LINCOLN L. YAO, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE NORMA C.

PERELLO

Facts: Before us is a petition for certiorari filed by Lincoln L. Yao, assailing the resolution dated March 22,
2002 and Order dated May 10, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274,[1which
respectively granted private respondent Bernadine D. Villarins petition for prohibition and denied
petitioners motion for intervention.

The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain corporation, PR Builders, Inc. and its managers, Enrico
Baluyot and Pablito Villarin, private respondents husband.

On September 17, 1999, the HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell between
petitioner and PR Builders, and ordering PR Builders to refund petitioner the amount of P2,116,103.31, as
well as to pay damages in the amount of P250,000.

Thereafter, the HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR Builders and its managers, and referred the
writ to the office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for enforcement.

Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna,
registered in the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The
property was scheduled for public auction on March 20, 2002.

On March 19, 2002, private respondent filed before the RTC of Paraniaque City, a petition for prohibition
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff
Melvin T. Bagabaldo from proceeding with the public auction. Private respondent alleged that she co-
owned the property subject of the execution sale; that the property regime between private respondent
and her husband was complete separation of property, and that she was not a party in the HLURB case,
hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the separate liability of her husband.

On even date, public respondent Judge Norma C. Perrello issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order
and set the case for raffle and conference on March 22, 2002.

The case was eventually raffled to RTC, Branch 276, presided by public respondent judge. A conference
was then conducted, after which public respondent judge issued the assailed resolution of March 22,
2002 granting private respondents petition for prohibition and declaring the subject property exempt from
execution. Hence, the scheduled auction sale did not materialize.

On April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public respondent judge issued the resolution of March 22,
2002, petitioner filed a motion for intervention. However, public respondent judge denied the motion in her
assailed order of May 10, 2002:

Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that the party who is interested in
sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. Thus,
as the judgment creditor in the HLURB case, petitioner claims that he was an indispensable party in the
petition for prohibition and should have been allowed to intervene in the said case. He was not allowed to
do so.

Issue: Whether or not the court gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petitioners motion for
intervention.

Held: Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
1
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (2a)

Consequently, petitioners claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the said
provision requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other
hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more
important than the second.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment creditor was adversely affected by
the lifting of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that there are other pieces of property
exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case that can be levied upon.

Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right to intervene, he
must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the period prescribed therefor.

As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court.[6 Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set
forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private respondents petition for prohibition and lifting the
levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002, after the lapse of 15 days,
the said resolution had already become final and executory.

Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the trial courts resolution is
sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to
correct its errors, if any.

Finally, grave abuse of discretion is committed when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. The Court fails to find grave abuse of discretion
committed by public respondent judge in rendering the assailed resolution and order.

AVELINO PULIDO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts: On May 30, 1980, the President of the Philippines, in Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1033, directed
the establishment of the Cavite Export Processing Zone at the site "opposite the Filoil Refinery," "the
specific location of which shall be submitted to (him) for prior approval". Thereafter, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1980, reserving for the Cavite Export Processing Zone certain parcels of land of the
private domain, situated in the municipalities of Rosario and Gen. Trias, with an aggregate area of
220.8898 hectares. 1 On September 19, 1980, the President, by Proclamation No. 2017, enlarged the
reservation to cover an additional 55 hectares, making the total area of 275,8898 hectares.

The reservation consists of 94 lots, 2 of which belong to the Government, and 49 to the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC, for short), a corporation owned by the Government. The rest are owned by
private landholders.

2
Immediately following the issuance of the proclamations, the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA for
short), took steps to implement the project and enlisted the aid of the Cavite Provincial officials who then
advised the farmers cultivating the lands inside the reservation not to plant new crops anymore in view of
the imminent EPZA take-over. The EPZA offered to pay the amount of P0. 50 per square meter, or
P5,000.00 per hectare to those farmers cultivating private lands, and P.30 per square meter or P3,000.00
per hectare to the farmers who are cultivating the PNOC's landholdings at its sufferance. 3 Some of those
concerned abided with the request and executed affidavits of surrender, relinquishing possession and
tillage of their lots in favor of the respondent EPZA, while some refused to give up their landholdings.
Those who refused, appealed to the President and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for assistance to
preserve and protect whatever existing rights they might have acquired over the lands they are cultivating,
under the agrarian land reform laws and decrees.

The Ministry of Agrarian Reform, however, fatted to act on their appeal, so that on February 27, 1981, the
farmers, seventy-six (76) in number, and the Samahan Ng Magsasaka at Mamumuwisan sa Cavite, of
which they are members, filed a complaint against Cornelio T. Rivera, the officer-in-charge of the Cavite
Export Processing Zone, and the J.H. Pajara Construction Corporation, the construction company hired
by the EPZA to build the roads and drainage systems in Phase I of the project, before the Court of
Agrarian Relations at Cavite, docketed therein as CAR Case No. 1097 '81, for Injunction with an urgent
petition for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, praying that the defendants or their
representatives be restrained "from entering in, and starting any works, such as planting concrete
monuments, ports, landmarks, surveying, bulldozing, grading excavation or removal of existing rice
paddies, and demolition of irrigation canals and distributory canals and any kind of initial construction of
roads, bridges, industrial or commercial buildings on, or inside the subject 275 hectares riceland, and
from otherwise molesting, harassing and preventing plaintiffs and their co-tenant farmers-tillers and their
farm helpers thereon from planting, tilling and cultivating and harvesting their regular palay crops thereon
during each cropping seasons, twice a year." 5

On March 19, 1981, the Court of Agrarian Relations issued an order restraining the defendants from
"performing any act that will tend to interfere in any way with the status quo. " 6

Then, after further hearings, or on March 30, 1981, the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and lifted the restraining order it previously issued, since "the lots in
controversy were no longer agricultural when the complaint was filed with (the) Court on February 27,
1981 — as the same were converted into industrial lots on September 19, 1980 by operation of law." 7

The farmers appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-12311, and on May
14, 1981, the said appellate court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants-
appellees and/or their representatives from entering the portions within the 275 hectares of riceland
subject of the litigation and from destroying dikes and any other improvements therein and from otherwise
preventing them from conducting preparations, plantings and cultivation of their crops in their respective
landholdings. 8 However, on July 17, 1981, the respondent Court of Appeals lifted the said restraining
order upon the posting by the defendants-appellees of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00.

Hence, the present recourse, to annul and set aside the appellate court's resolution of July 17, 1981. As
prayed for, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on August 13, 1981. 9

On February 16, 1982, February 25, 1982, and March 2, 1982, however, the Court granted the motions of
Bienvenido Gonzales, et al to withdraw their petition for the reason that they were no longer interested in
prosecuting their case since their respective claims had already been satisfied.

Then, upon motion of the parties, the Court also lifted the temporary restraining order it issued on August
13, 1981, except as to the landholding of the petitioner Avelino Pulido who did not file any motion to
withdraw and instead, manifested and prayed that his landholding should not be bulldozed and/or that
said petitioner and/or his parents should not be dispossessed, ejected, ousted, evicted or removed
therefrom, or likewise prohibited or molested in his possession and cultivation of palay and other
agricultural crops thereon, without prejudice to, or until and unless the legal issues raised by the adverse

3
parties in this case or the case between the petitioner Pulido and the respondent EPZA shall have been
finally settled, either amicably or judicially."

But, subsequently thereafter, Desales Loren wrote the Court asking that the order lifting the temporary
restraining order be recalled and/or that another temporary restraining order be issued for the reasons
that he and their counsel gave their conformity to the joint motion to lift the restraining order without
asking the other petitioners whether or not they were paid the compensation due them; that the
petitioners signed the said motions to withdraw the petition without the assistance of counsel or an
employee of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and without understanding the effects of their act; and that
the signatures of the other petitioners in the motion to withdraw were forged. 12

It appears, however, that the execution of the joint motion to lift the temporary restraining order was freely
and voluntarily executed by counsel for the petitioners, so that there is no compelling reason to recall the
order lifting the temporary restraining order. Ordered to comment on the letter of Desales Loren, Atty.
Enrique C. Villanueva, counsel for the petitioners, described the circumstances surrounding the filing of
the said joint motion to lift the restraining order. He stated, among others, that he "agreed to sign the
same provided that co-petitioner, Mr. Desales Loren for himself and as tenant-leader, President
of Samahan Ng Magsasaka at Namumuwisan sa Cavite, signs it first, and provided furthermore, that
respondent Governor Juanito Remulla and Atty. Jose Ricafrente for themselves and for the principal
respondent EPZA, sign the afore-mentioned NAPAGKAISAHANG KASUNDUAN' and provided further-
more, that said respondents guarantee, assure and agree in writing that the tenancy right of co-petitioner
Avelino Pulido over his subject landholding shall not be disturbed or touched unless his right thereto is
settled satisfactorily between the respondent EPZA and the Pulido family and/or until the legal issues
raised in this case are decided by this Honorable Court. That, after these conditions were met and
complied with, the undersigned affixed his signature on said prepared JOINT MOTION TO LIFT
RESTRAINING ORDER." 13

A client is bound by the action of his counsel on the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain
that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. 14

With the withdrawal of the other petitioners, only the petition of Avelino Pulido remains to be settled.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in lifting the
restraining order it previously issued pending the appeal of the herein petitioner from the order of the
Court of Agrarian Relations.

Held: Petitioner Pulido claims that the lifting by the respondent Court of Appeals of its restraining order of
May 14, 1981 would virtually allow respondents Cornelio T. Rivera, et al., to violate with impunity the
existing status quo order of the President and of the security of tenure of tenant-farmers and actual tillers
on rice and corn lands pending the promulgation of rules and regulations to implement P.D. 27; that
Proclamation Nos.1980 and 2017 upon which respondent Export Processing Zone Authority rely upon in
support of its intended conversion into industrial and commercial purposes of the subject 276.8898
hectares flat irrigated ricelands have already been superseded by a later Presidential fiat prohibiting
conversion of agricultural flat land into industrial purposes; and that to allow, respondent Export
Processing Zone Authority and other respondents to convert the said subject riceland into industrial land
pending the final determination of the aforementioned case before the Court of Appeals would not only
inflict serious and irreparable damages and injuries to petitioners but deprive them of their constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection of laws guaranteed under the new Constitution.

It would appear, however, that subsequent to the flung of this petition, a complaint for the expropriation of
the property occupied by the petitioner Avelino Pulido had been filed with the Court of First Instance of
Cavite, docketed therein as Civil Case No. N-079, and the amount of P117,027.00, equivalent to 10% of
the just compensation for the property had already been deposited with the Cavite Branch of the
Philippine National Bank for the account of the landowners." 16 It further appears that the court having
jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings had already issued an order for the issuance of a writ of on
over the property occupied by Avelino Pulido, 17 so that the issue of whether or not the respondent Court
of Appeals had abused its discretion in lifting the restraining order it issued is moot and academic.

4
Besides, the wisdom of converting their ricelands into an industrial site is within the proper exercise of
Presidential prerogatives and the Court may not inquire into it. The necessity and expediency of
exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their
character.

At any rate, since an application to condemn or appropriate had already been made directly to the court,
the question of necessity of such condemnation should be raised before, and decided by. the court having
jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings.

It is unfortunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his
family should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater majority of the inhabitants of
the country.

Republic vs Dela Rosa G.R. No. 104654

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440
and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision
dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which
re-admitted private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as
amended by C.A. No. 473); and (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on
February 27, 1992.

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of
Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63"
(Rollo, pp. 17-23).

In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and
directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation, for three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before
the said date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a
conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).

On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he
manifested his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for
filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the
hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp. 27-28).

The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992, wherein the hearing of the petition was
moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.

On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent as the sole witness. He submitted the
following documentary evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7, 1991 issued by
the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2) Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a
Citation issued by the National Press Club with private respondent’s picture (Exhs. "C" and "C-2"); (5)
Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College, Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a
Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification issued by the
Records Management and Archives Office that the record of birth of private respondent was not on file
(Exh. "G"); and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States District Court (Exh. "H").

Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted

as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him,
all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino citizen (Rollo, p. 33).

5
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before respondent Judge
(Rollo, p. 34).

On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was
filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and
prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law.

After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal
directly with the Supreme Court.