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MOMENTARINESS, BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF

possessed by the blind are identical to those discrete momentary entities. Its fundamental proposi-
possessed by the sighted.) tion is that everything passes out of existence as soon as
• Leibniz, G. W. (1765) New Essays on Human Under- it has originated and in this sense is momentary. As.an
standing, trans. and ed: P. Remnant and 1. Bennett, entity vanishes. it gives rise to a new entity of almost the
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. (A same nature which originates immediately afterwards.
commentary on Locke's Essay, unpublished in Thus, there is an uninterrupted flow of causally
Leibniz's lifetime, which contains an excellent connected momentary entities of nearly the same
treatment of the Molyneux problem on pages nature. the so-called continuum (santana). These
136-·8). entities succeed each other so fast that the process
• Locke, 1. (1688) 'Essai philosophique concernant cannot be discerned by ordinary perception. Because
l'Entendement ou l'on montre quelle est l'etendue earlier and later entities within one continuum are
des connaissances certaines, et la maniere dont almost exactly alike. we come to conceive, of something
no us y parvenons', Bibliotheque Universelle et as a temporally extended entity even though the fact
Historique, January-March: 49-142, Amsterdam, that 'it is in truth nothing but a series of causally
ed. 1. Le Clerc. (Locke's first major publication in connected momentary entities. According to this doc-
the journal of his Swiss friend Jean Le Clerc, whom trine. the world (including the sentient beings inhabiting
he met in The Netherlands. It is a substantial it) is at every moment distinct from the world in the
'. abridgement of his as yet unpublished Essay previous or next' moment. It is, however, linked to the
concerning Human Understanding and often re- past ,and future by the law of.causalit)J in so far as a
. ferred to witli the term Abiege, because it was later phenomenon usually engenders a phenomenon of its
republished separately and translated into English kind when it perishes, so that the world originating in
in 1692 as an extract of a book entitled A the next moment reflects the world in the preceding
Philosophical Essay upon Human Understanding.) moment.
• - - (1689) Essay concerning Human Understanding, At the root of Buddhism lies the (never questioned)
ed. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985. conviction that everything that has originated is bound
(Locke's magnum opus, breathtaking in its scope to perish and is therefore, with the exception offactors
and depth, still worth consulting on every topic it conducive to enlightenment, ultimately a source of
discusses. The second edition appeared in 1694.) frustration. There is no surviving textual material that
Molyneux, W. (1688) Letter to Locke of 7 July 1688, documents how this law of impe.rmanence came to be
in E.S. de Beer (ed.) The Correspondence of John radicalized in terms of momentariness. It seems that by
Locke,'Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, vol. 3, 482, the fourth century the doctrine of momentariness had
letter no. 1064. already assumed its flnal form. Characteristically, the
• - - (1692) Dioptrica Nova, London: Benjamin debate became more and more dominated by epistemo-
Tooke. (A treatise in the tradition of similar works logical questions, while the metaphysical aspect faded
by Kepler and Descartes, which is mainly devoted' into the background
to the physical aspects of optics, containing also
several remarks on the psychology of vision.) I Exposition
, Synge, E. (1695) The Correspondence of John Locke, 2 Relevance
vol. 5, ed. E.S. de Beer, Oxford: Oxford University 3 Development
Press, 1974. (Letter 1984 (pages 494-6) from 4 Doctrinal background
Molyneux to Locke, quotes in full the interesting 5 Proofs
letter by Synge -later Archbishop ofTuam - which
anticipates several later objections to Locke's reply.) Exposition
MENNO LlEVERS The doctrine of momentariness entails that entities
are too shortlived to undergo change. Thus, if an
entity has always engendered a new entity of exactly
the same kind and with exactly the same properties,
MOMENTARINESS, the worlds arising at every moment anew would be
identical, so that there could be no evolution. ThiS,
BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF however, is not the case because the process of
The object of the Buddhist dOctrine ofmomenlariness is reproduction of a ,given entity may be manipulated
not the nature of time. but existence within time. Rather by outside factors in such a way that the newly creat~d
thall atol'niziJlg tilne into nlOmenls, it atomizes phenom- entity differs qualitatively from the preceding entity, If
ena temporally by dissecting them into II succession of exposed to fire, for instance, it wood entity does not
469
MOMENTARINESS, BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF

give rise to an identical wood entity when it perishes, projected picture only consists of differently shaded
but to a wood entity which bears the mark of points, which by their specific arrangement give rise
impairment by lire and so is slightly charred. to the perception of composite shapes, so the world
(According to later parlance, the wood as the main around us consists of nothing but distinct atoms
cause forms, together with the fire as a subsidiary which are arranged in such a way that they convey the
cause, a causal complex which produces the slightly impression of compact bodies.
charred wood entity.) Thus, change is not constituted
by the transmutation of persisting entities, but by the
2 Relevance
qualitative difference between earlier and later entities
within a series. The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness does not
Not only the transformation of series but also their challenge our experiences of macroscopic events as
cessation (that is, what is ordinarily conceived of as such, but only our interpretation of: these events on a
the utter annihilation of temporally extended objects), microscopic level. The claim that macroscopic objects
is caused _by an external agent, which affects the are constituted by a succession of distinct momentary
process of reproduction of the object exposed to it in units only affects the intuitive conception of these
such a way that this process comes to a complete objects as self-identical units (think of the notion of
standstill. Hence, in the case of mu(der, the victim dies an uninterrupted line in contrast to one made up of
because the murderer affects the fmal moment of the distinct but contiguous points), but it does not affect
--- breath· of life (prara), that IS, the vital principle the question of how these macroscopic objects behave,
accounting for the body's animation, in such a way / whatever. their analysis on a microscopic level.
that it fails to reproduce itself. Since the final moment The doctrine of momentariness was not viewed as a
(like ail preceding ones) passes out of existence purely metaphysicaf theory without practical . rele-
automatically, murder is, microscopically speaking, vance. On the contrary, the contemplation of· the
not destruction but the interception of the process of constant rise and fall of phenomena was employed to
reproduction. In this way the teaching that all entities induce a particularly poignant experience of their
pass out of existence spontaneously without aepend- - impermanence, thus revealing the unsatisfactory
ing for this upon any external cause is recOnciled with nature of all existence. Moreover, in a Mahayana
the observation on a macroscopic level that wood is context this contemplation served as a tool for
burut byfrre, or that one dies when knifed by a undermining (but not negating) the substantial
murderer. . existence of phenomena. However, since only ad-
Independently of the doctrine of momentariness, vanced yogins seem to have been able to pet,ceive
the Buddhists, like many other Indian schools, also momentariness directly, the soteriological significance
dissected everything spatially into atoms (see MAT- of this doctrine remains very limited. This e'Xplains
TER, INDIAN CONCEPTIONS OF). Thus, in the final why it only played a marginal role in the wider context
analysis, the world is made up of momentary atoms; of Buddhist spirituality.
. which by their spatial arrangement and by their'
concatenation with earlier and later atoms of the
3 Development
same kind, give rise to the illusion of persisting
compact things. This analysis of existence can be The doctrine of momentariness is postcanonic and
illustrated by referring, anachronistically, to cinema- may have originated in the first century. It is for the
tography. Just as the rapid projection of distinct first time presupposed in the Vibhti,a (both in the
pictures evokes the illusion of continuous action on Chinese translation by Xuanzang (Hsiian-tsang) and
the screen, so the fast succession of distinct momen- by Buddhavarman) of the Sarvastivadins, one of the
tary entities gives rise to the erroneous impression major Hlnayana schools of Buddhism. In t~is
that the world around us (and we ourselves) exist scholastic compendium, the better part of WhICh
continuously without undergoing destruction and was probably compiled in the second century, the-
being recreated every moment. Similarly, as the momentariness of all phenomena is not treated as a
change of events on the screen is caused by the topic in its own right, but is frequently taken for
qualitative difference between earlier and later pic- granted when dealing with other issues.
tures on the IiIm reel, so the change in the world is Doxographical reports and other evidence confirm
brought about by the qualitative difference between the impression that it was in the milieu of. the
earlier and later entities. Moreover, as people vanish Sarvastivadins that all phenomena, more preCIsely
from the screen because they are not featured in the all conditioned entities (saI!lskrta, salJ1skiira), c~me to
subsequent frame, so things cease to exist because be looked upon as momentary_ (The Sarvastlvadim
they stop reproducing themselves_ Finally, just as each treated space and two forms of suppression of certalll

470
MOMENTARINESS, BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF

, factors as unconditioned entities (asGf!lskrta) which implies numeric difference, that' is, the substitution of
have never been created and, hence, are not subject to one entity for another. When Buddhists applied this
the law of impermanence, hence the specification at understanding of change to their analysis of ageing
this point that momentariness only applies to condi- they were bold enough toconcIude that the ageing
tioned entities and not to all phenomena.) Although body must at every moment vanish to be replaced by
the Sarvastivadins reduced the duration of all a new, slightly modified body. As all things were
phenomena to a moment, they still conceived of their conceived of as constantly changing, momentariness
existence much in the same way as they had done had to be attributed in this way not only to bodily
before the introduction oCthe doctrine, insisting that matter but also to all other things. The conviction that
even within one moment they first originate, then everything ·is always changing (in as much as it is
persist and decay and finally perish. This treatment alway~ subject to ageing) had resulted from the
violated the common conception of the moment contemplation of the law of impermanence.
(k~al)a) as the shortest conceivable unit of time and The discovery of the doctrine of momentariness in
consequently was rejected by the Dar~tantikas and this way was possible because at a much earlier stage
Sautrantikas, who are closely related to the Sarvas- the momentariness of all mental entities had already
, tivadins and may have evolved from them. These two been established in an apparently analogous way. This
schools argued that contradictory events cannot take way was the denial of a permanent Self, a cardinal
place within one moment. From this they concluded tenet of scholastic Buddhism which led to the
as
that all things perish soon as they have originated. conception of the mind as a flow of mental events
Since destruction was conceived of as the sponta- conceived of as entities ·in. their own right (see
neous cessation of existence and not as a time- BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF EMPTINEss):.Their momen-
consuming process, the existence of entities was / tariness was probably 'deduced from the speed with
reduced to mere acts of. origination, flashes into which mental events normally follow each' other. The
existence. ' """ . , ' : . ' . •. establishment of the doctrine of momentariness may
With this radicalization of the instantaneous have benefited from the testimony ofyogins who are
natli're of.existen~ thedoctrlne of momentariness reported to have access to the. direct experienCe of the
assumed its firialform:Such a form was adopted by incessant rise and fall of phenomena" at every
the Yogacaras, one of the tWo main Indian schools of moment.
Mahayana Buddhism, and came to be known by
other Buddhists and non-Buddhists. .The Yogacaras
5 Proofs
with a Mahayana orientation, however, only aCJ<epted
the doctrine of momentariness as valid on the level of Such a doctrine, fundamentally at odds with the
relative truth. In so far as the doctrine affirms the appearance of the world, met great opposition.
existence .of discrete entities (although they are Initially, it was rejected by large sections of the
.:-; . reduced to mere point instants), it is characteristic Buddhist community, notably the VatsIputrIyas and
of the realism of H'inayana Buddhism and at odds related schools. Later, when it had gained ground
with their Mahayana stance that all phenomenal among Buddhists, it was fervently opposed by the
entities are ultimately, on the level of highest truth,. Brahmanical schools as it contradicted thejr postula-
unreal (see BUDDHISM, YOGAcARA SCHOOL OF). tion of eternal entities of one sort or another (souls,
atoms, primary matter, a supreme deity). This
rejection made it necessary to defend the doctrine
4 Doctrinal background
by argumentation.
The surviving sources do not record how the doctrine The oldest transmitted proofs of momentariness
of momentariness originated. Hence the reconstruc- are recorded in early Yogacara sources. They are still
tion of this process has to be hypotheticaL The anti- primarily directed against other Buddhists and derive
substantialist tendency characteristic of Buddhism the momentariness of all phenomena in three
negates that entities have a substantial core beyond different ways. First, it is presupposed that the mind
the sum of their properties and thus equates the is momentary - this stance is also shared by Buddhist
properties with the entities themselves. Hence, phe- opponents who do not accept the momentariness of
nomena in Buddhism are called dharmas, a term with matter - and on this basis it is concluded that matter,
a wide range of meanings which is used in this context too, has to be momentary. This conclusion is based on
because it may stand for 'property' and 'quality'. the demonstration that mind and matter can only
Since change was viewed as the replacement of one depend upon .each other and interact as they do
quality for another, the identification of property and because they have -the same duration. Second, by
entity led to the position that any qualitative change referring to ageing and similar processes it is proved

471
,
....
MOMENTARINESS, BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF

that everything changes all the time and thus under- never superseded it completely. Its prominence can be
goes origination and destruction at every moment. explained partly by the logical peculiarity Of this
This argument rests on the presupposition that any proof which gave rise to an epistemological debate
form of transformation implies the substitution of one about the correct form of a valid syllogism. Since
entity for another. This proof from change reflects the momentariness is to be proved for everything, all
presumable doctrinal background underlying the entities are the subject of inference (pak.a). Thus, the
formation of the doctrine of momentariness. Third, inference from existence fails to fulfil two of the three
it is argued that everything has to perish as soon as it classical conditions (/rairiipya) for a valid syllogism,
has originated because, otherwise it would persist namely a positive and negative exemplification of the
eternally. This would be at odds with the law of logical nexus (vyiipll) between the reason (to be
impermanence. The argument rests on the presuppo- existent) and the argued property (to be momentary)
sition that destruction cannot be brought about from outside the subject (see INFERBNCE, INDIAN THE-
without and that it is impossible for an entity to ORIES OF).
perish on its own account after it has persisted as this Among other responses, this problem led to the
would require a change of nature. The latter modification of the conditions of a syllogism in suSh a
presupposition reflects the view that self-identical way that those vyiip/is also became accepted as valid
entities cannot change. where the logical relation between reason and argued
VASUBANDHU (fourth-fifth century) marks the property is not induced from. other cases.. This
gradual transition between the earlier phase when . solution was already developed by Dharmakirti
the debate was still confined to Buddhism and the himself, however, it was ne/pected until the time ?f
Jater phase when it was carried out between Buddhists Ratnakarasanti (eTeventh century). He argued that In
and non-Buddhists. Vasubandhu. only adopted the those syllogisms where the proving property is
third type of proof, deducing momentariness from the intrinsic to the subject (svabhiivahe/u), the logical
spontaneity of destruction. He developed this idea nexus is to be established by demonstrating that the
further with the argument that destruction cannot be proving property cannot inhere in a: locus that is
caused since, as mere nonexistence, it does not qualify lacking the argued property.
as an effect. Up to the time of DHARMAKIRTI Frequently, ,as a corollary of these proofs' of
(c.600-60) andto a lesser extent thereafter, this proof momentariness, the Brahmanical. arguments against
of momentariness, the so-called inference from this doctrine are refuted. The most prominent
I perishability (vini'iSitviinumiina), dominated the con- argument - that the recognition of phenomena
troversy. disproves their contended momentariness - is invali-
With Dharmakirti, the doctrine entered a new dated by the contention that recognition is a mixture
phase. He developed a new type of proof, the so- of perception and memory and does not therefore
,. called inference from existence (sattviinumiina), that qualify as a valid means of knowledge (pramiilJa). The
derives the momentariness of all entities (without related argument, that the mind cannot be a mere
presupposing their impermanence) directly from the stream of momentary mental entities because memory
fact that they exist. On the basis of the premise that and the discernment of causal relationships presup-
existence entails causal efficiency, Dharmakirti de- pose an enduring subject, is rejected. It is so on the
monstrates that all existing things have to be grounds that the knowledge of the past is, py the
momentary as it is impossible for nonmomentary principle of causal concatenation, passed on from one
entities to function as efficient causes. This impossi- mental entity to the next. Thus, it is transmitted down
bility derives from the idea that, if the entities already to the present moment in a way which we may
produce their effect in the first moment, they also compare to the transmission of historic data from
have to produce it again and again at all subsequent generation to generation.
moments of their existence (a situation which is clearly absurd), because Over the centuries the debate on the doctrine of
their nature then does not differ from their nature in the first moment momentariness developed to such an extent that
(lest they be different entities). Nor is it possible for the entities to dischar¥~
their causal efficiency gradually, because if they were not able to } Ratnaklrti (eleventh century) felt the need to deal with
produce their effect completely from the beginning, the inference from perishability, the inference fr?m
neither should they be able to do so later as this would existence and the refutation of the proof of duratIOn
entail a change of nature. This argument is also based each in a separate treatise.
on the premise that one and the same entity cannot See also: BUDlliiISM, ABHIDHARMIKA SCHOOLS OF;
change its properties. BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY, INDIAN; MUJO;
The inference from existence became more promi- POTENTIALITY, INDIAN THEORIES OF
nent than the inference from perishability, although it

472

* Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to proofread the final


draft. Hence my correction here of a mistake which must have occurred
in the editorial process. (AvR)

tiMh , un e 4M& e
c

MONBODDO, LORD (JAMES BURNETT)

References and further reading close physical resemblance between species is evidence
of biological relation.
The pertinent textual material has to be accessed in
the following studies where it is presen ted in reliable
By training as a jurist and through his writings as a
translations (in English, French, or Gennan) which
can also be consulted by readers without Indological linguist and anthropologist, Monboddo was one of
the most learned figures in eighteenth-century
training. Scotland. Appointed a law lord or judge on the
Mimaki, K. (1976) La Refutation bouddhique de la Scottish Court of Session' in 1767 (from which his title
Permanence des Choses (sthirasiddhidii_alJa) et la derives), he drew lifelong inspiration from the
Preuve de la Momentaneile des choses classicism of Thomas Blackwell, whose writings on
(k~alJa/jgasiddhi) (The Buddhist Refutation of the Homer and Augustus had helped to convince him of
Permanence of Things and the Proof of the the decline of modern man and the decadence of
Momentariness of Things), Paris: Publications de modern fonns of speech by contrast with the heroism
I'institut de civilisation indienne, fasc. 41. (Deals of the ancient Greeks and Romans and the poetic
with later proofs of the doctrine of momentariness.) resonance of their languages. More hostile to the
Oetke, C. (1993) 'Bemerkungen rur buddhistischen empiricist tendencies of contemporary British philo-· .
Doktrin der Momentanheit des Seienden. Dhanna- sophy than any other predominantly secular writer of '
kIrtis Sattvanumana' (Remarks on the Buddhist the Scottish Enlightenment, he sought to rescue the
Doctrine of Momentariness. Dhannakirti's Sattva- glorious achievements of ancient science, ethics and
numana (Inference from Existence», Wiener 8tu- rhetoric in refonnulating an essentially Aristotelian
dien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 29, interpretation of the human faculties, published in six
Vienna: Arbeitskreis rur. Tibetsich und Buddhis- vOlumes from 1779 to 1799, entitled Antient Metha-
tische Studien Universitat Wien. (Employs con- physics (see ENLIGHTENMENT, SCOT,TISH);'
temporary analytical logic for the analysis of the A similar enthusiasm for c1assicisJj}'overIiiodernity ,
Satt~l!numana.) is manifest in Monboddo's more iriflueiiIialwork of
Rospatt, A. von (1995) 'The Buddhist Doctrine of roughly the same peri()d, OJ the Origin diz4 Progress
Momentariness: A Survey of the Origins and Early of Language, also published in~ix;'\r91}lllies between
Phase of this Doctrine up to Vasubandhu', Alt- und 1773 and 1792. In, addition toconinienting on the
Neu-indische Studien 47, Stuttgart: Steiner. (Deals splendours of ancieritLatin" andtJreek," this text
with the early phase of the doctrine of momentari- discusses the nomenclature ofavariety of exotic
ness and analyses it doctrinal background on the languages, hicludirigFIuron,Qarib;;Eskimo and
basis of earlier proofs of momentariness; presents Tahitian, which Monboddo ,had/learned "through
the most complete collection of primary sources (all dictionaries and travellers' repoits?Hi~ attempt to
translated into English) available on the subject trace the natural history oflanguagesasal1 expression
mailer.) of both the universal ,capacities of the human mind
Steinkellner, E. (1968/9) 'Die Entwicklung des and the specific genealogies of diverse cultures drew
K~al}ikatvanumana bei Dhannakirti' (The Devel- Monboddo in the direction of the nascent sciences of'
opment of the K~al}ikatvanumiina (proof bf Mo- etymology and historical linguistics' along Ilnes
mentariness) by Dhannakirti), Wiener Zeitschriji developed by Sir William Jones (1746-89), with
fur die Kunde Siidasiens 12-13: 361-77. (Traces the whom he corresponded. But he was even more drawn
development of the Sattvanumana by Dhannakirti.) to the anthropological linguistics sketched in the
Discours sur !'inegalite (Discourse on the Origin of
ALEXANDER VON ROSPA TT Inequality) (1755) of Jean-Jacques ROUSSEAU, from
". which Monboddo adopted and developed two main
propositions: first, that language must be cultivated
and mastered in society and hence is not natural to
MONBODDQ, LORD (JAMES man; and, second, that the 'orang-utan' (in the
Enlightenment a generic term for all the great apes)
BURNETT) (1714-99) is human, since the inarticulacy of this creature so
In speculating that orang-utans' vocal organs must have similar to a human being is attributable to its not yet
been designed for speech, M onboddo was convinced that having had the opportunity to enter society and
, these creatures were primitive humans who had not yet thereinto exercise its larynx, pharynx and other
emer:d ,SOciety, His chief contribution to the history of organs of speech. Monboddo imagined that analo- /
!t~!fUISIlCS and alllhropo!ogy lurns upon two propo- , gous physical traits characteristically signify hO,~O:,/
S/llOns: that language is not nalllra! 10 man, and Ihat logous functIOns, so that unless Nature had been so ,'
, .

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