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Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution

Matthew Flindersa
a
University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
Online publication date: 09 September 2010
To cite this Article Flinders, Matthew(2005) 'Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution', West
European Politics, 28: 1, 61 — 93
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West European Politics,
Vol. 28, No. 1, 61 – 93, January 2005
Majoritarian Democracy in Britain:

New Labour and the Constitution
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MATTHEW FLINDERS
University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT In May 1997 the British electorate voted a Labour government into office
after 18 years of Conservative administration. This government has subsequently
enacted a large number of constitutional reforms. However, a debate exists in relation
to the degree to which, taken together, these reforms amount to a fundamental shift in
the nature of British democracy. This article utilises Arend Lijphart’s work on patterns
of democracy in order to provide a conceptual lens through which New Labour’s
constitutional reforms can be analysed in terms of representing either a minor or major
shift from a traditionally majoritarian to more consensus-orientated system. The article
concludes that, although significant, the actual degree of reform in Britain is less radical
than is commonly assumed: although New Labour is committed to far-reaching
constitutional reform in principle it has been far less committed in practice.
In May 1997 the British electorate voted a Labour government into office
after 18 years of Conservative administration. During its first term (1997–
2001) the Labour government implemented a programme of constitutional
reform and continued this during its second term (2001– ). Two central
issues surround this reform process, the first being an empirical question
regarding the degree to which these reforms actually represent a far-reaching
shift in the nature of British democracy. The second issue focuses on the
conceptual and analytical tools available to understand the inter-relation-
ship between specific constitutional reforms at the micro-political level and
to what degree these may impact upon macro-political models or patterns of
democracy.
It is a contention of this article that the correlation between specific
constitutional reforms and the nature of democracy in a given country is
an empirical question rather than an assumed fact. Consequently, it is
possible for a government to embark upon an apparently wide-ranging
programme of constitutional reform with little actual commitment to
changing the nature of democracy – what I refer to below as cosmetic
Correspondence Address: Matthew Flinders, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield,

Sheffield S10 2TY, UK
ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online # 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd

DOI: 10.1080/0140238042000297099
62 Matthew Flinders
reform. It is equally possible that a government may wish to shift the

balance of power within the constitutional configuration of a country to
some degree while still retaining control over core components and power
centres, such as the voting system and legislature – moderate reform.
Rarely, and usually in response to a major political crisis or incident, a
government may wish to embark upon a far-reaching reform process in
which the infrastructure of the constitution is amended in such a way that
power is either concentrated or dispersed in a manner which marks a stark
departure from the previous constitutional arrangement – fundamental
reform.
These two issues (the former being empirical and the latter conceptual)
are of particular significance in relation to Britain since 1 May 1997.
From an empirical perspective there has been a rather naı̈ve assumption
that the Labour government’s constitutional reforms represent a funda-
mental reform of the British constitution and democracy. New Labour
ministers, who are keen to embellish achievements in order to both
demonstrate their democratic credentials and respond to critics who
suggest the government has not gone far enough, have vigorously
presented this position. For example, the former Lord Chancellor, Lord
Irvine (1998), has described the reforms as ‘the most radical programme
of constitutional change since the Great Reform Bill of 1832’. While it
may not be surprising that politicians seek to exaggerate their achieve-
ments, more worrying is the fact that some observers and scholars have
assumed that the introduction of several pieces of constitutional
legislation does amount to a fundamental reform of British democracy.
Within Britain Wood (1999: 1) captures this position succinctly when he
notes, ‘Yet for all the talk about Third Ways and ‘‘Blatcherism’’, there is
a strand of Labour policy that is radical indeed – its programme of
constitutional reform.’ While from mainland Europe Mair (2000: 34)
observes, ‘New Labour is currently engaged in what amounts to a full-
blooded constitutional revolution, dragging the political system away from
an extreme version of majoritarian democracy towards a more institu-
tionally consensual model’.
Although New Labour’s reforms have been documented extensively it is
possible to suggest that much of this analysis has been overly descriptive,
frequently normative and largely atheoretical. This lack of a body of
literature that offers conceptual or ideological depth is particularly
pronounced in light of the fact that a key criticism levelled at the Labour
government is the accusation that the constitutional reform measures have
been devoid of any clear statement of principles or underlying rationale.
Moreover, it is clear that although the Labour government has been willing
to reform many aspects of the British constitution it has remained
unyielding in relation to demands to modify certain aspects of the
constitutional infrastructure. It is in explaining and understanding both
action and non-action in relation to constitutional reform in Britain that a
Majoritarian democracy in Britain 63
conceptually informed and theoretically robust analysis may be particularly

beneficial.
In order to provide depth (in terms of a conceptual and theoretical
framework) and breadth (in terms of a structure through which it is possible
to identify the inter-relationship between specific reforms) this article utilises
Lijphart’s (1984; 1999) distinction between majoritarian and consensual
democracies. Lijphart’s framework, it is argued, contributes a deeper
understanding and more fundamental analysis to the broader debate about
how the constitution and nature of democracy has altered in Britain since
May 1997. Furthermore, Lijphart’s work is particularly appropriate in

relation to Britain for four interconnected reasons. First, Britain has always
been presented as an exemplar of the majoritarian model; indeed the terms
‘majoritarian model’ and ‘Westminster model’ are frequently used
interchangeably. However, and second, in Britain the period since 1 May
1997 is often portrayed as a critical juncture that challenges Lijphart’s
characterisation of Britain as a majoritarian democracy. Third, Lijphart’s
scholarship provides a conceptual framework through which the reform of
institutions, structures and to some extent cultures can be mapped in order
to understand the trajectory of a democracy and how it may be moving
along the axis from majoritarian to consensus (and vice versa) over time.
Finally, Lijphart’s last analysis of developments in Britain examined the
period between 1971 and 1996. This article therefore represents a timely
opportunity to update and reflect on Lijphart’s conceptual and empirical
work on patterns of democracy as it relates to Britain after two successive
Labour governments.
The core argument of this article is that although New Labour has
reformed the British constitution in many important ways this has not led to
a far-reaching shift in the nature of democracy. There has been significant
change but only in relation to the federal–unitary dimension and this exists
in the shadow of parliamentary sovereignty (itself largely a euphemism for
executive power); paradoxically, the executive–parties dimension actually
reflects a concentration of power under New Labour. There has, therefore,
been no dramatic shift from a majoritarian to a consensual model of
democracy at the national level. The Westminster model continues to be the
default option in terms of democracy in Britain.
This article is divided into three sections. In the first section the Labour
government’s programme of reform is briefly outlined. The second section
draws upon Lijphart’s work. It synthesises his analytical framework on
majoritarianism and consensualism with an examination of New Labour’s
constitutional reforms. Analysing developments within the period 1997 to
2005 will provide a new data set, which can then be used to plot the location
of Britain on Lijphart’s conceptual map of democracy after two successive
terms of Labour government. The final section reflects on the findings of the
research and evaluates its implications for the notion of ‘New’ Labour and
the future of British democracy.
64 Matthew Flinders
New Labour and the British Constitution

Although the British constitution is never static or immobile, viewed in
retrospect, the second half of the twentieth century was a period of unusual
constitutional quiescence. Compared with the fundamental and often
prolonged constitutional struggles of the nineteenth century, the latter half
of the twentieth century, with the exception of the European Communities
Act, can be interpreted as a period of relative constitutional serenity. This
extended period of inertia ended with the election of the Labour government
on 1 May 1997. The adjective ‘New’ in relation to the British Labour Party
denotes the election of Tony Blair as leader of the party in July 1994 and the
subsequent modernisation of the party and its policies. A central aspect of
this modernisation process focused on the nature and operation of British
democracy and the perceived need for far-reaching constitutional reform.
Despite the fact that several members of the Labour government were
constitutionally cautious, Tony Blair included, the 1997–2001 parliament
can be interpreted as an unprecedented ‘window of opportunity’ in relation
to constitutional reform. The Labour Party was heavily committed to
certain reforms and its commitment to stay within the previous Con-
servative government’s spending limits restricted policy development in the
social and economic sphere. As a consequence, the parliamentary timetable
could accommodate a large amount of constitutional legislation without
intense competition within the cabinet for legislative space. (Consequently,
no fewer than 20 bills relating to constitutional reform were steered through
parliament during the first three parliamentary sessions.)
Although the constitutional reform project was by no means complete, it
was clear long before the 2001 general election that the Labour
government’s priorities had changed. It was also likely that the second
Labour administration would be less ambitious while also having less time
to concentrate on constitutional issues. Labour’s second term was therefore
not expected to match its first term in relation to constitutional reform. This
would be the time for constitutional consolidation: to complete unfinished
business, attempt to provide some form of coordinated overview and
monitoring capacity, and allow the reforms to ‘bed in’ (see Flinders 2004).
As expected, the early stages of Labour’s second term of office were
restrained: a high degree of constitutional fatigue had set in. This was due to
both international events (notably Iraq) and domestic policy pressures.
Morrison (2001) suggests that towards the end of the previous parliament
several senior members of the cabinet felt that constitutional reform had
taken up too much parliamentary and ministerial time. Moreover, surveys
and opinion polls suggested that the public failed to attach high political
salience to constitutional reform but were restless in relation to public
services. Crime, employment, health and education would therefore receive
priority during Labour’s second term. This contextual change in environ-
ment is critical in understanding the manner in which constitutional policy
has evolved during New Labour’s second term. During the first term some
form of devolution was irresistible due to a combination of popular
pressures. In many ways the constitutional pressures of the broader public
were satisfied to a greater or lesser extent. The second term agenda
prioritised public services. Paradoxically, not only did this reduce the
saliency of constitutional issues but also the pressure on New Labour to
deliver on health, education, etc. created an environment that demanded a
strong executive. In spite of this the Queen’s speech on 26 November 2003
included two constitutional bills: the House of Lords Bill and the
Constitutional Reform Bill. However, unlike the Labour government’s

previous constitutional reform measures, both these bills have faced intense
opposition and have aroused bitter criticism with regard to the Labour
government’s approach to constitutional reform.
There is a burgeoning literature on Labour’s approach to the constitution
that admirably charts the nature and implementation of these reforms (see
Hazell 1999; 2000; 2003). It is not the aim of this section to provide a
detailed outline of each reform (many will be reviewed in some detail below)
but only to provide a rough outline of how the constitutional terrain has
been altered in Britain under New Labour and provide a flavour of some of
the critical tensions, issues and anomalies surrounding the reform
programme. The main constitutional measures implemented by New
Labour are set out in Table 1.
There can be no doubt that significant reforms have been implemented,
notably in the sphere of devolution, human rights legislation and central
bank independence. However, the manner in which these reforms have been
designed, announced and implemented has aroused a degree of disquiet,
T ABL E 1
N E W L A B O U R ’ S M A I N C O N S T I T U T I O N A L M E A S U R E S A N D P R O PO S A L S ,
1 99 7 – 2 0 0 5
. Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997

. Scotland Act 1998
. Government of Wales Act 1998
. European Communities Amendment Act 1998
. Bank of England Act 1998
. Human Rights Act 1998
. Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998
. Regional Development Agencies Act 1998
. Greater London Authority Act 1998
. Registration of Political Parties Act 1998
. European Parliament Elections Act 1998
. House of Lords Act 1999
. Freedom of Information Act 2000
. Local Government Act 2000
. Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000
. Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Act 2003
. Constitutional Reform Bill 2003
. House of Lords Bill 2003
66 Matthew Flinders
which has increased markedly towards the end of New Labour’s second
term of office. These concerns focus on three issues.
First, there has been no clear statement of the principles or rationale
underlying the process as a whole.
Second, as Harlow (2000) notes, the whole reform programme has been
‘conceived in strictly Diceyan terms’, which, theoretically at least, maintain
the core components of the Westminster model (parliamentary sovereignty,
a unitary state, ministerial responsibility to parliament, strong government,
etc.). Although the Westminster model has shaped and limited the reform
process, it is abundantly clear that several elements of New Labour’s

constitutional reform programme have actually undermined to some extent
core components of the model. It is suggested below that by seeking to
accommodate their consensual reforms within a majoritarian system that
preserves executive dominance, the malleability of the Westminster model
has been exhausted. The result of this is that anomalies within the
constitutional infrastructure, many of which have existed for some time,
have become increasingly conspicuous.
The third tension surrounding New Labour’s constitutional reforms
stems from their apparent commitment to preserving core tenets of the
Westminster model while propounding a discourse which is far more
consensual and stimulates an expectation of far-reaching reform. The
divergence between New Labour’s discourse on constitutional reform and
change and the rather restricted nature of many of the reforms suggest that
New Labour may be committed to a more consensual model of democracy
in principle but is still wedded to a clearly majoritarian model in practice.
These three tensions are clearly inter-related and are to a degree mutually
reinforcing. Marquand (1999a) eloquently captured the combined result or
perception of this when he wrote,
It is very British, this revolution. It is a revolution without a theory. It is

the messy, muddled work of practical men and women, unintellectual
when not positively anti-intellectual, apparently oblivious of the long
tradition of political and constitutional reflection of which they are heirs,
responding piecemeal and ad hoc to conflicting pressures – a revolution
of sleepwalkers who don’t quite know where they are going or why.
The relationship between the notion of ‘New’ Labour, with its vaunted third
way, and the contradictions within the programme of constitutional reform
will be further discussed below. The next section utilises Lijphart’s work in
order to understand how British democracy has changed since 1997.
Patterns of Democracy
Lijphart’s central thesis is that democratic systems can be placed on an axis,
which has majoritarianism at one extreme and consensualism at the other.
Most democratic systems, Lijphart suggests, can be located on a continuum

between these poles. The majoritarian–consensus contrast therefore forms
the foundation of Lijphart’s framework. In the majoritarian model political
power is concentrated. This condensed power structure is generally nurtured
by a winner-takes-all electoral system, an adversarial political culture and a
competitive party system based largely around two dominant parties. The
consensus model is commonly based around a proportional electoral
system, a consensual political culture and a party system involving a number
of parties. Lijphart’s research suggests that, contrary to popular belief,
consensual systems do not commonly suffer from what Beer (1982) termed
‘pluralistic stagnation’ in which the decision-making processes become
overly complex leading to economic inefficiency. The difference between
majoritarian and consensual democracies is that the latter offer greater
opportunities for participatory and deliberative democracy leading to higher
levels of public trust and fewer examples of extreme policy shifts.
A notable benefit of Lijphart’s majoritarian and consensus models is that
they facilitate the creation of a ‘conceptual map’ on which specific forms or
models of democracy can be located. In order to locate the political system
of a country along the majoritarian–consensus axis, two dimensions are
established (executive–parties and federal–unitary) each involving five
characteristics. These two dimensions and ten characteristics (as set out in
Table 2 overleaf) form dichotomous contrasts in terms of majoritarian and
consensus models.
As noted above, the central argument of this article is that the
constitutional reforms enacted by the Labour government since 1 May
1997 do not amount to a significant shift in the pattern of democracy in
Britain. The reforms are more accurately interpreted as representing
moderate, and in some areas cosmetic, adjustments to what is still quite
clearly a majoritarian model of democracy. In order to validate this thesis it
is necessary to return to Lijphart’s framework and examine how the New
Labour government has changed each of the ten variables. The results of
this assessment will allow an examination of the degree to which the
programme of constitutional reform as a whole has shifted British
democracy in relation to the executive–parties and federal–unitary dimen-
sions and will therefore offer an indication of the trajectory of Britain in
relation to the majoritarian and consensual poles. The ten variables
employed by Lijphart are set out in Table 3 (p. 69), as are the contrasting
characteristics of ideal-type consensual and majoritarian systems. The
figures for each of the ten variables set out in columns four and five are
taken from Lijphart’s 1999 book. The figures in the sixth column represent a
replication of Lijphart’s work, derived using the formulae for the period
1997–2005. The seventh column summarises the extent of change under New
Labour for each variable.
The remainder of this section attempts to explain how the data for the
period 1997–2005 were derived and calculated. After detailing developments
68 Matthew Flinders
T ABL E 2
T W O D I M E NS IO NS AN D T EN C HA RAC TE RI ST IC S IN FO RM I N G T HE RE LAT I VE
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F M A J O R I T A R I A N A N D C O N S E N S U S M O D E L S OF
DE MOCRA CY
Executive–Parties Dimension
1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive
power-sharing in broad multi-party coalitions.
2. Executive legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive–
legislative balance of power.
3. Two-party versus multi-party systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus
coordinated and ‘corporatist’ interest group systems aimed at compromise and
concertation.
Federal–Unitary Dimension
1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralised government.
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative
power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions
that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own
legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their
constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.
Source: Lijphart 1999: 3–4.
for each variable between 1997 and 2005 an attempt is made to chart the
evolution of British democracy during this period onto Lijphart’s two-
dimensional conceptual map (see Figure 2, p. 85). The following sub-
sections relate to each of the ten variables set out in Table 3. Within a single
article it is only possible to provide a somewhat brief and rudimentary
review of developments in relation to each variable. The following text does,
however, provide detailed references in order to substantiate and underpin
the basic argument of each sub-section. The first of these relates to the party
system (V1).
V1 – Party system
The first of the ten variables that characterise the majoritarian–consensus
contrast is the difference between single-party majority governments and
broad multi-party coalitions. In many ways the party system epitomises the
nature of power within any democracy and is a key variable for the
executive–parties dimension. Two-party systems are a central aspect of the
majoritarian model of democracy. Lijphart employed the Laakso and
Taagepera (1979) index in order to gauge both the number of parties within
a system and their relative strength. In a two-party system with two equally
strong parties the effective number of parties is exactly 2.0; whereas in a
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TAB LE 3
AU DITIN G REF ORM IN BR IT AIN UN D ER N EW LAB OU R: LIJPHA RT’S T EN VARIAB LE S AN D TWO DIME NS IO NS
Variable Majoritarian Consensus 1945–1996 1971–1996 1997–2005 Conclusion (1997–2005)

V1. Party system Two party system Multi-party system 2.11 2.20 2.13 No change.
V2. Cabinets Single party majority cabinets Power-sharing multi-party 96.7 93.3 100.0 No change/ more majoritarian
coalitions
V3. Executive-Legislative Dominant executive Executive–legislature balance 5.52 5.52 5.52 No change/Cosmetic change
relationship of power
V4. Electoral system Disproportional first-past-the Proportional representation 10.33 14.66 17.06 No change/ more majoritarian
post system
V5. Interest groups Informal pluralist interest Co-ordinated and ‘corporatist’ 3.38 3.50 3.4 No Change
group interaction interest group interaction
V6. Federal–unitary Unitary and centralised Federal and decentralised 1.0 1.0 2.5 Significant change
Majoritarian democracy in Britain

dimension government government
V7. Unicameralism– Concentration of power in a Division of power between 2.5 2.5 1.75 Cosmetic change/more
bicameralism unicameral legislature two equally strong but majoritarian
dimension. differently constituted houses
V8. Constitutional Flexible constitution that can Rigid constitutions that can be 1.0 1.0 1.0 No change
amendment be amended by simple changed only by extraordinary
majorities majorities
V9. Legislative Legislature has the final word Legislation subject to a 1.0 1.0 1.5 Cosmetic/moderate change
supremacy on the constitutionality of judicial review of their
legislation constitutionality by a supreme
or constitutional court
V10. Central bank Dependent on the executive Independent central bank 0.31 0.28 0.59 Significant change
D1. Executive–Parties 1.21 1.39 1.47 No change/more majoritarian
D1. Federal–Unitary 1.12 1.19 0.31 Significant change
69
70 Matthew Flinders
system where one party is stronger than another, with respective seat shares
of 60 and 40 per cent, the index score would be 1.6. This would support an
intuitive belief that the system was closer to a one-party system than one in
which the two dominant parties were equally balanced. Using this index
Lijphart calculated that for the period 1945–96 (14 general elections) the
House of Commons scored 2.11 (1.99 lowest and 2.27 highest) therefore
indicating that Britain was essentially a two-party system. The general
election results for 1997 and 2001 are set out in Table 4 (opposite).
Replicating Lijphart’s work using the data in Table 4 produces a mean
score of 2.13 on the index of effective political parties. This figure suggests
that Britain has remained very much a two-party system since the election of
New Labour in May 1997. This finding is supported by an historical
perspective (set out in Figure 1 below). Clearly the nature of the party
system is to a great extent related to the balance of power within a
government (V2); the topic of the next sub-section.
V2 – Cabinets
The second of the ten variables examines the breadth of representation from
different parties within the executive branch of government. The difference
between one-party majority governments and broad multi-party coalitions
encapsulates to a large extent the contrast between the majoritarian
principle of concentrating power and the consensus principle of power-
sharing. Coalition theory offers three broad classifications that are pertinent
to this discussion: (1) minimal winning cabinets, ‘winning’ in the sense that
the party in the cabinet controls a majority of parliamentary seats in the
lower house but ‘minimal’ to reflect the fact that no other parties contribute
to the executive; (2) oversized cabinets, which do contain more parties than
are actually necessary for majority support in the legislature; and (3)
FIGURE 1
SEATS WON, UK, 1945–2001
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TA BL E 4
B R I T I S H G E N E R A L E L E C T IO N R ES U L T S 1 M A Y 1 9 9 7 A N D 7 J U N E 2 0 0 1
1997 General Election 2001 General Election

Votes Share of vote Seats won/% Votes Share of vote Seats won/%
(millions) (%) of seats won (millions) (%) of seats won
Conservative Party 9.6 30.7 165/25 8.36 31.7 166/25.2
Majoritarian democracy in Britain

Labour Party 13.52 43.2 418/63.4 10.72 40.7 412/62.5
Liberal Democrat Party 5.24 16.8 46/6.9 4.81 18.3 52/7.9
Plaid Cymru/Scottish National Party 0.78 2.5 10/1.5 0.66 2.5 9/1.4
Other 2.14 6.8 20/3 1.81 6.9 20/3
Total 31.29 100 659/100 26.37 100 659/100
Notes: ‘Other’: Ulster Unionist Party, Ulster Democratic Unionist Party, Social and Democratic Labour Party, Sinn Fein, UK Unionist Party and two MPs
elected as independents.
Source: House of Commons Library UK Election Statistics 1945–2003, Research Paper 03/59, July 2003.
71
72 Matthew Flinders
minority cabinets, which do not enjoy the support of a parliamentary

majority (see Lijphart 1999: 90–91).
Lijphart’s analysis of British political history between 1945 and 1996
established that the British executive had been a minimal winning cabinet
for 93.3 per cent of this period and a one-party cabinet for all (100 per cent)
of this period resulting in a mean of 96.7 per cent. For the period between
1997 and 2005 New Labour has enjoyed a minimal winning cabinet with
parliamentary majorities of 177 and 165 after the 1997 and 2001 general
elections respectively. During 1996 and early 1997 the Labour Party had
been in negotiations with the Liberal Democrat Party regarding the creation
of a minority and oversized cabinet should the forthcoming general election
produce a hung parliament (see Ashdown 2000). However, with majorities
of this size and an adversarial political culture there have been few incentives
for the Labour Party to form an oversized cabinet that included
representatives from other parties. Therefore one-party cabinet bolstered
by a large parliamentary majority has been the dominant (100 per cent)
form of government between 1997 and 2005. The figure of 100 per cent for
V2 suggests that on this variable Britain has become more majoritarian since
1997 rather than less. Indeed, increasing the period of analysis from 1996 to
2005 increases the mean figure from Lijphart’s 96.7 per cent, to around 98
per cent. Paradoxically, then, V2 suggests a move not away but towards
greater majoritarianism during New Labour’s first two governments.
This finding has a direct relationship with an increasing concern amongst
academics and parliamentarians that Britain has become increasingly
presidential under Tony Blair (see Foley 2000; Heffernan 2003; Burch and
Holliday 1999). Accordingly there is a burgeoning literature that suggests
that the prime minister has moved within the constitutional infrastructure
from being primus inter pares (the position in strict constitutional theory) to
Sartori’s (1994) primus solus. While much of this literature exaggerates the
extent of change since 1997, there is a clear sense that the nature of
governance, and particularly the connections and relationships within the
core executive, have changed (for a review see Holliday and Burch 2004). In
light of this perceived greater concentration of power within the cabinet the
relationship between the executive and the legislature (V3) takes on added
emphasis. This will be the topic of the next section.
V3 – Executive–Legislative Relationship
The third difference between majoritarian and consensual systems focuses
on the relationship between the executive and legislature – the consensus
model being characterised by a more balanced relationship than is
commonly found in majoritarian systems where the executive is dominant,
largely through its control of the majority party in the lower house. After
reviewing the period 1945–1996 Lijphart characterised Britain as displaying
‘clear executive dominance’. However, in the run-up to the 1997 general
election the Labour Party made parliamentary reform a central part of their
platform. In May 1996, the then shadow leader of the House, Ann Taylor
(1996), made a far-reaching ‘New Labour, New Parliament’ speech to
Charter 88. Echoing the critical report on the state of parliamentary
democracy published 20 years earlier by the Procedure Committee, she
committed the Labour Party to ‘re-establish the proper balance between
parliament and the executive’.
However, substantial reform of the House of Commons has been notably
absent from the Labour government’s constitutional reform programme. A
Modernisation of the House select committee was established but this has
focused largely on the day-to-day management of the House of Commons
rather than broader issues concerning the relationship between the
Commons and the executive. After reviewing developments under New
Labour, Gregory (1999: 47) concludes that ‘the government, despite its pre-
election promises, appears to have no appetite for any tangible ‘modernisa-
tion’ of parliament which will alter the balance of power’. This refusal on the
part of the Labour government to introduce reforms that would moderate
the dominance of the executive over and within the House of Commons led
to a serious confrontation between senior MPs and the Labour government
(see HC 300 1999–2000; HC 301 2000–2001; Cm 4737 2000).
Although the Labour government has made minor concessions, such as
the announcement by the prime minister in April 2002 that he would in
future appear before the Liaison Committee every six months, it has not
introduced measures which can be interpreted as far-reaching. Although a
degree of modernisation has taken place since 1997 it is crucial to
comprehend the difference between ‘modernising parliament’ and ‘parlia-
mentary reform’. Richard Crossman (Hansard, 14 Dec. 1966) once
explained that ‘there is a difference between modernisation and parliamen-
tary reform’ – modernisation involved practical and procedural changes to
the day-to-day business of the House whereas parliamentary reform
involved a conscious decision by the executive and legislature regarding
the proper balance and distribution of power. Tony Wright MP (2000) has
outlined how the reforms implemented by Labour – more sensible hours,
experiments with Westminster Hall, etc. – may be examples of modernisa-
tion but they do not amount to real parliamentary reform. Indeed, the utility
of such modernisation will be minimal and in many ways undermined by the
lack of concomitant parliamentary reform. Without a change in the balance
of power within the House many of the reforms introduced under the guise
of ‘modernisation’ may well represent subtle moves towards a more
majoritarian system. As one suspicious MP noted, ‘We all know what
modernisation means . . . It is a euphemism for streamlining the House so
that a quantity of legislation can be got through as quickly as possible’
(interview with the author, 9 Nov. 2000).
Measuring the relative power of the executive and legislature is clearly
problematic. The relationship between the two is frequently based upon
74 Matthew Flinders
informal rules, procedures and negotiations that deny the employment of

methodological tools to gauge the executive–legislature relationship.
Lijphart adopts cabinet durability as his central measure of this relationship
(based upon the four criteria of changes in party composition, prime
ministerialship, coalition status and new elections). Using these criteria
Lijphart arrives at a figure of 5.52 on an index of executive dominance (the
highest score on a scale with a mean value of 3.32). The obvious question
asks to what degree this figure has altered, if at all, since 1 May 1997? The
answer is not at all. The period between 1997 and 2005 in Britain has been
one of secure minimal winning one-party cabinets with no changes in party

composition, no changes in the head of the government, no coalitions and
no forced elections. If anything, the dominance of the executive has
increased due to the large size of the parliamentary majorities enjoyed by the
Labour Party in both parliaments (see Figure 1 above). The index score for
Britain (1997–2005) remains constant at 5.52. This result complements those
for V1 and V2 and suggests that, despite the consensual discourse, Britain
has not become any less majoritarian under New Labour. Clearly the
relationship between the executive and the legislature is dependent to some
extent on the electoral system (V4) – this will be the topic of the next sub-
section.
V4 – Electoral System
The electoral method within a polity forms both the keystone of the system
and generally ascribes a pattern or model of democracy. Majoritarian
systems generally employ single-member district plurality systems while
consensus systems typically operate through a proportional system. In
Britain the dominance of the executive in relation to parliament has always
been based on a disproportional electoral system that generally provides the
party winning the largest minority of votes with a large majority of seats in
the lower house of parliament. In 1997 the Labour Party’s manifesto
contained a commitment to hold a referendum on the voting system for the
House of Commons. In office the government established a commission to
explore the options for voting reform in relation to the House of Commons.
In October 1998 this commission published its final report, which
recommended a hybrid combining single-member constituencies, using the
Alternative Vote, with a limited top-up of 15–20 per cent of MPs (Cm
4090 1998). These proposals were opposed by the Labour government and
were not taken forward. By the 2001 manifesto the Labour Party’s position
on electoral reform focused on a promise to review Britain’s experience with
new PR systems before proposing any changes to the electoral system for
Westminster (see Constitution Unit 2004). The expected time for the review
was after the second round of elections in Scotland and Wales in 2003, but
no such review was announced and the position of the government at the
time of writing is that ‘it is still considering when best to initiate a review so
it can be comprehensive’ (Hansard, 3 Dec. 2003) but this is unlikely to be

until after the next general election in 2005 or 2006.
The Labour government’s ambivalence towards even opening up a debate
about altering the voting system for Westminster is possibly the starkest
illustration of its commitment to maintaining a strongly majoritarian model
of democracy in Britain. Indeed, Lijphart notes that very few democracies
change from plurality to proportional systems or vice versa. New Zealand’s
change in 1996 therefore represents a rare example of far-reaching reform,
which marked the conscious choice by a political elite to move towards a
more consensual model of democracy. It is clear from the above that New
Labour has displayed very little enthusiasm in office for a move to a more
proportional electoral system for the national parliament. Moreover, under
New Labour the degree of electoral disproportionality, Lijphart’s index
measure for this variable, has actually increased rather than diminished. The
mean index score, using the Gallagher index, for Britain (1945–96) was
10.33. This figure increased to 14.66 during the second half of this period
(1971–96). For the period 1997–2005 (analysing the general election results
for 1997 and 2001 as set out in Table 4 above) this figure increased to 17.06
(the mean of the two general elections in this period).
Implementing a change to the voting system to make it more proportional
would be likely to reduce executive power in terms of increasing the
likelihood of multi-party coalition governments (V2), distributing seats in
the House of Commons across a greater number of parties (V1), and,
altering the executive–legislature relationship (V3). That an incoming
government may renege on specific commitments to weaken or dilute the
dominant position of the executive in Britain is not wholly surprising.
The contradiction of New Labour stems from the fact that although it has
been willing to instigate more consensual reforms at the regional level it has
been adamantly opposed to stimulating a mature debate about introducing
similar reforms at Westminster. Consequently, elections to the Scottish
Parliament, Welsh Assembly and London Assembly have been established
using a proportional system (modified Additional Member System) and
fixed-term elections that makes the continued use of a plurality system for
Westminster increasingly difficult to justify. The next sub-section explores
Lijphart’s fourth variable (V5) – interest groups.
V5 – Interest Groups
The fifth of Lijphart’s variables (and the last of the five that together
constitute the executive–parties dimension) concerns the nature of the inter-
relationship between interest groups and the executive. The emblematic
interest group system of majoritarian democracy is competitive, pluralist
and uncoordinated. In contrast the consensus model is likely to display an
interest group system that is coordinated and compromise-orientated. This
latter model is commonly known as corporatism, which generally means
76 Matthew Flinders
that interest groups are relatively large in size and small in number and tend
to be coordinated into national peak or umbrella organisations. These peak
organisations will enjoy privileged access to the executive, which leads to
comprehensive agreements that are binding on all parties.
In assessing the corporatist (consensual) or pluralist (majoritarian) nature
of democratic systems Lijphart drew upon the research of Siaroff (1999).
The utilisation of Siaroff’s work is problematic, however, for a number of
reasons. First, it covered only 24 of the 36 countries included in Lijphart’s
study. Second, Siaroff’s work covered the periods 1963–70 and 1983–90 and
was not therefore comprehensive in terms of covering the full period of 1945
to 1996. Despite these methodological concerns Lijphart accepted Siaroff’s
five-point scale (theoretical maximum of four and minimum of zero) as an
appropriate measure of interest group pluralism. Using this scale Britain, or
more precisely the UK, was given an index score of 3.38 for 1945–96 and 3.5
for 1971–96. Given that the mean score for the 36 countries was 2.24, Britain
was placed very near the pluralist end of the spectrum, a result in line with
the broader acceptance of Britain as an archetypal majoritarian country.
Once again the question of change since 1997 becomes pertinent. The trade
union movement in Britain formed the Labour Party and a logical
hypothesis might suggest that the interest group pluralism score for the
period 1997–2005 would indicate a higher degree of corporatist style
interaction (see Taylor 1998).
However, in terms of its relationship with the trade unions New Labour
has not implemented corporatist-style governing arrangements. As part of a
wider strategy to foster confidence with the private sector the government has
assiduously avoided adopting any policy instruments that may appear overly
corporatist. Trade unions were significantly under-represented in the raft of
policy reviews and ‘task forces’ established by New Labour during the
beginning of its first term. Of the 449 individuals appointed to 30 leading task
forces and advisory bodies during New Labour’s first year in office only 26
(six per cent) were from trade unions compared to 129 (29 per cent) from the
private sector (Platt 1998). The fact that the Monetary Policy Committee of
the Bank of England (see below) was established in 1997 without a member
drawn from the trade union movement has also been seen as symptomatic of
a government that is committed to maintaining a somewhat arm’s-length
relationship with the trade unions. Even where apparently the government
has established tri-partite organisations, such as with the creation of the Low
Pay Commission in 1998, they have not included the government directly and
have formally been established as advisory rather than executive bodies.
Reforms have been implemented, such as the Employment Relations Act
1999 that provided for employee representation and union recognition. But
at the same time these reforms reflect a dilution of New Labour’s pre-
election commitment to far-reaching union recognition. The Employment
Relations Act, in particular, may well encapsulate the ‘third way’ or
‘partnership’ approach of New Labour but cannot be seen as a decisive shift
in the nature of interest group–government relations in Britain, especially

when weighed against New Labour’s retention of much of the previous
Conservative government’s anti-union legislation and their rejection of the
European Union’s proposed national level works councils.
In essence, then, the election of New Labour in 1997 has not led to a
dramatic shift towards a more corporatist style of government. Despite the
implementation of minor reforms under the guise of partnership and apart
from the implementation of a statutory national minimum wage, New
Labour has remained fundamentally committed to maintaining the
relationship with the trade unions that it inherited from the previous
Conservative government. Undy (1999: 333) suggests that New Labour’s
industrial relations strategy is very much akin to neo-liberalism and during
its second term (2001– ) the relationship between New Labour and the
unions became abysmal as tensions that had simmered throughout the
government’s first term came to the fore.
In the wake of New Labour’s second election victory many frustrated
trade union leaders were keen to move away from the relatively placid
relationship they had enjoyed with the government. For New Labour the
electoral success of June 2001 reflected the public’s confidence in the ability
of the Labour Party to manage the economy and as a result senior Labour
ministers reacted strongly against those public sector unions which voted to
take industrial action in 2002 and 2003. Strike action fuelled the suspicion of
the trade unions that had always existed within the New Labour project and
has led to a further distancing of the trade unions from the party (see
Waddington 2003; Ludlam and Taylor 2003). As Charlwood (2004) has
suggested, this led to an increased degree of anti-Labour Party feeling within
the union movement and the election of a new generation of younger and
more explicitly militant union leaders.
There is, however, as with so many of the variables, a paradox in that
New Labour’s reforms have apparently stimulated a more consensual style
of politics at the sub-national level while adamantly resisting demands to
institute a similar model at the national level. In Scotland, for example, the
Scottish Trade Unions Congress (STUC) and the Scottish Executive have
agreed and signed a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ in which both parties
have explicitly agreed to adopt a joint working relationship (Scottish
Executive/STUC 2004). This includes six-monthly meetings between
Scottish ministers and officials of the STUC and an annual review of the
operation of the joint working arrangements, and formalised consultation
procedures for all policy areas and an agreement in relation to senior
appointments to public bodies.
It appears, however, that the election of New Labour has not resulted in a
significant shift in the relationship between interest groups and government
at the national level. Indeed, Charlwood (2004: 391) notes: ‘New Labour’s
political strategy has been predicated on establishing distance from the trade
unions.’ Britain in 2005 is still, therefore, firmly located towards the higher
78 Matthew Flinders
end of the Siaroff index of interest group pluralism with a score of 3.4. This
reflects a (very) slight move to the left under New Labour but signifies that
no fundamental change has taken place. However, one variable where
significant change has taken place under New Labour since 1997 relates to
the federal–unitary dimension (V6). This will be the topic of the next sub-
section.
V6 – Federal–Unitary Dimension
The formal division of power between different levels of government forms

the sixth of Lijphart’s ten variables and the first indicator on the federal–
unitary dimension. Clearly the nature of inter-governmental relations within
a country has a clear relationship with both the majoritarian system (in
which power is concentrated) and the consensus system (in which power is
dispersed). Britain has always been characterised as a highly unitary (non-
federal) and centralised country in which the governmental structures at the
local and regional level are clearly subservient to the national level and enjoy
no constitutionally entrenched rights or powers. Lijphart employs a fivefold
classification system in which Britain is assigned a federalism index score of
1.0 (on a scale with a maximum of 5 for a fully federal country such as the
United States). With a mean federalism index score of 2.3, this figure
designates Britain a fully unitary and centralised country with no variation
between the two time periods (1945–96 and 1971–96) with which Lijphart is
principally concerned.
It is in relation to V6 that New Labour’s constitutional reforms do
represent a significant shift or reallocation of power within the British
polity. The creation of a Scottish Parliament with tax raising powers, a
Welsh Assembly and an Assembly in London, combined with the
government’s plans to hold a referendum on elected regional government
in the North-East of England on 4 November 2004, represent a major
adjustment to the constitutional infrastructure.
The momentum behind devolution and the trajectory of developments
within a relatively short time makes it unlikely (though not impossible)
that a future government would seek to repeal any of the devolution
legislation. The Welsh Assembly, for example, is already campaigning for
increased powers in a manner akin to developments in other European
countries, like Spain, where regional devolution has created a ‘snowball’ or
‘ratchet’ effect in which weaker regions seek to acquire the powers of more
autonomous regions (see Richard Commission 2004). The fact that New
Labour has created a quasi-federal structure within a constitutionally
unitary framework illuminates many of the tensions and anomalies that are
the topic of increasing disquiet within Britain. However, in terms of
employing Lijphart’s index of federalism to Britain for the period 1997–
2005 it is clear that an important change in the nature of British
democracy has taken place. From the index score of 1.0 for 1945–96, the
devolutionary reforms since 1997 have led to the creation of an

institutional structure somewhere between Lijphart’s ‘unitary and decen-
tralized’ category (2.0) and a semi-federal structure (3.0). The quasi-federal
nature of Britain’s federal–unitary balance would therefore receive an
index score of 2.5, which takes it much closer to the mean score of 2.3 for
all 36 countries within Lijphart’s study. However, the ambiguous nature of
New Labour’s approach to the constitutional reform becomes apparent
when the far-reaching reforms in relation to V6 are compared with the
cosmetic, and some might say majoritarian, reforms in relation to the
unicameralism–bicameralism dimension. This will be the topic of the next

sub-section.
V7 – Unicameralism–bicameralism dimension.
The second component of the federal–unitary dimension focuses on the
distribution of power within the legislature. The pure majoritarian model is
characterised by the concentration of legislative power in one single
chamber whereas the consensus model commonly involves a bicameral
legislature in which power is divided equally between two differently
constituted chambers. Most democratic systems employ an institutional
structure somewhere between these two extremes. The fact that Britain has a
bicameral parliament but unequal balance of powers between the upper and
lower houses led to Lijphart’s describing it as ‘asymmetrically bicameral’.
The House of Commons is the dominant chamber, with the House of Lords’
powers being severely limited to the amendment and delay of non-fiscal
bills. Since the Parliament Act of 1911, when the powers of the Lords were
curtailed, Britain has been governed by a system of weak bicameralism.
Lijphart analysis up to 1996 uses three variables (bicameral versus
unicameral systems, symmetrical versus asymmetrical systems and con-
gruent versus incongruent systems) in order to derive an index of
bicameralism and thereby assign a score to each of the 36 countries in his
study. Using this system Britain receives an index score of 2.5 (on a scale
from 1.0 to 4.0 with the latter being strong bicameralism and the former
unicameralism). This score reflects Britain’s classification as a system of
‘between medium strength and weak bicameralism’. In opposition New
Labour had made much of their commitment to remove the hereditary
members and make ‘the House of Lords more democratic and representa-
tive’ – a commitment that was included in their election manifesto (Labour
Party 1997).
The 1999 House of Lords Act duly removed all but 92 hereditary peers
from the Lords and was designed to be ‘stage one’ of a reform process that
would eventually lead to exclusion of the remaining hereditary peers when
reforms to introduce an elected component (‘stage two’) were implemented.
And yet under New Labour there has never been a clear vision of the role,
responsibilities or composition of a reformed second chamber. This reflects
80 Matthew Flinders
traditional tensions within the Labour Party that while committed to

abolishing the hereditary principle could not agree what to replace it with.
In November 2001 the government’s proposals for ‘stage two’ of reform
of the House of Lords were published in a white paper ‘Completing the
Reform’ (Cm 5291 2001). The document proposed that only 120 (one-fifth)
of the reformed second chamber of 600 members should be elected by
proportional representation for a term of 15 years or possibly less. The
proposals received widespread criticism and 165 Labour backbenchers
signed an Early Day Motion supporting a wholly or largely elected second
chamber. Of particular significance was the rejection by the government of

the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords’ recommenda-
tion that the independent Appointment Commission should make all
appointments, even those representing the political parties. The govern-
ment’s proposals maintained a critical source of party political patronage.
In May 2002, in an attempt to make progress on stage two of Lords
reform, the government supported the establishment of a Joint Committee
of both Houses. The committee published its report on 11 December 2002 in
which it put forward no fewer than seven options for the composition of a
revised second chamber from which both Houses could choose between in a
free vote (HL 17/HC 171 2002–3). In this vote the House of Lords chose a
fully appointed second chamber by 335 votes to 225, the House of
Commons rejected all the options for change. This has left the government’s
plans in disarray. The lack of any agreed position within the cabinet was
particularly apparent, with Tony Blair and Lord Irvine coming out strongly
in favour of a fully appointed second chamber and Robin Cook and several
other leading ministers at that time favouring an elected component. In
another surprise, 172 MPs, far more than expected, voted to abolish the
second chamber completely.
In May 2003 the Joint Committee, which had been reconvened to try and
find a way forward on Lords reform, issued a report in which it requested
that the government provide the committee with an indication of its current
thinking on the role and composition of a revised second chamber (HL 97/
HC 668 2002–3). The government published a rather blunt response in July
2003 in which it stated ‘there is no consensus about introducing any elected
element in the House of Lords’ (HL 155/HC 1027 2002–3). This statement
did little to offer the joint committee any guidance on how it should proceed
and this situation was worsened when on 18 September 2003 the
Department for Constitutional Affairs published a white paper (the Labour
government’s third on the topic) on reform of the Lords without any
advance consultation.
The white paper set out the government’s intention to remove the 92
remaining hereditary peers and create a statutory Appointments Commis-
sion. A bill to this effect was included in the Queen’s speech at the beginning
of the 2003–4 parliamentary session. The bill signals the government’s
intention to proceed on the basis of a purely appointed second chamber. The
Labour government’s gradual but consistent drift towards this position has
evolved since the 1993 Labour Party conference when, as shadow home
secretary, Tony Blair promised ‘an end to hereditary peers sitting in the
House of Lords as the first step to a proper, directly elected second chamber’.
As leader of the party in 1996 Blair hinted during the John Smith Memorial
Lecture that in addition to elected members there may be room for ‘people of
a particularly distinguished position or record’. The Labour government’s
white paper of January 1999 further signalled a change of emphasis as it
stressed that a revised second chamber ‘must neither usurp, nor threaten, the
supremacy of the first chamber’ (Cm 4183 1999). This last quote takes us to
the heart of tensions surrounding New Labour and its reform of the British
constitution: a tension between the capacity of a government to implement its
policies and the participatory demands of constitutional reformers. The
Labour government has been committed to the latter in principle but to the
former in practice. On the Lijphart index of cameralism it is possible to
suggest that the removal of all but 92 of the overwhelmingly conservative
hereditary peers from the Lords under New Labour has actually increased
the asymmetrical nature of the balance of powers between the two houses.
Britain has, therefore moved from a system of medium to weak bicameralism
to one which could now be better described as simply weak bicameralism or
even a ‘one and a half chamber system’. The index score of cameralism has
therefore changed from the pre-1997 score of 2.5 to somewhere between 2.0
and 1.5, producing a mean score of 1.75 for the 1997–2005 period.
In March 2004 the secretary of state for constitutional affairs announced
that a decision had been taken not to proceed with the House of Lords Bill
but that the government would return to the issue in its manifesto for the
next general election. The reason for this dramatic announcement was the
failure of the government to get the second constitutional bill of the 2003–4
parliamentary session, the Constitutional Reform Bill, through the House of
Lords. This will be the topic of the next sub-section.
V8/9 – Constitutional Amendment Procedures and Judicial Review

In the vein of Lijphart’s 1999 work, this sub-section examines V8 and V9
together due to the tight inter-relationship of these variables. Both these
variables concern the presence or absence of explicit restraints on the
legislative power of parliamentary majorities. The process for constitutional
amendment forms the first variable (V8), which is commonly understood
using the distinction between flexible and rigid constitutions. In the former a
constitution can be changed by simple majority votes in the legislature while
in the latter the same amendment would require some form of ‘extra-
majority’ or ‘super-majority’ (often involving both houses of the legislature).
The second variable (V9) concerns the presence of judicial review and the
existence of ‘higher order’ laws which are deemed to be beyond the purview
or jurisdiction of politicians and are protected by the oversight of an
82 Matthew Flinders
independent supreme court with the power to strike down or veto legislation
which is deemed unconstitutional when weighed against these ‘fundamental’
laws. Rigid constitutions tend to have more judicial review protection than
more flexible constitutions.
Britain has always been characterised as a country with a flexible
constitution and a weak system of judicial review. In terms of constitutional
amendment an ordinary majority, thereby indicating complete flexibility,
can approve any legislative proposal brought forward by the government.
Moreover, in Britain the government still enjoys a great number of
prerogative powers, which can be deployed without parliamentary approval.

Indeed, in government New Labour has been very careful to protect the
malleability of the British constitution and has rejected calls to introduce
controls on many of the executive’s prerogative powers (HC 442 2003–4).
On an index of 1.0 to 4.0 (with the former characterising systems in which a
simple majority was required to sanction a constitutional amendment
compared with super-majority greater than two-thirds in the latter) Lijphart
predictably ascribed Britain a score of 1.0 for the period 1945–96. Under
New Labour (1997–2005) this situation has not changed and a score of 1.0 is
returned in Table 3.
The unexpected announcement by the Labour government on 12 June
2003 of its intention to create a supreme court and establish an independent
appointments commission for judicial appointments suggests that a
significant change may have taken place in relation to V9. The role of the
lord chancellor as a member of the executive, legislature and judiciary had
for some time been the topic of disquiet. This had heightened since
incorporation of the ECHR that stipulates under Article 6 that a fair trial
must involve an impartial and independent judge (and not therefore a
member of the same government bringing the case). The ECHR factor
created a sense of urgency and reforms to the second chamber (in which the
highest judicial court sat) provided the opportunity to instigate a clearer
separation of powers.
Once more, however, the approach of New Labour failed to reflect the
inclusive style of politics that the government had suggested would underpin
its administration. The announcement was not preceded by any form of
consultation and was made without the availability of detailed plans. This
fuelled accusations that the government was acting in a high-handed manner
in relation to constitutional reform and, furthermore, doing so in a manner
devoid of any obvious appreciation of the implications that reform in one
area may have for other aspects of the constitutional infrastructure. (The
announcement appeared to take even some members of the cabinet by
surprise.)
Although creation of a supreme court may suggest a move towards a
more consensual political system in which the power of the government is
restricted by various control mechanisms the situation in Britain is less clear.
The planned court will not have the power to veto legislation; indeed,
without an agreed written constitution the courts have little to ‘bite on’ in
terms of gauging the constitutionality of government action or legislation.
The continuing relevance of the notion of parliamentary sovereignty has
been clear in relation to the arrangements for incorporating the nearest
thing that Britain has to ‘higher order’ laws – the ECHR. When the
government incorporated the ECHR into British law in 1998 the procedures
for judicial review were carefully designed to maintain parliamentary
sovereignty. Consequently, the courts were not empowered to strike down
legislation that they deemed to be irreconcilable with the ECHR but simply
to issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’. This does not annul the legislation

in any way but it would commence a procedure in which parliament was
invited to review the act and possibly revise the act in light of the court’s
views. However, parliament is under no obligation to alter the legislation
and is therefore free to judge the constitutionality of its own laws.
New Labour’s plans for a supreme court are therefore weaker than the
situation found in many consensual political systems due to the dominance
of the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed the Lord Chief Justice,
Lord Woolf (2004), described the government’s plans as ‘second class’ due
to the fact that the proposals have been designed in such a way as to protect
the supremacy of parliament and therefore do not include the powers
commonly invested in supreme courts to strike down legislation. This raises
the question of the degree to which the creation of a supreme court without
the existence of a rigid constitution and the judicial capacity to veto
legislation amounts to a meaningful alteration of a political system.
Lijphart’s classification once more facilitates an answer to this question as
he offers an index of judicial review strength that allows institutional
reforms to be measured.
An index score of 1.0 reflects no judicial review, whereas 4.0 indicates
strong judicial review. For the period 1945–96 Britain receives an index
score of 1.0 in light of the absence of either a codified constitution or
independent supreme court. Gauging the extent of reform in Britain is
problematic due to the fact that it demands a normative judgement on the
willingness of the executive not to invoke its reserve powers (parliamentary
sovereignty) but to rule according to an executive mentality that is willing to
cede power. In relation to the ECHR, for example, the government has
made it clear that a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ will usually lead to a
revision of the legislation to bring it into line with the convention. It is also
reasonable to suggest that incorporation of the ECHR does amount to a
shift in power to some extent between the judiciary and the executive, which
will be augmented when the position of the lord chancellor is abolished and
a member of the cabinet no longer heads the judiciary. And yet the broader
context of parliamentary sovereignty seems to eviscerate the very notion of a
supreme court as commonly understood. In light of this it seems appropriate
to suggest an index score that reflects a limited change in relation to judicial
review but retains a sense of the executive’s reluctance to formally
84 Matthew Flinders
acknowledge this change. Britain has, therefore, moved from a country with
no judicial review to one somewhere between ‘no judicial review (1.0)’ and
‘weak judicial review (2.0)’ in the period 1997–2005. This creates an index
score of 1.5 that intimates a shift towards a consensual system but within an
overall majoritarian structure. The next sub-section examines the final
variable (V10).
V10 – Central Bank

The final variable concerns central banks and how much power and
independence they enjoy. The existence of a highly independent bank is a
central characteristic of a consensual political system; whereas tightly
controlled central banks fit into the logic of majoritarian democracy. In
order to measure the independence of the Bank of England Lijphart used
the mean figure of the Cukiperman–Webb–Neyapti (CWN) and Grilli–
Masciandaro–Tabellini (GMT) indexes, which were both coded from zero
to one – the lowest to the highest of independence. Scores of 0.30 and 0.32
on each respective index led Lijphart to assign an overall index score of 0.31
for the period 1945–96 against an overall mean score of 0.38.
However, V10 represents the second area where New Labour has
implemented significant reforms. Just five days after the 1997 general
election the chancellor of the exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced the
granting of operational independence to the Bank of England (BoE), later
formalised in the Bank of England Act 1998. The policy change gave the
BoE ‘instrument independence’ in the sense that it was now free to pursue its
policy goals without interference from outside political pressures. However,
the Treasury still retains a degree of control over the formation of policy so
the reforms were limited to some extent and did not include ‘goal
independence’ (Spiegel 1998). Moreover, Gordon Brown made it clear to
the House of Commons that the government would retain the right to over-
ride the operational independence of the bank ‘in extreme circumstances’.
While emphasising that he expected these reserve powers to be used rarely,
the opacity surrounding the government’s criteria for intervention leaves
open the question of the true extent of the independence granted under New
Labour.
Once more it is necessary to try and gauge the difference between
theoretical capacity and practical politics within the British political system.
Although the conventions of ministerial responsibility to parliament and
parliamentary sovereignty prevent ministers abdicating complete responsi-
bility for functions and preclude governments from binding their successor,
in reality it is possible to suggest that it would be extremely difficult for any
government to seek to either override the Monetary Policy Committee or
repeal the legislation on which the BoE’s independence rests. So while
reserve powers exist: their practical utility is heavily constrained. This
supports the contention that the Bank of England Act, and indeed the acts
on which devolution to Scotland and Wales are founded, may have a quasi-
constitutional force (see below).
The index score of central bank independence for Britain since the Bank
of England Act 1998 has increased from Lijphart’s figure of 0.31 to 0.59
(using the mean of the CWN and GMT indexes) therefore reflecting a
significant increase in independence. This reflects the fact that the Monetary
Policy Committee of the BoE does not require government approval in
making decisions, the BoE’s statutory requirement to pursue monetary
stability, legal provisions which strengthen the position of the BoE vis-à-vis
the government and the transfer of responsibility for banking supervision to
FIGURE 2
TW O D IM EN SION AL CO NCE PT UA L MA P O F D EMO CR ACY IN BRIT AIN
1 9 4 5– 7 1 , 1 9 71 – 9 6 , 1 9 97 – 2 0 0 5 .
Notes: Figure 2 approximates Lijphart’s two-dimensional conceptual map of democracy (1999: 255) with
updated data for the UK from 1997 to 2005. However, this point is only an approximation as data for the
UK has been updated, but data for all other countries used to calculate the precise point on the graph were
not available. Therefore, while the data for calculating the point 1997–2005 on Figure 2 uses UK data from
this time period, it is in comparison with data from other countries using data between 1971–96. Following
Lijphart, the five variables on each of the clusters were standardised, so as to have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. The signs were adjusted so that high values on each variable represented majoritarianism, thus
reversing the signs for the effective number of parties and all five variables in the federal-unitary dimension.
After averaging these standardised variables, the averages were then standardised so that each unit on the
two axes represents one standard deviation (Lijphart 1999: 247).
86 Matthew Flinders
a new Financial Services Authority in June 1998. This final revised variable
score facilitates the revision of Lijphart’s conceptual map of democracy to
be re-drawn to include the period 1997–2005 (see Figure 2).
Lijphart’s framework for understanding political systems offers a
valuable tool for understanding how British democracy has been altered
by the constitutional reforms enacted by the Labour government since 1
May 1997. In addition to allowing scholars to gauge the actual extent of
change it also provides an overview of the changing constitutional terrain
and differences in emphasis between certain dimensions of change as
opposed to others. Figure 2 suggests that British democracy has changed

under New Labour but that this change has been one-sided. There has been
a clear shift along the federal–unity dimension, reflecting devolution and an
increase in central bank independence. However there has not been an
equivalent shift on the executive–parties dimension. On the contrary, the
change on this dimension suggests an increase or greater concentration in
executive power since 1997.
This conceptual diagram usefully illuminates and aids our understanding
of what observers, such as Marquand (1999b; 2000) and Mair (2000), have
described as the ‘Blair paradox’ – how can a government who has set in train
a great number of major constitutional reforms that involve the devolution
or transference of some degree of political power be seen, at the same time,
as having a strong centralising and controlling approach to governing which
conflicts with the centrifugal thrust of many constitutional reforms? The
next section seeks to explain this paradox and explore some of its
implications for the future of British democracy.
Explanations and Implications

After reviewing New Labour’s progress throughout the government’s first
term and the early stages of its second term Beetham (2002: 401) and his
colleagues conclude, ‘ministers are determined to hold onto all their
traditional powers at the centre and to reject, delay or frustrate
constitutional changes that would check or make transparent their exercise
of those powers’. Indeed, it is clear from the analysis of Lijphart’s variables
above that New Labour has taken great care to implement its constitutional
reforms, however precariously, within the traditional majoritarian structure
of British government. Consequently, Norton (quoted in Morrison 2001:
509–10) astutely observes, ‘they [New Labour] have taken the Westminster
model, the traditional constitution, and modified it, some would say
vandalized, and not actually replaced it with a new form of constitution’. To
paraphrase the work of Mair (quoted above), there has been no full-blooded
constitutional revolution and although New Labour may well be dragging
the political system away from an extreme version of majoritarian
democracy it is clearly not hauling it towards a more consensual model.
Crucially, there has been no discernible conception of an alternative
constitution. New Labour’s constitutional reform project cannot be

interpreted as a fundamental paradigm shift.
There is, and has been for some time, a contradiction at the core of the
New Labour project. A contradiction focused on a principled commitment to
a more consensual model of democracy but a practical awareness of benefits
offered to a governing party of majoritarianism, in terms of the capacity to
drive through change, control the political agenda and implement manifesto
commitments. In this respect there is little ‘new’ about New Labour.
Moreover, as Flinders (2004: 138) has demonstrated at length, constitutional
reform has never been located clearly within the wider ‘third way’ project –
‘there seems to be very little constitutional cement in terms of a uniting
ideological or theoretical framework or statement’. New Labour ministers
have often stated that ‘there is no intention to begin from first principles’
(Lords Hansard, 21 June 2001). This fact may, in itself, suggest explanations
for both the government’s commitment to a majoritarian system of
government while espousing a desire to move towards a more consensual
system; and the apparent inability to understand the impact of specific
reforms on the constitutional infrastructure as a whole.
Although the ‘third way’ has complex theoretical roots it is clear,
paradoxically, that a central aspect of the concept and hence New Labour’s
governing strategy is focused on results rather than political philosophy. As
Finlayson (1999: 271) notes, ‘Policy is legitimated not by ethical principles
but by the truth of certain social facts’. This approach is elaborated in
Giddens’ (1998) exposition of the third way – major societal challenges
demand a ‘deepening and widening of democracy’ but the evolution of a
‘new politics’ is based on a ‘philospohic conservatism’ that suggests a
pragmatic attitude to coping with change and a respect for the past and
history. Consequently, Sheldrick (2002: 141) concludes, ‘There is little in the
Third Way, at least in terms of its practice in the British context, for those
who hope for a more radical impetus towards democratisation.’
The principled pragmatism and emphasis on institutional modernisation
within New Labour’s constitutional project is highly restrictive. Moreover,
the statism, pragmatism and preference for the Westminster model appear
classic components of Old Labour philosophy. As Weir (quoted in
Morrison 2001: 527) notes, ‘New Labour is just a smokescreen. Broadly
what we have is pretty Old Labour party in terms of its pragmatism and its
acceptance of the status quo politically.’ Historically, the Labour Party has
always placed great weight on the capacity of the state to drive through and
implement far-reaching social change. Essentially, the constitution creates a
powerful executive unfettered by major hurdles that could implement its
policies. This is exactly the core dynamic of the constitution that New
Labour is reluctant to cede. Indeed, Giddens (1998: 68) has emphasised how
New Labour must be willing to use the ‘tools of modernity’ in order to drive
through its social and economic reforms. It is this failure to dilute the central
axis of political power that led Morrison (2001: 501) to conclude about New
88 Matthew Flinders
Labour that ‘despite all the reforms to the periphery, the core of the British
political system of elective dictatorship has remained intact’.
And yet calculating changes or shifts in the nature of political power are
problematic due to the New Labour’s commitment to retaining the reserve
powers that the Westminster model offers any government. This creates an
argument between those who interpret many aspects of New Labour’s
constitutional reforms as de facto entrenched facets of an increasingly
codified constitution and those who interpret such an approach as politically
naı̈ve. In the former group, for example, Maer (2004: 254) and her
colleagues state: ‘constitutional law is growing into a more distinct body of

fundamental law. Although technically these constitutional laws have no
higher status, politically they are entrenched in a way that ordinary statute
law is not’.
Against this position a number of scholars suggest that there is little
evidence that the constitutional legislation introduced by New Labour is any
more secure than any other legislation. Weir and Byrne (2004) highlight the
manner in which the British government used their parliamentary majority
to push through parliament the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act
2001, which involved derogating from Article 5 of the European Convention
on Human Rights less than two years after the passage of the Human Rights
Act 1998. In light of this, Maer et al.’s (2004: 254) contention that ‘however
much David Blunkett [the Home Secretary] may dislike the Human Rights
Act, that too is politically entrenched . . . human rights once recognised in
statute, cannot easily be taken away’ seems somewhat blinkered from the
reality and experience of political power under New Labour.
Given that an essential aspect of any move from a majoritarian to a
consensual democratic system involves the executive setting aside certain
reserve powers in order to entrench certain normative values and principles,
any retention of the basic framework of the Westminster model, however
vandalised, is problematic. In essence, fundamental laws and entrenched
constitutions are simply incompatible with the very notion of parliamentary
sovereignty.
Moreover, other anomalies have been created by New Labour’s
enthusiasm for creating a political system at the regional level that is
clearly based on a more consensus-orientated understanding of democracy.
This is reflected in the voting system, party system, the nature of executive
power and the cooperative relationship with interest groups, and a more
balanced executive/legislature relationship. But the differences in relation to
these variables underpin the argument made in the introduction to this
article; although the Labour government has been willing to reform
peripheral aspects of the constitution (in geographic and administrative
terms) and impose consensual models of democracy on regions within
Britain, it has been extremely unwilling to introduce similar reforms at the
national level. This has created a major political tension within British
democracy as the Labour government seems unwilling or unable to
legitimate why a more consensual model of democracy is appropriate for

sub-national and supra-national levels of government but not for the
national level.
The development of a more consensual political system at the sub-
national level in Britain raises three further issues.
First, from the perspective of public participation and involvement, a
more consensual style of politics does not, to date, seem to have fostered an
increase in public trust or interest in politics. Turnout fell to record lows in
the local and European elections held between 1998 and 2000 whereas the
second round of elections to the Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament in

May 2003 saw turnout drop by 12 per cent (38 per cent and 49 per cent)
from the inaugural elections in 1999.
Second, from a methodological perspective it is possible to question the
utility of Lijphart’s schema. In many ways the issues surrounding Labour’s
programme of constitutional reforms are more complex than the framework
allows. In focusing mainly on politics at the national level it risks
underplaying the impact of reform in other parts of the system. For
example, it may be easy – but fundamentally misleading – to dismiss the
degree of change in relation to the party system once the relative significance
of third parties at the devolved and European levels are removed from the
analysis. There is a danger, therefore, that the nature of democracy in
Britain may be changing but that the framework of analysis, in this case
Lijphart’s model, lacks the capacity to detect and understand these
modifications.
Finally, it could be argued that the application of Lijphart’s ten variables
is unfair as it underestimates the commitment to change and downplays the
existence of a strong institutional bias towards inertia over time. Several
variables might be interpreted as not actually being open to purposeful
constitutional engineering (notably the party system (V1) and interest
groups (V5)). The argument being that the impression of the degree of
change generated by Lijphart’s framework may be due more to the differing
susceptibility to constitutional modification of the variables rather than the
constitutional lethargy of the government. Although this argument is
legitimate it does downplay the capacity of government’s to legislate or
simply govern in a manner that would stimulate change. For example,
although the government cannot legislate to create more political parties it
can legislate to change to a more proportional electoral system that would
be likely to return a greater number of parties. Despite these methodological
and epistemological issues, Lijphart’s work provides arguably the best
framework for understanding the interaction between New Labour’s
reforms and the nature of democracy in Britain.
Although the anxiety surrounding New Labour’s constitutional reform
programme appears to be mounting towards the end of their second term,
the reluctance of the party to cede power is not difficult to understand. As
Flinders (2002) has demonstrated, British political history has for several
90 Matthew Flinders
centuries been dominated by the tension between two dominant conceptions

of British democracy. The first stressing parliamentary government,
participation, responsiveness, exposure and accountability (known at
various times as the ‘Whig’ or ‘Liberal’ view), the second emphasising
strong government, exclusion, distance, stability, control and the insulation
of ministers (the ‘Peelite’ or ‘Whitehall’ view). The paradox is that reforms
to increase the Whig view of the constitution (parliamentary reform,
freedom of information, etc.) are weak exactly because they would be
inimical to the Peelite strand. The movement from opposition to
government (and vice versa) generally produces a swing from one view to
the other. New governments frequently renege upon their commitments to
wholesale parliamentary reform and embrace the strong government Peelite
view while outgoing governments often develop a new-found zeal for the
Whig view. However, this shift in executive mentality does little to foster
public confidence or trust.
Indeed, although Tony Blair has emphasised that a core goal of the third
way strategy is to end disaffection with distant political institutions and
restore public trust in politics there is little evidence that this has happened.
The British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey of 2001 makes depressing reading
for New Labour strategists. The 2001 general election was in itself
disappointing as turnout fell to its lowest point since 1918 (59.1 per cent).
It appears that public trust in government and faith in the political
structure’s capacity to respond to public demands fell in the 1990s,
recovered slightly in the wake of Labour’s election in 1997, but have now
fallen back to more or less what they were in the mid-1990s (see Dunleavy et
al. 2001; Weir and Byrne 2004). New Labour has therefore failed in relation
to the core aim of its constitutional reform programme and it is possible to
suggest that the reason for this is not just that the government has been
unwilling to relinquish power but that the New Labour discourse of radical
reform actually increased public expectations and then made the contrariety
between rhetoric and reality more stark, leading to even greater disillusion-
ment.
Despite the central finding that New Labour’s constitutional reforms have
been less significant than might have been expected, it is possible to suggest
that they have set in train a critical momentum and dynamic that may well
force at some point an explicit reconsideration of the structure and power
relationships within Britain. It may well be that this analysis has been
conducted too soon; the impact of New Labour’s reforms may well not
become apparent for some time. As Marquand (2000: 78) emphasises, much
depends on the dynamics of the territorial constitution and the way in which
the prevailing conception of the proper relationship between Westminster
and the regions evolves over time.
The prospect of a referendum on a written constitution for the European
Union with the government supporting a yes vote may also have profound
implications as it will be difficult to seriously promote a written constitution
for the European Union without the argument spilling over into the need for
a similar document in the United Kingdom. It is these constitutional fuels
and falling electoral turnout and public trust that may force a future Labour
government to adopt a more radical approach to the constitution. At the
heart of such a reappraisal, as Harlow (2000) has recognised, would have to
be a formal acknowledgement that parliamentary sovereignty is, and has
been for some time, a relative rather than an absolute concept.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank Arend Lipjphart, Andrew Gamble, David
Galbreath, Steve Ludlam, Martin Smith, Ben Seyd, Declan McHugh,
Peter Mair and Andrew Taylor for their comments on an earlier version of
this article. He would also like to thank the staff of the House of
Commons Library and the Bank of England for the provision of data and
Sean Carey for his assistance with statistical analysis. A fuller exposition
of this article can be found in Matthew Flinders, Democracy in Britain:
New Labour and the British Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
forthcoming 2006.
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West European Politics

Majoritarian Democracy in Britain: New Labour and the Constitution

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Majoritarian Democracy in Britain:

Correspondence Address: Matthew Flinders, Department of Politics, University of Sheﬃeld,

ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online # 2005 Taylor & Francis Ltd

reform. It is equally possible that a government may wish to shift the

conceptually informed and theoretically robust analysis may be particularly

May 1997. Furthermore, Lijphart’s work is particularly appropriate in

New Labour and the British Constitution

Constitutional Reform Bill. However, unlike the Labour government’s

. Referendums (Scotland and Wales) Act 1997

process, it is abundantly clear that several elements of New Labour’s

It is very British, this revolution. It is a revolution without a theory. It is

Most democratic systems, Lijphart suggests, can be located on a continuum

Variable Majoritarian Consensus 1945–1996 1971–1996 1997–2005 Conclusion (1997–2005)

Majoritarian democracy in Britain

1997 General Election 2001 General Election

Majoritarian democracy in Britain

minority cabinets, which do not enjoy the support of a parliamentary

informal rules, procedures and negotiations that deny the employment of

one of secure minimal winning one-party cabinets with no changes in party

it can be comprehensive’ (Hansard, 3 Dec. 2003) but this is unlikely to be

in the nature of interest group–government relations in Britain, especially

The formal division of power between diﬀerent levels of government forms

devolutionary reforms since 1997 have led to the creation of an

unicameralism–bicameralism dimension. This will be the topic of the next

traditional tensions within the Labour Party that while committed to

chamber. Of particular signiﬁcance was the rejection by the government of

V8/9 – Constitutional Amendment Procedures and Judicial Review

prerogative powers, which can be deployed without parliamentary approval.

to issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’. This does not annul the legislation

V10 – Central Bank

the government and the transfer of responsibility for banking supervision to

opposed to others. Figure 2 suggests that British democracy has changed

Explanations and Implications

constitution. New Labour’s constitutional reform project cannot be

colleagues state: ‘constitutional law is growing into a more distinct body of

legitimate why a more consensual model of democracy is appropriate for

second round of elections to the Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament in

centuries been dominated by the tension between two dominant conceptions

HC 442 (2003–2004). Taming the Prerogative: Increasing Ministerial Accountability to

Siaroﬀ, Alan (1999). ‘Corporatism in Twenty-Four Industrial Democracies: Meaning and

Labour Government in 2002’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41:2, 335–58

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