Professional Documents
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KT&G CORPORATION
Korea
Analysts:
Overall Company Score (CGS) CGS–7 (maximum CGS–10)
Calvin Wong Sovereign Credit Rating* 'A-' foreign currency; 'A+'
Hong Kong local currency
Tel: +852 2533 3501
Email: Calvin_Wong@ Component Scores:
standardandpoors.com Ownership structure and external influence Strong
Katrina Tai Shareholder rights and stakeholder relations Moderate
Hong Kong Transparency, disclosure & audit Moderate
Tel: +852 2533 3538
Email: Katrina_Tai@ Board structure and effectiveness Strong
standardandpoors.com
Hyung Suk Kim Executive Summary
Korea KT&G’s overall score of 7, while indicative of a strong corporate governance standard, is also
Tel: 82-2-2122-4407
reflective of a company in transition. The company’s governance policies and practices will continue
Nam-Soo Kim to evolve as it transitions from a domestically focused state-owned monopoly into a fully privatized
Korea business competing in a global marketplace. A key positive governance feature is its simple and
Tel: 82-2-2122-4321 reasonably transparent ownership structure. Following the recent completion of the privatization
Ga-Hyun Song process, KT&G’s shares are widely held with no major block holders. However, a significant
Korea proportion of the shares are in the form of global depositary receipts (GDRs) and held under the
Tel: 82-2-2122-4307 names of nominees whose beneficial owners cannot be positively identified. Notwithstanding the
potential influence of the government as well as non-financial stakeholders such as the labor union
and tobacco interest groups, KT&G is not currently subject to any significant influence from
external parties whose interests might conflict with those of shareholders.
KT&G’s shareholder meeting and voting procedures generally facilitate shareholder participation in the
shareholders meetings. The company provides sufficient notice of meetings and quality information to both
domestic and international investors. Voting procedures, however, are relatively unstructured given the
absence of voting by poll and third party verification of the voting results. However, such voting procedures
are commonplace in Korea, and there is no evidence to date that shareholder rights have been compromised
as a result. Shareholder rights are generally provided ample protection by the Commercial Code and
KT&G’s Articles of Incorporation. However, loopholes in the provisions granting preemptive rights and the
*For important information absence of a clearly defined long-term dividend policy represent potential governance problem areas. In
on Corporate Governance practice, however, KT&G has not diluted existing shareholders through new share issues and has no plans
Scores, including Country
to do so. While KT&G announces annually its near-term dividend payment objective and has paid
Factors, please see the last
page of this report. dividends on a regular basis, it has not articulated a detailed long-term payout policy.
The quality, timeliness, and accessibility of KT&G’s public information disclosure are deemed
good by global standards but only with regard to the Korean language content. The English
language content is improving in both quality and accessibility but is still below par, particularly
for a company with a significant proportion of foreign ownership (29%). KT&G does not
provide financial statements prepared under an internationally recognized accounting standard or
a reconciliation of the Korean GAAP based financials with an international standard. This raises
concerns about financial transparency from the standpoint of foreign shareholders. Given the
company’s very recent privatization and transition into a more globally focused enterprise,
however, we expect to see KT&G continually upgrading its English language disclosure over
time. KT&G’s strong and improving audit process will drive the quality of disclosure going
forward. The presence of an empowered Audit Committee and the transparency of the most
recent process for selecting the new external auditor (KPMG Samjong) reflect positively from a
governance standpoint. However, privatization has hastened the need for stronger internal audit
and risk management processes that are currently at an early stage of development.
KT&G’s board structure provides a strong platform for representing the interests of all
stakeholders. It features a significant majority of non-executive directors and board level
committees for the audit, remuneration, and public services functions. KT&G’s Articles of
Incorporation and Corporate Governance Charter provide detailed direction regarding board
functions, composition, committees, and operations as well as director appointments, roles,
responsibilities, authority, qualifications, and independence. However, the structures and
procedures for some committees, particularly those relating to director nominations, are still
evolving. We expect to see continued evolution of KT&G’s board structure and processes as a
natural outgrowth of privatization and globalization. The board already demonstrates a high
level of independence and engagement, particularly on the part of the NEDs. Our interviews of
board members and a review of board meeting minutes reveal high levels of attendance and
participation in the board and committee meetings by the board members, including the NEDs.
Furthermore, the board has demonstrated strong leadership in guiding KT&G through the
privatization process. One area of concern, however, relates to the alignment of executive and
director financial incentives with the enhancement of long-term shareholder value in a changing
business environment. While existing executive compensation packages do contain both short
term and long-term performance-based elements, NEDs receive no monetary compensation for
their work other than expense reimbursements (albeit this is common amongst Korean
companies). Furthermore, KT&G’s NEDs currently are not subject to a formal performance
evaluation process. This situation gives rise to concerns that the company may not be able to
continue recruiting highly talented individuals from diverse backgrounds to the board and
maintain the board’s effectiveness in a more global and competitive business environment. The
board is also considering the addition of equity-based components to the executive compensation
packages. Such a move would merit close scrutiny to assure that the compensation packages
continue to appropriately align management’s interests with those of shareholders.
As of June 30, 2003, KT&G had issued only one class of shares; these were 181,442,497
shares of common stock. Among these, 121,937,374 were outstanding shares while
59,505,123 were held in the form of treasury shares. 95,266,117 of the outstanding shares
were listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the remaining 26,671,257 shares were
listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange (LSE) in the form of global depository receipts
(GDR). The GDRs are registered under the Bank of New York and are held through nominee
accounts. All outstanding shares, including GDR, are provided equal ownership rights under
the Korean commercial code. Due to their LSE listing, KT&G must follow the regulatory
requirements of Luxembourg as well as those of Korea’s Financial Supervisory Service.
As of June 30, 2003, overseas investors owned 52,999,208 shares equalling29.21% of total
issued shares, of which GDRs comprised 14.7% of total issued shares while the remaining
14.5% was held in KSE listed common shares.
Korean regulations require disclosure by KT&G of all share ownerships of 5% or higher,
and KT&G has abided by these requirements. Kookmin Bank maintains a list of the owners of
KT&G shares on the Korea Stock Exchange for use by KT&G during annual shareholders
meetings. Kookmin Bank is one of three institutions that are authorized in Korea to provide
this kind of service. On the other hand, the monitoring of GDR ownership lacks accuracy as
KT&G relies solely on unofficial monitoring reports that are prepared on a quarterly basis by
the depository, the Bank of New York.
As of March 31, 2003, shares held by KT&G’s executive directors were relatively
insignificant, and KT&G did not maintain any cross-holdings with affiliates. As of the same
date, KT&G had title to 61,874,371 shares. These shares, which are not afforded voting rights
under the Korean commercial code, were held in the form of either treasury shares or through
a treasury shares fund.
KT&G’s shares are widely held with only three parties holding a stake exceeding 5%. As of
March 31, 2003, KT&G’s largest and most significant shareholders were the Industrial Bank
of Korea, Daehan Investment Trust Securities, and the Employees Stock Owner Association
(ESOA), with holdings of 10.75%, 7.45%, and 6.40% of total outstanding shares respectively.
Although the Korean government has a history of exercising a significant amount of
influence over the company, there is little evidence of such influence in recent years, especially
since the completion of KT&G’s privatization in 2002. As of March 31, 2003, the Korean
government did not hold any direct stake in KT&G. Government shares were sold to the
private sector via domestic public offerings, international CB issuances, and international GDR
issuances. However, the government is indirectly connected to KT&G through the Industrial
Bank of Korea and Daehan Investment Trust Securities. Table 3 below provides a description
of KT&G’s privatization process.
The amendments to the Tobacco Business Law on July 1, 2001 resulted in many changes
within the Korean tobacco industry, including the abolition of KT&G's monopoly over
domestic cigarette manufacturing and the termination of KT&G’s obligation to purchase
domestic tobacco leaves. Prior to this amendment, the government required KT&G to obtain
its approval in order to increase product prices. Under the amended law, KT&G is only
required to provide six days advance notice of price changes to the government. This reporting
requirement for price changes is applied to KT&G and all of its competitors. Despite these
changes, the level of taxes levied on tobacco products is high enough such that changes in the
government’s taxation policies can impact KT&G and the demand for its products.
Shareholders meetings are held at KT&G’s head office in Taejon, Korea. KT&G takes care to
notify all shareholders in writing, including GDR holders. As a precaution against mailing
errors, KT&G also posts notices on their website and Korean daily newspapers at least two
weeks prior to meetings. For the GDR holders, KT&G sends the depository (Bank of New
York) a fax notice three weeks prior to meetings. Written notices are mailed well in advance
and contain information necessary for shareholders to make informed decisions on agenda
items. Shareholders, including GDR holders, may appoint a proxy to attend and vote at
shareholder meetings, and all votes cast in absentia are given equal weight. Under the
Ordinary general meetings of shareholders are held annually in March. Emergency shareholders
meetings may be called through a board resolution or at the request of shareholders representing at
least 1.5% of outstanding shares. Shareholders with holdings of 0.5% or more may submit an agenda
item for shareholders meetings. Although the board may elect to reject agenda items submitted by
shareholders, such decisions must be based upon criteria prescribed in the Securities Exchange Act.
The criteria are relatively fair and precise. However, one of the criteria places the burden on the board
to decide on the practicality, feasibility, and/or appropriateness of a submitted agenda item. To date,
small shareholders have not attempted to call an emergency shareholders meeting.
While it is difficult to find Korean companies that establish a separate board subcommittee to manage
relationships with non-financial stakeholders, KT&G is exceptional in this regard. Established in May
2001, the Public Services Committee at KT&G has played an active part in managing such
relationships, including those with employees, customers, suppliers, and local communities.
Since 1994, KT&G has engaged in a wide range of civic activities in the areas of public
welfare, public health, education, environmental protection, and youth guidance. From 1994 to
2001, KT&G contributed KRW 84.3 billion to public welfare programs. Its programs included a
KRW 5 billion fund for unemployment assistance, a computer equipment donation campaign for
the disabled, and a program which pays for treatment received by child leukemia patients.
An example of the Public Services Committee’s effectiveness can be found in KT&G’s
relationship with its labor union, which has never gone on strike. This is rare in Korea where
labor unions at public enterprises or at newly privatized enterprises are traditionally very
influential and frequently use strikes as a tactic during negotiations with management.
This committee is also responsible for developing the company’s code of ethics. KT&G’s
Code of Ethics, Directors Code of Ethics, and Charter of Ethics were developed because of the
Public Services Committee’s active oversight. In July 2003, KT&G also announced its
Corporate Governance Charter, another product of this committee.
The number of legal suits pending against KT&G is small, and the largest amount being
claimed by these suits is KRW 307,000,000.
The company abides by domestic disclosure regulations, which include the Korean Fair
Disclosure Rule. The Fair Disclosure Rule was instituted by the Korea Securities Exchange to
eliminate information asymmetry within the securities markets. Fair Disclosure is required
when company insiders make available information to certain parties before making timely
public disclosure. Information subject to the Fair Disclosure obligation fall under four
categories. These are the company’s business plan and strategy, business outlook, operational
results for the fiscal year, and information subject to timely disclosure.
The existence of the Auditor and Executive Director position at the Board level, which is a requirement
under Korean law, enhances the independence and integrity of the audit process. Under this structure, the
internal audit function does not report to the finance function but instead reports directly to the Board. The
Internal Audit Office performs thirty-three different audits according to KT&G’s 2003 audit schedule -- five
general audits, eleven special focus audits, one in-depth audit and sixteen unscheduled audits. However, most
of these audits are oriented toward compliance issues, and a systematic audit of financial statements is not
included in the audit schedule. The latter may be due to a lack of accounting expertise within the Internal
Audit Office. This kind of expertise may not have been necessary in the past as pre-privatized KT&G was
subject to audits by the Korean congress and the Board of Audit and Inspection, a government agency. For
the most part, KT&G relies on its external auditor to audit financial statements.
KT&G’s Audit Committee is composed of one executive director and three non-executive
directors. The head of the Audit Committee is a university professor who teaches accounting
courses. He is also a CPA, certified in both the United States and Korea, with experience
preparing financial statements. While none of the other committee members can be considered
accounting experts, they are all financially literate. The Audit Committee is fully responsible for
the selection and management of the external auditor; and is the primary medium through which
the external auditor communicates with the company. Therefore, the strength and independence
of the Audit Committee offsets some of the weaknesses in the internal audit process.
The External Audit Act restricts listed corporations from replacing their external auditor within
three years of selection. Pursuant to this requirement KPMG Samjong, a member company of KPMG,
has been engaged to provide external auditing services for the next three years, starting with FY2003.
KPMG Samjong does not provide any non-audit type services to KT&G. The selection of KPMG
Samjong as external auditor involved an open tender process in which four accounting firms submitted
bids. Unwarranted information such as the fee amount received by the previous external auditor was
not offered prior to the bid. The selection criteria focused on accounting expertise and fee amount.
Prior to its privatization, KT&G did not develop a sophisticated risk management system, in part
because the government always supported the company’s finances. Although KT&G was
completely privatized in 2002, it has not yet created formal, written risk management policy
guidelines. On the other hand, the company has recently recognized this need and has proceeded to
develop a plan to remedy the situation. The plan calls for the creation of a task force to actively
analyze the company’s risks and a separate committee to develop risk management strategies.
KT&G’s Board currently consists of three executive directors and ten non-executive directors.
The three executive directors are the Chairman & CEO, Executive Vice President and Auditor.
None of the three have any significant activities outside of KT&G. While Korean law calls for
NEDs to comprise at least two-thirds of a board’s members, KT&G exceeds this requirement
with its current ratio of ten out of thirteen.
The NEDs appear to be independent from the company and its management. This is evidenced
by BOD activity reports that document instances where the NEDs modified or rejected proposals
submitted by management. While the board members have a diversity of experience and expertise,
some board members have expressed the need for someone with financial industry background. The
company is also considering the addition of a bilingual NED with international experience. The
NEDs serve for three-year terms that are not concurrent. The terms for five NEDs end in March
2004, while two end in 2005 and three in 2006. The two longest serving NEDs have been on the
board since 1997, and the average tenure for the current NEDs is about three years.
While the same person at KT&G holds the CEO and Chairman positions, the company has
no plan to separate the two. KT&G is comfortable with the level of independence and
participation demonstrated by its NEDs and feels that this arrangement has not created an
imbalance of power between management and the NEDs. Furthermore, the most senior NED
on the BOD (currently Mr. Jong Kew Park) has traditionally played an informal role as “lead
NED”. While this position is not formalized within the board structure, it provides a platform
for the NEDs to meet separately from the rest of the board.
Board and subcommittee meetings are held frequently, and attendance rates at these meetings
have been high. In 2002, there were twenty-two board meetings and twenty-seven separate
committee meetings with attendance rates exceeding 90% on average. The Steering Committee
met the most frequently while the Public Service Committee met the fewest times. Management
keeps detailed records of these meetings.
The compensation packages for all board members are cash based. The CEO and executive
directors receive a fixed base salary that is determined by the Management Compensation
Committee. The CEO and executive directors also receive a performance bonus that is paid in
cash. The CEO’s performance bonus is based on a scorecard that is included in the
Management Contract between the CEO and the company. The scorecard contains both
quantitative and qualitative components that include the company’s profitability, productivity,
market share, customer satisfaction, share price and dividend ratio, as well as an evaluation of
the CEO’s leadership. The Management Compensation Committee, which is comprised
exclusively of NEDs, conducts the CEO and executive director evaluations. However, the
bonuses paid to executive directors are based in part on the CEO’s performance evaluation.
While such a system clearly holds the CEO accountable for individual performance, it may not
sufficiently differentiate performance amongst the other executives.
A Corporate Governance Score (‘CGS’) reflects Standard & Poor’s assessment of a company’s corporate
governance practices and policies and the extent to which these serve the interests of the company’s
financial stakeholders, with an emphasis on shareholders’ interests. These governance practices and policies are
measured against Standard & Poor’s corporate governance scoring methodology, which is based on a synthesis
of international codes, governance best practices and guidelines of good governance practice.
Companies with the same score have, in the opinion of Standard & Poor’s, similar company specific governance
processes and practices overall, irrespective of the country of domicile. The scores do not address specific legal,
regulatory and market environments, and the extent to which these support or hinder governance at the company
level, a factor which may affect the overall assessment of the governance risks associated with an individual
company (see below ‘Country Factors’).
CGS 8 and CGS 7—a company that, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, has strong corporate governance
processes and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard & Poor’s opinion,
some weaknesses in certain of the major areas of governance analysis.
CGS 6 and CGS 5—a company that, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, has moderate corporate governance
processes and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard & Poor’s opinion,
weaknesses in several of the major areas of governance analysis.
CGS 4 and CGS 3—a company that, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, has weak corporate governance processes
and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, significant
weaknesses in a number of the major areas of governance analysis.
CGS 2 and CGS 1—a company that, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, has very weak corporate governance
processes and practices overall. A company in these scoring categories has, in Standard & Poor’s opinion,
significant weaknesses in most of the major areas of analysis.
GovernanceWatch
A ‘GovernanceWatch’ designation may be used to highlight the fact that identifiable governance events and
short-term trends have caused a CGS to be placed on review. GovernanceWatch does not mean that a change to
the CGS is inevitable. GovernanceWatch is not intended to include all CGSs under review, and changes to the
CGS may occur without the CGS having first appeared on GovernanceWatch.
Country Factors
Although Standard & Poor’s publishes country governance analyses from time to time, it is important to note that
Standard & Poor’s does not currently score individual countries. However, consideration of a country’s legal,
regulatory and market environment is an important element in the overall analysis of the risks associated with
the governance practices of an individual company. For example two companies with the same Company Scores,
but domiciled in countries with contrasting legal, regulatory and market standards, present different risk profiles
should their governance practices deteriorate i.e. in the event of deterioration in a specific company’s governance
standards, investors and stakeholders are likely to receive better protection in a country with stronger and better
enforced laws and regulations. However, in Standard & Poor’s opinion, companies with high corporate governance
scores have less governance related risk than companies with low scores, irrespective of the country of domicile.
In the absence of specific country governance scores, the sovereign credit rating can serve in many ways as a proxy.
Important Note
A CGS is based on current information provided to Standard & Poor’s by the company, its officers and any other sources Standard & Poor’s
considers reliable. A CGS is neither an audit nor a forensic investigation of governance practices. Standard & Poor’s may rely on audited
information and other information provided by the company for the purpose of the governance analysis. A CGS is neither a credit rating nor a
recommendation to purchase, sell or hold any interest in a company, as it does not comment on market price or suitability for a particular investor.
Scores may also be changed, suspended or withdrawn as a result of changes in, or unavailability of such information.
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