Professional Documents
Culture Documents
this was a very proper and suitable case to try before the com- C. A.
mercial court, but without doubt because I can see no ground to ^958
justify a refusal to stay the action or in effect to make the order
. PHOENIX
t h a t t h e parties should not be bound by their agreement to TIMBER
arbitrate. CO.^LTD.-S
I agree with my Lords in their interpretation of section 5 of j n re,
t h e Act.
Appeal allowed.
Solicitors: Middleton, Lewis & Co.; Constant & Constant.
B . A. B .
H A N A K v. G R E E N . C. A.
" an action for the recovery of a sum " succeeding paragraph, Eule 6 of
"of money only shall be deter- " this Order shall apply to a counter-
" mined—(a) as regards the costs of "claim as it applies to a claim."
" the plaintiff, by the amount re- B. 7 (2) contains detailed provi-
" covered; and (t>) as regards the sions relating to the position where
" costs of the defendant, by the plaintiff or defendant is awarded costs
"amount claimed; . . . " on both claim and counterclaim.
E. 7. " (1) Subject to the next
2 Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. U
MORRIS L.J. The disputes between the plaintiff and the defen
dant were decided by the judge after considering the report made
by a referee before whom the parties appeared for three days.
So far as conclusions of fact and conclusions as to amounts are
concerned there is no appeal. The appeal originates in the discon
tent of the defendant as to the orders as to costs. But in order
to meet the difficulties that face those who complain of orders
concerning costs when there is a discretion in a judge as to the
award of them, the defendant challenges the form in which the
judgment was entered. If he does this successfully then he
submits that on a different form of judgment he can ask for a
different order as to costs. I t is only because of a very natural
concern as to the costs of the struggle that submissions have been
made to us as to the form in which the decisions in the struggle,
not themselves now in issue, should be expressed. So it has come
about that we have heard a learned debate, rich in academic
interest, but, save so far as costs are affected, barren of practical
consequence, on the subject as to whether certain claims could be
proudly marshalled as set-off or could only be modestly deployed
as counterclaim.
Before recording a view on the points of law it is necessary
to have in mind the nature of the various claims. [His Lord
ship stated the facts and continued: ] The judge did not, in his
judgment, deal with the question as to whether there was a set
off: this was probably because the submission as to set-off was
only being made in furtherance of the endeavour to have an order
as to costs which was favourable to the defendant.
Mr. Campbell submits that the items which total £84 19s. 3d.
should have been treated as being in part set off, with the result
that the plaintiff should have been adjudged to recover nothing
and the defendant to recover £10 Is. 9d. on his counterclaim.
In In re A Bankruptcy Notice 1 Lord Hanworth M.E. said:
" With regard to the word ' set-off,' that is a word well known
" and established in its meaning; it is something which provides
" a defence because the nature and quality of the sum so relied
i [1934] Ch. 431, 437.
2 Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. 17
" upon are such that it is a sum which is proper to be dealt with C. A.
" as diminishing the claim which is made, and against which the ^959
" sum so demanded can be set off." But in an action at law a
defendant could only set off after the passing of the Statutes of „
Set-off. The statute of 2 Geo. 2, c. 22, provided that if there GBEEN.
were mutual debts between a plaintiff and a defendant then one Morris L.J.
debt might be set against the other. But under that statute and
under the statute of 8 Geo. 2, c. 24, the claims on both sides
had to be liquidated debts or money demands which could be
ascertained with certainty at the time of pleading. Counterclaim
is the creature of statute. The Supreme Court of Judicature Act,
1873, s. 24 (3), enabled the courts to hear a counterclaim: until
then a cross-claim had to be advanced by a separate action. But
before the Judicature Act, 1873, there were circumstances in
which a defendant who was sued could, without bringing a
separate action, set up certain contentions against the plaintiff.
Thus ; in answer to a claim for the price of goods sold, it became
possible for a defendant to assert that the goods were of poor
quality. He was allowed to do so by way of defending the claim
made against him. That was not, however, by way of set-off.
Though a set-off when permissible is a defence, it is, of course,
not correct to say that every defence is a set-off. The way in
which the matter developed was explained by Parke B. in his
judgment in Mondel v. Steel.2 He said: " Formerly, it was the
" practice, where an action was brought for an agreed price of a
" specific chattel, sold with a warranty, or of work which was to
" be performed according to contract, to allow the plaintiff to
" recover the stipulated sum, leaving the defendant to a cross-
" action for breach of the warranty or contract; in which action,
" as well the difference between the price contracted for and the
" real value of the articles or of the work done, as any conse-
" quential damage, might have been recovered; and this course
" was simple and consistent. In the one case, the performance
" of the warranty not being a condition precedent to the payment
" of the price, the defendant, who received the chattel warranted,
" has thereby the property vested in him indefeasibly, and is
" incapable of returning it back; he has all that he stipulated for
" as the condition of paying the price, and therefore it was held
" that he ought to pay it, and seek his remedy on the plaintiff's
" contract of warranty. In the other case, the law appears to
" have construed the contract as not importing that the
" performance of every portion of the work should be a condition
c
the case that every cross-claim may be presented as a set-oS - A.
even if in amount it equals or overtops the claim. Nor does the igsg
mere fact that the cross-claim is in some way related to the trans- ~~
action which gave rise to the claim serve to invest the cross-claim „'.
GBEEN
with the quality of set-off. -
The position is, therefore, that since the Judicature Acts there Morris L.J.
may be (1) a set-off of mutual debts; (2) in certain cases a setting
up of matters of complaint which, if established, reduce or even
extinguish the claim, and (3) reliance upon equitable set-off and
reliance as a matter of defence upon matters of equity which
formerly might have called for injunction or prohibition. The
basis of (1) was explained in Stooke v. Taylor,25 in which case
Cockburn C.J. pointed out that in the case of a set-off, the
existence and the amount of a set-off must be taken to be known
to a plaintiff who should give credit for it in his action against
the defendant. He pointed out that that reasoning did not apply
to a counterclaim, which to all intents and purposes is an action
by the defendant against the plaintiff, and in which the claims are
not confined to debts or liquidated damages. In the same case
he said 2 6 : " Set-off and counterclaim are both the creation of
" statute, the common law not admitting of the action of a plain-
" tiff against a defendant being met by an independent claim of
" the defendant against the plaintiff, but leaving the defendant
" to his cross-action. The effect of these two modes of proceeding
" must, therefore, be sought in the statutes by which they were
" introduced, and in their results; and when these are looked at,
" it will be seen how essentially these two forms of procedure
" differ. By the Statutes of Set-off this plea is available only
" where the claims on both sides are in respect of liquidated
" debts, or money demands which can be readily and without
" difficulty ascertained. The plea can only be used in the way
" of defence to the plaintiff's action, as a shield, not as a sword."
The cases within group (2) are those within the principle of
Mondel v. Steel,27 to which I have referred. In these cases there
is a defence to the claim which the law recognizes (compare Sale
of Goods Act, 1893, s. 53). The cases within group (3) are those
in which a court of equity would have regarded the cross-claims
as entitling the defendant to be protected in one way or another
against the plaintiff's claim. Eeliance may be placed in a court
of law upon any equitable defence or equitable ground for relief:
so also any matter of equity on which an injunction against the
'' to restrain the plaintiff from proceeding with his action, I think C. A.
" a defendant is now enabled to rely on these grounds as a 1953
" defence to the action." Channell J., in his judgment, pointed —~~
out that if the defendant's claim had been for a liquidated amount v%
then, as the plaintiff was suing as trustee for her son, there could GBEEN.
even before the Judicature Acts have been a set-off. Channell J. Morris L.J.
added 3 0 : " T h e n the Judicature Act, and more especially the
" rules, distinctly put an unliquidated claim on the same footing
" a s a liquidated claim for the purposes of set-off; and conse-
" quently the defendant's claim against the plaintiff's son, which,
" if liquidated, could have been pleaded before the Judicature Act
" a s a set-off to the plaintiff's claim, can now, although unliqui-
" dated, be relied on as a defence to the extent of the claim."
These words must, I think, be read in relation to the situation
being dealt with in the case and in their context: they accord
with the reasoning of Lord Alverstone C.J., and they explain the
effect of the Judicature Acts in allowing reliance as a defence
upon matters of equity which formerly might have called for
injunction or prohibition. But I do not understand that Channell
J. was saying that the Judicature Acts abolish entirely the differ
ence between set-off and counterclaim, and, indeed, in view of the
authorities, he could hardly have so intended.
It was pointed out in Bankes v. Jarvis 31 that the plaintiff,
suing as trustee, " could not be in a better position than an
" assignee for value suing in his own name against whom ali
" equitable defences can be relied on." The case is in line with
Young v. Kitchin32 and with Newfoundland Government v. New-
foundland Railway Co.33 In the latter case, as in Young v.
Kitchin, there was an assignment and the principle of Young v.
Kitchin was followed. An assignee takes subject to equities. The
result is, that by allowing certain matters of equity to be relied
on by way of defence, there may in some cases be a setting up by
way of defence of cross-claims which are for liquidated damages.
For the reasons that I have indicated, I consider that a cross-
claim can be regarded as a set-off if in a court of law it would
have been so regarded at the time of the Judicature Acts, or if
it would have been regarded by a court of equity as the basis for
equitable set-off or for giving protection on equitable grounds to a
defendant.
What, then, is the result in the present case? The two sums
of £69 l i s . and £12 7s. 6d. were in substance and for all practical
32
30 [1903] 1 K.B. 549, 553. 3 Ex.D. 127.
31 [1903] 1 K.B. 549. " (1888) 13 App.Cas. 199, 213.
26
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [1958]
C A. purposes sums which were extras to the defendant's contract.
1958 Although the latter of these was claimed to be recoverable as a
sum due for breach of an implied term of the contract to allow
„. reasonable access to the premises, it represented expenses incurred
GREEN. by the defendant in the course of doing work for the plaintiff.
Morris L.J. Hence, leaving aside the small item of £ 3 Os. 9d., the sum
recovered as damages for trespass, the defendant was entitled to
£81 18s. 6d. That was an amount which in effect remained due
to the defendant under the contract under which he agreed to do
work for the plaintiff. B u t he had done some of the work badly
and because of this the plaintiff was entitled to £74 17s. 6d. from
him. On the authorities to which I have referred, it seems to m e
t h a t a court of equity would say t h a t neither of these claims ought
to be insisted upon without taking the other into account. I t
would not be equitable for the plaintiff to recover the £74 17s. 6d.
while the £81 18s. 6d. was owing by her under the contract. If
the defendant had assigned his claim to £81 18s. 6d. and if his
assignee had sued the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have been
entitled to set off her £74 17s. 6d. The position would be
comparable with t h a t in Young v. Kitchin,3i to which I have
referred above, and the passage from the judgment of Cleasby B .
becomes applicable. I t would be a case where in equity the
whole m a t t e r could be dealt with. The assignee would take
subject to equities and the plaintiff, if sued for the £ 8 1 18s. 6d.,
would be entitled " by way of set-off or deduction " to the
damages which she had sustained by the non-performance or
faulty performance of the contract on the part of the defendant.
On the authorities to which I have referred, it seems to m e
t h a t the defendant had an equitable set-off which defeated the
plaintiff's claim. This conclusion does not in any way depend
upon the terms used in the defence to the counterclaim. The
question as to what is a set-off is to be determined as a m a t t e r of
law and is not in any way governed by the language used by the
parties in their pleadings: see Sharpo v. Haggith.35
I n m y judgment, therefore, the defendant succeeded in
defeating the claim of the plaintiff and in establishing his right
to £10 I s . 9d. on the counterclaim. I t becomes necessary to
consider what is the fair order to make as to costs on this altered
and different basis. I think t h a t there should be judgment for
the defendant on the claim with costs on scale 4 : t h a t there
should be judgment for the defendant for £10 I s . 9d. on the
36 [1950] 1 All E.E. 378, 383. " [1954] 1 W.L.R. 809; [1954] 2
All E.R. 243.
28
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. [1958]
C A. i n exceptional circumstances. The Court of Appeal unhesitatingly
1958 reversed the order and directed that the tenant should have the
~ costs of the action.
HANAK
v. There had been in that case a tender, but it was a tender only
l_r"R T?pxf ^^
' of the balance of the rent. There was no tender in the present
Sellers L.J, case, but there was, as it turned out, no balance in favour of the
plaintiff. In order to avoid the liability for costs, if correctly
awarded here, and to meet the plaintiff's claim, which was pleaded
at £266 14s. and had been originally advanced at nearly double, the
defendant would have had to have tendered before action or have
paid into court £75 or thereabouts. If this had been accepted
(as it might have been) the defendant would have been left with
no security for his counterclaim of £85 or thereabouts. This leads
me to think that the fair order would have been to have set off
the two amounts and given the defendant judgment on the counter
claim for £10 Is. 9d. and for the costs of the claim, counterclaim
and reference to have been dealt with on that basis as the judge
thought right.
The question which has been argued is whether the judge
would have been entitled to make such an order in law and, if so,
whether he was obliged to do so in the circumstances of this case.
Set-off was relied on by paragraph 7 of the defence, and it
was reflected in the report of the referee, who assessed the plain
tiff's damages at £25 8s. 3d., having set off the defendant's
counterclaim against the total claim allowed at £110 7s. 6d. This
was also in accordance with the plea of the plaintiff in her defence
to the counterclaim. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the judge
disallowed an item of £35 10s., reducing her claim to £74 17s. 6d.,
which was £10 Is. 9d. less than she owed the defendant.
If the judge had followed the form of the referee's report
and had entered judgment for the defendant for the balance in
his favour after the claim had been set off against the counter
claim, I think it would have been open to him to have done so
and that it would have been in accordance with practice as it has
developed. If he had no such power in law (which includes
equity) it would, I think, be unfortunate, for costs would then
seem to prevail over the substance of the matter. If in this
case the result had been (and it would have meant but little
adjustment of the cross-demands) that each was to recover £75
from the other, neither party would have received a penny out of
the litigation but the defendant, who did not want to litigate,
would have been ordered to pay the costs of the action.
29
2 Q.B. QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.
" ' defendant Parkes are debts either actually due from him at C. A.
" ' the time of the execution of the deed ' (this was the deed by 1959
" which the third party who resisted the set-off was brought in)
" ' or flowing out of and inseparably connected with his previous „
" ' dealings and transactions with the firm.' That was a case of GREEN.
" equitable set-off, and was decided in 1852, when unliquidated sellers L.J.
" damages could not by law be the subject of set-off. That law
" was not found conducive to justice, and has been altered.
" Unliquidated damages' may now be set off as between the
" original parties, and also against an assignee if flowing out of
" and inseparably connected with the dealings and transactions
" which also give rise to the subject of the assignment. I t appears
" to their Lordships that in the cited case of Young v. Kitchin1*
" the decision to allow the counterclaim was rested entirely on
" this principle."
In the present case the referee allowed the defendant
£12 7s. 6d. for loss suffered by him because the plaintiff refused
access to the defendant's workmen. I would regard that as
clearly a matter of equitable set-off as it arises directly under and
affected the contract on which the plaintiff herself relies. But
that sum deducted from the plaintiff's claim of £74 17s. 6d.
would not in itself be sufficient so to reduce the claim as to alter
the scale of costs.
The items for extras totalling £69 l i s . include two charges in
connexion with the moving in of the plaintiff's household goods,
and the other item of £3 Os. 9d. is a claim for damages in trespass
as the plaintiff had apparently thrown away some tools of the
defendant's workmen. These two items are closely associated
with and incidental to the contract of June 14, 1954, on which
the plaintiff sues for breach, and in my opinion they also should
have been allowed as a set-off.
I agree, therefore, that the appeal should be allowed and an
order for costs made in the terms proposed.