1

March 2011

Pro – North Korea

Policy Files
Revision 3

Compiled by Jackie Mei

Contents
Nukes, Nuclear War.................................................................................................................................4
Expanding North Korean provocations will draw the US into nuclear conflict....................................4
North Korea has abandoned anti-nuclear talks in the status quo—they are rapidly modernizing their
nuclear arsenal....................................................................................................................................4
Increases risk of nuclear war in Asia....................................................................................................5
North Korean nuclearization will trigger escalation and war...............................................................6
North Korean nuclear weapons use leads to a full scale nuclear war..................................................7
North Korean proliferation risks proliferation exports—increasing the likelihood of war in the
Middle East or Asia..............................................................................................................................8
Increases chances of Asian wars go nuclear........................................................................................8
NK has enough plutonium for 6 atomic bombs and will use them if in conflict...................................9
North Korea undermines efforts to contain proliferation..................................................................10
Since the Korean War, NK has been stockholding nuclear supplies...................................................10
North Korean nukes threaten the non-prolif regime.........................................................................11
DPRK Prolif bad – causes terrorism...................................................................................................11
NK proliferates and will only do it more............................................................................................12
An isolated North Korea can sell nuclear materials to others............................................................12
If NK cannot be stopped, Asia could nuclearize.................................................................................12
The moderation argument is wrong- doesn’t change the actors’ judgment.....................................13
North Korea will never denuclearize – even if they say “yes”, they’ll cheat......................................14
Prolif General.........................................................................................................................................15
Nuclear prolif and terrorism must be avoided – these threats rise above all others is urgency........15
Proliferation makes nuclear terrorism is inevitable...........................................................................15
Prolif drastically increases the risk of accidents – guarantees nuclear war.......................................16
Nuclear deterrence fails and increases the risk of nuclear terrorism................................................17
Proliferation increases the risk of inadvertent escalation.................................................................18
Proliferation increases the risk of nuclear mishaps...........................................................................18
Succession Crisis....................................................................................................................................19
The succession crisis in North Korea increases the likelihood of miscalculation over the Korean
peninsula:..........................................................................................................................................19
 A messy power struggle in North Korea is on the way......................................................................20
The leadership struggle in North Korea risks violence spilling out of North Korea............................20
Risk for Troops.......................................................................................................................................21
North Korea constantly places US troops in danger of military and terrorist attacks........................21
US troops are currently in range of North Korean attack:.................................................................21
The US troop presence on the peninsula means the US will get sucked into any conflict:................21
Any threat to our troops is an automatic tripwire to US escalation of a conflict: if our soldiers are in
danger we will intervene to protect them:........................................................................................21
Deterrence Ineffective...........................................................................................................................22
U.S. forces don’t deter North Korea- they provide the primary driver for the nuclear program.......22
Deterrence will fail against North Korea:...........................................................................................23
A North Korean threat still remains...................................................................................................23
War Likely..............................................................................................................................................24
Risk of war in Korea is high................................................................................................................24
The risk of Korean war is high – small disputes could escalate..........................................................25
Korea is a military tinderbox—one accident could trigger a full scale war:.......................................26
North Korean brinksmanship risks a full scale war on the peninsula.................................................26
North Korean recklessness could lead to war on the peninsula at any time.....................................26
Now’s key---the risk of conflict’s uniquely high.................................................................................26
Intent.....................................................................................................................................................28
North Korean provocation increasing................................................................................................28
Military Strength....................................................................................................................................29
The North is highly capable of waging a war.....................................................................................29
Strategic positioning raises the risk of a devastating strike...............................................................29
The North’s standing army is huge....................................................................................................29
The North would put up a fight---no easy victory..............................................................................30
Misc.......................................................................................................................................................31
The risk of a full scale nuclear exchange trumps the risk of terrorism...............................................31
Nukes, Nuclear War
Expanding North Korean provocations will draw the US into nuclear conflict

Hayes, 06 - Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; and Director, Nautilus
Institute, San Francisco (Peter, “The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American
Nuclear Hegemony” 10/4, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0682Hayes.html)
If as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear ‘stalker state’ that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in
a less hostile and more respectful manner, then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less
so, to ameliorate stalking behaviours in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat offender, the
DPRK is likely to
continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift
in Washington’s attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state that stalks another with nuclear threat.
Currently, the United States has no common language for discussing nuclear weapons with the North Korean military in the context of the insecurities that bind the
two sides together at the Demilitarized Zone.

Continued rebuffing of Pyongyang’s overtures may lead to more ‘nuclear stalking’ – that is, the
development of creative and unanticipated ways of using nuclear threats, deployments, and actual use in
times of crisis or war. There are no grounds to believe that the DPRK will employ a US or Western
conceptual framework of nuclear deterrence and crisis management in developing its own nuclear
doctrine and use options. Indeed, US efforts to use ‘clear and classical’ deterrent threats to communicate to
North Koreans that ‘if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use
them will bring national obliteration’ – as Condoleezza Rice put it in her Foreign Affairs essay in 2000 – serve to incite the DPRK
to exploit this very threat as a way to engage the U nited States, with terrible risks of miscalculation and first-
use on both sides.

North Korea has abandoned anti-nuclear talks in the status quo—they are rapidly
modernizing their nuclear arsenal
Joongang Daily, March 18, 2010 (staff writer). Online. Internet. April 10, 2010.
(http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2917980)

North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have nearly stalemated the United States, with no viable alternatives to
the stalled six-party talks in sight, a scholar said Tuesday. “There is an increasing pessimism about the
prospect of diplomacy as a viable vehicle for denuclearization,” Scott Snyder, director of the Center for
U.S.-Korea Policy at the Asia Foundation, said on the Web site of the Council on Foreign Relations. “But
there’s also ... not much support for alternatives. That’s the core dilemma. Alternatives to diplomacy are
hard to muster, and yet hope for diplomacy to be successful is quite limited.” North Korea detonated its
second nuclear device last year and has been boycotting the six-party talks for nearly a year to protest UN
sanctions imposed after its nuclear and missile tests.

Increases risk of nuclear war in Asia

Cimbala, 10 - Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State, (Stephen, Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century,
p. 117-8)

Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia. Japan and
South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal configuration of nuclear
powers in the Pacific basis (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas – not including the United States,
with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear
preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an
assumed nuclear capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy. As George H. Quester has noted:

If the Pyongyang regime plays its cards sensibly and well, therefore, the world will not see its nuclear
weapons being used against Japan or South Korea or anyone else, but will rather see this new nuclear
arsenal held in reserve (just as the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal has been held in reserve), as a deterrent
against the outside world’s applying maximal pressure on Pyongyang and as a bargaining chip to extract
the economic and political concessions that the DPRK needs if it wishes to avoid giving up its peculiar
approach to social engineering.

A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical deterrence and
proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear
weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation
strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military options, not excluding preemptive
war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-sided nuclear arms race in
Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1)
some of these states already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable
or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear
first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused
an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue commanders; (3) faulty
intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the other’s defensive moves to
forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken preemption.

North Korean nuclearization will trigger escalation and war

Paul Dibb, 2006 (Emeritus Prof of International Relations at Australian National University), Sydney Morning Herald
(Australia), August 15, 2006. “As one nuclear flashpoint reaches a lull, another simmers away.” Online. Internet.
Accessed April 1, 2010 at http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/as-one-nuclear-flashpoint-reaches-a-lull-another-
simmers-away/2006/08/14/1155407736794.html
In North Korea a similar situation applies. Having seen the destruction of Saddam's regime, North Korea's
Kim Jong-il is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons to preserve his regime. But the end of the Cold War
has eroded the influence of North Korea's allies over its military ambitions and sense of security. China
has been embarrassed by its inability to restrain North Korea from testing nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles and Russia no longer wields any influence over the rogue state. In many ways, the situation in
North-East Asia is potentially even more dire than in the Middle East. North Korea's recalcitrance in
dismantling its nuclear weapons program comes at a time of unprecedented tensions between China and
Japan and South Korea and Japan where one false move could spell disaster. North Korea is playing a
dangerous game of bellicose brinkmanship; it continues to keep more than a million troops on high-alert
status, including heavy artillery concentrations only 50 kilometres from Seoul, a city of more than 10
million people. North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons threatens to seriously destabilise North-East
Asia and result in a nuclear arms race developing there. As it is, the North's belligerence is encouraging
Japan to build up its military capabilities. This at a time when China's poor relations with Japan are
worrying. The Chinese communist leadership drums up anti-Japanese nationalism whenever it suits,
while China's military build-up greatly concerns Japan. The pace of Beijing's defence spending is
puzzling, particularly as China faces no military threat for the first time in many decades. Similarly,
Japan's relations with South Korea are at a low point, partly over Japan's view of the history of World
War II but also because of territorial disputes, which Seoul has elevated to the level of national pride,
threatening the use of military force. This is occurring when, from Tokyo's perspective, South Korea is
drifting from the orbit of the US alliance and getting uncomfortably close to China, as well as appeasing
North Korea. All this is an unhealthy mix of great power tensions and deep-seated historical distrust and
growing military capabilities. The bigger worry is that Pyongyang's adventurism will incinerate any
efforts to stabilise a region full of dangerous rivalries, as will the inevitable collision between Iran and
Israel in the Middle East.
North Korean nuclear weapons use leads to a full scale nuclear war
Kim Myong Chol, 2002 (North Korea expert and research fellow, Nautilus Institute). October 24, 2002. “Agreed
Framework is Brain Dead; Shotgun Wedding is the only option to defuse crisis,” Online. Internet. Accessed, April 10,
2010 at http://nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html.

Set free from from the heavy fetters of the nuclear accord, the North Koreans now feel completely free to
fabricate a full range of nuclear bombs, including uranium bombs and hydrogen bombs. The North
Korean regime of Kim Jong Il is ready to join the elite nuclear club as a full-fledged member. They are
well confident that the North Korean scientists are resourceful enough to produce miniaturized nuclear
weapons. All the North Korean ICBMs, a joke to the American counterparts, can still wreak disastrous
havoc on prime targets on the Metropolitan U.S.A. From now on, not a single day will pass without North
Korean rolling out a nuclear bomb. To be candid, there is every good reason to suspect that as early as the
mid-80s the North Koreans managed to produce not less than fifty atomic bombs with more than 300 kg
of plutonium imported from abroad. However, they will never admit this fact under any circumstances. In
other words, when they succeeded in test-firing intermediate-range Scud missiles, a result of reverse-
engineering, it is logical to believe that they must have already had scores of nuclear weapons in their
arsenal. It is ridiculous to think that the North Koreans ought to have developed missile technology
without simultaneously working on nuclear devices. One estimate indicates that North Korea has now not
less than one hundred nuclear warheads. Successful test firing of multistage rockets in 1993 and
spectacular blastoff of a multistage rocket to put a tiny satellite into orbit can be better explained in this
context only. In short, North Korea is in an Israeli -like status. One critical difference is that North Korea
is capable of striking any strategic target on the U.S. mainland with a tiny fleet of ICBMs. Three facts
may suggest the extent of the North Korean readiness for nuclear exchange. A North Korean official said,
"One top-class nuclear scientist and one missile expert are on the Central Committee of the ruling
Workers Party of Korea. They are always among the suite accompanying Kim Jong Il on his criss-
crossing on-the-spot guidance tour. Most of the population of the nation can be evacuated into deep
hardened underground shelters in less than twenty minutes with little panic or confusion. The whole
nation can live safely in underground facilities for many months. Fortress North Korea has been designed
to withstand a nuclear saturation strike and retaliate in kind. However, it is not the case either with South
Korea or Japan or the U.S. The three countries are most vulnerable to North Korean missile attacks. Any
military strike initiated against North Korea will promptly explode into a thermonuclear exchange
between a tiny nuclear-armed North Korea and the world's superpower, America. The most densely
populated Metropolitan U.S.A., Japan and South Korea will certainly evaporate in The Day After
scenario-type nightmare. The New York Times warned in its August 27, 2002 comment: "North Korea
runs a more advanced biological, chemical and nuclear weapons program, targets American military
bases and is developing missiles that could reach the lower 48 states. Yet there's good reason President
Bush is not talking about taking out Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. If we tried, the Dear Leader would
bombard South Korea and Japan with never gas or even nuclear warheads, and (according to one
Pentagon study) kill up to a million people."
North Korean proliferation risks proliferation exports—increasing the likelihood of war in
the Middle East or Asia
David Sanger, May 28, 2010 (staff writer, New York Times), “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War.” New York
Times. Online. Internet. Accessed June 11, 2010 at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/weekinreview/30sanger.html

A Nuclear Provocation With tensions high, American spy satellites are looking for evidence that the
North Koreans are getting ready to test another nuclear weapon — just as they did in 2006 and 2009 — or
shoot off some more long-range missiles. It is a sure way to grab headlines and rattle the neighborhood.
In the past, such tests have ratcheted up tension, and could do so again. But they are not the Obama
administration’s biggest worry. As one of Mr. Obama’s top aides said months ago, there is reason to hope
that the North will shoot off “a nuclear test every week,” since they are thought to have enough fuel for
only eight to twelve. Far more worrisome would be a decision by Pyongyang to export its nuclear
technology and a failure by Americans to notice. For years, American intelligence agencies missed
evidence that the North was building a reactor in the Syrian desert, near the Iraq border. The Israelis
found it, and wiped it out in an air attack in 2007. Now, the search is on to find out if other countries are
buying up North Korean technology or, worse yet, bomb fuel. (There are worries about Myanmar.) In
short, the biggest worry is that North Korea could decide that teaching others how to build nuclear
weapons would be the fastest, stealthiest way to defy a new American president who has declared that
stopping proliferation is Job No. 1.
It is unclear whether the American intelligence community would pick up the signals that it missed in
Syria. And if it did, a crisis might not be contained in the Korean Peninsula; it could spread to the Middle
East or Southeast Asia, or wherever else North Korea found its customers.

Increases chances of Asian wars go nuclear

Jon Landay, March 10, 2000 (staff writer, Knight Ridder, Washington Bureau, lexis)

The 3,700-mile arc that begins at the heavily fortified border between North and South Korea and ends on
the glacier where Indian and Pakistani troops skirmish almost every day has earned the dubious title of
most dangerous part of the world. Few, if any, experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South
Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could
destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have
nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. And Asia lacks the kinds of organizations,
negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War
Europe.` `Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,'' said Bates Gill,
director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. ``We see
the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized
security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.'' In an effort to cool the region's
tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel
Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher.
There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the
United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea
attacked South Korea. And while Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a
conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the
already shaky international nonproliferation regime.
NK has enough plutonium for 6 atomic bombs and will use them if in conflict
Japan Today 3-26-10 “North Korea vows 'nuclear strikes' in latest threat”(http://www.japantoday.com/category/world/view/n-
korea-vows-nuclear-strikes-in-latest-threat)

North Korea’s military warned South Korea and the United States on Friday of “unprecedented nuclear
strikes” over a report the two countries plan to prepare for possible instability in the totalitarian country.
The North routinely issues such warnings and officials in Seoul and Washington react calmly. Diplomats
in South Korea and the U.S. instead have repeatedly called on Pyongyang to return to international
negotiations aimed at ending its nuclear programs. “Those who seek to bring down the system in the
(North), whether they play a main role or a passive role, will fall victim to the unprecedented nuclear
strikes of the invincible army,” North Korea’s military said in comments carried by the official Korean
Central News Agency. The North, believed have enough weaponized plutonium for at least half a dozen
atomic bombs, conducted its second atomic test last year, drawing tighter U.N. sanctions. Experts from
South Korea, the U.S. and China will meet in China next month to share information on North Korea,
assess possible contingencies in the country, and consider ways to cooperate in case of an emergency
situation, South Korea’s Dong-a Ilbo newspaper reported earlier this month, citing unidentified sources in
Seoul and Beijing. The experts will also hold follow-up meetings in Seoul in June and in Honolulu in
July, it said. The North Korean statement Friday specifically referred to the March 19 newspaper report.
A spokeswoman said the South Korean Defense Ministry had no information. South Korean media have
reported that Seoul has drawn up a military operations plan with the United States to cope with possible
emergencies in the North. The North says the U.S. plots to topple its regime, a claim Washington has
consistently denied. Last month, the North also threatened a “powerful—even nuclear—attack,” if the
U.S. and South Korea went ahead with annual military drills. There was no military provocation from
North Korea during the exercises. China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the U.S. have been trying to
persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons in six party talks. The North quit the negotiations
last year. The fate of the North’s nuclear weapons has taken on added urgency since late 2008 as concerns
over the health of leader Kim Jong Il have intensified. Kim, who suffered an apparent stroke in 2008, may
die within three years, South Korean media have reported. His death is thought to have the potential to
trigger instability and a power struggle in the North.
North Korea undermines efforts to contain proliferation

(Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr., Scott A. Snyder,  President of the Korea Economic Institute (KEI)  & former visiting
fellow at the Brookings Institution; Tilelli = degree in economics from Widener University; Snyder = Adjunct Senior Fellow for
Korea Studies at Council on Foreign Relations, June 2010, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” Independent Task Force
Report No. 64, Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/publication/22205/us_policy_toward_the_korean_peninsula.html?breadcrumb=/region/478/northeast_asia,
Date Accessed: June 25, 2010, CC)

The Task Force finds that a nuclear-capable North Korea under its current leadership
threatens the credibility of the global nonproliferation regime and undermines Northeast
Asia’s stability. An approach that attempts to contain the risks of North Korean proliferation
while managing to freeze nuclear and missile capabilities at their current levels is necessary,
but the Task Force finds that these steps are not enough to achieve full denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula. The Task Force finds that the debate over nonproliferation versus
denuclearization is a false choice; the United States and its partners can and must do both by
containing proliferation while also pressing for denuclearization.

Since the Korean War, NK has been stockholding nuclear supplies

Perry Davis Schoff Yoshihara 04 (Charles M. Perry Jacquelyn K. Davis James L. Schoff Toshi Yoshihara, “Alliance
Diversification and the Future of the U.S.-Korean Security Relationship”, June 30, 2004, the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, Inc., ZB)

From the Korean War onward, North Korea responded to this nuclear blackmail by building enormous
facilities underground or in mountain redoubts, from troop and material depots to munitions factories,
even to subterranean warplane hangars. American control of the air in that war illustrated a deterrence
principle supposedly developed only with “smart” weapons- namely, that “once you can see the target, it
is already destroyed”. The North Koreans have long known this and have acted upon the principle. In the
mid-1970’s P’yongyang faced more the activity only under enormous American pressure, while retaining
formidable potentialities. The ROK went ahead with its clandestine program to develop “indigenous
ability to build ballistic missiles” capable of carrying nuclear warheads. South Korea also garnered a
reputation as a “renegade” arms supplier to pariah countries like South Africa and to Iran and Iraq during
the war. Much of this reads as if it were written about North Korea, not South Korea, and puts
P’yongyang’s activities into perspective: much of it was in response to U.S. pressure and ROK initiatives.
North Korean nukes threaten the non-prolif regime
Auton, NATO research fellow and Ford postdoctoral fellow in European Society and Western Security at Harvard University’s
Center for International Affairs, 2008 (Graeme P. Auton, “Review of North Korea: Another Country by Bruce Cummings”,
accessed at Project Muse, pg. 3, jb, sob)

Such is particularly the case with the North Korean nuclear crisis, now in the throes of its
culmination. There can be no doubt that a nuclear-armed North Korea is a threat to the stability
of both Northeast Asia and the global nonproliferation regime. Yet, as Cumings notes, the
important question involves how we got here and what might have been done to avert this turn of
events. It is only through an understanding of that question that the parties embroiled in
Pyongyang’s nuclear showdown can reach a solution. Amnesiac Americans too easily forget that
before 1991 the United States threatened a non-nuclear-armed
North Korea with nuclear retaliation, in violation of the spirit—if not the letter—of the nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, the threat of such retaliation has persisted to the present,
despite the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula during the George H.
W. Bush administration. As Pyongyang’s first successful nuclear test elicits global
condemnation, Americans also forget that an imperfect but hard-won Framework Agreement—
negotiated by Robert Gallucci and his colleagues in 1993–94—was summarily thrown away by a
George W. Bush administration more interested in impressing its evangelical constituency,
lobbing schoolyard taunts, and treating bilateral diplomacy as a reward for good behavior than in
resolving practical security issues on the Korean Peninsula.
DPRK Prolif bad – causes terrorism
Kairouz Writer for the Economic and Political Weekly Magazine 04 (Aki, Jan. 04, Writer for the Economic and Political
Weekly Magazine, “North Korean Nuclear Crisis”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 1, Date accessed: 6/22, JH
& BH)

In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the leadership firmly believes that chemical and
biological weapons should complement conventional and nuclear power as they would demoralise the
enemy and destroy his defensive lines. All these mass destruction weapons, by contrast, would serve
to coerce and deter the US from launching a counter-offensive aim-ing at seizing Pyongyang. To
achieve this victory, North Korea has only a month to discourage Washington and its allies from
undertaking any military action against it. Internationally, North Korea has sought to secure as many
allies, friends and support-ers as possible as well as neutralising others. For this end, it has produced,
supplied and sold large quantities of weapons including offensive missiles to customers such as Iran,
Pakistan, Yemen and others.10 some analysts believed, , notably the US and Japan.
NK proliferates and will only do it more.
Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government 2010
(Graham Allison “Nuclear Disorder”, printed in Foreign Affairs January-February 2010 Vol 89 Issue 1, pg. 2, jb,
sob)

<North Korean developments over the past eight years. One of the poorest and most isolated states on
earth, North Korea had at most two bombs' worth of plutonium in 2001. Today, it has an arsenal of ten
bombs and has conducted two nuclear weapons tests. It is currently harvesting the plutonium for an
11th bomb and restoring its reactor in Yongbyon, which has the capacity to produce a further two
bombs' worth of plutonium a year. In addition, Pyongyang has repeatedly tested long-range missiles
that are increasingly reliable, has proliferated nuclear technology (including the sale of a Yongbyon-
style reactor to Syria), and may be developing a second path to nuclear weapons by building a facility
to enrich uranium. >

An isolated North Korea can sell nuclear materials to others

Wit, a former US State Department official 07

(Joel S., a former U.S. Department of State official and coauthor of Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis,
“Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea”, Spring 2007, Accessed on 6/22/10 AW GW)

<Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program poses a danger to the global nonproliferation regime. An
ostracized North Korea could export nuclear technology to make money, secure assistance to
expand its own arsenal, or build closer ties with like-minded countries and subnational groups.
Further, because of North Korea’s public acquisition of the bomb and Tokyo’s movement away
from its post–World War II pacifist roots, a nuclear tipping point could spread to neighbors,
particularly South Korea. A nuclear North Korea also poses a serious threat to peace and stability
in Northeast Asia. Overall, it could result in a region in greater political disarray rather than one
where growing cooperation fosters peace and stability.>

If NK cannot be stopped, Asia could nuclearize.

Pollack, professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the Naval War College,
2009 (Jonathan D., The Washington Quarterly: Kim Jong-il’s Clenched Fist, pg. 166-167, October 2009, accessed June 22, 2010,
FS TS)

<All states need to recognize that the North Korean nuclear issue is symptomatic of deeper questions
about the future identity and the longer-term viability of the DPRK. Can a largely autarkic strategy
possibly enable a measure of economic recovery? Might there ultimately be increased pressures for
internal change in the North? What if North Korea proves able to sustain and enhance its nuclear
capabilities? To be sure, the nuclear program will remain subject to a range of technical and material
limitations.37 But the risks and dangers of Pyongyang no longer inhibited by binding constraints on its
nuclear weapons activities are abundantly evident and there are many.
First, in the event that North Korea’s weapons development seems irreversible, Northeast Asia will
become more nuclearized. Japan and South Korea would heighten efforts to protect their security
interests, including enhanced missile defense and longer-range strike assets, either in conjunction with
the United States or by building more autonomous military capabilities to respond to a potential crisis.
There is already growing evidence of internal debate over these possibilities in both countries, though
more in conceptual than definitive policy terms, as well as enhanced expectations from Seoul and
Tokyo for more explicit U.S. nuclear guarantees. These possibilities do not foretell a major erosion of
the non-nuclear status of either country, but depending on their future defense preparations, the
capabilities and policy independence of each could increase measurably.
In turn, either heightened defense integration among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington, or enhanced
indigenous programs could directly impinge on Beijing’s long-term pursuit of a stable, more
predictable ‘‘peripheral security environment.’’ Washington must remain mindful of the security
interests of its major regional allies, though an autonomous Japan or South Korea is not what U.S.
policymakers have in mind. Balancing the benefits and risks for U.S. policy and addressing potential
differences with China therefore becomes a high priority task.>

The moderation argument is wrong- doesn’t change the actors’ judgment

Erik Gartzke Department of Political Science University of California, San Diego and Dong-Joon Jo
Department of International Relations University of Seoul, Republic of Korea Jan 30, 2009 Bargaining,
Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes, Journal of Conflict Resolution http://jcr.sagepub.com

Deterrence is a special case of coercive foreign policy in which the demand the deterring nation makes is
the status quo. The claims of proliferation optimists hinge on the assertion that nuclear nations do not
expand their objectives as they increase their capabilities. Yet proliferators face incentives to do just this.
While often couched in terms of deterrence, brinkmanship involves an attempt by at least one nation to
challenge and alter the status quo. If a challenger is equipped with nuclear weapons, then either this
capacity is not being exercised or the challenger is using its nuclear status to seek to compel not deter.
Scholars generally agree that compellence does not reduce the risk of conflict. It follows that the risk of war is contingent on
what is being demanded by both sides and that what is being demanded is in turn subject to the expectations of competitors. Countries with a nuclear advantage must choose between spending
some or all of this advantage on security (freedom from harm) or influence (discretion over outcomes). The bounded nature of any budget means that a country cannot increase its security and
influence with the same increment of power. A country that only sought to deter could lower the probability of experienc- ing a dispute, but to do so, the country must refrain from pursuing any
. Countries with nuclear weapons that want to alter the status quo
changes in the status quo that might be opposed by other nations

have the potential to do so but again, only by increaing opposition and, in turn, the risk of conflict.
Nuclear nations may prefer security to influence, but this is a more idiosyncratic claim than the assertion
that nuclear status deters. There is a case to be made on either side of the debate. Not all nations
proliferate. Those that do must be different in some way from those that do not. One way that
proliferators might differ from nonproliferators is in their valuation for influence. The pessimist view
sees proliferation porridge as hot. Nuclear weapons may feed a political appetite that exceeds the national
grasp, exacerbating instability and encouraging conflict. Proliferation might also cause other countries to
underestimate the nuclear country’s capabilities or resolve. Disagreements about the efficaciousness of
nuclear weapons, rapid changes in the balance of power brought about by nuclear weapons, or secrecy
could lead nations to misperceive. Finally, nuclear weapons could encourage leaders to act precipitously
or without consulting with opponents. While it is reasonable to be concerned that nuclear weapons may lead to reck- lessness, it is no less plausible that
proliferation encourages restraint. To get the pro- liferation story “just right” requires mixing elements of both stories. The ardor for war among some leaders may diminish in the face of nuclear
weapons. Anecdotes from the Cold War and from crises in the Indian subcontinent suggest that leaders are well aware of the tremendous dangers posed by escalating in the face of nuclear
the presence of nuclear weapons might inflame hostilities. Efforts by nuclear powers to
capabilities. At other times,

use force appear to be encouraged by their security from retaliation under a nuclear umbrella. If nuclear
weapons deter in some instances and spiral at other times, then these two forces will tend to cancel one
another out. Even if one tendency occurs more often, the overall relationship is weakened by the
countervailing tendency.
North Korea will never denuclearize – even if they say “yes”, they’ll cheat

Bennett 8 (Bruce, Senior Policy Analyst – RAND Corporation, “A New National Strategy for Korea: North Korea Threats
Require Deterrence, Reconciliation”, Korea Herald, 3-13, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2008/03/13/ KH.html)

Arms control seeks to reduce the risks of conflict, the damage that conflict could cause, and the
military cost to deter conflict or to achieve victory in conflict. For decades, South Korea, the United
States, and the international community have tried to use arms control measures to moderate the North
Korean threat, consistent with these objectives. Korean arms control efforts have focused on the North
Korean nuclear weapons program because of the serious threat that it poses. The history of these
efforts is, however, not very hopeful. North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in July 1977, and then joined the Nonproliferation Treaty in
1985. In 1991, North and South Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. They agreed to ... not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or
use nuclear weapons ... Moreover, they would ... not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium
enrichment facilities. In 1994, North Korea signed the Agreed Framework with the United States,
closing the Yongbyon facilities; North Korea promised to abide by the provisions of the NPT. And
now North Korea is delaying the agreements made under the six-party talks. North Korea has
apparently pursued nuclear weapons development throughout this period. Two examples suggest the
pattern. North Korea did operate a nuclear reprocessing facility, in violation of the Joint Declaration.
And in 1999, Dr. A.Q. Khan of Pakistan said he was shown three North Korean plutonium nuclear
weapons. If Dr. Khan was right, North Korea did produce and possess nuclear weapons, in violation of
the NPT and the Joint Declaration. Many experts on North Korea are skeptical that North Korea will
ever dismantle its entire nuclear weapon arsenal, because these capabilities have been so critical to
North Korea. Consider this: How is it that a nearly bankrupt country of only about 20 million people
can stand up to three members of the U.N. Security Council and Japan, four of the wealthiest countries
in the world? And in doing so, North Korea often comes out the victor. Would North Korea have such
leverage without nuclear weapons? Would the North Korean regime be able to survive without such
appearances of empowerment?
Prolif General

Nuclear prolif and terrorism must be avoided – these threats rise above all others is
urgency

Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government 2010 (Graham Allison “Nuclear Disorder”, printed in Foreign Affairs
January-February 2010 Vol 89 Issue 1, pg. 2, jb, sob)

Obama has put the danger of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism at the top of his national security
agenda. He has called it "a threat that rises above all others in urgency" and warned that if the
international community fails to act, "we will invite nuclear arms races in every region and the prospect
of wars and acts of terror on a scale that we can hardly imagine." Consider the consequences, he
continued, of an attack with even a single nuclear bomb: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city--be
it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris--could kill hundreds of thousands of people.
And it would badly destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life."

Proliferation makes nuclear terrorism is inevitable

Sturm 2009 [ Frankie, July, Nuclear Weapons: A New Paradigm for the 21st Century, Truman National
Security Project]

Six nuclear warheads went missing from an air force base in the summer of 2007. For thirty-six
hours, military officials could not account for the whereabouts of the deadly weapons. For fifteen hours,
the warheads were guarded by nothing more than a chain-link fence and roving patrols. After a day and a
half the weapons were finally located, but not before the world was reminded that the security of nuclear
weapons can too easily fall victim to human error. One might expect such an occurrence in anew nuclear weapons
state, where military officials and technicians have less experience with safeguarding a nuclear arsenal. But the “Bent Spear”
incident took place in the nation with the world’s most sophisticated military: the United States. Nuclear Weapons: The Problem,
Not the Solution. If nuclear weapons can go missing here in the U.S., they can go missing anywhere. In
a world of terrorists determined to obtain a nuclear bomb, and a black market with state and non-
state actors keen on profiting from the sale of necessary technology, the deterrence paradigm that
reigned during the Cold War no longer works. In a new era, we need new thinking grounded in a simple
notion: nuclear weapons are not the solution to our security, they are the problem. Nuclear weapons now
create more danger than security for two main reasons: nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents. Terrorist
organizations are actively seeking nuclear weapons, while black market syndicates and rogue state
suppliers are seeking to provide the necessary technology. Nuclear accidents continue to pose a threat as they
did during the Cold War, but the possibility that accidents – such as misplacing nuclear warheads – could put nuclear
weapons in the hands of terrorists raises the stakes even higher. To gain a full understanding of the problems
posed by nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents, one mustexamine each threat in turn. Why are Nuclear Weapons the Problem?
Terrorist Intentions and Rogue Suppliers The possibility of terrorists attaining a nuclear weapon poses the single-
greatest threat to U.S. national security, and terrorist groups are actively seeking these weapons. Osama
bin Laden himself laid down the gauntlet on nuclear weapons: “To possess the weapons that could
counter those of the infidels is a religious duty.” During the last two decades there have been at least 25
instances of nuclear explosivematerials being lost or stolen,while several nuclear and near nuclear states
maintain shadowy connections with terrorist groups. Iran is regarded by U.S. officials as the world’s
single greatest state sponsor of terrorism, and is currently seeking nuclear technology that is probably
intended for weaponization. North Korea already has nuclear weapons technology, is hard up for cash,
and is suspected of providing arms to Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers. It has supplied Libya with missile
technology, and U.S. officials suspect it helped Syria construct a nuclear reactor which Israel destroyed
last year. Pakistan is arguably the world’s most dangerous nuclear weapons state. Members of Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence service (ISI) have provided support to the Taliban, al Qaeda, and terrorist organizations that have
staged attacks in India. The father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, AQ Khan, headed a secret network that
sold nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Reports from U.S. officials and think tanks
suggest that remnants of the Khan network are still active. Whether the network transferred nuclear technology to al
Qaeda remains unknown. This adds up to a frightening reality: terrorists have more opportunities to acquire nuclear weapons than
ever before. This makes the mere existence of nuclear weapons in any state a greater threat to U.S. security than at any time since
the nuclear age began. In addition to these rogue states, accidents and misplaced weapons in friendly states can
enable terrorists to gain weapons.

Prolif drastically increases the risk of accidents – guarantees nuclear war

Sturm 2009 [ Frankie, July, Nuclear Weapons: A New Paradigm for the 21st Century, Truman National Security Project]

Accidents happen, but the price of a nuclear accident is impermissible. Yet, past incidents over the last
several decades far less known than “Chernobyl” could very well have led to more catastrophic results:
1979, U.S. Mistakes Computer Exercise for Soviet Nuclear Strike. When a realistic training tape was
mistakenly inserted into the computer running the United States’ early warning system, launch
control centers for Minuteman missiles received preliminary warning that the U.S. was under
attack, while the entire continental air defense interceptor force was put on alert. In a country with
less sophisticated systems, such an incident could have provoked a hasty retaliatory strike and
accidental nuclear war. 1988, Pakistan Mistakes Explosion for Indian Nuclear Attack. When a massive
conventional munitions explosion occurred at a secret ammunition dump near Rawalpindi, some
Pakistani officials mistook it for the start of an Indian nuclear strike. Given the size of Pakistan’s
conventional forces compared to India’s – and the proximity of the two nations, cutting down the
decision time in the event of a launch – such an incident could easily have resulted in accidental
nuclear war. 1995, Russia Mistakes Weather Balloon for U.S. Nuclear Strike. When Norway launched
a weather rocket to investigate the Northern Lights, Russian radars mistook the rocket for a missile
launched by a U.S. submarine. Russian officials scrambled their nuclear forces into position and
activated President Boris Yeltsin’s “nuclear brief- case.” A nation that feels vulnerable to nuclear
attack might feel obligated to launch a retaliatory strike before all the facts are in, leading to an accidental
nuclear war. The list of nuclear accidents and potential calamities goes on. As clearly put by Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger, “Mistakes are made in every other human endeavor. Why should nuclear
weapons be exempt?” In addition to the threat of discrete nuclear accidents lies the broader problem of
loose nuclear material. Russia possesses more than 10,000 nuclear warheads, many of which are poorly
guarded and vulnerable to theft. Although the U.S. and Russia have worked together through the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative to secure nuclear material and deactivate thousands of
warheads, analysts fear that underpaid scientists and lax security could create a situation in which a
terrorist group could buy or steal a bomb. Meanwhile, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal remains
in question, stoking fears that state collapse in that volatile country could also enable terrorists to acquire
a nuclear weapon. The accidental detonation of a single nuclear weapon could kill thousands; an
accidental nuclear war could kill millions worldwide. This threat has been with us for decades, but the
prospect that mistakes or mishaps could inadvertently help terrorists obtain nuclear weapons adds extra
gravity to the threat.

Nuclear deterrence fails and increases the risk of nuclear terrorism

Doyle 2009 [james, Abolishing Nuclear Weapons by George Perkovich and James M. Acton, editors, Adelphi Paper 396 ©
International Institute for Strategic Studies. Carnegie Endowment for international peace. Eyes on the Prize: A Strategy for
Enhancing Global Security

In their essay, Perry, Shultz, Kissinger, and Nunn assert that nuclear deterrence is “increasingly
hazardous and decreasingly effective.” In essence, they reject the prevailing belief within national security establish- ments that
nuclear weapons still provide powerful security benefits in the evolving international security environment. Theirs is an unprecedented challenge to the existing
nuclear order, and their arguments deserve serious analysis. In many ways, they are consistent with traditional critiques of the risks of nuclear deterrence. But
they also go deeper to demonstrate why nuclear deterrence is more unstable in the current environment than in the Cold War and why continued nuclear
proliferation is likely to exacerbate rather than attenuate these instabilities, increasing the risks yet further. Nuclear
deterrence is
increasingly hazardous because a large surplus of nuclear weapons and materials left over from
the Cold War is, in some cases, not adequately secured. In addition, an entirely new threat in
connection with these weapons and materials has emerged in the form of extremist groups that are
willing to carry out catastrophic terrorist attacks. Several states that are acquiring nuclear
weapons or increasing existing arsenals are located in conflict-prone regions and have limited
financial and technical resources to devote to nuclear security. Nuclear deterrence is decreasingly
effective because the conditions that enabled mutual deterrence during the Cold War have
changed. In today’s world, nuclear-armed states share disputed borders, have limited experience
with nuclear weapon safety and security, and have vulnerable early warning and nuclear weapon
control capabilities. Moreover, nuclear deterrence cannot effectively reduce the chance of nuclear
terrorism. The more states acquire nuclear weapons for “deterrence,” the more they will also risk
providing weapons and materials to terrorists who wish to carry out a nuclear attack. These realities refute the
view held most notably by Kenneth Waltz that nuclear weapons provide concrete benefits for states and will have a stabilizing influence on the international
system. The authors of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons do not give enough emphasis to the transformed nature of the security environment and the implications of
that transformation for traditional nuclear strategies. Strategic thought on nuclear arms evolved within a global security environment that no longer exists.
That security environment was defined by a single primary state adversary, whose threat of nuclear attack against the United States and its allies could be
a terrorist nuclear attack is thought to be much more
successfully deterred by a reciprocal threat of nuclear retaliation. Today,
likely than an exchange of nuclear weapons with another state. The interest and efforts of terrorist
networks to acquire nuclear weapons are well known, and their willingness to conduct a nuclear
attack, if they possess the capa- bility, is not in doubt. The al-Qaeda terrorist network has not been deterred from committing attacks against the United
States, Great Britain, several other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, Pakistan, and Israel. All of these states possess nuclear arms or
are in alliance with nuclear powers. In early 2008, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency director, Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, said in congressional testimony with
National Intelligence Director Mike McConnell that al-Qaeda had regenerated at least some of its robust research and development effort and was once
again trying to develop or obtain chemical, biological, radiological, and even nuclear weapons to use against the United States and other enemies. This assess-
ment was shared by Russian officials. That means that while nuclear weapons continue to offer some security benefits to their possessors, their existence in the
age of global terrorism also creates a very real security liability for all states.
Threats from a growing terrorist movement are
undeterrable by exist- ing means. The key uncertainty in the new security environment is not
whether the United States and its allies will be attacked by terrorists but whether the terrorists will
acquire the means to move from conventional to nuclear explosives, thus making their inevitable
attacks of strategic consequence. Here, the significant trends run in a negative direction. More nuclear
weapons materials are being produced; more knowledge relevant to the construction of a nuclear
weapon is being dispersed; and terrorist organizations are gaining the capability to mount
increasingly sophisti- cated attacks involving larger numbers of militants.
Proliferation increases the risk of inadvertent escalation
McGwire 94 [Michael, Faculty of Social and Political Science at Cambridge, "Is There a Future for Nuclear Weapons?"
International Affairs, 70, 2, p. 224-225]cn

Advocates of an LSN world claim that nuclear war would be prevented by the deterrent effect of mutually assured destruction. This assumes that war is always
the outcome of rational decision-making and ignores the possibility of accidental or inadvertent war. Recent analysis of the command, control
and communications (C3) systems ofUS and Soviet strategic forces during the Cold War argues that a significant probability of
procedural and systems malfunctions (and hence mistaken activation of strike plans) was inherent in both systems. Inadvertent war
can come about through misunderstanding and/or the momentum of events. The Cuban missile crisis is a classic example of this process ,
but access to the archives is revealing other incipient cases, the misreading of a NATO exercise in November 1983 being a good example. So far our luck
has held, but it will be severely tested as_we move from a bipolar to a multipolar game, where the new players'
nuclear C3 will be more prone to system errors, and each player's understanding of the others' thought processes
will be even more rudimentary. And can we assume that the other players will all be as cautious as the Soviet
Union, which saw the primary threat as inadvertent war, a danger that could be avoided but not prevented? Or are they more likely to emulate
the United States, which believed that war could be prevented by the threat of escalation, and was prepared to up the ante in
a crisis? The existence of two or more such players would sharply increase the future probability of inadvertent and
accidental war.

Proliferation increases the risk of nuclear mishaps

Freedman 95 [Lawrence, Professor of War Studies at King's College, "Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear
Weapons," Survival, v36 n4, Winter, p. 37]cn

As nuclear arsenals spread, despite the non-proliferation regime, more parts of the world move beyond the effective
influence of the former great powers, while, at the same time, the possibility of some dreadful nuclear mishap or
deliberate employment increases. Given the uncertain distribution of the effects of any nuclear detonations, this
prospect should encourage a broad view of vital interests. It argues not only for efforts to support the nonproliferation regime, but also, and as important, that the
great powers should get involved before areas of conflict begin to acquire a nuclear dimension.
Succession Crisis
The succession crisis in North Korea increases the likelihood of miscalculation over the
Korean peninsula:
David Sanger, May 28, 2010 (staff writer, New York Times), “In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War.” New York
Times. Online. Internet. Accessed June 11, 2010 at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/weekinreview/30sanger.html

A Power Struggle or Coup Ask American intelligence analysts what could escalate this or a future crisis,
and they name a 27-year-old Kim Jong-un, the youngest of Kim Jong-il’s three sons, and the father’s
choice to succeed him. Little is known about him, but his main qualifications for the job may be that he is
considered less corrupt or despised than his two older brothers. One senior American intelligence official
described the succession crisis this way: “We can’t think of a bigger nightmare than a third generation of
the Kim family” running the country with an iron hand, throwing opponents into the country’s gulags,
and mismanaging an economy that leaves millions starving. It is possible that on the issue of succession,
many in the North Korean elite, including in the military, agree with the American intelligence official.
According to some reports, they view Kim Jong-un as untested, and perhaps unworthy. “We’re seeing
considerable signs of stress inside the North Korean system,” another official reported. And that raises
the possibility of more provocations — and potential miscalculations — ahead. One line of analysis is
that the younger Kim has to put a few notches in his belt by ordering some attacks on the South, the way
his father once built up a little credibility. Another possibility is that internal fighting over the succession
could bring wide-scale violence inside North Korea, tempting outside powers to intervene to stop the
bloodshed. Curiously, when Kim Jong-il took the train to China a few weeks ago, his heir apparent did
not travel with him. Some experts read that as a sign that the Kim dynasty might fear a coup if both were
out of the country — or that it might not be wise to put father and son on the same track at the same time,
because accidents do happen.
A messy power struggle in North Korea is on the way
Doug Bandow, June 11, 2010 (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Confronting North Korea: Who’s
in charge?” Online. Internet. Accessed June 13, 2010 at
http://dailycaller.com/2010/06/09/confronting-north-korea-whos-in-charge/

Fourth, there’s no reason to expect a “soft landing” in the North. The existing regime has demonstrated
enormous resilience, both in surviving crisis and in resisting change. However, it took Kim Il-sung, who
won control with Soviet aid at the North’s founding in 1949, decades to transfer power to his son, Kim
Jong-il. The latter is in ill health and probably doesn’t have nearly as much time to orchestrate a similar
transfer. The result could be a messy power struggle on Kim’s death, with, in addition to Kim Jong-un,
two other sons, a brother-in-law, a younger half-brother, past and present wives, various illegitimate
children, and any number of officials who have been waiting years, even decades, for their chance to
gain control. Finally, the key to solving the “North Korean problem” is China. Shortly after the sinking of
the Cheonan Kim Jong-il scurried off to the PRC, apparently with his chosen son in tow. Today Beijing
provides the DPRK with the bulk of its food and energy. Until now the Chinese leadership has believed
that pushing Kim too hard risked the stability of the peninsula. But if Kim is willing to commit an act of
war against the South, his regime is the real source of dangerous regional instability. The PRC would be
serving its own interest if it acted to neuter Pyongyang. It’s hard to believe, but the situation in North
Korea could get worse. Imagine a weak collective leadership after Kim’s death dissolving into warring
factions as competing officials looked to their favorite Kim relative or army general. Imagine burgeoning
civil strife, growing public hardship, and mass refugee flows. Or violence flowing across the Yalu River to
the north and demilitarized zone to the south.

The leadership struggle in North Korea risks violence spilling out of North Korea
Doug Bandow, 2010 (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online. Internet.
Accessed April 1, 2010 at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144

Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from
engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership
transition of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach
for power, and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the
North and spilling outward seems real.
Risk for Troops
North Korea constantly places US troops in danger of military and terrorist attacks
Doug Bandow, May 24, 2010 (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Avoiding Pyongyang” Online. Internet. Accessed
May 24, 2010 at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432

The so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been a malign international actor
since its formation six decades ago. Kim Il-sung initiated full-scale war in 1950; over the years the regime
has engaged in a variety of military and terrorist attacks on both South Korean and American targets.

US troops are currently in range of North Korean attack:

Doug Bandow, May 24, 2010 (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Avoiding Pyongyang” Online. Internet. Accessed
May 24, 2010 at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23432

Washington is stuck in the center of Korean affairs today only because of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which
provides a security guarantee to South Korea with no corresponding benefit to America. Without the
alliance, there would be no U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula, within range of North Korean attack,
and no American promise to intervene in any war that might result from a provocation by Pyongyang or
retaliation by the South.

The US troop presence on the peninsula means the US will get sucked into any conflict:
Doug Bandow, May 25, 2010 (senior fellow @ CATO Institute) “Engaging China to maintain peace in East Asia”
Online. Internet. Accessed June 15, 2010 at http://dailycaller.com/2010/05/25/engaging-china-to-maintain-peace-in-
east-asia/

While the U.S. remains involved in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, East Asia contains the seeds of
potentially bigger conflicts. China holds the key to maintaining regional peace. For instance, the
Republic of Korea is imposing economic sanctions on North Korea after the latter sank a South
Korean naval vessel. A military response could set off a retaliatory spiral leading to war. With
27,000 troops stationed on the Korean peninsula, Washington could not easily stay out of any
conflict.

Any threat to our troops is an automatic tripwire to US escalation of a conflict: if our

soldiers are in danger we will intervene to protect them:
Doug Bandow, 1996 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World,
pg. 8-9.

More important is the military risk of U.S. security ties. Although the American commitment probably
helps deter North Korean aggression, it ensures that the United States will be involved if hostilities recur.
Indeed, the 37,000 U.S. soldiers are a tripwire that makes intervention automatic. Although the risk of
war seems slight at the moment—in late 1995 famine in the North and political scandal in the South did
raise tensions—the consequences would be horrific. And the possible acquisition by North Korea of
atomic weapons increases the potential costs exponentially. If a conflict erupted, perhaps over the nuclear
issue should the current agreement with Pyongyang break down, the American troops would become
nuclear hostages.
Deterrence Ineffective
U.S. forces don’t deter North Korea- they provide the primary driver for the nuclear
program
Bandow, 8 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies:
America's New Global Empire (Doug, “Seoul Searching”, 11/11, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20218)

Strengthening the alliance might have made sense three decades ago. The cold war still raged. Although
the South Korean economic miracle was underway, the Republic of Korea (ROK) had not yet become a
global powerhouse and the extraordinary weakness of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) was not yet obvious. The U.S.-ROK alliance arguably had a role to play, albeit a shrinking one.

Today, however, the misnamed mutual defense treaty—in practice, the defense guarantee runs only from
Washington to Seoul—is an expensive anachronism. It should be terminated, not reinforced. The ROK
and the United States should remain friends and cooperate in pursuing common goals, including
promoting Asian security, but the American people no longer should be responsible for South Korea’s
defense.

Washington’s promise to defend the South goes back to 1953 and the unsatisfying end of the Korean
War. Rather than gain the victory Americans had grown to expect, the Eisenhower administration
accepted a stalemate near the pre-invasion border. The fighting concluded with an armistice, but no peace
treaty. China, whose large-scale intervention had saved North Korea from defeat, maintained a large troop
presence in the DPRK.

Without wartime U.S. support, the ROK government would have been swept from the peninsula. Without
post-war U.S. support, Seoul would have been overwhelmed in any resumption of hostilities. The aged,
irascible and authoritarian Syngman Rhee was an embarrassment to the United States, but Washington
felt it had little choice but to support him as well as the military dictators who followed. At least Park
Chung-hee was an economic liberalizer, and the ROK economy took off before the South finally
transitioned to democracy, some two decades ago.

South Korea is a helpless international dependent no longer. The South ranks among the world’s top-
dozen economies and is the third most important geopolitical player in East Asia. Also, the ROK long ago
raced past the North in every measure of national power. South Korea has twice the population, upwards
of forty times the GDP, a vast technological edge, and far more allies and friends. Seoul’s military budget
approaches the DPRK’s entire GDP.

Moreover, the North’s one-time military allies, Russia and China, both recognized Seoul as the cold war
concluded. The ROK now does more business with Beijing than with America. The likelihood of either
Moscow or Beijing backing North Korea in any new war is somewhere between infinitesimal and zero.
The rest of East Asia would unreservedly stand behind South Korea.

And yet, Seoul has spent the last decade subsidizing the North. Providing aid to and investing in one’s
enemy is a curious strategy for dealing with a supposed security threat. If the ROK actually fears the
North, it should have redirected some of the aid money to its military budget.

In sum, the South doesn’t need America to defend it. South Korea has been capable of protecting itself for
decades. It makes no sense for the United States to maintain a defense guarantee for—or troop
deployments in—the ROK.

The North’s nuclear program, whatever the prognosis for the ongoing denuclearization talks, offers no
justification for the alliance. First, U.S. forces based in the peninsula do not constrain Pyongyang. To the
contrary, they offer a justification for the DPRK to build a nuclear arsenal. They will be nuclear hostages
if the North creates a deliverable weapon. Nowhere else on earth would Washington have so many
military personnel at such risk.

Second, absent America’s defense commitment, a North Korean nuclear weapon would be a problem for
the South and the rest of the region, not the United States. Washington retains an overwhelming deterrent
capability, Pyongyang as yet has no means of reaching the American homeland, and even if it were
capable of doing so, there is no evidence that Kim Jong-il, or his likely successors, are suicidal.

Deterrence will fail against North Korea:

Doug Bandow, February 26, 2009 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “Starting the Second Korean War?” Online.
Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at http://reason.com/archives/2009/02/26/starting-the-second-korean-war

Zelikow goes even further. He says: "whatever the merits of Harrison's suggestion when it comes to
North Korea's nuclear weapons, the United States should not accept Pyongyang's development of long-
range missiles systems, which can be paired with an admitted nuclear weapons arsenal, as still another
fait accompli." In his view, Washington should warn the North to stand down; if the DPRK failed to
comply, the U.S. should take out the missile on its launch pad. Why? Zelikow contends that "the North
Korean perfection of a long-range missile capability against the United States, Japan, or the Republic of
Korea would pose an imminent threat to the vital interests of our country." To rely on deterrence, he adds,
would be a "gamble."

A North Korean threat still remains

Cha and Kang 04 (Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang, Victor D. Cha is D.S. Song-Korea Foundation Chair of Asian Studies at the
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and David C. Kang is director of the Korean Studies
Institute at the University of Southern California, Summer 2004, Political Science Quarterly, “The Debate over North Korea”, pg.
232, JSTOR Database, 05/18/2010, JB and ZB)

Victor Cha believes that the threat posed by North Korea still remains and that although Pyongyang
has been rationally deterred from attempting a second invasion, there still exists a coercive
bargaining rationale for violence. In his view, the North undertakes limited but serious crisis-
inducing acts of violence with the hope of leveraging crises more to its advantage, an extremely
risky but also extremely rational policy for a country that has nothing to lose and nothing to
negotiate with. Moreover, Cha is skeptical as to how much Pyongyang's intentions have really
changed. Cha sees the October 2002 nuclear revelations as strong evidence validating hawkish
skepticism of North Korean intentions. In light of these activities, his support of engagement is
highly conditional (that is, only if the North Koreans return to the status quo ante); other wise, the
United States and its allies would be forced to pursue some form of isolation and containment of
the regime.  
War Likely
Risk of war in Korea is high
Bandow, 10 - senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to President Reagan, he is the author of Foreign
Follies: America's New Global Empire (Doug,”An Unstable Rogue”, 4/6, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144)

In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea. After his government
downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement, the South’s defense minister now says a mine
or torpedo might have been involved. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine actively targeted
Seoul’s aging corvette.

The Republic of Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen speculation by announcing
his intention to “look into the case in a calm manner.” But the possibility that Pyongyang committed a
flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. Seoul could ill afford not to react
strongly, both to protect its international reputation and prevent a domestic political upheaval.

All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Diplomatic talks would be halted. Prospects
for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear.

Moreover, Seoul might feel the need to respond with force. Even if justified, such action would risk a
retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no one could say. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly
conclusion.

The Yellow Sea incident reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war.
Tensions on the Korean peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—
which essentially provided bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior.

Nevertheless, the threat of war seemingly remained low. Thankfully, the prospect of conflict had
dramatically diminished over the last couple of decades. After intermittently engaging in bloody terrorist
and military provocations, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seemed to have largely abandoned
direct attacks on South Korea and the United States.

Now we are no longer sure.

Even if the DPRK was not involved in the sinking, only prudence, not principle, prevents the North from
engaging in armed instances of brinkmanship. And with Pyongyang in the midst of a leadership transition
of undetermined length, where the factions are unclear, different family members could reach for power,
and the military might become the final arbiter, the possibility of violence occurring in the North and
spilling outward seems real.

Such an outcome would be in no one’s interest, including that of China. So far the People’s Republic of
China has taken a largely hands-off attitude towards the North. Beijing has pushed the DPRK to negotiate
and backed limited United Nations sanctions. But the PRC has refused to support a potentially economy-
wrecking embargo or end its own food and energy subsidies to North Korea.

There are several reasons for China’s stance. At base, Beijing is happier with the status quo than with
risking North Korea’s economic stability or the two nations’ political relationship. Washington doesn’t
like that judgment. However, changing the PRC’s policy requires convincing Beijing to assess its interest
differently. The Yellow Sea incident could help.

Apparently North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is planning to visit China. Speculation is rife about the
reason: to request more food aid, promote investment in the North, respond to Beijing’s insistence that the
DPRK rejoin the Six-Party Talks or something else?
South Korea should propose its own high level visit to the PRC. The foreign ministers of both nations met
in Beijing in mid-March and issued a standard call for resumption of the Six-Party Talks. But the ROK
should press further, backed by the United States. Despite China’s preference for avoiding controversy,
the status quo is inherently unstable. Doing nothing is worse than attempting to force a change in the
North’s nuclear policies or ruling elites.

Even under the best of circumstances there is no certainty about what is likely to occur in North Korea.
Politics in Pyongyang resembles succession in the Ottoman court, involving not only varying factions but
different family members. A weaker Kim Jong-il is less able to impose his will on the military or hand
over power to his youngest son, as he apparently desires.

Although the DPRK’s governing structures so far have proven surprisingly resilient, it’s impossible to
ignore the possibility of an implosion, military coup or messy succession fight. If North Korea continues
to develop nuclear weapons, its actions could trigger two equally explosive responses: a military attack by
the United States or decisions by South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons in response.

The risk of Korean war is high – small disputes could escalate

Tisdale, 5/24 - an assistant editor of the Guardian and a foreign affairs columnist (5/24/10, Simon, The Guardian, " China faces
touch choices over Korea ", http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/24/china-faces-tough-choices-
korea)

The risk of renewed, all-out warfare on the Korean peninsula is rated low by most western and Chinese
analysts. But the chances of escalating armed clashes, planned or otherwise, have risen significantly
following South Korea's decision to punish the North for the March sinking of its naval corvette, the
Cheonan. And once shooting starts, it can be hard to stop.

Today's South Korean announcement that it is planning joint anti-submarine exercises with the US
provides one obvious possible flashpoint. Seoul says a North Korean torpedo destroyed the Cheonan,
killing 46 sailors. If its vengeful navy were to encounter another of Kim Jong-il's submarines, mayhem
may ensue.

President Lee Myung-bak's move to resume psy-ops (psychological warfare operations) along the
demilitarised zone, including broadcast propaganda messages targeted at North Korean troops, has
already led Pyongyang to threaten to shoot up the border. And if the South makes good its vow to
intercept North Korean commercial shipping, more trouble is likely.

Both sides have much to lose if violence ratchets up. "This latest violence is as unlikely as previous
incidents to lead to renewal of general fighting," said author Arthur Cyr in the China Post. "The Korean
war was extraordinarily costly, and neither side has ever tried to renew such hostilities. North Korea now
has at least a primitive nuclear weapon, but any use would result in instant devastating retaliation."

The US, with 29,000 troops based in the South, may quickly be drawn into any new skirmishing. Barack
Obama has directed the US military to be ready "to deter future aggression" and is demanding the North
admit responsibility and apologise. But cash-strapped Washington has no appetite, and scant capacity, for
more war, with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq unfinished. Much the same goes for Japan, which is
backing South Korea at the UN security council.
Korea is a military tinderbox—one accident could trigger a full scale war:
Doug Bandow, 2010 (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online.
Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144

We must hope that the Yellow Sea sinking was a tragedy rather than a provocation. But even if the
former, the incident should remind everyone that the Korean peninsula remains a military tinderbox. It
would only take one accident or mistake to trigger full-scale war.

North Korean brinksmanship risks a full scale war on the peninsula

Doug Bandow, 2010 (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online. Internet.
Accessed April 1, 2010 at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144

And the Yellow Sea incident highlights other dangers: it may have been an act of brinkmanship
too violent by half or an act of military disobedience designed to sink any prospect of
negotiations. Either of these could lead the worst of all outcomes on the peninsula—full-scale
war. Then the PRC would face the worst case in virtually every dimension: the end of North
Korea, a united ROK allied with Washington on China’s border, mass refugee flows over the
Yalu, and conflict, including possibly radiation, spilling over Chinese territory.
North Korean recklessness could lead to war on the peninsula at any time
Doug Bandow, 2010 (senior fellow, CATO Institute), “An Unstable Rogue.” April 6, 2010. Online. Internet.
Accessed April 1, 2010 at http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23144

In late March an explosion sunk a South Korean warship in the Yellow Sea. After his government
downplayed the likelihood of North Korean involvement, the South’s defense minister now says a mine
or torpedo might have been involved. A torpedo would mean a North Korean submarine actively targeted
Seoul’s aging corvette. The Republic of Korea’s president, Lee Myung-bak, has attempted to dampen
speculation by announcing his intention to “look into the case in a calm manner.” But the possibility that
Pyongyang committed a flagrant and bloody act of war has sent tremors through the ROK. Seoul could ill
afford not to react strongly, both to protect its international reputation and prevent a domestic political
upheaval. All economic aid to and investment in the North would end. Diplomatic talks would be halted.
Prospects for reconvening the Six-Party Talks would disappear. Moreover, Seoul might feel the need to
respond with force. Even if justified, such action would risk a retaliatory spiral. Where it would end no
one could say. No one wants to play out that scenario to its ugly conclusion. The Yellow Sea incident
reemphasizes the fact that North Korean irresponsibility could lead to war. Tensions on the Korean
peninsula have risen after President Lee ended the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”—which essentially provided
bountiful subsidies irrespective of Pyongyang’s behavior.

Now’s key---the risk of conflict’s uniquely high

Feulner 2010, “February 4, Edwin is the President of the heritage foundation and has a PHD” The Status of
the U.S.-Korea Relationship in 2010 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/The-Status-of-the-US-Korea-
Relationship-in-2010
Of course, during this New Year, we may have another bilateral U.S.-North Korea meeting or
even a resumption of Six-Party Talks. I also notice new rumors in the Seoul media of a
possible third inter-Korean summit. However, the real measure for success of any such
meeting must be what was accomplished rather than simply whether such a meeting occurred.
In 2010, we can expect more of the same from North Korea. It will alternate provocations
with seemingly conciliatory behavior. But at this time, the landscape is different in both
Washington and Pyongyang. There is less patience in Washington for Pyongyang's antics and
far fewer experts and officials who still believe that unfettered engagement will actually
achieve denuclearization, and there is a greater potential for instability in North Korea. As an
outsider, I read about: * Kim Jong-il's failing health; * Doubts of a successful succession
to Kim's third son, Kim Jong-un; * Worsening economic conditions brought on by systemic
problems; * The tightening noose of international sanctions that is starting to bite; and *
Internal unrest following North Korea's currency revaluation. All of these five factors could
combine to create a tinderbox of dangerous change in North Korea. As a result, we may be in
for a bumpy ride during the Year of the Tiger.
Intent
North Korean provocation increasing
Scobell and Sandord 09 “Andrew is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. John is a
U.S. Navy Captain, and is a 2006 graduate of the U.S. Army War College where his Strategic Research Paper,
“The Korean Armistice: Short Term Truce or Long Term Peace” was awarded the Commandant’s Award for
Distinction in Research. July 21, North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of
Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf)

In the first decade of the 21st century, Pyongyang has made provocative statements and engaged in
provocative actions. In October 2002, DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju told the visiting
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly that North Korea
possessed a nuclear weapons program. Soon after, Pyongyang removed the IAEA safeguard seals on
nuclear facilities, shut off the monitoring cameras, and expelled the inspectors.302 On January 10,
2003, Pyongyang announced to the world that it would withdraw from the NPT. It restarted the 20
MWt reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. By June 2003, it had extracted plutonium from
8,000 spent fuel rods. This amount of plutonium could have produced 25-30 kilograms for weapons.
Meanwhile, in April 2003, North Korean diplomats told their U.S. counterparts that Pyongyang had
started reprocessing spent fuel rods (in storage since 1994). In October, North Korean publicly
declared that the reprocessing had been concluded.303 Eventually, on February 10, 2005, a DPRK
Foreign Ministry official announced that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons. The conclusion that
one set of respected analysts draw is that “North Korea has an active nuclear weapons program and
may already possess enough separated plutonium to produce as many as nine nuclear weapons.”304
Moreover, Pyongyang also has a reprocessing plant and fuel fabrication, a plant at Yongbyon, a 200
MWt reactor at Yongbyon, and 700- 800 MWt reactor near Taechon (construction frozen under the
Agreed Framework), as well as uranium ore processing at Pyongsan and Pakchon.
Military Strength
The North is highly capable of waging a war

Scobell and Sandord in 2009 “Andrew is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. John is a U.S. Navy Captain, and
is a 2006 graduate of the U.S. Army War College where his Strategic Research Paper, “The Korean Armistice: Short Term
Truce or Long Term Peace” was awarded the Commandant’s Award for Distinction in Research. July 21, North Korea’s
Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf

As of 2006, North Korea is thought to possess between 600 and 800 short- and medium-range ballistic
missiles. This number is only likely to increase with steady output by the military industrial complex.
And if testing continues, then the DPRK eventually will produce and deploy long-range missiles capable
of reaching Alaska, Hawaii, and, some day, the continental United States.

Strategic positioning raises the risk of a devastating strike

Scobell and Sandord in 2009 “Andrew is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S. Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. John is a U.S. Navy Captain, and
is a 2006 graduate of the U.S. Army War College where his Strategic Research Paper, “The Korean Armistice: Short Term
Truce or Long Term Peace” was awarded the Commandant’s Award for Distinction in Research. July 21, North Korea’s
Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf

Although it is difficult to know North Korea’s precise intentions or aspirations, its forces are deployed
along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in such a manner that they could support an invasion of South Korea.
Currently, North Korea deploys approximately 70 percent of its military units, and up to 80 percent of its
estimated aggregate firepower, within 100km of the DMZ. North Korea theoretically could invade the
South without recourse to further deployments and with minimal warning time. But North Korea’s armed
forces also are positioned in order to deter an attack, being deployed to deliver a preemptive strike against
the South if Pyongyang believes that an attack is imminent or to retaliate with overwhelming force if the
North is attacked.

The North’s standing army is huge

Scobell and Sandord in 2009 “Andrew is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. John is a U.S. Navy Captain, and is a 2006
graduate of the U.S. Army War College where his Strategic Research Paper, “The Korean Armistice: Short Term Truce or Long
Term Peace” was awarded the Commandant’s Award for Distinction in Research. July 21, North Korea’s Military Threat:
Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf

North Korea, or as it prefers to be known officially, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),
possesses a massive armed force with substantial military capabilities—both conventional and
unconventional. Most experts agree that the Korean People’s Army (KPA) is the world’s fourth largest
military in terms of manpower with the world’s largest Special Forces (SOF) component, behind China,
the United States, and India (see Figure 1).1
NK is the most militarized state on Earth
Scobell and Sandord in 2009 “Andrew is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College. John is a U.S. Navy Captain, and is a 2006
graduate of the U.S. Army War College where his Strategic Research Paper, “The Korean Armistice: Short Term Truce or Long
Term Peace” was awarded the Commandant’s Award for Distinction in Research. July 21, North Korea’s Military Threat:
Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub771.pdf

Indeed, the KPA is the fourth largest military in the world in terms of men and women in uniform, with
possibly over 1.2 million personnel.15 But this statistic does not reflect adequately the size of the armed
forces relative to the size of North Korea. If measured in terms of soldiers per thousand population, the
comparative size of the KPA readily becomes more apparent. At 44.3 per thousand population, North
Korea is by far the largest military in the communist bloc past or present, not to mention in the larger
contemporary world.16 In addition, North Korea has almost 7 1/2 million paramilitary reserves. This
means that some 40 percent of the populace serve in some military or paramilitary formation. In short, the
DPRK is undoubtedly the “most militarized state on earth.

The North would put up a fight---no easy victory

Margolis, June. 1 2010, Eric, contributing editor to the Toronto Sun, “north korea strikes back”
http://www.lewrockwell.com/margolis/margolis190.html

In spite of Mrs. Clinton’s bellicose talk, the US and South Korea have only three poor options: First,
launch punitive air and missile raids on North Korea, and blockade or mine its ports. North Korea has
250–300 long-ranged 170mm guns and 240mm rocket batteries dug into caves in the granite hills of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that could destroy a third of the South Korean capital Seoul, a metropolis of
10.3 million. Downtown Seoul is less than 30 miles from the DMZ. Some 65% of North Korea’s army is
concentrated within 60 miles of the DMZ. North Korean troops could erupt from the many tunnels
secretly dug under the DMZ. I’ve been in some of them: a 12,000-man North Korean division could jog
through one each hour, taking the first line of South Korean and US DMZ defenses from the rear. Behind
this first line, the US and Republic of Korea (ROK) Army have constructed successive belts of
fortifications, mine fields, and anti-tank barriers that span the width of the peninsula. Their very existence
is denied, but I have seen them (modern fortification is a specialty of mine). North Korea has some 1,000
mostly Scud missiles targeted on South Korea and the vital US airbases at Osan and Kunsan. North
Korean Nodong missiles could deliver chemical or possibly nuclear warheads as far away as US bases in
Okinawa and Guam, and Japan’s mainland, including Tokyo and Osaka. North Korea also has the world’s
largest commando force, 88,000 "suicide" fighters tasked with attacking US and Korean air bases,
communications, headquarters, political targets and supply depots in Korea and targets in Japan. They
would be infiltrated from the sea and by ancient Soviet AN-2 biplanes flying below radar. The US is
loathe to tangle with a powerful enemy that can fight back and inflict serious American casualties –
particularly one with a nuclear arsenal. Russian military experts say the US cannot defeat North Korea
using conventional weapons. Pentagon estimates put the US casualty rate in a conventional war with
North Korea at 250,000.
Misc
The risk of a full scale nuclear exchange trumps the risk of terrorism
Doug Bandow, 2008 February 1, 2008 (Senior Fellow, CATO Institute), “GOP lost in defense budget black hole.”
Online. Internet. Accessed April 1, 2010 at
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/doug_bandow_gop_lost_in_defense_budget_black_hole2008-
02-01T08_00_00.html

Terrorism, a la 9/11, is horrid, but the potential consequences are nothing like that of even a small nuclear
strike. Such terrorism is best met by sophisticated intelligence, international cooperation, law enforcement
and special forces rather than huge militaries and preventive wars. The threat of nuclear terrorism or a
rogue state missile attack is real — though very unlikely — and must be guarded against. But, again,
there is no comparison with the possibility of a full-scale nuclear exchange.