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Administrative Theory & Praxis / March 2010, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 123–128.
© 2010 Public Administration Theory Network.
1084-1806 / 2010 $9.50 + 0.00.
DOI 10.2753/ATP1084-1806320108 123
124 Administrative theory & praxis v Vol. 32, No. 1
PRESIDENTIAL COMMODIFICATION
Marketing scholar Philip Kotler says that “the American public is treated
every few years to the illusion that they run their country by making a choice
among the men who want to run their country for them” (Kotler, 1975, p. 761,
emphasis added). Political candidates are inexorably engaged in a market-
ing game, so turning presidential candidates into commodities via branding
was the next logical step. Commodities are bought and sold, and presidents
following the Obama model could encounter the same fate. The candidate,
Kotler continues, must market him- or herself to parties, voters, and interest
groups—all diverse markets with various needs. As Rawthorn (2008) details,
Obama would subtly change and craft his brand depending upon the audience.
This is common with rebranding products (think recently of RadioShack
becoming The Shack), so why not with a branded candidate?
Obama, however, was not the first presidential candidate to recognize the
commodification of the person and office. He was, though, the candidate who
perhaps perfected the movement. Niffenegger (1989) illustrates how Nixon
changed his image in 1968 to match a national ideal. Reagan, Niffenegger
continues, made use of 45-minute-long telephone interviews with “tens of
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thousands of voters to determine the major issues as well as the image dimen-
sions of the ideal 1980 president” (1989, p. 47, emphasis added). Obama’s
use of social media tactics allowed his team to push the predetermined image
out to massive audiences for little money or effort. It was a targeted use of
marketing research—go where the people are to sell a product. The people,
in this Web 2.0 world, are moving to social media.
As a commodity, the candidate goes through the traditional steps of prod-
uct marketing—create identity (brand image), get party approval (company
image), win primary election (test market), campaign hard (advertising and
distribution), get elected (market share), and stay in office (repeat sales) (Kot-
ler, 1975, p. 768). In this sense, “political contests remind us that candidates
are marketed as well as soap” (Kotler & Levy, 1969, p. 10); that is, candidates
become a commodity just like a consumer’s favorite brand of soap. Harfoush
(2009), an Obama campaign insider, details how the team constructed the now-
familiar Obama brand. The brand started in an ad hoc manner built on what
random staffers thought should appear. Eventually, the campaign controlled
the image and focused on a strong typeface and color scheme that appeared
“perfectly American” (p. 68). The logo, the author continues, was designed
with the ray pattern mentioned above yet tailored to a specific audience; ex-
amples are shown from global applications of the Obama brand. In this sense,
the Obama marketing really was no different than selling soap, as products
usually are packaged differently when sold internationally.
Marketing, as Kotler and Levy note, also is a consumer-driven experience.
Tailored research to understand the consumer can help sellers “identify and
create the goods and services consumers really want” (1973, p. 55). Political
marketing, as explained in the next section, is a way to achieve that end.
POLITICAL MARKETING
PRESIDENT AS SIMULATION
With the overreliance on branding and marketing, the president—in this case,
Obama—could slip into a hyperreal simulation. He becomes not an actual
leader, but an image of leader. He becomes not an actual statesman, but the em-
bodied image of a national brand. He becomes not a political campaign model,
but an image-centric candidate model. It is this third implication that could
be most dangerous for public administration, as simulations are rarely held
accountable for actions. There are no real consequences in a simulation.
Baudrillard (1994) examines presidential simulation, saying that simula-
tion can dilute actual power. “With the extenuation of the political sphere,
the president comes increasingly to resemble that Puppet of Power who is the
head of primitive societies” (p. 23). Presidents, especially charismatic lead-
ers, have to perpetuate the myth and live within the image-driven simulation
they created. “For a long time now a head of state—no matter which one—is
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nothing but the simulacrum of himself, and only that gives him the power and
the quality to govern” (p. 26, emphasis in original). Continuous image focus
only perpetuates the simulation.
When a president is a brand, turned into a commodity, and marketed like a
product, consumer drives take over for practical, rational ones. People buy—or
buy into—signs of the real (Baudrillard, 1998). With the president as brand,
consumers are buying into the ultimate simulation and powerful product.
They buy a simulation with practical consequences. “In a way, the generalized
consumption of images, of facts, of information aims also to conjure away
the real with signs of the real” (p. 33, emphasis in original). The ideal is what
is put out to vote in the political market. Rubenstein (1989) applied the idea
of simulation to President Reagan, arguing that the man and his presidential
terms were nothing more than simulations. She envisions Reagan as a hyperreal
object because of his foundations in Hollywood, having been an actor before
becoming president. “Fiction of the real” (p. 601) is problematic, especially
in terms of Reagan and his stance as “the Gipper” and an actor all rolled
into one. With Obama, the simulation was created on the campaign trail and
continues to be perpetuated in office, with Obama delivering a message both
in traditional forms and through immediate social media.
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES