GGPC was a subsidiary of t e Genung Sewu Group, one of the larger corporate groups in Indonesia, owned by Mr. Go Swie Kie. GGPC would be 100% export-orlen ed - there was no market in Indonesia for he type ot pineapple GGPC produced in ei her fresh or canned form.
GGPC was a subsidiary of t e Genung Sewu Group, one of the larger corporate groups in Indonesia, owned by Mr. Go Swie Kie. GGPC would be 100% export-orlen ed - there was no market in Indonesia for he type ot pineapple GGPC produced in ei her fresh or canned form.
GGPC was a subsidiary of t e Genung Sewu Group, one of the larger corporate groups in Indonesia, owned by Mr. Go Swie Kie. GGPC would be 100% export-orlen ed - there was no market in Indonesia for he type ot pineapple GGPC produced in ei her fresh or canned form.
rea IPMI wstrrur pencemsancan manasemen inconesia
P.T. GREAT GIANT PINEAPPLE COY. (A)
As Esther Satyono, Marketing Manager of Great Giant Pingepple Coy. IGGPC). flew
from Lampung, Sumatra to Jakarta in August 184, she thought about the decision
she must soon make on GGPC’s basic marketing strategy to penetrate export
‘markets. GGPC’s plantation in Sumatra wouls soon begin producing. its cannery wes
built and the cenning equipment would soon be installed. Now “all” Esther had to do
Jwas sell GGPC's canned pineapples on world markets. She was due to leave on her
tirst selling tip in early September. Esther thought, “The good news is that we are
all ready to go. The bad nens is shat we're not sure where to 90, how to get there,
for what to set when we do errive.” 2
‘This wes @ crucial decision for Esther and GGPC. GGPC would be 100%
export-oriented - there was no market in Indonesia for the type of pineaople GGPC
produced in either fresh or canned form. Four other Indonesian compenies had
invested in pineapple plentations for export in the recent past. All had failed.
Gunung Sewu (Thousand Mountain}, GGPC and the Go family
(This section is based on Reference Book on Indonesia's Major Business Groups, 1st
Eaition, Datatrust. Inc., Jakarta, December 1986.)
GPC was a subsidiary of the Genung Sewu Group, one of the larger corporate groups
in Indonesia, owned by Mr. Go Swie Kie. Genung Sewu was comprised of over fifty
comasnies with operations in real estate, property and housing cevelopment,
construction contracting, office building management, industrial estate development
pepe aces Nes art Hoe! ath ore
‘This case was prepared by Professor Donald J, Lecraw, The School of Business Adminiatavion, The
University of Western Ontario and faculty membars from the Institut Pengembangen Manalemen
Jnconesia Pld wien fencing provided by USAID through DSP | under the supervision of 2 Stearing
Commirese from Bappenas. The case is intended a5 9 basis for class discussion rather then te
iste eiener etfeczve or inaHectve hancling of an adminsvative situation.
Conriah 1990 oy leat Pengeengen Mansmen dons Renae 199,Francisco. Upon graduation, Esther joined Venus Markating Pre, Led., an importer
distributor of perfumes, cosmetics, and toiletries in Singapore, as a Sales and
Pramation Supervisor. Qver the next eight years Extner was successively promoted
to Marketing Manager, Regional Sales Training Director, and to Regional Marketing
Director. In this position, she headed five deparuments.
In July 1983, Esther resigned her position at Venus and retumed :o Jakarta. She had
reached a crucial decision point in her career: she wanted to work in Indonesia to use
the education and experience she had gained abroad to manage an Indonesian
company in order to contribute to the development of Indonesia’s manufacturing
Sector and to participate in Indonesie’s drive to penetrate export markets. Esther
believed that Indonesia could do more than export natural resources in unprocessed
form; it could become known as a producer and exaorter of high quality orocessed
and manufactured products. -—
Esther had known the Go family socially.and, in August 1983, she was invited by Mr.
Husodo and Mr. Setiawan to join GGPC as Marketing Manager. Her first job would
be to find out where and how GGPC should marker its canned pineapples.
Commercial procuction was due to commence in October, but, as yet, GGPC had not
déveloped a marketing plan, nor had it lined uo customers abroad for its output.
Esther's response to this proposal had been positive - with the proviso that after five
yeers of working without 2 vacation, she was due to leave for the U.S, for four
‘months. If GGPC could wait until January 1984, sne would join the company at that
time. In the meantime, while in the U.S., Esther could start to learn about the world
pinespple market. Mr. Husodo and his close friend and business associate Mt.
Setiawan had agraed 10 this proposel,
Of nor raturn to Indonasia in January 1984, Esther had started an iacensive study of
the economics and technology of pineapple production and cf world markets tor
canned pineapple. Thus Degan a pariod of intense work, du: also of intense
frustration for Esther. GGPC's offices were in 2 cur-down building: rats scurried
around the offices. Estner didn’ even nave a permanent desk: she had to migrate
from dask to desk degending on who’ was out of the office for the dey. Worse,
despite promises of [ts imminent arrival, as yet, tare was no machinery in the
canning plant in Lamaung. Nonetheless, Esther saw the benefits to all concerned if
GGPC could be successful: benefits to its flele and procuction workers, to. the
Lampung region, and to Indonesia as a whole ‘
Time dragged on until, in June 1984, Esther went ta the owners of GGPC and asked
why there seemed to te no action toward buying .and installing the canning
equipment and starting production. Sha was finally cold that cha problem lay in
arranging 8 benk loan for the equipment. Not inciuding the cost of the land, the
Gunung Sewu Group had alreacy invested over Rp. 3 billion ($3 milion) in GGPC in
re-operating expanses. The owners felt chat GPC should be able to obsain a loan
for the purchase of the equipment, now that tha project was finally ready to go ahead
after so many years of research and expenditures. As yet. however, no bank had
been willing to make a loan to what was perceives as highly nsky venture, Afterall,
four pineapple canning companies had recently gore bankruot. If GGPC mer the
3costs)
Types of Canned Pineapple
‘There were five basic types of canned
(rings), and chunks. Although pieces and
also sold at the lowest prices. They essentiz
commodity products, at prices 15% bein.
Pineapple chunks, rings, and tidbits were ifficult to produce to international
were vary epchese "Pes of products, correct and consistent clos coe ony flavor
Beverse Coreen (htY vatlation slong any af these simencians wots coe
den Consumer reaction. Consaquenty, buyers were very conta twine sourcing
decisions and very risk averse in their selaction of sources
Grades of Canned Pineapple
of 2red pineapple products sold in three grades: A, 8, and C. Grade 8 Products sold
Frou a eemium over Grade C praduets and Grade A pradune ole tn 7.5%
Prange, ver Grede 8 products, Esther had atked the Taimoreee Production
fad replied that Co ind srades af pinaspple were the easiest to proces They
Gand eed het GGFC could preduce Grade B pieces (30% of eugene ns at least
Sake.C shees (70% of output, 100% of te time. They had ponene cut, however,
that GGPC could produce Grade B quality slices 80% of the time, i.e., $0% of the
5 008 Would be of Grade 8, bur they could not determine which core contained Grade
A 20e! whieh contained Grede C. The produeson manages tak aes, GGPC would be
foolish to sell Grade 8 output as Grade C products at Grade prices. They pointed
completed en's in Taiwan sold their products as Grade 8 sed, if the buyers
conmanaat oS Grade C was not possibie since they could not kro once can/case
tna GGSC gon Sate). The production managers werd offended at amy suggestion
Grate goa 3 QUBUC fOr which they were responsible, wosldn't be good enough for
Grade 8 and might be sold as Grate c
TRC had gore even further. It did not want to buy eny Grade C slices from GGPC
For ere de ecu have to be sold at low prices and TFC's buyes oes only locking
Bf Siede 8 produers. TPC, nawever, was unwiling 19 take Goecre output as Grade
8 since i would contain an unacceptably high ammount of Grace product. Hence,No name products were 3 relatively new innovation in the processed food industry.
They sold at 10% discounts from house brands and largely competed on the basis of
price. Their target consumer group either couldnt citterentiate on the basis of quality,
didn't care about quality difterentials, or couldn’: afford to buy more expensive
products. No Neme praducts were often sold by supermarket chains at a loss and
were used simply to get customers into their storas, whare it was heped they would
aiso buy other more expensive and higher margin products. No name products
comprised about 5% of the marker.
Major Consuming Country Markets for Pineapple Products
The country markets for gineapple products can be divided into seven areas: North
America (the United States and Canade), Germany, France, the U.K., Scandinavia.
depen, and Australie. Together these seven areas accounted for 80% of world
canned pineapple consumption. Dole and Del Monte had a §2% - 54% market share
in North America, the largest single market for canned pineapples.
Countries Producing and Exporting Pineapple
Total world-wide production of canned pineapple in the mid-180s varied trom 34 to
38 million standard cases per year. In 1984, the largost canned pineaople
exporters were tha Philippines, Thailand, Melaysia, South Aftice, and Taiwan.
(Note, in the tables at the end of the case, no statisties are given for Taiwan, since
itis not a member of the United Nations.) Hawaii's production was largely gold in the
Us.
‘Over the previous decade, there hac been a marked shift in the division of worldwide
production end vade in cenned pineapples. Capacity constraints in Hawaii, Taiwan,
South Africa. and Malaysia nad lec to stagnant production in these mejor producing
areas. Political and insurgency problems in the Philipgines had limiced production
there. In these countries, the aree under cultivation for pineapples had not increased
significantly. To fil tne cemanc-supply gap, production an exports of pineansles
from Thailand had grown rapidly over the past decede. Sy 1984, Thailand was the
second largest producer and exporter of canned pinaappies, and it was projected to
take over the lead within the next few years. In 1984, eleven companies were
producing canned pineapple for exportin Thailand. Esther believed that if GGPC were
ever to become comperitve in tha world cannad pineapple market, it would have to
bbe able to deliver its product to the target market et a lower cost (et comparable
quality, volume, and deivery schedule} in competition with this emerging giant of the
Industry
Compared t0 Indonesia, Thailand had a relatively well-developed road end port
infrastructure to supportits pineapple industry. Its government specifically targeted
the pineapple industry for investment for export production. And, perhans most
imporeantly, farmer-landowners in Thailang were very entreareneurial and flexible inmanufacturing sector and increesing domestic value added prior to export for its
natural resource products. The Government was also 2 strong supporter of the
current producers of tin plete in Inconesia
'n 1984, Indonesie was beginning negotiations to join the General Agreement on
Tariffs end Trade (GATT). If mese negotiations were successful, the Government
would have to helt its export bonus systam. In thie situation, the Government could
allow export: oriented firms to import their inputs duty free (either through e duty
ramback system or by posting 2 guaranzes).
SGPC would aiso have to overcome the problem of trensporistion cosis. Currently.
the port facilities at_Panjang, the port closest to its plantation, were not well
Geveloped and did not have the cepebility of handling containers. In any event, the
Toads between the port and GGPC’s factory in Lampung could not handle Targe
Containerizad trucks. Consequently, GGPC would have t0 lo20 its cases of canned
Pineapple onto small tucks, truck them to the por. and load them onto larger
Containers on the ship. Leck of containerization facilities, combined with the small
volumes that GGPC would export initially, would lead 19 shipping costs that would
De about 50% higher then those feced by producersin Thailand. For each dollar of
Production costs, GGPC would have to pay $.25 to ship its products to world
Markets, compared to $.125 paid by Thai producers. :
lndonesia did have some advantages over Thailand, however. Its weather was more
constant year round, with less extreme changes trom wet to dry seasons, ftom cold
1 hot seasons, anc from night time temperatures 10 day time temperatures.
Pineepples were very sensitive to changes in the weather. if, for example, day and
‘ight time temperatures differed by more than a ten degrees, the plants would go Into
Spontaneous tlowering. The plants also could not take extremes of wet and dry soll
Conditions. Pineapple production in Indonesia could be undertaken aver the entire
twelve months of the year compared to only seven months in Thailand. GGPC would
be able to operste for eleven months of the year, with one month off to cleen the
factory during Le Baren, the Musiim fasting month. Land and labor costs in Indonesia.
were also below those in Thailand. Together these factors lowered GGPC's
Production costs by about 12% compared to producers in Thailand,
Esther had calculated that if GGPC were to be viable in the worldwide industry over
the long run, tne economies of scale in plantations, canning,” infrastructure
Gevelooment, conteinenzation, and transportation, and exportmarketing dictatedtnat,
‘over the next five or six years, GGPC would have to eventually achieve a volume of
2t least 3.5 million cases per year, about 8% t0 10%. of the world market. This
Output would entail production from 5,200 hectares of land (compared to current land
under cultivation of about $00 hectares}, canning facilities of capable of producing
800 tons per day (compered to its current facility of 200 tons per day], and total
employment of 5,000 workers. Esther estimated tnat an operation on this scale would
require GGPC's total assets to increase from Ro. 11 billon te Rp. 45 billion over the
next five years, no: counting the opportunity cost of the additional land that would
have to be devoted to pineapale production or the costs of the losses GGPC would
incu over the first years of te operations.
2As the plane landed, Esther gathered her papers together and summerized her
thoughts. For GGPC to be successful, it would have to overcome huge obstacles in
costs, quelity, market acceptance, government regulation and infrastructure
development, and in the attitudes and skills within GGPC itself. GGPC's
disadvantages would heve te be overcome and all the uncertainties in the government
regulatory environment successfully dealt with if GGPC were to become a viable
‘competitor in the world canned pineapple industry in the long term. Otherwise GGPC
Would inevitably suffer the seme fate as its predecesso’s in the Indonesian pineapple
industry. With that sobering thought in mind, Esther turned to her basic decision:
What marketing strategy snould GGPC follow in order to penetrate export markets?
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