Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon
City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General
Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors
— several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court —
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their
agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the
documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event,
the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated
June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2)
major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of
a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the
personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a
seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor
could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the
evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the
corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis
supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of
June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the
search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer
to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating
a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would
happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it
fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied
with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets
and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights
— that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of
general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as
the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search
warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to
an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far
as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to
bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established
by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing
previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state
intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be
"a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without
that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with
the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the
Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by
avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks
and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches — state or federal — it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of
the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short,
the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege,
namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that
the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which
the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less
than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of
the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable
searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably —
finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the
possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality
had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that
Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room
No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein
petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records,
papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners
and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest
rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records,
papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein,
but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would
appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be
reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory
now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of
the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should
we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open
for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the
search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the
searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the
documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the
twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the
Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore
proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches and
seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for
the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the
opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other
places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in
the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with
which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places
other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view
even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral developments of
this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and
future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants
and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore
unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder.
Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures
were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of
it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the
requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places
other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts
have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which
are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects
gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched gives "standing";
and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily"
directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners
personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises"
declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners
and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2,
1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by
or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing
as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d.
650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was president), United States
vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F.
2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United
States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional
provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area,
be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What
the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally
protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to
know it will be secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not
tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the
surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years have
involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately
invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S.
vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move
for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary
and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except
to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen
Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices
within the corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets
in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned
the controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized
therefrom.

In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched premises
necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then
prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily
and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which
they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers'
Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as
those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning
procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in order to have
standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several
corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs.
Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president successfully moved for the return
and suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the corporation's was entitled to protection
against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and
unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be granted.
(Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the articles seize had the necessary
standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice
Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he
is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in
United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S.
Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless
declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."

Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant
organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the
return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property seized,
and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully
searched the corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to Jones, the court
observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It
tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the
corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a
substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized
two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted
that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed
at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that
the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the
subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to enable the
question of unreasonable search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked
possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person gives "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The
defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the
seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm
which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be private,
personal and business papers together with corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not
even claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held
invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had
"standing" to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs.
Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed
out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only
person suggested in the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having
been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell M.
Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even before
Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any
interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432
U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision. The
factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate
papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED
SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the
illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed
against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the
extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private
papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other
place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court
indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers
and effects belonging to the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and
seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized,
be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as
shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers
belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers,
documents and things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the lower courts
which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the
suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically
mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great
clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from
cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937

NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents.

Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Adolfo N. Feliciano for respondents Anti-Usury Board.
No appearance for other respondent.

IMPERIAL, J.:

The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his
house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain accounting books, documents and papers belonging to him in his
residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury
Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to
Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to
reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his
oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of
his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the
information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant
which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure
of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the
law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at seven o'clock on the
night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to
1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two memorandums, three
bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one
bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book belonging
to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents and loan contracts with security and
promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. The
search for and a seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who stated his protest below the
inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought
immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney, filed a motion on June 8, 1936,
praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office
of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court. On said date
the court issued an order directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within twenty-four hours from the receipt of
notice thereof and giving him a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt
of court. On June 10th, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of
the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of thirty
(30) days for the necessary investigation. The attorney for the petitioner, on June 20th, filed another motion alleging that,
notwithstanding the order of the 8th of said month, the officials of the Anti-Usury Board had failed to deposit the articles seized
by them and praying that a search warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all the articles into his custody and deposit
of the Anti-Usury Board be punished for contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th, filed an ex parte petition alleging that
while agent Emilio L. Siongco had deposited some documents and papers in the office of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to
file an inventory duly verified by oath of all the documents seized by him, to return the search warrant together with the affidavit
it presented in support thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken by him; and prayed that said agent be directed to
filed the documents in question immediately. On the 25th of said month the court issued an order requiring agent Emilio L.
Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the proceedings taken by him, and to
present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2d of said year, the attorney for the petitioner filed
another petition alleging that the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had nit yet been returned to date together with the
proceedings taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return
of all the articles seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges
be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, 1936, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was
obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled,
and that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the
chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show case, if any, within the unextendible period of two (2) days from the date of
notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory, Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the petitioner. The
assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the
articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law
committed by the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the attorney for the petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an
order requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify the time needed by it to examine the documents and papers seized and which of
them should be retained, granting it a period of five (5) days for said purpose. On the 30th of said month the assistant chief of the
Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten (10) days to comply with the order of September 25th and that the
clerk of court be ordered to return to him all the documents and papers together with the inventory thereof. The court, in an order
of October 2d of said year, granted him the additional period of ten(10) days and ordered the clerk of court to send him a copy of
the inventory. On October 10th, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to examine the
documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 1016, 23, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of sixty (60) days. In an order of October 16th,
the court granted him the period of sixty (60) days to investigate said nineteen (19) documents. The petitioner alleges, and it is
not denied by the respondents, that these nineteen (19)documents continue in the possession of the court, the rest having been
returned to said petitioner.

I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice
of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court
(section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his
private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed., 241;
Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed., 1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law.
ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basis principles of government (People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).

II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of the
court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the individual, to
prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer County, 198 Pac.,
362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237 Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general rule that statutes
authorizing searches and seizure or search warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed., [2d], 189; Leonard vs.
U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14 Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).

III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit of
agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a
basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from a person whom he
considered reliable. To the question "What are your reason for applying for this search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the
agent answered: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises,
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender,
charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in attesting the truth of his statements contained in the affidavit,
the said agent states that he found them to be correct and true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to the bill of rights, provides that "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place top be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." Section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and
upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." It will
be noted that both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant ands the witnesses he may produce. In its
broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an
act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined asan outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W.,
1034; In re Sage, 24 Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphery vs. State, 122 N. W., 19; Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154
Pac., 378; Atwood vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U. S. vs.
Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U. S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603; U. S. vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused (State vs. Roosevelt Country 20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280; State vs.
Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).

It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizure.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term
"unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed,
absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. All illegal searches and seizure are
unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any particular
case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search, the presence or absence or probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374; Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed.,
[2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497; Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed., 413; U. S. vs. Bateman,
278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16 Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).

In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of
the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is
hereby held that the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal
and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.

IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the search warrant be declared illegal and cancelled is that it was not
supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot
be issued unless it be supported by affidavits made by the applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessity by him. Section 1,
paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 98 of
General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the complainant
and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit
of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case,
relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any
other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the
deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose
of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal
but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the
existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint
contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable
cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only
on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation thereof,
the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at night
when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. As we have
declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the contention is
equally well founded and that the search could not legally be made at night.

VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an
adequate description of the books and documents to be seized. Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and
section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining
whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a particular description of the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U.
S., 24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U. S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U. S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408; In
re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605; People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App., 4125); but where,
by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather generally, it is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284; People vs. Kahn, supra). The only
description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said premises
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no
other more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer
of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.

VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the
articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or
cases which might be filed against him for violation of the Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised
before the court it clearly appeared that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to
conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal
cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using
them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes
the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
accused to testify against himself (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S., 620; Temperani vs. U. S.,
299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297 Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U. S., 132). Therefore, it
appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them as evidence against the
petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search warrant issued is illegal
and that the documents should be returned to him.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the
proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromise
whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We are of the
opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second,
because if there was a compromise it reffered but to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
The waiver would have been a good defense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search and seizure
of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and stated his protest in
writing in the insufficient inventory furnished him by the agents.

Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought by the petitioner does not lie because he can appeal from the orders
which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his petition. Section 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure in fact provides that
mandamus will not issue when there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. We are of the
opinion, however, that an appeal from said orders would have to lapse before he recovers possession of the documents and before
the rights, of which he has been unlawfully deprived, are restored to him (Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6 Phil., 426; Manotoc vs.
McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119; Cruz Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14 Phil., 641; Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).

Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:

1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No. 58, relative to search and seizure, should be given a liberal
construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;

2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and fundamentally restrict the enjoyment of the ownership,
possession and use of the personal property of the individual, they should be strictly construed;

3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the
affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued
for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the
petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;

4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in
the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could the search and seizure be made at night;

5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a complainant in cases
where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when the applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists;

6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is necessary, but whereby, by the
nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, but is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;

7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights because the offer of compromise or settlement attributed to him, does
not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the search and seizure; and

8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if taken by him, would not be an effective, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently, the petition for mandamus filed by him, lies.

For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of the respondent court
authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are declared illegal and are set aside, and it is ordered that the judge
presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas direct the immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents
designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23, 25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

My views on the fundamental questions involved in this case are fully set forth in my dissenting opinion filed in People vs. Rubio
(57 Phil., 384, 395). I am gratified to see that, in the main, those views have now prevailed. I therefore concur in the decision of
the court herein.

LAUREL, J., concurring:

I subscribe to the views expressed in the foregoing carefully prepared opinion, with the reservation now to be stated. To my
mind, the search warrant in this case does not satisfy the constitutional requirement regarding the particularity of the description
of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized" (par. 3, sec. 1, Art. III, Constitution of the Philippines).
Reference to "books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as money-
lender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law" in the search warrant is so general, loose and vague as to confer
unlimited discretion upon the officer serving the warrant to choose and determine for himself just what are the "books,
documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers" used by the petitioner in connection with his alleged activities as money-lender.
The evident purpose and intent of the constitutional requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made, — that abuses
may not be committed (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil., 886).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE
CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL.,
respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene
Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the
validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the
"We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General,
AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case
No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in
behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until
final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for
preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.

Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having
previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity
of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this
procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
issues raised not to mention the public interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in
Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this Court to
exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de
Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said
search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or
after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on
June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was
because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in
this country, from release of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter
to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after
such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential Security
Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.

After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise
them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the
presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches
against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the seized
documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not
follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he
pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the
validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants in question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6
This objection, however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing
on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution
of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D.
885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued because the
purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have
issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search
warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the
place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent
judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been
held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the
judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer
may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose
Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services,
Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal
property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties
that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose
possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the
person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5]
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision
was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed.
This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence
Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro
U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of
the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application
and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has
published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application
that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable
under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro
M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free
Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In
Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court
in Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature
of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording
equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and
any and all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the
subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts,
lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared
void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the
violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the articles sought to
be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between the
Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical
episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks
with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural
or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with
implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied
the request of the military authorities to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing
presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of
the equipment and all materials in the premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign
Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President
Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing facilities
and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7,
1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return
of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas,
JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own reasons for
holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.

The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross
violation of the Constitution.

The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)

Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense
must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been
alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words
of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree
without reference to any determinate provision thereof.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and
take possession, among other things, of the following:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make
them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been
published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all of
the items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own reasons for
holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the petition are utterly void.

The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross
violation of the Constitution.

The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3, Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)

The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense
must be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been
alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the words
of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree
without reference to any determinate provision thereof.

The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and
take possession, among other things, of the following:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make
them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are obnoxious to the Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been
published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the same content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all of
the items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 82544 June 28, 1988

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN SHERMAN and
ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A petition for Habeas Corpus.

Petitioners Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, are both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan,
Laguna, while Adriaan Van Elshout, 58 years old, is a Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna.

The case stems from the apprehension of petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their respective residences by agents of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center.

Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close
surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29 February 1988, seventeen (17) of
the twenty-two (22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and have left the country. One was released for lack of evidence;
another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. Thus, of the original twenty two
(22), only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.

Seized during petitioners apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown in
salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child
prostitutes.

The "Operation Report," on Andrew Harvey and Richard Sherman dated 29 February 1988 stated:

xxx xxx xxx

ANDREW MARK HARVEY was found together with two young boys.

RICHARD SHERMAN was found with two naked boys inside his room.

In respect of Van Den Elshout the "After Mission Report," dated 27 February 1988 read in part:

Noted:

There were two (2) children ages 14 & 16 which subject readily accepted having been in his care and live-in for quite sometime.

On 4 March 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against petitioners for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code (Deportation Case No. 88-13). The "Charge Sheet" read inter alia:

Wherefore, this Office charges the respondents for deportation, as undesirable aliens, in that: they, being pedophiles, are inimical
to public morals, public health and public safety as provided in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.

On 7 March 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III
commenced trial against petitioners.

On 14 March 1988, petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously
affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release,
respondent ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners were healthy.

On 22 March 1988, petitioners filed a Petition for Bail which, however, respondent denied considering the certification by the
CID physician that petitioners were healthy. To avoid congestion, respondent ordered petitioners' transfer to the CID detention
cell at Fort Bonifacio, but the transfer was deferred pending trial due to the difficulty of transporting them to and from the CID
where trial was on-going.

On 4 April 1988 petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation"
and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he
voluntarily departs the country." On 7 April 1988, the Board of Special Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days
only under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed,
Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition.

On 4 April 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was
filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was
presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.

Petitioners question the validity of their detention on the following grounds:

1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which legally clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the existence
of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.

2) Respondent violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the
CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision.

3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners that they are
pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and
detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor
is it a crime to be a pedophile.

We reject petitioners' contentions and uphold respondent's official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General.

There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not (Moncado vs. People's Court, 80
Phil. 1 [1948]. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon
probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the
warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof." (People vs.
Syjuco 64 Phil. 667 [1937]; Alverez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 [1937]).

The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a
private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence;
and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5).

In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during
which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo
negatives, photographs and posters without warrant (See Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, February 28, 1968,22 SCRA 857; People vs.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86, cited in CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p.
143). Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence (Section 12, Rule
126,1985 Rules on criminal Procedure).

But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation
charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on 4 March 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued against them on 7
March 1988 "for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Administrative Code." A
hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become
legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The process of the law is being followed (Cruz vs. Montoya, L-39823, February 25, 1975,
62 SCRA 543). "were a person's detention was later made by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently
filed against the detainee, his petition for hebeas corpus becomes moot and academic" (Beltran vs. Garcia, L-49014, April 30,
1979, 89 SCRA 717). "It is a fumdamental rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has
become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning" (Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 1050 [1947]).

That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their
respective rooms, the ones with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to
believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving children" (Kraft-Ebbing
Psychopatia Sexualis p. 555; Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children are the preferred sexual object" (Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, 1971 ed., p. 1665) [Solicitor General's Return of the Writ, on p. 101. While not a crime
under the Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the State to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).

At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity
attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity (Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977,
77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).

The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Section 37(a) provides in part:

(a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation or any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision should be construed in its entirety in view of the summary and indivisible nature of a deportation
proceeding, otherwise, the very purpose of deportation proceeding would be defeated.

Section 37(a) is not constitutionally proscribed (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562). The specific
constraints in both the 1935 1 and 1987 2 Constitutions, which are substantially Identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially
criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never
construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary
Court proceedings.

It is of course well-settled that deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a
punishment, (Maliler vs. Eby, 264 U.S., 32), it being merely the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions
upon which he could continue to reside within our borders (U.S. vs. De los Santos, 33 Phil., 397). The deportation proceedings
are administrative in character, (Kessler vs. Stracker 307 U.S., 22) summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with the ordinary court proceedings (Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155). It is essential, however, that the warrant of
arrest shall give the alien sufficient information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied upon. (U.S. vs. Uhl 211 F.,
628.) It is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unprejudiced
investigators (Strench vs. Pedaris, 55 F. [2d], 597; Ex parte Jew You On, 16 F. [2d], 153). However, all the strict rules of
evidence governing judicial controversies do not need to be observed; only such as are fumdamental and essential like the right of
cross-examination. (U.S. vs. Hughes, 104 F. [2d], 14; Murdock vs. Clark, 53 F. [2d], 155.) Hearsay evidence may even be
admitted, provided the alien is given the opportunity to explain or rebut it (Morrell vs. Baker, 270 F., 577; Sercerchi vs. Ward, 27
F. Supp., 437). (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]).

The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G. R. No. 24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the
Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with
paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the Constitution" (referring to the 1935 Constitution) 3 is not invocable herein.
Respondent Commissioner's Warrant of Arrest issued on 7 March 1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why
they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as
undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation.

Section 37 of the Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of Immigration to issue warrants for the arrest of
overstaying aliens is constitutional. The arrest is a stop preliminary to the deportation of the aliens who had violated the condition
of their stay in this country. (Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562).

To rule otherwise would be to render the authority given the Commissioner nugatory to the detriment of the State.

The pertinent provision of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, which gives authority to the Commissioner of Immigration
to order the arrest of an alien temporary visitor preparatory to his deportation for failure to put up new bonds required for the
stay, is not unconstitutional.

xxx xxx xxx

... Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under Section 37[al of
Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State. (Ng Hua To
vs. Galang, G. R. No. 10145, February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 411).

"The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs.
Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation proceedings.

The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G. R. No. 10280, September 30, 1963, 9
SCRA 27 [1963]) reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that "under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution),
it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose
is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated,
probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing
be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent
evidence. Thus, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code explicitly provides:

Sec. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported,
expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior
investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In
such a case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than 3
days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his
own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in
deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 provides that "any alien under
arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such other conditions as may be imposed by the
Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive
and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly discretionary (Ong Hee Sang vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-9700, February 28,1962, 4 SCRA 442). "Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail." (Tiu Chun Hai et al vs.
Deportation Board, 104 Phil. 949 [1958]). As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the
constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings (Ong Hee Sang vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, supra).

Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for
its self-preservation or public interest (Lao Tan Bun vs. Fabre 81 Phil. 682 [1948]). The power to deport aliens is an act of State,
an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign power (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41 [1918]). It is a police measure
against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic
tranquility of the people (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco et al., 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). Particularly so in this case where the State has
expressly committed itself to defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, C.J., Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding
Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City: HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL. JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.

Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners
will be referred to through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.

1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of
Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She
was then still at large.

2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at
the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by
respondents. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time
is an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents have alleged
that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late on august 6th.

4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent
Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street,
Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock
surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted
by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with the MV
Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may be stated:

(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search
Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.

(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge
Paño.

(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge Paño
but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept
in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front,
including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. 1

5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the following may be stated:

(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably without a
warrant of arrest.

(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden
boxes, making 431 items in all. 3

(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made in the
presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that
TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay
Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before the
Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."

(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of
Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.

(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and
NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied on November 16th.

7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter alia, that
the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, in connection with cases that are presently pending against
Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court. 5

(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano to comment on the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-
ROQUE did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.

(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to
disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."

8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such
of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were
unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be
litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued
in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent
RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of
respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to Suppress.

This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their duly authorized
representatives from introducing evidence obtained under the Search Warrant.

The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established
for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant's witness. The respondents, represented by the Solicitor General,
contend otherwise, adding that the questions raised cannot be entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving
for the quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.

We find merit in the Petition.

Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be seized as follows:

Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National
Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the
officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered
null and void for being too general. Thus:

Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement. 6

The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were described as 'subversive documents, propaganda
materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other subversive materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to
the search team as to what articles might be lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than,
the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the Chief of Staff"which this Court declared null and void for
being too general. 7

In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed the seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times,
manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters,
duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all
conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under
consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. 8

The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.

Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to
know if you affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?

(The deposition instead)—

A Yes, sir,

Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?

A Almost a month, sir.

Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?

A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.

Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for search warrant?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?

A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many suspicious persons with documents.

Q What kind of documents do you refer to?

A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's Army.

Q What else?

A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic Front, Organization of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ...

Q And may include what else?

A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign and local
sources. 9

The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and
circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st,
2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description
of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of particularity.
The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11

Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the Court that issued
it instead of this original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that petitioners did raise that issue in the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the admissibility of the
evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings
under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had
questioned the legality of the Search Warrant.

Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be advisable
that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another
Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the
Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search
warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be
made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been
arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be
search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts
and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to
what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the
individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals." 13

Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for
her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling;
and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search
at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public
order.

Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained. by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion
Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her
any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño is
hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent from introducing evidence obtained
pursuant to the Search Warrant in the Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent, the, personalities seized may be
retained by the Constabulary Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1, pending
before Special Military commission No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque objecting to their relevance and
asking said Commission to return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and Patajo concur.

Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.

Aquino, J.; took no part.

Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos. The questioned search warrant has
correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional
mandate that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated" (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights orders the
absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: "Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule has proved
by historical experience to be the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches
and seizures by outlawing all evidence illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of state and police officers
to disregard such basic rights. What the plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power of the courts to change
or modify.

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three
petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court
has held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the
statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or
gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it." (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 393-394)

The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the
constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in the dissenting portion of
his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a search warrant
and obtained the void warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who
is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a
place other than the place of arrest. In this case, petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on board a public vehicle on
the road (at Mayon and P. Margall Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant
is to sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

I vote to grant the petition in toto.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño for the reasons adduced by Justice Melencio Herrera. In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal
and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he allowed himself to be used by the military. In either
case his action can only be described as deplorable.

I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for
possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1 pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree
with Justice Cuevas. for the reasons stated by him, that their retention cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with Justice Cuevas, statement that not all the things seized can be ordered
returned to their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials seized by the government agents." What are subversive materials?
Whether a material is subversive or not is a conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the determination? Certainly not the
military for it is not competent to do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. thus copies of Playboy
magazines were seized from a labor leader now deceased and medicines were also seized from a physician who was suspected of
being a subversive. I say return everything to the petitioners.

CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting

I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. 80-84 issued by the Hon. Ernani Cruz
Paño Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City It does not
specify with requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized hereunder. Being in the nature of a general
warrant, it violates the constitutional mandate that the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, 'must be
particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973 Constitution)

I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court which provides:

SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the aforequoted provision (Sec. 12,
Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by, the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the
warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited
to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Hence—

An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in
the commission of the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping or which may be
used as evidence in the trial of the cause ... (In Re Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)

With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest.
Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and
only at the place where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search a person lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by
which it was committed, as well as weapons or other things to effect an escape from custody is not to be doubted. CAROLL vs.
US 267 US 122. 158. ... But the right does not extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several blocks distant from
Alba's house where the arrest was made. When it was entered and searched, the conspiracy was ended and the defendants were
under arrest and in custody elsewhere. That search cannot be sustained as an incident of the arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US
192, 199. (Emphasis supplied) (Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)

The second element which must exist in order to bring the case within the exception to the general rule is that, in addition to a
lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest.

The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this
latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have a right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if
the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future
arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S. 273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84 F 2d 160, 163)

In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976.
The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest, that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same
day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence of petitioner AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayn St., Quezon
City. How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the
record. But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion
of nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners.
Not being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID
SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties seized
on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule. However, not all
the things so seized can be ordered returned to their owners. Objects and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law,
cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 1984 citing
Castro vs. Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials seized by the government agents which cannot be legally
possessed by anyone under the law can and must be retained by the government.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 125164 September 25, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. LORENZO VENERACION, RICARDO B. BANGAYAN, BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.,
ROBERTO BANGAYAN, RODRIGO BANGAYAN, LANIE L. ZIPAGAN, ATTY. ALMARIO AMADOR, MANNY SIA,
SGT. JOSE "PEPE" AGUILAR, ANGELITO CHUA, EDUARDO R. IGNACIO, BERNADETTE C. CRISTOBAL, OSCAR L.
MACALINO, HILARIO L. CULLA, BASILIO B. ZAPATA, RICARDO J. EBUNA, respondents-appellees.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 23 May 1996 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
15113 which denied petitioner's petition for review of the order 2 of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila granting
private respondents' motion to quash the informations in Criminal Case No. 93-118715 for violation of Section 3602 in relation
to Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.

The factual and procedural antecedents are summarized in the challenged decision of public respondent Court of Appeals, as
follows:
On March 30, 1993, State Prosecutor Brenda P. Lumabao of the Department of Justice, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila an information against private respondents Ricardo B. Bangayan, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr., Roberto Bangayan, Rodrigo
Bangayan, Lanie L. Zipagan, Almario Amador, Manny Sia, Jose "Pepe" Aguilar, Angelito Chua, Eduardo Ignacio, Bernadette C.
Cristobal, Oscar L. Macalino, Hilario L. Culla, Basilio B. Zapata and Ricardo J. Ebuna, for the [sic] violation of Section 3602 in
relation to Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (hereinafter, TCCP) allegedly committed as follows:

That in (sic) or about and during the period from July 16, 992 to August 12, 1992, in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the entry of 64,480 bags more or less of PVC resins in three (3)
shipments from Busan, Korea, consigned to Peaks Marketing, LBZ Commercial and Final Sales Enterprises, respectively;
thereafter, secured their release from the Manila International Container Port, using Bureau of Customs Official Receipts
(BCOR'S 26386184, 26387164, 26634054) issued by Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) Binondo Branch,
purportedly representing final payment of customs duties and other charges due on the importations in the amount of
P13,265,225.00, when in truth and in fact, as shown [by] the records of the Bureau of Customs, no such payments were remitted
to the National Treasury and the three (3) importers above-named are fictitious; and further, on September 20 and 21, 1992,
illegally withdrew 14 truckloads of said PBC [sic] resins from the warehouse at 716 Gen. Luis St., Bagbaguin, Caloocan City, by
breaking the official Customs [s]eal affixed by the Bureau of Customs operatives pursuant to Warrants of Seizure and Detention,
all to the damage and prejudice of the government.

The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 903 [sic]-118715 [sic] of said court and assigned by raffle to Branch 47
thereof with respondent Lorenzo E. Veneracion presiding.

Thereafter, the different accused, through their respective counsel, filed omnibus motions, the principal thrust of which is the
quashal of the information filed, premised upon Sections 3(a), (f), and (g), Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure in that:
(1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (2) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (3) the
information contains averments which if true would constitute a legal excuse or justification. Additionally, the accused
maintained that, as attested to by the files, documents, and other public records in the possession of the prosecution, the final
payment of customs duties and other charges . . . in the amount of P13,265,225.00 had been made.

The accused, now private respondents in this petition, argue that the information filed against them averred that they had secured
the release of approximately 64,480 bags of imported PVC resins from the Manila International Container Port, using Bureau of
Customs Official Receipts No. 26386184, 26387164, and 26634054, purportedly representing final payment of customs duties
and other charges due on the importation in the amount of P13,265,225.00 "when in truth and in fact, no such payments were
remitted to the National Treasury . . . and that, on September 20 and 21, 1992, private respondents "illegally withdrew 14
truckloads of said PVC resins from the warehouse at 716 Gen. Luis St., Bagbaguin, Caloocan City . . . . Private respondents
however claim that, even before the filing of the information against them on March 30, 1993, the customs duties and penalties in
the amount of P13,265,225.00 had been fully paid, as shown by three RCBC (the Bureau of Customs Collecting Bank) Official
Receipts in the amounts of P4,431,099.00, P4,901,396.00, and P4,132,730.00, respectively, with corresponding Bureau of
Customs Official Receipts, or a total of P13,265,225.00, and the required Central Bank Release Certificates. It is therefore the
submission of private respondents, that upon the issuance of the Bureau of Customs Official Receipts and the Central Bank
Release Certificates which are the clearances for the importation of the PVC resins, whatever infraction there may have been
prior to the payments and clearances are deemed condoned, waived, quit claimed [sic], otherwise extinguished; when the "res" is
cleared of any taint of violation of the Tariff and Customs Code, the offenses alleged to have been committed, if any at all, under
the Code, are deemed extinguished.

After due hearing on private respondents' omnibus motions, respondent court in an order dated May 19, 1993, dismissed said
Criminal Case No. 93-118715, reasoning that:

It is undisputed that the importers in this case, represented by some of the accused, paid the customs duties and other charges in
the amount of P13,265,225.00 after they were informed in a letter dated September 19, 1992, by District Collector of Customs
Buenaventura C. Maniego, that the Bureau of Customs official receipts covering the final payment described in the said letter and
which were the basis for the release of the shipment in question, were not remitted to the National Treasury through the Central
bank and in view thereof, demand was made for the immediate reimbursement of the said amount immediately from the date
thereof, "otherwise appropriate legal action shall be taken under the premises".

Accordingly, and in compliance therewith and before the investigation by the Department of Justice could be commenced on
October 13, 1992, the said amount of P13,265,225.00 was made to the Bureau of Customs through the RCBC, which payment
and receipts have been acknowledged to be genuine and authentic. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the allegations in the information that no such payment of P13,265,225.00 was remitted to the National Treasury is not
therefore accurate. The Court also finds that the conclusion of the prosecution that the three firms, namely: Fix [sic] Marketing,
LBC Commercial and Final Sales to be fictitious, appears not supported by the evidence. The letters of Credit covering the
importations were issued upon proper application by these companies, and pursuant to the existing regulations; unless these
companies are duly registered with the appropriate agencies of the government, and duly accredited by the Bureau of Customs,
the letters of credit could not have been opened by the bank in their favor. The fact that letters of credit were issued by the RCBC
and that these firms were duly accredited by the Bureau of Customs, and appropriate Central Bank clearances were issued for the
release of the shipments in question, to the mind of the Court clearly shows that the said companies are legally authorized to
transact the importations in question.

The Court also finds and so holds that the accused should not be faulted for the alleged withdrawal of 14 truckloads of PVC
resins on September 20 and 21, 1992 from the warehouse described in the information, considering that said withdrawal is
covered by a valid Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila through then 1st Executive Judge
now Court of Appeals Justice Corona Ibay Somera.

While this Court strongly believes that the laws of the land should be strictly enforced to instill national discipline among our
people, this Court feels that our business entrepreneurs are entitled to assistance by the government as provided for under existing
laws and regulations to the end that they can contribute to the growth of the economy. This Court believes that proceeding in this
case in the manner the prosecution would like to do, will not serve the government and the higher interest of our country and
people. It may, as a matter of fact, give a wrong signal to the business community, which certainly will be detrimental to our
economic growth. Besides, the government appears not prejudiced in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

The prosecution (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) received a copy of the aforesaid Order of Dismissal on June 3, 1993.

On June 10, 1993, petitioner filed its motion dated June 8, 1993, for the reconsideration of said order of dismissal, arguing that

. . . the gravamen of violation of Sec. 3602 is not the non-payment of customs duties and that therefore, the payment made by
accused Angelito Chua thru the RCBC on October 13, 1992 long after the offense was committed in July and August, 1992, did
not extinguish the criminal action or liability.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration however did not contain the appropriate notice of hearing required by Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, on June 11, 1993, respondent court issued an order stating that "it cannot act on the
petitioner's motion dated June 8, 1993 because there is no date set for its hearing".

Notwithstanding the forgoing Order of June 11, 1993 of respondent court, it was only on July 1, 1993, that petitioner asked for
leave of court that its motion for reconsideration filed on June 10, 1993, be set for hearing "preferably on July 8, 1993, at 10:00
o'clock in the morning with the request that notice thereof be sent to the accused who were already furnished copies of the motion
for reconsideration".

On August 19, 1993, respondent court issued its order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, ratiocinating that:

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the records of this case shows that the action taken by this Court embodied in its Order of May 19, 1993, was
anchored on its verification that the accused had already remitted to the Bureau of Customs the taxes and duties due these
importations in question in the total amount of P13,265,225.00, in compliance with the formal demand by the Bureau of Customs
to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). The Court recalls that representatives of the Bureau of Customs were
summoned to appear before this Court, and said representatives, assisted by the State Prosecutor admitted in open Court that the
receipts presented by the accused covering the remittance of said amount of P13,265,225.00 are genuine, and the receipt of said
amount by the Bureau of Customs was duly acknowledged and confirmed. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing admissions by
the representatives of the Bureau of Customs and the State Prosecutor negate the allegations in the information that the taxes and
duties of P13,265,225.00 had not been remitted to the National Treasury, and that the Government was, accordingly, damages
[sic] and prejudiced thereby.

A thorough review of the Motion for Reconsideration, Comments and Rejoinders by the State Prosecutor does not show that the
foregoing observations of this Court had been refuted or challenged.

The Court notes further that the remittance by the accused of the taxes and duties in the amount of P13,265,225.00 was not in the
nature of a compromise settlement of the taxes and duties of the importations in question, but in compliance with the letter of
demand of the Bureau of Customs.
A copy of the aforesaid Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration was received by the former on August 26, 1993. On
September 3, 1993, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for an extension of thirty days within which to file its
petition for the review on certiorari, which was granted by the First Division of said Court in a resolution dated September 22,
1993 in G.R. No. 111510.

On September 24, 1993, petitioner, by reason of the aforesaid grant of extension, filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
review on certiorari, which the latter thereafter referred to this Court in a resolution dated October 18, 1993 reading as follows:

G.R. No. 111510 (People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Lorenzo Veneracion, et. al.,) — The petition for certiorari filed pursuant to
the provisions of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration and adjudication on
the merits, the latter having jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the case, and this Court having been cited to no special
and important reason for it to take cognizance of said case in the first instance.

This Court thereafter gave due course to the petition and directed private respondents to file their answers thereto.

On December 12, 1994, private respondent Ricardo Bangayan filed a Manifestation with this Court calling attention that after
private respondents have filed their answers herein, a related case arising from the same incident, but which was separately
investigated by petitioner, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-137856 of respondent court, was ordered dismissed by said court
against private respondent Ricardo Bangayan upon recommendation of a State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, duly
approved by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovito R. Zuño. 3

In its decision of 23 May 1997, 4 public respondent Court of Appeals denied the petition on grounds hereafter summarized.

First, the petition, although filed within the period allowed by this Court in G.R. No. 111510, was filed "far beyond the
reglementary period allowed by the Rules and existing circulars." Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order of the trial
court granting the motions to quash, although filed on the seventh day after receipt of the order, did not toll the running of the
period to appeal as the motion did not contain a notice of hearing addressed to the private respondents' counsel, pursuant to
Manakil v. Revilla, 5 Manila Surety Co. v. MRR 6 and Del Castillo v. Aguinaldo. 7 As such, it was a mere scrap of paper in
accordance with Goldloop Properties Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 8 The filing of a motion to set the motion for reconsideration for
hearing only on 1 July 1993 was:

[T]oo late in the day to give due course [to said motion to set for hearing] because the order of dismissal of May 19, 1993, having
been received by petitioner on June 3, 1993, attained finality on June 19, 1993, after the expiration of fifteen days from notice to
petitioner. The duty to give notice of the hearing devolves upon the movant, not the court. 9 The belated motion of July 1, 1993,
filed by petitioner after the period of appeal from the Order of May 19, 1993, had already expired, did not cure the defect of the
earlier lack of notice. Neither was the defect cured by the subsequent order of respondent court dated August 19, 1993, acting
upon, although denying, petitioner's motion for reconsideration because, as held in Manila Electric Company vs. La Campana
Foods Products, 747 SCRA 77 (1995), a motion that does not meet the requirements of Section 4 and 4, Rule 145 of the Rules of
Court is a worthless piece of paper and a court has no authority to act upon it. A fortiori, this Court holds the view that
petitioner's motion for extension of time, as well as its petition for review on certiorari, were filed with the Supreme Court far
beyond the reglementary period allowed by the Rules and existing circulars. The mere fact that the Supreme Court, in its
Resolution of September 22, 1993 in G.R. No. 111510, granted petitioner and extension of thirty days within which to file its
petition for review, does not likewise erase such a defect because the grant of such extension was "conditioned upon the
timeliness of the filing of said motion and the timeliness of the payment of the legal fees.

Second, even if the petition for review be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the
petition would still fail for certiorari can not be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. 10

Finally, even if it be further conceded that the petition was filed on time or that it could be properly treated as a special civil
action for certiorari, the petition would still fail, for the trial court did not err in holding that no criminal liability was incurred
since there was payment of taxes and duties on 13 October 1992 upon demand by the Bureau of Customs, several months before
the filing of the information on 30 March 1993 and before any apprehension was made. On this matter the Court of Appeals
noted:

Petitioner however argues that though the payment of the taxes and duties due were made before the filing of the information on
March 30, 1993, such payment was however done only on October 13, 1992, long after the offense was committed in July and
August 1992, and the last paragraph of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs [Code] provides:

When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown to had possession of the article in question, possession shall
be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the
court: Provided, however, THAT PAYMENT OF THE TAX DUE AFTER APPREHENSION SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE A
VALID DEFENSE IN ANY PROSECUTION UNDER THIS SECTION. (Capitalization ours)
"Apprehension", as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, is "the seizure, taking, or arrest of a person on a criminal
charge" (p. 92). Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, upon the other hand, defines it as "the taking into custody of a person accused of
a crime. Synonymous with arrest, which, however, is also used in connection with civil process." (p. 52) But no evidence
whatsoever was presented by petitioner during the hearing of the motion to quash to establish such "apprehension" as
contemplated in the last paragraph of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code. The only vague reference of petitioner,
which it argues, amounts to an apprehension, is the alleged retrieval by the Bureau of Customs of the "remaining PVC resins
from the NFA compound totalling 14,000 bags more or less" (See Annex "B", Petition, p. 50 Rollo). But no proof had been
adduced that any of private respondents had been arrested or apprehended during this alleged raid, and therefore, this Court could
not consider the same to be an apprehension as understood in the last paragraph of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code
earlier cited in this decision. As explained by respondent court in its assailed order of May 19, 1993, it appears that respondents
had paid the amount of P13,265,225.00 to the Bureau of Customs by reason of the latter's demand for its payment, and not
because of any apprehension.

Before us, petitioner asserts, in the main, that the shipments were constructively seized by the Bureau of Customs and the
payments of the taxes and duties were made after the seizure of the goods; hence the crime was already committed before the
payment. Accordingly, the motions to quash should have been denied. Petitioner likewise assails the Court of Appeals' resort to
technicalities concerning the notice of hearing on the motion for reconsideration, contending that absence of notice in the motion
for reconsideration was deemed cured when the trial court took cognizance of said motion considering that the adverse party was
also notified.

We gave due course to the petition after the filing of private respondents' separate comments. Except for petitioner which adopted
the petition as its memorandum, private respondents filed separate memoranda.

Notwithstanding petitioner's arguments, clearly, the key issue here is the time-worn question of whether absence of notice of
hearing is fatal to a motion for reconsideration.

Under Section 4 of Rule 15 11 of the Rules of Court, the applicable law during the pendency of the case before the trial court,
every written motion must be set for hearing by the applicant and served together with the notice of hearing thereof, in such a
manner as to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing, unless the court, for good cause, sets
the hearing on shorter notice. Under Sections 5 and 6 12 thereof, the notice of hearing shall be addressed to the parties concerned
and shall specify the time and date of the hearing of the motion; no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party are not affected.

A motion without a notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the period to appeal, 13 and upon
expiration of the 15-day period, the questioned order or decision becomes final and executory. The rationale behind this rule is
plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within
which he may file his reply or opposition. 14

A supplemental pleading subsequently filed to remedy the previous absence of notice will not cure the defect nor interrupt the
tolling of the prescribed period within which to appeal. In Cledera v. Sarmiento, 15 citing Manila Surety v. Bath, 16 this Court
ruled:

We are not impressed by the argument that the supplement filed by the appellants on May 30 should be deemed retroactive as of
the date the motion for reconsideration was filed and, therefore, cured the defect therein. To so consider it would be to put a
premium on negligence and subject the finality of judgments to the forgetfulness or whims of parties-litigants and their lawyers.
This of course would be intolerable in a well-ordered judicial system.

[A]ppellants were or should have been alerted to the fact that their motion for reconsideration of May 12 did not interrupt the
period for appeal when they received the court's order of May 21, 1959, wherein it was stated that what appellants had filed was
not even a motion and presented no question which the court could decide.

This ruling squarely applies here. When petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration of the Court's order of dismissal on 10 June
1993 without setting the same for hearing, said motion was pro forma such that the period to appeal from the order was not
tolled. Further, petitioner's filing of the 1 July 1993 motion for leave to set for hearing the Motion for Reconsideration was akin
to the supplemental motion in Cledera v. Sarmiento, and did not prevent the order from becoming final and executory.

It follows then that insofar as petitioner is concerned, the Order of 19 May 1993 dismissing Criminal Case No. 93-118715
became final and executory on 18 June 1993, because petitioner received a copy thereof on 3 June 1993 and its motion for
reconsideration filed on 10 June 1993, or on the seventh day of its period to appeal, did not suspend the running of the period to
appeal. The subsequent action of the trial court in formally denying the motion for reconsideration on grounds other than that the
motion was a mere scrap of paper for want of notice and that the assailed order had already become final and executory, neither
created any right in favor of petitioner nor conceded to it any benefit.

Needless to state, petitioner lost its right to appeal from the order of 19 May 1993 by the negligence of its counsel who could
have easily filed a motion to set the motion for reconsideration for hearing immediately after receipt of a copy of the trial court's
order of 11 June 1993 informing the parties that it could not act on the motion for reconsideration because no date was set for
hearing. Thus, on 3 September 1993, when petitioner filed with us G.R. No. 111510, its motion for extension of time to file
therein a petition for review on certiorari was already rendered moot and academic as the order sought to be challenged in the
intended petition had long become final and executory. Respondent Court of Appeals was then correct in holding that while we
granted the motion for extension, such was "conditioned upon the timeliness of the filing of the said motion . . ." This element of
"timeliness," of course, had reference to the filing of the motion before the expiration of the original period to file the petition,
pursuant to Section 1 17 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. If it be subsequently shown that the motion for extension was filed
beyond the original period, the grant of the motion was ineffective and did not amount to a suspension of the Rules to bestow
upon petitioner a fresh period to assail the trial court's order.

In view of the foregoing, resolution of the issue concerning the propriety of the order dismissing the information in Criminal
Case No. 93-118715 is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals of 23 May 1996 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 15113 is AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.