and reconnaissance elements
replacements: at least 270 tanks or advanced to the edge of St. Lambert.
assault guns to provide each armored Beside it, the Polish division secured the
division with about 30; 9 artillery battal- area around Hordouseaux and Hills 258
ions of 108-mm. howitzers to replace and 137, while a reinforced reconnais-
guns lost by the panzer divisions; and as sance troop probed to within half a mile
many 180-mm. howitzers as possible. He north of Chambois. T h e result denied
required a 9,000-ton capacity transporta- the Germans one of their two main es-
tion facility to expedite the delivery of cape routes.10
essential supplies and the movement of On the southern shoulder of the gap,
reserve units to the front. And, finally, General Gerow’s V Corps had launched
he requested that 6 panzer brigades in its attack on 18 August. Gerow had in-
the process of activation in Germany be structed the 2d French Armored Divi-
dispatched to the Western Front.8 sion on the left to hold firmly to the
Meanwhile, the situation on the Army Ecouché–Argentan line, in order to
Group B front had again deteriorated 9 A G p B Tagesmeldung, dated 19 Aug, A G p B
on 18 August. T h e army group KTB.
reported the left flank of the LXXXVI 10 Two main sources have been used for the
action on the northern flank: Canadian Opns; I.
Corps pushed behind the Vie River, still Dywizja Pancerna w Walce ( T h e First Armored
out of contact with the I SS Panzer Division in Battle) (Brussels: La Colonne, Ltd.,
1947) (hereafter cited as 1st Polish Armored Divi-
sion), pp. 67–70, 91–103. Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff
8 Model’s Rpt to Jodl, 18 Aug, OB WEST K T B , kindly made available the information published in
Anlagen, p. 1513. the Polish language.
534 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
prevent the Germans from breaking out ing mist rising from patches of damp
of the impending trap, and assist the and densely thicketed forests hampered
corps attack by fire. In the center, be- the troops at first. Later, thick smoke
tween Argentan and le Bourg-St.-Léon- from smoldering timber set afire by
ard, the 80th Division was to commit white phosphorus shells obscured their
the 318th Infantry in a thrust designed vision. This, plus German fire (par-
to bypass Argentan on the east, cut the ticularly of the 8th Werfer (Rocket)
Argentan–Trun road, and enter Argen- Brigade) and defensive action by the
tan from the northeast.11 On the right, 116th Panzer Division, prevented the
from a line between le Bourg-St.-Léon- 90th from attaining its objective,
ard and Exmes, the 90th Division was T h e gap on the eastern end of the
to drive north to capture high ground pocket remained open, and through it
near Chambois. Fifteen artillery battal- that night German headquarters and
ions were to lend support.12 units escaped. T h e 116th Panzer Divi-
T h e 318th Infantry, 80th Division, sion, for example, sent trains and artil-
made no progress against strong German lery through the Trun–Chambois gap.
resistance. Occupying rising ground T h e L V I I I Panzer Corps headquarters,
and possessing superior observation, the having fulfilled its mission of regulating
Germans knocked out four Sherman traffic over the Orne bridges, moved
tanks with their first few antitank across the Dives to safety.
shells. Their artillery and machine gun Yet the Germans had ample cause for
fire inflicted severe casualties on the in- concern. T h e pocket had been further
fantry. General McBride called off the compressed. “Practically speaking,” ac-
attack and requested the artillery fire of cording to German commanders, “the
seven supporting battalions in an attempt pocket was closed.” With the exception
to reduce the German defenses before of a narrow belt of woodland running
trying to advance again.13 along the watershed between the Orne
T h e 90th Division had more, but not and Dives River valleys, the terrain
complete, success. Moving cross-coun- offered little cover. T h e roads were
try, American infantrymen outflanked like chalk marks on a billiard table, in
resistance astride the le Bourg-St.-Léon- plain view of Allied aircraft and artillery
ard–Chambois road, then cut the road observers. During the night of 18 Au-
about half way to Chambois.14 Morn- gust intense artillery fire suddenly
descended on the pocket from all sides
11Only one other regiment of the 80th Division, in unprecedented volume, and it con-
the 317th was available to Gerow, and he kept it
as his corps reserve. The third regiment, the 319th
tinued throughout the following day.15
was on a separate mission near the Loire River. Outside the Army Group B perspec-
12V Corps FO 20, 1800, 17 Aug; V Corps Ltr of
Instr (Gerow to Leclerc) 18 Aug; Thompson, Arty
Study. 15 MS # A–919 (Gersdorff) ; see Telecon, Gersdorff
1380th Div AAR, Aug; Interv with McHugh, and Speidel, 2020, PO Aug, AGp B K T B ; Com-
Stockton’s Hosp Intervs, Vol. III, GL–93 ( 2 3 5 ) . mandant Richard Mouton, “Le Piége se Referme
14Lt. Col. Christian H. Clarke, Jr., though suffer- a Chambois,” in Herval, Bataille d e Normandie, I,
ing a painful and partially disabling wound, mani- 416; Leigh-Mallory, “Despatch,” Fourth Supple-
fested heroic leadership and was awarded the ment to the London Gazette of December 31, 1946,
DSC. p. 67.
CLOSING T H E POCKET 535
tive, events in the west were also having Marseille and Toulon by a division
their effect on higher levels, and on 18 each.16
August Hitler issued an order to amplify With Army Groups B and G withdraw-
his instructions of the 16th, instructions ing from northwest and southern France
that applied to the situation in southern by 18 August, Model at midnight, after a
France. On 16 August, a day after the day of inspection and conference in the
Allied invasion of southern France, Hit- west, assumed command of OB WEST
ler had ordered all noncombat troops of and Army Group B.17 His predecessor,
Army Group G west of the line Orléans– Kluge, departed for Germany by auto-
Clermont-Ferrand–Montpellier to begin mobile.
moving northeastward to the Seine- Shortly before Model’s arrival in the
Yonne River line. This order affected west, Kluge had told a colleague, “You
neither the combat troops of the Nine- may rest assured that I shall talk with
teenth Army opposing the Allied Medi- him [Hitler] again tonight without
terranean landings nor the fortress troops mincing any words. Something has to
on the Atlantic coast. On 18 August, happen. I owe this to the troops and
because developments in the Army to the German people. One way or
Group B sector foreshadowed the pos- another.” 18 Relieved of command be-
sibility that the Nineteenth Army might fore he could do so, Kluge nevertheless
be cut off in the near future, Hitler fulfilled his promise by writing a frank
ordered Army Group G to disengage its letter to Hitler before his departure.
forces in southern France–with the ex- On the road to Metz he then committed
ception of troops at Toulon and Mar- suicide, taking potassium cyanide. Hit-
seille. Army Group G was to move to ler at first repressed news of Kluge’s
gain contact with the southern flank of death, but soon after he received Kluge’s
Army Group B and begin at once to letter he informed important party offi-
organize a rallying position along a line cials and military authorities of Kluge’s
from Sens through Dijon to the Swiss suicide. 19 Hitler also advised them that
border. Firm rear-guard action on pre- Kluge had admitted his guilt for the de-
determined lines of resistance was to in- feat in the west. Kluge was buried
sure the orderly withdrawal of all troops quietly at home without the public ac-
from southeastern France. T h e 11th clamation later accorded Rommel, who,
Panzer Division was to be left in the unlike Kluge, was to be forced to take
Rhône River valley as protection against his own life.
Allied airborne landings and later was to
16Hitler Order, O K W / W F S t / O p , 16 Aug, re-
form the rear guard of the Nineteenth ceived by OB W E S T at 0320, 17 Aug, OB WEST
Army. T h e progress of pursuing Allied K T B , Anlagen, p. 252; Hitler Order, 18 Aug, OB
forces was to be impeded to the utmost W E S T K T B , Anlagen, p. 1499.
by demolition and destruction–“not one 17 F i f t h Pz A K T B , Anlage 40.
18MS # B–807 (Kuntzen) .
locomotive, bridge, power station, or re- 19 Telecon, 1710, 20 Aug, A G p B K T B . Speidel
pair shop shall fall into enemy hands un- reported that Kluge had complained on several
destroyed.” Fortress areas on the Atlan- occasions of dizziness and also that Kluge had
seemed deeply affected by the critical situation of
tic and Mediterranean coasts of France the encircled troops and by the fact that his
were to be defended to the last man, son was among them.
536 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Neither the letter nor Kluge’s suicide Getting across the Dives River was
affected the course of events. Nor did the next step in the withdrawal opera-
they bring comfort to Hitler, whose tion, but with the exit from the pocket
forces in the west were undergoing the in imminent danger of being closed by
destruction incident to defeat. Allied pincers at T r u n and Chambois,
Hausser, the Seventh Army commander,
T h e Pocket Closed came to the conclusion that he would
have to fight his way across the Dives and
During the night of 18 August and out of the pocket that night-not an easy
throughout the next day the Seventh matter.22 Daylight movements were
Army, with Panzer Group Eberbach extremely costly. All the roads leading
attached, fell back behind the railroad to the Dives were clogged with the wreck-
east of the Falaise–Argentan highway. age of vehicles and armament of every
T h e pocket was then approximately six kind. Though distances separating
miles deep and seven miles wide. In- headquarters were short, chaotic condi-
side were the headquarters of the tions made communications precarious.
Seventh Army, Panzer Group Eberbach, For example, the LXXIV Corps, which
and the LXXIV and LXXXIV Corps, was holding the northwestern sector of
the II Parachute and XLVII Panzer the pocket, was out of touch with army
Corps; the remnants of six infantry divi- headquarters. At 1130 on 19 August
sions still operating as entities: the 84th, the corps dispatched a radio message
276th, 277th, 326th, 353d, and 363d; one reporting its dispositions, requesting
parachute division, the 3d; three panzer urgently information on the general
divisions, the 12th SS, 2 d , and 116th; situation and its own combat mission,
perhaps two more panzer divisions, the and stating that it was out of contact
1st SS and 10th SS; a number of splinter with two of its divisions (the 84th and
groups of divisions that had ceased to 363d, still west of the railroad early that
exist as tactical units and that had been morning, about six miles from the corps
absorbed by other divisions or amal- command post). This message reached
gamated into kampfgruppen; and a mass the army headquarters by some round-
of stragglers, service elements, and about way two hours later, even though
trains-all compressed within an area the straight-line distance between the
that lay entirely under the watchful eye corps and army command posts was little
and effective fire of Allied artillery and
air. 21
zer Corps command post in the Vimoutiers area.
averted the defeat in August by disobeying Hitler T h e I SS Panzer Corps, split in two by the attacks
and withdrawing to the Seine at the beginning of of the Canadian and Polish armored divisions, was
the month, but Eberbach conceded that Kluge was trying to hold the line north of the Allied pene-
being watched so closely after the July 20th Putsch tration with what remained of its units east of the
that a false step would have resulted in his im- Dives River.
mediate relief and the substitution of a more man- 22Sources for the German action include MS #
ageable commander. MS # A-922 (Eberbach) . B–824 (Straube), MS # B–610 (Viebig), MS #
21T h e LVIII Panzer Corps headquarters was near B–526 (Badinski), MS # P–179 (Nettmann) , MS #
Vimoutiers. (Radio Msg, LVIII Pz Corps to P–169 (Fiebig), MS # B–163 (Dettling), MS #
Seventh Army, 0330, 19 Aug, Seventh Army KTB, A-968 (Elfeldt), MS # B–784 (Criegern), MS #
Anlagen.) Eberbach himself was at the II SS Pan- A–985 (Mahlmann), MS # P–164 (Meyer) .
538 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
more than three miles.23 Handicapped all day. About 0700 that morning Haus-
by communications difficulties, Hausser ser had arrived at the II Parachute Corps
tried to give his instructions on the forth- headquarters. Meindl, the corps com-
coming operation personally to his corps mander, interpreted such an early visit
commanders. On that day he was able as a bad omen, and he greeted Hausser
to visit three of his four corps head- with: “I presume the lid is on [the
quarters. kettle–the German word for pocket in
T h e Dives River itself was not con- the military sense] and we shall prob-
sidered a serious obstacle, but the main ably have to try to break out.” Hausser
Allied opposition was expected to be replied that that indeed was the matter
met along the east bank. According to he had come to discuss.
fragmentary intelligence available inside After Hausser indicated his ideas,
the pocket, a small opening on the east- Meindl formulated his II Parachute
ern edge of the pocket was supposed to Corps plan. With his two divisions, the
exist along the river south of Trun; 3 d Parachute and 353d, he proposed to
farther south toward Chambois the situa- break through the Allied lines between
tion was not at all clear. T r u n and Chambois, secure the Mt.
Hausser intended to break out of the Ormel hill mass three to four miles the
encirclement by means of a two-corps other side of the Dives, turn about on
attack. T h e II Parachute Corps was to that dominating ground, and, facing
thrust across the Dives River south of west, keep the breach open for troops
Trun, the XLVII Panzer Corps to cross following. From a line of departure
farther south near Chambois. T h e II near la Londe and starting at 2230, the
SS Panzer Corps was to render assistance four regiments of the 3d Parachute Divi-
from outside the pocket by launching a sion were to advance cross-country on
supporting attack with two divisions compass azimuths toward Coudehard
from Vimoutiers toward the Trun- and the Mt. Ormel hill mass, seven miles
Chambois area, thereby opening a path away. T h e paratroopers were to move
for the Seventh Army escape. T h e II SS on two axes, with two regiments on the
Panzer Corps attack had originally been left, one on the right, and the fourth
planned for 19 August, but Allied covering the rear. They were to cross
fighter-bombers prevented the air deliv- the Dives south of Magny, then move to
ery of necessary supplies, and the attack seize the northern part of the Ormel
was postponed until the morning of 20 ridge. Exploiting the cover of darkness
August. 24 ThusHausser’s forces would to the utmost, the paratroopers were to
be on their own in the initial stage of the advance “Indian fashion,” as noiselessly
breakout scheduled for the night of 19 as possible. No fire was to be opened
August. before dawn. Because of gasoline short-
T h e preparations for the effort took ages, artillerymen were to expend their
remaining ammunition during the day,
28Msg, 1130, 19 Aug, Seventh A r m y K T B , then destroy their pieces. A few anti-
An lagen. tank and 88-mm. antiaircraft guns, pro-
24AGp, B Tagesmeldung, 19 Aug, dated 0215, 20 vided with gasoline, were to accompany
Aug, and Telecon, II Fighter Corps CofS and
A G p B Ia / F, 1500, 19 Aug, AGp B K T B . the troops. Similarly, the 353d Division
CLOSING THE POCKET 539
GENERALMEINDL
on the right was to break out across the Panzer Division, holding the line along
Dives near St. Lambert and Chambois, the Argentan–Chambois road, was to
then seize the southern portion of Mt. cover the rear and, on order, follow the
Ormel. other divisions out.25
Hausser approved Meindl’s plan. He T h e LXXIV Corps, holding the
also issued his order for the XLVII Pan- northwestern part of the pocket perime-
zer Corps attack. T o give the II Para- ter with five divisions (the 277th, 276th,
chute Corps’ penetration by stealth a 326th, 84th, and 363d–the latter two still
better chance of success, Hausser in- west of the railroad), had the mission of
structed the XLVII Panzer Corps to start protecting the rear of the breakout
its attack no earlier than midnight-this operation in its sector. T h e corps was
would serve to keep from arousing then to move through the breach and
prematurely Allied vigilance and coun- out.
termeasures. T h e XLVII Panzer Corps T h e L X X X I V Corps, having passed
was to assemble the 1st SS and 2d Panzer its last division, the 353d, to the control
Divisions (perhaps also remnants of the of the II Parachute Corps on the previous
10th SS Panzer Division) in the Forêt
25 Hausser to Model, 0930, 19 Aug, Seventh Army
de Gouffern, and break out in the St. K T B , Anlagen; M S # A–923 (Meindl) ; see also MS
Lambert–Chambois area. T h e 116th # A–904 (Luettwitz) and MS # B–162 (Mueller) .
540 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
day, had neither units nor a mission on two places, and Livarot on the extreme
the morning of 19 August. Shortly be- left flank was lost. Farther south, that
fore noon Elfeldt, the corps commander, part of the greatly weakened I SS Panzer
received the order to break through the Corps still east of the Dives River was
Allied lines near T r u n with the few re- unable to check the advance of the two
maining elements of the 12th SS Panzer armored divisions of the 2d Canadian
and 277th Divisions, which were to be Corps.
pulled out of the front. Convinced that These divisions, one Canadian, the
unfavorable terrain and strong con- other Polish, continued to raise havoc
centrations of Allied forces around T r u n with the Germans. Some elements of
precluded success, Elfeldt, with Meindl’s the 4th Canadian Armoured Division
support, obtained a change in mission. at T r u n crossed to the west bank of the
With remnants of only the 12th SS Pan- Dives River. In the northeastern part
zer Division under his command, he was of St. Lambert, a small force of about
to protect the north flank of Meindl’s 175 men, 15 tanks, and 4 self-propelled
II Parachute Corps, then move behind antitank guns held doggedly against re-
the paratroopers across the Dives River. peated attacks by German units that
The LXXIV Corps was to follow. tried desperately to keep the escape route
Because of communications difficul- through St. Lambert open. Reconnais-
ties, it took the better part of the day, sance elements advanced to the vicinity
and in some instances most of the night, of Moissy, and an armored brigade was
for all orders to reach subordinate units. present in the Hordouseaux–Ecorches
As darkness fell on 19 August, the area.
pocket contracted still more. T h e units T o strengthen the northern jaw of the
along the railroad pulled back to the for- closing pincers, the 3d Canadian Infantry
ests of Feuillet and Gouffern. T h e 84th Division deployed along the eastern
and 363d Divisions, which had held the bank of the Dives River between Beau-
most western positions during the day, vais and Trun, while an infantry brigade
moved through the new rear-guard of the 4th Armoured Division closed
outposts and into the Bois de Feuillet, to the highway be-
there to assemble and make ready to fol- tween T r u n and Hordouseaux.
low the forces charged with making the Meanwhile, the 1st Polish Armored
breakout . Division was advancing on two axes
Meanwhile, British troops crossed the over difficult tank terrain infested with
Orne River and moved eastward to with- enemy troops. T h e bulk of the division,
in a few miles of the Falaise–Argentan on the left, moved from the area around
highway. Hill 258 toward Mt. Ormel. This
While the Germans inside the pocket prominent ridge about two miles long
readied themselves for what was to be straddles the Chambois–Vimoutiers high-
the last act of the Argentan–Falaise way and dominates the countryside for
drama, the deterioration of the situation miles. By noon of 19 August the for-
on the Fifth Panzer Army front ap- ward units were approaching the north-
proached a climax on 19 August. T h e ern extremity of the ridge, Hill 262.
LXXXVI Corps line was breached in After a short fight they occupied it.
CLOSING T H E POCKET 54 1
Moving southward along the ridge, Pol- Chambois on the second day of Gerow’s
ish tanks surprised a long column of V Corps attack on the southern shoulder
German vehicles and armor moving of the gap between Argentan and Exmes.
bumper to bumper on the Chambois- General Gerow had released his corps
Vimoutiers highway. T h e Poles opened reserve, the 317th Infantry, to its parent
fire and destroyed the column. Dense unit, the 80th Division, and General
smoke from the burning vehicles spread McBride had committed it with the
over a large area in the dusk and re- 318th. Though still unable to enter
duced visibility to such an extent that Argentan, 80th Division troops cut the
further advance that day to the next ob- Argentan–Trun road. On the corps
jective-another Hill 262 on the southern right General McLain’s 90th Division,
end of the ridge-was impossible. By reinforced by French tankers, continued
midnight two Polish armored regiments to drive toward Chambois, an objective
and three battalions of motorized in- reached in late afternoon. T h e village
fantry were concentrated on the north- was in flames, and everywhere there was
ern end of the Mt. Ormel ridge and an unbearable stench of death and
were making ready to resume the ad- burned flesh, an unbelievable clutter of
vance the next morning. Thus, when dead Germans, dead horses, and de-
Meindl’s breakout attack got under way, stroyed equipment.26
an important part of his objective was While Americans and Poles cleaned
already in Polish hands. out the last defenders of Chambois, com-
On the Polish right, two armored regi- manders of the Polish group and the
ments reinforced with a troop of antitank American 2d Battalion, 359th Infantry,
guns had started about 1100 from the met and worked out a plan for the com-
vicinity of Ecorches toward Chambois. mon defense of the town. T h e Poles
After reaching a hill less than a mile handed over to the Americans about
north of Chambois, and after being 1,300 prisoners as well as their own
joined in the afternoon by the division wounded because they lacked facilities
reconnaissance regiment, the group for them. Tired, short of ammunition
launched an attack on the town from and supplies, the Polish units in Cham-
the northeast-astride the Vimoutiers- bois were cut off from their rear.
Chambois highway. T h e approaches to Thus the long-sought juncture of
Chambois were littered and the streets Allied forces to close the pocket oc-
literally choked by the debris of Ger- curred. T h e closure, however, was of
man wreckage, which proved a greater the most tenuous sort. T r u n and Cham-
obstruction to progress than did enemy bois were both firmly in Allied hands,
resistance. A small detachment work- and a small Canadian force held part of
ing its way into Chambois from the
south finally reached the main intersec-
26Msg, Gerow to Hodges, 2005, 19 Aug; [Alpert] ,
tion of the town late in the afternoon. Notes. For his part in the capture of Chambois,
There it met Company G of the 90th Capt. Edward R. Lienhart was awarded the DSC.
Division’s 359th Infantry, which had Pfc. George J. Caldwell and Pfc. Walter C. Giebel-
stein, working together as a bazooka team, destroyed
entered the town from the southwest. four tanks with five rounds of ammunition, and
T h e American troops had reached were also awarded the DSC.
542 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
T h e German Breakout
August, reached the Dives River. Be- crowned by tanks, and ran head on into
cause the division commander, General- machine gun fire from a concealed tank
leutnant Richard Schimpf, was seriously thirty yards away. Meindl and the few
wounded in the last encounter, Meindl men around him hit the ground, while
himself assumed command of the 3d those in the immediate rear rushed to
Parachute Division. 29 the protection of the dead angle of the
Bypassing Allied-held points had de- hill. Aroused by the commotion, other
layed progress and broken contact among tanks in the vicinity opened fire. Tra-
units and along the chain of command. jectories were high, and none of the
Thus when Meindl reached the Dives paratroopers was hurt. At about the
somewhere between Magny and St. same time wild musketry fire flared up
Lambert, he had with him only twenty on the right rear near St. Lambert,
paratroopers and Hausser’s small com- where the 353d Division was supposed
mand group. As he searched for a to be crossing the river.
suitable crossing site, Meindl came upon According to Meindl, the liberal use
one of his regimental commanders, who of tracer bullets by the Allies was quite
told him of a ford, about a mile south- helpful in revealing gaps in their lines
east of Magny, where the water was through which the paratroopers were
about five feet deep. able to infiltrate. On the other hand,
T o move a large body of men across the Very lights were a great nuisance.
the river and maintain silence in close Drifting leisurely to the ground, they
proximity to enemy forces was no easy illuminated large areas, froze all move-
task. T h e opposite bank was covered ment, and delayed progress considerably.
with dense underbrush, and it rose Meindl’s group, reduced to about fif-
steeply toward a hill, where three enemy teen men, worked its way out of the field
tanks stood silhouetted against the sky. of tank fire by crawling along a furrow
There was no time to lose if the troops in the ground. T h e men continued
were to get out of the pocket before eastward, deflected from time to time
daylight. Having gathered a larger by hostile tanks, As the sky began to
group about him, Meindl took the lead pale, they were still only half way to
and set off to the southeast, crossed the their objective, the hill mass of Mt.
river about half a mile downstream from Ormel near Coudehard. T h e fire fight
St. Lambert, went around the hill at St. Lambert had subsided, but another
29On 14 August Schimpf had issued a message to broke out in the left rear, in the
his paratroopers as follows: “False rumors are the direction of Neauphe-sur-Dives, where
same as bad odors-both come from the rear. . . .
contrary to all rumors . . . there is no need to
Meindl thought his rear-guard regiment
worry that the division might be encircled and was likely to be. A drizzling rain set in.
cut off from its supply lines. . . . Even if the T h e dim diffused morning light seemed
enemy should ever succeed temporarily in inter- oppressive. T h e exertion of the past
rupting our supply routes, this would be no reason
tor a paratrooper, who is specially trained to jump hours suddenly began to tell. T h e men
into the midst of the enemy, to feel depressed. . . . felt very tired.
He who thinks or talks otherwise will be slapped They continued nevertheless to work
across the mouth.” VII Corps G–2 Per Rpt 79, 23
Aug. their way eastward, picking up strag-
544 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
glers and small groups of men along ridge, a move that soon had to be can-
the way. By the time there was enough celed as heavy enemy pressure began
light to distinguish the main features to develop against the northern sector
of the landscape, they found themselves of the Polish perimeter.
less than a mile west of the northern hill When the morning mist lifted, almost
of the Mt. Ormel ridge. This was the whole plain to the west came into
Meindl’s objective, but it was not long Polish view. T h e ground was covered
before he realized that it was already with German columns moving to the
in Allied hands and that the encircling northeast in dispersed formations on the
ring was much deeper than he had roads and cross-country.
anticipated. 30 While Polish guns were taking profit-
T h e Allied troops on Mt. Ormel were able targets under fire, a German attack,
that part of the 1st Polish Armored Divi- the first of several that day, struck the
sion that had advanced to the ridge on northeastern part of the perimeter at
19 August and by nightfall had oc- 0900. T h e attack was beaten off by
cupied a defensive perimeter on the 1030. In the meantime, German tanks
northern extremity, Hill 262 just north had been observed around 1000 moving
of the Chambois–Vimoutiers highway.31 from the direction of Champosoult to-
Two infantry battalions and a tank regi- ward Hill 239, less than two miles north
ment deployed along the ridge line fac- of the Polish perimeter. A detachment
ing westward; the third infantry bat- dispatched to deny the Germans posses-
talion and the other tank regiment sion of the hill, from which they could
guarded the approaches to the hill from enfilade the Polish position, was unable
the north and east. There were about to accomplish its mission. About an
1,500 infantrymen, approximately 80 hour later gun fire from the direction of
tanks. Hill 239 struck the Poles on Hill 262.
No supplies had reached the Poles by Very quickly the Poles lost five tanks
evening of 19 August and at 0200, 20 and a number of killed and wounded.
August, it was established that Germans T h e German units involved in both
were astride the roads to their rear. of these actions belonged to the 2d SS
Throughout the night they heard the Panzer Division of the II SS Panzer
rumble of traffic moving toward Vimou- Corps. T h e mission of the corps, which
tiers; reconnaissance reported Germans had earlier assembled in the Vimoutiers
digging in along the Chambois–Vimou- area, was to assist the Seventh Army
tiers road. Nevertheless, apart from a breakout by an attack with two divisions
few concentrations of harassing mortar in a southeasterly direction toward the
fire on the southern part of the perim- Trun–Chambois line. T h e 9th SS Pan-
eter, the night passed uneventfully. zer Division on the right advanced to-
In the morning a task force moved out ward Trun, the 2d SS on the left toward
to secure the southern part of the Ormel Chambois. Both divisions had been
“utterly torn asunder” by previous night
30MS # A–923 (Meindl) .
31The account of Polish action is based on the
marches and air attacks. Together they
1st Polish Armored Division, pp. 110–16. had perhaps twenty tanks; their infantry
CLOSING T H E POCKET 545
consisted of about the equivalent of Retracing his steps to the west, then
three battalions. They had few com- turning south, then east, chased by ar-
munications facilities. Roads were “so tillery fire part of the way, Meindl found
packed with burned out vehicles” that the army commander southwest of
tanks had “to clear an alley before pass- Coudehard about noontime. In an old
ing.” Yet Allied aircraft were not over- bomb crater–the area was under artil-
head, for the weather was bad, just as lery fire–they discussed the situation.
the meteorologists had predicted for this Meindl reported his intention of attack-
day, the date that Eberbach so long ago ing Hill 262 from the north and learned
had thought he could attack again to- from Hausser that a panzer division had
ward Avranches. T h e 9th SS Panzer reached the Mt. Ormel area and was
Division bogged down near Champosoult preparing to attack the ridge. Hausser
and played a passive role for the rest of intended to join this division for the
the day, but the 2d SS actively engaged final breakout. He told Meindl to make
the Poles on Mt. Ormel and thereby every effort to open the way for the re-
made a significant contribution to the maining divisions. Despite the extreme
Seventh Army breakout.32 exhaustion of his men, Meindl ex-
When the first German attack struck pressed confidence that they would make
the Polish perimeter, Meindl was north- it, though probably not before evening.
west of Coudehard, not far from the By this time a large number of troops
place he had reached at dawn. He was and two tanks had joined his attack
immobilized there for a considerable force.
time, first by an encounter with Polish While Meindl was conferring with
tanks, later by a heavy concentration of Hausser, an impressive volume of Ger-
Allied fire on the entire Coudehard man artillery and mortar fire, especially
area. Around 0900, Meindl saw behind the latter, began to fall on the Polish
him a paratroop unit charging headlong positions on Mt. Ormel. About two
into Polish fire from Hill 262. He hours later the Germans launched a
stopped the attack, admonished the cap- series of determined, but apparently un-
tain in command for his reckless be- co-ordinated, attacks against the perim-
havior, oriented him on the situation eter. Lasting through the afternoon,
around Hill 262, and pointed out the the attacks struck for the most part
possibility of outflanking the hill from against the northern and southern sectors
the north. Learning from the captain of the Polish positions. T h e climax of
the whereabouts of Hausser, Meindl the battle came about 1700, when Ger-
turned over to the captain’s command man infantry supported by tanks broke
the men who had joined him during the into the northeastern part of the perim-
night, a considerable number by then, eter. T h e attack was finally beaten off
and set out to find Hausser. by the combined efforts of infantrymen,
tankers, and men of a mortar platoon
acting as riflemen after they had
32MS # P–162 (Harzer) ; MS # P–159 (Stueckler expended their mortar ammunition.
and Wisliceny); MS # A–922 (Eberbach); see also
AGp B Tagesmeldung, 20 Aug, dated 0155, 21
Another deep penetration occurred at
Aug. AGp B K T B . the junction of two Polish infantry bat-
546 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT’
that day, and when night came their Shortly. before dawn Mahlmann, in
perimeter formed a small island in a the column on the right, was approach-
broad stream of escaping Germans. ing Chambois. He made contact with
a group of tanks, which, according to the
Escape officer in charge, had the mission of
cleaning the enemy out of the Chambois
Meindl's leadership was without doubt area. But because this appeared impos-
one of the significant actions of the Ger- sible, the tank commander decided to
man breakout, perhaps the focal inci- cross the Dives River at Moissy. T h e
dent. Other commanders and other tanks moved out around daybreak.
units had also contributed to the final, Mahlmann and his column, along with
though only partially successful, outcome stragglers from other units who had
of the operation. Their activities dur- joined, followed them closely across the
ing the twenty-four hours following the river. T h e tanks continued through
arrival of darkness on 19 August were Moissy and disappeared into the dis-
diverse, illustrating clearly the nature tance. Shortly afterward Allied tanks
and the complexity of the event. appeared in the vicinity and closed the
T h e 353d Division, under General- gap.. Their appearance was followed by
leutnant Paul Mahlmann, had also exe- an intense concentration of Allied ar-
cuted a breakout attack as part of the tillery fire on the village jammed with
II Parachute Corps effort. Assembled German troops. Losses were high, and
on the evening of 19 August in woods all semblance of organization vanished.
near Vorché, six miles west of the Dives, Mahlmann finally succeeded in bring-
the division started its movement at ing some order out of chaos. He or-
nightfall. Meindl had instructed Mahl- ganized a breakout attempt with the
mann to make his main effort at St. help of two stray tanks found in the vil-
Lambert on the left, while sending his lage. T h e tanks had barely left the vil-
vehicles through Chambois. A little lage when Allied fire knocked them out.
later Mahlmann received information Again, disorganization and apathy set
that both localities were in Allied hands. in–spent, dispirited, resigned to their
He therefore decided to make his main fate, men huddled under whatever cover
thrust across the Dives in the Chambois they could find.
area to try to save his vehicles. Taking a dozen stouthearted fellows,
At Tournai-sur-Dives, about halfway Mahlmann reconnoitered a concealed
to the river, the division came to a halt. road leading to the east, receiving a light
T h e village was burning and its streets head wound in the process. T h e road
were blocked by wrecked vehicles, dead enabled Mahlmann to get at least part
horses, and abandoned tanks. T h e ter- of the men in Moissy out. Most of the
rain around Tournai did not permit by- wounded had to be left. All guns and
passing the village, so a passage had vehicles, except two or three amphibious
to be cleared. This took three hours. jeeps, along with part of the division
Though the area lay under harassing staff, were lost.
artillery fire, the division suffered no Mahlmann headed for the southern
losses from it. eminence of Mt. Ormel, and that after-
548 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
noon he and those who accompanied when his division would be pulled back
him began to climb the western slope and sent to the rear for rehabilitation.34
of the hill. T h e whole area seemed
covered with an amorphous mass of Like Meindl’s paratroop corps for the
German soldiers hastening toward the north flank, the XLVII Panzer Corps
ridge. An American observation plane had the task of opening the way for the
circled leisurely, seeming to hang in the surrounded forces on the southern
sky, as it directed artillery fire on the re- flank. 35 Funck’s XLVII Panzer Corps
treating troops. had the 1st SS and 2d Panzer Divisions
As he approached his objective, Mahl- (probably the 10th SS Panzer Division
mann faced a situation quite different also) assembled in the Forêt de Gouffern,
from that which had confronted the 3 d the 116th Panzer Division holding a long
Parachute Division on his left. Ger- thin line practically from Argentan to
man pressure on the northern part of the Dives. T h e corps was to cross the
Ormel had forced the Poles to call off river in the St. Lambert–Chambois area,
their advance to Hill 262 (south) in with the 116th covering the rear.
the morning. Thus Mahlmann was T h e corps breakout order did not
able to occupy his objective without reach the 2d Panzer Division com-
opposition. mander, Generalleutnant Freiherr Hein-
There Mahlmann organized three rich von Luettwitz, until around 1900,
combat groups and deployed them 19 August. Because reconnaissance
along the ridge line facing west, one revealed the roads so clogged with wreck-
composed of S S men on the right, age as to make night movement impos-
another of men of his own division on sible, Luettwitz decided, to hold off his
the left, and the third of paratroopers attack until 0400, 20 August. He placed
in reserve. His efforts to establish con- all of his tanks (about fifteen) and his
tact with units on the flanks and with armored vehicles at the head of his
higher headquarters were unsuccessful. column, left an infantry regiment rein-
Late in the afternoon, when the S S forced with several antitank guns as a
group reported hostile reconnaissance rear guard, and ordered what remained
units on the north flank, Mahlmann de- of his artillery to support his advance.
cided to fall back three miles to the east A dense fog hung over the area that
to a new line behind the Vie River. morning, and the 2d Panzer Division
He accomplished his withdrawal without was not the only unit moving toward St.
undue interference, and that evening in- Lambert. Columns composed of all
fantrymen and paratroopers occupied sorts of components streamed through
the new position. T h e S S group, dis- the fog, sometimes eight abreast. When
obeying orders, continued to move east- the fog lifted, a “hurricane” of Allied ar-
ward and vanished. tillery fire descended. Vehicles dashed
Soon afterward Mahlmann made per- toward the Dives, Luettwitz later re-
sonal contact with Seventh Army head- 34MS # A–985 (Mahlmann) .
quarters and received instructions to re- 35There is a scarcity of information regarding
main on the Vie until the next day, the activities of this corps.
CLOSING T H E POCKET 549
membered, “turned around, circled, got area, the other north of the Forêt de
entangled, stopped, and were destroyed. Gouffern near Bon-Ménil. About 0900,
Tall pillars of flame from burning gaso- 2 0 August, the division lost radio com-
line tanks leaped into the sky, ammuni- munication with the corps headquarters.
tion exploded, and wild horses, some In the afternoon, when heavy Allied
severely wounded, raced” in aimless pressure developed against the Argentan
terror. Effective control was impossible. group, it pulled back to positions north
Only the armored elements and part of the forest.
of an armored infantry regiment reached T h e pressure was exerted by the 80th
St. Lambert in an orderly manner about Division, which finally took Argentan
1000. Luettwitz led an attack across the that day.38 On the same day British
river into the village. Incredibly, the troops approaching from the west moved
bridge across the Dives still stood despite to the Falaise–Argentan road.
the bombs and shells that had fallen Both groups of the 116th Panzer Divi-
nearby. “The crossing of the Dives sion remained in place during the rest
bridge,” Luettwitz recalled later, “was of the day. When the division com-
particularly horrible, the bodies of killed mander, Col. Gerhard Mueller, learned
men, dead horses, vehicles, and other around 1800 that the corps headquarters
equipment having been hurled from the was east of the Dives, he prepared to
bridge into the river to form there a break out during the night at St. Lam-
gruesome tangled mass.” bert.
On the east bank of the river, Luett- Mueller sent a reconnaissance party to
witz organized and dispatched combat St. Lambert after nightfall. Allied ar-
troops for passage through the hail of tillery fire on the village indicated it was
Allied fire. Wounded that afternoon, he not yet in Allied hands. After strenu-
finally departed around 2100,reaching ous efforts, the troops cleared a narrow
Orville and safety early on 21 August.
36 passage through the wreckage in the
Meanwhile the XLVII Panzer Corps streets. During a two-hour period
headquarters and the 1st SS Panzer Divi- around midnight, 2 0 August, the divi-
sion had probably fought across the sion staff, remnants of the infantry
Dives River in the St. Lambert–Cham- regiment, 5 artillery pieces, and about
bois area early on the morning of 2 0 50 combat vehicles passed through the
August. More than likely they com- village without significant losses. They
pleted their breakout that afternoon.37 continued to Coudehard, then to Orville
Covering the XLVII Panzer Corps and safety. T h e Argentan group-
rear, the 116th Panzer Division had de- about 8 tanks, 10 20-mm. antiaircraft
ployed in two groups on the evening guns, and about 80 Engineer troops-lost
of 19 August. One was in the Argentan its way in the darkness, tried to break
out near Trun, and was taken prisoner.39
36MS # A–904 (Luettwitz) . Hausser’s breakout attack by the II
37 No information is available from corps and
division sources. The above has been deduced from 38 For singlehandedly destroying a machine gun
statements by Blauensteiner, II Parachute Corps position that had halted his company, Pfc Earl G
chief of staff, and from incidents described by Goins was awarded the DSC.
Mahlmann, Meindl. and Lt. Col. Hubert Meyer. 39MS # B–162 (Mueller).
550 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Parachute and XLVII Panzer Corps had hours of 20 August, he ordered the in-
thus succeeded in large measure. But fantry group to move out.
success did not make it possible for the At daybreak the group came into con-
rest of the troops simply to follow out tact with several tanks of the 1st SS
of the pocket. They too had to fight to Panzer Division preparing to attack
get across the Dives River. through Chambois. T h e armored in-
fantrymen joined the tanks, but intense
T h e missions of the two remaining Allied artillery, tank, and antitank fire
corps, the LXXXIV and the LXXIV, from high ground south of Chambois
were to cover, respectively, the northern soon stalled the attack. Because the
flank and the rear of the breakout opera- German armor was drawing the Allied
tion. Both were then to move across fire, the infantry detached itself and in
the Dives in the wake of the paratroopers small groups began to cross the river
and tankers. between Chambois and St. Lambert.
The LXXXIV Corps had only rem- Some troops of other units were advanc-
nants of the 12th SS Panzer Division ing toward the Allied positions and
under its command. Because of the waving white handkerchiefs and flags.40
chaotic conditions on the roads and the T h e two commanders became sepa-
complete disruption of communications, rated. Elfeldt and his staff took part in
the division organized its units into two an action near St. Lambert with a hastily
groups for better control. T h e motor- assembled group of soldiers. Meeting
ized elements, including what remained strong opposition and “having literally
of the artillery and the division radio spent his last cartridge,” Elfeldt, the
section, were to follow the 1st SS Panzer LXXXIV Corps commander, surren-
Division across the river at Chambois. dered. Meyer, having crossed the Dives,
T h e rest of the division, mostly infantry, took command of a group of soldiers
subdivided into task forces for independ- and led them on foot across the plain
ent action if necessary, was to follow the toward the southern spur of Mt. Ormel.
3d Parachute Division through St. Lam- Using whatever natural concealment was
bert. Four or five tanks or tank destroy- available, they reached safety. Some of
ers were to cover the rear. General the motorized elements of the 12th SS
Elfeldt, the corps commander, and Lt. Panzer Division also escaped that after-
Col. Hubert Meyer, the division com- noon. Most of the artillery was lost.
mander, accompanied the infantry
group. The LXXIV Corps, designated the
Around midnight of 19 August, Meyer covering force in the rear of the break-
sent a liaison patrol to the 3d Parachute out attack, had, on 19 August, three of
Division to obtain word on the outcome its five infantry divisions (276th, 277th,
of the breakout. T h e patrol did not and 326th) along the northwestern per-
return. As all remained quiet along the imeter of the pocket, the other two (84th
Dives River, Meyer assumed that the and 363d) assembled in the Bois de
paratroopers’ penetration by stealth had 40MS # A–968 (Elfeldt) , MS # B–784 (Criegern) ,
succeeded. Therefore, in the very early MS # P–164 (Meyer).
CLOSING T H E POCKET 55 1
Feuillet. T h e two latter divisions were sion, about goo men, moved from their
ready to cross the Dives River in the positions to a previously reconnoitered
wake of the LXXXIV Corps, the other crossing site on the Dives northwest of
three were to follow on order. St. Lambert. T h e noise of the crossing
Communications were practically non- brought Allied artillery and machine
existent. Orders from corps to division gun fire, and in the ensuing confusion
could be transmitted only by staff officers. Viebig lost control. Nevertheless, small
There was no liaison with the II Para- groups screened by heavy rain continued
chute Corps–General der Infanterie to move, and what remained of the divi-
Erich Straube, the LXXIV Corps com- sion reached the II SS Panzer Corps lines
mander, had no knowledge of the time on the morning of 21 August. A few
set for the breakout attack. All efforts days later, when Viebig assembled his
to establish contact with the Seventh command–combat units, administrative
Army failed.41 elements, stragglers, hospital returnees-
T h e state of affairs in the LXXIV he had about 2,500 men, of whom ap-
Corps sector was therefore somewhat proximately 1 , 0 0 0 were combat troops.42
chaotic. T h e 277th Division on the Generalleutnant Curt Badinski’s 276th
corps right was in contact with two corps Division, on the 277th left, received its
headquarters, its own and the LXXXIV, first order from corps about 0300, 2 0
and for a while received contradictory August: the division was to fall back,
orders from both. T h e two divisions apparently in conjunction with the
farther to the south, the 276th and 326th, 277th withdrawal, to a line just west of
were out of touch with corps head- Vorché and on the Trun–Occagnes road.
quarters throughout the day, and both Not long after carrying out this move,
division commanders pondered the Badinski received his second and last
problem of whether they should con- order from the corps. He was to break
tinue to wait for orders or act on their out of the pocket south of Trun, starting
own initiative. from his positions at 0830, 20 August.
In the early hours of 2 0 August, after Soon after his units got under way, it
the 12th SS Panzer Division pulled out appeared to Badinski that an attempt to
of the line on the 277th Division right, break out in broad daylight was bound
the 277th fell back to a position along a to fail. Every movement was detected
curved line facing west and northwest- by Allied observation planes and im-
about one and a half miles from mediately subjected to a heavy concen-
Villedieu-lés-Bailleul. There the divi- tration of artillery fire. Badinski
sion remained for the rest of the day. therefore halted the movement, hoping
Around 2300, still without orders from to renew the attempt after darkness, but
the corps, his men exhausted, and short before the day was over his command
ammunition even for the infantry weap- post on the edge of the Forêt de Gouf-
ons, the division commander, Colonel fern was surrounded by Allied tanks,
Wilhelm Viebig, decided to break out and Badinski and his small staff were
that night. T h e remnants of the divi- taken prisoner. Most of the division
remnants shared their fate. Only a few T h e 363d Division had had its mission
men escaped during the stormy night.43 changed early on 2 0 August by what
T h e 326th Division received its order turned out to be its last order from
to break out during the night of 19 LXXIV Corps. Instead of following
August. T h e division was to assemble the LXXXIV Corps across the Dives, the
at nightfall, 2 0 August, near St. Lam- 363d was to occupy and hold a line from
bert, from there to make its way to Bailleul to Bon-Ménil, north of the
Coudehard. Learning that an impro- Forêt de Gouffern. Generalleutnant
vised group of infantry and tanks of the Augustus Dettling, the commander,
1st and 10th SS Panzer Divisions had carried out the order but, subjected to
crossed successfully at St. Lambert dur- heavy Allied pressure during the day,
ing the afternoon of 2 0 August, the was forced to give up some ground
326th Division arranged with elements With no instructions from corps, Det-
of the 116th Panzer Division to make a tling decided to break out at nightfall.
concerted break that night. T h e plan Organized into three kampfgruppen, the
worked well. T h e armor crossed the division was across the Dives at St.
St. Lambert bridge, miraculously still Lambert by 2 2 0 0 , then moved on
intact despite the continuous and heavy azimuth toward Coudehard. It sus-
shelling, and the infantry went over an tained considerable losses in killed,
emergency footbridge nearby. From wounded, and captured; it lost the bulk
the river the men marched in a seem- of its heavy weapons, all of its artillery,
ingly endless single file column on and most of its vehicles. About 2 , 5 0 0
azimuth toward Coudehard. Despite men reached Champosoult and safety the
some inevitable confusion and an oc- next morning.46
casional burst of fire from Allied out- The commander of the LXXIV Corps,
posts, the column reached a road near Straube, and part of his staff crossed the
Coudehard, where the tanks were wait- Dives during the afternoon of 2 0 August
ing. Closing behind the tanks, the at St. Lambert, where Straube met Luett-
infantry resumed its advance and, by- witz, who commanded the 2d Panzer
passing Coudehard, reached the posi- Division. Together, they worked out
tions of the 2d S S Panzer Division at measures for holding the crossing site
dawn.44 open and organized the men of all arms
T h e other two divisions under converging on St. Lambert into kampf-
LXXIV Corps, the 84th and 363d, had gruppen for the completion of the break-
been assembled in the Bois de Feuillet out. In the evening Straube departed
ready to follow the LXXXIV Corps with one such group of several hundred
across the Dives. T h e 84th Division men and a few tanks. He reached
commander, Generalleutnant Irwin Meindl's command post near Coudehard
Menny, was captured; elements of at around midnight, then completed his
least one regiment apparently escaped breakout with the paratroopers.47
through St. Lambert on 2 0 August.45
48MS # B-326 (Badinski).
44 MS # P-179 (Nettmann) 40 MS # B-163 (Dettling) .
46Information is scanty; see MS # P-169 (Fiebig) . 47MS # B-824 (Straube).
CLOSING T H E POCKET 553
While the battle had raged around shell disabled Hawk’s gun and wounded
the Poles on Mt. Ormel, the Polish and him, but he secured a bazooka and with
American troops in Chambois were also a companion kept the tanks in a small
subjected to considerable pressure. Des- wood until two American tank destroy-
perate German efforts launched against ers arrived. Their shelling was inef-
Chambois on 20 August to open an fective until Hawk climbed to an ex-
escape route through the town made the posed position to act as a human aim-
situation so tense that there were mo- ing stake. The subsequent fire of the
ments when Poles and Americans won- tank destroyers knocked out two Ger-
dered whether they could retain posses- man tanks and forced the remaining
sion of the town. Germans into the open to surrender. 50
For the Polish armored group, it was The heavy rain that set in around mid-
the second day of heavy action without night of 20 August helped thousands of
resupply. That evening American sup- Germans to escape to safety. At 0230,
plies came forward, and the Poles re- 21 August, Meindl began to wake up
ceived a share of the ammunition, gas- the men around him near Coudehard.
oline, and rations.48 It took some time to get a man on his
On that day the 90th Division Artil- feet and make him understand what was
lery was operating with observation later going on. By 0345, Meindl’s troops
described as an “artilleryman’s dream.” were assembled along the road in march
Five battalions pulverized columns driv- formation, and the head of the column
ing toward the Dives. American sol- started to move eastward in the drench-
diers cheered when German horses, carts, ing rain. Meindl himself, with two
trucks, volkswagens, tanks, vehicles, and tanks and a small group as the rear
weapons went flying into the air, dis- guard, departed around 0500. Two
integrating in flashes of fire and puffs hours afterwards, they were within the
of smoke.49 lines of the 2d SS Panzer Division near
Near Chambois several German tanks Champosoult .
and perhaps a company of infantrymen Later that day Meindl learned that
would have escaped but for Sgt. John some of his paratroopers had escaped by
D. Hawk of the 359th Infantry, who a route southeast of Coudehard, that a
manned a light machine gun. A tank tank unit had brought the seriously
wounded Seventh Army commander,
4890th Div G–3 Per Rpt, 21 Aug. According to Hausser, safely out of the pocket, and
the Polish narrative: “The fraternity of arms dis- that he, Meindl, was to move his II Para-
played by the Americans during our common battle
deserves special recognition. The Americans shared
chute Corps to the Seine River south of
with us their rations, ammunition, gasoline. and Rouen. He estimated that between
were very generous with their cigarettes. It will be 2,500 and 3,500 paratroopers had es-
difficult to forget the supply officer of the American
regiment, Major Miller, who, being short of work-
caped; their combat strengthdid not ex-
ing hands, helped personally to load ammunition ceed 600. Of the two regiments of the
boxes on our trucks.” 1st Polish Armored Division, 353d Division that broke out at St. Lam-
PP. 104–05.
49V Corps Operations in the E T O , p. 190; Interv
bert, only remnants of one later rejoined
with Capt M. H. Smith, Hosp Intervs, Vol. III, GL–
93 (249) ; [ Alpert], Notes. 50Hawk was awarded the Medal of Honor.
554 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
TRUCKLOADS
OF PRISONERS
HEADEDFOR PRISONER
OF WAR CAMPS
the division, the rear-guard regiment Allied division to collect prisoners from
having been completely lost. as many as twenty divisional units in a
Only small isolated groups were able single day. “We very much enjoyed
to slip across the Dives during the early going into the woods,” a regimental com-
morning hours of 2 1 August. Fighting mander later recalled. “One of my
along the river subsided gradually, and lieutenants and I got nineteen [pris-
by noon, with all of St. Lambert firmly oners] on one trip.” 51
in Canadian hands, the escape route was Meanwhile, a sizable number of men
closed. Rounding up the remnants of and vehicles, the tail end of the forces
the Seventh Army trapped west of the that had succeeded in getting across the
Dives began. Allied troops accepted Dives during the night, were still mov-
German surrenders, in mass and in small ing toward the Mt. Ormel ridge on the
groups, and gathered u p stragglers “who
had been living in holes in the ground 51Quotes are from VII Corps AAR, Aug, and
McHugh Interv, Stockton’s Hosp Intervs, III,
in the forest since separating from their GL–93 (235); see also V Corps G–2 Est of Enemy
units.” It was not uncommon for an Situation 7, 2400, 23 Aug.
CLOSING T H E POCKET 555
morning of 2 1 August. Shortly before considering its skeleton forces, was not
noon the Poles on Hill 262 had their so spectacular as the army group be-
hands full repelling German attacks on lieved. T h e II SS Panzer Corps had ac-
the southwestern part of their perimeter, complished three things: it tied u p ele-
that part closest to the Chambois–Vi- ments of Canadian and Polish armor
moutiers road. T h e culmination came on the outer edge of the encircling ring;
around noon with a suicidal attack of it helped to open the Coudehard–Cham-
German infantry straight up the hill posoult road; and it provided a rallying
from the area around the Coudehard position for troops that were able to
church. T h e massed fires of Polish ma- escape the pocket. T h e major factor
chine guns smashed it. deciding the outcome of the breakout
Canadian troops advanced and finally operation was the determination and the
made contact with the Polish perimeter will to fight of the units inside the
that afternoon. Supplies arrived about pocket.
1400; evacuation of the wounded and
the prisoners began. About that time The Results
enemy activity ceased, and what the
Poles called the Battle of Maczuga came How many Germans escaped? N o
to an end. Having captured approxi- one knew. At the end of 20 August
mately 1,000 Germans, the Poles had Army Group B reported that “approxi-
lost about 350 men; 1 1 tanks were dam- mately from 40 to 50 percent of the en-
aged or destroyed.52 circled units succeeded in breaking out
Beyond Mt. Ormel, German soldiers, and joining hands with the II SS Pan-
singly and in groups, had continued to zer Corps.” This was an optimistic as-
pass through the lines of the II SS Pan- sessment. By the end of the following
zer Corps throughout the morning of day, the strength of six of seven armored
21 August. T h e movement thinned out divisions that had escaped the pocket
in the afternoon and by 1600 ceased al- totaled, as reported at that time, no more
together. At dusk the corps moved than 2,000 men, 62 tanks, and 26 artil-
back its two divisions to an assembly lery pieces.54
area near Orbec, thirteen miles north- Later estimates of the total number
east of Vimoutiers. of Germans escaping varied between
Army Group B praised the action of 20,000 and 40,000 men, but combat
the II SS Panzer Corps in the highest troops formed by far the smaller pro-
terms, for it considered the corps had portion of these troops. T h e average
been a major factor making possible the combat strength of divisions was no
escape of much of the Seventh Army.53 more than a few hundred men, even
In reality, the corps contribution to the
54A G p B Tagesmeldungen, 20 Aug, dated 0155,
breakout operation, though noteworthy 21 Aug, and 2 1 Aug, dated 2000, 21 Aug, A G p B
K T B . Hitler on 23 August ordered O B W E S T to
52Maczuga is the Polish word for cudgel, which submit a report on strengths and losses pertaining
seemed to match the shape of the Mt. Ornnel ridge. both to the divisions that had escaped from the
See 1st Polish Armored Division, pp. 116–17. pocket and to those that had not been involved,
53AGp B Tagesmeldung, 21 Aug, dated 0100, 22 but this report, if submitted, has not been located.
Aug. A G p B K T B , Anlagen, 21–23 Aug, p. 1626.
556 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
THEPOCKETDESERTED
though the over-all strength of some di- shock of this discovery,” Danhauser
visions came close to 3,000. T h e ex- later wrote, “brought tears to the eyes of
planation lay in the fact that a partial the commander of the artillery regi-
exodus had begun at least two or three ment whose batteries had expended their
days before the breakout attack–when last rounds some days ago.” 56
shortages of ammunition, gasoline, and T h e few batteries sent out of the
other supplies had already become pocket before the final few days were
acute.55 saved. T h e rest of the artillery, heavy
Some divisions acting on their own weapons, and other equipment remain-
initiative, others with the approval of ing inside the pocket was almost com-
corps, had started to send to the rear, pletely lost–destroyed by Allied fire, by
in some instances as far east as the Seine the Germans themselves, or abandoned.
River, all nonessential personnel and One commander estimated, probably
vehicles, as well as artillery pieces that with some exaggeration, that not many
could not be supplied with ammunition. more than 50 artillery pieces and per-
Ironically, on 18 August, the day after haps that many tanks reached safety.
the 271st Division ceased to exist as a Radios, vehicles, trains, supplies were
fighting unit, the division commander, lost; “even the number of rescued ma-
Generalleutnant Paul Danhauser, dis- chine guns was insignificant.” 57 “The
covered large stocks of artillery ammuni- losses in material are very high,” Army
tion of all calibers in the Bois de Feuil- Group B reported, “. . . set on fire
let, stocks that had been forgotten, over- by enemy fighter-bombers . . . and by
looked, or simply abandoned. “The
55See MS # B–526 (Badinski); MS # P–179 56 MS # P–177 (Danhauser)
(Nettmann) 57 MS # A–922 (Eberbach) .
CLOSING T H E POCKET 557
massed fires of heavy artillery. All days as the artillery of two Allied armies
radio stations were silenced, and the and the massed air forces pounded the
army was deprived of its means of com- ever-shrinking pocket was perhaps the
greatest of the war. The roads and fields
mand. Yet the performance of the men were littered with thousands of enemy dead
who fought the breakout battle in the and wounded, wrecked and burning ve-
face of overwhelming odds merits the hicles, smashed artillery pieces, carts laden
highest praise.” 58 with the loot of France overturned and
T h e severe ordeal to which the Ger- smoldering, dead horses and cattle swelling
in the summer’s heat.60
mans were subjected for many days-
constant air and artillery pounding, ex-
hausting night marches on clogged roads Of the higher staffs, only the LXXXIV
after a day’s fighting, shortages of am- Corps headquarters was missing. Most
munition and supplies–could not be en- of the higher commanders, including
dured indefinitely without affecting Hausser, were wounded. When Haus-
troop morale. Many “unpretty pic- ser was evacuated, Funck, the XLVII
tures” were witnessed by German com- Panzer Corps commander, took tempo-
manders-incredible disorder on the rary command of the Seventh Army,
roads where often the right of the strong- which was subordinated to the Fifth Pan-
est prevailed (tankers and paratroopers zer Army 61
being the chief offenders); the panic, T h e Allies did not know exactly how
men with hands up surrendering in many prisoners they took. From 1 3
droves; at least one case of outright through 17 August it was possible to
mutiny when a sergeant shot and killed count them accurately–British and Ca-
his commanding officer because the com- nadians reported daily figures in excess
mander refused to consent to surrender. of a total of 6,000, the First U.S. Army
But the units that were under the firm 2,500 for 15 August alone. After 17
control of their commanders fought to August the figures were approximate-
the limit of their physical and moral for example, the First Army estimated
endurance and thereby made the escape more than 9,000 on 21 August.62 All
of a sizable part of the encircled troops together, the Americans probably took
possible. One such unit, a paratroop about 25,000 prisoners, British and Ca-
outfit, made quite an impression on men nadians an equal number. Among the
of an SS panzer division when, emerg- captives were three general officers. In
ing from the pocket, the paratroopers addition to the 5 0 , 0 0 0 men captured,
passed through the tankers smartly, in
road formation, singing.59 60First U.S. Army, Report of Operations, I, 18;
Behind the men who had fought their see V Corps Operations in the ETO, p. 188, and
way out of the pocket lay an inferno of 90th Div AAR, Aug. Guingand, Operation Victory,
page 410, has a vivid description of the destruction.
destruction. 61Telecons, 1335 and 1355, 2 1 Aug, A G p B K T B .
Dietrich remained in command of the F i f t h Panzer
The carnage wrought during the final Army and apparently Eberbach several days later
took command of the Seventh A r m y . See A G p B
58 A G p B Tagesmeldung, 20 Aug, A G p B K T B . Tagesmeldung, 31 Aug.
59MS # P–159 (Stueckler) ; MS # B–526 (Badin- 62FUSA G–2 Telecon, 1730, 18 Aug, FUSA G–2
ski) ; MS # P–179 (Nettmann) . Jnl and File, and AAR, Aug.
558 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
11th INFANTRYMEN
meet resistance in the drive to Angers.
Having fought with the V Corps be- soon be normal, General Irwin began
fore being pinched out on the First at once to march from one American
Army left flank near Vire, General Ir- flank to the other.5
win’s 5th Division received instructions On the road for three days in a march
an hour before dawn on 4 August to hampered by traffic congestion, the 5th
join the XX Corps by moving immedi- Division reached Vitré on 7 August.
ately through Villedieu and Avranches On that day Patton orally instructed
to an assembly area near Vitré, forty Walker to move a regiment of the 5th
miles south of Avranches. T h e sudden- Division to seize Angers, fifty-five miles
ness of the call precluded advance plan- southeast of Vitré; an infantry battalion
ning, and General Irwin felt handi-
capped by a lack of definite knowledge of 5General Irwin’s Official Diary of the Div Comdr;
his next combat mission and the terrain XV Corps G–3 Memo, Conflict with XX Corps, 5
Aug, XV Corps G–3 Jnl and File. T h e quotations
in which he would fight. With no ink- in this section, unless otherwise noted, are from
ling that this manner of operating would General Irwin’s diary.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 561
to capture Nantes, sixty-five miles south- 16th Luftwafle Field Division) assumed
west of Vitré; and the rest of the di- responsibility for defending the Loire
vision to Segré, twenty-two miles north- along a front that eventually extended
west of Angers. Gaffey, Third Army from Nantes to Orléans. T h e 16th Di-
chief of staff, arrived at Irwin’s com- vision was short of equipment but was
mand post at noon that day to transmit well trained and well led.7 Part of this
the mission for quick compliance. force, with some few elements that had
Though tired from their long hours on come from Normandy, met the 5th U.S.
the road, the 5th was to move at once. Division at Angers, a city of 95,000 in-
Perhaps Gaffey was not explicit, perhaps habitants located just south of the point
Irwin misinterpreted. In any event, Ir- where the Mayenne and Sarthe merge
win felt that the fifty-mile distance be- to become the Maine River. T h e
tween Nantes and Angers, as well as the Maine, only six miles long, flows through
distance of both towns from Vitré, made Angers before joining the Loire. Three
it impractical for him to take both ob- miles south of Angers, a highway bridge
jectives at the same time. T h e develop- crosses the Loire at les Ponts-de-Cé.
ment of the major operations to the east From Vitré, General Irwin dispatched
and Patton’s instructions for Walker to Col. Charles W. Yuill’s 11th Infantry
reach the Mayenne River south of Chà- through Candé in a direct approach to
teau-Gontier seemed to give Angers Angers from the west. He sent a com-
priority over Nantes.6 pany-sized task force on a more devious
Information on the enemy in the area route to cross the Mayenne and Sarthe
south and east of Vitré was scant, but Rivers, outflank Angers on the east, cut
“a general withdrawal by the Germans, the main highway south of the city, and
extent and destination not yet clear,” capture the bridge across the Loire.8
was presumed. Actually, there were T h e small task force soon discovered
scarcely any Germans between Vitré and that all bridges across the Sarthe and
the Loire River. T h e First Army in Mayenne in the division zone were de-
southwest France had been charged on molished and that few Germans were
2 August with protecting the crossing between Chàteau-Gontier and the Loire.
sites along the Loire River, its northern T h e force then retraced its steps and re-
boundary. Two days later the LXXX joined the division, which in the mean-
Corps artillery commander brought a time had displaced to Angers behind the
measure of unified leadership to the 11th Infantry. T h e 11th had encoun-
troops along the river line from St. Naz- tered no serious resistance until reaching
aire to Saumur–security formations, a point two miles west of Angers on the
naval personnel, antiaircraft units, and evening of 7 August. General Irwin
the like. On 8 August, the 16th Divi-
sion (formed by consolidating the 158th 7 MS # B–245 (Haeckel); MS # B–034
Reserve Division –which
was intended (Schramm) .
originally to furnish replacements to the 8See The Fifth Division in France (Metz, France:
Imprimerie du Journal de Lorraine, 1944), pp. 9–
units committed in Normandy–and the 13; The Fifth Infantry Division in the ETO
(Atlanta, Georgia: Albert Love Enterprises, 1945) ,
6 TUSA AAR, I, p. 22; 5th Div AAR, Aug. no pagination.
562 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
had then moved the remainder of the bridge southwest of Angers, and this gave
division south from Vitré. direct access into the city. General Ir-
Impatient, General Walker phoned win funneled Col. Robert P. Bell’s 10th
Irwin at noon, 8 August. Walker Infantry across the bridge on 9 August
wanted Angers quickly, but he also and prepared a co-ordinated two-regi-
wanted a reinforced infantry battalion ment attack for the following day.
sent to Nantes. If German activity at General Walker visited the division
Lorient, Brest, and St. Malo indicated and was satisfied with the preparations,
a pattern of behavior likely to be en- but he characteristically “urged more
countered at all the ports, it was reason- speed in attack.” Launched on io Au-
able to assume that strong and deter- gust, the drive carried American troops
mined German forces held Nantes. Al- into the city, and, by the morning of
though his available troops permitted 1 1 August, the 5th Division had almost
him only to contain the enemy in the two thousand prisoners and was in con-
area, Walker desired at least a token trol of Angers. American aircraft de-
force to block the northern exits of stroyed the highway bridge south of the
Nantes and prevent the Germans from city by bombardment, thus isolating
sallying forth unnoticed against Ameri- Angers from the south.9
can communications. Developments elsewhere had their ef-
Irwin, who was already involved at fect on the XX Corps. On the basis of
Angers, his major objective, wanted to information that German reinforcements
keep his units well consolidated so he were moving into the le Mans–Alenqon–
could deal with any emergencies. Op- Sées area, Third Army on 1 1 August di-
erating in what he considered a vacuum rected Walker to assemble on the May-
of information, he was uneasy because enne–le Mans line three of the four di-
his “mission, zone of action, and adja- visions then assigned to him. With the
cent forces [were] not clear,” even 7th Armored, 35th, and 80th Divisions,
though he was “using every agency” to he was to attack promptly from the May-
find out what his neighbors were doing. enne–le Mans line to the northeast to
Nevertheless, when he learned at the secure the Carrouges–Sées line. T h e in-
end of the afternoon of 8 August that tention apparently was to eliminate a
Walker was “much exercised” because potential German threat from the west
no troops were on the way to Nantes, against the exposed left and rear of the
Irwin sent out a call for trucks. They
arrived early on 9 August, and a rein-
forced infantry battalion motored to 9 The XX Corps, Its History and Service in World
War II (Osaka, Japan: The Mainichi Publishing
Nantes. Encountering no opposition Co., Ltd., 1951) (hereafter cited as XX Corps), pp.
until reaching the outskirts of the city, 74–77. On 8 August the Reconnaissance Troop
the battalion destroyed a telephone cen- supply section was transporting fuel and rations
forward in convoy when the leading armored
ter and a radio station, then set up block- vehicle performing escort duty struck a mine and
ing positions along the city’s northern was destroyed. Hostile troops nearby opened fire.
exits. For braving the fire to rescue several wounded and
unconscious soldiers who were lying in the road, S.
Meanwhile, the 11th Infantry on 8 Sgt. Wardie Barnett and T/5 Vincent Hughes were
August had captured intact a railroad awarded the DSC.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 563
XV Corps, which was driving north to- not much more than changing directions
ward Argentan. In addition, Walker of march. Strained communications,
was directed to move the 5th Division, sketchy information, and a surprising
less a regiment to be left at Angers, absence of German opposition charac-
northeast along the Loir River about terized his division’s movements, and he
fifty miles from Angers to a line gen- could only guess that his ultimate ob-
erally between le Mans and Tours, there, jective might be Dreux, Chàeaudun, or
as Patton put it, “to guard against a Orléans. In time, General Walker told
very doubtful attack on our [south] him to remain south of the Chartres–
flank.” 10 Etampes highway. Finally Walker ad-
T h e 7th Armored Division, which had vised him to stand fast just south of
recently landed at OMAHABeach and Chartres. Irwin then assumed that he
was hurrying toward le Mans, was not was “heading south of Paris to the east,”
immediately available, nor was the 35th but he hoped for a few days rest so that
Division, engaged at Mortain. But so his troops could take care of long-needed
urgent was the need to cover the ex- mechanical maintenance.
posed left flank of the XV Corps that Meanwhile, a 4th Armored Division
Walker, directed again on 1 2 August combat command had relieved the bat-
to attack, initiated action on the 13th talion of the 5th Division at Nantes, and
with the two regiments of the 80th Di- the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division
vision at hand. Though the attack had replaced Colonel Roffe’s 2d Infan-
made good progress and swept away try, which Irwin had temporarily left
scattered German resistance, it ended in at Angers. As these components joined
embarrassment as the 80th Division the division near Chartres, Irwin again
troops collided with XV Corps units had a complete unit, and he would soon
moving across their attack zone.11 get a definite mission.12
Meanwhile, the 5th Division was mov-
ing northeast from Angers. To Gen- The Drive to the East
eral Irwin, who was less than fully in-
formed on the big picture, “sudden and Despite Irwin’s bewilderment as to
unexpected changes cause[ d] consider- the meaning of his apparently uncharted
able confusion in arrangements, trans- and aimless peregrinations, a well-de-
portation, and plans,” particularly since fined course of action was emerging.
there was “no indication of reasons for Although the strands of significance were
orders.” His bewilderment increased often improvised and tangled, they re-
during the next few days when orders flected a pattern of activity designed to
“made no sense at all” and prompted exploit the German disorganization in
“great confusion.” western France. T h e general area of
Between 1 2 and 16 August, Irwin re- operations for those units not engaged
ceived conflicting orders that indicated at the Argentan–Falaise pocket lay be-
tween the Seine and Loire Rivers, an
10Memo, Patton for Gaffey, 8 Aug, XV Corps G–
3 Jnl and File: see also TUSA AAR, I, 26, and 12Ltr, Patton to Walker, 11 Aug, and Msg, Patton
Annex 2. to Walker, 12 Aug, XV Corps G–3 Jnl and File;
“See above, Ch. XXVI. Memo, 15 Aug, VIII Corps G–3 Jnl and File.
564 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
open, level plain ideally suited for ar- Army units coming from England and
mored operations. T h e chalk plateaus dispatching them to the front. Al-
in the Evreux, Dreux, Chartres, and Chl- though the corps headquarters had been
teaudun areas provided excellent air- scheduled to take control of the 7th
field sites capable of insuring satisfac- Armored and 80th Infantry Divisions,
tory air support for post-OVERLORD op- neither proved available; the 80th was
erations east of the Seine. Since se- involved at Argentan, and the 7th Ar-
curing this ground was an essential pre- mored was moving toward Dreux. For-
liminary to breaking out of the lodg- tunately, the 35th Division was about to
ment area, the operations of the Third complete its mission near Mortain, and
Army were oriented toward this goal. 13 Patton gave it, as well as the 4th Ar-
Depending on further developments mored Division (coming from Brittany
in the fast changing situation, the most and VIII Corps control), to XII Corps.
likely objectives toward which the Third With these forces, XII Corps, in addi-
Army could next direct its efforts were tion to protecting the south flank of the
closing the Argentan–Falaise gap, cut- army, could advance toward the Paris-
ting off at the Seine the Germans escap- Orléans gap or, if necessary, support the
ing from the pocket, and securing the XX Corps drive to the lower Seine.15
Paris-Orléans gap. Accordingly, Pat- After Bradley halted the XV Corps
ton on 13 August ordered his forces to at Argentan and after Patton ordered
assume flexible dispositions. T h e XV Haislip to split the corps and move two
Corps at Argentan was already in posi- divisions eastward, Patton found him-
tion to secure the Argentan–Falaise gap. self on 15 August, for all practical pur-
Patton gave the XX Corps the 7th Ar- poses and exclusive of the VIII Corps
mored Division and instructed Walker to in Brittany, in command of four corps
secure Dreux as the initial step in block- of two divisions each. Half of the XV
ing German escape across the lower Corps (2d French Armored and 90th In-
Seine. T h e XII Corps, with newly as- fantry Divisions) was facing north in
signed subordinate units, was to concen- the Argentan area, while the XV Corps
trate in the area southeast of le Mans to headquarters with the other half (5th
be in position for an advance to the Armored and 79th Infantry Divisions)
Paris-Orléans gap. Because of the fluid was heading generally eastward, as were
situation, Patton instructed all three the XX Corps (7th Armored and 5th
corps commanders to be prepared to Divisions) and the XII Corps (4th Ar-
operate to the north, northeast, or east.14 mored and 35th Divisions). On 15 Au-
T h e XII Corps headquarters had vir- gust Patton directed the XII Corps to
tually completed the administrative task seize Châteaudun and Orleans and pro-
of landing and assembling the Third tect the army right flank along the Loire.
He changed the objective of the XX
13PS SHAEF (44) 11 (Final) , SHAEF Plng Staff, Corps—instead of taking Dreux, the
Post-NEPTUNE Courses of Action After Capture of corps was to establish a bridgehead across
the Lodgment Area, Sec. 11: Method of Conduct-
ing the Campaign, 30 May, SGS SHAEF File 381.
Post-OVERLORDPlng. 15TUSA AAR, Aug; Memo, Maddox for Evans,
14See TUSA Dir, 13 Aug. 13 Aug.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 565
the Eure River at Chartres. He in- and the 35th Division on the road from
structed the XV Corps to establish a Mortain.
bridgehead over the Eure at Dreux. Since Patton had told him to “get
Thus evolved the Third Army three- started as soon as possible,” Cook formed
corps drive eastward to the Seine.16 an armored-infantry column composed
(Map XII) of elements from both divisions and
Though General Patton alerted his headed the column down the main road
corps commanders for advances beyond from le Mans to Orleans on 15 August. 18
these objectives, General Bradley ex- T h e 4th Armored Division’s CCA under
erted a restraining influence. Bradley Colonel Clarke had driven from Nantes
was concerned with the strain that the to St. Calais–more than a hundred
rapid advance was imposing on supply miles-in one day, but after a short halt
and communications facilities. In ac- for refueling, the tankers moved on to-
cord with OVERLORD planning, Bradley ward Orleans. Immediately behind
wanted to give the logistical apparatus came a 35th Division regimental task
time to develop installations that would force, Col. Robert Sears’s 137th Infan-
provide a secure base for post-OVERLORD try. T h e armor was eventually attached
operations beyond the Seine. He there- to the infantry, and both units then op-
fore restricted Patton to Dreux: Chartres, erated under General Sebree, the 35th’s
and Orleans so that he, Bradley, could assistant division commander.
there regroup his forces and readjust the There was little knowledge of enemy
army boundaries. 17 strength or dispositions save vague re-
ports that the Germans were assembling
T o secure Orléans was the mission of forces to defend Châteaudun and Or-
Maj. Gen. Gilbert R. Cook, a West leans. As a result of conflicting intel-
Pointer who had fought in France dur- ligence, Cook later received contrary
ing World War I, who had commanded messages from Patton advising him to
XII Corps since 1943, and who in addi- proceed directly to Orleans and also to
tion was deputy commander of the Third go by way of Châteaudun. T o resolve
Army. T o perform his first combat mis- the matter, Cook ordered Sebree to take
sion as corps commander, General Cook Orléans if quick capture appeared fea-
set up his headquarters at le Mans on sible without reinforcement and if it
13 August and awaited the arrival of appeared possible to hold the city with
his widely separated units-the 4th Ar- light forces after its capture.
mored Division coming out of Brittany With very few maps, without prior
reconnaissance, lacking information of
16TUSA Dir, 15 Aug (confirming verbal orders, enemy dispositions, and ignorant of the
14 Aug) ; 12th AGp Dir for Current Opns, 15 Aug; natural obstacles of the region, tankers
Telecon, Gay to Menoher, 1845, 15 Aug, XV Corps
CofS Jnl and File: XV Corps AAR, Aug; Bradley,
Soldier’s Story, p. 379. 18This account is from the XII Corps, 4th Armd
17Telecons, Gen Gaffey and Maj Gen Gilbert R. Div, and 35th Div AAR’s; Extracts from Cook’s
Cook, 1740, 15 Aug, and Gaffey and Hagan, 1540, Diary and XII Corps Historical .Officer’s Notes, CI
16 Aug: Memos, Gaffey for Haislip and for Walker, 354. GL-140; Maj Randolph Leigh’s XII Corps,
15 Aug. All in XV Corps CofS Jnl and File. Rup- Hosp Intervs, IV, GL-93 (319) ; and Koyen, Fourth
penthal, Logistical Support, I , 484-88. Armored Division, pp. 27ff.
566 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the Germans would be able to raid U.S. Corps, and having collided with XV
lines of communication. General Cook Corps units, XX Corps received new
therefore instructed the 4th Armored orders sending it to Dreux. General
Division to sweep the north bank of the Walker’s field order, issued on the morn-
Loire between Tours and Blois. Gen- ing of 14 August, directed an attack “on
eral Wood gave the mission to General the axis le Mans-Nogent-le-Rotrou-
Dager’s CCB, which was moving from Dreux-Mantes-Gassicourt to seize the
Lorient toward Orléans. CCB was to line of the Seine between Meulan-Ver-
clear the north bank and destroy the non.” 23 As far as Dreux was concerned,
bridges but was not to become involved this projected an advance to the north-
in action that might delay its progress. east. But XV Corps on the XX Corps
In compliance, as CCB drove the 2 5 0 left was preparing on the same day to
miles from Lorient to Vendôme (forty advance to the east, also on Dreux, with
miles west of Orleans) in thirty-four the two divisions departing the Argentan
hours, General Dager dispatched patrols area. If the two corps converged on a
to the river. These were sufficient to single point, in this case Dreux, a con-
cause the Germans, already harassed by fusion of major proportions was inevi-
the FFI, to demolish the bridges them- table. During the evening of 14 August,
selves and withdraw to the south bank therefore, Walker received a new mis-
between Tours and Blois. A XII Corps sion–Chartres became the new XX
task force composed of the 1117th Engi- Corps objective.
neer Group and an attached artillery As a result of these changes, the initial
battalion performed the same function commitment of the 7th Armored Divi-
for the bridges between Blois and Or- sion was fraught with haste and potential
leans. With all the bridges destroyed, disorder. Having almost been sent into
aircraft keeping the Loire River valley attack on the XV Corps left as it was
under surveillance, patrols guarding the hurrying from its recent unloading at
buffer zone between the Loir and the OMAHABeach toward le Mans, the 7th
Loire from Angers to Orléans, and the Armored Division on the afternoon of
Germans manifesting little hostile intent, 13 August received orders to pass
the southern flank of the 12th Army through le Mans, clear the roads to en-
Group appeared secure. General Cook able the 35th Division to advance on
had accomplished his mission. His first Orléans, and assemble near la Ferté-
assignment as XII Corps commander was Bernard, fifty miles southwest of Dreux.
also his last. In poor health for some While the division was assembling near
la Ferté-Bernard, General Walker ar-
time, he finally gave in to doctors’ orders
and relinquished his command. rived at the command post at noon,
14 August. He ordered the division
T h e XX Corps mission to take commander, Maj. Gen. Lindsay McD.
Chartres had evolved out of a fluid situa- Silvester, to begin his attack at once-
tion that bred some confusion. After toward Dreux and Mantes-Gassicourt.
having attacked on the left of XV Corps
on 13 August toward the Carrouges-Sées
line, the same objective given to XV 23 XXCorps FO, 14 Aug.
THE DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 569
GENERAL
WALKERHOLDING
ROADSIDE
CONFERENCE
with General Silvester.
Though some division components were morning of 15 August the forces had
still coming from the beaches, Silvester shifted and consolidated into two
had three armored columns advancing columns.26 T h e excellent road net, the
toward Dreux that afternoon.24 sparseness of enemy opposition, and
T h e columns encountered scattered re- good command control had facilitated a
sistance and advanced about fifteen miles difficult readjustment made during the
to Nogent-le-Rotrou by evening. At hours of darkness. Yet, despite the shift
that time Silvester received word of the of armored columns, considerable traffic
change in objective. He was to move intermingling occurred on 15 August be-
instead to chartres.25 Silvester immedi- tween the 7th Armored and the 79th
ately notified his subordinate commands Divisions on the approaches to Nogent-
of the change in direction, and by the le-Roi.
Still mindful of driving to the Seine,
General Silvester sent Col. Dwight A.
24This account is taken from the XX Corps, 7th Rosebaum’s CCA and Lt. Col. James W.
Armd Div, and 5th Div AAR’s, Aug; XX Corps,
p. 79; CI 285; Irwin Diary; personal documents Newberry’s CCR north of Chartres and
loaned to the author by General Silvester.
Telecon, Walker and Silvester, 2145, 14 Aug.
25
7th Armd Div G–3 Jnl. 26 7th Armd Div G–3 Jnl, entry 2255,14 Aug.
570 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
into the area between Chartres and Chartres in particular. Before the fight
Dreux; he dispatched Brig. Gen. John B. for Chartres terminated, regimental-
Thompson’s CCB to take the new ob- sized portions of both new divisions (the
jective. At the outskirts of Chartres by 338th tied to the artillery of the vanished
the evening of 15 August, CCB attacked 708th Division) were committed there.27
with two forces. One force entered the CCB of the 7th Armored Division at-
town from the northwest; the other tacked Chartres again on 16 August and
sought to enter from the southwest. extended a precarious hold over part of
T h e latter met determined opposition the objective despite active resistance in-
that came somewhat as a surprise be- side the town and the arrival of increas-
cause of the relatively light resistance en- ing numbers of new troops in wooded
countered earlier. At a disadvantage in areas just south of the town.28 Corps
the failing light, the troops withdrew. artillery, cautioned to be careful of the
Meanwhile, the 5th Division, which historic town and its cathedral, com-
had moved from Angers, was arriving at menced to fire on 17 August in support
an area about eight miles southwest of of CCB, which encircled Chartres and
Chartres. fought to clear German troops from the
town. Since the Germans continued to
Like the Americans, the Germans were defend stubbornly, and because tanks
surprised by the effectiveness of the were at a disadvantage in the narrow
Chartres defenses. T h e First Army, in streets, General Walker ordered the 5th
command of the area between Chartres Division to aid the armor.
and the Loire, had designated Chartres General Irwin, still not altogether in-
as an “absorption point,” where rem- formed on the broad picture, wished he
nants of units (among them the 17th SS had more information on the American
Panzer Grenadier and 352d Divisions) armored dispositions, felt that the XX
and stragglers from the Normandy bat- Corps was overextended, and believed
tlefield were to be reorganized. As at that security against enemy infiltration
Chàteaudun and Orleans, a local com- was insufficient. He dispatched the 11th
mander was in charge of assembling these Infantry just as General Walker made
and rear-area troops (among them stu- his usual telephone call to urge speed.
dents of an antiaircraft training center T h e 11th Infantry attacked toward
at Chartres) into a coherent force. On Chartres on 18 August, and, despite stiff
the afternoon of 15 August, as the 7th opposition that included tanks and artil-
U.S. Armored Division was approaching,
27 Hitler Order, WEST/Op.Nr. 772830/44 g.Kdos.
General der Infanterie Kurt von der Chefs, 11 Aug, quoted in Msg, AGp B to the armies,
Chevallerie, the First Army commander, 0030, 12 Aug, AGp B Fuehrer Befehle; MS # B–732
was holding a conference in the town to (Hold), MS # B–003 (Hoehne), MS # B–728
plan how newly arriving units that (Emmerich), MS # P–166 (Casper); First Army
FO 2, 16 Aug, translated and reproduced in Annex
Hitler had ordered there-the 48th Divi- I to TUSA G–2 Per Rpt 69, 19 Aug.
sion from northern France and the 338th 28Col. Welborn B. Griffith, Jr., the XX Corps
Division from southern France-might G–3 who was killed at Chartres, and 1st Lt. Mario
J. Fortuna of the 38th Armored Infantry Battalion,
best reinforce the defenses west of the who led an assault party in the capture of a nearby
Seine in general and the defenses of village, were awarded the DSC.
THE DRIVE T O THE SEINE 571
lery, the combined efforts of armor and At the same time, the XV Corps was
infantry succeeded in clearing and secur- making its sixty-mile advance from
ing the remainder of the town.29 More Argentan: the 79th Division toward
than two thousand prisoners were taken, Nogent-le-Roi, and the 5th Armored Di-
a large German Air Force installation vision toward Dreux. T h e 5th Armored
(including airport, warehouses, depots, met only a few Germans at lightly de-
a bomb assembly plant, and fifty planes) fended roadblocks. Although German
was captured, and the XX Corps was in jamming of radios interfered with com-
possession of a historic gateway to Paris, munications between unit commanders
only fifty miles away. and the heads of their columns, the
troops crossed the Eure River on the
28 S. Sgt. Clarence E. White of the 11th Infantry
morning of 16 August, encircled Dreux,
was instrumental in the success, establishing and fired at some German troops fleeing east-
maintaining an exposed artillery observation post. ward, and took the town that afternoon.
Though wounded, White adjusted fire until he
collapsed from loss of blood. He was awarded the
Nine artillery pieces, six destroyed tanks,
DSC. and a little more than two hundred
572 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
prisoners were captured. T h e motor- lem than were gasoline and rations.33
ized 79th Division, advancing toward Gasoline consumption, which skyrock-
Nogent-le-Roi, met hardly a German eted, and ration requirements, which re-
and on 16 August established a bridge- mained constant, threatened to bring
head on the east bank of the Eure River, operations to a halt.
thirty-seven miles from Paris.30 In order to keep the troops moving,
Although capture of Orléans and Allied commanders looked to air sup-
Chartres had placed the XII and XX ply.34 Nevertheless, only small amounts
Corps within striking distance of Paris, of supplies actually arrived on the Con-
the approach to the French capital from tinent by air in early August, primarily
Dreux was shorter and considered better. because transport planes were being held
Five bridges across the Eure and a good in readiness for possible airborne opera-
road net afforded more than adequate tions at Orléans and Chartres. Once the
accommodations for military move- two cities were captured, use of the
ment.31 Despite the attractiveness and transports was less restricted. On 19 Au-
the importance of Paris—the most vital gust twenty-one C-47’s landed forty-
communications center in France—the seven tons of rations near le Mans in the
Seine River, not the city, became the first delivery of what was to become a
foremost Allied objective. daily emergency airlift to the Third
Army. 35
T o the Seine and Across Although this emergency measure
hardly promised to make up all short-
General Bradley had limited General ages, the temptation to take advantage
Patton to Dreux, Chartres, and Orléans of the weak enemy opposition at Dreux,
primarily because of logistical problems. Chartres, and Orleans (despite the local
T h e essential difficulty was that the sup- resistance at Chartres) was irresistible.
ply services did not have enough trans- After meeting with Hodges and Patton
portation to keep up with the breakout to discuss “spheres of influence” and
from the Cotentin and the spectacular “zones of action,” Bradley on 1 7 August
momentum of the Allied advance.32 It removed his restriction on going beyond
was obvious after the first week in Au- the confines of the OVERLORD lodgment
gust that the combat gains were out- area to the Seine. Since the main enemy
stripping the capacity of the Communi- forces were concentrated west of the
cations Zone to keep the units adequately lower Seine (north of Paris), Allied
supplied. Because of the rapidity of troops advancing to the Seine would in
troop movement and the relative paucity 33The Gen Bd, USFET, Rpt on Ammo Supply
of targets, ammunition was less a prob- for FA, Study No. 58, File 471/1, p. 19.
34Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 2 Aug, SGS
SHAEF File 381, OVERLORD I (a); SHAEF Msg S-
57489, 12 Aug, Msgs, EXFOR Main to SHAEF,
30XV Corps, 79th Div, 5th Armd Div AAR’s, Aug; MGA-2, 14 Aug, SHAEF to EXFOR Main, FWD-
Wyche Diary; Notes of Mtg, 2000, 16 Aug, XV 12901, 15 Aug, and 12th AGp to SHAEF, Q-2050,
Corps CofS Jnl and File. 11 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 373/2.
31 Notes of Mtg, 2000, 16 Aug, XV Corps CofS 35Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 385; Bradley, Effect
Jnl and File. of Air Power, p. 71; Huston, Biography of A Battal-
32For detailed discussion, see Ch. XXXI, below. ion, pp. 370-72; TUSA AAR, Aug.
THE DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 573
3612th AGp Ltr and Ltr of Instrs 5, 17 Aug; see 38 12th AGp Memo for Rcd, 19 Aug, ML-205. For
also XV Corps G–2 Per Rpt 15, 0300, 18 Aug, and a detailed discussion of this decision, see Ch. XXX,
Sylvan Diary, 17 Aug. below.
37 TUSA Dirs, 17 and 18 Aug; Patton to Haislip, 39 Notesof Mtg, 2000, 19 Aug, XV Corps CofS
17 Aug, XV Corps G–3 Jnl and File. Jnl and File.
574 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
cult to cross, and fashion another en- head on the east bank of the river as a
circlement inside Normandy. springboard for future operations. T h e
T h e major difficulty of a maneuver XV Corps thus drew a double mission-
such as this was the same that had in- the 5th Armored was to attack down the
hibited American activity north of west bank while the 79th established a
Argentan. At Mantes, the XV Corps bridgehead on the east bank. In his
was again beyond the zone assigned to order issued on 2 0 August, Montgomery
the 12th Army Group. Further ad- cautioned: “This is no time to relax, or
vance toward the mouth of the Seine to sit back and congratulate ourselves.
would place the corps across the pro- . . . Let us finish off the business in rec-
jected routes of advance of the British ord time.” 4 2 By then, American troops
and Canadian armies and would surely were already across the Seine.
result in “an administrative headache.” 40 General Wyche had received a tele-
Although General Bradley offered to phone call at 2135, 19 August, from
lend trucks to transport British troops to General Haislip, who ordered him to
Mantes-Gassicourtand suggested that the cross the Seine that night.43 T h e 79th
British move units through the American was to get foot troops on the east bank
zone to launch the attack down the west at once, build a bridge for vehicles, tanks,
bank of the river, General Dempsey de- and heavy equipment, and gain ground
clined with thanks on the basis that his in sufficient depth (four to six miles) to
logistical organization could not support protect the crossing sites at Mantes from
such a move. For the Allies then to take medium artillery fire.
advantage of the alluring possibilities at In a situation that was “too fluid to
the Seine—disrupting the German with- define an enemy front line,” General
drawal, bagging additional prisoners Wyche anticipated little resistance. His
among the escapees from the Argentan- 79th Division had that day engaged only
Falaise pocket, removing Germans from scattered German groups in flight, had
the British zone, and thus allowing captured nineteen vehicles and a Mark
Dempsey to move to the Seine against IV tank, and had received only sporadic
“almost negligible resistance”-General machine gun fire from across the Seine.
Montgomery would have to permit T h e river itself was the main problem,
further intrusion of American troops for near Mantes it varied in width from
into the British sector and accept in ad- five hundred to eight hundred feet.
vance the administrative consequences.
He, Bradley, and Dempsey decided to 4221 AGp Gen Operational Situation and Dir.
M–519, 20 Aug.
chance the headache.41 43The following account is taken from the XV
Having decided to send part of Pat- Corps and 79th Div AAR’s, Aug; Wyche Diary;
ton’s force down the west bank of the XV Corps FO 6, 2330, 19 Aug, and G–2 Per Rpt
17. 0300, 20 Aug; Telecons, Menoher and Wyche,
Seine, the Allied commanders saw a 2135, 19 Aug, and Col Menoher and Col Kramer
coincident opportunity to seize a bridge- Thomas, 1000, 20 Aug; Haislip Memo, 2100, 19 Aug;
Notes of Mtg, 2000, 19 Aug; 314th Infantry Regi-
40Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 381. ment, Through Combat, pp 27–30; History of the
41See Ltr, Bradley to Eisenhower, 10 Sep, Pogue 313th Infantry in World War II (Washington,
Files. For an interesting speculation, see Wilmot, 1947), pp. 95-99; Interv with Capt Ernest Rothem-
Struggle for Europe, pp. 427–28. berg, Hosp Intervs, ML–2234.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 575
to cover Paris and the Army Group B the sector between the Eure and the
rear. In any event, though Hitler hoped Seine River where an enemy break-
to stop the Allies at the Touques or at through attempt to Louviers can be ex-
the Seine, he was already preparing to pected.” T h e Fifth Panzer Army was to
organize the Somme–Marne River line absorb all the Seventh Army headquar-
for defense.46 ters. T h e armored units of the Seventh
Model on 20August subordinated the Army unfit for combat were to be sent to
Seventh Army to the Fifth Panzer Army the Beauvais–Senlis area for rehabilita-
(perhaps because Hausser had been tion under the LVIII Panzer Corps head-
wounded and was evacuated), thereby quarters. Other units of the Seventh
giving Dietrich command ‘of the entire Army temporarily unfit for combat were
area from the coast to the First to be dispatched across the Seine for re-
Army boundary (Chartres–Rambouil- habilitation, construction of fortifica-
let-northwest outskirts of Paris). On 21 tions along the Seine, and defense of the
August he spelled out Dietrich’s mission. river line.47
T h e Fifth Panzer Army was to occupy In another order issued the same day,
and hold during the night of 2 1 August Model informed Dietrich that if the de-
the Touques River–Lisieux–Orbec– velopment of the situation required
Laigle line. Because it was “of para- withdrawal behind the Seine, the with-
mount importance” to bolster the east- drawal was to be carried out in four
ern flank in the Eure sector, Model steps, through a series of three inter-
ordered Dietrich to move all the ar- mediate positions. 48
mored units fit for combat (except those On that date Dietrich organized his
of the II SS Panzer Corps) to the vicinity army front into three corps sectors, with
of Evreux, the area Model considered the LXXXVI on the coast, the II SS
most threatened. T h e eventual task of Panzer in the center, and the LXXXI
these forces was to regain contact with on the left. In compliance with Model’s
the Paris defenses of the First Army. directive, he dispatched an armored
Because a firm hold on the Seine River group to the Evreux area-the remnants
between Vernon and the army boundary of the 2d, 1st SS, and 12th SS Panzer
was a prerequisite to successful defense Divisions under I SS Panzer Corps. 49
in that area, a corps headquarters was to Despite the orderly appearance of
be charged with building defenses there; troop dispositions and unit boundaries
the arrival of the 49th Division at the on a map, the forces were weak. T h e
Seine was to be accelerated by all avail- Seventh Army could not even begin to
able means. “I am stressing in particu-
lar,’’ Model stated, “the importance of 47Model Order to Dietrich (No. 6376/44), 21
Aug, Fifth Pz Army K T B , Anlage 37.
46 0B W E S T K T B , 8 Aug, Anlagen 1218 and 48Model to Dietrich (No. 6353/44), 21 Aug,
1220; Telecons, Tempelhoff and Metzke, 1150 and Fifth Pz Army K T B , Anlage 38. Whether this
1220 8 Aug, A G p B K T B ; MS # B-727 (Gersdorff) ; preceded or followed the order cited immediately
MS # B-807 (Kuntzen); Hitler Order, W F S t / O p . above is not clear. Though the numbering of the
Nr. 772830/44 g.Kdos. Chefs, 11 Aug, quoted in Anlagen suggests that it follows, the numbers on
Msg, A G p B to the armies, 0030, 12 Aug, A G p B the documents suggest otherwise.
Fuehrer Befehle; OB W E S T , a Study in Command, 49
Dietrich Order, 21 Aug, Fifth Pz Army K T B ,
p. 139. An lagen.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 577
prepare an accurate strength report, but the lower jaw that the V Corps head-
Dietrich on 21 August instructed two quarters had made from Tinchebray to
corps of his army to count their men, Argentan, the XIX Corps and its divi-
tanks, and artillery pieces. T h e count sions were to displace more than a hun-
was discouraging. T h e I SS Panzer dred miles in a large and complicated
Corps reported that the roth SS Panzer troop movement from the vicinity of
Division had only a weak infantry bat- Flers to cover the gap between the V and
talion (perhaps 300 men), no tanks, no XV Corps—from Gacé to Dreux. T h e
guns; the 12th SS Panzer Division had corps moved and by 19 August was con-
300 men, 10tanks, no artillery; the 1st centrated (with the 2d Armored, 28th,
SS Panzer Division was unable to give and 30th Divisions) in the Mortagne–
any figures. T h e II SS Panzer Corps re- Brezolles area. From there the XIX
ported that the 2d SS Panzer Division Corps was to attack north toward the
had 450 men, 15 tanks, 6 guns; the 9th Seine. T h e XIX and XV Corps would
SS Panzer Division had 460 men, 2 0 to thus fashion a two-corps drive straddling
25 tanks, and 2 0 guns; the 116th Panzer the E w e River, with the divisions of
Division had one battalion of infantry the XIX on the left attacking to Elbeuf
(perhaps 500 or 600 men), 1 2 tanks, and and XV (5th Armored Division) on the
no artillery. right attacking to Louviers.51
A week later the strength of these divi- The LXXXI Corps, which since
sions, plus that of the 21st Panzer Divi- 16 August had had the difficult mission
sion-all that remained of Model’s ar- of screening the south flank of both Ger-
mored forces–totaled 1,300 men, 24 man armies in Normandy from Gacé to
tanks, and 60 artillery pieces.50 Paris, was scheduled to defend the Eure
In that intervening week the Allies River line. When parts of the 344th
were driving toward the Seine. Division (a static division released by
the Fifteenth Army) arrived near Gacé
When the XV Corps had been ordered on 1 7 August, conglomerate forces under
to thrust downstream along the west the headquarters of Panzer Lehr were
bank of the Seine from Mantes-Gassi- pulled out of the line and sent east of the
court and clear the area between the Seine for rehabilitation. Soon after-
Eure and Seine Rivers, General Hodges wards, portions of the 6th Parachute and
(after a conference with Generals Brad- 33rst Divisions came into the sector and
ley and Montgomery) had been in- were committed on the 344th left (east).
structed to assist with the First U.S. T h e 17th Luftwaffe Field Division, pre-
Army. Hodges was to use the XIX viously employed at Le Havre as a static
Corps, which had been pinched out of division, took positions near Dreux so
the western portion (upper jaw) of the hastily that its commitment could not
Argentan–Falaise pocket. In the same be executed in an orderly or unified
kind of displacement from the upper to manner. These units were far from im-
5112th AGp Ltr of Instrs 5, 17 Aug, Addenda to
50Telecon, Rotbers and Tempelhoff, 1545, 21 Ltr of Instrs 5, 19 Aug, and Memos for Rcd, 18
Aug, and Fifth Pz Army Rpt, 0650, 28 Aug, AGp and 19 Aug; Telecon, Patton to Haislip, 19 Aug,
B KTB. XV Corps G–3 Jnl and File; Sylvan Diary, 19 Aug.
578 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Almost immediately after leaving their court to Autheuil on the Eure River.
positions about eight miles northwest of General Corlett echeloned the 28th Divi-
Mantes on 2 0 August, the 5th Armored sion to the left rear to protect the corps
Division ran into strong opposition from west flank.57
the kampfgruppe of panzer elements General Brooks's 2d Armored Divi-
commanded successively by Wahl, Fick, sion forced crossings over the Avre River,
and Col. Wilhelm Mohnke. T h e Ger- bypassed Verneuil, leaving its reduction
mans fought skillfully, using to good ad- to the 28th Division, and continued to-
vantage terrain features favorable for de- ward Breteuil. Despite rain, mud, and
fense, numerous ravines and woods in poor visibility, the armor continued to
particular. Fog and rain that continued advance rapidly, bypassing Breteuil,
for several days provided additional leaving it also to the 28th, and rushed
cover for German ambush parties headlong through Conches and le Neu-
using Panzerfausts and antitank grenades bourg toward the Seine. Opposition
against American tanks. It took the ar- from the 17th Luftwaffe Field Division
mored division five days of hard fighting and the 344th and 331st Divisions just
to advance about twenty miles and ac- melted away. Small pockets of infantry-
complish its mission. men were easily swept into prisoner of
At 0600, 24 August, XV Corps passed war cages, and jammed columns of
from the control of Third Army to that motorized and horse-drawn vehicles were
of First Army. On that day General smashed, burned, or captured.58 A
Hodges informed General Haislip that, counterattack launched by the LXXXI
starting on the following morning, Sec- Corps with elements of the 1st SS, 2d SS,
ond British Army elements (belonging 2d, and 116th Panzer Divisions had little
largely to the 30 Corps) were to cross effect; German troops manifested a
the American zone north of the Pacy-sur- stronger inclination to get to the Seine
Eure–Mantes-Gassicourt highway and ferries than to fight.
close to the Seine. Haislip was to move By 24 August 2d Armored Division
the 5th Armored Division south of the spearheads were at the southern out-
British area by 0800, 25 August, leaving skirts of Elbeuf. There they struck
reconnaissance troops along the Seine stubborn resistance.
until British relief.56 From the beginning of the American
This order also affected the XIX Corps attack west of the Seine on 2 0 August,
on the XV Corps left. T h e XIX Corps Model and Dietrich had focused their at-
had assembled its three divisions in the tention on developments occurring on
Mortagne–Brezolles area and on 20 Au-
gust attacked with two divisions abreast- 57FUSA Ltrs of Instrs, Hodges to Gerow, 17
the 2d Armored on the left to advance Aug (confirming verbal orders, 16 Aug), and
Hodges to Corlett, 18 Aug; XIX Corps FO 16, 2030,
on the Verneuil–Elbeuf axis, the 30th 19 Aug; [Ferriss], Notes.
on the right to attack through Nonan- 58Telecon, Gause and Schneider, 0430, 23 Aug,
LXXXI Corps KTB. Pvt. Bennie F. Boatright of
the Medical Detachment, 41st. Armored Infantry,
56XV Corps and 5th Armd Div AAR's, Aug; XV was killed as he courageously went to the aid of
Corps G–2 Per Rpt 20, 0200, 23 Aug; FUSA Ltr wounded soldiers. He was posthumously awarded
of Instr, 24 Aug. the DSC.
580 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the Fifth Panzer Army south flank. turned it over to Canadians arriving
T h e relentless pressure exerted by the from the west. 60
XIX and XV Corps during four days Meanwhile, General Hobbs’ 30th
rolled up the panzer army left flank for Division on the XIX Corps right had
almost half the length of the army front. advanced against sporadic resistance and
Model’s plan, outlined on 21 August, for on 23 August, without opposition, oc-
an orderly retrograde movement in four cupied Evreux, bypassed by the 2d Ar-
successive phases, came to naught, and mored Division. T h e 30th remained in
the units on the northern flank of the its positions and in corps reserve on
army, those facing the British, had to 24 August. On the following day, upon
accelerate their withdrawal. corps order, two regiments moved north
All desperate efforts to check the to ground west and south of Louviers,
American advance by the weak remnants thereby cutting the roads into town from
of panzer divisions, some of which had to the west. Patrols found Louviers aban-
be pulled from other parts of the front doned by the Germans.61
where they were also badly needed, were While the XIX and XV Corps were
to no avail. On 24 August, when clearing the Eure area from Mantes-Gas-
American spearheads were approaching sicourt to Elbeuf, British and Canadian
Elbeuf, the German commanders foresaw troops were approaching the Seine from
the danger that the remainder of the the west. T h e First Canadian Army
army might be cut off from the Seine had been attacking eastward since 16 Au-
crossings. They therefore deployed the gust, when units crossed the Dives River
battered splinters of eight panzer divi- in the coastal sector near Mézidon.
sions along the southern part of the British airborne troops under Canadian
front, between the Ride and Seine control broadened the offensive by at-
Rivers.59 tacking in the marshes near Cabourg.
This force, representing the concen- Progress against the German forces that
tration of armored units on the southern had not been involved in the Argentan-
flank of the German bridgehead west of Falaise action was slow, for the with-
the Seine-with part under the II SS drawal by the German units outside the
Panzer Corps and part under the 116th pocket was well planned and orderly,
Panzer Division (once again commanded with demolitions, obstacles, and mines
by Schwerin)—had the mission of pro- left in wake of the rear guards. T h e
tecting the Seine crossings to Rouen. Canadian army did not reach and cross
It defended Elbeuf, but not for long. the Touques River until 2 2 August,
On 25 August CCA of the 2d Ar- when the 1st Belgian Infantry Brigade,
mored Division, reinforced by a combat
team of General Cota’s 28th Division, 60 ETHINT 18 (Schwerin); 2d Armd and 28th
Div AAR’s, Aug; see Charles Brisson, “La Libera-
launched a co-ordinated attack on Elbeuf tion d’Elbeuf et la Bataille dans la Vallée de la
and entered the town. T h e troops se- Seine,” and Andre Bourlet, “Combats à Elbeuf,” in
cured Elbeuf on the following day, then Herval, Bataille de Normandie, II, 167–83 and
184–88.
61 30th Div AAR, Aug; [Ferriss], Notes; see J.
L. Cailly, “Louviers Libére,” in Herval, Bataille de
59See Fifth Pz Army KTB, 24 Aug. Normandie, II, 160–61.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 581
moving along the coast, arrived at ache earlier envisioned never devel-
Deauville. On that day Montgomery re- oped.63
leased the 2d Canadian Corps for an
advance to the Seine. Two days later While the Americans were turning
units breached the Touques defenses at over part of the Seine’s west bank to the
Lisieux. Bypassing the city, the Cana- British and Canadians, the Germans
dians drove on toward Bernay to main- were trying desperately to maintain a
tain contact as the German withdrawal semblance of order in what remained of
to the Seine began to accelerate. On their contracting bridgehead west of the
2 6 August Canadian forces were at Seine. Between 2 0 and 2 4 August, the
Bourgtheroulde, where they relieved the Germans got about 2 5 , 0 0 0 vehicles to the
XIX U.S. Corps of responsibility for east bank. But pressed against the west
Elbeuf. On the following day other bank, the German units were fast being
Canadian forces in the coastal sector, compressed into the wooded peninsular
among them the Royal Netherlands pieces of land formed by the loops of
(Princess Irene’s) Brigade, approached the river north of Elbeuf and Bourg-
the mouth of the Seine. theroulde. As Allied artillery fire fell
Meanwhile, the Second British Army into this area, destroying vehicles and
was also moving east, on the route personnel jammed at entrances to river
through Bernay toward les Andelys and crossings, the Germans fought to main-
Louviers and along the highway through tain defensive lines and keep their escape
Gacé and Laigle toward Mantes-Gassi- facilities operating.
court and Vernon. Little opposed the With I SS Panzer Corps in command
advance, and British troops met Ameri- of the 49th Infantry and 18th Luftwaffe
can forces of the XIX Corps at the Risle Field Divisions on the east bank of the
River. 62 Seine generally south of Louviers,
During the last week of August the Dietrich on 2 4 August proposed a re-
British and Canadians closed to the organization of command for those forces
lower Seine from Vernon to the coast. still west of the river-the L X X X V I and
In accordance with arrangements made LXXXI Corps were to assume control of
on 2 4 August, Americans of the XIX and all the infantry divisions, the II SS
XV Corps withdrew along the west bank Panzer Corps of all the armored divi-
of the Seine south across the army group sions. On the following day he put it
boundary. British and American col- into effect. He drew his corps bound-
umns alternately used crossroads and aries so that the LXXX VI controlled the
completed the transfer of territory with units on the Fifth Panzer Army right,
relative ease. T h e administrative head-
63FUSA Ltr of Instrs, Hodges to Haislip and
Corlett, 24 Aug; XV Corps CofS Jnl and File, 23-
26 Aug; First U.S. Army Report of Operations, I ,
62Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 173, 20; [Ferriss], Notes. Events during the month had
176–77; Second Br Army Opns, 21 Jul-9 Sep, BAOR, moved so fast that defining the changing army
2 Nov 45, and Info furnished by 21 AGp to Hist group boundaries had proved to be a virtually im-
Sec USFET, 9 Aug 45, ML–2251; Intentions Second possible task until 21 August. See 21 AGp to
British Army and First Canadian Army, 19, 20 21, SHAEF, 21 Aug, SHAEF File GCT 384-1/0ps (A),
and 23 Aug, 12th AGp File 371.3 Mil Ops, Vol. I. Boundaries of Armies and AGps.
582 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the LXXXI those in the center, and the rehabilitation. In addition, all elements
I SS Panzer (on the east bank) those on of these units that could be spared were
the left. T h e armored units under the to construct fortifications along the
II SS Panzer Corps and concentrated on Somme.65
the southern flank of the German bridge- Thus, though the Germans were pre-
head west of the Seine had no designated paring to defend along the Seine, the
sector of their own. Though thousands plans seemed impossible of execution.
of troops—estimated by the Second Brit- According to one estimate–probably
ish Army between forty and fifty thou- too low–of the battle strength of the
sand-were still west of the Seine, the Fifth Panzer Army on 25 August, 18,000
Germans were hoping to organize a infantrymen, 314 artillery pieces, and
coherent front on the east bank. There 42 tanks and self-propelled guns were
the Fifth Panzer Army would operate in arrayed against the Allies who, in addi-
a sector between the Fifteenth Army (in tion to their overwhelming superiority
the coastal area south to Le Havre) and in the air, in ammunition, and in gaso-
the First Army (covering Paris and the line supplies, were estimated to have
rest of the Army Group B front).64 more than 100,000 infantry in line and
Model on 25 August instructed Diet- 90,000 in immediate reserve, 1,300 artil-
rich to withdraw the few units still west lery pieces deployed and 1,100 in reserve,
of the Risle River across the river that 1,900 tanks in operation on the front and
night, and all the forces in the Seine 2,000 more in reserve.66 Holding at the
River bridgehead behind the Seine in Seine appeared a slim prospect. T h e
one bound on the following night. Once Somme River line seemed to offer the
across the Seine, the army was to organize only possible position for the next stand.
and reinforce positions in such a manner Before any stand could be made, the
as to assure successful defense of the troops jammed against the west bank of
river line. In addition, the remnants of the Seine had to be extricated and
the armored units were to be formed brought across the river. They were
into two reserve groups—one to be virtually trapped. Three days had been
located northeast of Rouen, the other necessary in July and early August to
near Beauvais. T h e II Parachute Corps move two divisions abreast westward
headquarters was to move to Nancy for across the Seine toward the front; it was
rehabilitation under control of the First therefore obvious that a crossing in
Parachute Army. T h e Seventh Army reverse under the unfavorable conditions
was to move the remnants of eleven divi- of late August would allow little more
sions unfit for combat—the 3d Parachute, than personnel to get to the east bank.
the 84th, 85th, 89th, 243d, 272d, 276th, T h e approaches to the ferries were in-
277th, 326th, 363d, and 708th Infantry, adequate, and the remnants of the
plus other splinter units—to the Somme Seventh Army congested the approaches.
River–St. Quentin area in the rear for By 25 August eighteen major ferries and
several smaller ones were still operating
64 Fifth Pz Army KTB, 24 and 25 Aug; Second 65Model Order to Dietrich, 25 Aug, AGp B KTB,
Br Army Intel Summary 81, 2400, 24 Aug; see also Anlage 46.
AGp B KTB, 21 and 25 Aug. 66 Fifth Pz Army KTB, Anlage 50.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 583
in the Rouen area; miscellaneous boats In contrast, the Allies, having closed
and rafts made hazardous trips; one small to the lower Seine north of Paris and
bridge to Rouen was still intact. These being in possession of a bridgehead held
facilities were hardly adequate for the by the 79th Division, were ready to
thousands of troops who in some in- undertake post-OVERLORDoperations east
stances fought among themselves for of the Seine.
transportation across the river. Orderly
movement was difficult if not impossible. Through the Paris–Orléans Gap
Though it was generally agreed that
tanks were to be saved first, SS forma- A day after operations along the lower
tions often insisted that they had priority Seine had started, those directed toward
over all other units, and it was some- the upper Seine south of Paris began. On
times necessary for high-ranking com- 21 August the XX Corps attacked east-
manders to resort to the use of force or ward from Dreux and Chartres, the XII
at least the threat of force in order to Corps from Châteaudun and Orléans.
carry out the semblance of an orderly T h e objective of the two corps, moving
procedure. Same “unpleasant scenes” abreast, was the Paris–Orléans gap–the
took placeat the Seine. 67 Seine River line south of Paris.69
Despite some disorder and panic, the Confronting the two corps was the
Germans managed to get a surprisingly German First Army, commanded now by
large number of troops to the east bank General de Panzertruppen Otto von
of the Seine, mostly on 26 and 27 August. Knobelsdorff, who was trying to gather
T o the Germans, it seemed that the forces to defend the upper Seine and
British and Canadians did not push as a line southward through Nemours,
hard as they might have. Neither did Montargis, Gien, and Orleans. His im-
the Allied air forces seem as active as mediate task was to delay the Americans
usual during the critical days of the with- by blocking the main roads until new
drawal. T h e Seine ferries that remained divisions promised for the Western Front
in service operated even during daylight could be brought u p to defend the line
hours.68 of the Seine. T h e only delaying forces
This achievement was rather hollow. available were security troops, local gar-
There was no longer any option of de- risons, antiaircraft detachments, and
fending at the Seine or even hoping for stragglers from scattered units, all with
an orderly withdrawal east of the river. hopelessly inadequate equipment.
T h e escaping units were weak and close Those portions of the 48th and 338th
to exhaustion. Divisions that had met the Americans at
67LXXXI Corps K T B , Anlagen, Karen; Telecon, Chartres fell back to the Seine to join
Blumentritt, Speidel, Jodl, 1045, 25 Aug, AGp B other newly arriving and as yet uncom-
KTB; MS # B-758 (Kuntzen) and MS # B-807 mitted portions that gathered at Melun,
(Kuntzen) ; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic,
p. 176; Second Br Army Intel Summary 81, 2400, Fontainebleau, and Montereau. These
24 Aug; AGp B K T B , 21 and 25 Aug. were far from impressive forces–the 48th
68OB WEST, a Study in Command, p. 162; see
Leigh-Mallory, “Despatch,” Fourth Supplement to 6912th AGp Memo for Rcd, 19 Aug, including
the London Gazette of December 31, 1946, p, 67, additional notes of conf, Bradley and Patton, 1730,
for an opposite point of view. 19 Aug, ML–205; TUSA Dir, 20 Aug.
584 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
was without combat experience, inade- fire, raced to Sens. Spearheads entered
quately trained, and deficient in equip- the city that afternoon and took the
ment; the 338th lacked organic trans- German garrison so by surprise that
portation and became partially mobile some officers were strolling in the streets
only after commandeering French in dress uniform—tourists who had
vehicles. At Montargis, which Hitler missed the last truck home. Having
had ordered strongly defended, were as- captured the city, CCA established a
sembled the erstwhile defenders of bridgehead on the east bank of the
Orléans—fragmentsof the 708th Division Yonne by the morning of 2 2 August.
and the usual quota of security troops T o eliminate those Germans con-
and supply personnel. T h e 348th Divi- centrated at Montargis, the 35th Divi-
sion and the 18th Luftwaffe Field Divi- sion pushed to the western outskirts of
sion were on the way from northern the city while CCB of the 4th Armored,
France to the First Army but were which had also crossed the Loing River
diverted later toward the Seine north of at Souppes, turned south to outflank the
Paris.70 defenses. A co-ordinated attack crushed
On the American side, General Eddy, the resistance and liberated the town on
former commander of the 9th Division, 24 August. After clearing Montargis,
took General Cook’s place in command armor and infantry proceeded to sweep
of XII Corps and was given the mission the area eastward to Sens.
of driving to the Yonne River at Sens, From Sens, CCA of the 4th Armored
seventy miles east of Orléans.71 After Division drove forty miles to the out-
attaching the 137th Infantry, 35th Divi- skirts of Troyes on the morning of 25
sion, to the 4th Armored Division, Gen- August. There the bulk of the com-
eral Eddy on 20 August ordered Gen- mand launched a frontal attack in desert-
eral Wood to attack. CCA (with a spread formation. With tanks approxi-
battalion of attached infantry) pushed mately a hundred yards apart and tankers
o f f in a drive that gathered speed as it firing their weapons continuously, the
progressed. Though the tankers found troops charged across three miles of open
Montargis defended and the bridge over ground sloping down toward the city.
the Loing River at the town destroyed, Inside Troyes, the Germans fought
reconnaissance troops located a damaged back. Though street fighting continued
but usable bridge at Souppes-sur-Loing, through the night, the Americans were
fifteen miles north of Montargis. Ignor- in possession of the greater part of the
ing Montargis, CCA dashed to Souppes- city by nightfall. That evening a
sur-Loing on 2 1 August, crossed the column crossed the Seine a few miles
river, and, against occasional small arms north of the city. Not until the follow-
ing morning, when this column drove
70MS # B-003 (Hoehne); MS # B728 (Emme-
rich): MS # B-732 (Hold); First Army FO 2, 16
into the rear of the German garrison,
Aug, translated and reproduced in Annex 1 to did the battle come to an end.72
TUSA G–2 Per Rpt 69, 19 Aug. MS # P-166
(Casper) is the principal German source.
71The following account is taken from the XII 72Col. Bruce C. Clarke, the CCA commander,
Corps, 4th Armd Div, and 35th Div AAR’s, Aug; and Maj. Arthur L. West, Jr., who led the armored
CI 354. attack, were awarded the DSC.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 585
FERRYING
JEEPS ACROSSTHE SEINEIN THE EARLYMORNINGFOG
Meanwhile, the 35th Division pushed moved from Angers to relieve them.73
through Joigny to St. Florentin, thereby T h e other regiments of the 80th Division
protecting the corps right flank east of (attached to the XII Corps) marched
Orleans. from Argentan to assemble near Orleans.
Armor and infantry had worked to- On the left of XII Corps, when Gen-
gether smoothly. Crossing their col- eral Walker received word to take XX
umns west of Montargis, the divisions Corps eastward and secure Seine River
had performed a difficult maneuver effi- bridgeheads between Melun and Mon-
ciently, Casualties were extremely tereau, reconnaissance patrols of the
light, prisoners numerous. 7th Armored Division had already moved
While advancing to the Seine, Eddy to Rambouillet and the Seine River.
had also protected the army group south T h e virtual absence of enemy forces con-
flank. Patton had relieved him of vinced American commanders that little
guarding the Loire River west of Orleans would oppose the advance.74
by assigning that task to the VIII Corps.
East of Orleans, part of the 35th Divi-
sion, CCR of the 4th Armored, and 73 Msg, Middleton to Patton, 19 Aug, VIII
cavalry troops patrolled a line from Corps G–3 Jnl and File.
74The following is taken from the 5th Div AAR,
Orleans through Gien to Joigny until Aug; Irwin Diary; XX Corps, pp. 84-89; Fifth
the 319th Infantry of the 80th Division Infantry Division in the ETO.
586 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
In driving from Chartres to Fontaine- ing, 2 3 August, the resistance faded, en-
bleau and Montereau (fifteen miles abling the 11th Infantry to move the
apart), General Irwin’s 5th Division twelve miles to Fontainebleau before
would cross a wide plateau cut by narrow noon.
valleys and two rivers, the Essonne and At the Seine, Lt. Col. Kelley B. Lem-
the Loing, which afforded the Germans mon, Jr., a battalion commander, dis-
outpost positions for Seine River de- covered the bridge destroyed. He swam
fenses. With Fontainebleau as the pri- the river, found five small boats on the
mary objective, Irwin committed two east bank, tied them together, and
regiments abreast on 2 1 August. T h e paddled them back for the troops to use
10th Infantry, on the right, moved to to establish a bridgehead. Meanwhile,
Malesherbes, reduced unexpectedly Capt. Jack S. Gerrie, a company com-
heavy local opposition, crossed the mander, and T. Sgt. Dupe A. Willing-
Essonne River on two bridges still in- ham, a platoon sergeant, had found a
tact, and continued three miles before canoe, and they paddled across the Seine
stopping for the night. T h e 2d Infan- to reconnoiter the east bank. Detected
try, on the left, met a strong garrison at by Germans, Gerrie covered Willinghain
Etampes. Unable to reduce the resist- while the sergeant swam back to organ-
ance, the regiment encircled the town, ize a firing line on the west bank.
isolated the garrison, and set about in- Under cover of this fire, Gerrie also
vesting the town systematically. Un- swam back.75
willing to be delayed, General Irwin After a short fire fight with elements
committed his reserve, the 11th Infantry, of the 48th Division, riflemen began to
in the center. T h e 11th skirted cross the Seine in random boats found
Etampes on the south and crossed the along the bank. By the following day,
Essonne River, which proved to be no 24 August, a battalion had paddled
major obstacle. T h e 5th Division thus across, engineers had installed a tread-
had advanced about forty miles during way bridge, and the entire 11th Infantry
the day and still had two regiments was east of the Seine River.
abreast for a final thrust to the objec- When it had become apparent on 23
tives. August that the defenders of Fontaine-
On 2 2 August the 10th Infantry en- bleau were about to melt away, Irwin
countered increasing resistance while had sent the 10th Infantry on to Mon-
attacking from Malesherbes toward la tereau. Men of the 10th forded the
Chapelle, which fell that evening. Loing River not far from its juncture
There, the regiment was in position with the Seine, and vehicles crossed at
either to reinforce the attack on Fon- Nemours, already liberated by the FFI.
tainebleau or to continue to Montereau. On 24 August, the regiment cleared
For a while it appeared that reinforce- Montereau. That evening, after en-
ment of the 11th Infantry drive toward gineers brought assault boats to the
Fontainebleau would be necessary, for river, the infantrymen established a
that regiment had advanced barely five
miles on 22 August before running into
a counterattack. Early the next morn- 76All three received the DSC.
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 587
ADVANCING
UNDERr IRE TOWARDFONTAINEBLEAU
bridgehead on the east bank of the Seine. good command judgment and flexibility
In the face of a feeble counterattack by of maneuver.
the 48th Division on the following morn- On the left at Dreux, General Sil-
ing, the entire 10th Infantry crossed the vester’s 7th Armored Division had
river.76 received the mission of driving to Melun
T h e 2d Infantry, meanwhile, had and crossing the Seine there, ten miles
taken Etampes on 2 2 August. When it north of Fontainebleau and twenty-five
was clear that these troops would not be miles south of Paris.77 Straddling the
needed to reinforce the other regiments, Seine at the apex of a long, V-shaped
they crossed the Yonne River between bend, the town of Melun is divided by
Montereau and Sens. the river into three parts. T h e prin-
T h e 5th Division had moved rapidly cipal portion is on the right (east) bank;
and aggressively almost seventy miles to the modern part is on the left; the third
Montereau and almost sixty miles to section is on an island in the center of
Fontainebleau. T h e attack displayed the river, the site of a Roman camp
dating from the time of Caesar’s Gallic
76Pvt. Harold A. Garman of the 5th Medical 77The following is taken from the XX Corps
Battalion was later awarded the Medal of Honor and 7th Armd Div AAR’s, Aug; CI 285, GL–165;
for having, under fire, rescued from drowning XX Corps, pp. 84-89; and personal papers of Gen-
wounded men being evacuated across the river. eral Silvester.
588 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
wars. A highway bridge, still intact, man artillery, automatic weapons, and
joined the three parts of town. small arms fire soon halted the attack.
T h e problem of taking Melun was not Another assault the same evening, this
simple since the Seine is 250 to 300 feet time after an air attack and a twenty-
wide there. Twisting and turning be- minute preparation by three battalions
tween steep banks, it presents a serious of artillery, was also unsuccessful. T h e
natural obstacle. T h e 48th Division oc- troops then took defiladed positions and
cupied a defensive sector fifty miles long prepared to make a third attack on the
between Montereau and Corbeil; at following day.
Melun and in possession of dominating Before the combat command could
ground along the right bank of the Seine attack on the morning of 23 August,
was a reinforced infantry regiment. the Germans destroyed the bridge.
General Silvester suspected that Melun Recognizing that CCR, which lacked
would be strongly held and doubted that assault boats, could then perform only a
the Germans would permit the bridge diversionary and holding action at
across the Seine there to remain intact Melun, General Silvester canceled the
for long. Charged still with maintain- attack the combat command had sched-
ing security at Dreux and mindful of uled, then turned his attention to CCA,
the proximity of Paris, he retained CCB held up near Arpajon.
at Dreux. He sent CCR on 21 August Prodded forward on 23 August, CCA
directly to Melun to seize the bridge and late that afternoon reached the Seine
take the town by frontal assault if pos- near the village of Ponthierry, about
sible, to perform a holding mission if seven miles downstream from Melun.
not. At the same time, he dispatched Since the bridge at Ponthierry was de-
CCA in the main effort to cross the river stroyed, armored infantrymen crossed the
several miles north of Melun and river in assault boats several hundred
threaten the town from the rear. yards to the north at the hamlet of
CCA on the left and CCR on the right Tilly and established a slender bridge-
gained thirty miles on 21 August despite head that evening. Division engineers
rather difficult terrain–steep hills and worked through the night to bridge the
narrow valleys, thick woods (including river.
the great forest of Rambouillet), and in- Meanwhile, the corps commander,
numerable villages that afforded the General Walker, had appeared at the
enemy excellent opportunities for road- CCR command post near Melun late on
blocks, mine fields, and ambush. On the morning of 23 August. Dissatisfied
22 August, though artillery fire near with what he considered the idleness of
Arpajon delayed CCA, CCR reached the CCR, he ordered an immediate attack.
railway embankment on the outskirts of That afternoon armored infantrymen of
Melun. T h e bridge across the Seine CCR advanced to the river. Enough of
was still standing and in good condition. the bridge structure remained to give
Hoping to take the enemy by surprise, foot soldiers passage to the island in the
General Silvester ordered CCR to attack middle of the stream. While Walker
at once without an artillery preparation. virtually took control of the local opera-
When the combat command did so, Ger- tion, an infantry company scrambled
T H E DRIVE T O T H E SEINE 589
across the wreckage of the bridge and Immediately behind came CCB, relieved
secured the island.78 T h e only result of of its duty at Dreux. Across the river
this success was the liberation from a and on the east bank, CCB turned south
prison on the island of several hundred and drove toward Melun. Hasty mine
French felons who fled to the west bank, fields and small roadblocks slowed the
where civil affairs personnel, military advance, but early on 25 August armored
police, and civilian authorities took columns of CCB entered Melun from
them into custody. Heavy fire from the northeast and dispersed the defend-
the east bank of the Seine inflicted nu- ers.
merous casualties on CCR units. T h e As the result of the action by the XII
action appeared stalemated. and XX Corps between 20 and 25
Downstream at Tilly, however, en- August, the Third Army had four
gineers completed a treadway bridge on bridgeheads across the upper Seine River
the morning of 24 August, and tankers south of Paris between Melun and
and artillerymen of CCA crossed at once Troyes. North of Paris along the lower
to reinforce the bridgehead and establish Seine, the First Army had another
blocking positions to the north and east. bridgehead at Mantes-Gassicourt. And
on 25 August, in the most dramatic act
78General Walker received the DSC, as did his of liberation to take place in France, the
aide-de-camp, 1st Lt. David W. Allard, who swam
across the Seine River under enemy fire to get in- Allies were securing still another bridge-
formation for the corps commander. head across the Seine at Paris.
CHAPTER XXIX
for the combat troops, was “enough for T h e result might be the imposition of
a three days’ motor march toward the a government on France that the French
German border.” In view of the dis- people might not want.5
integration of the German forces in Nor- These logistical and political factors
mandy, which invited immediate Allied played a part in the Allied decision to
pursuit operations toward Germany, the postpone the liberation, despite recogni-
necessity of diverting troops and supplies tion that “Paris will be tempting bait,
to Paris on humanitarian grounds, and for political and morale reasons
though difficult to reject, seemed un- strong pressure will doubtless be exerted
warranted, particularly since the military to capture it early.”6 T h e circumstances
supply lines were already strained and were such as to give full play to the desire
since continued military pressure east of to spare Paris and its two million in-
Paris might bring the war to a quick end. habitants devastation and injury. Ever
T h e Allies felt that the Germans in since the preliminary phases of Opera-
Paris could only delay the Allied tion OVERLORD when Allied planes had
advance, and because the Allies would attempted to destroy the German com-
soon have other crossing sites over the munications network in France, pilots
Seine, an unnecessary challenge might had attacked railroad marshaling yards
provoke the Germans into destroying outside Paris rather than terminals in-
the city.4 side the city, and in August the same
T h e political factor working against motivation applied in the decision to
immediate liberation stemmed from the swing ground troops around the capital
aspirations of General Charles de Gaulle, rather than through it.
chief of the Free French movement.
Though Marshal Henri Petain headed German Hopes
the government in France, de Gaulle
several days before the invasion had pro- T h e German high command had long
claimed his own National Committee of had “grave worries” that loss of Paris to
Liberation the provisional government the Allies would publicize the extent of
of the French Republic. By making the German reverses. Because of this
possible de Gaulle’s entry into Paris and and because of Hitler’s tactical plans,
thus unavoidably intervening in the the Germans decided at the beginning of
internal affairs of France, General Eisen- August to hold the French capital. 7
hower “foresaw possible embarrassment.” At the same time that Hitler had con-
ceived the Mortain counterattack, he
had had to consider seriously the pos-
4Msg, Eisenhower to Koenig, SGS SHAEF War
Diary, 5 Aug; Adrien Dansette, L’Histoire de la sible eventuality of withdrawing his
Libération de Paris (Paris, c. 1946) (hereafter cited forces from Normandy, perhaps from
as Dansette, Libération de Paris), pp. 70–78. Dan-
sette is a basic source for this chapter. Eisenhower,
5Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 241, and Ltr,
Crusade in Europe, p. 296; Bradley, Soldier’s Story,
Pogue to author, 28 Nov 54, OCMH Files.
pp. 384-87; 21 AGp Gen Operational Situation and 6PS SHAEF (44) 11 (Second Preliminary Draft) ,
Dir, M-519. 20 Aug; Montgomery, Normandy to the Post-NEPTUNE Opns, 22 Jul, SHAEF File 18008,
Baltic, p. 176; PS SHAEF (44) 11, Post-NEPTUNE Post-OVERLORDPlng, G–3 Plans.
Opns (First Draft), 12 Aug, Final, 17 Aug, SHAEF 7OB WEST, a Study in Command (pp. 136, 188,
File 18008,G–3 Plans. 142ff.. and 155) is a useful source.
592 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
capita the garrison had a sufficient num- tary staff in London, and had proclaimed
ber of tanks and machine guns to com- just before the cross-Channel attack that
mand the respect of the civil populace he headed a provisional government.
and thereby insure the security of Ger- Inside France, although it was freely ac-
man communications and the rear.15 knowledged that de Gaulle had symbol-
ically inspired anti-German resistance,
French Aims heterogeneous groups had formed spon-
taneously into small, autonomous organ-
Though the liberation of Paris was izations existing in a precarious and
not an immediate major military goal clandestine status.17 In 1943 political
to the Allies, to Frenchmen it meant the supporters of de Gaulle inside and out-
liberation of France. More than the side France were instrumental in creat-
spiritual capital, Paris was the only ing a supreme co-ordinating Resistance
place from which the country could be agency within the country that, while
effectively governed. It was the hub of not eradicating factionalism, had the
national administration and politics and effect of providing a common direction
the center of the railway system, the to Resistance activity and increasing de
communication lines, and the highways. Gaulle’s strength and authority in Allied
Control of the city was particularly im- eyes.
portant in August 1944, because Paris Although political lines were not yet
was the prize of an intramural contest sharply drawn, a large, vociferous, and
for power within the French Resistance increasingly influential contingent of
movement. the left contested de Gaulle’s leadership
T h e fundamental aim of the Resist- inside France. This group clamored for
ance-to rid France of the Germans- arms, ammunition, and military sup-
cemented together men of conflicting plies, the more to harass the Germans.
philosophies and interests but did not Some few in 1943 hoped in this small
entirely hide the cleavage between the way to create the second front demanded
patriots within occupied France and by the Soviet Union. T h e de Gaullists
those outside the country-groups in outside the country were not anxious to
mutual contact only by secret radios and have large amounts of military stores
underground messengers.16 Outside parachuted into France, and the matériel
France the Resistance had developed a supplied was dropped in rural areas
politically homogeneous character under rather than near urban centers, not only
de Gaulle, who had established a polit- to escape German detection but also to
ical headquarters in Algiers and a mili- inhibit the development of a strong left-
wing opposition.18
15See XII Corps G–2 Per Rpt, 19 Aug, XII Corps Early in 1944 the de Gaullists suc-
AAR, Aug.
16The following account is from Dansette,
Libération d e Paris, and Participation of the French 17 See App. A to Annex Rpt, French Resistance,
Forces of the Interior in the Liberation o f France, 19 Apr, JIC Papers, Pogue Files.
a MS prepared by French Resistance Unit, 18 Seestudies, Ltrs, and Msgs in SGS SHAEF File
ETOUSA Hist Sec, 1944 and 1945, OCMH Files, Pt 373 / 2, Employment of Airborne Forces in Opn
II, Ch. II, Sec. 6, The Liberation of Paris (here- OVERLOOK, particularly those dated 21 and 23 Jun,
after cited as Resistance Unit, Liberation of Paris) . 1 5 and 23 Jul, and 2 Aug.
T H E LIBERATION O F PARIS 595
men in the Paris area belonged to the promised to be valuable, Nordling was
FFI, but few actually had weapons since able to learn on the evening of 19 Au-
the Allies had parachuted only small gust that Choltitz was willing to discuss
quantities of military goods to them. conditions of a truce with the Resist-
While the Resistance had been able to ance. That night an armistice was ar-
carry on a somewhat systematic program ranged, at first to last only a few hours,
of sabotage and harassment–destroying later extended by mutual consent far an
road signs, planting devices designed to indefinite period.
puncture automobile tires, cutting com- Without even a date of expiration, the
munications lines, burning gasoline arrangement was nebulous. Choltitz
depots, and attacking isolated Germans- agreed to treat Resistance members as
for the FFI to engage German armed soldiers and to regard certain parts of the
forces in open warfare was quite an- city as Resistance territory. I n return,
other matter.21 he secured Resistance admission that cer-
T h e leaders of the Resistance in Paris, tain sections of Paris were to be free for
recognizing the havoc that German guns German use, for the unhampered passage
could bring to an overtly insubordinate of German troops. Yet no boundaries
civilian population and fearing wide- were drawn, and neither Germans nor
spread and bloody reprisals, sought to French were certain of their respective
avert open hostilities. They were for- sectors. Thus, an uneasy noninterfer-
tunate in securing the good offices of Mr. ence obtained.23
Raoul Nordling, the Swedish consul T h e advantages for both parties were
general, who volunteered to negotiate clear. T h e French Resistance leaders
with Choltitz. Nordling had that very were uncertain when Allied troops
day succeeded in persuading Choltitz would arrive, anxious to prevent Ger-
not to deport but to release from deten- man repressive measures, aware of Resist-
tion camps, hospitals, and prisons several ance weakness to the extent of doubting
thousand political prisoners. T h e agree- their own ability to defend the public
ment, which “represented the first capit- buildings seized, and finally hopeful of
ulation of Germany,” was a matter of preserving the capital from physical
considerable import that “was not lost damage.
either on the Resistance or on the people For the Germans, the cessation of
of Paris.” 22 Having established a per- hostilities per se fulfilled Choltitz’ mis-
sonal relationship with Choltitz that sion of maintaining order within the
capital and enabled him to attend to his
21 See SHAEF/17245/6/5/2/Ops ( A ) , Operational
primary mission of blocking the ap-
Dir to CG FFI, 15 Jun, SHAEF File G–5/702, Dirs,
France. proaches to the city. Having known
22Resistance Unit, Liberation of Paris, p. 1244 for a long time of the attempts to sub-
(see pp. 1242–44, and Dansette, Libération d e Paris, ordinate the Resistance to the Allied
pp. 139–46 for detailed account) ; Ministerial Coun-
selor Eckelmann’s Rpt to OKW/Abwicklungsstab/ military command, the Germans guessed
Rudolfsstadt, 31 Jan 45, Rpt D–32 (hereafter cited that sabotage directly unrelated to Allied
as Eckelmann, Rpt to OKW) , OCMH Files. Eckel- military operations was “mainly the work
mann assisted Choltitz in Paris, was taken prisoner
during the liberation, and was apparently released
and repatriated. 28 Krause Interrogation.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 597
of communist groups.” 24 It was there- possession of the city before the Ameri-
fore reasonable for Choltitz to assume cans arrived.” 27 By concluding a truce,
that the disorder in Paris on 19 August, Choltitz hoped to destroy the cement
which had no apparent connection with that held the various French groups to-
developments on the front, was the work gether against their common enemy and
of a few extremists. Since part of his thus leave them free to destroy them-
mission was to keep order among the selves.
population and since the police were no That Choltitz felt it necessary to use
longer performing their duties, Choltitz these means rather, than force to suppress
felt that the simplest way of restoring the insurrection indicated one of two
order was to halt the gunfire in the things–either he was unwilling to en-
streets. T o prevent what might develop danger the lives of women and children
into indiscriminate rioting, he was will- or he no longer had the strength to cope
ing to come to an informal truce, “an with the Resistance. He later admitted
understanding,” as he termed it.25 to both. In any event, French under-
A more subtle reason also lay behind ground activities had become so annoy-
Choltitz’ action. Aware of the faction- ing that Choltitz’ staff had planned a co-
alism in the French Resistance move- ordinated attack on widely dispersed
ment, he tried to play one group off Resistance headquarters for the very day
against the other to simplify his problem the insurrection broke out, but Choltitz
of Choltitz believed that himself had suddenly prohibited the
since the insurrectionists directed their action. Instead of resorting to force, he
immediate efforts toward seizing govern- listened to representations in favor of
ment buildings and communications fa- peace from the neutral Swedish and
cilities, the insurrection was at least in Swiss consulates. Meanwhile, should
part the opening of an undisguised civil disturbance become worse, Choltitz
struggle for political power within gathered provisional units to augment
France. T h e Pétain government no his strength, securing, among other
longer functioned in Paris (Pétainist of- units, a tank company of Panzer Lehr.28
ficials with whom the Germans were Choltitz apparently informed Model,
accustomed to work no longer answered the new chief of OB WEST and Army
their telephones), and in this vacuum Group B , of his weakness, for when Hit-
there was bound to be a struggle for ler on 20 August advised Model that
power among the Resistance factions. Paris was to become the bastion of the
“The Resistance had reason to fear,” a Seine–Yonne River line, Model replied
German official wrote not long after- that the plan was not feasible. Al-
wards, “that the Communists would take though Model had arranged to move the
348th Division to Paris, he did not think
24See Rundstedt’s Est of the Situation, 25 Oct
43; Der Oberbefehlshaber West, Ia Nr. 550/43
these troops could arrive quickly enough
g.Kdos, Chefs, 28.10.43, Beurteilung der Luge Ob.
West am 25.10.1943, Sec. K, Innere Luge, in Bavarian 27Eckelmann, Rpt to OKW.
State Archives, Munich, Germany. 28Krause Interrogation; Telecon, 1900, 20 Aug,
25Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten, p. 252. AGp B K T B ; Telecons, 21–24 Aug, AGp B K T B ,
26Choltitz Rpt, cited in OB WEST K T B , 23 Aug, particularly Blumentritt and Tempelhoff, 1745, 21
Anlage 1646. Aug; Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten, pp. 252–53.
598 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
to hold the city against the external Al- In history the loss of Paris always means
lied threat and the internal Resistance the loss of France. Therefore the Fuehrer
disturbance. Apparently having misun- repeats his order to hold the defense zone
in advance [west] of the city. . . .
derstood Hitler’s desire, Model decided Within the city every sign of incipient
that the Seine was more important than revolt must be countered by the sharpest
Paris. Since the Seine flows through means . . . [including] public execution of
the city, defending at the river would ringleaders. . . .
necessitate a main line of resistance in- The Seine bridges will be prepared for
demolition. Paris must not fall into the
side the capital. With the civil popu- hands of the enemy except as a field of
lace in a state of hardly disguised revolt, ruins.31
he did not believe Choltitz could keep
civil order and at the same time defend T h e French Point of View
against an Allied attack with the strength
at hand. Model therefore revealed to Resistance leaders in Paris had mean-
OKW that he had ordered an alternate while radioed the exterior Resistance for
line of defense to be reconnoitered north help, thereby alarming Frenchmen out-
and east of Paris.29 side Paris by reports, perhaps exagger-
Model’s action seemed inexcusable ated, of disorder in the city and by ur-
since the order to create a fortress city gent pleas that military forces enter the
implied that Paris was important enough capital at once.32 De Gaulle and his
in Hitler’s judgment to warrant a de- provisional government had long been
fense to the last man. Furthermore, worried that extremist agitation not
Hitler had explicitly stated on 40 Au- only might bring violent German re-
gust, “If necessary, the fighting in and action but also might place unreliable
around Paris will be conducted without Resistance elements in the capital in po-
regard to the destruction of the city.” litical power. T h e parties of the left
Jodl therefore repeated Hitler’s instruc- were particularly influential in the Paris
tions and ordered Model to defend at Resistance movement, to the extent that
Paris, not east of it, even if the defense the FFI commander of Paris belonged
brought devastation to the capital and to one of them. Conscious of the dic-
its people.30 tum that he who holds Paris holds
Hitler himself left no doubt as to his France and sensitive to the tradition of
wishes when he issued his famous “field Paris as a crucible of revolution, its
of ruins” order: population ever ready to respond to the
The defense of the Paris bridgehead is of 31 Hitler Msg, quoted in full in Msg, OB WEST
decisive military and political importance. to A G p B , 1100, 23 Aug, A G p B Fuehrerbefehle.
Its loss dislodges the entire coastal front Choltitz (Soldat unter Soldaten, pp. 255–59) and
north of the Seine and removes the base for Schramm (MS # B–034) date Hitler’s order as 22
the V-weapons attacks against England. August, and it is possible that some commanders
received the substance of the message before the
29Hitler Order, 20 Aug; Msg, FHQu, 20 Aug, official reception and recording of it. T h e AGp B
O K W / WFSt/Op. Nr. 772956/44, in OKW/175; K T B reports the order in an entry at 1030, 23
Msg, Model to Jodl, 1800, 21 Aug, AGp B Fuehrer- August.
befehle; MS # B–34 (Schramm). 32See Resistance Unit, Liberation of Paris, passim
30 HitlerOrder, 20 Aug; O B W E S T and A G p B and annexes, for Resistance messages from Paris
K T B ’ s , 21 Aug. to the exterior.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 599
cry “ A u x barricades!” the French com- Armored Division had been selected.
manders within the OVERLORDframe- Just before the cross-Channel attack and
work advocated sending aid to Paris im- again early in August, the French mili-
mediately.33 Their argument was that tary chief, General Koenig, had re-
if riot became revolution, Paris might minded General Eisenhower of the Al-
become a needless battleground pulling lied promise to use that unit to liberate
Allied troops from other operations. Paris. Its entry into the capital would
An immediate hope lay in parachuting be a symbolic restoration of French pride
arms and ammunition into the city. as well as the preparation for de Gaulle’s
This would enable the FFI to resist more personal entry into Paris, symbolic cli-
effectively and perhaps permit; the Re- max of the French Resistance 36 . When
sistance to seize tactically important the situation seemed propitious for these
points that would facilitate Allied entry. events to take place, General Leclerc’s
Despite a natural reluctance to arm ur- armored division was at Argentan, more
ban people and SHAEF’s concern that than a hundred miles away, while Ameri-
the heavy antiaircraft defenses of Paris can troops were less than twenty-five
might make an air mission costly, an air- miles from the center of the capital. If
drop of military equipment was sched- the French could persuade General Ei-
uled for 22 August. When a thick fog senhower to liberate Paris at once, would
that day covered all British airfields, the he be able to honor his promise to em-
drop was postponed. On the following ploy Leclerc?
day, when the British radio made a pre- General Eisenhower had no intention
mature announcement that Paris had al- of changing the plan to bypass Paris, as
ready been liberated, SHAEF canceled Generals de Gaulle and Koenig dis-
the operation.34 covered when they conferred with him
T h e decisive solution obviously lay in on 21 August, but he repeated his
getting Allied troops into the capital, promise to use Leclerc’s division at the
for which provision had been made in liberation. Although the French had
Allied plans as early as 1943. SHAEF agreed to abide by General Eisenhower’s
had agreed to include a French division decisions on the conduct of the war in
on the OVERLORD troop list “primarily return for Allied recognition of a d e
so that there may be an important facto government headed by de Gaulle,
French formation present at the re-oc- General Alphonse Juin that same day,
cupation of Paris.”35 T h e 2d French 21 August, carried a letter from de
Gaulle to the Supreme Commander to
33See Rousseau, Bataille de Normandie, pp. 204— threaten politely that if General Eisen-
05 for an account of French pressure on Eisenhower.
34Detailed accounts are found in Dansette, hower did not send troops to Paris at
Libération de Paris, pp. 320–24, and in Resistance once, de Gaulle might have to do so him-
Unit, Liberation of Paris, pp. 1251, 1255.
35L t r , Gen Morgan (Deputy Chief of Staff,
self.37 T h e threat was important, for de
SHAEF) to French Forces in London, 7 Mar,
quoted in Resistance Unit, Liberation of Paris, p. 36Even, La 2e D.B., p. 114, n. 9.
1236; Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 239; SH/3244/ 37Ltr, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 21 Aug, SGS
Sec, Employment of French Forces in Continental SHAEF File 092, French Relations; Pogue, Supreme
Opns, 19 Jan, one of many documents on this Command, p. 240; Interv by Pogue with de Gaulle.
matter in SGS SHAEF File 381, French, I. 14 Jan 47, and Butcher Diary, 11 Jul, Pogue Files.
600 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Gaulle was the potential head of the Unfortunately for Leclerc’s hopes, the
French government and would theoreti- last stage of operations to close the Ar-
cally stand above the Supreme Com- gentan–Falaise pocket had started, and
mander on the same level with President his armored division found itself again
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. engaged, eventually under the control of
Leclerc, who was conscious of the his- the First U S . Army and General Ge-
toric mission reserved for him, had long row’s V Corps. Although Leclerc was
been impatient for orders to move to not told, Bradley and Patton on 19 Au-
Paris. As early as 14 August, when he gust agreed once more that only the
learned that Patton was sending part of French division would “be allowed to go
the XV Corps (but not the 2d French into Paris,” probably under First Army
Armored Division) eastward from Argen- control.41 Leclerc fretted and bom-
tan, Leclerc had requested the corps barded V Corps headquarters with re-
commander to query the Third Army quests premised on the expectation of a
commander as to when the French di- momentary call to Paris–for example, he
vision was to go to Paris. Leclerc’s ex- attempted to secure the release of the
planation--"It is political"--availed little, French combat command attached to the
for the army chief of staff bluntly or- 90th Division. For his part, General
dered that Leclerc was to remain where Gerow saw no reason to employ the
he was. Two days later Leclerc wrote French division any differently from his
Patton suggesting that since the situation American units, for Paris was no specific
at Argentan had become quiet, the 2d concern of his.42
French Armored Division might com- Invited by General Hodges to lunch
mence to assemble for its projected on 20 August, Leclerc seized upon the
march on Paris.38 That evening he occasion for “arguments, which he pre-
visited Patton’s headquarters, where he sented incessantly,” that roads and traffic
saw Bradley as well as Patton, and gained and plans notwithstanding, his division
cordial assurance from both that he should run for Paris at once. He said
would have the honor of liberating the he needed no maintenance, equipment,
capital. Patton laughingly turned to or personnel, but a few minutes later
General Wood, who was also present and admitted that he needed all three. Gen-
who had been pressing for permission to eral Hodges “was not impressed with
lead his 4th Armored Division to Paris. him or his arguments, and let him under-
“You see, Wood,” Patton supposedly stand that he was to stay put” until he
said, “he [Leclerc] is a bigger pain in received orders to move.43
the neck than you are.” 39 Patton When British troops on 21 August
nevertheless announced his intention of moved across the V Corps front and V
moving Leclerc to Dreux as soon as pos-
4112th AGp Memo for Rcd, 19 Aug, ML–205.
sible.40 42Ltr, Leclerc to Gerow [20Aug]; Msgs, Gerow
38 Telecon, Gaffey and Menoher, 1715, 14 Aug, to Leclerc, 2045, 20 Aug, 1400, 21 Aug; V Corps
and Ltr, Leclerc to Patton [16 Aug], XV Corps Dir, 21 Aug, and Ltrs of Instrs, 21 and 22 Aug.
CofS Jnl and File. All in V Corps G–3 Jnl and File. Unless otherwise
39Quoted in Dansette, Libération d e Paris, p. 310. noted, documents hereafter cited in this chapter
40Notes [16 or 17Aug] , XV Corps CofS Jnl and are in the V Corps G–3 Jnl and File.
File. 43Sylvan Diary, 20 Aug.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 601
Corps divisions began to withdraw to ment and the French Army.47 Writing
assembly areas south of Argentan, Le- to de Gaulle that evening, Leclerc ex-
clerc saw no justification for remaining plained, “Unfortunately, I cannot do the
so far distant from his ultimate objective. same thing for the bulk of my division
“We shall not stop,” he had said in 1941, because of matters of food and fuels”
“until the French flag flies over Stras- (furnished by the U.S. Army) and be-
bourg and Metz,” and along the route to cause of respect for the “rules of military
these capitals of Alsace and Lorraine, subordination.” 48
Paris was a holy place.44 He persuaded Knowing that Guillebon could not
himself that Gerow was sympathetic to reach Paris undetected, Leclerc sent his
his wishes, and though the corps com- G–2, Maj. Philippe H. Repiton, to Ge-
mander was powerless to authorize Le- row on the morning of 22 August to ex-
clerc’s march on Paris, Leclerc convinced plain his act on the following basis: in-
himself that as the sole commander of surrection in the capital made it neces-
French regular military forces in Opera- sary for an advance military detachment
tion OVERLORD, he was entitled to certain to be there to maintain order until the
prerogatives involving national con- arrival of regular French political au-
s i d e r a t i o n ~ . ~Furthermore,
~ since Koe- thorities. Guillebon’s absence, Leclerc
nig, who anticipated that the 2d Ar- pointed out, did not compromise the
mored would liberate Paris sooner or ability of the division to fulfill any com-
later, had appointed Leclerc provisional bat mission assigned by the corps. Ge-
military governor of the capital, Leclerc row, who was thoroughly a soldier and
felt that this gave him authority to act.46 who had received a peremptory message
With at least an arguable basis for from the Third Army asking what
moving on Paris, Leclerc on the evening French troops were doing outside their
of 21 August (the same day that Eisen- sector, saw only Leclerc’s breach of dis-
hower had rejected de Gaulle’s request) cipline. “I desire to make it clear to
dispatched a small force of about 150 you,” Gerow wrote Leclerc in a letter he
men-ten light tanks, ten armored cars, handed personally to Repiton, “that the
ten personnel carriers-under a Major 2d Armored Division (French) is under
Guillebon toward the capital. Guille- my command for all purposes and no
bon ostensibly was to reconnoiter routes part of it will be employed by you except
to Paris, but should the Allies decide to in the execution of missions assigned by
enter the city without the 2d French this headquarters.” H e directed Le-
Armored Division, Guillebon was to ac- clerc to recall Guillebon.49
company the liberating troops as the rep- Unwilling to comply, Leclerc sought
resentative of the provisional govern-
47Even, La 2e D.B., pp. 114–16; Etat Major des
Forces Françaises de l’Interieur, Twelfth Monthly
Progress Rpt to SHAEF Aug 44, 10 Sep 44, SGS
44 Quoted in Dansette, Libération de Paris, pp. SHAEF File 322, FFI.
211–12. 48Quoted in Dansette, Libération de Paris, p. 313.
45See Rousseau, Bataille de Normandie, pp. 204– 49Dir, Gerow to Leclerc, 22 Aug, with hand-
05. written note; Even, La 2e D.B., p. 116; Dansette,
46Ltr, Koenig to Leclerc, # 2039, 11 Aug, cited Libération de Paris, p. 314; Ltr, Gerow to OCMH,
in Even, La 2e D.B., p. 114, n. 9. 22 Sep 54.
602 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
higher authority by taking a plane to the such as the FFI seemed a clear enough
First Army headquarters. There he indication that to salve his honor and
learned that General Bradley was con- protect his family in Germany he had at
ferring with General Eisenhower on the least to make a pretense of fighting be-
question of Paris. Leclerc decided to fore capitulating to superior forces. He
await the outcome of the conference. apparently would surrender to regular
Allied troops after a show of arms.
Eisenhower’s Decision T o convince the Allied command of
the need for regular forces in Paris at
Reflecting on Choltitz’ behavior after once while Choltitz vacillated between
the truce arrangement, Resistance mem- desire and duty, Resistance emissaries,
bers were somewhat puzzled. They be- official and unofficial, departed the city
gan to interpret his amenity as a special to seek Allied commanders. 51 Nord-
kind of weakness, a weakness for the ling’s brother Rolf and several others in
physical beauty as well as the historical a small group reached the Allied lines
and cultural importance of Paris. They on 23 August and made their way up the
figured that Choltitz was appalled by the echelons to the Third Army headquar-
destruction he had the power to unleash, ters. Patton, who was disappointed in
and they wondered whether he worried being denied the liberation of Paris, was
that fate had apparently selected him to contemptuous of their efforts. Deciding
be known in history as the man who had that “they simply wanted to get a suspen-
ravaged the capital.50 How else could sion of hostilities in order to save Paris,
one explain his feigned ignorance of the and probably save the Germans,” he
Resistance, his calling the insurrection “sent them to General Bradley, who”—he
only acts of violence committed by ter- imagined incorrectly—“arrested them.” 52
rorists who had infiltrated into’the city Nordling’s group reached Bradley’s
and who were attempting to incite a command post too late to affect the
peaceful population to revolt, his pre- course of events, but another envoy, Re-
tense that he had no authority over sistance Major Gaullois (pseudonym of
French civilians (despite his plenary a M. Cocteau), the chief of staff of the
power from Hitler to administer Paris), Paris FFI commander, had left Paris on
his acceptance of Nordling’s explanation 2 0 August and had reached Bradley’s
that the Resistance members were not headquarters on the morning of 2 2 Au-
terrorists or ruffians but patriotic French- gust.53 He may have had some influ-
men, and his willingness to agree to a ence, for he spoke at some length with
truce? Either that or he felt that the Brig. Gen. A. Franklin Kibler, the 12th
German cause was hopeless. His off- Army Group G–3, who displayed interest
hand but perhaps studied remark to in the information that Choltitz would
Nordling that he could of course not be surrender his entire garrison as soon as
expected to surrender to irregular troops
51See, for example, V Corps G–2 Jnl, entries 2100
PO Aug, and 2100 1 Aug.
This is Dansette’s thesis (see Libération de 52Patton, War as I Knew It, pp. 115, 117.
Paris, pp. 138-39, 293-94) ; see also Resistance Unit, 53Bradley, Solder’s Story, pp. 390–91, is in error
Liberation of Paris. because of an incorrect time sequence.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 603
Allied troops took his headquarters-the sible. If the enemy tries to hold Paris with
Hôtel Meurice on the rue de Rivoli.54 any real strength he would be a constant
It so happened that General Eisen- menace to our flank. If he largely concedes
the place, it falls into our hands whether we
hower had on the evening of 2 1 August like it or not. 58
(after his conference with de Gaulle)
begun to reconsider his decision to delay T h e dilemma had another aspect. If
the liberation of Paris. In this connec- liberating Paris only fulfilled a political
tion he requested Bradley to meet with need, then the Supreme Commander’s
him on the morning of 2 2 August. De position of conducting operations on
Gaulle’s letter, delivered by Juin, had military grounds alone would not allow
had its effect, and Eisenhower had jotted him in good conscience to change his
down that he would probably “be com- mind-unless he turned Leclerc and the
pelled to go into Paris.” 5 5 T h e Com- French loose to liberate the capital as
bined Chiefs of Staff had informed him they wished. If he could not approve
on 16 August that they had no objection such a politically motivated diversion of
to de Gaulle’s entry into the capital, cer- part of his forces, or if he felt he could
tainly strong evidence of Allied inten- not afford to lose control of the French
tions to recognize his government, and division, he had to have a military basis
it was becoming increasingly clear that for an Allied liberation. Yet how could
the majority of French people approved he initiate action that might damage the
of de Gaulle and thereby reinforced his city? T h e only solution seemed to be
claim to legality.56 Koenig’s deputy, a that if the Germans were ready to quit
British officer who reflected the British the city without giving battle, the Allies
point of view of favoring (apparently ought to enter-for the prestige involved,
more so than the United States) de to maintain order in the capital, to
Gaulle’s political aspirations, also urged satisfy French requests, and also to se-
the immediate liberation of the capital.57 cure the important Seine crossing sites
Pressed on all sides, General Eisenhower there.
set forth his dilemma in a letter to Gen- Much indicated to General Eisen-
eral Marshall: hower that the Germans were ready to
Because of the additional supply com- abandon Paris. De Gaulle thought that
mitment incurred in the occupation of a few cannon shots would disperse the
Paris, it would be desirable, from that view- Germans. Bradley had told Eisenhower
point, to defer the capture of the city until that he, Bradley, agreed with his (G–2,
the important matter of destroying the re- who thought “we can and must walkin.”
maining enemy forcesup to includethePas Bradley had even suggested, facetiously,
de Calais area. I do not believe this is pos-
that the large number of civilian news-
papermen accredited to his headquarters
54 Resistance Unit, Liberation of Paris, p. 1253.
55Handwritten note by General Eisenhower on comprised a force strong enough to take
Ltr, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 21 Aug, SGS SHAEF the City “any time you want to,” and that
File 092, French Relations; see Pogue, Supreme
Command, p. 240, and V Corps G–3 Memo, 21 Aug.
56Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 239, 241. 58Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA–90235, 22
57Resistance Unit, Liberation of Paris, p. 1250; Aug, SHAEF G–3 File Ops A 322.011/1, Comd and
Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 231. Contl of U.S./Br Forces.
604 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
if they did, they would “spare us a lot of tirely accurate, the Allied command
trouble.” 59 reached the conclusion that if the Allies
In the midst of conflicting rumors that moved into Paris promptly, before guer-
Choltitz was ready to capitulate and that rilla warfare was resumed, Choltitz
the Germans were ready to destroy the would withdraw, and thus the destruc-
city with a secret weapon, the Resistance tion of the bridges and historic monu-
envoys appeared. They brought a great ments that would ensue if he had to fight
deal of plausible, though incorrect, in- either the Resistance or the Allies would
formation. They assured the Allied be avoided.61 Since the available “in-
command that the FFI controlled most formation indicated that no great battle
of the city and all the bridges, that the would take place,” General Eisenhower
bulk of the Germans had already de- changed his mind and decided to send
parted, that enemy troops deployed on reinforcement to the FFI in order to
the western outskirts were only small de- repay that military organization, as he
tachments manning a few roadblocks. later said, for “their great assistance,”
They argued that the Germans had which had been “of inestimable value in
agreed to the armistice because the Ger- the campaign.” 62 Reinforcement, a le-
man forces were so feeble they needed gitimate military action, thus, in Eisen-
the truce in order to evacuate the city hower’s mind, transferred the liberation
without fighting their way through the of Paris from the political to the military
streets. T h e envoys stated both that the realm and made it acceptable.
armistice expired at noon, 23 August, T o make certain that Choltitz under-
and that neither side respected the agree- stood his role in the liberation of Paris,
ment. Since the FFI had few supplies an intelligence officer of the “ ‘Economic
and little ammunition and was holding Branch’ of the U.S. Service” was dis-
the city on bluff and nerve, the Resist- patched to confirm with Choltitz the
ance leaders feared that the Germans “arrangement” that was to save the city
were gathering strength to regain con- from damage. T h e Allies expected
trol of the city and bring destruction to Choltitz to evacuate Paris at the same
it upon the termination of the truce. time that Allied troops entered, “pro-
T o avoid bloodshed, it was essential that vided that he did not become too much
Allied soldiers enter the city promptly involved in fighting the French upris-
at noon, 23 August.60 ing.” T h e time selected for the simul-
Unaware that the reports were not en- taneous departure and entry was the
supposed time the truce expired-noon,
59Ltr, de Gaulle to Eisenhower, 21 Auf (and 23 August.63
handwritten note) ; Bradley, Soldier‘s Story, p. 386;
Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 240; Dansette, Libéra-
tion de Paris, p. 316. 61Ltr, Bradley to OCMH, 7 Jan 55, OCMH
60 Memo dictated by Bradley for Hodges, 22 Aug, Files; Interv by Pogue with Gen Bradley, 6 Nov
transmitted by Hodges to Haislip and Gerow, XV 46, Washington, D.C., Pogue Files.
Corps CofS Jnl and File. The memo is also Incl 62Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 296.
1 of V Corps FO 21, 23 Aug, and a photostatic copy 63Ltr, Bradley to OCMH, 7 Jan 55; FUSA Memo,
appears in V Corps Operations in the E T O , p. 200. Info [to be] Elicited from the German Comman-
This document contains all the information then dant of Paris, 31 Aug, FUSA G–2 Jnl and File; Ltr,
known by the Allied command on the situation in Pogue to author, 27 Sep 54, OCMH Files; Dansette,
Paris. Libération de Paris, pp. 138–39.
THE LIBERATION OF PARIS 605
Since a civil affairs commitment was action started. Finding Leclerc await-
an inescapable corollary of the decision ing him at the airstrip with an account of
to liberate Paris, General Eisenhower his differences with Gerow over Guil-
ordered 23,000 tons of food and 3,000 lebon’s movement to Paris, Bradley in-
tons of coal dispatched to the city im- formed Leclerc that General Eisenhower
mediately. General Bradley requested had just decided to send the French
SHAEF to prepare to send 3,000 tons of armored division to liberate Paris at
these supplies by air. T h e British also once. Off the hook of disobedience,
made plans to fulfill their part of the Leclerc hastened to his command post,
responsibility. 64 where his joyous shout to the division
T h e decision made, Bradley flew to G–3, “Gribius, . . . mouvement immédiat
Hodges’ First Army headquarters late in sur Paris!” announced that a four-year
the afternoon of 22 August to get the dream was finally about to come true.65
64V Corps Operations in the E T O , p. 198; Brad-
ley, Soldier’s Story, p. 387; 21 AGp/5541/2/Q 65 [Lt.-Col. Repiton-Préneuf et al.], La 2e DB,
(Plans), Development of British Advance Base in Général Leclerc, Combattants et Combats en France
Area Havre–Rouen–Dieppe, 22 Aug, 12th AGp File, (Paris: Aux Editions Arts et Métiers Graphiques,
Mil Objs, II. 1945) , p. 45.
606 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
to Paris to “take over from the Resist- for.”70 Further, he had had the ex-
ance Group, reinforce them, and act in perience needed for a mission fraught
such mobile reserve as . . . may be with political implications. Serving
needed.” T h e Allies were to enter Paris with the War Plans Division of the War
as soon as possible after noon of 23 Au- Department from 1936 to 1939, he was
gust. T h e Supreme Commander had chief of that division during the critical
emphasized that “no advance must be year of 1941. He was thus no stranger
made into Paris until the expiration of to situations involving the interrelation-
the Armistice and that Paris was to be ship of military strategy and national
entered only in case the degree of the policy. Yet he had not been informed
fighting was such as could be overcome of the political considerations involved,
by light forces.” In other words, Gen- and his instructions to liberate Paris
eral Eisenhower did not “want a severe were of a military nature.71
fight in Paris at this time,” nor did he Acting in advance on General Hodges’
“want any bombing or artillery fire on orders to be issued on 23 August to
the city if it can possibly be avoided.”68 “force your way into the city this after-
A truly Allied force was to liberate the noon,” Gerow telephoned Leclerc on the
city: the 2d French Armored Division, evening of 2 2 August and told him to
the 4th U.S. Infantry Division, an Ameri- start marching immediately. T h e 38th
can cavalry reconnaissance group, a 12th Cavalry Squadron was to accompany
Army Group technical intelligence unit, Leclerc to “display the [American] flag
and a contingent of British troops. T h e upon entering Paris.” 72 According to
French division, accompanied by Ameri- the formal corps order issued later, the
can cavalry and British troops, all dis- only information available was that the
playing their national flags, was to enter Germans were withdrawing from Paris
the city while the 4th Division seized in accordance with the terms of the
Seine River crossings south of Paris and armistice. T h e rumor that the Ger-
constituted a reserve for the French. mans had mined the sewers and subways
Leclerc was to have the honor of liberat- was important only in spurring the
ing Paris, but he was to do so within the Allies to occupy the city in order to pre-
framework of the Allied command and vent damage. No serious opposition was
under direct American control.69 expected. If the troops did, however,
T h e leader of the expedition, General encounter strong resistance, they were
Gerow, had been characterized by Gen- to assume the defensive.. 73
eral Eisenhower as having demonstrated
70Eisenhower to Marshall, FWD–12428, 22 Jul,
“all the qualities of vigor, determination, Pogue Files.
reliability, and skill that we are looking 71“Interv, author with Gen Gerow, Maj Gen
Charles G. Helmick (formerly V Corps Arty
Comdr), and Brig Gen John G. Hill (formerly V
Corps G–3), 15 Oct 54, OCMH Files; Ltr, Gerow
68Memo dictated by Bradley to Hodges, 22 Aug, to OCMH, 22 Sep 54, OCMH Files.
XV Corps CofS Jnl and File. 72Gerow Memo for Rcd, 25 Aug.
69 Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 73V Corps Ltr of Instrs, Gerow to Leclerc, 22
176; Notes of Mtg, 0900, 23 Aug, XV Corps CofS Aug, and Dir, Gerow to 102d Cav Recon Gp
Jnl and File; VII Corps Opns Memo 73, 23 Aug (Mecz), 23 Aug; Ltr, Gerow to OCMH, 22 Sep 54,
(confirming oral orders, 22 Aug) . OCMH Files.
608 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Despite the anticipated absence of op- several miles beyond Rambouillet on the
position, Gerow commanded a large road to Versailles; the southern column
force that was to move on two routes- had reached Limours. At both points,
Sées, Mortagne, Château-en-Thymerais, the French met opposition.
Maintenon, Rambouillet, Versailles; and Within Paris, before receiving Hitler’s
Aleyon, Nogent-le-Rotrou, Chartres, order to leave the city to the Allies only
Limours, Palaiseau. T h e northern col- as a “field of ruins,” Choltitz had had
umn-the bulk of the French division, no intention of doing anything but his
the attached American troops, a U.S. duty. His handling of the insurrection
engineer group (controlling three com- was sufficient evidence of that. When
bat battalions, a treadway bridge com- Aulock, who commanded the perimeter
pany, a light equipment platoon, and a defenses west of the city, requested per-
water supply platoon), the V Corps Artil- mission to withdraw on 22 August be-
lery (with four firing battalions and an cause he felt he could not stop an Allied
observation battalion), in that order of advance, Choltitz said no. But after re-
march-had an estimated time length of ceiving Hitler’s order and realizing that
fourteen hours and twenty-five minutes. he was expected to die among the ruins,
T h e southern column-a French combat Choltitz began to reconsider. About
command, the bulk of the American the same time he learned that the 348th
cavalry, the V Corps headquarters, the Division, which was moving from north-
4th Division (reinforced by two tank ern France to strengthen the Paris de-
destroyer battalions, an antiaircraft bat- fenses, was instead to be committed north
talion, two tank battalions), in that of the capital along the lower Seine.75
order-had a time length of twenty-two At that moment he became rather cyni-
hours and forty minutes. For some un- cal. “Ever since our enemies have re-
explained reason the British force, de- fused to listen to and obey our Fuehrer,”
spite General Eisenhower’s explicit de- he supposedly remarked at dinner one
sire for British participation, failed to evening, “the whole war has gone
appear. T o make certain that the badly!” 76
French troops, which led both columns, One of Choltitz’ first reactions to
respected the truce in the capital, Gerow Hitler’s “field of ruins” order was to
ordered that no troops were to cross the phone Model and protest that the Ger-
Versailles-Palaiseau line before noon, 23 man high command was out of tune with
August.
74 (Map XIII) reality. T h e city could not be defended.
Although Gerow had ordered Leclerc Paris was in revolt. T h e French held im-
to start to Paris immediately on the eve- portant administrative buildings. Ger-
ning of 22 August, the division did not man forces were inadequate to the task
commence its march until the morning of preserving order. Coal was short.
of 23 August, By evening of 23 August T h e rations available would last the
the head of the northern column was
75Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten, p. 259; MS #
B–728 (Emmerich).
74V Corps Ltr of Instrs, Gerow to Leclerc, 22 76 Quoted in Dansette, Libération de Paris, pp.
Aug, and FO 21, 23 Aug. 293–94.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 609
troops only two more days.77 But by a generous desire to spare human life
Choltitz was unable to secure a satisfac- and a great cultural center, or simply by
tory alternative from Model, so he his lack of technical means to do so-both
phoned Speidel, Model’s chief of staff at of which he later claimed-the fact was
Army Group B. After sarcastically that representatives of the neutral
thanking Speidel for the lovely order powers in Paris were also exerting pres-
from Hitler, Choltitz said that he had sure on him to evacuate Paris in order
complied by placing three tons of ex- to avoid a battle there.80 Yet Choltitz
plosive in the cathedral of Notre Dame, refused to depart. Whether he was
two tons in the Invalides, and one in the playing a double game or not, his will-
Palais Bourbon (the Chamber of Dep- ingness to avoid fighting inside Paris did
uties), that he was ready to level the not change his determination to defend
Arc de Triomphe to clear a field of fire, Paris outside the city limits-a defense
that he was prepared to destroy the that eventually included orders to de-
Opéra and the Madeleine, and that he molish the Seine River bridges, three
was planning to dynamite the Tour rejections of Allied ultimatums to sur-
Eiffel and use it as a wire entanglement render, and refusal of an Allied offer to
to block the Seine. Incidentally, he ad- provide an opportunity for him to with-
vised Speidel, he found it impossible to draw.81
destroy the seventy-odd bridges.78 T h e field fortifications on the western
Speidel, who had received Hitler’s and southern approaches to the city
order from OKW and had realized that formed a solid perimeter that was
the destruction of the bridges meant de- more effective than Aulock judged. Ob-
stroying monuments and residential viously, 2 0 , 0 0 0 troops dispersed over a
quarters, later claimed that he had not large area could not hold back the Allies
transmitted the order forward and that for long, but they could make a strong
Choltitz had received it directly from defense. Artillery, tanks, and antiair-
OB WEST. Yet, since Gestapo agents craft guns sited for antitank fire sup-
were monitoring Speidel’s telephone to ported strongpoints at Trappes, Guyan-
prove his complicity in the July 20th court, Châteaufort, Saclay, Massy, Wis-
plot, Speidel later recalled that he urged sous, and Villeneuve-le-Roi. T h e roads
Choltitz—as diplomatically and as ob- to Versailles were well blocked, and
liquely as he knew how-not to destroy
the 79
French captial. 80Marcelle Adler-Bresse. “Von Choltitz, a-t-il
Choltitz had no intention of destroy- Change d’Avis?” (a review of Choltitz’ Brennt
Paris? Tatsackenberickt des letzten deutscken
ing Paris. Whether he was motivated Befeklskabers in Paris (Mannheim: Weltbucherei,
1950) and his Soldat unter Soldaten) and notice of
77 Telecon, Choltitz and Model, 1200, 23 Aug, an article in the East Berlin newspaper Taglicke
A G p B K T B . His mention of the shortage of Rundsckau, December 28, 1954, both in Revue
rations contrasts with his later statement that he d‘Histoire de la Deuxiime Guerre Mondiale, No. 19
had Eckelmann distribute army food to the French (July, 1955), p. 116; Dietrich von Choltitz, “Pour-
populace. Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten, p. 245. quoi en 1944, je n’ai pas détruit Paris,” Le Figaro,
78Telecon, Choltitz and Speidel, 2215, 23 Aug, October 4, 1949; Telecon, Choltitz and Speidel,
A G p B K T B ; Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten, pp. 2225, 24 Aug, A G p B K T B .
256–57. 81Telecon, Choltitz and Speidel, 1100, 25 Aug.
79MS # C-017 (Speidel) . A G p B K T B ; Eckelmann, Rpt to OKW.
610 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
forward outposts at Marcoussis and Colonel Dio’s, in that order, were ad-
Montlhéry as well as strong combat out- vancing toward Rambouillet on the
posts at Palaiseau and Longjumeau northern route; Col. Pierre Billotte’s
covered the approaches to the positions combat command was on the south. In-
guarding the highway north from Arpa- stead of making the main effort from
jon. 82 the west through Rambouillet and
On the Allied side, there was prac- Versailles, Leclerc decided to bring his
tically no information on the actual situ- major weight to bear on Paris from the
ation inside Paris and on its approaches. south, from Arpajon. He directed Bil-
When General Leclerc arrived in Ram- lotte to go from Limours to Arpajon,
bouillet with a small detachment around turn north there, and attack toward the
noon 23 August, well ahead of his divi- southern part of Paris. He switched
sion, he learned for the first time from Dio to the southern route in direct sup-
his reconnaissance elements and from port of Billotte. CCR was to stage a
French civilians that there appeared to diversionary attack toward St. Cyr, while
be a solid defense line along the western Langlade, skirting Versailles on the
and southwestern suburbs of Paris, a south, was to push through Chevreuse
line reinforced by tanks, antitank weap- and Villacoublay to Sévres. When
ons, and mines. This meant that a Leclerc showed his operations order to
major effort by the whole division would General de Gaulle, who was at Ram-
be necessary to open the way into the bouillet that evening, de Gaulle said
city proper. merely that Leclerc was lucky to have
Eager though he was to come to the the opportunity of liberating Paris, and
rescue of the FFI in Paris, which he thereby, by inference at least, ap-
thought might have by this time lib- proved. 84
erated the interior of the city, General Not so the Americans, who years later
Leclerc had to postpone his attack. He could not understand Leclerc’s reasons
had to wait until the following morning for disregarding the V Corps instruc-
because the main body of his division tions. Was Leclerc reluctant to attack
could not reach the Rambouillet area through Versailles because he did
before evening of the 23d.83 not want to endanger that national
monument? Was he concerned about
T h e Liberation securing the right flank protection af-
forded by the Seine River and the de-
Leclerc’s plan of attack departed from stroyed bridges between Corbeil and
Gerow’s instructions. Two combat com- Paris? Though he had cautioned his
mands, Colonel de Langlade’s and troops to avoid the large traffic arteries,
was he attracted nevertheless to the wide
82 MS # B–741 (Ziegelmann) , including Sketch # Orleans-Paris highway, which passes
2b; Eckelmann, Rpt to OKW; Even, La 2e D.B., p.
118; V Corps Operations in the E T O , pp. 200–202; through Arpajon? Did he want to dis-
CI 32 (4th Div) ; 2d French Armored Division G–3 play his independence and his resent-
Report, Operations, is a basic source for the mili-
tary activity of the division. 842d Fr Armd Div Opns Order, 1800 [23 Aug] ;
83Ltr, Leclerc to de Gaulle, 1330, 23 Aug, repro- see Even, La 2e D.B., pp. 117–18, and Dansette,
duced in Even, La 2e D.B., facing p. 118. Libération d e Paris, pp. 329, 336.
THE LIBERATION OF PARIS 611
GENERALLECLERCAT RAMBOUILLET,
ON THE ROADTO PARIS
ment of American control in a matter These were weak when compared to the
that seemed to him to be strictly French? positions in the Rambouillet area, where
Perhaps he had not even seen Gerow’s American troops of the XX Corps had
instructions.85 swept aside the outposts and laid bare
Actually, the military basis of Leclerc’s the main line of resistance. By deciding
decision was his estimate that the opposi- to make his main effort at Arpajon,
tion along the Arpajon–Paris axis seemed Leclerc inadvertently selected as his
“less robust” than in the Rambouillet– point of intended penetration the place
Versailles area.86 Guillebon’s detach- where the German defense was in great-
ment on the previous day had encoun- est depth.
tered German outposts near Arpajon. There were other unfortunate results.
By directing his southern column to go
from Limours to Arpajon, he impinged
85Interv with Gerow, Helmick, and Hill, 15 Oct on the sector of the 4th Division. By
54, OCMH Files; see Even, La -2e D.B., p. 118. switching his principal effort from Ver-
862d Fr Armd Div G–2 Rpt, Opns; Even, La 2e
D.B., p. 118. sailles to the southern axis through
612 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
CHATEAUFORT
FRENCHSOLDIERSATTACKTOWARD
Arpajon, he placed his main attack out- Meanwhile, Leclerc had launched his
side the range of the V Corps Artillery.87 attack toward Paris at dawn, 24 August,
When Gerow received Leclerc’s opera- in a downpour of rain that later dimin-
tions order on the morning of 24 August, ished to a drizzle. On the left, CCR
he immediately warned General Barton, made a diversionary attack to block off
the 4th Division commander, of French St. Cyr, and Langlade moved toward
encroachment but instructed Barton to Châteaufort and Toussus-le-Noble. T h e
continue on his mission “without regard armored columns quickly encountered
to movements of French troops.” After mines and artillery fire, but after a four-
informing General Hodges, the army hour fire fight at close range, the French
commander, of Leclerc’s activity, Gerow knocked out three of eight tanks and
drove to Rambouillet to see Leclerc and penetrated the German defensive line.
straighten out the matter. He dis- With only slight enemy interference,
covered that Leclerc had gone forward Langlade’s combat command then swept
from Rambouillet. Gerow followed toward the Pont de Sévres, the greatest
until traffic congestion forced him to re- obstruction being the enthusiastic wel-
turn to his command post.88 come of civilians, who swarmed about
the combat vehicles, pressing flowers,
87See V Corps Arty Jnl, entry 0700, 23 Aug. de Paris, p. 401; Msg, Hodges to Gerow, 1240, 24
88Msg, Gerow to Barton, 0840, 24 Aug; V Corps Aug; Interv with Gerow, Helmick. and Hill, 1 5
Operations in the E T O , p. 203; Dansette, Libération Oct 54. OCMH Files.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 613
kisses, and wine on their liberators and Leclerc had not yet liberated Paris.
luring some from duty. “Sure we love Since they expected the Germans to with-
you,” the more conscientious soldiers draw, Leclerc’s slow progress seemed like
cried, “but let us through.” At Sévres procrastination. That the French had
by evening, Langlade found the bridge failed to move immediately from Argen-
still intact and unmined. He quickly tan and to reach their designated line of
sent several tanks across the Seine and departure by noon, 23 August, seemed
established a bridgehead in the suburb to substantiate this feeling. If Leclerc’s
immediately southwest of Paris. French inability to move more rapidly on 24 Au-
troops had almost, but not quite, reached gust was due to his unwillingness to
the capital. “jeopardize French lives and property
Billotte’s combat command in the by the use of means necessary to speed
main effort north from Arpajon had a the advance,” that too was insubordina-
much more difficult time. Encounter- tion, for Leclerc had been instructed
ing resistance at once, the troops had to that restrictions on bombing and shelling
turn to a dogged advance through a suc- Paris did not apply to the suburbs.90
cession of German outposts, roadblocks, It seemed to Bradley, as he recalled
and well-positioned strongpoints sup- later, that the French troops had
ported by numerous antiaircraft guns “stumbled reluctantly through a Gallic
sited for antitank fire. Narrow, crooked wall as townsfolk along the line of march
roads through a densely populated region slowed the French advance with wine
of small stone villages further frustrated and celebration.” 91 Gerow substanti-
rapid progress. It took two full-scale as- ated the impression. It appeared to him
saults to capture Massy, and costly street that the resistance was slight and the at-
fighting was necessary to take heavily de- tack halfhearted, that the French were
fended Fresnes that evening. American fighting on a one-tank front and were
tactical air suport could not assist be- not only unwilling to maneuver around
cause of the rainy weather.89 obstacles but also were reluctant to fire
Whereas Langlade had moved fifteen into buildings.92
miles, had tanks across the Seine, and Exasperated because Leclerc was dis-
was almost touching Paris, Billotte, after regarding “all orders to take more ag-
advancing thirteen bitter miles, was still gressive action and speed up his ad-
five miles from the Porte d’Orléans (the vance,” General Gerow requested au-
closest point of entry into the city thority to send the 4th Division into
proper), seven miles from the Pantheon Paris. Permission might be enough, he
(his objective), and eight miles from Ile thought, to shame Leclerc into greater
de la Cité, the center of the capital. activity and increased effort. Agreeing
T h e easy entrance the Allies had ex-
pected had not materialized. 90Ltr, Gerow to OCMH, 2 2 Sep 54.
T o the American commanders follow- 91Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 392.
ing French progress on the midafternoon 92Interv with Gerow, Helmick, and Hill, 15 Oct
of 24 August, it was incredible that 54. General Gerow was also troubled by reports
that French troops were stopping in towns along
the way to celebrate with the inhabitants. Sylvan
89 See V Corps G–3 Jnl, entry 1520, 24 Aug. Diary, 23 Aug.
614 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
that he could not wait for the French French were moving too slowly and de-
“to dance their way to Paris,” Bradley clared: “. . . the French Armored Divi-
exclaimed, “ T o hell with prestige, tell sion is moving into Paris at high speed.
the 4th to slam on in and take the libera- Those enemy elements . . . in the. way
tion.” 93 . . . have been very roughly handled in-
Actually, Leclerc had all the incentive deed.” Finally, French losses in the bat-
he could possibly need to enter Paris tle toward Paris did not indicate an
quickly. He was quite conscious of the absence of opposition; 71 killed, 225
prestige involved for French arms and wounded, 2 1 missing, and 35 tanks,
aware of the personal distinction that 6 self-propelled guns, and 111 vehicles
awaited him as the hero of the liberation. destroyed totaled rather heavy casualties
He had heard conflicting and exag- for an armored division.95
gerated reports of the German threats, T h e American commanders, however,
reprisals, and destruction that only the were less interested in reasons than in re-
entrance of regular troops could prevent. sults. Ordered to liberate Paris and dis-
He knew that de Gaulle expected him to satisfied with Leclerc’s progress, they
be in Paris on 24 August to resolve the committed the 4th U.S. Infantry Divi-
internecine struggle for power in the sion without regard to preserving the
capital-“Tomorrow,” de Gaulle had glory of the initial entry for the French.
written the previous evening, “Tomor- “If von Choltitz was to deliver the city,”
row will be decisive in the sense that we General Bradley wrote, “we had a com-
wish.” 94 pact to fulfill.” 96
Four factors had retarded Leclerc: Advised by Hodges that it was “im-
faulty attack dispositions; the reluctance perative” for Allied troops to be in Paris
of his troops to damage French property; without delay and that considerations of
the real problem posed by the enthu- precedence in favor of the French no
siastic welcome of the French popula- longer applied, Gerow ordered Leclerc:
tion; and the German opposition, which “Push your advance vigorously this after-
had been stronger than anticipated. noon and continue advance tonight.”
T h e 4th Division staff understood that He notified General Barton that he was
the American division was being ordered still to secure a Seine River bridgehead
into Paris as a normal procedure of rein- near Corbeil, but now he was to shift
forcing a unit that was having unex- his main effort from east to north and
pected difficulty with an enemy who was use all the means at his disposal “to force
not withdrawing, but instead strengthen- a way into the city as rapidly as possible.”
ing his defenses. A British intelligence When Barton said that he would start
agency reported no evidence that the north from Villeneuve-le-Roi two hours
93Ltr, Gerow to OCMH, 2 2 Sep 54, and Interv 95CI 32 (4th Div) ; Resistance Unit, Liberation
with Gerow, Helmick, and Hill; Msg, Gerow to of Paris, p. 1252; 2 1 AGp Phantom Sitrep, U.S.
Leclerc, 24 Aug. Quote is from Bradley, Soldier’s Armies, 2400, 24 Aug; Even La 2e D.B., p. 131.
Story, p. 392. The losses are through 29 August, but most oc-
94Ltr, Gen de Gaulle to M. Luizet, 2230, 23 Aug, curred on 24 August.
quoted in Even, La 2e D.B., p., 1 2 1 ; Dansette, 96Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 392; Ltr, Bradley
Libération d e Paris, pp. 329–30. to OCMH, 7 Jan 55, OCMH Files.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 615
after midnight, Gerow informed Leclerc sembled the 4th Division near Arpajon,
that Barton would help the French and selected the 12th Infantry-which was
that Leclerc was to render assistance to closest to Paris and had lost over 1,000
Barton “in every way.” 97 casualties while attached to the 30th
Leclerc decided to make one more ef- Division at Mortain and needed a boost
fort that night. Although Langlade was to morale-to lead the division into Paris
practically inside the city at Sèvres and on 25 August. Motorized, the regiment
faced no opposition, Leclerc could get no started to take the road through Athis-
word to him, for, as the French admitted, Mons and Villeneuve-le-Roi, but gunfire
“liaison between the columns for all from the east bank of the Seine deflected
practical purposes no longer exists.” 98 the movement away from the river.
For that reason, Leclerc called on Without encountering resistance, the
Billotte to dispatch a small detachment troops, screened by the 102d Cavalry
of tanks and half-tracks to infiltrate into Group, reached Notre Dame cathedral
the city. A small force under a Captain before noon, 25 August, “the only check
Dronne rolled along side roads and back . . . being the enormous crowd of Pari-
streets, through the southern suburbs. sians in the streets welcoming the
Civilians pushed aside trees they had troops.” Units of the regiment occupied
felled along the routes to hamper the the railroad stations of Austerlitz, Lyon,
Germans, repaved streets they had torn and Vincennes, and reconnaissance ele-
up to build barricades, and guided ments pushed northeast and east to the
Dronne into the capital by way of the outskirts of the city.101 (Map 18)
Porte de Gentilly (between the Porte While American troops secured the
d’Orléans and the Porte d’Italie). Fol- eastern half of Paris, the French took
lowing small streets, Dronne crossed the the western part. Langlade’s command
Seine by the Pont d’Austerlitz, drove advanced to the Arc de Triomphe,
along the quays of the right bank, and Billotte’s to Place du Châtelet, the spear-
reached the Hôtel de Ville shortly before heads of both columns meeting later at
midnight, 24 August.99 Rond Point des Champs Elysées. Dio’s
Although the Germans had resisted troops, split into two task forces, moved
effectively on 24 August, their defenses to the Ecole Militaire and to the Palais
melted away during the night as Choltitz Bourbon. Several sharp engagements
ordered Aulock to withdraw behind the took place with Germans entrenched in
Seine.100 General Barton, who had as- public buildings, some of them of
great historic value-Luxembourg, Quai
97Msg, Gerow to Leclerc, 24 Aug; Gerow Memo d’Orsay, Palais Bourbon, Hôtel des
for Rcd, 24 Aug; Ltr, Gerow to Leclerc, 2345, 24 Invalides, and Ecole Militaire among
Aug; Interv by author with Cen Barton, io Jun
54, OCMH Files.
982d Fr Armd Div G–3, Rpt, Opns. 101CI 32 (4th Div) ; A Short History of the 38th
99Even, La 2e D.B., pp. 122-23; Dansette, Libéra- Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized)
tion de Paris, pp. 334-39; 2d Fr Armd Div G–3 Rpt, (Prestice, Czechoslovakia, 1945) , pp. 15-18; John-
Opns; Telecon, Choltitz and Speidel, 2225, 24 Aug, son, History of the Twelfth Infantry Regiment in
AGp B KTB. World War II, pp. 168-71; 4th Div AAR, Aug, and
l00Telecons, Choltitz and Speidel, 2225, 24 Aug, FO 24, 0800, 25 Aug (confirming oral orders, 2400,
and 1100, 25 Aug, A G p B KTB. 24 Aug).
616 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
D. Holmes, Jr.
MAP 18
others. About two thousand Germans Choltitz’ formal surrender was necessary.
remained in the Bois de Boulogne. Though Nordling presented him with an
T o avoid a fanatic last-ditch struggle ultimatum from Billotte, Choltitz re-
that might irreparably damage the city, fused to capitulate.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 617
T h e end came after French tankers Barton. Without inviting him to lunch,
surrounded the Hôtel Meurice shortly Leclerc suggested that Barton go to the
after noon, set several German vehicles Montparnasse station. Barton, who was
under the rue de Rivoli arcades on fire, hungry as well as irritated by Leclerc’s
and threw smoke grenades into the halls attitude, finally said, “I’m not in Paris
of the hotel. A young French officer because I wanted to be here but because
suddenly burst into Choltitz’ room and I was ordered to. be here.” Leclerc
in his excitement shouted, “Do you shrugged his shoulders. “We’re both
speak German?” “Probably better than soldiers,” he said. Barton then drove to
you,” Choltitz replied coolly and allowed the Gare Montparnasse, where he found
himself to be taken prisoner.102 General Gerow already taking charge of
Leclerc had installed his command the enormous responsibility of Paris.103
post in the Montparnasse railway station, Instead of taking Choltitz to Mont-
but he himself went to the Prefecture of parnasse, which would have been normal
Police. Barton, who was in Paris and procedure, his French captors took him
wanted to co-ordinate the dispositions of to the Prefecture of Police, where
the divisions with Leclerc, located him Leclerc was waiting. There Choltitz
there having lunch. Holding his napkin signed a formal act of capitulation in the
and appearing annoyed at being dis- presence of Leclerc and .the commander
turbed, Leclerc came outside to talk with of the Paris FFI, who together as equals
102Choltitz, Soldat Unter Soldaten, p. 264. 103Interv with Barton, 10 Jun 54
618 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
logne. Furthermore, Paris posed serious the parade this afternoon or at any other
problems of control, both with regard to time except on orders signed by me per-
the civilian population and to the troops, sonally.
particularly because of the danger that To keep the record straight, Gerow
the liberation hysteria might spread to informed Hodges that he had “directed
the soldiers. T h e thought of a German General Leclerc to disregard those orders
air attack on a city with unenforced [of de Gaulle] and carry out his assigned
blackout rules and inadequate antiair- mission of clearing the Paris area.” 111
craft defenses hardly added to Gerow’s Some members of Leclerc’s staff were
peace of mind. T h e Germans north purportedly “furious at being diverted
and east of the city were capable of from operations but say Le Clerq has
counterattacking. Feeling that the city been given orders and [there is] nothing
was still not properly secure, anticipating they can do about [it].” They were sure
trouble if ceremonial formations were that the parade would “get the French
held, and wishing the troops combat- Division so tangled up that they will be
ready for any emergency, Gerow ordered useless for an emergency operation for
Leclerc to maintain contact and pursue at least 1 2 hours if not more.” 112
the Germans north of the capital.109 Torn by conflicting loyalties, Leclerc
Leclerc replied that he could do so appealed to de Gaulle for a decision.
only with part of his forces, for he was T o an American present, de Gaulle sup-
furnishing troops for de Gaulle’s official posedly said, “I have given you LeClerc;
entry. Acknowledging Gerow as his surely I can have him back for a moment,
military chief, Leclerc explained that de can’t I?” 113
Gaulle was the head of the French Although Barton suggested that Gerow
state.110 Profoundly disturbed because might cut off Leclerc’s gasoline, supplies,
the de Gaulle-Leclerc chain of command and money, Gerow felt that it would
ignored the Allied command structure, have been unwise, as he later wrote, “to
Gerow wrote Leclerc a sharp note: attempt to stop the parade by the use of
You are operating under my direct com- U.S. troops, so the only action I took
mand and will not accept orders from any was to direct that all U.S. troops be taken
other source. I understand you have been off the streets and held in readiness to
directed by General de Gaulle to parade put down any disturbance should one
your troops this afternoon at 1400 hours. occur.” 114
You will disregard those orders and con- Gerow’s concern was not farfetched.
tinue on the present mission assigned you
of clearing up all resistance in Paris and When Hitler learned that Allied troops
environs within your zone of action. were entering the French capital, he
Your command will not participate in asked whether Paris was burning,
111 Gerow to Leclerc, Orders, 26 Aug; Msg, Gerow
109V Corps G–2 Msg, 1303, 26 Aug; Gerow to to Hodges, 1302, 26 Aug.
Hodges, 0 0 1 0 , 26 Aug; V Corps AAR, Aug; Ltr, 112Msg, 26 Aug, probably from V Corps liaison
Gerow to OCMH, 2 2 Sep 54, and Ltr and attach- officer with the French division.
ments, Maj Gen Harold W. Blakeley to author, 30 113Quoted in Dansette, Libbration d e Puris, p
Sep 55, extracts in OCMH Files; Dansette, Libéra- 403; see Ltr, Gerow to OCMH, 2 2 Sep 54.
tion d e Paris, p. 420. 114Ltr, Gerow to OCMH, 22 Sep 54; Interv with
1102dFr Armd Div Msg, 26 Aug. Barton, 10 Jun 54.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 621
longer required, disappeared and re- Paris are inactivated, dissolved, and their
sumed their normal pursuits. Others duties will be carried out by the Com-
sought to exploit their weapons for per- manding Generals of the different mili-
sonal ends. Disturbing incidents took tary regions.” Those Resistance mem-
place in the capital and the provinces, bers liable for military service were to be
some simple disorders, others, such as regularly drafted into the Army.130
the proclamation of local soviets in T h e French War Department imple-
isolated areas, politically inspired.127 mented the decision by issuing the regu-
Koenig, anxious to relieve the situa- lations “to be applied concerning inte-
tion by placing disturbing elements in gration of the FFI’s into the Army.” 131
uniform and thus under military dis- Despite criticism by extremists of the
cipline, asked SHAEF to furnish uni- left, who declared that the action re-
forms and equipment for 15,000 men. stricted the growth of a “national popu-
SHAEF complied immediately. SHAEF lar and democratic army,” the Provi-
had earlier recognized that legal status sional Government in September passed
for the FFI required the enrollment of decrees placing the FFI under French
its members in the French Army in order military law.132
to provide them with a distinctive form Although de Gaulle had wanted the
of military dress that would distinguish 2d French Armored Division in Paris
them from irregular forces not entitled immediately after the liberation, Leclerc
to the privileges and guarantees of mili- protested occupation duty. T h e divi-
tary custom and law.128 Using this as sion nevertheless stayed in the capital to
a lever, Koenig projected the policy by clear the few remaining Germans and to
announcing that FFI members, “because guard bridges, military stores, and in-
of the magnificent patriotic zeal which stallation.133 On 3 September, after
they evinced in particular [ly] difficult de Gaulle apparently was satisfied with
circumstances, are naturally indicated to the order in the capital and the solidity
constitute the frame of our future of his political position, he requested
Armies.” 129 General Eisenhower to remove the divi-
Such tactful circumspection was not sion from the capital for use in active
de Gaulle’s forte. Three days after the operations. Five days later, the division
liberation of Paris, he ordered that, rejoined the Third Army.134
“beginning the 29 August 1944, the high 130Gen de Gaulle, Decision, Ref No. 7 CAB-Mil/
command of the underground forces in PA, 28 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 322, FFI.
131War Dept, Cabinet, Provisional Govt of the
Republic, Memo for the Dept of the Chief of the
127Psychological Warfare Div AEF, Spec Rpt General Staff, Ref No. 14/CAB, 28 Aug, SGS SHAEF
(France) No. 10, FFI, S.824R/I.S. 204, g Oct, SGS File 3 2 2 , FFI.
SHAEF File 322, FFI. 132Office of the Secretary of War, Decrees of 19
128Msg, Vissering to SHAEF, 28 Aug, SHAEF and 20 Sep 44, concerning the Organization of the
File 014.1, France, 11; SHAEF/17245/6/5/Ops (C) , FFI . . . , excerpts from the “Journal Officiel” of
French Forces of the Interior 2 2 Jul, SGS SHAEF the French Republic, No. 8 1 , 23 Sep, SGS SHAEF
File 322, FFI; SGS SHAEF War Diary, 2 2 Jul. File 322, FFI.
129Spec Mil Staff of the Supreme Comd of French 133V Corps Dir, Gerow to Leclerc, 29 Aug, FO
Forces in Great Britain, Organization of the French 23, 1100, 28 Aug, and AAR, Aug.
Forces of the Resistance, 2.051 EMP/DM, 11 Aug, 134Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 242–43; V
SGS SHAEF File 322, FFI. Corps Operations in the E T O , p. 210.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 625
mitted more efficient operation. Occur- made to rush food and coal to Paris.” 144
ring when transportation was so critical A tremendous relief program was
as to immobilize some combat units, the already under way.
move came at an unfortunate time. Also, T h e greatest problem in organizing
long before the liberation, General relief for Paris was transport. Bombing
Eisenhower had reserved the city and its and sabotage had disrupted railroads,
hotels, in his mind at least, for the use rolling stock was in short quantity,
of combat troops on furlough. “Field bridges had been destroyed, heavy mili-
forces in combat have always begrudged tary traffic had damaged roads. T h e
the supply services their rear-echelon requirements of the breakout had placed
comforts,” General Bradley later wrote. a heavy strain on motor vehicles, and
“But when the infantry learned that gasoline was in such short supply that
Com Z’s comforts had been multiplied combat operations were about to come
by the charms of Paris, the injustice to a halt.145 So serious was the lack of
rankled all the deeper and festered there transport that at least one Liberty ship
throughout the war.” 141 Though with food for Paris could not be accepted
Eisenhower tried to reduce the num- for discharge on the Continent.146
ber of rear-echelon troops in the T o overcome these deficiencies, Gen-
city, the military population of Paris eral Eisenhower ordered carrier planes to
nevertheless swelled to what seemed like supplement rail and road movements.
unreasonable proportions. 142 On 2 7 August airplanes began delivering
One of the first impressions the libera- 3,000 tons of food, medical items, and
tors of Paris received was that the soap from the United Kingdom at the
population appeared “healthy and full of rate of 500 tons a day. General Bradley
vigor.” Yet at the time of liberation authorized a daily allocation of 60,000
only one day’s supply of food was on gallons of fuel-gasoline or diesel-and
hand for civil population.143 “The food 6,000 gallons of lubricants for vehicles
situation is serious,” de Gaulle had delivering supplies to Paris. He also
wired. “The lack of coal is grave. allotted 1 , 0 0 0 gallons of fuel oil for col-
Thanks in advance for what you can do lective kitchens in the capital. All
to remedy this.” “You may depend on transportation that could possibly be
us to do everything consistent with the spared from military requirements was
military situation,” the Supreme Com- made available. Two ships departed the
mander replied. “Every effort is being United Kingdom on 2 7 August carrying
179 3/4-ton trucks, each with a trailer, to
be used to get supplies to the French.
141Bradley, Soldier’s Story, pp. 405–06.
142 Eisenhower to Lee, FWD–15033, 16 Sep, Although every effort was made to get
SHAEF File G–3 Ops A, 312.1–2, Dirs to AGps;
Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 320–33; Interv by 144De GauIIe to Eisenhower, 1915, 26 Aug, SGS
Pogue with Maj Gen Walter Bedell Smith, Wash- SHAEF File 092, French Relations; Eisenhower to
ington, 13 May 47, Pogue Files; see also Rup- de Gaulle, FWD–133336, 28 Aug, SGS SHAEF File
penthal, Logistical Support, II, 31–32. 014.1, France.
143V Corps G–5 Staff Sec Rpt, and AAR, Aug; 145See below, Ch. XXXII, for a detailed dis-
V Corps Operations in the E T O , p. 206; Msg, Vis- cussion.
sering to SHAEF, 27 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 014.1, 146Msg, EXFOR Rear Movements to COMZ,
France. QM–430, 30 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 014.1, France.
T H E LIBERATION OF PARIS 627
PARISIANS'
WELCOMETO GENERALDE GAULLE
coal into the city for essential utilities, ducing areas and arrange for their
its importation was an especially difficult delivery to the city. T h e French began
problem because railroad service was to move cattle on the hoof to Paris.
lacking and because all the trucks in Half the daily relief supplies provided
service were carrying food. Military by the Americans and 800 tons of coal
vehicles rushed 1 , 0 0 0 tons of supplies per day were moved at the expense of the
per day from British and American con- military effort. Representatives of the
tinental stockpiles provided for that pur- two army groups and the Communica-
pose. French and captured German tions Zone co-ordinated the flow within
trucks moved several hundred tons of Paris, while French authorities arranged
nearby indigenous stocks into the capital local distribution. More than a month
daily. Ships brought cargo from the and a half after the liberation of Paris,
United Kingdom for relief distribution. French relief was still a consequential
T o offset the diminishing military stock- Allied military responsibility.147
piles, American agricultural specialist
147Msg, Gen Eisenhower to Asst Secy of War
officers were assigned to help French John J. McCloy, FWD–13308, 27 Aug; Gen Bradley
officials locate supplies in surplus pro- to Maj Gen Frank F. Scowden, Q–10373, 27 Aug;
628 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
PURSUIT
CHAPTER XXX
tinent was also deficient.3 T h e spec- T h e decision to cross the Seine neces-
tacular nature of the breakout from the sitated little soul searching. T h e ex-
cramped pre-COBRA beachhead had made ample of McClellan at Antietam was too
it impossible for supply installations to well known. Pursuit of a defeated enemy
keep up with the combat units, supply was axiomatic.
distances having suddenly changed from General Eisenhower’s decision to pur-
tens of miles to hundreds. T h e First sue the enemy across the Seine changed
Army had relinquished logistical respon- neither the port development plans nor
sibilities to the Communications Zone at the prevalent feeling that the Breton
the end of July, just when the demands ports were vital for the development of
of the static battle of the hedgerows were the campaign.6 According to the Allied
giving way to the different requirements troop dispositions and the plans for post-
of mobile warfare. T h e Communica- OVERLORD operations, the 2 1 Army
tions Zone, instead of expanding the Group would advance up the Channel
depot system as planned, had to assume coast while the 12th Army Group drove
the more pressing task of delivering sup- eastward away from the coast and across
plies directly to the consumers. T h e northern France. By liberating and
result was not the most secure logistical opening the Seine and Channel ports,
base from which to launch post-OVER- which had been reserved in the OVER-
LORD operations. LORD planning for British and Canadian
Despite his awareness of the logis- logistical operations, the 2 1 Army Group
tical flaws, General Eisenhower on 17 would ease its supply problems. In con-
August felt that “the beating” the Allies trast, the American forces would be mov-
were administering the enemy in Nor- ing away from the coast and lengthening
mandy would enable the Allies to “dash their supply lines. Since in August
across the Seine.” Two days later he Cherbourg was still handling less cargo
decided to cross the Seine in strength.4 than anticipated and since the gales of
On 20 August, while the 79th Division September might disrupt and even
was securing the first Allied bridgehead terminate the beach operations on the
over the Seine, the Allied command was invasion coast, sheltered waters and port
giving serious consideration to the next unloading facilities in Brittany, despite
goal-the Rhine River, more than two their increasing distance from the front,
hundred and fifty miles to the east.5 remained objectives of vital importance.
“We are promised greatly accelerated
shipments of American divisions directly
3 See Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I , 483ff; from the United States,” General Eisen-
The Gen Bd USFET, Rpt on Ammo Supply for FA,
Study 58, p. 18, File 471/1. hower explained to General Montgomery
4 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA-90228, 17 as he set forth his thoughts on pursuit
Aug, Pogue Files; Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery,
19 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORD Plng;
12th AGp Memo for Rcd (Additional Notes of Ltrs of Instrs; 12th AGp G–4 Jnl, 20 Aug, 12th AGp
Bradley-Patton Conf, 1730, 19 Aug), 19 Aug, 12th File 371.3, Mil Obs, I; Maj Gen Manton S. Eddy’s
AGp File 371.3, Mil Obs, I. Diary, entry 22 Aug.
5 21 AGpOperational Situation and Dir, M-519, 6Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I , 470–74. and
20 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORD Plng; II, Ch. 11; see ANCXF to SHAEF, 15 Aug, SGS
12th AGp Operational Plan, 20 Aug, 12th AGp SHAEF File 373/2.
THE BATTLE FOR BREST 633
operations beyond the Seine, “and it is shore of Brittany, had been captured in
mandatory that we capture and prepare good condition, and supplies discharged
ports and communications to receive at Brest could easily be transported to the
them. This has an importance second troops in the interior of France.9
only to the destruction of the remaining Conscious of the deficiency of unload-
enemy forces on our front. ” T h e speed ing equipment at Brest and of the prob-
of Bradley’s advance east of Paris, Gen- ability that the Germans would destroy
eral Eisenhower felt, would be governed all facilities before letting the port fall
by the speed with which the Breton ports into Allied hands, the Allies had drawn
could be secured and the supply situa- plans for constructing a port complex at
tion improved. 7 Quiberon Bay. Yet in order to use not
T h e opening attack on the most im- only Quiberon but also Lorient, St.
portant of the Breton ports, Brest, coin- Nazaire, and Nantes, the Allies first had
cided on 2 5 August with the start of the to clear the sea lanes around the Brittany
pursuit beyond the Seine. Generals tip-that is, eliminate the German naval
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton antic- base at Brest and seize the submarine
ipated quick success on both fronts, and pens there.10
the Supreme Commander talked of send- In the same way that the Allies
ing the VIII Corps to secure Bordeaux thought the fall of St. Malo would
very soon-as soon as the Breton ports weaken the German will to resist at the
fell.8 other port cities, they hoped that the
A fortress city of 80,000 people situated reduction of Brest would affect the
on the northern shore of an excellent morale of the garrisons at Lorient and St.
landlocked roadstead of ninety square Nazaire. After Brest, the Allies in-
miles, Brest had been a major base of the tended to attack Lorient “if it was still
French Navy. Because it was primarily holding out.” 11
a naval base and remote from the in- Thus it came about that as the Allies
dustrial centers of France, Brest had plunged into pursuit of the retreating
never attained commercial importance. enemy east of the Seine, more than fifty
In World War I, the American Expedi- thousand U .S. troops became involved
tionary Force had used it as the principal in siege operations againt the fortress of
port for the direct movement of troops Brest, three hundred miles west of the
from the United States to France. front.
Though the cargo-handling facilities
were not as good as at other French
ports, Brest offered the Allies an excel- 9 See above, Ch. XXII. Support, II, Ch, II;
10 Ruppenthal, Logistical Support,II Ch. II;
lent deep water harbor. T h e railroad 12th AGp Ltr of Instrs 6, 2 5 Aug. The VIII Corps
from Brest to Rennes, along the north AAR’s of August and September give excellent ac-
counts of the action at Brest and have been used
7 Ltr,Eisenhower to Montgomery, 19 Aug, SGS throughout the chapter as the basic sources; see
SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORD Plng; Eisenhower also Kenneth Edwards, Operation N E P T U N E
to CCS, CPA–90235, 22 Aug, SHAEF G–3 Ops A (London: Collins, 1946), pp. 264–69.
322.011/1, Comd and Contl of U.S./Br Forces; see 11 Middleton-Macon Conf Notes, 1 7 Aug; VIII
12th AGp Ltr, Rpt o f Staff Visit . . . to Hq VIII G–2 Est 6, 15 Aug. All documents in this chapter,
Corps, 16 Aug (Bradley-Middleton conf) , ML–205. unless otherwise noted. are in the VIII Corps G–3
8 12th AGp Memo for Rcd, 19 Aug, ML–205. Journal and File.
634
BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
At Lorient General Grow, the 6th against Brest as soon as adequate sup-
Armored Division commander, chafed plies could be stocked. (Map XV)
under his static containment mission and Adequate supplies were as much a
wrote Middleton “a plea for the charac- problem for Middleton as they were for
teristics of the Division to be exploited the commanders driving east from the
to the maximum at the earliest practi- Seine. By far the most serious shortage
cable date.” 15 Middleton appreciated for the siege-type action about to take
Grow’s eagerness to get into the main place at Brest was in artillery ammuni-
operational stream outside Brittany, but tion. T h e shortage was already pla-
considered the presence of an armored guing the corps at St. Malo, and on 10
reserve essential. Grow then went to August Middleton had warned the
see Patton, who told Grow to move a Third Army that he foresaw heavy am-
combat command to Orleans; on the munition expenditures at Brest. Patton
way, the troops were to clear small Ger- promised that even though the Third
man groups that were still a nuisance Army might be rationed in ammunition,
along the Loire River. At least part of he would see to it that the VIII Corps
the 6th Armored Division would thus be was supplied.17 When the army re-
closer to the main body of the Third quested formal estimates of the Brest re-
Army and more quickly available to Pat- quirements, Middleton based his reply
ton. CCB started out of Brittany on 28 on the St. Malo experience and on the
August, forced a small group of Germans expectation of using an armored division
on the north bank to evacuate to Sau- and three infantry divisions supported
mur, found no other enemy forces north by thirteen battalions of corps artillery.
of the Loire River, and eventually moved He requested an initial stock of 8,700
to Montargis.16 tons of ammunition, plus a replenish-
Meanwhile forces gathered for the at- ment allowance of 11,600 tons for the
tack on Brest. T h e Communications first three days.
Zone headquarters took responsibility T h e Third Army staff considered the
for Rennes and relieved the 8th Division, request excessive on two grounds. It
which reached Plabennec by 18 August. anticipated that only two divisions and
T h e 2d Division arrived at Landerneau ten corps artillery battalions would take
on 19 August, and the 29th Division as- part in the operation against Brest, and
sembled just south of Lannilis four days it believed that the corps had overesti-
later. With Task Force A and contin- mated the strength of the enemy garrison
gents of the FFI also nearby, Middletan and its will to resist. Setting 1 Septem-
was ready to commence his operation ber as the target date for the fall of Brest,
Third Army allotted only about 5,000
Aug; TUSA Dir, 17 Aug, and Msg, 23 Aug; 12th tons for the entire operation–less than
AGp Ltr and Ltr of Instrs 5, 1 7 Aug; Journal des
Marches.
15Grow to Middleton, 20 Aug. 17VIII Corps G–3 Jnl, entry 13 Aug; Ruppenthal,
16 Memos, Middleton for Patton, J T R for Evans, Logistical Support, I , 528ff. is an excellent account
15 Aug, Middleton for Grow, 18 and 21 Aug; 6th of the logistical difficulties at Brest. See also Con-
Armd Div FO 14, 28 Aug; TUSA Operational Dir, quer, the Story of the Ninth Army, 1944—1945
27 Aug; Patton to Middleton, 2 Sep; Read to (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947) (here-
Grow, 30 Aug, 6th Armd Div CCB Unit Jnl. after cited as Story of N i n t h Army), pp. 53ff.
636 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
tions, long distances, and weather con- tions in Brittany. In addition it had the
tributed their adverse effects, but at the task of receiving, processing, and train-
bottom of the difficulties was improper ing units arriving in France. General
co-ordination for the Brest operation at Bradley had thought of inserting the
all the echelons of higher command due Ninth Army into the line during the
to the optimistic initial belief that Brest pursuit east of Paris, but the speed of
would fall quickly. the advance and logistical difficulties
Another headquarters became in- prompted him to assign it to Brittany.
volved in the Brest operation on 10Sep- T o permit Middleton to give undivided
tember, when VIII Corps passed from attention to Brest, General Simpson
Third Army control to Lt. Gen. William placed the 6th Armored and 83d Di-
H. Simpson's Ninth U.S. Army, opera- visions, which were not involved at
tional five days earlier at Rennes. T h e Brest, directly under his own control.
Ninth Army assumed responsibility for Almost immediately afterwards, when
protecting the southern flank of the 12th Bradley called for troops to augment the
Army Group and for conducting opera- forces in the pursuit, Simpson accelerated
638 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
the movement into Brittany of the 94th stacles included barbed wire entangle-
Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. ments, mine fields, and antitank ditches.
Harry J. Malony, in order to release T h e Germans incorporated into their de-
the 6th Armored Division. Around the fensive system a number of old French
middle of September, after the newly forts, built before the Franco-Prussian
arrived division assumed the job of War and located in the western and
guarding Lorient, the 6th Armored Di- northwestern suburbs of the city. Even
vision finally moved eastward to rejoin the high ramparts of an ancient fortress
the Third Army.20 at the mouth of the Penfeld, a work con-
T h e problems of getting the operation structed by Vauban in the seventeenth
started and keeping it in motion were century, had a role in the defense
matched by the task of reducing the de- scheme–in some places thirty-five feet
fensive complex of the fortress of Brest.21 high, fifteen feet thick, and protected by
( M a p XIV) The city itself, originally a moat, overgrown with grass, vines, and
on the slopes of hills on both sides flowers, and serving as a promenade for
of the Penfeld River, spread over several Sunday strollers, the walls sheltered gun
neighboring communities, among them emplacements.
Recouvrance and St. Pierre-Quilbignan T h e Germans integrated into their
on the west, Lambézellec on the north, land defenses dual-purpose antiaircraft
St. Marc on the east. T h e city proper guns and guns stripped from ships sunk
and the small commerical port area are in the harbor by Allied planes. Bat-
east of the river; the western side, known teries of coastal and field artillery on the
as Recouvrance, includes the naval base, Daoulas promontory and the Quelern
with extensive repair shops, drydocks, peninsula provided additional fire sup-
quays, barracks, storehouses, and U-boat port. Heavy guns near le Conquet, in-
shelter pens. tended primarily to protect the sea ap-
T h e countryside around Brest, a proaches to Brest, could also help the
gently rolling plateau, presents a pattern landward defenses. Although the Ger-
of small hills and low ridges separated mans considered their twelve batteries
in some places by narrow deep-cut val- of Army field artillery and eighteen bat-
leys, the whole criss-crossed by numerous teries of Navy Flak inadequate for the
streams. T h e Germans used these ter- task of defending Brest, the Americans
rain features to good advantage and or- were to find them more than trouble-
ganized a system of positions of various some.22
kinds and in varying strengths to es- Approximately thirty thousand troops
tablish a defense in depth. defended Brest, nearly twice the number
T h e defensive works ranged from estimated by the Americans. T h e core
simple trenches to concrete pillboxes, of the defense was the 2d Paratroop Di-
casemates, and gun emplacements. Ob- vision, composed of tough young soldiers.
Their commander, Ramcke, who had
20Story of N i n t h Army, pp. 21, 28-39, 45-46; 12th gained prominence in the German air-
AGp Memo for Rcd, 19 Aug, ML-205: 12th AGp
Ltr of Instrs 7, 5 Sep.
21See Albert Vulliez, Erest au Combat, 1939–1944 22MS # B–731 (Fahrmbacher) ; 12th AGp Immed
(Paris, c. 1950), map facing p. 154. Rpt 49, German Defenses at Brest, 9 Sep.
T H E BATTLE FOR BREST 639
borne attack on Crete in 1940, was also French civilians who might encumber
the fortress commander. His chief of his defense, Ramcke used his para-
staff was Colonel von der Mosel who, be- troopers as nuclei to stiffen the defense
fore Ramcke’s appointment, had com- of strongpoints held by the miscellaneous
manded the fortress. Generalmajor Jo- naval and static personnel of the garri-
sef Rauch, the commander of the 343d son.24
(Static) Division, was charged with the Between 13 August, when the 6th Ar-
Daoulas and Crozon sectors.23 mored Division had started to displace
Ordered by Hitler to hold to the last from Brest to Lorient, and 18 August,
man, Ramcke was determined to do so. when the bulk of the 8th Division began
If he needed to justify resistance that to arrive near Brest, the presence of little
could count victory only in the number more than a combat command of Allied
of days the garrison held out, Ramcke troops near Brest led the German garri-
could feel that the Allied forces he tied son to make raids on the countryside.25
down at Brest and the ammunition he These came to an end as U.S. forces
caused the Allies to expend there would gathered. On 18 August the VIII Corps
constitute just that much less that could command post moved one hundred and
be brought to bear on the German twenty miles to Lesneven, fifteen miles
homeland. Having evacuated all the from Brest, to undertake the siege of the
23MS # B-427 (Kogard); Vulliez, Brest au 24Ramcke, Fallschirinjager, Damals und Dannch,
Combat, pp. 224-25 has a good description of pp. 46–48, 51; CI 14 (2d Div).
Ramcke. 25Journal des Marches.
640 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
fortress. Though Bradley and Patton in the Brest area, General Middleton
thought the Germans would soon capitu- launched a preliminary operation de-
late, Middleton figured that Brest would signed to protect his flanks, isolate his
be little different from St. Malo. Sev- objective, prevent the escape of the garri-
eral days before the operation began, son across the harbor, and secure obser-
planners at the 12th Army Group also vation points on the promontory between
concluded that the Brest garrison would Brest and Daoulas.27 Combining the
probably fight to the last man. 26 2d Division's 38th Infantry, plus ad-
ditional units, with General Earnest's
T h e Fight for Brest long-standing Task Force A, General
Middleton created a unit called Task
Even before the arrival of all his forces
2 7 Ninth U.S. Army Operations, I, Brest-Crozon,
26 Storyof Ninth Army, p. 24; 12th AGp Plng USFET Hist Div, MS (1946), OCMH Files, is a
Sec Memo, 20 Aug. valuable source.
T H E BATTLE FOR BREST 641
Force B under Brig. Gen. James A. Van wounded destroyed a pillbox with gre-
Fleet, the assistant commander of the 2d 29 Against a total loss of 7 dead
nades.
Division.28 He instructed Van Fleet to and 28 wounded, Task Force B took 143
attack from Landernau to Hill 154, a prisoners and counted about a hundred
dominating feature on the approaches German bodies on the crest of the hill.30
to Brest south of the Elorn River. (See Having deprived the Germans of an
Map VIII.) excellent observation post on the eastern
Task Force B jumped off on 2 1 Au- approaches to Brest, Task Force B
gust and advanced rapidly for several pushed forward to clear the remainder
miles until stopped by a massive volume of the promontory. By forcing the Ger-
of fire from positions on Hill 154 and mans to demolish the reinforced concrete
from artillery north of the Elorn. T h e bridge over the Elorn River and thereby
defenders, soldiers of the 353d Division, cut land communication between the
were well dug in on a strong position promontory and Brest, the force secured
that included a network of trenches Middleton’s left flank. T h e task force
around the crest of the hill, eight steel used flame throwers, demolitions, and
and concrete reinforced pillboxes, and tank destroyer and artillery fire to de-
barbed wire entanglements. They had stroy pillboxes and emplacements. It
more than twenty-five machine guns, cleared the entire peninsula by the last
several antitank weapons, and mortars. day of August and took 2,700 prisoners.
T h e strength of the position and the fire Characterizing the action an “outstand-
power allocated to its defense indicated ing success,” Middleton dissolved the
the importance the Germans attached to task force, sending the 38th Infantry to
its possession. rejoin the 2d Division, Task Force A to
Supported by tank destroyer and artil- guard the approaches to the Crozon
lery fire, a battalion of the 38th Infantry peninsula, and the 50th Armored Infan-
assaulted on 23 August over rocky ter- try Battalion to Lorient to rejoin the
rain that afforded scant cover and con- 6th Armored Division.31
cealment. Success was in large part at- Because the Daoulas promontory juts
tributable to the action of Staff Sgt. Al- out into the roadstead southeast of Brest,
vin P. Casey, who though mortally it provided excellent artillery positions.
Middleton dispatched a corps artillery
28 Other components were: three field artillery
group there to take under fire the rear
battalions (from the 2d Division), the 50th Armored of the landward defenses around Brest
Infantry Battalion, a company each of the 68th and also German positions on the Crozon
Tank Battalion and the 603d Tank Destroyer
Battalion, and a battery of the 777th AAA AW SP
peninsula. On the basis of plans drawn
Battalion (from the 6th Armored Division). The by Task Force B, Middleton formed a
components of Task Force A were: the 1st Tank
Destroyer Brigade, controlling the 6th Tank De-
stroyer Group, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battal- 29 Casey was awarded the Medal of Honor.
ion, a battalion of the 330th Infantry (83d Divi- 30Memos, Van Fleet for Earnest, 21 Aug, and
sion), the 15th Cavalry Group, and an engineer Evans for Middleton, 28 Aug.
combat battalion. VIII Corps G–3 Msg, 21 Aug. 31CI 15 (2d Div); Buckley, History of the 50th
The 38th Infantry headquarters acted in a dual Armored Infantry Battalion, pp. 27-28. Other 6th
capacity—for the regiment and for Task Force B. Armored Division elements rejoined the division
Ltr, Zwicker to OCMH, 14 Mar 56. early in September.
642 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
for a constant four-plane air alert in sup- T h e attack on 26 August displayed the
port of each division. In addition, kind of combat that was to predominate
Middleton secured the assistance of the during the siege of Brest. Because am-
British battleship H.M.S. Warspite for a munition stocks were low, the artillery
15-inch-gun bombardment of the heavy reduced its activity to direct support mis-
coastal batteries, particularly those near sions. As the Americans came to a full
le Conquet.35 realization of the strength of the German
Part of the bombing program had to opposition, and as the pattern of the
be canceled because of adverse weather enemy defense system emerged, com-
conditions, but seven groups of medium manders on all echelons saw the necessity
bombers and 150 Flying Fortresses struck of changing their own tactics. T h e
Brest and started a large fire in Recouv- units turned to more detailed study of
rance, west of the Penfeld River. T h e their tactical problems with the purpose
Warspite hurled some three hundred of reaching intermediate objectives.
shells into the coastal batteries near le T h e nature of the battle changed from a
Conquet and after scoring several direct simultaneous grand effort to a large-scale
hits shifted to forts in Recouvrance. nibbling—a series of actions dictated by
Fifteen medium and heavy battalions of the local problems of each sector com-
the corps artillery were also active. mander. 38
Fighter-bombers strafed and bombed, T h e divisions began to probe to locate
and sank several ships in the harbor near and systematically destroy pillboxes, em-
the Crozon peninsula.36 Despite this placements, fortifications, and weapons,
heavy volume of preparatory fire, the moving ahead where weak spots were
well-co-ordinated ground attack of the found, overwhelming pillboxes with
three divisions made little progress. flame throwers and demolitions after
Attempting to soften the will to resist, patient maneuver and fire. Small sneak
RAF heavy bombers struck Brest around attacks, the repulse of surprise counter-
midnight of 25 August, and on the fol- attacks, mine field clearance, and the use
lowing morning American and RAF of smoke characterized the slow squeeze
heavies blasted targets again. T h e re- of American pressure. Fog, rain, and
sumption of the ground attack on 26 Au- wind squalls during the remainder of
gust, however, brought little change. August restricted air support, while con-
T h e German garrison remained firm.37 tinued shortages of ammunition cur-
tailed the artillery. Yet on 28 August, a
35SHAEF Msg, 25 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 381, regiment of the 29th Division bounded
Post-OVERLORDPlng; Bradley to Middleton and toward Brest on the le Conquet highway
Middleton to Bradley, 24 Aug; 12th AGp Immed
Rpt 44, Air Ground Opns in Attack on Brest, 31 for almost two miles against virtually no
Aug; VIII Corps FO 11, 22 Aug. Vulliez, Brest au resistance. On the following day, the 8th
Combat, pp. 225ff., gives an interesting account of Division gained on one front, but the
the battle from the point of view of the civilian
population. Germans cut off two leading companies
36Bradley, Effect of Air Power, pp. 128ff.
372d Lt. Earl O. Hall of the 13th Infantry, who 382d Div FO 10, 23 Aug, and Ltr of Instrs, 2030,
participated in vicious fighting for trenches and 26 Aug; MS # B-731 (Fahrmbacher) ; Brest Fortress
concrete emplacements until killed by artillery fire, Comdr Rpt, 12 Aug, OB WEST KTB, Anlage
was posthumously awarded the DSC. 1330.
644 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
of infantry and marched them into Brest having shown no signs of weakening.”
as prisoners. In the 2d Division sector, Middleton requested more 4.2-inch mor-
the troops were in the midst of dogged tars, more artillery, and more and better
fighting to reduce strong positions. air support. General Bradley talked to
Typical of the fighting was the action of Maj. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the com-
Lt. Col. H. K. Wesson of the 9th Infan- mander of the Ninth Air Force, in an
try, who reorganized a rifle company re- attempt to improve the air support, and
duced to forty-six men, then led the several days later General Eisenhower
unit in an assault across hedgerowed ter- authorized Vandenberg to “utilize maxi-
rain, destroyed a machine gun position, mum number of aircraft which can be
and took fourteen German paratroopers effectively employed in support of this
prisoner.39 operation.” 41
On 1 September, the expected comple- Middleton’s letter was like the dark-
tion date of the siege, as ammunition ness before dawn. T h e first real break
prospects seemed momentarily improved occurred on 2 September when the 2d
and with the divisions in the main Ger- Division captured Hill 105 southwest of
man defenses, General Middleton again Guipavas. A month earlier the 6th
launched a co-ordinated attack after a Armored Division commander, General
strike by medium bombers and a forty- Grow, had recognized the hill as a key
five-minute preparation by the division terrain feature in the defense of Brest,
artillery pieces and nine corps artillery one of two hills dominating the eastern
battalions. Although the VIII Corps approaches to the city. As the Germans
Artillery fired 750 missions, including fell back from Hill 105 several hundred
136 counterbattery, in twenty-four hours, yards in the center of the corps zone, the
and although single pieces, batteries, and 8th Division advanced and took another
sometimes battalions kept known enemy of the fortified hills in the outer defense
gun positions under continuous fire, the ring. Yet the 29th Division, facing Hill
only apparent result of the attack was a 103 east of the village of Plouzané, had
gain of several hundred yards by the no such success.
8th Division. Even this small gain was For five more days the divisions con-
almost immediately lost to counterat- tinued their individual efforts. While
tack.40 medium and heavy bombers attacked
Discouraged, General Middleton Brest every day save one, local ground
wrote “a rather pessimistic letter” to attacks inched the front toward the port.
General Bradley. He reported that his By the end of the first week in Septem-
troops were “none too good,” that re-
placement arrivals were behind schedule, 41Memo, Kibler for Swift, Brest, 2 Sep, ML-205:
that ammunition supply was poor though Leigh-Mallory to Vandenberg, Smith to Vandenberg,
and Eisenhower to Vandenberg 4, 6, and 7 Sep, SGS
improving, and that air support “left SHAEF File 381. General Middleton also sought
much to be desired.” T h e Germans had landing craft for local amphibious operations
“no intention to fold u p right away, against Brest, but his request was denied by naval
authorities on the ground that no plan had been
39 Colonel Wesson was posthumously awarded the developed for such action. SHAEF to ANCXF,
DSC. FWD-13554, 2 Sep, SGS SHAEF File 381, Post-
40see TUSA AAR, Sep. OVERLORDPlng.
T H E BATTLE FOR BREST 645
2D DIVISION
TROOPS
move through a devastated area near Brest.
ber, the grip around the Brest garrison tain another effort on the whole front.
had tightened. T h e 2d Division was Securing six planes per division for con-
within reach of Hill 92 (the second stant air alert, he launched a co-ordi-
hill dominating the northeastern ap- nated attack on 8 September after a
proaches); the 8th Division was on the strong artillery preparation. T h e weight
approaches to the village of Lambézellec of all three divisions carried a number
(the gateway to Brest from the north); of positions that previously had been
and the 29th Division, still denied Hill denied. T h e 2d Division captured
103 (“we’re on it, but so are the Jer- strongly fortified Hill 92; the 8th Divi-
ries”), stood before Fort de Mengant, five sion-to a great extent because of the
miles west of the Penfeld River.42 By actions of Pfc. Ernest W. Prussman, who
then the besieged area was so small that was virtually the leading man in the at-
heavy bombers could no longer attack tack-advanced two regiments several
without endangering the American hundred yards toward Lambézellec and
ground troops. Hill 82; and the 29th Division finally
On 7 September Middleton judged took an important strongpoint at Kergo-
that he had enough ammunition on hand nant, just north of the village of
(and assurance of more to come) to sus- Penfeld.43 Prisoners totaled close to one
TROOPS
FIGHTING
THEIR
WAY THROUGH
THE STREETSOF BREST
mander, as “a corporal’s war.” 44 A typ- the fortified city wall first, at Fort
ical obstruction was a concrete reinforced Bougen on 10September. An infantry
dugout no higher than ten inches above assault, preceded by an artillery prepara-
ground, which was built on a street tion, failed to breach the wall, which was
corner with an opening for a heavy ma- 25 to 35 feet high and behind a dry moat
chine gun at street level. Eight men 15 to 25 feet deep. General Stroh pre-
(with two flame throwers, a bazooka, pared an attack for the following day,
and two BAR’S) made a wide detour, but after direct fire from heavy-caliber
neutralized several small nests of resist- corps artillery pieces tore gaps in the
ance, came up behind the pillbox, and upper portion of the wall without effect
flamed the position until thirteen Ger- on the lower sections, it was obvious that
mans surrendered. 45 an infantry assault would be costly and
Because the 2d Division had a larger of doubtful success. Since the con-
section of the city to reduce before reach- verging movement on the city com-
ing the old wall, the 8th Division com- pressed the division fronts and deprived
pleted its street fighting and arrived at the divisions of sufficient maneuver
room, General Middleton decided to
withdraw the 8th Division. This took
44VIII Corps AAR, Sep; see Story of Ninth
Army,pp.32ff. place in several stages. Two battalions
45CI 15 (2d Div) . assumed part of the 29th Division front
648 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
FORT MONTBAREY
330, the dominating terrain near the to surrender, a few artillery rounds and
base, then contented himself with pa- the threatening presence of a single
trolling since he knew he could expect fighter-bomber overhead proved suffi-
no assistance from the forces in the main cient persuasion.
battle at Brest.52
When the 8th Division, pinched out T h e operations against Brest had been
before Brest, arrived on Crozon in mid- a series of actions against approximately
September, General Stroh (supported by seventy-five strongpoints. T h e heavy-
the attachment of Task Force A and the walled forts of massive stonework were
2d Ranger Battalion) directed an attack for the most part pivots of resistance
that overran a defensive line maintained rather than bastions of a line, their real
by the 343d Division. T h e German importance coming from their domi-
division commander, Rauch, surrendered nating sites. T h e Americans had gen-
on 17 September, a day before the gar. erally advanced after probing for weak
rison in the city of Brest capitulated. spots, moving against open flanks, turn-
T h e final action on Crozon occurred on ing those flanks, and finally reducing
19 September when troops scaled the outer works by fire before destroying the
wall across the throat of the Quélern individual strongpoints at close range.
and pushed to the Pointe des Espagnols. Local actions, often seemingly unre-
Only a group of diehards about Ramcke lated—“At one time we had three
remained. That Ramcke too was ready separate wars going in the division,”
to surrender was obvious when he sent a General Gerhardt later stated—produced
message asking Brig. Gen. Charles D. W. an over-all pressure that was hammered
Canham, the 8th Division’s assistant com- home by increasing amounts of artillery
mander, for his credentials. Canham re- fire and by air attacks. T h e actual con-
plied that his troops served to identify quest of the garrison had come as the
him. Claiming later to have fired the result of action by the combined arms-
last shell from his remaining 75-mm. as- heavy artillery fire, infantry assault, engi-
sault gun, Ramcke surrendered during neer blasting operations, and the use of
the afternoon of 19 September.53 flame throwers. Bunkers and pillboxes
T h e action on Crozon had been far of reinforced concrete, sometimes nine
from easy. In taking 7,638 prisoners on feet thick, did not always require close-in
the peninsula, for example, the 8th Divi- action toward the last because in many
sion between 15 and 19 September in- instances the constant pounding of
curred casualties of 7 2 killed and 415 bombs and shells had prepared the Ger-
wounded. mans mentally for capitulation.54
T h e final action occurred on 2 0 Sep- Air support normally did not directly
tember when Task Force A drove down aid the advance of small units in the same
to Douarnenez to demand the surrender way that close support artillery, mortars,
of an isolated group of three hundred
Germans. Though they refused at first 54Marshall and Westover, Kergonant Strong
Point; CI 14 (2d Div); 2d Div Ltr of Instrs, 2000,
52TF A Opns, 1 Aug-22 Sep. 14 Sep; Interv with Capt Robert E. Garcia, Hosp
53Ramcke, Fallschirmjaeger, Damals und Danach, Intervs, ML-2234; Ltr, Gerhardt to OCMH, 26
p. 67; Ninth U.S. Army Opns, Brest-Crozon. Apr 56; 29th Div AAR, Sep.
T H E BATTLE FOR BREST 653
and machine guns did. T h e principal heavy and medium bomber effort had
function of the planes was to destroy or been less effective than expected because
neutralize strongpoints a thousand yards the planes were sometimes assigned tasks
or more behind the enemy front, though beyond their capabilities. Yet if certain
the immediate effect weakened morale selected targets proved invulnerable to
among the Germans in close contact. bombardment and shelling, the effect of
Air also restricted enemy movement, tons of explosives dropped from the air
(particularly of reserves), kept gun crews and the expenditure of almost 500,000
under cover and away from firing posi- rounds of artillery had lent authority to
tions, and limited hostile observation.55 the tightening grip around the city.
From 25 August through 19 Septem- American casualties totaled 9,831;
ber, the VIII Corps received continuous prisoners numbered 38,000, of which
air support except during periods of more than 20,000 were combat troops.
inclement weather. Fighter-bombers on T h e 2d Division had advanced approxi-
alert status alone flew approximately 430 mately eight miles at a cost of 2,314
separate missions involving more than casualties. It had expended more than
3,200 sorties. Fighter-bombers of the 1,750,000 rounds of small arms ammuni-
IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands tion, rounds of heavy caliber,
218,000
also attacked fifty targets on planned had requested 97 air missions–fulfilled
missions between 4 and 7 September. by 705 fighter-bombers, which dropped
Medium and heavy bombers of the 360 tons of bombs. T h e 29th Division,
Eighth and Ninth Air Forces and of the expending a similar amount of ammuni-
Royal Air Force attacked coastal and tion, had lost 329 killed and 2,317
heavy antiaircraft batteries, forts, block- wounded. Casualties of the 8th Divi-
houses, strongpoints, and defensive in- sion for the month of September were
stallations in the inner ring of the Brest close to 1,500. 57
defenses.56 T h e VIII Corps turned over the cap-
Despite the impressive amount of air tured fortress of Brest and the prisoners
power employed at Brest, difficulties had to the Brittany Base Section of the Com-
ensued because of inadequate communi- munications Zone on the evening of
cations and because the corps was con- 19 September, and the combat troops
ducting an independent operation hun- moved into assembly areas to rest, re-
dreds of miles from the main front. ceive winter clothing, and repair arma-
Aircraft had to be diverted to Brest, and ment and transport. Task Force A was
good weather on one front did not always soon dissolved. T h e 29th Division de-
signify the same for the other. T h e parted on 24 September to rejoin the
First Army, and on 26 September the
55CI 87 (29th Div) , Air Support at Brest; Brad- VIII Corps headquarters and the 2d and
ley, Effect of Air Power, 128ff.; 12th AGp Immed 8th Divisions began to move by rail and
Rpt 65, Close Air Support of Ground Forces Around
Brest, 26 Sep. motor to Belgium and Luxembourg for
56Air Chief Marshal Harris suggests (Bomber
Offensive, p. 214) that without heavy bombers the
Allies would have been able to capture Brest (and 57VIII Corps G–1 Per Rpt, 19 Sep; CI 16 (2d
other fortified ports) only after much more pro- Div) ; Ninth U.S. Army Opns, Brest-Crozon; 8th
longed siege warfare. Div AAR, Sep.
654 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
DRYDOCK
DESTRUCTION
AT BREST
commitment in a new zone, still under had been withdrawing from southwest
Ninth Army control.58 France since mid-August, a group, mostly
noncombatant military personnel,
In an unrelated action occurring at the under Generalmajor Botho H. Elster,
same time as the capture of Brest, the formerly commandant of Biarritz. When
83d Division, which was protecting the the Germans lost contact with a screening
Third Army south flank, had accepted force that was to have provided escort to
a mass German surrender at the Loire Dijon, they became increasingly harassed
River. Allied successes in Normandy by Allied planes and the FFI. By
and on the Mediterranean shores of 5 September, Elster’s columns stretched
France had prompted German forces in virtually unprotected more than thirty
southern France to withdraw. T h e Ger- miles along the roads generally between
man prisoners taken at the Loire were Poitiers and Châteauroux. T h e com-
from the rearmost portion of troops that mander of twenty-four men of the Intel-
ligence and Reconnaissance Platoon,
58Story of Ninth Army, pp. 53-55. Some heavy 329th Infantry, 1st Lt. Samuel W. Magill,
equipment was moved by water transport through
the English Channel. Edwards, Operation NEP-
displayed initiative and daring by taking
TUNE, p. 269. his unit south of the Loire to make con-
T H E BATTLE FOR BREST 655
tact with Elster on 8 September. Two ened and collapsing walls made passage
days later Elster surrendered to General hazardous. T h e French inhabitants who
Macon, the 83d Division commander. had been evacuated before the siege re-
Elster conducted his force—754 officers, turned to find their city virtually
18,850 men, and 10 women, plus 400 obliterated. 61
civilian automobiles, 500 trucks, and T h e vast amount of reconstruction
1,000 horse-drawn wagons—in three col- and repair necessary to rehabilitate the
umns across the Loire at Orleans, port led the Allies to confirm a decision
Beaugency, and Mer into hastily con- already made—that use of Brest was not
structed prisoner of war enclosures. 59 necessary. T h e difficult operation at
Brest had contrasted bleakly with the
T h e Best Laid Plans triumph of the pursuit, and Allied com-
manders had been as disappointed by the
T h e capture of Brest gave the Allies a siege of Brest as they had been elated by
totaIly destroyed city and a thoroughly the surge toward the Rhine. Interest in
demolished port. T h e desolation was the geographically remote ports of Brit-
appalling. T h e Germans had wrecked tany had begun to wane toward the end
everything that might be of any use to of August as unabashed Allied optimism
the Americans, Ramcke later boasting raised hopes that the Channel ports, in-
that he had done so “in good time.” 6o cluding even Rotterdam and Amsterdam,
Twisted bridge structures blocked the would soon come within reach. 62
Penfeld River channel. T h e wharves, On 3 September SHAEF planners rec-
drydocks, cranes along the waterfront, ommended the abandonment of plans to
even the breakwaters enclosing the naval use the ports of Lorient, Quiberon Bay,
basin and the commercial port, had been St. Nazaire, and Nantes, a recommenda-
ruined. Scuttled ships lay in the har- tion SHAEF accepted four days later.
bor. Had the battle of Brest not been in
T h e American operation had also con- progress, the planners might well have
tributed to the destruction. Bombs and withdrawn their approval of Brest also,
shells from air and ground, including a conclusion they finally reached on
white phosphorus and jellied gasoline, 14 September, even before capture of the
had burned and gutted practically every city. Yet only a day before, General
building in the downtown section of Eisenhower had said that since no one
Brest as well as in Recouvrance. De- could predict with certainty when the
molished houses had tumbled into the Channel ports would be taken and
streets, filling thoroughfares with rubble. opened, he still felt that he needed Brest
Even after bulldozers cut paths through to receive newly arriving troops and
the piles of brick and masonry, weak- their organizational equipment that were
scheduled to come directly from the
United States.63 Thus the continuing tion of the operation freed VIII Corps
idea of taking Brest was like insurance for action in the operations directed
that everyone hoped he would not have toward Germany. T h e charge was later
to collect. made that the employment of three divi-
Whatever the actual value of Brest sions and valuable transport and supplies
in retrospect, it appeared with certainty at Brest adversely affected pursuit opera-
at the end of August that Brest and the tions, for just at that time troops,
other ports were needed to supplement vehicles, and supplies were desperately
the far from adequate port capacity of needed on the main Allied front. Yet
Cherbourg and the minor harbors of the resources used at Brest, slender when
Normandy. Yet soon afterwards, port compared to the total effort, could hardly
plans for Lorient and St. Nazaire were have altered the pattern of a pursuit
scrapped, and the 15,000-man German that was destined to run a limited
force at Lorient and the 12,000-man course.66
force at St. Nazaire, together with a small T h e serious Allied problem of port
pocket northwest of Bordeaux, were con- capacity had prompted the Brest opera-
tained until the end of the war. 64 tion. T h e Allied commanders who had
Since the Breton ports, on which the initiated the operation had not been
Allies had counted so heavily, were not able to foretell exactly when and to what
put to use, what had been accomplished extent the Channel ports would alleviate
by the siege of Brest? T h e immediate the situation. Thus they looked upon
result was the elimination of a strong Brest as a port in reserve. T h e fact that
German garrison of aggressive, first-rate capture of neither the destroyed harbor
soldiers. Containment of the Brest gar- of Brest nor the Channel ports proved
rison, according to General Bradley, to be an immediate solution did not
would have required “more troops than vitiate their wisdom and vision. For,
we could spare on an inactive front.” as it turned out, the problem persisted.
According to Patton, he and Bradley Not until November, when Antwerp
agreed that Brest was useless, but they was opened, was the problem of port
felt that “when the American Army had capacity finally solved.
once put its hand to the plow, it should If it seemed in retrospect that the
not let go.” 6 5 In any event, comple- commanders erred in starting the siege
of Brest, they did so on the side of cau-
63Msg, Eisenhower to Bradley, FWD-14066, 7 tion, preferring to be safe rather than
Sep, SHAEF File Eisenhower’s Ltrs and Dirs; Msg, sorry. If they displayed any reckless-
Eisenhower to Bradley, FWD-14764, 13 Sep, 12th ness at all, it was in the pursuit beyond
AGp Incoming Cables; see Msg, Eisenhower to
CCS, FWD-14376, 9 Sep, SGS SHAEF File 381.
the Seine, where that kind of behavior
64Story of Ninth Army, pp. 39-49; MS # B-731 was understandable.
(Fahrmhacher).
65 Bradley,Soldier’s Story, p. 367; Patton, War 66 See Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 259-60, and
as I Knew It, p. 128. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I , 535-36.
CHAPTER XXXI
Montgomery had still not talked with Eisenhower modified his plans again.7
Eisenhower when Bradley informed “For a very considerable time,” he con-
Montgomery two days later that the fided to General Marshall, “I was of the
Supreme Commander inclined toward belief that we could carry out the opera-
the idea of splitting the Allied force, tion to the northeast simultaneously with
sending half east toward Nancy. Since a thrust east, but later have concluded
no firm decision had been reached, that due to the tremendous importance
Montgomery resolved to try to change of the objectives- in the northeast we
the Supreme Commander’s mind. Mean- must first concentrate on that move-
while, he tentatively alerted the 21 Army ment.” 8
Group for movement to the northeast, For his main effort, General Mont-
the 12th Army Group for two possible gomery requested not only reinforcement
movements: either a dual thrust north- by the airborne army but also by the
east toward Brussels and east to the First U.S. Army. Despite General Brad-
Saar or a concentrated drive to the north- ley’s feeling that a corps would be suffi-
east on the 21 Army Group right flank.5 cient and General Eisenhower’s belief
General Eisenhower, although still that Montgomery was being overly
basically reflecting the planners’ recom- cautious, the Supreme Commander ac-
mendations, made an alteration on 2 2 ceded. Instead of driving eastward to
August. As before, the 2 1 Army Group pass south of the Ardennes, General
(reinforced by the Allied airborne army Hodges was to go northeast from the
and other units) was to go northeast Seine-north of the Ardennes–in sup-
from the Seine toward the Ruhr in the port of the 2 1 Army Group. General
main effort north of the Ardennes, and Eisenhower then allocated the bulk of
the 12th Army Group was to go east- the 12th Army Group stocks of gasoline
ward in a subsidiary drive. But now, to Hodges, thereby depriving Patton of
despite a general orientation eastward adequate supplies for a long strike
south of the Ardennes, the 12th Army toward the Saar. Since the more im-
Group, he thought, might shift its direc- portant objectives lay to the northeast-
tion of advance from east to northeast the V-weapon sites, airfields, the Channel
toward the coastal region and Belgium ports, and the Ruhr—the subsidiary ef-
and the Netherlands if it became neces- fort was curtailed. Yet since Patton had
sary to bolster the main thrust.6 about a week’s supply of fuel on hand,
After General Montgomery saw the he would be able to initiate an advance
Supreme Commander on 23 August and beyond the Seine. “I cannot tell you,”
presented his concept for a concentrated Eisenhower wrote Marshall, “how anx-
thrust north of the Ardennes, General ious I am to get the forces accumulated
for starting the thrust east from Paris.
I have no slightest doubt that we can
5Ltr, Montgomery to ACIGS, 20 Aug, in Answers quickly get to the former French-Ger-
by Br Hist Sec; 21 AGp Gen Operational Situation
and Dir, M–519, 20 Aug. 7See Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic,
6Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA–90235, 22 p. 192.
Aug, SHAEF G–3 Ops A 322/011.1, Comd and 8 Msg, Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug, Pogue
Contl of U.S./Br Forces. Files.
660 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
man boundary but there is no point in Montgomery had drawn the boundary
getting there until we are in a position between the army groups along a line
to do something about it.” 9 from Mantes-Gassicourt to a point just
Thus three armies were to drive east of Antwerp.11 T h e 21 Army Group
northeast from the lower Seine-the First thus had a zone that ended at the
Canadian, the Second British, and the Schelde—the Canadian and British
First U.S.—in the Allied main effort armies at the conclusion of their advance
north of the Ardennes and directly would be facing the estuary. Looking
toward the Ruhr. T h e Third U.S. all the way to the Rhine, Bradley sug-
Army, alone, was to make the subsidiary gested that Montgomery curve the
thrust east from the upper Seine and pass boundary northeastward at Tournai to
south of the Ardennes. Although the allow the British army to wheel through
First U.S. Army was to perform a sup- Antwerp toward the Rhine and the
porting role, it had the most direct and Ruhr, and thereby cover the First Army
best route to the Ruhr—the Maubeuge- left flank. 12
Liège axis. T h e Second British Army, Though very much aware of the Ruhr
designated to make the main effort of as the goal, Montgomery had his eyes
the principal thrust, and the First Cana- fixed on the immediate objectives as-
dian Army on its left, were to move signed by Eisenhower-capture of the
through the water-crossed flatlands of Channel ports, destruction of the Fif-
Flanders, passing over the old battlefields teenth Army, and seizure of the V-weap-
of World War I. on sites. He foresaw that the Cana-
Specifically, according to Montgom- dians would have to drop elements off to
ery’s instructions, Crerar’s Canadian deal with the fortified port cities as they
Army was to clear the Channel coast, in- moved northward along the coast. He
cluding the Pas-de-Calais; Dempsey’s was also uncomfortably aware that Brit-
British army was to drive into north- ish logistical deficiencies dictated a re-
west Belgium, west of a boundary from duction in combat forces for the initial
Mantes-Gassicourt generally through drive east of the Seine. With limited
Beauvais, Amiens, Lille, and Ghent to forces, Montgomery had limited his
the southern bank of the Schelde estuary; sights. His primary concern was to de-
Hodges’ First Army was to move gen- stroy the Fifteenth Army, the last uncom-
erally northeast along the Paris-Brussels mitted German force in France and
axis to the Maastricht, Liège, Charleroi, Belgium, by pinning that army against
and Namur areas east and south of the Schelde estuary. With this force
Brussels. Simultaneously, Bradley would eliminated, the V-bomb launching sites
send Patton toward the Rhine River be- overrun, and airfields secured, the Allies,
tween Koblenz and Mannheim.10 it appeared, would face virtually no op-
position, and after taking Antwerp could
9Ibid.; Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Aug,
SGS SHAEF File 381,Post-OVERLORD Plng, I; Pogue
Supreme Command, pp. 251-52. 11Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, map, p.
1021 AGp Dir, M–520, 26 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 210.
381, Post-OVERLORDPlng, I; 12th AGp Ltr Of Instrs 12Ltr, Bradley to Montgomery, 26 Aug, 12th AGp
6, 25 Aug, and Memo, Future Opns, 25 Aug (the File 371.3, Mil Objs, I; Bradley, Soldier’s Story,
latter in ML-205). pp. 398ff.
T H E DRIVE BEYOND T H E SEINE 661
go where they pleased.13 Since chang- T h e time had come to “cripple his power
ing the boundary at Tournai would have to continue in the war.” 16
no effect on these initial goals, and since T h e German situation was every bit as
the change would facilitate an airborne bad as the Allies thought. Hitler and
operation near Tournai that was being Jodl had been concerned with rearward
planned for early September, Mont- lines of defense since the end of July,
gomery readily acquiesced in Bradley’s and at the beginning of August the
suggestion.14 military governor of France, Kitzinger,
T h e objectives disclosed no basic dif- had been charged with responsibility,
ference between the two men insofar as under OKW, for erecting field fortifica-
they judged the future course of the tions along the Somme, Marne, and
campaign. Both were optimistic, and Saône Rivers to the Jura Mountains of
they accepted the prophesies that were the Franco-Swiss border. With the
common that the end of the war was Seine River forming a potential outpost
“within sight, almost within reach.” line and the terrain around Amiens-
There was “no clue yet as to the enemy’s Compiègne–Soissons sector forming the
final intentions,” but it seemed that center of the Kitzinger line, the Germans
“events may move too fast for him.” 15 hoped to stablize a withdrawing front
T h e Germans were thought to have lost far west of Germany. 17
the equivalent of thirty divisions since Unequivocal German withdrawal in
D Day, and the Allies judged that only the west had begun on 16 August in
four or five divisions of the once-power- three separate movements. Army Group
ful Fifteenth Army still remained un- B comprised the main body, with four-
committed east of the Seine. T h e forces teen battered infantry divisions, nine
that had fought in Normandy and that fresh but incompletely trained divisions
were rapidly retreating east of the river along the Channel coast in reserve, the
seemed to comprise two weak groups remnants of fourteen divisions released
north and south of Paris. “The enemy from the Normandy front for rehabilita-
forces are very stretched and disorgan- tion, and nine mangled armored divi-
ized,” Montgomery observed; “they are sions providing a sort of cavalry screen.
in no fit condition to stand and fight us.” Army Group G was withdrawing five
divisions of the Nineteenth Army north-
ward up the Rhône River valley in a
13Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 196ff; rapid but orderly movement. Its
Ltr, Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Aug, and 21 LXIV Corps, with two divisions en-
AGp Dir, M-520, 26 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 381,
Post-OVERLORDPlng, I.
cumbered by noncombatants, was re-
14Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. 200, tiring from southwest France through a
208. hostile country infested with FFI guer-
15Montgomery statement reported in TUSA
Briefing of G–3 Liaison Sec and Liaison Officers, 22
Aug, and Second [British] Army Intel Summary 16TUSA G–2 Rpt, 26 Aug; Montgomery, Nor-
81, 2400, 24 Aug, XV Corps G–3 Jnl and File; mandy to the Baltic, p. 171; 21 AGp Operational
SHAEF Weekly Intel Summaries, 23, 24, 26 Aug, Situation and Dir, M-520, 26 Aug.
SHAEF G–2 File; Pogue, Supreme Command, pp. 17OB WEST, a Study in Command, p. 155,
244-45; Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. Bauer, R–20; OB WEST Ltr Order 1000, 4 Aug.
192; First US. Army Report of Operations, I, 31. OB WEST K T B , Anlage 1098.
662 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
rilla bands. All three groups headed Seine, was extremely short. Even
for the Kitzinger line.18 though Model assured Jodl on 28 Au-
Work on the line did not progress far. gust that he was getting nearby French
Kitzinger did not have enough engineer civilians to do nothing but dig, dig, dig,
units to supervise the preparation of he did not believe it possible to stop the
tank obstacles, mine fields, and the like. Allies short of the western approaches to
Organization Todt, which had been the Rhine River. Only on German soil
ordered to stop construction on the could the German Army count on civil-
Atlantic Wall-except at the V-weapon ians to help construct effective fortifica-
sites-in order to work for Kitzinger, was tions.20
slow in responding and short of matériel Model needed troops, and he asked for
and equipment; even under optimum fifteen additional divisions in the Troyes,
conditions it could not have furnished Dijon, and Jura Mountains area; four
enough workers to build a defensive army headquarters, twelve corps head-
position of the proper length and depth quarters, thirty or thirty-five divisions
in the time required. Impressed civil- for front-line duty, plus a panzer army,
ian labor did little good, for unlike the four panzer corps, and twelve panzer
Germans in East Prussia, who willingly divisions as a mobile hard-hitting reserve
dug trenches to try to stop the Russians, for the Kitzinger line. With these, he
the French in France were hardly en- thought he could meet with some degree
thusiastic about working at a task that of equality the fifty Allied divisions that
would only postpone their own libera- he expected to be facing on 1 Septem-
tion. 19 ber.21
Warned on 2 2 August that the Kit- Though Hitler had been making ar-
zinger line seemed hardly begun, Jodl rangements to get new units to the west,
consulted with Hitler and on the follow- he hardly could fulfill Model's request.
ing day placed Kitzinger under Army In mid-July Hitler had ordered approxi-
Group B control. Putting Model in mately one hundred fortress battalions,
charge of the construction had little then being used in rear areas, to be
effect-it was already too late. T h e transformed into replacement battalions
Seine River line had already been for the front, and of these approximately
breached at Mantes-Gassicourt, and eighty would eventually reach the west.
heavy American pressure on the ap- In mid-August he had ordered twenty-
proaches to several crossing sites along five Volks Grenadier divisions organized
the Seine indicated that the Seine River in Germany as a general reserve, and
position concept might soon, perhaps in four became available for the west almost
a matter of hours, be hopelessly com- immediately. T h e 3d and 15th Panzer
promised. This meant that time for Grenadier Divisions, experienced troops,
building up the Somme—Marnedefense
line, roughly seventy miles from the 20Telecons, Blumentritt and Jodl, 2300, 22 Aug,
Model and Jodl, 1920, 28 Aug, and Telecon, 1515,
18OKW/WFSt Daily Operationskarten, 10-31 23 Aug, transmitting Friedel Telecon to OB
Aug. WEST, AGp B KTB; OB WEST KTB, 24 Aug.
19Telecon, Model and Speidel. 1250, 28 Aug, 21Msg, Model to Jodl, 2300, 24 Aug, AGp B
AGp B KTB. Wochenmeldungen und Lagebeurteilnngen.
T H E DRIVE BEYOND T H E SEINE 663
were traveling from Italy for commit- appeared fortunate. With the Kitzinger
ment in France. Two “shadow divi- line practically invalidated by the speed
sions’’ (filler troops trained to restore of the Allied advance and by its incom-
veteran units reduced to cadre strength) plete state of construction, the Germans
and two panzer brigades (tank-infantry looked toward the next natural rearward
task forces designed to defend critical obstacle that might halt the Allied drive
positions) were also slated for OB WEST. toward Germany. T h e Schelde estuary,
These forces would not become available the Albert Canal, and the Meuse River
until the end of August or early Septem- formed a continuous water line. Perhaps
ber, nor would they give Model his the armies could make a successful stand
desired strength. Meanwhile, the front there.24
was disintegrating.22 Since 2 1 August L V I I I Panzer Corps
Logistical matters seemed somewhat had supervised the rehabilitation of the
less discouraging. T h e difficulties of Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies’ frag-
transporting supplies to the front in mentary panzer divisions in “refreshing
July and early August had diminished areas” immediately east of the Seine, but
as distances shrank—the reverse of the Model soon realized that “a smooth and
Allied situation. Summertime had efficient refreshing of the divisions was
provided the Germans with insufficient out of the question.” He ordered the
hours of darkness for supply movements panzer divisions to move behind the
to the Normandy coast, and their rail- Somme and the Marne. With the Seine
road trains and motor convoys, forced to River crossings intolerably congested by
travel in daylight, had attracted Allied 25 August, he instructed the Seventh
fighter-bombers. Wrecked and plun- Army—commanded by Eberbach after
dered trucks, wagons, and freight cars Hausser was wounded in the Argentan-
littering the countryside attested to the Falaise pocket—to reconstitute its divi-
extent of losses. T h e Germans had sions behind the Somme also, while the
attempted to ameliorate the situation by Fifth Panzer Army, commanded by Diet-
assigning mobile Flak units to guard rail- rich, was to cover the withdrawal.
roads and highways. Barges on the Whether the troops could get back to the
Seine had supplemented overland traffic. Somme before the Allies arrived was
As the front withdrew eastward, though a matter of grave conjecture. T h e First
the problems were by no means solved, Army forces along the upper Seine were
the combat troops came closer to three so few that whether or not they reached
supply complexes that had been estab- the Marne was really of little impor-
lished on 25 July just east of the Meuse tance. By 29 August Model frankly
River—one in Luxembourg near Arlon, admitted that the Allies had “attained
another in the Nancy and Toul area, and absolute tactical superiority” in both
the third around Belfort.23 mobility and weapons, and he judged
T h e location of the supply bases them capable of sweeping through the
still uncompleted Kitzinger line and
22 OB WEST K T B , 21-28 Aug; Pogue, Supreme
Command, p. 303; Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 50.
23OQu West K T B , Anlage 101; Hodgson, R-58,
pp. 162ff. 24OB WEST, a Study in Command, p. 166.
664 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
DEMOLISHED
BRIDGEAT CHÂLONS-SUR-MARNE
Marne from Melun via Château-Thierry Army south of Paris and the status of
to Châlons and, with organic remnants supply might not be equal to the task.
fleshed out by stragglers, had established T h e Third Army south of Paris con-
a thin but coherent line from Soissons sisted of two corps, the XII and the XX,
through Epernay to Châlons. Security standing abreast, each with one armored
troops, provisional units, and stationary and one infantry division—contrary to
antiaircraft detachments supplemented general belief, far from “top heavy” in
the combat forces in the First Army armor. T o flesh out the corps, Patton
sector.29 added one infantry division to each, the
Although it was true that the German 90th going from Argentan to XX Corps,
opposition posed no great problem, the the 80th from Orléans to XII. T h e
distance from the upper Seine to the VIII Corps was not available for the east-
Rhine, the frontage to be covered, and ward drive since it was engaged in Brit-
the wide-open right flank were serious tany, but the XV Corps, which was hold-
matters. T h e strength of the Third ing the Mantes-Gassicourt bridgehead
in the First U.S. Army zone, was soon
to revert to Patton’s command. Patton
29MS # B–222 (Knobelsdorff); MS # B–728
(Emmerich); MS # B–732 (Hold); MS # B–003
hoped to match the XV, the XX, and
(Hoehne). the XII Corps with his three immediate
666 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
objectives, Reims, Châlons, and Vitry- between 200,000 and 300,000 gallons of
le-François, but the XV Corps did not gasoline to move fifty miles, found only
become available as soon as expected, 3 1,000 gallons on hand on 24 August and
and since only two corps were south of 75,000 gallons on the following day.
Paris, objectives had to be juggled.30 As Only the capture of thirty-seven carloads
it turned out, the XII and XX Corps of German gasoline and oil at Sens
were adequate. restored stocks somewhat and made pos-
T h e problem of supplies was more sible at least the commencement of
serious. No appreciable ration reserves operations east of the Seine bridge-
had been accumulated, clothing and in- heads. 31
dividual equipment needed replacement, Before moving his forces beyond the
shortages of medical and signal supplies Seine, Patton relinquished to the First
were becoming critical, and gasoline U.S. Army the Melun bridgehead, which
stocks were dangerously low. With the had been secured by the XX Corps. He
exception of clothing and individual also relieved XII Corps of the duty of
equipment—which had top priority for guarding the Loire River west of
the rest of the month—stocks were re- Orléans by extending VIII Corps respon-
plenished by emergency measures and by sibility.32 With these details attended
good fortune. On 25 August two to, he ordered XX Corps to advance
hundred and seven air transports landed from Fontainbleau and Montereau to
at Orléans with 507 tons of supplies, Nogent-sur-Seine, then to Reims; he
mostly rations, and on the following day instructed XII Corps to drive from
80 tons of medical supplies were airlifted Troyes to Chilons-sur-Marne. ( M a p
in. Ten tons of medical equipment XV)
were captured at Orléans, fifteen tons at In the XII Corps zone, CCA of the
Dreux, and twenty at Fontainebleau. 4th Armored Division was capturing
Three hundred miles of German tele- Troyes on 2 5 August. T h e German gar-
phone wire found in a cave near Char- rison of security troops and miscel-
tres replaced to a certain extent the in- laneous remnants resisted surprisingly
numerable reels of wire unraveled across well. Not until noon of the following
the countryside. Other signal supplies day did the battle come to an end, with
arrived from England with a shipment of the Americans in possession not only of
four truck companies to the Third the town but of 500 prisoners and with
Army. When Third Army gasoline Allied fighter-bombers harassing a small
receipts on 23 August fell short of daily group of fleeing Germans.
expenditures, the Communications Zone While CCB swept the corps zone with-
established a special trucking service out encountering any resistance to speak
from the beaches. This, however, could of, and while the 35th Division protected
not remedy the situation at once, for the the right flank from Orléans to Troyes,
XII Corps, which estimated that it used CCA on 28 August sped fifty miles from
3012th AGp Ltr of Instrs 6, 25 Aug, and corrected 31TUSA AAR, Aug.
copy, 29 Aug; TUSA Plans for Opns, 23 Aug, 32TUSA Memo to VIII Corps and Operational
Operational Dir, 25 Aug, and Msgs, 26 Aug. Dir, 25 Aug.
T H E DRIVE BEYOND T H E SEINE 667
Troyes to Vitry-le-Franqois without diffi- Much the same thing was happening
culty and crossed the Marne. As the in the XX Corps sector. T h e corps
80th Division attacked from Troyes to- lacked positive knowledge of the forces
ward Châlons on the west bank of the in opposition, but it was not long before
Marne, CCA moved down the east bank. the 7th Armored Division, attacking east
By noon of 29 August the squeeze play from Melun on 25 August, encountered
had netted Châlons. troops of the 48th and 338th Division,
By then XII Corps was virtually out of horse-drawn artillery of the 708th Divi-
gasoline. Fortunately, more than 100,- sion, and tank elements of the 17th SS
000 gallons of German fuel were cap- Panzer Grenadier. T h e 5th Division
tured, mostly at Châlons. By careful attacked east from Montereau on 26
restrictions of vehicular movement, the August and met somewhat less opposi-
corps could continue toward Commercy tion as it seized Nogent-sur-Seine and
and the Meuse River.33 Romilly .
CCA of the 4th Armored turned T o free the 7th Armored Division for
southeast from Châlons and entered St. a quick thrust northeast to Reims, Wal-
Dizier, which had earlier been captured ker instructed the 5th Division to clear
by the 2d Cavalry Group, and on the Provins. Then, as the 5th Division
morning of 31 August, in a heavy rain, followed on the right and the 90th fol-
the combat command drove toward the lowed on the left, the 7th Armored
Meuse. A light company in advance of spearheaded the attack toward Reims on
the main body surprised enemy outposts 28 August with two combat commands
at Commercy, neutralized artillery em- abreast—a total of six columns driving
placements by shooting the gun crews ahead to fulfill General Silvester’s hope
before they could so much as remove that one or two at least would capture
their breechblock covers, seized the bridges over the Marne intact. Advanc-
bridge across the Meuse intact, and took ing against small pockets of resistance,
possession of high ground immediately in actuality the disintegrating panzer
to the east. grenadiers, the armored division reached
On the same day, while the 35th Divi- Epernay and came into contact with the
sion guarded the corps right flank, CCB LXXX Corps’ Marne River defenders.
advanced across the Marne near Join- Two platoons of American armored in-
ville. A day later, on 1 September, CCB fantry got across a still-intact bridge near
took Vaucouleurs and seized high Dormans before the Germans demolished
ground east of the Meuse. T h e 80th it. Though most of the bridges were
Division moved through Bar-le-Duc, already destroyed, engineers quickly
took over the bridgehead at Commercy, threw treadways across the river during
and established another Meuse bridge- the night. From Epernay, CCB drove
head at St. Mihiel.34 north toward the Aisne, bypassing Reims
on the east. Meanwhile, CCA and CCR
33TUSA AAR, Aug, and Operational Dir, 30 on the left jumped ahead to Château-
Aug (confirming orders, 29 Aug) ; XII Corps AAR, Thierry, overran roadblocks on the out-
Aug; Eddy Diary, entry 29 Aug.
34XII Corps, 4th Armd, 8oth, and 35th Div Armored Division, pp. 29-34: Cole, Lorraine Cam-
AAR’s, Aug; CI 384 (XII Corps); Koyen, Fourth paign, p. 57.
668 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
skirts of the city, and seized several ward distant objectives and maintaining
Marne River bridges. Continuing an incredibly rapid movement to deny
through Fismes to the Aisne on 29 Au- the enemy the ability to organize and
gust, CCA and CCR wheeled eastward defend natural terrain obstacles. It was
and cut the roads north of Reims. T h e an immense clearing operation that
5th Division then liberated Reims on liberated thousands of square miles.
30 August without difficulty. Pursuit warfare meant capture of ex-
That afternoon XX Corps drove east- citing booty such as the thirty-four car-
ward in a column of divisions toward loads of German freight that contained
Verdun, seventy miles away. Difficult parachutes (the silk was excellent for
terrain such as the Argonne Forest, in- scarves and as gifts), tinned food, mar-
creasing but still scattered resistance, garine (rumored from Indianapolis),
and the necessity of conserving gasoline powdered milk, sardines (supposedly
slowed the advance. T h e Germans had from California), liver paste (allegedly
installed mines to destroy the Meuse from New York), and plenty of wine
River bridge at Verdun, but the FFI and cognac (indubitably French). It
prevented demolition. By noon on 31 was also a time of hysterical happiness
August, 7th Armored Division tanks for liberated Frenchmen.
were in town and across the river, and on It was a period of confusion, when a
the first day of September, despite Ger- jeepload of soldiers who had missed a
man air attacks that vainly tried to turn in the road might capture a village,
destroy the bridge, XX Corps was across when an antiaircraft battery or a few
the Meuse in strength.35 Quartermaster truck drivers might in-
T h e Third Army’s eastward advance advertently take a hundred Germans
during the last week in August had been prisoner, when a single officer might go
a spectacularly fast movement against way ahead of his unit only to find that
disorganized opposition-pursuit warfare another outfit had already seized his
at its best, a headlong, pell-mell rush that assigned objective.
swept Allied troops irresistibly toward It was also a time of anxiety for com-
the German border. By its nature manders, of worry that gasoline supplies
opportunistic and relatively uncon- might be inadequate to allow continua-
trolled, it was also exciting. Units sought tion of a virtually unimpeded advance,
the enemy for battles of maneuver and of reflection that the tyranny of logistics
surprise, and reconnaissance detach- might be more baleful than the opposi-
ments and advance points had occasional tion of the enemy. It was not clear then
nasty engagements. It was a motorized whether the reason was a shortage of
advance, everybody riding on tanks, gasoline on the Continent or an inability
trucks, trailers, and jeeps. It was a frantic to get it forward from the beaches. T h e
search for bridges or fords. T h e Amer- ever present possibility of a lack of fuel
icans had the exhilaration of striking to- supplies hung like Damocles’ sword,
threatening to cut the triumphant Third
Army movement toward the Rhine. Yet
35XX Corps, 5th and 90th Divs, AAR’s, Aug; CI
285 (7th Armd Div); Irwin Diary; XX Corps, pp.
Patton remained cheerful, the most
94-104. optimistic man in the world, unwilling
T H E DRIVE BEYOND T H E SEINE 669
29 August the large gap on the First mud, would ground Allied airplanes and
Army left, which left open the road to immobilize Allied tanks.42
the Saar by way of Vitry-le-Franqois, If Patton’s troops had not met
Verdun, and Metz, caused OKW to stiffened resistance at the Moselle, they
assign to the First Army, in addition to would have encountered it at the Rhine.
the two panzer grenadier divisions com- In either case, the rugged warfare that
ing from Italy, four Volks Grenadier awaited the Third Army was to bring
divisions, two panzer brigades, and disturbing memories of the hedgerows.
eventually several divisions that had T h e Lorraine campaign was to prove
fought in Normandy. With these forces, that the August pursuit was a finite ex-
the First Army received the mission of perience. Adequate gasoline at the end
defending the exposed German border of the month would probably not have
between Luxembourg and Nancy and of sustained the dream of an unlimited pur-
preventing the potential encirclement of suit terminating in quick victory.43
Army Group B by fighting at Moselle
River.41 The Main Effort
T h e Germans had shown no evidence
of rout or mass collapse. On the con- T h e Allied pursuit launched across
trary, German military government the lower Seine and from the Melun
officers and OKH inspectors had mani- bridgehead exhibited the same character-
fested considerable individual initiative istics displayed by the pursuit beyond
in scraping together provisional units the upper Seine. “The enemy has not
and trying to slow the Americans by the troops to hold any strong position,”
forcing spearheads to deploy off the roads General Montgomery had advised.
or by destroying an occasional bridge,
and by fighting wherever possible. De- The proper tactics now are for strong
spite serious losses, the Germans had ex- armored and mobile columns to bypass
enemy centers of resistance and push boldly
tricated fighting men of good quality. ahead, creating alarm and despondency in
It was the security troops, the antiair- enemy rear areas. Enemy bypassed will be
craft personnel, and the supply forces dealt with by infantry columns coming on
who filled the American prisoner of war later. I rely on commanders of every rank
cages, not the combat soldiers, and and grade to “drive” ahead with the utmost
energy; any tendency to be “sticky” or
American intelligence officers recognized cautious must be stamped on ruthlessly.44
that the enemy was preparing a defensive
line “known only to himself.” Although More German forces than had op-
posed the Third Army were in the Allied
the Germans were wholly on the defen-
path of advance nearer the coast, but
sive, they were trading earth for time in
the hope that worsening weather con-
ditions, bringing poor visibility and 42TUSA G–2 Est 9, 28 Aug; XX Corps G–2 Per
Rpt 19, 0700, 29 Aug; XX Corps Annex 1 to FO 9,
30 Aug: TUSA Per Assessments of German Capa-
bilities, 26 Aug–2 Sep.
41OB WEST KTB, 29 and 31 Aug, Anlagen 1800 43 See Cole, Lorraine Campaign.
and 1829; MS # B-034 (Schramm); MS # B-214 4421 AGp Gen Operational Situation and Dir,
(Mantey) ; OB WEST, a Study in Command, p. M–520, 26 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORD
199: Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 50. Plng.
T H E DRIVE BEYOND T H E SEINE 671
they were in bad straits. Road conges- panzer remnants; with the 348th Divi-
tion added to the problems of German sion, which was arriving in a dilatory
commanders who sought with little suc- fashion from northern France too late to
cess to preserve a semblance of order in strengthen the Paris defenses as in-
the flight to the Somme River. With tended; and with fragments of the 18th
artillery and antitank guns lost, staffs and Luftwaffe Field Division and the 6th
technical services dispersed, command Parachute Division. When news came
and communication virtually non- that the First Army was falling back
existent, and rumors spreading among from the upper Seine toward Reims,
the troops that everyone was heading Army Group B assigned the LVIII Pan-
back to Germany, the Fifth Panzer and zer Corps to the Fifth Panzer Army.
Seventh Armies found it impossible to Lacking communications with army,
conduct controlled operations. There without even knowledge of where the
had been no over-all planning early army command post was located, the
enough to make the withdrawal beyond corps decided to withdraw toward
the Seine an orderly procedure, and after Compiègne.46
a brief attempt by some units to make a The LXXXI Corps, directed to hold
stand, all fell back to the Somme. the area around Vernon, tried to cling to
T h e L X V I I Corps, under the control wooded terrain near Mantes with several
of the Fifteenth Army and responsible straggler battalions and panzer troops
for the coastal area between the Seine formerly belonging to the II SS Panzer
and the Somme, had received no orders Corps. Allied attacks as well as the
to direct the river crossings of the troops general climate of retreat soon dissipated
streaming eastward, but did so anyway. combat strength, and, without units
Co-ordinating with the Fifth Panzer capable of battle and without supplies,
Army traffic control staff, the LXVII the L X X X I Corps withdrew toward the
Corps tried to collect troops, allocate Somme.47
them to assembly areas, and secure sup- As the German forces rushed rear-
plies for them—a hopeless task that came ward, a vast undefended gap opened
to an end on 27 or 28 August when the between the weak forces of the First
Fifteenth Army ordered the corps to Army and the conglomerate masses of
withdraw behind the Somme.45 the Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies
T h e L V I I I Panzer Corps had ap- seeking refuge in the Pas-de-Calais area,
pointed about one hundred officers to which was defended by the Fifteenth
block the roads and stop the beginnings Army. Into the gap came the First U.S.
of a panic-stricken retreat toward Reims Army.
and points east. Under the control of the General Hodges was to support the
First Army, the corps tried to form a British by advancing in a northeasterly
defensive line between the Oise and the direction from the Mantes-Gassicourt-
Seine, positions generally northeast of Melun line to Péronne–Laon, more than
Paris, from Beaumont to Meaux—with
46MS # B-157 (Dingler); MS # B-728 (Emme-
rich).
45 MS # B-596 (Gerber) ; MS # B-236 (Spon- 47MS # B-807 (Kuntzen) ; MS # B-728 (Emme-
heimer) . rich) .
672 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
eighty-five miles away. Then, after driv- right, Hodges would launch a twin pur-
ing about fifty miles to Mons–Sedan, the suit to encircle Paris and drive to
army was to turn gradually to the east Péronne and Laon. Heavy artillery was
and advance a hundred and twenty-five to remain west of the Seinefor the time
miles through Liège–Arlon, the duchy being. Supplies for the pursuing troops
of Luxembourg, and across the Rhine seemed adequate.49
River between Cologne and Koblenz to Collins’ VII Corps attacked to the
the southern fringe of the Ruhr.48 northeast from Melun on 26 August and
T h e terrain, the best invasion route to quickly unhinged the LVIII Panzer
Germany, posed no special problems. Corps line near Meaux. Dispersing the
T h e army would generally follow the defenders and passing within a mile of
Oise River valley to Landrecies, the the First Army command post near Fon-
Sambre River valley from Maubeuge to tenay-Trésigny, American tankers sped
Namur, the Meuse River valley to Liege. through Château-Thierry and Soissons
Only in the right side of the zone were on 28 August, reaching Laon two days
there several obstacles—the Marne, the later. On the last day of the month
Aisne, and the Meuse Rivers crossed the armored troops were at Rethel and Mont-
routes of advance in succession, and cornet, a hundred miles beyond the
later the Ardennes interposed its rugged Seine. General Rose, who had developed
terrain. But if the army could move the 3d Armored Division “into a mar-
quickly, and there seemed no reason velous thing, . . . built up morale, taught
why it should not, it would forestall the division how to . . . fight,” led the
effective opposition on these terrain advance, with the 9th Division (com-
features. In the left part of the army manded now by Maj. Gen. Louis A.
zone, where General Hodges was to Craig) and Huebner’s 1st Division clear-
make his main effort to support the ing the corps zone behind the armor.50
British, no major waterways or terrain Until the XIX Corps headquarters
obstacles intervened. Enemy resistance took over the Mantes-Gassicourt bridge-
was expected to be ineffective along the head, XV Corps continued in command.
whole army front. Hobbs’ 30th Division reinforced Wyche’s
Hodges had four corps, only two of 79th (which had held the bridgehead
which were immediately available. for a week with the help of extensive
Gerow’s V Corps in the center was artillery support and a “big program of
liberating Paris. Haislip’s XV Corps harassing and interdicting fires”) on 2 7
headquarters, commanding the forces in August, and Brooks’ 2d Armored Divi-
the Mantes-Gassicourt bridgehead, was
to rejoin the Third Army after being re- 49FUSA Ltr, FA and TD’s, 27 Aug, FUSA G–2
placed by Corlett’s XIX Corps head- Jnl and File, L–379 (56).
quarters. Collins’ VII Corps was to 50
Collins’ Talk, 19 Jan 48; VI Corps AAR, Aug,
FO 9, 26 Aug, and Opns Memo 76, 26 Aug; 9th and
take over the Melun bridgehead. With 1st Div AAR’s, Aug; MS # B-728 (Emmerich). S.
Corlett on the left and Collins on the Sgt. Lafayette G. Pool of the 32d Armored Regi-
ment, who commanded the lead. tank of an armored
column for three days and alone accounted for four
4812th AGp Ltr of Instrs 6, 25 Aug, and Memo, German tanks, three antitank guns, and approxi-
Future Opns, 25 Aug, ML–205. mately fifty vehicles, was awarded the DSC.
T H E DRIVE BEYOND T H E SEINE 673
sion crossed the Seine on 28 August to the armor dashed to the Forêt de Com-
protect the left flank of the bridgehead. piègne, hampered only occasionally by
T h e 79th and 30th began to expand hastily erected roadblocks. There, the
their hold on the east bank by seizing troops met units under control of the
and securing badly broken and heavily LVIII Panzer Corps. Bogged down in
wooded ground. Thirty-five artillery poor terrain, hindered by some confu-
battalions fired “a generous amount of sion of communications, the tankers let
ammunition” in support.51 4th Division infantry pass through to
At noon, 29 August, as Haislip’s XV clear the forest and take the city of Com-
Corps headquarters started to move to piègne, forty-five miles northeast of
an assembly area southeast of Paris and Paris. In the early morning hours of 1
eventual Third Army assignment, Cor- September, contingents of the corps got
lett’s XIX Corps took command of the across the Aisne River between Com-
three divisions east of the Seine. Since piègne and Soissons.53
the troops were emerging on terrain For the soldiers, the countryside had
favorable for rapid advance and since become a monotonous blur of changing
the organized resistance of the LXXXI scenery. Their eyes bloodshot and tear-
Corps had disintegrated, Corlett moved filled from sun, wind, dust, and wea-
the 2d Armored Division into the lead, riness, they followed a blinding road all
and the corps drove forward against day long and at night strained to keep
virtually no opposition. Two days later the cat eyes of the vehicle ahead in
the corps was fifty miles to the east, on a sight.54 Little seemed spectacular ex-
line between Beauvais and Compiègne.52 cept the lack of opposition and the
Gerow’s V Corps joined the pursuit growing feeling that they would soon
on 29 August in the army center when reach Germany. “Unfortunately,” it
Cota’s 28th Division, after parading in often seemed, “the Germans pulled out
Paris, joined Barton’s 4th. Two days of the town before we arrived.” 55 Those
later Oliver’s 5th Armored Division infantrymen who clung to the tanks of
passed through both infantry divisions the advance units were grateful that the
to move into the lead. In five columns, “tank-riding detail” got them “first into
with three combat commands abreast, the towns, with first shot at the cheers,
the cognac, and the kisses.” 56
51Notes of Msgs, 0900, 23, 26, 27, and 28 Aug. There were exhilarating moments
Notes of Hodges-Haislip Conf, 1130, 1330, 26 Aug. such as the one in the little village of
XV Corps CofS Memo, 2015, 27 Aug, Opns Instrs 8, Braine (on the Vesle River ten miles
2100, 27 Aug, XV Corps CofS Jnl and File; [Fer-
riss], Notes; XV Corps and 79th Div AAR’s, Aug. east of Soissons). When the French sta-
1st Lt. Alfred P. McPeters of the 315th Infantry tionmaster informed American tankers
was posthumously awarded the DSC for heroic
action that day. 53V Corps History of Operations in the ETO, pp
52TUSA Operational Dir to XV Corps, 26 Aug; 213ff; 5th Armd, 4th, and 28th Div AAR’s, Aug and
XV Corps CofS Memos, 27 and 28 Aug; Hodges to Sep; CI 32 (4th Div).
Menoher, 28 Aug; First U.S. Army, Report of 543d Armored Division, Spearhead in the West
Operations, I, 30. 1st Lt. James L. Mosby of the (with G–3 Supplement) (n.p., n.d.), p. 81.
120th Infantry, who singlehandedly destroyed an 55 1st Lt. C. A. Wollmer, Hosp Intervs, IV, GL-93
antitank position on 29 August. was awarded the 1316).
DSC. 56314th Infantry, Through Combat, p. 32
674 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
passing through that a German train Channel ports, faced a more difficult
coming from Paris was due in fifteen problem in getting across the Seine.
minutes, no one was interested, no one Not only was the river wider between
except Sgt. Hollis Butler, who com- Rouen and the sea, German troops had
manded a gun section of the 468th Anti- been deflected downstream by the Ameri-
aircraft Artillery Automatic Weap- can drive down the west bank and were
ons Battalion (self-propelled). German fighting with desperation to maintain
planes had been virtually nonexistent escape routes across the river. Canadian
east of the Seine, and his men had not forces neverthless secured five bridge-
fired for several days. Although a train heads-two in the Elbeuf–Rouen area,
was bound to be less exciting than a three between Rouen and the coast—and
plane, Sergeant Butler pulled his car- on 30 August, against slight opposition,
riage mounting a 37-mm. gun and dual entered and liberated Rouen, the capital
.5o-caliber machine guns out the column of Normandy and the second largest port
and covered the railroad so that his men in France.
could shoot a few rounds. When the T h e Second British Army, beset by
train appeared, the crew quickly dis- logistical difficulties, retained one corps
abled the locomotive and raked the cars west of the Seine and used its transpor-
with machine gun fire. Turning them- tation facilities to support the two corps
selves for the moment into infantrymen, making assault crossings near Vernon
the artillerymen advanced in squad for- and Louviers. Armored forces departed
mation with marching fire, captured the Vernon bridgehead on 29 August,
thirty-six cars (among them machine but weather, scattered mine fields, and
shops for tank repair) and seventy pris- small German pockets of resistance kept
oners. Local FFI members were on the advance to a mere twenty miles. On
hand to take the prisoners, and the the afternoon of the following day, as
Americans got into their vehicles and re- the weather improved and resistance di-
joined the column. Because the train minished, British tankers drove forward
blocked the tracks, it was easy for men with increasing speed. After continuing
of the 54th Armored Field Artillery Bat- to advance through the night, they
talion to capture a second train thirty reached Amiens early on 31 August and,
minutes later.57 with FFI assistance, secured the city and
While the First Army was having took several bridges over the Somme in-
such easy success, the 21 Army Group tact. Eberbach, the Seventh Army com-
was also getting across the Seine and to- mander who had just signed an order
ward the Somme, some seventy miles dis- for the defense of the Somme River line,
tant. T h e First Canadian Army, in- was captured.58
structed to drive up the Channel coast With the capture of Amiens, the last
with the main weight on the right for sector of the German Somme–Marne de-
pursuit purposes and at the same time fense line fell into Allied hands, a line
to develop right hooks to secure the earlier penetrated by the Third Army
capture of Châlons and the First Army defended, virtually no obstacles seemed
advance northeast of Paris. With the to lie between the armies making the
exception of the Albert Canal and Meuse main Allied effort and the western ap-
River water line, which appeared un- proaches to the Rhine.
CHAPTER XXXII
On the basis of this estimate, the feated Fifth Panzer Army, and the
overriding Allied goal became the desire shrunken Fifteenth Army, all located in
to reach the Rhine before the Germans the northwest portion of France, in
could organize an effective defense at the Belgium, and in the Netherlands, could
West Wall. T h e West Wall was no re-establish a stable front short of the
longer the impressive shield it had once German border. Only the overstrained
been. T h e Germans had neglected and Allied supply lines might stop a rapid
partially dismantled it after their vic- Allied advance. In the face of the glow-
tories in 1940. They had stripped most ing opportunity for continued pursuit of
of its armament for use at the Atlantic disorganized forces, the Allies decided to
Wall. Its works had fallen into disre- keep moving as long as possible. T h e
pair, and no appreciable number of armies were to “go as far as practicable,”
troops manned the line in the summer General Bradley announced, “and then
of 1944. Yet the West Wall remained wait until the supply system in rear will
an important psychological barrier for permit further advance.” 7 T h e hope
both the Germans and the Allies. 5 If was to get at least through the West Wall
the Allies could reach it before the Ger- to the Rhine.
mans couId man it (either with troops If the German high command had
retreating from Normandy or with anything to be thankful for, as O B
others already in Germany), the Allies WEST staff members later recalled, it
would probably be able to get through was that the Allies failed to conduct an
to the Rhine with little difficulty. T h e immediate and ruthless exploitation of
pursuit east of the Seine was thus to dis- the Seine River crossing at Mantes-Gassi-
play some of the aspects of a race.6 court by an enveloping movement along
Though the Albert Canal and Meuse the east bank of the Seine to Le Havre.
River formed a natural obstacle favor- That kind of maneuver, the Germans
able for defense far in front of the West thought, would have led to the complete
Wall, it hardly seemed possible that the destruction of the Fifth Panzer and
remnants of the Seventh Army, the de- Seventh Armies and would have created
an irreparable gap between the Fifteenth
fensive position established in 1916 behind the and First Armies. T h e path to the
central portion of the Western Front. Extending northeast—to Germany—would have
from St. Laurent, just east of Arras, through St.
Quentin to Missy-sur-Aisne, four miles east of been undefended, and further resistance
Soissons, the line played an important role as the in France would have been futile. Since
battle front fluctuated during the last two years the Allies had not elected this course,
of the war. The Germans fell back on it in the
early spring of 1917, and from there launched their the Germans continued to fall back to-
last great offensive in France in March 1918. They ward the Schelde estuary, the Albert
withdrew to the same position in September and Canal, and the Meuse River, trying to
were finally dislodged from it by the Allied counter-
offensive in October.
maintain a fairly orderly withdrawal in
CI 361-A (XIX Corps) ; Charles B. MacDonald, the hope that a continuous front might
The Siegfried Line Campaign, UNITED STATES be re-established there. T h e ports of
A R M Y IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1961);
Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 194. 7 12th AGp Admin Instrs 13, 27 Aug; The Sieg-
6 See Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, pp. fried Line, TSFET Hist Sec MS, 1946, OCMH Files,
198-99. Ch. 4. p. 1.
678 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Calais, Boulogne, and Dunkerque, about orders that were out of date before the
to be isolated, were to be held in com- disorganized units received them. T h e
pliance with Hitler's fortress policy di- Fifteenth Army, in precarious command
rected against Allied logistics. o f the Channel ports, was in danger of
If the Germans could maintain a de- being cut off and isolated. T h e Fifth
fensive line at the Schelde, Albert, and Panzer Army, which had moved inland
Meuse, they would retain the Nether- to take command of the bulk of the re-
lands and its naval bases, air warning maining armor, was unable to hold
service, and food and war production; around Soissons. T h e Seventh Army
they would deny the Allies the port of had scarcely begun to resurrect its ghost
Antwerp, preserve the territorial integ- divisions at the Somme when it lost its
rity of Germany, and protect the Saar commander, Eberbach, who was taken
and the Ruhr. Most important, they prisoner on 31 August. Unable to form
would gain time to repair and rearm the a cohesive battle line, Model by 3 Sep-
West Wall. 8 tember saw no course open except with-
T h e troops extricated from Normandy drawal to the West Wall. T h e Ger-
west of the Seine and those in the Pas-de- mans had been routed and whatever re-
Calais tried to maintain a cohesive front sistance occurred was to a large extent
close to the northern coast of France. the product of individual initiative on
Screening their landward flank with mo- the lower echelons. 10
bile units, they hoped by delaying action Whether the Germans in northwest
to blunt Allied spearheads thrusting into France could withdraw more quickly
that flank and thereby to gain time to than the Allies could advance was the
reach the Schelde–Albert–Meuse line. important question. T o the Allies, the
German commanders insisted that the answer seemed negative on the basis of
Allied pursuit was hesitant and that or- comparative motorization alone. More
derly resistance could be successful de- precise indications were also available.
spite inferiority in strength and re- T h e XIX Corps on the First Army left
sources. Yet congested roads, traffic seemed to have outraced enemy forces
bottlenecks, an insufficient number of that were apparently moving eastward
bridges and ferries, the fatigue of con- in an attempt to block the Allied pur-
tinuous movement, Allied strafing from suit.11 Various Resistance groups in
the air, and the lack of information on northern France were of the opinion that
the general situation created a depressing the Germans did not have enough men,
feeling of defeat.9 matériel, and mobility to establish and
Model was no longer master of the hold a strong defensive line anywhere
Army Group B situation. With hope of short of the West Wall.12 Despite
holding at the Somme–Marne River line
shattered, he found himself issuing futile 10See Hitler Msg, 0530, 3 Sep, AGp Fuehrerbe-
fehle; AGp B Tagesmeldungen, 1 Sep: First U.S.
Army, Report of Operations, I, 31-32.
8 OBWEST, a Study in Command, pp. 160–61, 1130th Div G–2 Per Rpt 72, 30 Aug; 28th Div
175. G–2 Rpt, 1 Sep; VII Corps G–2 Memo for VII
9Among the many personal documents see, for Corps CofS, 31 Aug, VII Corps G–2 Jnl and File.
example, MS # B-236 (Sponheimer) and MS # 12XIX Corps Mil Intel Team Rpt 101, 30 Aug,
B–596 (Gerber) FUSA G–2 (Comd Echelon) Jnl and File.
TOWARD T H E HEART OF GERMANY 679
weather conditions that prevented ex- the earlier boundary line that had been
tensive air reconnaissance during the last drawn by Montgomery and then
days of August, Allied pilots noted large changed at Bradley’s request. At the
German groups in various stages of dis- conclusion of its northward drive, the
organization drifting east and northeast First U.S. Army would have compressed
across the First U.S. Army front-more the British and Canadians into a narrow
than a hundred enemy armored vehicles zone ending at the Schelde estuary.
near St. Quentin, more than three hun- T h e British and Canadians would then
dred miscellaneous vehicles clogging the be facing out toward the sea. Appar-
road net northeast of Amiens. By 1 ently without consulting higher head-
September only a few German tanks re- quarters, General Bradley ordered Gen-
mained on the Second British Army eral Hodges to execute the maneuver.
front .13 T h e most important objective of the
Recognizing that the Germans could shift in direction was the city of Tour-
hope to organize resistance only at the nai, Belgium, and during the afternoon
Albert-Meuse line, General Bradley tem- of 31 August the First Army G–3, Brig.
porarily shifted his sights from the Rhine Gen. Truman C. Thorson, arrived at
River in favor of a maneuver to block Corlett’s XIX Corps headquarters to out-
the German retreat and eliminate the line the new plan. Instead of driving
major part of the German forces in through Montdidier and Péronne and
France. T o accomplish this, Bradley turning gently eastward toward Mons,
decided to turn the army from a north- Corlett was to go north beyond Péronne
easterly direction to the north. Hod- to Tournai, a hundred miles ahead of
ges’ troops, by racing across the Franco- the corps’ leading units, and then north
Belgian border to cut the Lille–Brussels to Ghent, forty miles farther. T h e im-
highway, might sever the escape routes mediate objective, Tournai, was to be
of approximately two panzer and eight taken within forty-eight hours-at the
to ten infantry divisions that appeared latest by midnight, 2 September.15
to be west of a north-south line from T h e precise deadline for reaching
Laon to Mons, Belgium.14 Tournai reflected additional motives.
This projected advance resembled the General Bradley thought that the British
third envelopment that earlier Patton would advance less rapidly than the
had tentatively planned east of the Seine. Americans and that the Germans holding
In effect the maneuver would reinstate Tournai would consequently constitute
a threat to the First Army left flank.
13VII Corps G–2 Rpt 87, 31 Aug; Telecon, FUSA More important, an airborne operation
G–2 Air and FUSA G–2, 2305, 31 Aug, FUSA G–2 was scheduled to take place at Tournai
(Comd Echelon) Jnl and File; Telecon, FUSA and against General Bradley’s wishes. Brad-
V Corps, 0545, 1 Sep, and FUSA G–2 Air to V
Corps G–2, 1915, 1 Sep, V Corps G–3 Jnl; Second Br
ley had consistently opposed the use of
Army G–2 to XIX Corps G–2, 1710, 1 Sep, XIX airborne troops during the pursuit be-
Corps G–2 Jnl. cause he believed that ground forces
14XIX Corps G–2 Est, Possible Lines of Action
Open to the Germans, 1200, 28 Aug; FUSA G–2
alone could gain distant objectives and
Est 23, 31 Aug; First U.S. Army, Report of Opera-
tions, I, 33ff see Cole, Lorraine Campaign, p. 12. 15[Ferriss], Notes.
680 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
because he felt that available aircraft Armored Division crossed the Somme
would be better employed to bring sup- early on 1 September after bypassing a
plies to the ground units rather than to pocket of resistance at Montdidier,
transport airborne troops. Overruled which the 79th Division soon eliminated,
by Eisenhower, Bradley had warned that and on 2 September—two hours before
ground units would secure the Tournai the midnight deadline—reached Tour-
drop zones before airborne troops could nai. While a regiment of the 30th took
land there. T o insure the correctness the city, both infantry divisions as-
of his prediction, he ordered General sembled in the objective area around
Hodges to get the XIX Corps to Tournai midnight. General White’s CCB ar-
despite the fact that Tournai was within rived after a two and a half hour engage-
the British army zone. 16 ment with an enemy column that re-
General Hodges was under another sulted in the destruction of 96 German
impression. He thought that the reason vehicles and 28 guns. T h e Reserve had
why Bradley wanted additional speed on just enough gasoline to reach the ob-
the different axis was his desire to link jective but instead assembled about ten
up with the paratroopers scheduled to miles short of it to keep a small supply
drop on 3 September. 17 of fuel on hand for emergencies. Ex-
T o get to the Belgian border in the cept for these two instances of resistance,
short time allowed, Corlett used all his the corps had advanced against only the
available trucks, chiefly of artillery and faintest kind of opposition.19 Even de-
antiaircraft units, to motorize two regi- stroyed bridges had failed to slow the
ments of the 79th Division and one of rate of advance. In keeping with pro-
the 30th—this in addition to the organic cedure that had become standard, engi-
transportation that enabled each infan- neers laid a treadway bridge first, then
try division to motorize one regimental built a Bailey bridge nearby. When the
combat team. With the 2d Armored Bailey was completed, the traffic was di-
Division leading two almost completely verted to it, and the treadway was pulled
motorized infantry divisions, the XIX up for the next crossing.
Corps set forth to bypass resistance and American incursion into the British
make night marches if necessary in or- zone had begun to look like a habit, and
der to reach Tournai at the appointed one of General Montgomery’s aides
hour. “Get a good night’s sleep and visited Corlett on the afternoon of 2
don’t worry,” the armored commander, September to protest. Montgomery
General Brooks, advised Corlett, “it’s in wanted XIX Corps halted short of Tour-
the bag.” Nearby, the excited corps nai so that American troops would not
chief of staff exclaimed, “Hot pursuit!” 18 interfere with the British advance, but
Col. John H. Collier’s CCA of the 2d it was too late to stop the columns.
When Hodges informed Corlett later in
16Bradley, Soldier’s Story, pp, 401-02; 12th AGp the evening that a change in plans made
Memo for Rcd, 2 Sep, ML–205; Ltr, Bradley to
OCMH, 7 Jan 55, OCMH Files.
17Sylvan Diary, 31 Aug.
18Telecon, Corlett and Brooks, 2015, 31 Aug, 19XIX Corps and 2d Armd, 79th, and 30th Divs
XIX Corps G–3 Jnl and File; Wyche Diary. AAR’s, Aug and Sep.
TOWARD T H E HEART OF GERMANY 68 1
a halt necessary, the leading troops were Like XIX Corps, V Corps had received
virtually on the objective.20 instructions to advance north. It was
T h e XIX Corps halted at Tournai, as to cut the Lille–Brussels highway at
much because the units were out of gaso- Leuze (ten miles east of Tournai) and
line as because of orders. While British Ath. Using artillery, tank destroyer,
troops, who had reached the vicinity of antiaircraft, and engineer transportation
Tournai shortly after the Americans, facilities, General Gerow formed provi-
swept beyond, XIX Corps processed a sional truck companies to motorize his
disappointing total of only 1,300 pris- infantry.23 With the 4th Division, rein-
oners. A small captured barge loaded forced by a 5th Armored Division com-
with German gasoline enabled reconnais- bat command, in the lead, and the re-
sance units to mop up the area. Mean- mainder of the armor and the 28th Di-
while, Corlett waited for further instruc- vision following, V Corps accelerated its
tions and gasoline supplies. pace on the evening of 3 1 August. T h e
T h e Tournai airborne operation had corps advanced continuously until the
in the meantime been canceled. Awak- morning of 2 September when, in the
ened at daybreak on 3 September by a vicinity of Landrecies, about twenty
complaint from Montgomery that Ameri- miles short of the border, most of the
can troops were blocking the roads at units ran out of gasoline. Gerow re-
Tournai, Bradley was satisfied that they ceived word from Hodges later in the
had also blocked the airborne drop.21 day to remain on the Cambrai–Land-
General Eisenhower had tentatively de- recies line, but his order to halt did not
cided on 2 September to cancel the oper- reach all the elements of the 5th Ar-
ation on the announced theory that the mored Division. By afternoon of the
purpose of the drop-to bar German es- 3d, CCB was about eight miles south of
cape routes to the east-had been Leuze, and its reconnaissance elements
achieved by ground action. After con- were on the final objective. T h e only
ferring with Montgomery, the Supreme resistance, encountered near Landrecies,
Commander confirmed his decision. In had been overcome without difficulty.
the meantime, the commander of the Relatively few prisoners were taken.24
First Allied Airborne Army, General Although most bridges in the V Corps
Brereton, had announced poor weather zone had been destroyed by the Ger-
conditions as the official reason for can- mans, a few had been seized intact and
celing the drop.22
tions, some of which were scrubbed because our
20Corlett to Hodges, 1645, 2 Sep, XIX Corps G- armies moved too fast and others because Troop
3 Jnl and File; First U.S. Army, Report of Opera- Carriers were engaged in air supply.” Brereton.
tions, I; Ltr, Corlett to OCMH, 2 Sep 53. Diaries, p. 343. See also AEAF Ltr, Airborne Opns
21Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 403. to Further OVERLORD, 6 Jul, SGS SHAEF File 373/2,
2212th AGp Memo for Rcd, 2 Sep, ML-205; Employment of Airborne Forces in Opn OVERLORD:
Huston, Airborne Operations, Ch. VII, p. 19; SHAEF Msg to AGWAR, FWD–12907, 16 Aug.
SHAEF 24500/3/Ops (Airborne) , Employment of SHAEF Msg File, Plans and Opns.
Airborne Forces [26] Aug, SHAEF File 24533/Ops; 2 3V Corps Ltr of Instrs, 31 Aug.
21 AGp Dir, M-522, 29 Aug, Pogue Files. “In the 2 4 V Corps History of Operations in the ETO, pp.
40 days since the formation of the First Allied 216ff.; Gerow to Oliver, 2 Sep, V Corps G–3 Jnl
Airborne Army,” General Brereton wrote on 16 and File; First U.S. Army, Report of Operations.
September, “we have planned 18 different opera- I . 30ff.
682 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
a few had been saved by FFI action. T h e 9th Division was to protect the
Piles of destroyed German equipment right flank; the 1st Division was to come
along the roads attested to the accurate u p on the left to reinforce the armor. 26
fire from Allied aircraft. Ground T h e 3d Armored Division drove due
troops sometimes had to use bulldozers north on the highway through Vervins,
to clear paths through the wreckage and and by nightfall of 2 September spear-
the dead horses, from which hungry ci- heads were approaching Mons. Hodges,
vilians had already cut steaks.25 who had notified Corlett and Gerow on
T h e VII Corps, on the army right, had 1 September that there was talk of swing-
also received orders on 31 August to ing eastward again toward the Rhine,
change direction. Instead of driving was unable to reach Collins by telephone
northeastward from Montcornet and Re- that day. Thus, he did not transmit
thel toward Namur and Liège, Collins news that might have acted as a brake
was ordered to turn north and drive on the VII Corps drive to the north.
through the towns of Avesnes, Mau- On 2 September Hodges received in-
beuge, and Mons. General Collins’ first structions to “curl up” the VII Corps
concern was for the gap that would de- short of Mons and hold because of gaso-
velop on the right between his corps and line shortages. But again he was unable
the Third Army. When he asked Hod- to get word to the leading elements of
ges who was to fill the gap, he learned the corps. On the morning of 3 Sep-
that that was his own problem. Though tember the 3d Armored Division took
Collins thought at first that he would firm possession of Mons. Yet armored
have to leave a division behind for the columns were strung out for twenty-five
purpose, he decided instead to cover the miles behind, as far back as Avesnes.
gap with the 4th Cavalry Group, rein- By that time the 9th Division on the
forced by a battalion each of light tanks, east flank had moved to Charleroi, and
motorized artillery, tank destroyers, and 1st Division units were pushing into
infantry, three Engineer companies, and Avesnes, on the tail of the armored
a platoon of a Medical collecting com- units. 27
pany. Even though he had been di- T h e apparent absence of enemy forces
verted to the north to trap Germans, in the Avesnes–Monsarea was deceptive.
Collins still had his eyes fixed on the In reality the First Army maneuver initi-
West Wall. Anxious to continue north- ated on the last day of August had not
eastward across the Meuse, he instructed been in vain. Though the compara-
the 4th Cavalry not only to maintain tively few prisoners taken by XIX and V
contact with Patton but also to seize Corps indicated that the Germans had
a Meuse bridgehead near Mézières. escaped those northward thrusts, in-
Meanwhile, he swerved the 3d Armored
2612th AGp Irnrned Rpt 73, Cavalry as a Task
Division—which was moving toward Force, 8 Oct; Interv by author with General Collins,
Sedan and Charleville—onto new roads 2 Sep 55; VII Corps Opns Memos 79 and 81, 30 Aug
to the north toward Hirson and Vervins. and 1 Sep (confirming oral orders, 30 and 31 Aug) ;
VII Corps G–3 Per Rpt 86, 1 Sep.
27VII Corps Sitrep, 3 Sep; 3d Armd, 1st, and 9th
25CI 32 (4th Div) ; 3d Armored Division, Spear- Div AAR’s, Aug and Sep; Sylvan Diary, 1 and 2
head in the West, p. 78. Sep.
TOWARD T H E HEART OF GERMANY 683
creasing contact with German troops ters, he estimated that the provisional
along the Avesnes–Mons line indicated army was in imminent danger of en-
that many Germans had not evaded VII circlement. Deciding to withdraw to an
Corps. area that was naturally suited to a defen-
Thousands of Germans were in fact sive effort, he chose the canal and marsh
moving into the area southwest of Mons, region near Mons. Since he realized that
generally along the axis of the Amiens- the faster-moving Americans still might
Cambrai–Mons highway. While the 3d encircle the troops of the three corps,
Armored Division set u p a line of north- who for the most part traveled on foot,
south roadblocks along the Avesnes- he started an immediate well-planned
Mons road to cut further German move- and well-organized movement.
ment toward the northeast, the 1st Di- T h e main units that Straube con-
vision attacked northwest from Avesnes trolled were remnants of the 3 d Para-
into a confused and milling mass of re- chute Division, “almost insignificant in
treating enemy. Blocked on the east by numbers”; the 6th Purachute Division,
the 3d Armored Division, pushed on the which had a strength of about two infan-
west by the XIX Corps near Valen- try battalions plus a few heavy-caliber
ciennes, hemmed in on the south from weapons; the 18th Luftwaffe Field Divi-
Cambrai to Landrecies by the V Corps, sion, in one-battalion strength; and two
about to be cut off on the north by the infantry divisions that were “hardly use-
British advance beyond Tournai, and ful.” Around these forces had gathered
jabbed on the southeast by the 1st Di- fragmentary units, stragglers, depot per-
vision, a large, amorphous enemy group sonnel, and a host of miscellaneous
was pocketed. troops. Harassed from the air, ambushed
Many of the troops trapped near Mons by Resistance groups, attacked by Allied
belonged to three corps-the LVIIIPan- spearheads, finally encircled near Mons,
zer, the II SS, and the LXXIV—that had the provisional army, with little ammuni-
earlier been under the control of Fifth tion, fuel, or communications, blundered
Panzer Army. Near St. Quentin on the into American roadblocks and upon con-
last day of August, the three corps head- tact was thrown into confusion.28
quarters had been out of contact with During the night, for example, a Ger-
any higher command. Without instruc- man half-tracked vehicle stumbled on a
tions from above, the three commanders Sherman tank installed as a road obstacle.
conferred and decided to form a provi- Other American tanks nearby opened
sional army among themselves. Straube, fire down a straight stretch of road.
the LXXIV Corps commander, assumed When an early round set a German ve-
command of the other two corps, while hicle ablaze, illuminating others, it was
his staff began to function as the provi- “like shooting sitting pigeons.” At day-
sional army headquarters. break tankers of the 3d Armored Di-
Straube was completely in the dark on vision discovered that they had destroyed
what was happening outside his immedi- a column a mile long. During the en-
ate area but, from Allied radio broad- suing confusion, when Medical Corps
casts and from meager reports occasion-
ally delivered by subordinate headquar- 28MS # B-157 (Dingler).
684 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
T h e alteration in the command of the although it is much earlier than any of the
ground forces had long been planned. technicians believed it could be done.37
In anticipation that General Eisenhower It was nevertheless done although, dur-
would take control of the land warfare ing the next few weeks, it would
beyond the Seine, General Montgomery seem that immediate and firm direc-
had made his plans for the advance be- tion and control were sometimes lacking.
yond the Seine on the basis that he would T o SHAEF at this time the hostile
direct only those forces on the routes army appeared to be “no longer a cohe-
north of the Ardennes. 36 General Brad- sive force but a number of fugitive battle
ley had done the same for Patton’s sub- groups, disorganized and even demoral-
sidiary drive south of the Ardennes. ized, short of equipment and arms.”
Though General Eisenhower sought T h e German strategic situation pre-
to take effective control of all ground sented signs of so much deterioration
action, it was difficult to accomplish, not that recovery no longer seemed possible.
only because SHAEF was far from the Political upheaval within Germany or
front but also because signal facilities insurrection within the Army seemed
were in short supply. General Eisen- likely to hasten the end of the war.38
hower had foreseen the problem as early T h e success of the subsidiary Allied
as 19 August, when he had dictated for invasion of western Europe by way of
the record: southern France underscored the ap-
Obviously, communications from the senior parent hopelessness of the German situa-
fighting commanders to their divisions on tion. T h e DRAGOONforces, primarily
the front took precedence over the estab- American and French, had had little dif-
lishment of communications for SHAEF ficulty in landing in southern France
headquarters. Our woeful insufficiency in west of Cannes on 15 August and in
Signal troops has made it impossible, as yet,
to provide for me on the Continent a head- driving up the Rhône valley. SHAEF
quarters which would permit me to dis- had estimated that DRAGOON would have
charge all the responsibilities devolving no direct effect on OVERLORD until the
upon me and at the same time take over forces from the Mediterranean moved
the broad operational coordination neces- well over three hundred miles to Dijon,
sary between Army Groups. Even now, with and that this was hardly to be expected
all available US signal units allocated to
Bradley, his communications with Patton before November.39 Yet at the end of
are ordinarily limited to radio telephone or August, in addition to having captured
laborious code, and to his rear they are no the major port of Marseille, the Allied
better. . . . forces in southern France were approach-
.. . the very signal units I need have had
to be given to Bradley so that he could
37 Butcher Diary, entry 19 Aug; see Eisenhower
keep in even sketchy contact with the
rapidly changing situation. to Marshall, 24 Aug, Pogue Files, and Memo, Eisen-
Some time ago I ordered my staff to be hower for Bedell Smith, Comd Organization, 22
Aug, SGS SHAEF File 381, POSt-OVERLORDPlng, I.
ready to function on the Continent Septem- 38SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 23, 2 Sep.
ber 1st. I still hope to make that date, SHAEF G–2 File; FUSA G–2 Est 24, 3 Sep; TUSA
G–2 Est 9, 28 Aug; see Pogue, Supreme Command,
36See 21 AGp Dirs, M-519 and M-520, 20 and pp. 244-45.
26 Aug, SGS SHAEF File 381, Post-OVERLORD
Plng. 39PS SHAEF (44) 11 (Final), POSt-NEPTUNE
I. Opns, 17 Aug, SHAEF File 18008 G–3 Plans.
686 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
ing Lyon, little more than a hundred border and sent both U.S. armies toward
miles short of Dijon.40 Since German the Rhine. Patton was to advance to-
withdrawal all along the Western Front ward Mannheim and Frankfurt; Hodges
made the juncture of OVERLORD and was to shift from his northward course-
DRAGOON forces foreseeable in the near which pointed across the British routes
future, an Allied coup d e grâce seemed of advance in Belgium-to an eastward
in order. How to deliver the coup be- axis toward Koblenz and Cologne. T o
came the subject of much discussion in cover the gap that had opened between
early September. the First and Third Armies, Hodges was
T h e discussion was an outgrowth of to send one corps through the Ardennes,
differences apparent as early as 19 Au- a route not recommended by the prein-
gust, when General Eisenhower had de- vasion planners.42
cided to cross the Seine and initiate At this particular moment, Dempsey’s
pursuit operations without waiting for Second British Army was in the midst of
a more secure logistical basis. He had a spectacular advance. Having crossed
then thought of following the preinva- the Somme River at Amiens on 31 Au-
sion plan of splitting his forces equally gust and again between Amiens and
to make a dual thrust toward the Ruhr Abbeville on 1 September against dis-
by routes north and south of the Arden- organized resistance, British armor drove
nes. General Montgomery, in contrast, into the industrial region of northern
had favored a single drive north of the France. Outflanking Arras, bypassing
Ardennes directly toward the Ruhr. Lille, moving through Douai and
T h e result in late August had been a Tournai, armored spearheads swept
compromise that leaned toward Mont- across the Belgian border and took Brus-
gomery’s point of view. Three armies sels, Antwerp, and Ghent on 3 , 4, and
carried the main effort north of the 5 September, respectively. With three
Ardennes, while Patton’s Third Army, armored divisions in the lead and with
making the subsidiary effort, had had its infantry mopping up, the British ad-
gasoline supplies curtailed.41 vanced 250 miles in six days to the Albert
On 2 September, as Eisenhower met Canal between Antwerp and Hasselt.
with Bradley, Hodges, and Patton, he Crerar’s First Canadian Army had
reinstituted what later came to be called similar success. Moving out of the
the broad-front strategy. Hoping to Rouen bridgehead on the last day of
keep the enemy stretched so that he August, armor began pursuit action
would be unable to organize an effective while infantry turned to the ports. In-
defense at the West Wall, General Eisen- fantrymen took Dieppe and le Tréport
hower allocated gasoline stocks to the on 1 September and St. Valery-en-Caux
Third Army just as Hodges’ First Army the following day. While the 1 British
was running out of gas at the Belgian Corps swung toward Le Havre, the 2d
40See Robert Ross Smith, The Riviera to the 4212th AGp Memo for Rcd, 2 Sep, ML-205; see
Rhine, a volume in preparation for the series Eisenhower Msg, SHAEF FWD-13765, 4 Sep, 12th
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II AGp File 371/3, Mil Objs, 1. A detailed account of
41See Ltr, Eisenhower to Bradley, 29 Aug, 12th the high-level discussion is found in Pogue, Supreme
AGp File Mil Objs, ML-205. Command, pp. 252–55
TOWARD T H E HEART OF GERMANY 687
Canadian Corps moved through the sume operations and who had thereby
coastal belt, invested Boulogne, Calais, instituted a broad-front movement, justi-
and Dunkerque, and took Ostend by fied his course of action, which was more
9 September. Armored troops had cautious than Montgomery’s, by a rea-
meanwhile crossed the Somme River soned statement. Eisenhower did not
near Abbeville on 2 September and believe that the Allies could support
driven toward Belgium. Held u p briefly a drive to Berlin, and he thought that
by resistance near Bruges, the mobile the Allies first needed to attain the suc-
elements were at the Belgian-Dutch cessive objectives of breaching the West
border and within striking distance of Wall, crossing the Rhine on a wide front,
the Schelde estuary by the second week and seizing the Ruhr and the Saar. An
in September. T h e Canadians had over- advance on the entire front, he argued,
run the flying bomb launching sites in would compel the Germans to stretch
the Pas-de-Calais by 6 September, al- their meager forces to the breaking point
though the Germans began two days and would imperil the rear of the Army
later to fire V-weapons from the Nether- Group G forces retreating from southern
lands and continued to do so until al- France. He also thought it desirable to
most the end of the war.43 keep Patton moving because he wanted
Impressed by the development of the the Allies to take advantage of all exist-
pursuit and particularly by the capture ing lines of communication. If, how-
of Brussels and Antwerp on 3 and 4 Sep- ever, Montgomery needed additional as-
tember, Field Marshal Montgomery be- sistance, Eisenhower was willing to give
gan to believe that the Germans in the him SHAEF’s strategic reserve, the
west were so weak as to be incapable of Allied airborne army, which could help
withstanding a major Allied effort. He Montgomery seize crossings over the
concluded that the war could be ended Rhine, help him make a deep advance
at once by a thrust launched immediately into the Ruhr, and enable him even to
to Berlin via the Ruhr. He proposed threaten Berlin. T h e only factor, he
to the Supreme Commander on 4 Sep- said, that limited optimism for future
tember that all the Allied resources operations and ruled out what he inter-
available on the Continent be allocated preted as Montgomery’s proposal for a
for this drive, a strong single thrust that thin thrust to Berlin was logistics, al-
General Eisenhower later misunderstood ready “stretched to the limit.” 4 5
to be “pencillike.” 4 4 It was just the logistical situation that
General Eisenhower, who had two days made Montgomery feel that the Allies
earlier made it possible for Patton to re- could afford only one effort. He wanted
it to be a strong effort, and he believed
43The last Hying bomb was launched from the that it should be aimed through the
Pas-de-Calais on 3 September. Harris, Bomber
Offensive, p. 236. Between 13 June and 1 Septem-
Ruhr and toward Berlin.46
ber the Germans had launched an average of 102 45Eisenhower to Montgomery, FWD-13889, 5
V-1 bombs daily, of which 2,340 reached London. Sep, and Eisenhower Memo for Rcd, 5 Sep, Pogue
Helfers, Employment of V-weapons by the Germans Files. Wilmot, Struggle for Europe, pages 466 and
During World War II, p. 34. 468 suggests that the Americans perhaps thought
44 Montgomery to Eisenhower, M-160, 4 Sep. Montgomery too timid to direct pursuit operations.
Pogue Files 46Montgomery to Eisenhower, 7 Sep, Pogue Files.
688 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Yet SHAEF judged Montgomery’s sug- intact was often the most significant de-
gestion too optimistic. Eisenhower pro- tail. “There have been so many changes
vided him additional support, particu- in the First Army direction,” an observer
larly in locomotives and rolling stock, wrote, “that indeed it seems at times as
but he refused to allay Montgomery’s if those ‘on top’ did not have an alto-
basic dissatisfaction over what Mont- gether clear and consistent conception of
gomery considered an unrealistic Allied the direction from which they wish to
dispersion of effort. During early Sep- cross the German frontier.” 48
tember Eisenhower continued to allocate Thinly spread, both laterally and in
fuel supplies on a broad-front basis. depth, the armies overran and liberated
Bradley managed to keep an uneasy northern France, most of Belgium and
gasoline balance between the two U.S. Luxembourg, and parts of the Nether-
armies, his principal motive apparently lands. Reconnaissance units and cavalry
the desire to keep Patton moving. With swept far and wide, clearing great areas,
Hodges oriented toward Cologne, Bonn, particularly on the flanks, to free infan-
and Koblenz, and Patton toward Mann- try and armor for advance along the main
heim and Mainz, and, if possible, highways. Various patriotic groups were
Karlsruhe, it was clear that General helpful.49 Local Resistance members
Eisenhower preferred to use all the usually appeared soon after the arrival
routes toward Germany, good and bad of American troops in a town, and they
alike.47 quickly formed into units and marched
out to clear the countryside of German
The Nature of the Pursuit stragglers and to guard bridges and lines
of communication. Individuals some-
T h e Allied advance toward the West times accompanied Allied reconnaissance
Wall was spectacularly fast and fluid. units. Civilians cleared a number of
It operated with a minimum of control obstacles, in at least one case repairing
and a maximum reliance on subordinate a destroyed bridge before the arrival of
commanders. Unit dislocations, chang- Engineer troops. Engineer support pla-
ing routes of advance, and an overriding toons often accompanied cavalry ahead
fluidity resulted. When gasoline stocks of the main body of troops to remove
permitted, the pursuit resembled a obstacles before they could delay the ad-
stampede of wild horses. T h e dust that vance. T h e artillery was usually unable
was kicked up did not obscure the fact to displace fast enough to get into action,
that a mass Allied movement east of the and even the light artillery did compara-
Seine took place, a gigantic and some- tively little firing.50
times haphazard closing action of all
available forces toward Germany in
which a frantic search for a bridge still 48Sylvan Diary, 2 Sep.
49See David Ryelandt, “The Resistance Move-
ment,” in Jan Albert Goris, ed. and translator,
Belgium under Occupation (New York: Moretus
47
Bradley, Soldier’s Story, pp. 410–14; 12th AGp Press for the Belgian Governnient Information Cen-
Ltr of Instrs 8, 10 Sep (confirming oral orders); ter, 1947). pp. 191ff.
see also the provocative discussion in Wilmot, 50CI 32 (4th Div) ; 4th Div AAR, Sep; First U.S.
Struggle for Europe, pp. 458ff. and 482ff. Army, Report of Operations, I, 35.
TOWARD T H E HEART OF GERMANY 689
few days of August to several thousand cause of shortages of vehicles and prop-
tons per day. erly trained drivers. One of the most
T h e planners had intended to rely on dramatic logistical developments was the
the excellent French railways for long- organization by the Communications
distance hauling, but Allied air attacks Zone of the Red Ball Express, a long-
and French sabotage had virtually de- distance through-highway system inaugu-
molished the railroad system. T h e re- rated late in August. Designed as an
construction of damaged rail lines, which emergency expedient to support the
required repair of choke points, rail Seine crossings by getting 82,000 tons of
centers and junctions, bridges, tunnels, supplies to the Chartres–Dreux area by
viaducts, roundhouses, machine shops, 1 September, the Red Ball Express be-
and rolling stock, could not keep pace came an institution that lasted until
with the advancing forces. As early as November and operated east of the Seine
June, when it had become apparent that as well. On 25 August Red Ball con-
paralyzing German mobility by destroy- voys began to use two parallel one-way
ing the transportation system would round-trip routes from which all other
mean similar paralysis later for the traffic was excluded, and before long
Allies, supply chiefs had begun to re- more than a hundred truck companies
quest that facilities be spared and had were involved. O n 29 August, for ex-
started to hope in earnest that the Ger- ample, 132 truck companies—6,000 ve-
mans would not destroy them in retreat. hicles-moved more than 12,000 tons of
Though the rail lines east of Paris were supplies. Operating day and night and
in better shape, the hub of the system without blackout precautions, the Ex-
around the French capital had been press delivered 135,000 tons of supplies
heavily damaged. By 30 August two to army service areas by mid-September.
main railroads were open as far as the T h e cost of this achievement was
capital, but the mutilated rail yards high—mounting strain on personnel and
of Paris and the destroyed Seine River equipment, continual use of vehicles
bridges prohibited through traffic. Small without proper maintenance, rapid de-
tonnages could be routed forward terioration of equipment and roads,
through Paris only after 4 September. abuse of vehicles by overloading and
Not until mid-September, although bot- speeding, a large number of accidents
tlenecks around Paris and the shortage caused by driver fatigue. T h e Red Ball
of rolling stock still inhibited railway fostered the habit of poor road discipline,
traffic, would the railroads begin to as- offered opportunity for malingering,
sume their hoped-for importance as long- sabotage, and black marketeering, and
distance carriers. By then the pursuit tempted combat units to hijack and
would be over. otherwise divert supplies. Haste con-
Motor transport played a much larger tributed to poor documentation of ship-
role on the Continent than had been ments and concomitant sparse informa-
planned, and consequently theater facili- tion on the status of supply. “Red Ball
ties were neither well suited nor well was part of a gamble, part and parcel of
prepared for extensive operations be- the tactical decision to cross the Seine
TOWARD THE HEART OF GERMANY 691
and exploit to the full the existing tacti- planned airborne operations reduced air
cal advantage.” 5 2 deliveries to a trickle, but an enlarged
Because the Communications Zone re- airlift was resumed on 6 September.
frained from moving its depots forward From 19 August to mid-September,
in the interests of conserving transporta- American planes carried a total of 20,000
tion facilities, the armies took over much tons of supplies, of which about 13,000
of the hauling. Their supply vehicles tons were delivered to the 12th Army
sometimes had to make round trips of Group. 53
up to three hundred miles. Bradley had By far the most important require-
instructed Patton and Hodges to leave ment of the pursuit was gasoline. Dur-
their heavy artillery west of the Seine so ing the week of 20 August, when most
that artillery cargo trucks could be used of the units of both U.S. armies were for
to transport supplies, and Hodges, for the first time engaged in a war of move-
example, formed between ten and ment, the daily consumption of gasoline
twenty provisional truck companies from ran well over 800,000 gallons. By
these vehicles to help his forty-three 28 August the Communications Zone
Quartermaster truck companies. transportation resources were spread so
T h e Allies also transported supplies by thin and the lines of communication ex-
air, though the advantages of speed and tended so far that daily deliveries could
freedom of movement were often offset no longer be relied on. Increasing gaso-
by low volume and tonnage capacity, un- line demands were due not only to the
certainty of available aircraft, inadequate requirements of the combat forces but
ground facilities at loading and landing also to the ever-growing requirements of
sites, the possibility of enemy inter- the carriers—Red Ball trucks alone con-
ference, and the hazard of weather. As sumed more than 300,000 gallons per
a result, air supply could only be re- day.
garded as an emergency measure. How- Gasoline was only one of many re-
ever, under the direction of the Com- quirements. T h e troops of a single divi-
bined Air Transport Operations Room sion ate about thirty-five tons of field
(CATOR), a special AEAF staff section rations a day, besides expending am-
that acted as a regulating station for all munition and wearing out clothing and
air supply missions, small shipments to equipment. Fortunately, captured Ger-
ground forces began in June, medical man items sometimes alleviated short-
evacuation commenced in July, and on ages. A German dump in Namur,
19 August more extensive air shipments Belgium, for example, provided beef and
started. By 25 August over 4,000 tons of canned plums and cherries; a candy fac-
supplies had been delivered to forward tory yielded flour and sugar; a ware-
ground units, mainly whole blood and house full of salt was worth its weight
such signal equipment as field wire and in gold. Yet captured stocks hardly ful-
radio parts. At the end of August, com- filled requirements and exactly when
peting demands of the various armies, the
civil relief program for Paris, and 53 See Leigh-Mallory, “Despatch,” Fourth Supple-
ment to the London Gazette of December 31, 1946,
52Ruppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 572. pp. 83-84.
692 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
dwindling supplies would finally bring vance, respectively, on the left and in
the pursuit to a halt was a painful ques-the center of the army zone.55 Since
tion that troubled all commanders. Meuse River crossings were the most
T h e port capacity problem was still urgent objective, Hodges diverted avail-
with the Allies, despite optimism in early
able gasoline supplies to the V and VII
September stemming from capture of Corps, which were closer to the Meuse
Rouen on 31 August, seizure of Antwerp and which were to strike at once toward
on 4 September, the rapid liberation of the river between Sedan and Namur.
the minor Channel ports of Dieppe and T h e XIX Corps thus remained inactive
Ostend, the quick investiture of Le for several days.
Havre, Boulogne, Calais, and Dun- Ordered to move through the Arden-
kerque, and the not so remote possibilitynes to fill the gap between the First and
of taking Rotterdam and Amsterdam. T h i r d Armies, Gerow designated an as-
T h e capacity of most of the ports was sembly area in his new zone. Some
small, even when they were captured units assembled there before marching
intact, and Le Havre, taken on 1 2 Sep- eastward, others moved at once because
tember, was far behind the front. Most of an absence of opposition. While the
important of all, British seizure of 4th Division on 4 September cleared
Antwerp—the greatest port in continen- some slight resistance near St. Quentin
tal Europe, one close to the fighting in the old zone, the 102d Cavalry Group
front—had failed to prompt the Germans and the 5th Armored Division abreast,
to relinquish the banks of the Schelde the latter particularly troubled by gaso-
estuary along the sixty miles between line shortages, started toward the Meuse.
Antwerp and the sea. Until the Schelde By 5 September they had crossed the
could be cleared, Antwerp was useless. river without difficulty. As the 4th Divi-
It would be more than two months be- sion followed the cavalry and the 28th
fore the complex port problem would be Division trailed the armor, V Corps be-
solved.54 gan to move through the Ardennes. A
rugged wooded plateau, the Ardennes
T o the West W a l l extends in a northeasterly direction
across the Meuse River valley in France,
T h e reorientation of First Army on through Belgium and north Luxem-
3 September from a northward to an bourg, almost to the Rhine. T h e corps
eastward direction involved some compli- was to sweep the region, maintain con-
cations. Gerow’s V Corps in the center, tact with the Third Army, and eventually
virtually pinched out by the converging support Patton’s projected Rhine River
advances of the corps on its flanks, was crossings.
to move across the rear of Collins’ VII Spread thin over a fifty-mile front, the
Corps to a new zone on the army right. corps moved through southern Belgium
Corlett’s XIX Corps and Collins’ VII
Corps, turning to the right, were to ad- 55Hodges to the corps commanders, 3 Sep, FUSA
G–2 (Comd Echelon) Jnl and File; VII Corps FO
54For the port story, see Ruppenthal, Logistical io, 3 Sep; Hodges to Gerow, 1727, 3 Sep, V Corps
Support, II, Chs. III and IV, and MacDonald, G–3 Jnl and File; see Answers by Gen Kibler to
The Siegfried Line Campaign. Questions by Col Cole, 29 May 46.
TOWARD T H E H E A R T O F GERMANY 693
and Luxembourg in a dozen or more the 28th Division, and entered Luxem-
parallel battalion columns several miles bourg. O n the following day, as the
apart. T h e troops encountered only the inhabitants of Luxembourg gave an
most perfunctory resistance and ad- enthusiastic welcome, the armored troops
vanced as rapidly as their limited trans- entered and liberated the capital unop-
portation permitted. When the 5th posed. With them came Prince Felix,
Armored Division ran out of gas on consort of the Grand Duchess and at the
7 September, Gerow passed the 28th time a brigadier in the British Army.
through and diverted his meager supplies East of the city, American tankers came
of gasoline to the infantry, which con- into contact with some enemy forces.
sumed less than armor. T h e 4th and His troops extended over a sector about
28th both moved steadily forward on thirty miles wide, General Oliver halted
foot and by motor. his advance briefly to await instructions
On 8 September Gerow looked ahead concerning the West Wall.
to the West Wall, prepared an attack T h a t afternoon General Gerow or-
against it for 10 September, and desig- dered his divisions to close the next day
nated Koblenz as the objective. Choos- into assembly areas previously designated
ing to make his main effort on the left,56 on the St. Vith–Echternach line. From
he shifted his infantry to the north and there they were to probe the West Wall
aimed at Pruem in an approach to positions.
Koblenz. Conducting a virtually inde- Although the Rhine River was only
pendent operation, his cavalry screens fifty miles away and the end of the war
maintaining only light contact with units seemed at hand, General Hodges was
on his flanks, yet instructed to support about to postpone a co-ordinated attack
a Third Army crossing of the Rhine, on the fortifications for a day or two
Gerow nevertheless turned toward closer until sufficient artillery ammunition for
contact with the First Army. If he con- an attack on the fortified line could be
centrated the bulk of his strength at moved forward. Obscured by the pre-
Trier, he would be forty miles from the vailing optimism, the pause turned out
closest Third Army forces at Metz. Per- to be a significant event–it marked the
haps recognizing the significance of the end of the pursuit.57
stable defenses the Germans seemed to
have erected at the Moselle, Gerow On the evening of 3 September, the
turned the 4th and 28th Divisions north- three divisions of Collins' VII Corps
eastward into a narrowing zone of ad- were deployed on a 20-mile front from
vance that led to the juncture of the Mons to a point south of Charleroi.
borders of Belgium, Luxembourg, and T h e 3d Armored and 1st Divisions were
Germany. around Mons, the 9th was at Philippe-
Meanwhile, the 5th Armored Division, ville. Screening the right flank of the
with an infantry regiment attached, re- corps along the Meuse River, the 4th
fueled on 9 September, passed through Cavalry Group was at Mézières and
56VCorps FO 26, 1830, 8 Sep; V Corps Memo for 57 V Corps Operations in the ETO, pp. 229ff.;
Rcd, 10Sep, V Corps G–3 Jnl and File. TSFET, Siegfried Line.
694 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
589th Div FO’s 30 and 31, 0230, 3 Sep, and 2230. 599th Div AAR, Sep; TSFET, Siegfried Line:
4 Sep. MS # P-164 (Meyer) : MS # P-159 (Stueckler).
TOWARD T H E HEART OF GERMANY 695
weak. Hindered somewhat by the the enemy, and it appeared that the Ger-
enthusiastic welcome of the inhabitants, mans were disengaging to take positions
the troops completed routine mopping in the West Wall. With German soil
up. One of the participants later re- within reach, pursuit came to an end for
marked: the VII Corps too. Ahead lay the task
Our chief difficulty was the fact that there of the West Wall.63
breaching
were so many civilians trying to get out of
town. We carried on a battle anyway, firing Corlett’s XIX Corps—which remained
over their heads. At one point my tank ran temporarily out of action near Tournai
over four of them as we backed up . . . . awaiting gasoline—trained, rested, and
several civilians crawled up on the tank
and begged for guns. We had none for incidentally gathered almost nine hun-
them. We entered the town and our tanks dred prisoners. T h e 79th Division de-
went up parallel streets cleaning out Ger parted the corps to rejoin the T h i r d
mans. This took us all afternoon and we Army. 64 By the time gasoline arrived
suffered no casualties. 60 and the corps was ready to move, the
In the slightly bored tone that indicated Allied forces on both sides had already
that they had become accustomed to this outflanked the Germans in the new zone
sort of thing, the troops reported, “Once of advance leading east toward the Albert
again cognac, champagne, and pretty Canal and Meuse River between Hasselt
girls.” 61 and Liège. Bypassing or overrunning
Advancing on the Liège–Aachen axis, ineffectual rear-guard detachments, the
the best invasion route into Germany, 113th Cavalry Group rushed past the
the VII Corps took Verviers and Eupen historic battlefields near Waterloo and
on 9 and 1 1 September, respectively. reached the canal line on 7 September.
Although resistance was still sporadic, T h e 2d Armored and 30th Divisions fol-
it seemed to be increasing. There were lowed as rapidly as fuel supplies per-
no more V-for-Victory signs, no more mitted, the infantry marching a good
flowers, no more shouts of Vive l‘Améri- part of the way on foot. T h e units
que. Instead, a sullen border populace closed to the water barrier by 10 Septem-
showed hatred, and occasional snipers ber.
fired into the columns. 62 Cavalrymen had meanwhile explored
By the end of 10September the VII the situation along the water line and dis-
Corps was deployed along a front ex- covered all bridges destroyed and ap-
tending from Malmédy through Verviers parently strong German detachments
to Herve, eleven miles east of Liège. dug in on the east bank. Since the
T h e 9th Division had lost contact with British on his left already had a bridge-
head across the Albert Canal and the
60Interv with 1st Lt Robert A. Annin, Hosp VII Corps on his right was beyond both
Intervs, ML–4234. Maj. Gen. Maurice Rose, the 3d
Armored Division commander, was awarded the the Albert Canal and the Meuse, Corlett
DSC for his leadership 6-9 September. saw no reason for his corps to stage what
613d Armored Division, Spearhead in the West,
p. 91.
62Ibid, p. 93. Colonel Gibney, commander of the 633d Armd Div AAR, Sep; CI 259 (3d Armd
60th Infantry, was awarded the DSC for heroic Div) ; 9th Div AAR, Sep.
leadership on 9 September. 64See Ltr, Corlett to OCMH, 2 Sep 53.
696 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
would probably be a costly assault cross- their cumulative effect reduced the
ing. While General Corlett made ar- strength of all combat units. Tanks and
rangements with his neighbors to use vehicles had gone so long and so far with-
their bridges across the water obstacles, out proper maintenance and repair that
XIX Corps, like V and VII Corps, in one armored division less than a third
paused briefly.65 of the authorized number of medium
No one knew it yet, but the pursuit tanks were actually fit for combat. 68
was over. T h e troops were soon to dis- Another had had so many tanks fall out
card the “carnival garlands, ribbons, and of column because of mechanical failure
souvenirs gathered during the liberation or lack of gasoline that its equipment
parade” through northern France, Bel- was spread over the countryside between
gium, and Luxembourg and become Valenciennes and Luxembourg, more
caught up again in hard fighting.66 than a hundred miles. Since the gaso-
Patton’s T h i r d Army was already im- line shortage prevented transferring ve-
mersed in the difficulties of the Lorraine hicles for repair, mobile crews performed
campaign. Immobilized by lack of gaso- on-the-spot adjustments when they were
line for several days, the army attacked able, but those tanks that needed shop
on 5 September to gain Moselle River treatment had long to wait.69 Tank
bridgeheads near Metz and Nancy. Five engines had passed the time limit of ef-
days later, though some troops had seized ficient operation but were hard to re-
Toul in the Moselle bend, others had place. Of 190 reserve engines consid-
been repulsed at Pont-à-Mousson, and ered necessary for effective combat, one
the army was fighting furiously for armored division had had only 30 avail-
bridgeheads in the Metz and Nancy able at the beginning of the pursuit,
areas. Hodges’ First Army was soon to Replacement tracks were particularly dif-
be involved in problems of similar diffi- ficult to come by. Ceaseless driving
culty at the West Wall.67 T h e war of caused vehicles literally to fall apart, and
movement set in motion by Operation serious shortages of spare parts could
COBRAin the last days of July was not be remedied in the near future.70
merging imperceptibly into a war of Transportation facilities were unable
position. to maintain an adequate flow of supplies
to the front. By 6 September, for ex-
T h e End of the Line ample, daily deliveries to the First Army
were 1,500 tons (almost one third) below
Though it was not to become obvious normal daily requirements. With in-
for a week or so, the Allied troops were come below operating expenses, the
tired. T h e pursuit had been wearing army began to live on its capital; basic
on men and equipment. Casualties had loads vanished, reserve stocks virtually
not been heavy at any one place, but disappeared. Although a diminishing
arrival of everyday necessities had not
65XIX Corps FO 22, 1730, 7 Sep; [Ferriss],
Notes.
66Quote from 3d Armd Div CCA AAR, Sep. 683d Armd Div AAR, Sep.
67See Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, and Mac- 695th Armd Div AAR, Sep.
Donald, T h e Siegfried Line Campaign. 70See XV Corps AAR, Aug.
TOWARD T H E H E A R T O F GERMANY 697
actually stopped the sustained drive, the transportation on the Continent was un-
day of reckoning was not far away. T h e equal to the demands placed upon it.
Allies needed no soothsayers to know As the Allies approached the German
that an economy of famine awaited them border, opposition seemed to stiffen,
as they moved onto German soil. and the existence of the West Wall had
Yet it seemed as though the Allies only its psychological effects. T o insure the
partly appreciated the implications of establishment of at least one bridgehead
these conditions, for no admission was beyond the Rhine, General Eisenhower
made that the pursuit had come to an on 10September approved employment
end. Instead, optimism in most quar- by Field Marshal Montgomery of the
ters continued, “tempered only by ex- Allied strategic reserve, the First Allied
asperation over supply shortages.” T h e Airborne Army, which Montgomery was
first train arrived in Soissons on 6 Sep- to use like seven-league boots in an at-
tember, bringing hope that shortages tempt to get across the lower Rhine in
might soon cease to exist. O n that day the Netherlands.72
the regrouping of the First Army forces Whether Eisenhower drew upon
had been almost completed, and Ameri- SHAEF’s strategic reserve to exploit the
can leaders had expected the drive to success of the pursuit or to propel a
the Rhine to gather speed. With ten dying advance across the Rhine, the act,
days of good weather, General Hodges while perhaps subconsciously admitting
said, he thought the war might well be the weariness of the Allied troops, sought
over as far as organized resistance was to take advantage of German disorganiza-
concerned. Four days later, however, tion before .the Germans could re-form a
despite promises that shortages would be cohesive line. As the dispersed though
only temporary, Hodges admitted, as he optimistic Allied forces approached the
awaited shipments of artillery, that the West Wall, vague symptoms appeared
supply situation would undoubtedly de- that the Germans might achieve what
lay, at least slightly, a concentrated at- they would later call the “Miracle of the
tack on the Siegfried Line.71 West.” Army Group B , despite the
Hodges’ feeling actually mirrored con- Mons pocket, managed to get what re-
cern with a question that was beginning mained of its units east to the West Wall,
to trouble some Allied commanders: and Army Group G (the Nineteenth
Was the pursuit going to peter out be- Army and the LXIV Corps) escaped
fore the Allies got through the West from southern and southwest France
Wall and across the Rhine? Certain with the major part of its combat ele-
signs, though not to become clear until ments. By 10 September the juncture
later, indicated that this might happen. of Army Groups B and G was accom-
T h e Allied forces were overextended plished, and the front formed a con-
along a 200-mile front between Antwerp tinuous, if not solid, line from the North
and Switzerland, the troops exhausted, Sea to the Swiss border.73 Considering
their equipment badly worn. Continen- the shortages of men, arms, equipment,
tal ports of entry were inadequate, and 72 For an account of this operation, see Mac-
71
Kuppenthal, Logistical Support, I, 583; Sylvan Donald, The Siegfried Line Campaign.
Diary, 6 and 10 Sep. 73OB WEST, a Study in Command, p. 166.
698 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
TEETH,THE SIEGFRIEDLINE
DRAGON’S
and supplies, the condition of the West abundance of Allied matériel, as com-
Wall, and the immensity of the defeat pared with the inadequate German sup-
suffered, the German recuperation would plies. O n 4 September Model stated
later appear incredible. that, in order to prop u p the entire
During the first few days of September Western Front before it gave way com-
there had been no coherent German de- pletely, he needed a minimum of twenty-
fense. Panic infected rear areas. Sup- five fresh infantry divisions and at least
ply installations were destroyed without five or six panzer divisions.75
orders, fuel depots demolished, ammuni- Hitler, for his part, showed little ap-
tion dumps abandoned, ration and sup- preciation of the difficulties facing OB
ply installations looted by troops and W E S Tand some lack of knowledge o f
civilians, and reports on the status of the situation. Since 28 August, on
supply nonexistent. 74 T h e retreating Hitler’s order, OB W E S T had been
units had hardly any heavy weapons. planning a counterattack against the
Few of the panzer divisions had more southern Allied flank, a strike north in
than five to ten tanks in working order. the Troyes area between the Seine and
T h e morale of the troops was depressed Marne Rivers. On 3 September Hitler
by Allied control of the air and by the 75 AGp B Lagebeurteilungen, Ia; MS # B-730
(Brandenberger) ; MS # B-623 (Keppler) ; MS
74MS # B-596 (Gerber) . # C-048 (Kraemer) .
TOWARD T H E H E A R T OF GERMANY 699
or six weeks to restore the West Wall interior unrest and dissension coupled with
and characterized his situation on 1 1 Sep- the gradual loss of Germany’s satellites
tember as “continued reduction in com- makes her position less and less stable. This
indicates an early end of Herr Hitler.91
bat strength and lack of ammunition.” 87
SHAEF had observed that the Germans Most officers believed that the West
did not seem to have enough men to Wall was only a bluff and that, since
hold the West Wall, and despite the the Germans had hardly any troops left,
increasing deterioration of Allied logis- it would take the Allies three days at the
tics, commanders on all echelons were most to get through the fortifications.
quite certain that the end of the war was After that, there would remain only the
at hand.88 T h e troops that had fought task of mopping up scattered demoral-
in the battle of the hedgerows remem- ized units inside Germany.92
bered with some surprise how St. Lô The Siegfried Line . . . although a strong
had “seemed months away and Germany natural position, is not what it was bally-
itself almost unattainable.” 89 hooed to be by the Germans. . . . it will not
There was a quality of madness about the be too difficult to break. . . . the great ex-
whole debacle of Germany’s forces in the penditure of money, materiel, and time the
West. . . . Isolated garrisons fought as Germans made on the Siegfried Line is as
viciously as before, but the central planning great a waste as the French Maginot Line
and coordination . . . were missing. . . . it proved to be.93
looked very much as though Adolf Hitler General Bradley reported that Hodges
. . . might be forced into surrender long was “quite optimistic about his ability
before American and British units reached to push through the Siegfried Line and
the Rhine. That was the avowed opinion
of allied soldiers on the western front, and
on to the Rhine,” and that the “situa-
German prisoners were of the same mind, tion in front of Patton looks very hope-
often stating that it couldn’t last for an- ful.” 94 Field Marshal Montgomery was
other week.90 still thinking of getting on to Berlin.
T h e fact that the T h i r d Army had met And General Eisenhower, though he
increasing resistance in Lorraine hardly may have had reservations, began to con-
seemed as important as the fact that the sider objectives beyond the Rhine—as far
enemy was in headlong flight before the distant as Berlin.95
First U.S. Army. Other developments I n most respects, optimism seemed
bolstered this point of view: justifiable. Turkey had broken diplo-
While it is highly unlikely that Hitler, matic relations with Germany in August,
while he holds the reins of Government in and Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland
Germany, will ever permit a capitulation of were negotiating for peace. A repeti-
her Army, his position as head of govern- tion of the autumn of 1918, when Bul-
ment is becoming daily more unstable, and garia had defected, and Turkey and
87OB WEST KTB, 11 Sep; AGp B Sitrep, 11
Sep, AGp B KTB.
88SHAEF Weekly Intel Summary 25, 9 Sep, 91
VII Corps Annex 2 to EO 9. 27 Aug.
SHAEF G–2 File; see Pogue, Supreme Command, 92See CI 32 (4th Div).
p. 283. 935th Armd Div AAR, Sep.
89Hewitt, Story of the 30th Infantry Division, 94Bradley to Eisenhower, 14 Sep, 12th AGp File
p. 22. Mil Objs, II.
903d Armored Division, Spearhead in the West, 95 See, for example, Eisenhower to Bradley. 15
p. 81. Sep, SHAEF File GCT 370-31 /Plans.
702 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
All pertinent Army records have been scrutinized in an effort to include in the following list the
name of every soldier who received the DSC for his part in the operations recounted in this volume.
Inasmuch as no complete listing of DSC awards is maintained in any single Army file, it is possible
that some names may inadvertently have been omitted. (P) indicates a posthumous award; * indicates
that the Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster was awarded to a DSC previously ordered; # indicates that both
the DSC and the Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster were awarded to the individual for separate actions during
the operations narrated in this volume.
1st Lt. David W. Allard Sgt. Samuel C. Davis (P)
Capt. James D. Allgood Capt. Mario T. De Felice
Capt. Benjamin W. Anderson (P) Pfc. William A. Delmont (P)
T/Sgt. Joe M. Barnett Lt. Col. Leander L. Doan
S/Sgt. Wardie Barnett Pvt. William J. Draper
Lt. Col. Jacob W. Bealke, Jr. 2d Lt. James I. Durden (P)
Pvt. Anthony J. Blazus, Jr. 1st Lt. Robert Edlin
Pvt. Bennie F. Boatright (P) Pvt. Leonard L. Eggleston
S/Sgt. Thomas R. Brazil Pfc. Joseph A. Elwell (P)
Pfc. Buster E. Brown Capt. Reynold C. Erichson
1st Sgt. Virgil L. Brown (P) Pfc. Louis Ferrari (P)
Cpl. Richard S. Butterfield Col. Harry A. Flint (P) *
Pfc. Clifford W. Buzzard Pfc. Milo J. Flynn
Capt. Delmont K. Byrn Pvt. Thomas T. Flynn
Pfc. George J. Caldwell Cpl. Clarence E. Follis
Pfc. Alfred A. Cannon 1st Lt. Mario J. Fortuna
T/Sgt. Lawrence Cappeletti Lt. Col. Robert E. Frankland
Capt. Thomas F. Carothers S/Sgt. Carl J. Frantz
T/Sgt. Wilson R. Carr Lt. Col. Arthur H. Fuller
Capt. Phillip H. Carroll T/Sgt. Joseph P. Fuller
S/Sgt. Ignacio H. Castro Pfc. James L. Geach
Sgt. Wilbur Caton Capt. Harry L. Gentry
S/Sgt. James J. Cermak Pfc. Lawrence Georgeatos (P)
Capt. Graham V. Chamblee Capt. Jack S. Gerrie
Col. Bruce C. Clarke Pfc. Walter C. Giebelstein
Lt. Col. Christian H. Clarke, Jr. Col. Jesse L. Gibney
S/Sgt. Gayln Clay Pvt. Jack Gill (P)
Capt. Richard T. Clemens Pfc. Joseph J. Giordano
Capt. Cameron A. Clough Capt. Hamilton F, Glover (P)
Sgt. Peter A. Cocossa (P) Pfc. Earl G. Goins
Lt. Col. Wilson D. Coleman (P) Capt. Richard G. Gooley
Maj. William K. C. Collonan (Missing) 2d Lt. Joseph Gorniak, Jr.
T/Sgt. Irvin F. Conley (P) 1st Lt. John R. Greene (P)
Sgt. Harold B. Cordes Col. Wilborn B. Griffith, Jr. (P)
Pfc. Roy V. Craft (P) S/Sgt. Konstanty Gugala
Pfc. Clifford L. Curry S/Sgt. Stanley P. Gull
Brig. Gen. Holmes E. Dager S/Sgt. Lawrence W. Gunderson (1’)
1st Lt. Anthony V. Danna 2d Lt. Earl O. Hall (P)
APPENDIX 705
T h e official records of U.S. units in the author during his brief visit to France
field provide the documentary basis of in the summer of 1953.
Breakout and Pursuit. These consist of Certain headquarters consolidated
monthly narrative After Action Reports their After Action Reports after the war
accompanied by supporting papers (jour- and published official histories. In this
nals, periodic reports, messages, staff sec- category are the 12th Army Group Re-
tion reports, and overlays), as well as port of Operations (in fourteen volumes,
administrative records, originating in which detail the work of the staff sec-
each headquarters down through regi- tions), the First U.S. Army Report of
ment and separate battalion. Without Operations (two separate series: one in
this collection of primary source ma- seven volumes covering the period 20
terial, in the possession of the World October 1943 to 1 August 1944, the other
War II Records Division, National in four volumes, covering the period
Archives and Records Service (NARS), from 1 August 1944 to 2 2 February
it would have been impossible to write a 1945), the two-volume T h i r d Army After
detailed history of operations. All else Action Report (of which most of the
has been supplementary. official supporting documents seem to
T h e unit records naturally vary in have vanished), and the V Corps Opera-
quantity and quality. Some are so tions in the E T O .
sketchy that they are historical in form Other headquarters published unof-
only. Others are so complete that they ficial histories. Many of these tend to be
could well have been motivated by a little more than mementos for members
passion for history. Among those head- of the command, strong on photographs,
quarters that preserved records of ex- personal anecdotes, and a well-earned
ceptional completeness and thereby light- pride of unit accomplishment. Notable
ened the task of the historian are the exceptions are the Combat Record of the
VIII and XV Corps and the 90th and 9th 6th Armored Division, the 314th In-
Divisions. Particular mention must be fantry Regiment’s Through Combat, the
made of the valuable records of tele- 3d Armored Division’s Spearhead in the
phone conversations in the papers of the West, Robert L. Hewitt’s Work Worse
2d, 29th, 30th, and 83d Divisions. of the Western Front: the Story of the
T h e U.S. Air Force Historical Section 30th Division, and Conquer, the Story of
made available from its records primary the Ninth U.S. Army, 1944–1945.
source material on Operation COBRA. Combat interviews secured shortly
T h e Historical Sections of the French after action by members of Information
Army and Navy made available pub- and Historical detachments assigned to
lished and manuscript accounts to the the field armies provide detailed accounts
708 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
de la Libération de Paris is a superb ac- tact with an American soldier for the
count of that subject. first time: “Oh! I beg your pardon.
Memoirs have furnished insights into Excuse me. How quite joyful we are to
the activities as well as the personalities be delivered . . . Rule Britannia . . . Yan-
of important personnages. T h e pub- kee Doodle . . . Oh!” (Rousseau, La
lished accounts by Generals Eisenhower, Bataille de Normandie au Pays d’Argen-
Bradley, Patton, de Guingand, and Air tan, p. 30).
Marshal Harris are well known. T h e T h e Pogue Files, OCMH, mentioned
Brereton Diaries fall into the category so frequently throughout the volume,
of memoirs rather than of primary belongs in a special classification. Dr.
source material. O n the German side Forrest C . Pogue collected a vast amount
the published recollections of Speidel, of material while preparing his volume,
Choltitz, and Ramcke have been con- T h e Supreme Command. One part con-
sulted, as has Blumentritt’s description sists of interviews and letters that Dr.
of Rundstedt, a memoir rather than a Pogue obtained after World War II from
biography. important participants. Another part
Herval’s two-volume Bataille de Nor- includes papers, journals, and letters
mandie offers an interesting collection of written by key participants during the
scenes of warfare as remembered. by in- war. Dr. Pogue kindly opened much of
habitants of the terrain over which the his collection to the author, making
battles were fought. Some of these available in some instances original
reminiscences that detail the hazards of papers, transcripts, and photostats, in
civilian life during a bombardment or other instances his own notes of inter-
attack were compressed from book- views or of papers. Much of the ma-
length manuscripts; others were later ex- terial in the Pogue Files is not available
panded into published volumes. Among elsewhere, though some documents that
the best are accounts by J. and G. Buis- have been cited as in the Pogue Files
son (on Mortain) and by Commandant exist in SHAEF or 12th Army Group
Richard Mouton (on Argentan–Falaise). files as well.
In the same category of personal or com- Principal research on the German
munity adventure is the collection edited operations of the period was performed
by Xavier Rousseau, who was interested by Mr. James B. Hodgson, who wrote
in the region around Argentan. Other several manuscripts (in OCMH Files)
local historians have written narratives more or less attuned to the organization
of the battles around their towns, among of Breakout and Pursuit. These manu-
the better ones the volume by R. Fouque scripts are based principally on German
on St. Malo. Such material has value to documentary sources, the most important
the military historian as a reminder that being the daily war diaries of operations,
warfare does not take place on an ab- Kriegstagebuecher ( K T B ) , maintained
stract sand-table level. It also serves to by the forward echelons of all commands,
explain vividly such matters as libera- together with supporting documents in
tion. Witness the exclamation of a annexes (Anlagen). T h e captured Ger-
Frenchman who has just come into con- man records seized by the U.S. Army
710 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
during and immediately after World # B–034 (Schramm). Though the sup-
War II are in the custody of the World porting documents of this manuscript
War II Records Division, NARS. have been destroyed and though it is
Though many of the German military sometimes difficult to check obvious er-
records have been lost, enough are extant rors and inconsistencies, Der Westen is
to give a remarkably clear picture of the only source that reflects Hitler’s day-
operations. T h e details are vivid, pri- to-day planning.
marily because of the small size of the T h e OB W E S T K T B is principally
German staffs. Stenographic notes of useful as an index to select support-
commanders’ conferences were more fre- ing documents, which present much ma-
quently preserved than not. All the terial on OKW intentions and sometimes
diaries contain reasons for commanders’ the reasons for decisions both strategic
decisions. T h e after action reports were and tactical. T h e OB W E S T K T B
approved by the chief of staff or com- Anlagen, in the custody of the German
parable officer of the unit who obviously Bundesarchiv in Bonn, became available
was aware of the scrutiny that later for consultation only after completion of
historians would give them. Breakout a n d Pursuit and were used
Details on Hitler’s planning are in the primarily to check information already
Fuehrer Fragments-remnants of notes of secured from other sources.
Hitler’s conferences-found in the pub- T h e A r m y Group B records are by far
lished U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence the best of any echelon, the war diary
(ONI) Fuehrer Conferences and, par- opening each day with a description of
tially, in Gilbert’s Hitler Directs His events and following with a chronologi-
War. T h e O N I Fuehrer Directives (in cal listing of telephone conversations,
two volumes) and the International Mili- conferences, and notes. Supporting doc-
tary Tribunal Documents (in forty-odd uments, collected according to category
volumes) include most of the important and not indexed to the text, include the
policy papers on Hitler’s strategy. Hit- Fuehrerbefehle, field orders, and peri-
ler’s field orders for operations on the odic reports.
Western Front may be found in the OB T h e Seventh Army KTBis wordy and
W E S T K T B Anlagen and in the Army less useful than its telephone journal.
Group B Fuehrerbefehle. Though no Seventh Army field orders
T h e daily situation reports on which for July have survived, the telephone
OKW based its knowledge of the war in notes, as well as command conference
the west are collected in the OKM war minutes in the supporting documents of
diary, which is also useful as an index other war diaries, provide a rather com-
to Hitler’s strategic thought. T h e Jodl plete picture. T h e Fifth Panzer Army
diary, actually Jodl’s memo book, is help- (Panzer Group West) records are quite
ful. T h e most important document on short, while those of the LXXXI Corps,
the OKW level is the O K W / WFSt K T B , the only corps that has left a record, are
Der Westen, written from his own notes detailed and excellent.
by Maj. Percy Schramm in the spring of Few, if any, division war diaries sur-
(referred to in the volume both as vived the war. T h e operations of
Der Westen (Schramm) and as MS Panzer Lehr are reflected to a small ex-
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL N O T E 711
Military Units—Identification
*For complete listing of symbols in use during the World War II period, see
FM 21–30, dated October 1943, from which these are taken.
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 719
Size Symbols
T h e following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying
arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Communications Corps-Continued
air-ground: 208, 222,229, 333–34, 382, 384–85 XII-Continued
armor-infantry: 43–44 See also Cook, Maj. Gen. Gilbert R.; Eddy,
facilities: 4, 14, 43–44, 213, 241, 352–53, 384–85, Maj. Gen. Manton S .
472–73, 565 . 345–56, 419–39, 446, 448–49, 484–86, 494-
interception of 326 515, 523–27, 559, 563–65, 568–69, 571-81, 665-
problems of: 65, 71, 73, 82, 85, 87–88, 113, 115–16, 66, 672–73. See also Haislip, Maj. Gen. Wade
137–38, 142, 155–56, 160, 164–65, 236–37, 299, H.
332, 351–54, 357, 374–78, 381–82, 392, 429, XIX: 40, 53, 90–118, 122–23, 133–41, 143, 149–75,
473–74, 513, 563, 571–72, 636–37, 653, 666, 673, 206, 215–17, 282–86, 288–90, 295–304, 305, 330,
685 430, 446, 449–56, 471, 481–82, 491–92, 494, 510-
Communications, German 15, 577–89, 672–73, 678–83, 692, 695–96. See
facilities: 397 also Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H.
problems of 238, 242, 275–76, 323–29, 331–32, XX: 104, 345–56, 432, 471–72, 559–65, 567–80,
380, 384, 503–05, 516, 518, 521, 537–38, 540, 583–89, 665–68. See also Walker, Maj. Gen.
544–45, 549–51, 556–57, 670–71, 682–83, 689 Walton H.
sea: 343 Provisional, Third Army: 527, 529–30. See also
Communications Zone, ETO: 209, 347, 572, 625- Gaffey, Maj. Gen. Hugh J.
27, 631–32, 635–36, 666, 690–92 Corps Artillery
Compiégne: 661, 671,673 V: 151,530, 608, 612
Concarneau: 634 VII: 55, 80, 219–20, 250, 274–75
Conches: 579 VIII: 202, 268, 315, 406–07, 409, 411–12, 643–44,
Condé-sur-Noireau: 454, 455, 518 647–48
Condé-sur-Vire: 291, 298 xv: 575
Conley, Sgt. Irvin F.: 163n XIX: 95, 250, 302
Cook, Maj. Gen. Gilbert R.: 565, 567–68. See also Cossé-le-Vivien: 438
Corps, XII. Cota, Maj. Gen. Norman D.: 166, 170–71, 511, 622
Corbeil: 588, 610–11, 614–15, 621–22 Cotentin: 1–184, 259–61, 263, 267, 272–76, 279, 283-
Cordes, Sgt. Harold B.: 449n 84, 307, 326, 328, 330, 347,440
Corlett, Maj. Gen. Charles H.: 90, 100–101, 288. results of July offensive: 175–82
See also Corps, XIX. terrain of: 10–13, 38–40, 53–55, 119, 122–23, 214,
and Mortain: 449, 451–52 226–27,288
and operations east of the Seine: 672–73, 679–82, weather in: 119
695–96 Coudehard: 538, 542–43, 545–46, 549, 552–55
and operations east of the Vire: 296–304 Couesnon River: 371–72
and St. Lô: 102–18, 134, 149, 153–54, 158–59, 161, Counterbattery fire: 42–43, 67, 143, 161, 164, 202,
165–66, 168, 173–74 242, 250, 268, 298–99, 307, 446,490, 644
and Seine crossing: 579 Counterbattery fire, German: 66
Cornog, Col. William, Jr.: 487 Coutances-Caumont drive: 37, 38, 40, 53–61, 78-
Corps 80, 90, 175–82, 197–223, 226–27, 249–50, 257–58,
II: 36 261–63, 264, 266, 267–68, 271, 280, 306–07, 314,
V: 53, 90–118, 122–23, 133–40, 146–74, 178, 215–17, 325, 328
282–86, 290–95, 298, 424, 449–56, 471–72, 481–82, Couvains: 153, 156, 174
491–92, 510–15, 529, 533–34, 541, 577, 600–601, Crabill, Col. Edwin B.: 82, 408
606, 608, 610–11, 621–22, 672–73, 681–83, 692, Craft, Pfc. Roy V.: 684n
695–96. See also Gerow, Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Craig, Maj. Gen. Louis A.: 672
VII: 40, 53, 76–77, 78–90, 122–23, 124, 127, 128– Craon: 438
34, 140–41, 143–45, 165–66, 175, 197, 214, 215–46, Crerar, Lt. Gen. Sir Henry D. G.: 9, 454–56, 479,
249–81, 282–86, 287–88, 305–10, 314, 318, 329–32, 509–10
333–35, 347–48, 425, 428, 430, 444-49, 466–75, Criegern, Col. Friedrich von: 275–77
486–92, 494–505, 510–15, 524–27, 672, 682, 692- Crocodiles: 649–51
96. See also Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton. CROSSBOW: 34
VIII: 37, 40, 53–77, 78–81, 122–28, 143–44, 175, Crozon peninsula: 638–39,641, 647–48, 651–52
197–204, 215–46, 261–64, 266–81, 283–84, 287- Culin, Sgt. Curtis G., Jr.: 206
88, 306–07, 309–22, 330, 345–57, 369–415, 419- Curry, Pfc. Clifford L.: 285n
39, 440, 484, 495–97, 559–89, 631, 633–56, 666. Cuves: 447
See also Middleton, Maj. Gen. Troy H.
XII: 345–56, 563–68, 572–73, 583–89, 634, 665–67. Dager, Brig. Gen. Holmes E.: 311–12, 316–19, 567–
68
INDEX 731
Dangy: 260, 273 Dreux: 440, 455–56, 502, 520–21, 523–24, 563–65,
Danhauser, Generalleutnant Paul: 556 568–73,577–78, 583, 587–89, 600, 666
Daoulas promontory: 387, 638–42, 651–52 Drôme River: 49, 148
Deauville: 580–81 Dronne, Captain: 615
Deception: 32, 209, 235–36,238–39, 329, 345 Dual-purpose gun, 88-mm., enemy: 107
Deception, German: 318 Ducey: 318–20,470–71
DeFelice, Capt. Mario T.: 256n Dunkerque: 340, 677–78,686–87, 692, 699
Demolitions: 26–27, 94–97, 402, 404, 408, 641, 643–44, Dunn, Lt. Col. Carroll H.: 94
649–52 Durden, Lt. James I.: 379n
Demolitions, German: 5–6, 168, 339–40, 360–61, 366- Dwyer, Col. Philip R.: 164, 166
67, 398–99, 420, 535, 580–81, 598, 608–09, 614,
618, 655,698
Dempsey, Lt. Gen. Sir Miles C.: 9, 14, 188–96, 289, Earnest, Brig. Gen. Herbert L.: 349–51, 374, 389-
294–95, 454–56, 574 93, 651–52
Derval: 360–61 Eberbach, Gen. Heinrich: 169, 182
Dettling, Generalleutnant Augustus: 552 and Argentan-Falaise pocket: 481–86, 500–05, 507,
Devers, Lt. Gen. Jacob L.: 702 517–19, 521–23,530–33, 537n, 544–45
DeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L.: 236 and breakout to Avranches: 325–27
Dickson, Col. Benjamin A.: 36n, 46, 211–12 and Caen drive: 48,50, 121–22
Dieppe: 686–87, 692 and COBRA:191–94,225–26,239
Dietrich, Generaloberst Josef: 29 commands Panzer Group West: 47
and Argentan-Falaise pocket: 483, 505, 517–19, and counterattack on Avranches: 459–60,465
521, 532 Normandy defensive plan: 48, 50
and operations east of Seine: 663–64, 699 and operations east of Seine: 663–64, 674, 678
and Seine drive: 576–77, 579–82 and Seine drive: 421, 423
Dijon: 535, 566–67, 575, 654–55, 662, 669–70, 685, Echternach: 693
702 Eckesparre, Maj. Arthur yon: 483
Dinan: 350, 354–55, 369–79, 384, 386, 389–94, 396, Ecorches: 540–41
400 Ecouché 502,504–05,518, 520, 524–27,533–34
Dinant: 693–94 Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S.: 221n, 243, 249, 448.
Dinard: 394–97, 399–403,406, 410–11 See also Corps, XII; Infantry Divisions, 9th.
Distinguished Service Cross, awards of 704–06 biography: 134–35
Dives River: 518–19, 521–22, 523, 525, 527–29, 530, and Paris-Orleans gap: 584–85
532–34,537–43, 547–55,580–81 and Périers drive: 137–38, 141–42, 144
Division Artillery and pursuit to Rhine: 669
2d: 641n Edlin, 1st Lt. Robert: 642
4th: 64, 86,88,470–71 Ednie, Col. Alfred V.: 93, 169–70
9th: 64, 82, 236–37 Eisenhower, General of the Army Dwight D.: 14-
30th: 110, 113,490 15, 55, 119, 134–35, 204, 287, 334–35, 343–44,
83d: 242 394. See also Allied Expeditionary Force;
90th: 553 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Divisions, German, organization and strength: 32- Force.
33. See also German Army units, Divisions. and airborne and amphibious operations: 186
Divisions, U.S. See Airborne Divisions; Armored appointed Supreme Commander: 13n, 8–9
Divisions; Infantry Divisions. and Argentan-Falaise pocket: 492–94,506, 508–10
Doan, Lt. Col. Leander L.: 307–09 on artillery shortages: 45
Doenitz, Grossadmiral Karl: 18, 26, 28, 119 and beachhead build-up: 186–87
Dol-de-Bretagne: 341, 350, 369–79, 372–73, 389–90, on breakout into Brittany: 431
396 and Brest: 633, 644, 655–56
Dollman, Generaloberst Friedrich: 29, 47 and Caen: 190, 194–96
Domfront: 422–23, 430, 443, 444–46, 450, 456, 466- and COBRA:187,331
67,48243,492–95, 511, 517–18, 520 and command of ground forces: 8–9, 684–85
Dormans: 667–68 command structure, directive on: 197–98
Douai: 686 and drive west of Orne: 454
Douarnenez: 652 evaluation of Bradley: 36
Douve River: 38–39 on exploitation at Avranches: 339
DRAGOON.See Southern France. and Montgomery: 119
Draper, Pvt. William J.: 490n on nature of Normandy combat: 177
732 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Smoke, tactical use of: 70, 97–98, 199–200, 222, 234- Tactical plans—Continued
35, 268–69, 301–02, 339, 500, 510, 643–44, 649- Brittany: 10–11, 339–51, 354–55, 359–60, 362, 369-
51 80, 381, 383–86, 389, 562, 632–33, 642–43
Smythe, Col. George W.: 141 Caen: 120, 122, 188–96, 288–90
Snyder, Tech. Sgt. Harold D.: 163n COBRA:185–96, 197–223, 262–68, 270, 279, 282–92,
Soissons conference: 24 296–98,305–08, 309–11, 313–14
Somme River: 419, 422–23, 575–76, 582–83, 591–92, Cotentin: 10, 13–16, 36–47, 53–58, 80–82, 90, 93-
661–64, 670–71, 674–75, 678, 680, 686–87 96, 102–07, 123, 128–29, 140–42, 151, 153–59,
Soulle River: 260–61, 273, 275 161–64, 166, 168–70, 185–96, 197
Souloeuvre River: 290, 292, 294–95, 449–50 drive to Seine: 424–56, 465–67, 471–72, 559–69,
Souppes-sur-Loing: 584 572–74, 577–79, 590–91, 599, 606–08, 610–11,
Sourdeval: 423, 443–44, 446–47, 452–54, 466–67, 481- 614–15
82, 486, 490–92,494, 511 east of Seine: 573, 590–91, 632–33, 657–61, 664–66,
Southern France Campaign: 6, 486, 517, 521–22, 534- 669, 671–72, 674, 676–80, 684–88
35, 566–68, 654–55, 661–62, 669–70, 685–86, 697- Eisenhower role in: 119
99, 702 SHAEF: 185–96
Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl: 8 Tactical plans, German
Spang, Generalleutnant Karl: 384 air: 26, 28
Speer, Albert: 122 Argentan–Falaise pocket: 481–86, 498–501, 503–05,
Speidel, Generalleutnant Hans: 212, 521–22, 535n, 515–23, 528–40,542, 545, 548–52
608–09, 620–21 Brittany: 339–43, 357–58, 361, 381–82, 386–87, 396,
Squire, 1st Lt. William F.: 138n 632, 639
Stallings, Capt. George T.: 117n Caen: 191–92, 212–13
Steelman, Tech. Sgt. Fred D.: 299n COBRA:199, 201, 224–28, 246–49, 266, 275, 283–84,
Sterling, Tech. Sgt. Harold V.: 470 290–92, 295–96,298–99, 313, 323–32, 339–43
Storck, Col. Louis J.: 315n concept of commanders: 20–23
Strategic plans, Allied: 6 Cotentin: 20–27, 47–50, 58–59, 75, 94–95, 102,
Strategic plans, German: 20–28 148, 157, 159, 168–69, 177–78, 212–13, 224–28,
Strategic plans, U.S.: 220–23, 228–41 287, 296, 304, 322, 327, 330
Straube, General Erich: 551–52, 683 defensive concept: 24–26, 28, 30
Street fighting: 646–48, 651 defensive measures: 47–50
Strickland, Lt. Col. Erasmus H.: 447 drive to Seine: 419–39, 442–43, 457–62, 474–75,
Stroh, Maj. Gen. Donald A.: 125–26, 361–62, 647–48, 481–86, 566, 570, 575–76, 579–80, 582, 591–94,
652 609
Student, Generaloberst Kurt: 699 east of Seine: 661–65,669–71, 677–78, 698–700
Supply by artillery fire: 489 to hamper Allied mobility: 26–27
Supply deficiencies, German: 608–09 and Hitler’s decisions: 20–23, 25–28, 30
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force naval: 26, 28
(SHAEF). See also Allied Expeditionary Force; Tank Battalions: 43
Eisenhower, General Dwight D. 68th: 641n
and Argentan–Falaise pocket: 500 70th: 86
decisions on ports: 655–56 712th: 428n, 434n
displacement to France: 343–46, 684 737th: 163
and drive to Seine: 599, 605–06, 623–25 743d: 96, 113, 489
estimate of Brest garrison: 388 746th: 82
and operations east of Seine: 657, 684–88, 700 749th: 420n
recognition of FFI: 594–95 Tank Destroyer Battalions
supply capabilities: 491 603d: 373, 641n
tactical plans, initial: 185–96 607th: 428n, 434n
Sutherland, Col. Edwin M.: 473 654th: 163
Switzerland: 535, 661, 676–77,697 702d: 254n, 277–78
SWORDHILT: 186n 703d: 105n
Sylvan, Maj. William C.: 24n 705th: 641n
801st: 86
802d: 82
823d: 95, 114, 473–74
Tactical plans Tank Destroyer Brigade, 1st: 349n, 389, 641n
air: 3–4, 220–23, 228–41 Tank Destroyer Group, 6th: 349n, 389, 641n
Argentan–Falaise pocket: 479–80, 482–83, 492–502, Tank-infantry co-ordination
506–09, 513–14, 523–30 COBRA:243–44, 284
INDEX 747
Tank-infantry co-ordination—Continued Terrain—Continued
Cotentin: 41–44, 74–76, 85, 95–96, 106, 109–10, effect of, on operations-Continued
116, 207 Caen: 120–21, 193, 226
drive to Seine: 585 COBRA:241–42, 253–56, 265–68, 284–86, 290,
weaknesses in: 43–44, 106, 109–10, 116 292, 294–95, 298–99, 306, 313, 327
Tank-infantry co-ordination, German: 141–42 Cotentin: 30, 53–55, 81–83, 85, 88–89, 107–11,
Tank-infantry-engineer co-ordination: 149–50, 154 119, 122–23, 128, 129–30, 143–44, 176–78,
Tankdozers: 96, 107–08, 151–52, 154, 205–06, 311–12. 187–88, 198–202, 214,226
See also Bulldozers. hedgerows. See Hedgerows.
Tanks marsh: 38–39, 53, 55, 58–59, 92, 128, 178, 199-
armament: 45 200, 268
as cargo carriers: 68–69 mud: 69, 76
comparison with German: 204–05 water barriers: 39–40, 87, 92–93, 290, 294–95, 313-
Sherman: 45 14, 419, 663–65, 672, 674–75, 677, 699. See also
telephones in: 43–44 River crossings; River crossings, German.
vulnerability: 24 Terrette River: 143–44
Tanks, German Tessy-sur-Vire: 217–18, 256, 290, 292, 294, 296–304,
armament: 44–45 306, 313, 328, 330, 430, 441, 446–47, 449, 451,
capabilities: 44–46 452–53, 472
Mark III: 204–05 Thompson, Brig. Gen. John B.: 569–70
Mark IV: 44–46, 204–05, 253–55 Thorson, Brig. Gen. Truman C.: 36n, 679
Mark V (Panther): 30, 44–46, 63, 244, 260, 262, Thurston, Pfc. William: 73
274–75 Thury-Harcourt: 423, 454, 480
Mark VI (King or Royal Tiger): 30, 44–46, 204- Tilly: 239–40, 588–89
05 Time bombs: 506
Task Forces Tinchebray: 443, 450, 454, 461–62, 481, 490, 492-
A, VIII Corps: 349–56, 374–78, 381, 384–85, 389- 94, 510–11,529–30, 577, 634
94, 396, 413–14, 634–35, 640–41, 651–54 Tirepied: 314, 317, 321
B, VIII Corps: 640–42, 651–52 Topography. See Terrain.
Barth: 436–37 Torigni-sur-Vire: 291–92, 294–95, 298
C, 29th Division: 166, 169–74 TOTALIZE: 479n
Clarke: 428 Toul: 663, 696
Randolph: 428 Toulon: 552
S, 29th Division: 642 Touques River: 532–33, 575–76, 580–81
Weaver: 434–37, 497–98 Tournai: 660–61, 679–83, 686, 695
Wood: 434, 437–38 Tournai-sur-Dives: 547
Tauchert, Staff Sgt. Walter R.: 302n Tours: 484, 562–63, 566–68
Taute River: 38–39, 78, 80–81, 86–102, 106–07, 110- Toussus-le-Noble: 612–13
11, 128–33, 141–42, 198–200, 219, 227–28, 242, Traffic control: 4, 94, 97–98, 106, 241, 446
247, 250–51, 267–71 Traffic control, German: 522, 531–32, 534, 546, 671
Taute-Vire Canal. See Vire et Taute Canal. Training: 43–44, 149–50, 154
Taylor, Brig. Gen. James: 311, 374, 384 Trappes: 609–10
Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D.: 81 Tribehou island and causeway: 131–32, 135, 141–42,
redder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W.: 8, 190, 198–99
221 Trier: 693
Terrain Troisgots: 297–303, 323
Argentan–Falaise pocket: 479, 500, 502, 525, 534, Trouville: 442
540–42 Troyes: 584, 589, 662, 666–67, 698–99
bocage: 38 Trun: 527–34, 537–42, 544, 549, 551, 558
Brittany: 346–47, 371, 379, 382, 387–88, 396–97, Turkey: 419, 701
399, 406, 633, 638, 644
COBRA:214–15,257, 265–68, 283, 290, 313–14, 318 Unconditional surrender: 7–8
Cotentin: 4, 10–13, 38–39, 60–61, 64, 68–69, 72- Unger, Staff Sgt. Frederick W.: 299n
75, 92–93, 111, 129, 143, 148–49, 162, 199, 201- UTAHBeach: 10
02, 288
drive to Seine: 419, 448, 450–51, 563–64, 587–88 V-weapons
east of Seine: 419, 664, 672 defense against: 208n, 211–12
effect of, on operations enemy launchings: 34, 686–87
on armor actions: 30 launching sites, attacks on: 31, 34, 657–62, 676,
686–87
748 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Vaiges: 436 Wanielista, Pfc. Walter S.: 126n
Valenciennes: 683, 696 Warlimont, General Walter: 192, 296, 323, 325, 421
Valognes: 4, 209 Warren, 2d Lt. Glenn H.: 490n
Van Fleet, Brig. Gen. James A.: 640–41 Warspite, HMS: 413, 642–43
Vandenberg, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S.: 644 Waterloo: 695
Vannes: 3–4, 346–47, 355, 357, 362–65,385–86 Watson, Maj. Gen. Leroy H.: 103–04, 106–12, 116-
Vaucouleurs: 667 17, 264–66,513n, 642
Vaux de Vire River: 450–51 Weather, effect of, on operations
Vendôme: 567–68 Argentan–Falaise pocket: 503, 544–45, 548–49,
Verdun: 664, 668–70 551, 553
Verneuil: 520–21, 579 Brittany: 355, 379, 388, 636–37, 643–44,650, 653
Vernon: 568, 576, 578, 581, 671, 674 Caen: 189, 193
Versailles: 608–12, 621–22 COBRA: 210, 223, 228–30, 233–35, 262, 270, 304,
Verviers: 695 326, 333
Vervins: 682 Cotentin: 5–6, 37, 44, 57–59, 64, 67–71, 73, 76, 81-
Vesle River: 664 82, 87–88, 96–97, 99–100, 112–13, 119, 128, 129,
Vidouville: 290 141–42, 151, 158, 160–61, 166, 178–79,202
Vie River: 533, 548 drive to Seine: 461–62, 474–75, 480, 483–84, 575.
Viebig, Colonel Wilhelm: 551 578–79, 599, 612–13
Vieman, Lt. Col. Lewis D.: 489 east of Seine: 667, 674, 681, 697
Viette River: 529 Weaver, Brig. Gen. William G.: 434–37, 530n
Vilaine River: 362 Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab: 6
Villacoublay: 610 Weiss, Sgt. Harry: 126n
Villebaudon: 217–18, 256, 297–302, 448 Weiss, 2d Lt. Robert L.: 488
Villedieu-les-Bailleul: 551–52 Wesson, Lt. Col. H. K.: 643–44
Villedieu-les-Poëles: 287, 303, 306–09, 313, 317–19, West, Maj. Arthur L., Jr.: 584n
323-24, 330–31, 341, 441, 444, 446–48, 466, 471, West Wall. See Siegfried Line.
560 Weyland, Brig. Gen. Otto P.: 345–46, 567
Villeneuve-le-Roi: 609–10, 614–15 Wharton, Brig. Gen. James E.: 511
Villers-Bocage: 454 White, Staff Sgt. Clarence E.: 571n
Villers-Charlemagne: 438 White, Brig. Gen. Isaac D.: 272–74,276, 278
Villiers-Fossard: 153–54, 159, 162 White phosphorus, tactical use of 41, 42, 65, 96
Vimoutiers: 522–23, 529–32, 537n, 538, 540–42, 544- 131, 222, 319, 393, 409, 534, 655
46, 554–55 Whitson, Pvt. William H.: 319
Vincennes: 618–20 Whittington, Sgt. Hulon B.: 280
Vincenterie peninsula: 141–42 Wiesbaden: 658–59
Vire: 37–38, 287–290, 292, 294–95, 297–98, 301–03, Willingham, Tech. Sgt. Dupe A.: 586
322, 324, 327, 334–35, 422–23, 430, 441, 443–44, Wilson, Tech. Sgt. Milford W.: 402
446, 449–54, 455, 458, 471–72, 480–82, 491–92, Wilson, Col. Robert W.: 36n
494, 495–97 Winslow, Col. William R.: 311, 649–50
Vire et Taute Canal: 90–101, 106, 109–10, 134–35, Wire obstacles, use of 57, 75, 124–25, 151, 299, 638,
140–41 641
Vire River: 10n, 11, 25, 38–40, 49, 102–07, 109, 111, Wissous: 609–10
117–18, 143, 148–49, 153–57, 159–63, 165–66, Wood, Maj. Gen. John S.: 310, 312n, 314, 316–18,
169, 171–75, 214–19, 226–28, 239–41, 243–44, 351, 353–54, 357–68, 567–68,584, 600
247–48, 250–52, 255, 260–61, 272, 275–76, 288–99, Wood, Col. Sterling A.: 74, 434
327, 422, 449–50 Woody, 1st Lt. Ronal E., Jr.: 488
Vitré: 438, 471–72, 560–62 World War I: 558, 701–02
Vitry-le-François: 664–67, 669–70 Wyche, Maj. Gen. Ira T.: 73–76, 123–24, 126, 434,
Vorché: 547, 551 437–38, 574–75
Vosges Mountains: 419
Wagner, Pfc. Theodore G.: 127n Yonne River: 534–35, 584, 587, 597–98, 607
Wahl, Captain: 520–21, 577–78 York, Col. Robert H.: 132, 200–201
Walker, Brig. Gen. Nelson M.: 125 Yuill, Col. Charles W.: 561–62
Walker, Maj. Gen. Walton H. See also Corps, XX.
biography: 559
and drive to Seine: 559–63, 568–71, 585, 588–89 Zeitzler, Generaloberst Kurt: 210–11
and operations east of Seine: 667–68 Zingale, Pfc. Leo T.: 126n
and St. Lô: 104, 112 Zwicker, Col. Ralph W.: 151
INDEX 745
St. Ideuc: 397, 399, 402–04 Sée River—Continued
St. Jean-de-Daye: 93–94, 97, 99, 104, 106–07, 110- 468–71, 473–74, 487, 490
12, 113–15, 134, 135–37 Sées: 492–95, 497, 498, 500–503, 513–14, 519–20, 522,
St. Jean-des-Baisants: 283–86, 290 562–63, 568, 608
St. Joseph’s Hill: 397, 399–400 Segre: 560–61
St. Lambert: 533, 538–43, 547–54 Seine River: 3–6, 10–11, 14, 16, 29–30, 33, 38–39,
St. Lô: 29, 38, 40, 49, 60, 78–80, 86, 90–93, 101–04, 193–94, 334–35, 340–41, 343, 348–49, 421–22,
106, 111, 117–18, 133, 135–37, 139–41, 143, 146- 430–33, 440, 454–56, 495–97, 507, 523–24, 532-
74. 214–15, 215n, 224, 226–27, 240–41, 243–44, 33, 534–35, 553–54, 556, 558–92, 597–98, 607,
248, 249–51, 257, 261–63, 267–68, 271, 282–85, 609–15, 621–22, 632, 657–66, 670–71, 672, 674,
286, 296–97, 326–27, 329 676–78, 686, 690,698–99
St. Lunaire: 402 Seine River, bay of 191–92, 394
St. Malo: 34, 324, 340, 342–43, 346–47, 349–51, 366, Seitz, Col. John F. R.: 257
372, 374, 376–77, 379, 381, 384–85, 389–415, Selleck, 2d Lt. Harold B.: 444n
562, 631, 634 Selune River: 313–14, 317–21, 331, 343, 369, 425, 427,
St. Malo Citadel: 396–97, 399, 402–03, 631 430, 444, 446, 454, 456, 466–67, 470–71
St. Marc: 638 Senlis: 576
St. Michel-en-Grève: 392–93, 413–15, 636–37 Sens: 535, 584, 587, 666
St. Mihiel: 664, 667 Sèves River: 59, 124, 127, 129–30, 178, 201–02, 267-
St. Nazaire: 3–4, 10–11, 340, 342–43, 346–47, 357, 361, 70
366, 414–15, 561, 631, 633–84, 655–56 Sèvres: 610–13,615
St. Pierre-Quilbignan: 638, 648 Shea, Brig. Gen. George: 95
St. Pierre-sur-Dives: 518–19, 528 Shortages
St. Pois: 308, 330, 334–35, 444–48, 450, 466, 471 ammunition: 15, 37, 68–69, 87–88, 99, 100, 179,
St. Quentin: 582, 678–79, 683, 692 358, 372, 546–47, 635–37, 642–46
St. Samson-de-Bonfossé: 255–56 artillery: 45
St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte: 60–62 grenade launchers: 42
St. Sauveur-Lendelin: 248–51, 260, 266–68, 270, 271, manpower: 179
311–12 maps: 179
St. Servan-sur-Mer: 396–400, 403, 406–08 medical supplies: 666
St. Sever-Calvados: 287, 448–49,471 POL: 358, 363, 372, 438–39, 541, 666–69, 680–82,
St. Vaast: 4 686, 692–96
St. Valery-en-Caux: 686–87 rations: 68–69, 87–88, 358, 691–92
St. Vith: 693 transport: 68–69, 636–37
Ste. Suzanne: 436–37 water: 68–69, 372
Ste. Suzanne-sur-Vire: 283–84, 290 white phosphorus: 42
Sainteny: 80–89, 128–31 Shortages, German
Sambre River: 672, 694 ammunition: 33, 181, 224–25, 503, 517–18, 521,
Saône River: 419, 575–76, 591–92, 661–64, 674–75, 551, 556–57, 683
678 manpower: 32, 325–26
Sarthe River: 435, 437–39, 524–25, 561–62,567 mines: 57
Sartilly: 317–18, 321 POL: 33, 224, 503–05, 517–22, 531, 538–39, 556,
Saumur: 561, 566–67, 635 683
Savigny: 260–63,266 rations: 33
Scanlon, Staff Sgt. George T.: 646n tanks: 213, 224–25
Schelde (Escaut) River: 660–61, 663, 674–75, 677- transport: 326–27
79, 686–87, 692, 699 weapons: 33
Schimpf, Generalleutnant Richard: 524–43 wire: 57
Schulz, Maj. Robert H.: 530n Sicily Campaign: 7–8
Schutzstaffel: 18–19 Siegfried Line: 27, 419–21, 676–78,677n, 692–702
Schwerin, Generalleutnant Gerhard Graf von: 462- Sienne River: 218, 260–61, 264, 272–74, 276–78, 296,
64, 580 306–07, 314–17
Searchlights, tactical use. See Illumination, battle- Sille-le-Guillaume: 486, 514
field. Silrester, Maj. Gen. Lindsay McD.: 568–70, 588, 667-
Sears, Col. Robert: 565–66 68
Sebree, Brig. Gen. Edmund B.: 163, 565–66 Simard, Capt. Naubert O., Jr.: 280n
“Secret weapons,” German: 536, 604 Simonds, Lt. Gen. Sir G. G.: 479
Sedan: 671–72, 682, 692 Simpson, Lt. Gen. William H.: 637–38
Sée River: 287, 308, 313–14, 317–19, 321, 331, 356, Slidex: 114n
422, 425–27, 429, 443, 444, 446–48, 456–63, 466, Smith, Col. George, Jr.: 253
746 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Smoke, tactical use of: 70, 97–98, 199–200, 222, 234- Tactical plans—Continued
35, 268–69, 301–02, 339, 500, 510, 643–44, 649- Brittany: 10–11, 339–51, 354–55, 359–60, 362, 369-
51 80, 381, 383–86, 389, 562, 632–33, 642–43
Smythe, Col. George W.: 141 Caen: 120, 122, 188–96, 288–90
Snyder, Tech. Sgt. Harold D.: 163n COBRA:185–96, 197–223, 262–68, 270, 279, 282–92,
Soissons conference: 24 296–98,305–08, 309–11, 313–14
Somme River: 419, 422–23, 575–76, 582–83, 591–92, Cotentin: 10, 13–16, 36–47, 53–58, 80–82, 90, 93-
661–64, 670–71, 674–75, 678, 680, 686–87 96, 102–07, 123, 128–29, 140–42, 151, 153–59,
Soulle River: 260–61, 273, 275 161–64, 166, 168–70, 185–96, 197
Souloeuvre River: 290, 292, 294–95, 449–50 drive to Seine: 424–56, 465–67, 471–72, 559–69,
Souppes-sur-Loing: 584 572–74, 577–79, 590–91, 599, 606–08, 610–11,
Sourdeval: 423, 443–44, 446–47, 452–54, 466–67, 481- 614–15
82, 486, 490–92,494, 511 east of Seine: 573, 590–91, 632–33, 657–61, 664–66,
Southern France Campaign: 6, 486, 517, 521–22, 534- 669, 671–72, 674, 676–80, 684–88
35, 566–68, 654–55, 661–62, 669–70, 685–86, 697- Eisenhower role in: 119
99, 702 SHAEF: 185–96
Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Carl: 8 Tactical plans, German
Spang, Generalleutnant Karl: 384 air: 26, 28
Speer, Albert: 122 Argentan–Falaise pocket: 481–86, 498–501, 503–05,
Speidel, Generalleutnant Hans: 212, 521–22, 535n, 515–23, 528–40,542, 545, 548–52
608–09, 620–21 Brittany: 339–43, 357–58, 361, 381–82, 386–87, 396,
Squire, 1st Lt. William F.: 138n 632, 639
Stallings, Capt. George T.: 117n Caen: 191–92, 212–13
Steelman, Tech. Sgt. Fred D.: 299n COBRA:199, 201, 224–28, 246–49, 266, 275, 283–84,
Sterling, Tech. Sgt. Harold V.: 470 290–92, 295–96,298–99, 313, 323–32, 339–43
Storck, Col. Louis J.: 315n concept of commanders: 20–23
Strategic plans, Allied: 6 Cotentin: 20–27, 47–50, 58–59, 75, 94–95, 102,
Strategic plans, German: 20–28 148, 157, 159, 168–69, 177–78, 212–13, 224–28,
Strategic plans, U.S.: 220–23, 228–41 287, 296, 304, 322, 327, 330
Straube, General Erich: 551–52, 683 defensive concept: 24–26, 28, 30
Street fighting: 646–48, 651 defensive measures: 47–50
Strickland, Lt. Col. Erasmus H.: 447 drive to Seine: 419–39, 442–43, 457–62, 474–75,
Stroh, Maj. Gen. Donald A.: 125–26, 361–62, 647–48, 481–86, 566, 570, 575–76, 579–80, 582, 591–94,
652 609
Student, Generaloberst Kurt: 699 east of Seine: 661–65,669–71, 677–78, 698–700
Supply by artillery fire: 489 to hamper Allied mobility: 26–27
Supply deficiencies, German: 608–09 and Hitler’s decisions: 20–23, 25–28, 30
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force naval: 26, 28
(SHAEF). See also Allied Expeditionary Force; Tank Battalions: 43
Eisenhower, General Dwight D. 68th: 641n
and Argentan–Falaise pocket: 500 70th: 86
decisions on ports: 655–56 712th: 428n, 434n
displacement to France: 343–46, 684 737th: 163
and drive to Seine: 599, 605–06, 623–25 743d: 96, 113, 489
estimate of Brest garrison: 388 746th: 82
and operations east of Seine: 657, 684–88, 700 749th: 420n
recognition of FFI: 594–95 Tank Destroyer Battalions
supply capabilities: 491 603d: 373, 641n
tactical plans, initial: 185–96 607th: 428n, 434n
Sutherland, Col. Edwin M.: 473 654th: 163
Switzerland: 535, 661, 676–77,697 702d: 254n, 277–78
SWORDHILT: 186n 703d: 105n
Sylvan, Maj. William C.: 24n 705th: 641n
801st: 86
802d: 82
823d: 95, 114, 473–74
Tactical plans Tank Destroyer Brigade, 1st: 349n, 389, 641n
air: 3–4, 220–23, 228–41 Tank Destroyer Group, 6th: 349n, 389, 641n
Argentan–Falaise pocket: 479–80, 482–83, 492–502, Tank-infantry co-ordination
506–09, 513–14, 523–30 COBRA:243–44, 284
INDEX 747
Tank-infantry co-ordination—Continued Terrain—Continued
Cotentin: 41–44, 74–76, 85, 95–96, 106, 109–10, effect of, on operations-Continued
116, 207 Caen: 120–21, 193, 226
drive to Seine: 585 COBRA:241–42, 253–56, 265–68, 284–86, 290,
weaknesses in: 43–44, 106, 109–10, 116 292, 294–95, 298–99, 306, 313, 327
Tank-infantry co-ordination, German: 141–42 Cotentin: 30, 53–55, 81–83, 85, 88–89, 107–11,
Tank-infantry-engineer co-ordination: 149–50, 154 119, 122–23, 128, 129–30, 143–44, 176–78,
Tankdozers: 96, 107–08, 151–52, 154, 205–06, 311–12. 187–88, 198–202, 214,226
See also Bulldozers. hedgerows. See Hedgerows.
Tanks marsh: 38–39, 53, 55, 58–59, 92, 128, 178, 199-
armament: 45 200, 268
as cargo carriers: 68–69 mud: 69, 76
comparison with German: 204–05 water barriers: 39–40, 87, 92–93, 290, 294–95, 313-
Sherman: 45 14, 419, 663–65, 672, 674–75, 677, 699. See also
telephones in: 43–44 River crossings; River crossings, German.
vulnerability: 24 Terrette River: 143–44
Tanks, German Tessy-sur-Vire: 217–18, 256, 290, 292, 294, 296–304,
armament: 44–45 306, 313, 328, 330, 430, 441, 446–47, 449, 451,
capabilities: 44–46 452–53, 472
Mark III: 204–05 Thompson, Brig. Gen. John B.: 569–70
Mark IV: 44–46, 204–05, 253–55 Thorson, Brig. Gen. Truman C.: 36n, 679
Mark V (Panther): 30, 44–46, 63, 244, 260, 262, Thurston, Pfc. William: 73
274–75 Thury-Harcourt: 423, 454, 480
Mark VI (King or Royal Tiger): 30, 44–46, 204- Tilly: 239–40, 588–89
05 Time bombs: 506
Task Forces Tinchebray: 443, 450, 454, 461–62, 481, 490, 492-
A, VIII Corps: 349–56, 374–78, 381, 384–85, 389- 94, 510–11,529–30, 577, 634
94, 396, 413–14, 634–35, 640–41, 651–54 Tirepied: 314, 317, 321
B, VIII Corps: 640–42, 651–52 Topography. See Terrain.
Barth: 436–37 Torigni-sur-Vire: 291–92, 294–95, 298
C, 29th Division: 166, 169–74 TOTALIZE: 479n
Clarke: 428 Toul: 663, 696
Randolph: 428 Toulon: 552
S, 29th Division: 642 Touques River: 532–33, 575–76, 580–81
Weaver: 434–37, 497–98 Tournai: 660–61, 679–83, 686, 695
Wood: 434, 437–38 Tournai-sur-Dives: 547
Tauchert, Staff Sgt. Walter R.: 302n Tours: 484, 562–63, 566–68
Taute River: 38–39, 78, 80–81, 86–102, 106–07, 110- Toussus-le-Noble: 612–13
11, 128–33, 141–42, 198–200, 219, 227–28, 242, Traffic control: 4, 94, 97–98, 106, 241, 446
247, 250–51, 267–71 Traffic control, German: 522, 531–32, 534, 546, 671
Taute-Vire Canal. See Vire et Taute Canal. Training: 43–44, 149–50, 154
Taylor, Brig. Gen. James: 311, 374, 384 Trappes: 609–10
Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D.: 81 Tribehou island and causeway: 131–32, 135, 141–42,
redder, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W.: 8, 190, 198–99
221 Trier: 693
Terrain Troisgots: 297–303, 323
Argentan–Falaise pocket: 479, 500, 502, 525, 534, Trouville: 442
540–42 Troyes: 584, 589, 662, 666–67, 698–99
bocage: 38 Trun: 527–34, 537–42, 544, 549, 551, 558
Brittany: 346–47, 371, 379, 382, 387–88, 396–97, Turkey: 419, 701
399, 406, 633, 638, 644
COBRA:214–15,257, 265–68, 283, 290, 313–14, 318 Unconditional surrender: 7–8
Cotentin: 4, 10–13, 38–39, 60–61, 64, 68–69, 72- Unger, Staff Sgt. Frederick W.: 299n
75, 92–93, 111, 129, 143, 148–49, 162, 199, 201- UTAHBeach: 10
02, 288
drive to Seine: 419, 448, 450–51, 563–64, 587–88 V-weapons
east of Seine: 419, 664, 672 defense against: 208n, 211–12
effect of, on operations enemy launchings: 34, 686–87
on armor actions: 30 launching sites, attacks on: 31, 34, 657–62, 676,
686–87
748 BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT
Vaiges: 436 Wanielista, Pfc. Walter S.: 126n
Valenciennes: 683, 696 Warlimont, General Walter: 192, 296, 323, 325, 421
Valognes: 4, 209 Warren, 2d Lt. Glenn H.: 490n
Van Fleet, Brig. Gen. James A.: 640–41 Warspite, HMS: 413, 642–43
Vandenberg, Maj. Gen. Hoyt S.: 644 Waterloo: 695
Vannes: 3–4, 346–47, 355, 357, 362–65,385–86 Watson, Maj. Gen. Leroy H.: 103–04, 106–12, 116-
Vaucouleurs: 667 17, 264–66,513n, 642
Vaux de Vire River: 450–51 Weather, effect of, on operations
Vendôme: 567–68 Argentan–Falaise pocket: 503, 544–45, 548–49,
Verdun: 664, 668–70 551, 553
Verneuil: 520–21, 579 Brittany: 355, 379, 388, 636–37, 643–44,650, 653
Vernon: 568, 576, 578, 581, 671, 674 Caen: 189, 193
Versailles: 608–12, 621–22 COBRA: 210, 223, 228–30, 233–35, 262, 270, 304,
Verviers: 695 326, 333
Vervins: 682 Cotentin: 5–6, 37, 44, 57–59, 64, 67–71, 73, 76, 81-
Vesle River: 664 82, 87–88, 96–97, 99–100, 112–13, 119, 128, 129,
Vidouville: 290 141–42, 151, 158, 160–61, 166, 178–79,202
Vie River: 533, 548 drive to Seine: 461–62, 474–75, 480, 483–84, 575.
Viebig, Colonel Wilhelm: 551 578–79, 599, 612–13
Vieman, Lt. Col. Lewis D.: 489 east of Seine: 667, 674, 681, 697
Viette River: 529 Weaver, Brig. Gen. William G.: 434–37, 530n
Vilaine River: 362 Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab: 6
Villacoublay: 610 Weiss, Sgt. Harry: 126n
Villebaudon: 217–18, 256, 297–302, 448 Weiss, 2d Lt. Robert L.: 488
Villedieu-les-Bailleul: 551–52 Wesson, Lt. Col. H. K.: 643–44
Villedieu-les-Poëles: 287, 303, 306–09, 313, 317–19, West, Maj. Arthur L., Jr.: 584n
323-24, 330–31, 341, 441, 444, 446–48, 466, 471, West Wall. See Siegfried Line.
560 Weyland, Brig. Gen. Otto P.: 345–46, 567
Villeneuve-le-Roi: 609–10, 614–15 Wharton, Brig. Gen. James E.: 511
Villers-Bocage: 454 White, Staff Sgt. Clarence E.: 571n
Villers-Charlemagne: 438 White, Brig. Gen. Isaac D.: 272–74,276, 278
Villiers-Fossard: 153–54, 159, 162 White phosphorus, tactical use of 41, 42, 65, 96
Vimoutiers: 522–23, 529–32, 537n, 538, 540–42, 544- 131, 222, 319, 393, 409, 534, 655
46, 554–55 Whitson, Pvt. William H.: 319
Vincennes: 618–20 Whittington, Sgt. Hulon B.: 280
Vincenterie peninsula: 141–42 Wiesbaden: 658–59
Vire: 37–38, 287–290, 292, 294–95, 297–98, 301–03, Willingham, Tech. Sgt. Dupe A.: 586
322, 324, 327, 334–35, 422–23, 430, 441, 443–44, Wilson, Tech. Sgt. Milford W.: 402
446, 449–54, 455, 458, 471–72, 480–82, 491–92, Wilson, Col. Robert W.: 36n
494, 495–97 Winslow, Col. William R.: 311, 649–50
Vire et Taute Canal: 90–101, 106, 109–10, 134–35, Wire obstacles, use of 57, 75, 124–25, 151, 299, 638,
140–41 641
Vire River: 10n, 11, 25, 38–40, 49, 102–07, 109, 111, Wissous: 609–10
117–18, 143, 148–49, 153–57, 159–63, 165–66, Wood, Maj. Gen. John S.: 310, 312n, 314, 316–18,
169, 171–75, 214–19, 226–28, 239–41, 243–44, 351, 353–54, 357–68, 567–68,584, 600
247–48, 250–52, 255, 260–61, 272, 275–76, 288–99, Wood, Col. Sterling A.: 74, 434
327, 422, 449–50 Woody, 1st Lt. Ronal E., Jr.: 488
Vitré: 438, 471–72, 560–62 World War I: 558, 701–02
Vitry-le-François: 664–67, 669–70 Wyche, Maj. Gen. Ira T.: 73–76, 123–24, 126, 434,
Vorché: 547, 551 437–38, 574–75
Vosges Mountains: 419
Wagner, Pfc. Theodore G.: 127n Yonne River: 534–35, 584, 587, 597–98, 607
Wahl, Captain: 520–21, 577–78 York, Col. Robert H.: 132, 200–201
Walker, Brig. Gen. Nelson M.: 125 Yuill, Col. Charles W.: 561–62
Walker, Maj. Gen. Walton H. See also Corps, XX.
biography: 559
and drive to Seine: 559–63, 568–71, 585, 588–89 Zeitzler, Generaloberst Kurt: 210–11
and operations east of Seine: 667–68 Zingale, Pfc. Leo T.: 126n
and St. Lô: 104, 112 Zwicker, Col. Ralph W.: 151