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Advantage 1 is North Korea

First, North Korea didn’t back off, they kept the ROK off balance and made them look weak
Feigenbaum 12/21—Adjunct Senior Fellow for East, Central, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations,
PhD in Chinese politics (Evan A, 21 December 2010, “North Korea “Backs Off”?”,
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/12/21/north-korea-%E2%80%9Cbacks-off%E2%80%9D/,)

So, the New York Times says that North Korea’s failure to respond to yesterday’s South Korean live-fire drills “could signal [a] new
policy”—namely, that Pyongyang, to quote a South Korean analyst cited in the article, may be “trying to create the mood for
dialogue.”We’ll see. But, sorry, I just don’t buy it. Why didn’t North Korea act after all the bluster? The fact is,
And conflict this time was unlikely because North Korea
North Korea often rains fiery rhetoric on the South.
did not need to strike, having already achieved many of its objectives.Three explanations, taken
together, probably explain what happened yesterday: (1) Beijing, humiliated by the 23 November
attack, surely used (private) channels to tell Pyongyang to knock it off. (2) Pyongyang, quite
simply, did not need to respond to yesterday’s exercise, having already accomplished its
objective of humiliating South Korean president Lee Myung-bak and keeping Seoul off
balance. And (3) North Korea’s threats of future attack remain credible ; put differently, yesterday’s
non-response would in no way suggest to Seoul or Washington that Pyongyang has “gone
soft.”

And, the US security guarantee is no longer credible to North Korea

Fenenko 12/8—leading research fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of International Security, PhD
(Alexei, 8 December 2010, “North Korea no longer takes the U.S. security guarantees
seriously”, http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20101208/161686288.html,) 
The current crisis reveals yet another negative trend: North Korea no longer takes American security
guarantees seriously. The United States is bound by a set of obligations to protect its two allies –
Japan and South Korea; therefore, it is conventionally accepted that the United States would
initiate the conflict. Now that the Obama administration has shown that, unlike the previous Republican administration, it
does not necessarily take so robust stance on defending its allies, North Korea has begun to “vet” the United
States to see if, under certain circumstances, they would be prepared to abandon their allies in
the Pacific, especially since the United States already has serious ongoing commitments to
two theaters of conflict: Iraq and Afghanistan. 

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And more provocations will go nuclear—we’re on the brink of massive South Korean retaliation
Guardian 12/23 (23 December 2010, Jonathan Watts, “North Korea threatens nuclear 'holy war' with South”,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/23/north-korea-holy-war-warning,)

Tensions on the Korean pensinsula were at their most dangerous level since the 1950-53 war today when North Korea
threatened to use nuclear weapons in a "holy war" against its neighbour after South Korean
tanks, jets and artillery carried out one of the largest live-fire drills in history close to the
border.The military exercise at Pocheon, just south of the demilitarized zone, was the third such show of force this week by
South Korea. Multiple rocket-launchers, dozens of tanks and hundreds of troops joined the drills, which the South Korean
president, Lee Myung-bak, insisted was necessary for self-defence, following two deadly attacks this year. Last month, two
civilians and two marines were killed by a North Korean barrage on Yeonpyeong island following a live-fire drill in disputed
territory. In March, 46 sailors died when the South Korean naval ship, Cheonan, was sunk, apparently by an enemy torpedo." We
had believed patience would ensure peace on this land, but that was not the case," Lee told
troops today. He earlier warned that he was ready to order a "merciless counterattack" if
further provoked.North Korea's armed forces minister, Kim Yong-chun, also lifted the pitch of the sabre-rattling . "To counter
the enemy's intentional drive to push the situation to the brink of war, our revolutionary forces are making preparations to begin a
holy war at any moment necessary based on nuclear deterrent," North Korea's KCNA news agency quoted him telling a rally in
Pyongyang.Bellicosity and brinkmanship are nothing new on the divided peninsula and there are
doubts that North Korea is capable of an accurate nuclear strike, though it has conducted two
bomb tests and is believed to have enough high-grade plutonium for at least six warheads.But
even with conventional artillery, the two neighbours are capable of inflicting horrendous
casualties among their densely packed populations. The political situation is less predictable than usual due to
the ongoing transition of power in Pyongyang from Kim Jong-il to his son Kim Jong-un. There has also been a
hardening of positions in Seoul, where president Lee is belatedly trying to demonstrate his
toughness. After being criticised for his restrained response to the two earlier incidents, Lee
has fired his top military advisers and replaced them with hardliners, who favour an escalated
display of self-defence.

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And, China isn’t cooperating now due to US presence in Korea

Putten 12/21—research fellow with the Clingendael Institue in The Hague, PhD in History (Frans-Paul van der
Putten, 21 December 2010, “Sino-US geopolitical rivalry does not help Korean stability”,
"http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/21/sino-us-geopolitical-rivalry-does-not-help-korean-stability/" )

The United States government believes China needs to do more to contribute to stability on the Korean peninsula. According to
this view, North Korea is highly dependent on Chinese support and Beijing should use its influence to moderate Pyongyang’s
behavior. As some American and other Western observers have put it, it is time for China to start behaving like a responsible
great power. But it is not likely that China will fundamentally alter its policies.The main reason for this is that geopolitical
rivalry between China and the United States overshadows the situation on the Korean
peninsula. Lately both Chinese and US actions have escalated this rivalry. As long as the two
powers are more interested in keeping the other in check than in stabilising the peninsula no
significant progress in terms of stabilising the region is possible. North Korea recently shelled the South
Korean island of Yeonpyeong after a period of escalating tensions, killing two soldiers and two civilians. North Korea claims that it
opened fire after being provoked by a South Korean exercise. In response to the shelling incident the US and South Korea have
conducted joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea. These involved a US aircraft carrier and are regarded as threatening not only
by North Korea but also by China.China’s economic and diplomatic support for North Korea undermines efforts by other countries
to affect the behavior of the regime in Pyongyang. Even China is troubled by North Korean behavior. The North Korean nuclear
program, and the risks Pyongyang is running in escalating tensions with South Korea and the US, are counter to China’s security
interests. Theoretically, the Chinese government could therefore decide to put pressure on Pyongyang by limiting its economic
support and by ending the diplomatic support it often gives in the United Nations Security Council. It is very unlikely that China’s
policy towards North Korea will change much. The US diplomatic reports revealed by WikiLeaks are a confirmation of uneasy
Sino-North Korean relations rather than an indication that this relationship is about to change.China will probably continue to give
more support than any other country because it is highly vulnerable to the consequences of political or economic collapse in North
Korea. The longest and most accessible border of North Korea is the one it shares with China. Chaos in North Korea would harm
stability in China’s northeast, the region formerly known as Manchuria.Moreover, Beijing is less motivated to put pressure on the
North Korean regime than other countries are. The US is primarily interested in preventing the proliferation of nuclear technologies
from North Korea. South Korea and Japan are mainly worried about the military threat from the north. Compared with these
countries, China is less concerned about such issues. The most fundamental element in China’s policy
towards North Korea is that Beijing regards the US as a greater security threat than the
situation on the Korean peninsula. Since neither China nor the US is by itself the predominant
great power in Korean affairs, Beijing can only assume responsibility for regional stability if it
does so jointly with the US. However, this will not happen since China and the US each regard
one another as their main potential military adversary. They also have contrary interests on the
Korean peninsula.While China regards the US military presence in South Korea as a potential
threat that should eventually be removed, the US intends to maintain this presence as it helps
to limit Chinese regional influence. The relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang cannot be seen apart from this
context of geopolitical rivalry. It is desirable for China that the regime in North Korea continues to exist and that the Chinese
government retains a certain degree of influence in Pyongyang.

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And, withdrawal from South Korea Is key to get China on board to check North korea

Carpenter 10—vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history (Ted
Galen, 3 August 2010, China Spats, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-spats-3778,) 
Beijing's failure to rein in an increasingly reckless Pyongyang is a legitimate security issue for
the United States. So too are China's breathtakingly broad claims in the South China Sea. China regards virtually that entire
sea as its territorial waters—something that, if enforced, would have profound implications for international navigation and
commerce. As the world's leading maritime and trading power, the United States cannot tamely accept such a brazen attempt to
change the status of international waters through which much of the world's commerce flows. 
But even on those issues, Washington needs to understand that some concessions may need to be
made to secure Chinese cooperation. It is unrealistic to expect, for example, that China will
incur the risks involved in pressuring North Korea if the United States offers nothing in return.
Beijing worries that coercing Pyongyang could cause Kim Jong-il's regime to unravel—perhaps even cause the North Korean
state itself to implode, much as East Germany did at the end of the 1980s. That development would produce massive refugee
flows into China, and possibly result in the emergence of a united Korea closely allied to the United States and with a U.S. military
presence on the peninsula. 
If we want China to take on serious risks to tame North Korea, we have to offer some
incentives. Promising to assist Beijing in dealing with the probable refugee problem would seem to be the absolute minimum.
In all likelihood, Chinese leaders would also want a commitment to phase out American military
bases in Korea if the North Korean threat were neutralized. Yet Washington has not offered the slightest
hint of concessions on either issue. U.S. officials implicitly expect Beijing to accept the risks
entailed in getting tough with Pyongyang but receive nothing at all in return. 

Plan leads to Chinese economic leverage that halts the nuclear program 
Carpenter 10—vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history (Ted Galen,
Winter 2010, Plan B for Dealing with North Korea,http://www.cato.org/pubs/Policy-TedGalenCarpenter.pdf,) 
The strategy of imposing tighter economic sanctions also faces major hurdles. Both Beijing and
Moscow have consistently opposed vigorous sanctions in the UN Security Council, arguing that they will make Pyongyang less
rather than more cooperative. The Russians and Chinese (particularly the latter) were successful in dramatically diluting the 2009
sanctions that the United States and Japan wanted. 
It is especially important to understand the reasons for China's reluctance to endorse truly robust sanctions. Although a few
Sinophobes in the United States charge that China is in league with the North Koreans and would not mind a nuclear-armed North
Korea, most evidence suggests that Beijing is not eager to see nuclear weapons introduced on the
Korean Peninsula. Among other drawbacks, such a development may lead the Japanese to
build nuclear deterrents of their own, which is the last thing China wants. 
Maintaining the non-nuclear status quo on the Korean Peninsula may be a significant Chinese objective, but it is not their most
important one.5 Beijing's top priority is to preserve the North Korean state as a buffer between China and the US sphere of
influence in Northeast Asia. Chinese leaders probably fear that rigorous sanctions would increase the
danger of the North Korean state imploding, much as East Germany did in 1989. Such a development could lead
to a unified Korea allied to the United States right on China's doorsteps-probably with the continued presence of American military
bases on the Korean Peninsula. It might lead to a massive flow of North Korean refugees into China. Uneasiness over these
scenarios limits the amount of pressure that Beijing is willing to exert on Pyongyang.  
In theory, China might be able to use its economic leverage as North Korea's principal source
of energy, food, and other vital commodities to compel Kim Jong Il's regime to halt its nuclear
weapons program. Without Chinese cooperation, coercive economic measures would have
little impact on Pyongyang. And given Washington's dependence on Beijing's willingness to
continue funding the soaring US Treasury debt, American officials are not in a good bargaining position to
pressure China into endorsing robust sanctions. 

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The plan can solve the nuclear crisis without making concessions in our nuclear power
Bandow 10 – (4/18/10, Doug, “Let the Koreans Take Care of the Koreas,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-
bandow/let-the-koreans-take-care_b_542141.html,) 
What value, then, is the alliance? 
Some proponents view it as a useful tool of nonproliferation, discouraging South Korea from developing a nuclear weapon.
However, that possibility remains remote. Although nuclear negotiations with the North hardly look promising, China might yet
forcefully weigh in to halt the North Korean program. Moreover, the U.S. could maintain a nuclear umbrella over
the ROK without keeping conventional forces on the ground in South Korea, which only act as
nuclear hostages vulnerable to DPRK intimidation. 
Moreover, the most powerful incentive for Beijing to apply significant pressure on the North to
denuclearize (and not just return to the Six-Party talks) is the threat of further proliferation. The People's
Republic of China does not fear a North Korean atomic bomb. The PRC might not worry unduly about a South Korean weapon.  
But Japan and even Taiwan might consider joining a growing nuclear parade. That possibility
should raise more than eyebrows in Beijing, encouraging a vigorous response to halt the
process at the start. The best way to keep the ROK and neighboring states non-nuclear is to
make the North non-nuclear. The best way to make North Korea non-nuclear is for the PRC to
use its full array of diplomatic and economic tools on Pyongyang. 

Only China can check north korea

Global Security 11/29 (, “China Calls For Talks Over Korean Crisis, Parties
Unresponsive”, http://globalsecuritynewswire.org/siteservices/print_friendly.php?ID=nw_20101129_2947,)
China yesterday called for emergency direct diplomacy with North Korea in order to lower escalating tensions following last week's artillery attack on South Korea (see GSN,
Nov. 24). 
However, the United States and its allies said now is not the time to address Pyongyang's demands for new six-party talks. 
North Korea's shelling of the inhabited South Korean island of Yeonpyeong resulted in the
deaths of several soldiers and civilians and injuries to nearly 20 mor e. The incident directly
followed news from Washington that Pyongyang revealed to visiting U.S. experts earlier this
month that it had covertly built a large-scale advanced uranium enrichment facility at its Yongbyon
nuclear complex, the Wall Street Journal reported. 

The two events have renewed international attention on the North Korean nuclear impasse.
Beijing dispatched its senior foreign affairs official to lead a delegation to Seoul over the
weekend for talks on the crisis . However, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak told the Chinese visitors that it was not the "right time" to
relaunch long-stalled six-nation talks aimed at the permament denuclearization of North Korea, according to an administration official.  
The nuclear talks involve China, Japan, the two Koreas, Russia and the United States. They were last held almost two years ago. Pyongyang withdrew from the negotiations
in April 2009 and one month later carried out its second nuclear weapons test, an action for which it was punished with heightened U.N. Security Council sanctions.  
The North for some time has declared its willingness to return to the nuclear talks. However, Washington,
Seoul and Tokyo are leery of returning to a negotiating framework that has been used by the North in the past as a means to win international concessions only to later
resume work on its nuclear weapons program. The three allies have called on Pyongyang to demonstrate its "sincere" commitment to nuclear disarmament before they will
agree to resume negotiations. 
China is North Korea's strongest foreign ally and chief economic benefactor. Beijing's
continued support of the Kim Jong Il regime is frequently cited in Washington as the only thing keeping
the Stalinist government from collapsing. Because of this, China has come under growing criticism from the international community to do more to press North
Korea over its belligerent behavior. 
"It's hard to know why China doesn't push harder," Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in a CNN interview aired yesterday. "They clearly are interested in this -- in the region
not spinning out of control -- so my sense is they try to control this guy, and I'm not sure he is controllable."  
Lee yesterday told Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo in blunt remarks that China must take a "more fair and responsible position" on peninsula affairs and leave Cold War-era considerations behind,
according to presidential spokesman Hong Sang-pyo. In a television address today, Lee pledged North Korea "would pay a price" for any future hostilities and said that "more endurance and forgiveness would
only result in bigger provocations" (Fairclough/Ramstad, Wall Street Journal I, Nov. 28). 
Japan today dismissed Beijing's call for direct talks with North Korea. Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara said it would be "unacceptable for us to hold six-party talks only because North Korea has gone
amok," the Wall Street Journal reported (Yuka Hayashi, Wall Street Journal II, Nov. 29).  
The United States has yet to give a response to China's call for emergency talks, saying it would carry out discussions with the South Korean government first, Reuters reported.  A high-ranking Pyongyang
official voiced doubts about Beijing's initiative to engage in discussions. While the North has not responded to China's call, the unidentified official told Kyodo News that countries involved in the latest incident
should meet for talks first (Laurence/Choonsik, Reuters, Nov. 29).  
While urging that the two Koreas to refrain from actions that would raise tensions on the peninsula, China has abstained from condemning Pyongyang's shelling of the South Korean island, indicating that

other states to punish the North, the Los Angeles Times reported last
Beijing will refuse the urging of Washington and

Thursday. North Korea's presumed possession of the nuclear bomb, its large arsenal of
chemical weapons and a massive standing army make a military assault on the isolated state
an unattractive option, according to reports. The United States and much of the international community have already drastically curtailed trade relations
with the Stalinist state. In the White House view, China remains the only nation to have sway over the North and the only hope of producing a change in the Korean nuclear
impasse.  "China
is pivotal to moving North Korea in a fundamentally different direction ," U.S. State
Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said. "You
can go [to] the U.N. Security Council or call for a five-
party meeting (minus North Korea). But first you've got to go after China," said Victor Cha,
point man for North Korean policy during the Bush administration. 

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North Korean aggression will cause nuclear conflict – even a limited nuclear war escalates
Hayes & Hamel-Green, 2010 – *Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable
Development, AND ** Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria
University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)
The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple,
interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons
of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and
actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued
US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s
nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration,
regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied
upon for protection. The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the
North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious , not only for the
Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of
nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident , leading to the resumption of
Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range
missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million,
Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange
would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be
the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far
more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear
exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States
currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32
Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in
global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter,
but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the
last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A
decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow… The period of nuclear darkness will cause much
greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of
millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected
into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone. 4 These, of
course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and
downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-
use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the
global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial
crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in
particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation
and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global
security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including
possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and
aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear
proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international
community.

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And, this makes nuclear proliferation throughout Asia inevitable—guarantees nuclear conflict
Cimbala, Prof. of Political Science @ Penn State in ‘10
[Stephen, Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21st Century, p. 117-8]
Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout Asia.
Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A pentagonal
configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basis (Russia, China, Japan, and the two Koreas – not including the United
States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at risk and create enormous temptation toward
nuclear preemption. Apart from actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear
capability in order to support its coercive diplomacy. As George H. Quester has noted:
If the Pyongyang regime plays its cards sensibly and well, therefore, the world will not see its nuclear weapons being used against Japan or
South Korea or anyone else, but will rather see this new nuclear arsenal held in reserve (just as the putative Israeli nuclear arsenal has been held
in reserve), as a deterrent against the outside world’s applying maximal pressure on Pyongyang and as a bargaining chip to extract the
economic and political concessions that the DPRK needs if it wishes to avoid giving up its peculiar approach to social
engineering. A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be linked, in geopolitical
deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents in India and Pakistan,
and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran. An arc of nuclear instability from Tehran
to Tokyo could place U.S. proliferation strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more
drastic military options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses, and counter-deterrent special operations. In addition, an eight-
sided nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent
nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of these states already have histories of protracted
conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable or immature command and control systems,
especially during a crisis involving a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or
immature systems might permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch, or a deliberate but unauthorized launch by rogue
commanders; (3) faulty intelligence and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the
other’s defensive moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering
a mistaken preemption.

De-nuclearizing North Korea sets a vital precedent to eventually solving global peace—unilateral shows
of force fail 
Ivashentsov 10—Ambassador of Russia to Korea (Gleb, International Affairs, No. 5, October 2010, page(s): 128-
139, “The Korean Issue and Security in Northeast Asia”,https://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/22820970,) 

Progress on the Korean Peninsula is to a very large degree key to the future not only of
Northeast Asia but also of the entire Asia Pacific region as well as to the evolution of global
processes. On the one hand, the resolution of the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula would
set a very important precedent for resolving similar problems in other parts of the world and
thus become a weighty contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
On the other hand, the six-party negotiations will accelerate the inter-Korean reconciliation process, which will  
page 138  set an example - extremely important in the present conditions - of a collective search for a way out of the acute
confrontational impasse inherited from the Cold War era. Only on this basis - not through unilateral use of force - is it possible
today to stabilize the unbalanced system of international relations, demilitarize them and take the ideological edge off them.
Russia is completely for inter-Korean reconciliation. Our country wants to see the Korean Peninsula free of military confrontation
and of nuclear weapons; it wants to see the future single Korea as a prosperous neighbor and a friendly partner.  

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Advantage 2 is Japan-China Relations

Japan and China currently have diverging views of regional cooperation that prevent an
increase in relations—South Korean and Japanese cooperation solves because it makes Japan
more willing to engage in dialogue
Yoshihide, 2010 – Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at Keio University (Soeya, “An East Asian
Community and Japan-China relations,” May 17, AJISS-Commentary, an online publication of The Association of the
Japanese Institute of Strategic Studies, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/05/17/an-east-asian-community-and-
japan-china-relations/)

one would also realise the fundamental differences between Japan’s and
Looking from this perspective,
China’s perspectives on evolving regionalism in East Asia , including the concept of an East
Asian Community. China’s regional outlook and its policies are still conditioned , at the deepest level,
by its preoccupation with the modern elements of diplomacy and international politics , including
strong nationalism, a sense of rivalry with the United States, an unprecedented pace and scale
of military modernisation, and preoccupation with territorial integrity. Japan’s perspective on
East Asian regionalism and its interests therein, in contrast, are essentially post-industrial, including
commitment to non-traditional security issues such as human security, problems common to
rapidly evolving civil societies, and issues associated with aging societies. Of course, there are still
modern elements in Japanese society and politics, which particularly tend to surface in an emotional vicious cycle over historical and territorial issues
between Japan and China. The main story in the evolution of Japanese diplomacy and thinking toward East Asian regionalism, however, has been
largely, if not exclusively, a post-modern and post-industrial one. The first critical and explicit manifestation of this tendency was Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi’s policy speech in January 2002 proposing the establishment of an East Asian Community. Koizumi said to the audience in
Singapore that, starting from Japan-ASEAN cooperation, the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand
will be core members of such a community. The Koizumi speech actually ignited a process of conceptual competition between China and Japan. In
particular, the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand embodied the line of division between the two. In the Japanese thinking, there still remains a
concern about a China-centered process of community-building possibly developing into a closed region, reflecting Chinese preoccupation with
modern values and interests such as national sovereignty and a sense of strategic rivalry vis-à-vis the United States over the long run. In this
Japanese conception, the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand holds a double function. First, they provide a venting channel leading to the United
States as a security anchor in East Asia, an important foundation of an East Asian Community from the Japanese perspective. Secondly, the
membership of Australia and New Zealand is also important from the point of view of universal values that will sustain, as well as keep open, the
basis of an East Asian Community to the rest of the world. Therefore , behind the competition over the primary
institution for community building between the ASEAN+3 formula, on the one hand, and the
East Asian Summit or the ASEAN+6 on the other, lies this conceptual rivalry, if not geopolitical
conflict, between Japan and China. This should be a healthy competition in which the other East Asian nations,
including the Japanese and the Chinese, would be involved through constructive dialogue and
debate. For such diplomatic approaches by Japan toward East Asia, the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, signed in
March 2007, has important meanings. The actual context of the declaration reveals that the agreement is the embodiment of security cooperation
between countries concerned about a set of non-traditional security and political issues. The declaration has no elements regarding traditional
security such as territorial integrity or balance of power considerations. It specifically mentions Japan-Australia cooperation on non-traditional
security issues, including law enforcement to combat transnational crime, disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
security
peace operations, and humanitarian relief operations. From the perspective advanced in this essay, one would realise that similar
cooperation should not be entirely impossible between Japan and South Korea. Indeed, if
Japan and South Korea can establish a genuinely cooperative relationship as true equals
located between the United States and China, this will become an epoch-making trigger for a
paradigm shift in East Asian regionalism. Under the dominant realities today, this perspective may sound rather
normative. Nonetheless, it is not entirely without substance, as evidenced by rapidly expanding civil society exchanges between
Japan and South Korea and the coordination of alliance policies toward the United States. Although it is a bit too early to judge
where the new diplomacy by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will go, there are indications that this sort of paradigm shift may
not be entirely impossible in the coming years. Of particular importance is Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s emphasis
on Japan’s diplomacy toward neighboring countries, i.e., South Korea and China , in the overall context of an
East Asian Community concept. The idea is to start the community-building efforts with Japan’s most troubled relationships, i.e.
those with South Korea and China, and his rather explicit approach to the history problems represents an important initiative in
this overall context of a new East Asian diplomacy rather than simply in a bilateral context.

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That brings China and Japan into a regional security architecture

Iida, 2009 – Senior Fellow @ National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo (Masafumi, “CHAPTER 6 Japan-China
Relations in East Asia : Rivals or Partners?,” NIDS Joint Research Series No.3 – China’s Shift: Global Strategy of the
Rising Power, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/publication/joint_research/series3/series3.html)

China has tried to moderate obstacles in its bilateral relations with Japan by way
It is fair to say that
of positioning its Japan policy as a part of its multilateral diplomacy in East Asia . In other words,
China put great importance on promoting regional cooperation in East Asia and then
contemplated a foreign policy toward Japan with a view to strengthening East Asia
cooperation, which allowed the Chinese government to maintain cooperative relations with
Japan that were necessary for advancing regional cooperation and containing negative
influences from controversial disputes with Japan within the bilateral scheme. As to this kind of
relationship between China’s regional policy and its Japan policy, Zhang Yunling, director of the Center for AsiaPacific Studies,
China Academy of Social Sciences, argues that one of the political implications of East Asian cooperation is
to improve the Sino-Japanese relationship through putting both countries in a common
mechanism of regional cooperation, which can play the role of a “lubricant” for smoothing
acrimonious relations between Beijing and Tokyo.6 Men Honghua, professor at the Central Party School, points
out that China and Japan realize that the most effective way to secure their core national
interests is to play the role of responsible major powers in a regional framework by taking
responsibility as stakeholders. In this way, East Asian cooperation can provide the two countries
with more routes toward their cooperation and dialogue .7 In this respect, it is imperative that China’s policy
toward East Asia is investigated in order to understand the future direction of its Japan policy.

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The plan solves—withdrawing from Korea motivates Japanese and Korean cooperation because
military presence allows them to only engage through the US
Bandow, 2008 – senior fellow at Cato, former special assistant to Reagan (Doug, “Time to Tell Irresponsible Allies
No Thanks,” September 20, http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2008/09/19/time-to-tell-irresponsible-allies-no-
thanks/)

Six decades have passed since World War II ended, but you wouldn’t know it from relations between South Korea and
Japan. The two leading democratic, capitalist powers in East Asia – both close US allies – have been blustering over
the status of 33 barren but contested blocks of rock. Cooperation over truly important issues,
such as denuclearizing North Korea and channeling Chinese ambitions in a positive direction,
has taken a back seat to immature political posturing. This irresponsible behavior is made possible by Washington’s continued
defense of both nations. Imperial Japan gained dominant influence in the peninsular kingdom in the late 1800s and formally annexed Korea as a colony in 1910. Tokyo’s
policies were characteristically brutal: Korean culture was suppressed, Korean names were outlawed, and Korean labor was conscripted. During World War II the Japanese
took Koreans as "comfort women" for Japanese soldiers on break from conquering East Asia and the Pacific. It’s no wonder that anti-Japanese feeling, strong throughout
most of the region, was especially intense in Korea. Indeed, it was one of the few unifying features of a peninsula divided by the US and Soviet Union in 1945. These feelings
were understandable, but the statute of limitations has run out. Japan’s wartime leaders all died long ago. Even most of the "grunts" are dead. The militaristic imperial order,
devastated by Tokyo’s defeat, died along with them. The US disarmed Japan and imposed a "peace constitution," which technically outlaws any military. Tokyo’s neighbors
applauded, but American policymakers soon reconsidered. After the Chinese Revolution, Washington faced two large communist rivals in East Asia. In contrast, America’s
allies were marginal: Australia and New Zealand small and distant, the Republic of Korea an economic and political wreck, the Philippines a third world state. Japan was
America’s only potential powerful friend in Asia during the Cold War’s early years. Anti-Japanese taunts became a useful political tactic for political elites in the ROK and
elsewhere, such as Singapore. Secure beneath America’s protective umbrella, these countries demanded that Tokyo eschew even the ability to defend itself. Japan didn’t
help matters, with assorted politicians periodically sounding off on the alleged benefits of colonialism in Korea and visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, at which more than a
thousand convicted war criminals are interred. Relations between South Korea and Japan have improved in recent years. Dissident Kim Dae-jung took refuge in Japan
decades ago; he encouraged more positive bilateral ties after he was elected ROK president in 1997. Moreover, the horrifying brutality and criminality of the North Korean
government eroded the support, financial as well as political, of Pyongyang by many ethnic Koreans living in Japan, most of whom had come from the North. Kim’s
successor, Roh Moo-hyun, attempted to use anti-Japanese feeling to bolster his fading popularity, but President Lee Myun-bak, elected last December, advocated improving
relations. Alas, the controversy over the Takeshima (Japanese name)/Dokdo (Korean name) Islands (or Liancourt Rocks in the West) has pushed relations backwards. (The
surrounding waters are commonly known as the Sea of Japan, except in Korea, which calls them the East Sea. Just two Koreans, an octopus fisherman and his wife, live
permanently on the assorted outcroppings – 56 acres in all – but every day hundreds of South Koreans visit. The voyage takes several hours and the unpredictable waves
often prevent anyone from landing. Even when the sea cooperates, the visitors typically stay only 20 minutes. Nevertheless, 80,000 South Koreans have made the trek so far
this year, a testament to the frivolous petulance which sometimes captures the popular psyche of the Republic of Korea. The competing claims are tied up with Tokyo’s
military victory over Russia and – the cause of the issue’s emotional sensitivity in Korea – Japan’s subsequent takeover of the Korean peninsula. America occupied both the
ROK and Japan at the end of World War II, but left the issue unresolved. South Korea installed a small police garrison in the 1950s to stake its claim and rejected Tokyo’s
offer to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice. The two countries set the issue aside when they normalized relations in 1965, but controversy flared in 2005 when
the government of Shimane prefecture in Japan declared Takeshima Day, celebrating Tokyo’s claim. In July the Japanese Ministry of Education issued a new manual for
teachers and textbook publishers asserting Tokyo’s rightful ownership. Seoul called it "an intolerable act," temporarily recalled its ambassador from Japan, canceled a
scheduled meeting between the two countries’ foreign ministers, and sent Prime Minister Han Seung-soo to the islands. South Korean citizens demonstrated. The South
even conducted military exercises nearby – to prepare for any Japanese provocation, noted Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee. North Korea, which has largely ignored the
issue (the islands are much closer to the South), added its angry voice. The US was drawn into the controversy. The US Board on Geographic Names changed its listing of
the islands from South Korean to "undesignated sovereignty." The ROK predictably protested and, faced with the threat of popular protests during President George W.
Bush’s planned visit to Seoul in early August, the White House ordered the Board to reverse itself. (A similar controversy enveloped the Library of Congress, which planned
on listing the islets as Liancourt Rocks, before backing down under pressure.) In August Seoul arranged an international press delegation to Dokdo/Takeshima to build public
support. South Korea says it may construct a marine science research station and village on the rocks next year. Hong Joon-pyo, an official in the ruling Grand National
Party, sought to rally the ROK against "the Japanese ambition for territorial aggression." Twenty-four-year-old Kim Eun-taek, a police conscript stationed on the islands,
spoke for many of his countrymen when he told the New York Times: "I feel immensely proud. Not every South Korean gets a chance to guard the easternmost territory of
our nation. Besides, I never liked the Japanese." It seems inconceivable that either nation would ever use military force to advance its claim, but both send naval patrols into
the more practical consequence of the controversy is to poison relations
the surrounding waters. Still ,

between the two countries. During abortive negotiations between the two states, one official observed: "We would be
better off if we just blow up the islands." He was right. The advantages of cooperation between Japan and
South Korea are obvious. Economic ties are strong and the two are important trading partners.
There is perhaps even greater cause to work together to promote their mutual security . North
Korea remains an unpredictable and hostile force, especially with the status of dictator "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il in question.
China’s influence is growing, and while Beijing has been assertive rather than aggressive so far, both South Korea and
Japan would be more secure if they acted in tandem on geopolitical issues . However, neither
feels much pressure to do so as long as Washington provides both security guarantees and military
garrisons. Indeed, Seoul cheerfully subsidizes North Korea, as it constructs a nuclear arsenal, while lobbying
America to maintain its troop presence – and treating Japan as a potential threat. The US should say no
more. With the end of the Cold War the case for continued American military domination of
East Asia disappeared. That policy no longer serves US security interests, since its allies are
well able to defend themselves, and to cooperate with each other in doing so. Moreover,
attempting to maintain Washington’s military hegemony along China’s border is unsustainable,
as Beijing grows wealthier and more influential. Escaping disputes like the South Korean-Japanese quarrel over
who owns 33 worthless bits of rock a world away from America would be an added benefit of disengagement. It’s time for
Tokyo and especially Seoul to behave like serious members of the international community rather than spoiled teenagers,
and provide responsible leadership in East Asia.

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The recent fishing boat incident raised tensions over disputed islands in the East China Sea—
without normalization of relations, Japan will adopt a more provocative military policy in the
East China Sea
Watanabe, September 29, 2010 – special to the Asahi Shimbun (Akio, “COMMENTARY/ No winners in Japan-
China trawler showdown,” http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201009280411.html)

China brought onto itself major negative fallout. For one thing, it lost the feelings of expectation and trust
toward China that the Japanese public was beginning to hold recently. The other negative aspect is that
China demonstrated to Asian nations and the world just how rough Chinese diplomacy really was. It would be a major mistake for
China to be happy about the situation. On the other hand, it cannot be called a victory for Japanese diplomacy, either. Releasing
the captain when both the prime minister and foreign minister were not in Japan was a sloppy handling of the matter. Although
prosecutors said they made the decision independently, that was not possible because core elements of the government must
have been involved. Throughout the entire incident, the Japanese government lacked agility .
Considering China's recent unilateral actions in the South China Sea, there was a need to
prepare for the occurrence of such an incident in Japan's territorial waters . However, did Japan
conduct hypothetical tests and prepare for such possibilities? What actually happened was a hasty decision at a crucial juncture.
In that sense, Japan's diplomacy was unprofessional. While it is unclear who the victor is, it is very evident what was lost due to
the incident. Although Japan said it would "proceed in an orderly manner" and "handle the matter calmly," that was insufficient.
What should have been the basis of its actions was a Japan-China relationship that was
disciplined and that followed the solid principle that Japan "would not allow any coercive
change in the status quo." In that sense, the loser in this incident can be said to be a "disciplined
Japan-China relationship." Seen objectively, the Senkaku Islands are under the effective control of Japan. There is no
legal or historical basis for China's argument that the islands are its territory. Trying to change that status by going against
international law, treaties and international agreements is an act that disrupts order and must be said to lie outside a "disciplined
Japan-China relationship." China, therefore, has primary responsibility for the incident. However, Japan must also bear major
responsibility. Has the Japanese government clearly made known its position to "not allow any coercive change in the status
quo?" Were the political will and the strength of that will sufficient? Moreover, did Japan prepare the "power" that would be needed
to support that will? In fact, Japan had neither a clear will nor the sufficient posture to persist with that will. The incident has
not reached a conclusion, yet. What the Japanese government has to do is clarify its political will by stating what its
position is and to lay out the principles that will be employed for the resolution of the issue. Beyond that, the issue becomes one of
diplomatic technique, and there would be various ways of proceeding. However, if Japan continues taking
convenient measures without clear principles in place, that will only hurt a disciplined Japan-
China relationship. Sufficient consideration should be given to this point. This will be an important precedent
for the nations that are feeling a threat from the heavy-handed acts of China in the South
China Sea. In that sense, Japanese diplomacy must do its best. If Japan-China relations should become
even more acrimonious, voices might arise in Japan calling for a more robust, military response.

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That causes Sino-Japan war and destabilizes the region

Malik, October 9, 2010 – Japan Foundation Fellow and author of an important volume on Pakistan-Japan
relations (Ahmad Rashid, “Sino-Japanese Balance Must Be Maintained,” October 9, PanOrient News,
http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=484)

Sino-Japanese relations revolve around acute sensitivities. A tempest in a teacup can easily
turn into a political typhoon. Both Japan and China are powerful countries. Their relationship is an ancient
relationship, but it is often held together by a very weak thread that can be broken at any time on any
issue. This creates many challenges, not only for Japan and China, but also for the many nations which maintain important
relations with both of them. A Sino-Japanese rivalry that gets out of hand would present a formidable
destabilizing element that would confuse the policies of many nearby nations. In spite of the great
need for a constructive Sino-Japanese relationship, these nations have a tendency to clash even on rather marginal issues. In
regard to the highly emotional, territorial issue presented by the Senkaku / Diaoyu Islands dispute, international law
in fact provides more questions than answers. More assertive military policies by either side could easily
trigger a large-scale conflict that would benefit no nation. Clearly, the recent confrontation over a
Chinese fishing boat captain has been a setback to efforts to deal with the islands issue
peacefully and has led to an overall deterioration in Japan-China relations.

The impact is nuclear war

Kennedy 2k—Professor of History at Yale (Daily Yomiuri, 1-10)

Kennedy: Over the past two or three decades, many Asian nations have increased their defense budgets, while European
countries have done otherwise. During this time, there have been many flash points in Asia, such North
Korea, Taiwan and Kashmir. Some Asian countries have developed nuclear weapons, as contrasted with
few Europeans who even want nuclear power stations today. We have good reason to feel worried that Asia could become a
tinderbox should there be any conflict in disputed territories like the Spratly Islands and an
autistic North Korean regime that does not bother to understand the outside world. Taiwan is
often rash to provoke Beijing, while the Kashmir conflict could grow into an India-Pakistan war.
There is great concern about how we should ensure that bitter rivalries in the Asian part of the
globe will not bring down a system that is emerging in the world now. We do not want a repeat
of 1914. I am concerned that an armed conflict might arise in South or East Asia in 2008, for example, and bring down the
credit, financial flow and capital in the region.

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The US would inevitably be drawn into a war over the East China Sea—our defense commitment
to Japan applies
Bush, October 2010 (Richard C., Director, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies @ Brookings, “China-Japan
Security Relations,” Policy Brief #177, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/10_china_japan_bush.aspx)

If such a clash occurred, it would pose a serious dilemma for the United States. The U.S.
commitment to defend Japan, enshrined in Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty, applies to “territories
under the administration of Japan.” The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are under Japan’s
administrative control, even though Washington takes no position on which state (China or Japan) has sovereignty over
them under international law. Successive U.S. administrations have reaffirmed that application,
suggesting that the United States would be legally obligated to assist Japan if the People’s
Liberation Army attacked or seized the islands . In the more ambiguous contingency of a fight over oil and gas
fields in the East China Sea, Washington would not be legally obligated to render assistance to Japan, but Tokyo would likely
pressure it to do so. In any clash over the islands or some other part of the East China Sea that could
not be immediately contained, Tokyo would thus look to Washington for help in standing up to
China’s probable reliance on coercive diplomacy. Washington seeks good relations with both China and Japan. It does not want
to get drawn into a conflict between the two, especially one that it believed was not necessary to protect the vital interests of
either. A Senkaku scenario is not, from the U.S. perspective, the issue where the American commitment to Japan is put to the
test. But Washington would understand that not responding would impose serious political costs
on its relations with Tokyo and would raise questions about U.S. credibility more broadly
among other states that depend on the United States for their security. Congressional and
public opinion would probably favor Japan or, at least, oppose China.

US-China war causes nuclear extinction

Hunkovic, 2009 – American Military University [Lee J, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict
Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, http://www.lamp-
method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a
nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be
affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great
Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that
participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant
members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then
plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well
as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of
military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale
conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it.
However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual
outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

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The Senkaku crisis will be handled, but only with increased Japan Sino relations
AP 11/14
Japan's foreign minister urged China on Sunday to reopen talks on developing natural gas
deposits off islands claimed by both countries. His Chinese counterpart, however, said
tensions must cool before things can move forward , a Japanese Foreign Ministry official said on condition of
anonymity, citing protocol. Relations between China and Japan have been strained over a collision
between a Chinese trawler and two Japanese patrol vessels near the disputed islands in the
East China Sea two months ago . China's Yang Jiechi met with Japan's Seiji Maehara on the sidelines of the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, saying the two sides must properly handle sensitive issues. He did not elaborate. In the
wake of the Sept. 7 boat collision, Beijing cut off ministerial-level contacts with Japan, repeatedly summoned Tokyo's ambassador
to complain and postponed talks on the joint development of the undersea natural gas fields. China also quietly halted exports to
Japan of rare earth metals, which are essential for making high-tech products. But on Saturday, Japan's trade minister
said he
Akihiro Ohata told reporters that his Chinese counterpart promised the "proper handling" of rare earth shipments. Ohata
was confident that the Chinese rare earth imports to Japan would be normalized. Ohata had warned
Beijing of bringing the case to the World Trade Organization, but said he was no longer considering such a step . The
disruption of rare earths shipments has served as a wake-up call to Japan and the rest of the
world. Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper agreed Sunday to step up
cooperation in areas including energy and the development of rare earths in resource-rich Canada.

And China is pursuing aggressive policy towards East China sea now—failure to resolve leads
to conflict and Chinese regional hegemony
Caryl 2010 (Chritian, Foreign Policy, Navel Grazing in Asia,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/18/naval_gazing _in_asia)

Beneath the two countries' wrangling on the high seas lies a complicated tangle of legal and political issues. There are, for example, still
unresolved territorial disputes between the two governments especially the one involving a set of islands (known as Diaoyutai to the
Chinese and as the Senkakus to Japan) located between Taiwan and the tip of Japan's southern Ryukyu Island chain (of which Okinawa
Island is part). Perhaps even more contentious, though, is the issue of natural resources. Both China and Japan
are desperate for energy to power their industries. (The jury is still out, by the way, but it looks likely that China
overtook Japan as the world's second-largest economy recently -- which presumably makes the tensions between the two a matter of
some relevance to the world at large.) Tokyo and Beijing adhere to starkly different definitions of their
respective EEZs and both fear establishing bad precedents if they give up so much as a square
inch of ocean. In short, even though many economic issues bring the two closer together, there are others that drive them apart.
There is one more layer to the maneuvering, though, and that has to do with Japan's role as America's closest and most powerful ally in
the Western Pacific. China's present leadership seems to have made a strategic decision that the Middle
Kingdom no longer has to hide its light under a bushel-- and that projecting military power is a
legitimate way of defending its expanding interests. John Tkacik, who headed China intelligence analysis at the U.S.
State Department during the Clinton administration, says, "China is now asserting that it, not Japan, is the
preeminent Asian power and that both the Chinese people and the masses of Asia must acknowledge China's new
preeminence." He notes that many of the recent Chinese maneuverings have taken place in waters near those
islands that are claimed by both China and Japan. The Chinese, he says, are testing to see how far the
Americans are really prepared to stand up for Japan's side of the argument. "China is probing the
U.S.-Japan alliance for fissures."

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That causes Asian war to go nuclear and global – uniquely most likely scenario for war
Sheridan 9 (Greg, Foreign editor - The Australian, "Hatoyama poised for global struggle," The Australian, 9-5-09,
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,26027029-7583,00.html0

Kurt Campbell, now the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, co-authored a study on the US's
Asia policy last year. He wrote: "Asia is not a theatre at peace. It is a cauldron of religious and ethnic tension;
a source of terror and remism; an accelerating driver of the insatiable global appetite for energy; the place where the most people will
suffer the adverse effects of global climate change; the primary source of nuclear proliferation and the most likely theatre
on earth for a major conventional confrontation and even a nuclear conflict." This is not just rhetoric. For the first time,
there are more warships in the US Pacific fleet than in its Atlantic fleet. And a rarely acknowledged truth is that Japan is Washington's most
important ally anywhere on the globe. Who else would be a candidate? Britain sends more troops to Iraq and
Afghanistan, but they are not decisive and the US has a full suite of European allies. Australia is important, but we are a nation of only
22 million people. Japan and the US military bases it hosts are central to the US position in Asia. Japan, a
nation of 125 million people, is still the world's second-largest economy, far bigger than any of the Europeans. The Obama administration seems
to get this.

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