Psychology

at Berkeley
Highlights of Insight and Excellence in Undergraduate Research

University of California, Berkeley

Volume 4 - Spring 2011
i
 ii

Journal Staff
Editors-in-Chief
Alexandra Carstensen
Chardèe A. Galàn

Executive Editor
Gwen Bassett

Associate Editors
Christopher De Anda Hana Huff
Corey Brown Wesley Jackson
Ashli Butler Poruz Khambatta
Jeffrey Capps Michael Kneier
Laurel Chun Morgan Mann
Joeun Chung Mary Mykhaylova
Bryan Dickerson Batool Rizvi
Lameese Eldesouky Wren Yoder
Jose Gallegos Florencia
Rachel Gevertz
Natalie Goldberg
Irene Hong

Cover Art
Gwen Bassett

Executive Layout
Wesley Jackson

Associate Layout
Kristina Garfinkel

Web Design
David Allen
Wesley Jackson
iii

Table of Contents
iv Editors’ Note
Chardèe A. Galàn & Alexandra Carstensen
v Preface
Stephen P. Hinshaw

1 Transference and Social Power

Bryan Dickerson :: University of California, Berkeley
10 Sexual Nourishment: Transcultural sexual metaphors and the
framing of sexuality
Wesley Jackson :: University of California, Berkeley
16 A Developmental Study on the Susceptibility to the Framing
Effect and Individual Differences on Decision-making
Marissa Sharif, Linda Van Leijenhorst, Kristine McGlennen, and Adriana
Galvan :: University of California, Los Angeles
21 Fonts, Stars, and Cockroaches: The differential weighting of infor-
mational cues in judgment-based decisions
Tawny Tsang :: University of California, Berkeley

27 About the Authors

Psychology At Berkeley is an Associated Students of the University of California (ASUC) sponsored publication. The
ideas and opinions contained in this publication solely reflect those of the authors and not the University of California.
 Editors’ Note iv

W
elcome to the fourth edition of Psychology at Berkeley!  This
journal celebrates the dedication, tenacity, and intellectual
accomplishments of undergraduate researchers in psychology.

This publication is the product of the hard work and collaboration of

numerous authors and editors. These students and aspiring scientists have
labored with enduring dedication and passion for years to design, analyze,
compose, review, rewrite, and finally transform their research articles
into the professional pieces of work presented here. Bryan Dickerson
explores the interaction between relationships with significant others and
social power role expectations during transference encounters. Wesley
Jackson exposes how metaphorical frameworks of reproduction, selfhood, and
nourishment may underlie universal conceptualizations of human sexuality.
Marissa Sharif discusses how decision-making may be more influenced by
individual differences in personality than by differences in affective
processing due to developmental changes. Finally, Tawny Tsang demonstrates
that the content of a message outweighs its superficial features when
making judgment-based decisions.

As editors, we are exceedingly grateful to have had the opportunity to

work so closely with the many inspired, motivated, and passionate students
who make this journal what it is. In the past four years, Psychology at
Berkeley has grown from a small group of volunteer editors and authors
engaged in research at Cal to a large and diverse community of
undergraduate researchers across the country, involving courses,
conferences, and endless dedication from an amazing group of intensely
motivated young psychologists. We cannot wait to see what comes next.

This journal exemplifies the academic rigor, scholarly pursuit, and

intellectual enthusiasm at the heart of the Berkeley experience. We hope
that you will thoroughly enjoy reading this publication!

With pride,

Chardèe A. Galàn & Alexandra Carstensen

Editors-in-Chief
v Preface

P
sychology is both a social science and a life science, with both ‘basic’ and
‘applied’ aspects. The quantity of psychological research has exploded in
recent decades, and in many instances, so has its quality. We at Berkeley
have the singular goal of fostering research of the highest quality, in order to
understand the brain and mind, individual personalities and social interactions,
the contexts in which all humans develop (i.e., families, schools, and cultures),
normal and atypical development, and the ways in which all such information
might be used to promote optimal development, relationships, and functiniong.
Excellent research must “start young.”  Undergraduate investigations in our
Department deal with exciting, cutting-edge topics while similtaneously reflect-
ing key historical trends in the field. The quality of the work you will find in this
journal is stunning. Psychology has a bright future indeed when we know that
our undergrads are eager to pursue knowledge, work closely with mentors to
gain technical and conceptual prowess, and produce the kinds of findings herein
that push the field forward.  I congratulate the editors, the investigators, and
their mentors for combining their talents to yield the next edition of this excit-
ing and wonderful journal.

Stephen P. Hinshaw
Professor and Chair, Department of Psychology
University of California, Berkeley
vi
Volume 4 | Spring 2011 1

Transference and Social Power

Bryan Dickerson
University of California, Berkeley

In transference, an individual’s representation of a significant other is activated during encounters with new others,
leading to shifts in perception, evaluation, and behavior regarding the new person (Andersen & Glassman, 1996;
Chen & Andersen, 1999). Extending previous research, it was hypothesized that power-role dynamics should be
stored in memory within a significant-other representation and thus should be activated during transference en-
counters. A two-session transference experiment was employed in which participants first reported information about
their relationship with a significant other to whom they were an authority figure. Participants later returned for an
experimental session in which they expected to interact with a new person who either resembled their significant other
or not, and who shared the same power role as their significant other or not. As expected, transference led participants
to express elevated optimism and positive affect, consistent with the high-power authority role they typically possess
with their significant other. Moreover, transference effects were independent of the manipulation of authority role.

A n individual’s relationships to significant oth-

ers, such as their family, friends, and romantic
partners can profoundly influence his or her
feelings, thoughts, and behavior. Research has shown
that possessing a sufficient number of healthy, close
relationships generates happiness (Myers, 1999; My-
ers & Diener, 1995), improves health (Cohen, 2004;
Kiecolt-Glaser, 2002), and extends longevity (Berkman
& Syme, 1979). Additional research has demonstrated
that an individual’s specific relationships to significant
others can potentially influence his or her perceptions,
expectations, and behavior in interactions with new
people (Chen & Andersen, 1999).
One way in which relationships to significant others
can affect interactions with unrelated people is through
the social-cognitive phenomenon known as transfer-
ence (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Andersen & Glassmen,
1996; Chen & Andersen, 1999). In transference, cues
from the social environment, specifically the resem-
blance of a new person to a significant other, activate
an individual’s stored representation of that signifi-
cant other (ibid.). Once activated, the significant-other
representation leads the perceiver to behave, think, and
feel in a manner consistent with how that individual
typically does when with the relevant significant other
(for a review, see Andersen & Baum, 1994; Baum & An-
dersen, 1999). While a large body of research supports
the notion that significant others shape new interac-
tions through transference (for a review, see Andersen
& Chen, 2002), little work has yet been done examin-
ing how the social roles that significant others play in
people’s lives, such as bosses, parents, and employees,
impact transference processes. This experiment deter-
mines if power-role dynamics, such as the control and
influence of an individual in a relationship, are stored
within significant-other representations, and thus have
the potential to be activated during transference (Kelt-
ner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003).
The present study investigates the possibility that
© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/
the power role a person occupies in his or her relation-
ship with a significant other is stored in memory and
activated in transference, leading to power-role con-
sistent perceptions and affect whenever a significant-
other representation is activated (Keltner et al., 2003).
The present study advances existing research by ex-
amining role dynamics in transference and by studying
the interplay between the social-cognitive and affective
impact that both power dynamics and significant-other
representations have on one’s thoughts and feelings.
Transference and the Relational Self
According to the social-cognitive model of trans-
ference, knowledge about significant others and about
who the self is when with those significant others is
stored within memory structures known as significant-
other representations (Andersen & Glassman, 1996;
Chen & Andersen, 1999; Hinkley & Andersen, 1996).
These representations can easily become activated
through transference, wherein an individual encoun-
ters a new person who resembles his or her significant
other in traits such as personality, role, and physical
appearance. When a significant-other representation is
activated, the activation spreads, leading the perceiver
to “go beyond the information given” (Bruner, 1957),
and to evaluate the new person based on expectations
from the significant-other relationship.
There are two primary components of the transfer-
ence phenomena. The first consists of representation-
consistent inferences, in which individuals undergoing
transference infer that attributes of their significant
other (e.g., plays poker) are also characteristic of the
new person (Andersen & Cole, 1990). The second com-
ponent consists of representation-consistent evalu-
ations, in which individuals undergoing transference
evaluate a new person in line with his or her positive or
negative evaluation of their significant other (Ander-
sen & Baum, 1994). In addition to these two hallmarks
of transference, individuals undergoing transference
2 Transference and Social Power | Bryan Dickerson
also react behaviorally, emotionally, and motivationally
towards a new person in a manner consistent with the
activated significant-other representation (Andersen et
al., 1996; Berk & Andersen, 2000). For example, partic-
ipants expected a new target person to like and accept
them to a greater extent, and were more motivated to
emotionally approach the new person when that per-
son resembled his or her own positively toned signifi-
cant as opposed to when the new person resembled his
or her own negatively toned significant other (Ander-
sen et al., 1996).
Given all the information stored along with signifi-
cant-other representations, a person’s power role with-
in a relationship should also be activated in transfer-
ence, leading to power-role consistent perception and
affect in this context. Research suggesting that an indi-
vidual’s power role in a relationship is likely to be acti-
vated in transference is limited, but promising. Accord-
ing to transference research, information regarding the
social roles played out when with a significant other
should be highly salient, and should thus be stored in
memory along with other aspects of the relationship
(Baum & Andersen, 1999; Andersen & Chen, 2002). For
example, participants expecting to interact with a new
person who resembled a significant other experienced
a decrease in positive affect and an increase in negative
affect when they were assigned a power role for the
interaction that was inconsistent with the power role
they played within the relationship, suggesting that
relevant power-role information was being accessed
and utilized (Baum & Andersen, 1999).
In addition, research suggests that other social cat-
egory information, such as ethnicity, is stored within
a perceiver’s significant-other representation. For ex-
ample, participants were more likely to make inferences
about a new person’s ethnic background in transfer-
ence, consistent with the ethnic identity of their sig-
nificant other, when that person resembled their own
significant other as opposed to when that person did
not resemble their significant other (Saribay & Ander-
sen, 2007). This research suggests that an individual’s
power role within a relationship to a significant other
should be stored in memory and activated in trans-
ference, leading to power-role consistent perceptions,
evaluations, and affect during interactions with new
individuals.
Social Power and its Consequences
One of the most pervasive and influential role dy-
namics in both formal and informal social interactions
is that of power. Power within this context is defined
as the ability of an individual to influence the state of
another by overseeing punishment and denying re-
sources such as affection or financial resources (Chen,
Lee Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Ma-
gee, 2002; Keltner et al., 2003; Smith & Trope, 2006).
In many relationships, such that between mother and
child, president and intern, or boss and new employee,
it is clear who possesses a higher level of social power.
According to Keltner et al. (2002), elevated power is
associated with increased rewards and freedom and
thereby activates the behavioral approach system, lead-
ing to increased focus on one’s self and the achieve-
ment of potential rewards (Higgins, 1997).
There is a large body of work which supports the
above supposition, and numerous other cognitive, af-
fective, and behavioral consequences of social power
have been discovered. For example, elevated power
has been found to enhance and elicit the experience
of positive affect (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). It was
found that men, who were rated by their peers as being
high-power individuals, reported an elevated baseline
level of positive affect compared to individuals who
were not rated as being similarly powerful. Addition-
ally, possessing a high level of social power can influ-
ence individuals to exhibit greater optimism towards
personally relevant risks (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).
For example, it was found that both individuals pos-
sessing a high generalized sense of power, and indi-
viduals primed with a high-power mind-set, were more
optimistic in their perceptions of personally relevant
risks. For example, they rated themselves as less likely
than average to experience negative events common to
all people, were more likely to behave in a risk-seeking
manner, such as engaging in unprotected sex, and took
more risks during a face-to-face negotiation by divulg-
ing their interests to the other party (ibid.).
Extending the above research, this experiment
tests whether an individual undergoing transference
in an interaction with a new person would experience
power-related cognition and affect, consistent with the
power role they typically hold with their relevant sig-
nificant other.
The Present Study
To test the hypothesis presented above, a two-ses-
sion transference experiment was employed. In the first
session, participants completed an online pre-screen-
ing survey in which they reported information about a
relationship to a significant other to whom they were
an authority figure. A few weeks later, participants
possessing the kind of significant-other relationships
described above returned for the experimental session
in which they expected to interact with a new person
who was made to either resemble the significant other
or not. Participants were also assigned a role for the
anticipated interaction which either matched the high
power role they typically occupy in relation to their sig-
nificant other or did not match his or her high power
role. Participants then completed measures assessing
transference and power-related effects of affect (Kelt-
ner et al., 2003) and optimistic perceptions (Anderson
& Galinsky, 2006). It was hypothesized that regardless
of the power role of the new interaction partner, all
participants undergoing transference would experi-
ence elevated positive affect and optimistic perceptions,
consistent with the activated high-power role they usu-
ally play when with their significant other as compared
Volume 4 | Spring 2011
to participants not undergoing transference.
Method
Participants
Fifty undergraduate students at a large public
university participated in the experiment, either for
monetary compensation or course credit as part of a
requirement for a psychology class. The majority of
participants were female (n = 35), and the largest eth-
nic group was Asian American (n = 33), followed by
European American (n =10).
Materials and Procedure
Pretest session.
Participants first completed an online survey dur-
ing which they generated unique trait statements which
described a well-known, positively regarded significant
other (SO). Specifically, participants were asked to de-
scribe an individual whom they had known for a long
time, who had a significant impact on them, and who
they generally liked and accepted. Participants were
also asked to describe a significant other who seemed
less knowledgeable and experienced than them—that
is, someone who they were in a position to observe,
pass judgment on, and influence. Participants were
asked to indicate the length and nature of the relation-
ship shared with the significant other they identified.
After identifying a significant other who fit the
above criteria, participants generated written state-
ments that uniquely described the significant other. In
line with previous research on transference (e.g., An-
dersen & Baum, 1994), participants generated seven
positive and seven negative descriptive statements
about their significant other and ranked them in or-
der of relative descriptive importance. Participants
were instructed not to generate statements referring
to their authority within the relationship. In addition,
they were told to make their statements specific and
descriptive of the significant other, for example “Tere-
sa is reliable.” Participants then identified at least seven
traits from a list which were irrelevant to describing
their significant other (e.g., suave, eccentric). These de-
scriptors were used later on during the experimental
session as filler items in the recognition-memory test
used to assess representation-consistent inferences.
Participants also reported on a 9-point Likert scale
(1 = very negative, 9 = very positive) how positive or
negative the relationship with the significant other was
and about how positively they felt about their authority
role within the relationship. Participants then complet-
ed two questions on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = not at
all, 9 = very much) concerning how much they tended
to be an authority figure within the relationship and
how much control and influence they possessed within
the relationship.
Finally, in line with previous research (Kraus &
Chen, 2010), participants rated a set of 100 faces of
mixed age and ethnicity in terms of their resemblance
to their specific significant other. These photographs,
3
acquired from public databases (Face-Rec.org, n.d.),
were black and white forward facing pictures of the
face and neck. Participants rated each face on a 7-point
Likert scale with respect to how much they resembled
the face of their significant other (1 = not at all, 7 =
very much). The face which most resembled the par-
ticipant’s significant other was shown later to partici-
pants in the Own condition of the experimental session
in order to activate the participant’s significant-other
representation and generate transference effects.
Experimental session.
At least two weeks later, participants returned
for an ostensibly unrelated second experiment. Par-
ticipants who successfully completed the pre-screen-
ing measures, and rated themselves at least a 6 on the
9-point scale with respect to their authority within
their relationship with the significant other they de-
scribed in the on-line survey were invited to the second
session of the experiment.
In the second session of the experiment, partici-
pants were told they had been paired with, and would
later interact with, another person as part of research
for a student mentorship program that would be im-
plemented at the university the following year. Then,
participants were given a photograph, and were told
that the photograph was of their upcoming partner’s
face. The photograph was actually taken from the pre-
screening survey. Next, participants were given sever-
al vague descriptors about their partner’s personality,
which they were told were generated from a previous
phase of the research, but could actually be considered
true for all people (e.g., Davies, 1997; Furnham & Var-
ian, 1988). An example statement was: “Sometimes she
is self-confident, whereas other times she needs others
to like and admire her.”
The face of the upcoming partner was manipulated
to either resemble or not resemble participants’ signifi-
cant other based on their ratings of facial resemblance
during the pre-screening session. In the Own SO-
Resemblance (Own-SO) condition, participants were
shown the face of the person they rated as most resem-
bling their significant other, thereby eliciting transfer-
ence. The traits used in the transference measures were
taken from participants’ descriptions of their signifi-
cant other generated during the pre-screening session.
Participants in the Yoked-SO Resemblance (Yoked-SO)
condition saw the same photograph and list of state-
ments as participants in the Own-SO condition; howev-
er Yoked participants had rated that photograph as not
resembling their significant other (i.e., they had given
the photograph a rating of 1). This yoking procedure
removes the possibility of confounds due to idiosyn-
crasies in the appearance of the anticipated interaction
partner, and thereby served as a control condition.
In addition to expecting to engage in an interaction
with a person who either did or did not resemble their
significant other, participants were also manipulated to
anticipate interacting with that person in a role with
4 Transference and Social Power | Bryan Dickerson

high authority which would either be consistent with Optimism towards the upcoming interaction was
their role in relation to the significant other or not. assessed using a modified version of the 9-point op-
More specifically, after viewing the photograph and timism scale (-4 = very unlikely, 4 = very likely) used
statements about their alleged upcoming interaction in prior research (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; see Ap-
partner, Own-SO participants drew one of two name pendix A). The scale items were modified to be specific
tags randomly from a bag (“Boss” or “New Employee”) to optimistic perceptions regarding the upcoming in-
and were told that “the Boss will be in charge of the teraction, and were averaged to indicate participants’
upcoming interactive portion of the experiment, will overall optimism, with items pertaining to negative
decide which measures each of you complete, and will expectations about the interaction reverse-scored (M
have the opportunity to evaluate the New Employee’s = 1.30, SD = 1.29, a = 0.71). A sample item was: “My
performance on the measures at the end of the experi- interaction with my partner will go smoothly.”
ment.” Yoked-SO participants were assigned the same Participants’ current experience of affect was as-
power role as the Own-SO participant with whom they sessed using 14 discrete emotions (amusement, worry,
were paired. Thus, participants were randomly as- concern, enthusiasm, sadness, warmth, anxiety, love,
signed to one of four conditions: 2 (Own- vs. Yoked-SO excitement, upset, embarrassment, fear, happiness, and
Resemblance) x 2 (Power-Role Match vs. Mismatch). interest). Participants rated how much of each emo-
tion they were currently experiencing using a 7-point
Test phase. Likert scale (1 = not at all 7 = very much; Anderson,
After learning about their partner, participants Langer, & Keltner, 2001). Averages were computed re-
completed measures of transference assessing their flecting both mean positive (M = 3.68, SD = 1.07, a
evaluation of their interaction partner, with the expec- = 0.92) and mean negative (M = 5.42, SD = 1.06, a =
tation that Own-SO participants would evaluate the 0.92) emotion experienced in anticipation of the up-
partner more favorably than Yoked-SO participants, coming interaction. A total composite score for the el-
consistent with Own-SO participants’ evaluation of evated affect experienced by each participant was gen-
their significant other (Andersen & Baum, 1994). Par- erated by first adding the values of the seven positive
ticipants evaluated their partners by answering eight emotions (amused, enthusiastic, warm, loving, excited,
questions on 7-point Likert scales (1 = not at all 7 = happy, interested), and then subtracting the values of
very much). Sample items included “In general, how the seven negative emotions (worried, concerned, sad,
positive is your impression of this person?” and “How anxious, upset, embarrassed, afraid; M = 4.55, SD =
much do you desire to interact with this person?” Par- 1.40, a = 0.92)
ticipant scores were averaged over the eight items, with Manipulation checks for two manipulations — SO
the questions pertaining to their negative impressions resemblance and role — were included at the end of
of their interaction partners reverse-scored (M = 3.94, the experiment. For the role manipulation, participants
SD = 0.79, a = 0.84). responded to eight questions on 7-point Likert scales
Participants also completed a representation-con- (1 = disagree strongly 7 = agree strongly) pertaining
sistent inference measure of transference. Participants to their level of expected power in the upcoming in-
were asked how likely they felt that their interaction teraction (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Sample items
partner would possess each of 15 characteristics using included “I will be able to get my partner to do what
10-point Likert scales (1 = not at all, 10 = very much; I want” and “My ideas and opinions will be mostly ig-
Andersen & Cole, 1990). The characteristics were all nored.” Means were computed for these items, indicat-
taken from the Own-SO participant’s pre-screening ing participants’ sense of their own power within the
survey. In line with previous transference experiments anticipated interaction, with items relating to nega-
(ibid.), four positive descriptive statements (ranked as tive expectations being reverse-scored (M = 4.73, SD
the first, second, third, and seventh most descriptive), = 1.01, a = 0.88). Participants then rated how similar
four negative descriptive statements (ranked as the their partner in the experiment was to their actual sig-
first, second, third, and seventh most descriptive) and nificant other using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at
seven traits being listed as irrelevant to describing the all 7 = very much; M = 3.65, SD = 1.33). Next, par-
significant other (the first 7 listed) were used to gener-ticipants were given a standard suspicion probe asking
ate the measure, for example “He/she is always friend- them if any of the tasks were strange or difficult to
ly”. Mean scores were computed from the ratings of perform and to give their best guess about the hypoth-
how descriptive the positive and negative statements eses of the experiment. Finally, all participants were
were of the new person (M = 5.68, SD = 1.24, a = fully debriefed and then compensated for their partici-
0.76). The irrelevant descriptions were not included. It pation.
was expected that Own-SO participants would “go be-
yond the information given” (Bruner, 1957), and would
rate their interaction partner as being more likely to Results
possess characteristics that were relevant to the sig- One participant was excluded due to experimenter
nificant other but not more likely to possess irrelevant error. To maintain perfect yoking, their yoked partner
characteristics. was also excluded. The following analyses were con-
Volume 4 | Spring 2011 5

Representation Consistent Evaluation Representation Consistent Inference

4.5 7

4 6
Mean Likert Score

Mean Likert Score

3.5 5

3 4

2.5 3
2 2
Own-SO Yoked-SO Power-Role Power-Role Own-SO Yoked-SO Power-Role Power-Role
Match Misatch Match Misatch
Figure 1: Representation-consistent inferences and evaluations for Own-SO and Yoked-SO participants.
ducted using the remaining sample (n = 48). No par- that participants in the Own-SO condition felt that
ticipants successfully deduced the hypotheses of the they would have more power and authority during the
experiment. upcoming interaction (M = 4.96) than did participants
in the Yoked-SO condition (M = 4.51), F(1,45) = 2.82,
Manipulation of Transference p = 0.10. No other effects were significant for this mea-
To determine how manipulation of SO resem- sure (F < 1).
blance (transference) influenced the participants’ rat-
ings of their upcoming interaction partner in contrast Representation-Consistent Evaluation
to the significant other they identified for, the pre- To determine if transference occurred for partici-
screening surveys were compared. A 2 (Own vs. Yoked pants in the Own-SO, but not Yoked-SO condition, par-
SO) x 2 (Power-Role Match vs. Mismatch) between- ticipants’ responses to the items assessing their rep-
participants Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed resentation-consistent evaluations of their upcoming
a significant main effect. Own-SO participants (M = partner were examined. The items were subjected to
4.25) rated their partner as more similar to their actual the same 2 x 2 ANOVA. Analysis revealed participants
significant other relative to Yoked participants’ ratings in the Own-SO condition reported a greater tendency
(M = 3.04), F(1,45) = 12.73, p < .05). Interestingly, a to evaluate their upcoming partner in a positive man-
trend was also discovered for the power-role manipu- ner consistent with their positive evaluation of their
lation. Participants who were anticipating an interac- significant other (M = 4.27), relative to participants in
tion with a new person who shared the same power the Yoked-SO condition (M = 3.60), F(1,45) = 12.26,
role in relation to them as did their significant other p < .05 (see Figure 1). Interestingly, an additional
(M = 3.96) felt their significant other to be more simi- main effect was discovered, such that participants in
lar to the new person than did participants anticipating the Power-Role Match condition also demonstrated a
an interaction with a new person whose role did not greater tendency to evaluate the new person in a posi-
match the power role of their significant other in rela- tive manner consistent with their evaluation of their
tion to them (M = 3.33), F(1,45) = 3.40, p = 0.72. No significant other (M = 4.31) relative to participants
other effects were significant for this measure (F < 1). in the Power-Role Mismatch condition (M = 3.56),
F(1,45) = 9.87, p < .05. It is possible that the high-
Power-Role Manipulation power role may simply be perceived as more enjoyable
To determine if manipulation of the expected than the lower power role participants were assigned
power role a participant had for the upcoming inter- during the experiment, resulting in a generally posi-
action was successful, responses to the items assess- tive evaluation of the anticipated partner. No other ef-
ing how much power and authority participants felt fects were significant for this measure (F < 1).
towards the upcoming interaction with their partner
were examined. The measure was subjected to the Representation-Consistent Inferences
same 2 x 2 ANOVA. The analysis revealed that partici- As an additional means of determining if trans-
pants in the Power-Role Match condition (i.e., assigned ference effects had occured, participants’ responses to
a high power role for the interaction; M = 5.09) did, items assessing their representation-consistent infer-
in fact, rate themselves as more likely to possesses a ences were examined. The items were subjected to the
high level of power during the interaction relative to same 2 x 2 ANOVA as above. The analysis revealed
participants in the Power-Role Mismatch condition (M a significant main effect: participants in the Own-SO
= 4.38), F(1,45) = 6.72, p < .05. Interestingly, a trend condition reported a greater tendency to go beyond the
also emerged for the transference manipulation such information given, inferring that their anticipated part-
6 Transference and Social Power | Bryan Dickerson

Optimistic Perception of Risk Elevated Affect

2 3.5
1.5 3
Mean Likert Score

Mean Likert Score

1 2.5
0.5 2
0
1.5
-0.5
1
-1
-1.5 0.5
-2 0
Own-SO Yoked-SO Power-Role Power-Role Own-SO Yoked-SO Power-Role Power-Role
Match Misatch Match Misatch
Figure 2: Optimistic perception of risk and elevated affect for Own-SO and Yoked-SO participants.

ner possessed features in line with their significant oth- emotional states typically found in individuals possess-
er (M = 6.20), relative to participants in the Yoked-SO ing a high power social role. To test this prediction,
condition (M = 5.16), F(1,45) = 11.19, p < .05 (see Fig- participants’ responses to items assessing their present
ure 1). Interestingly, an additional main effect occurred emotional states, using the same 2 x 2 ANOVA, com-
for the power-role manipulation such that participants bining both the elevation of positive emotions and the
in the Power-Role Match condition also demonstrated reduction of negative emotions, was examined. The
a greater tendency to infer significant-other-consistent analysis revealed two significant main effects. A signifi-
characteristics regarding the upcoming partner (M = cant effect was found in which participants in the Own-
6.06) relative to participants in the Power-Role Mis- SO condition reported elevated positive affect and re-
match condition (M = 5.30) F(1,45) = 5.99, p < .05. No duced negative affect (M = 5.01) relative to participants
other effects were significant for this measure (F < 1). in the Yoked-SO condition (M = 4.10), F(1,45) = 11.37,
p < .05 (see Figure 2). Additionally, a significant main
Optimistic Perceptions of the Interaction effect was found in which participants in the Power-
The first central prediction was that participants Role Match condition reported elevated positive affect
undergoing transference would make optimistic per- and reduced negative affect (M = 4.83) relative to par-
ceptions of their upcoming social interaction, consis- ticipants in the Power-Role Mismatch condition (M =
tent with the high-power role they hold when with 4.28), F(1,45) = 4.27, p < .05. No other significant ef-
their significant other, whereas no such optimism fects were found for this measure (F < 1).
would occur for participants not undergoing transfer-
ence. To test this prediction, participants’ responses to Discussion
items assessing their optimism regarding the upcom- The literature on transference was extended by
ing interaction with the new person, using the same testing the idea that information regarding the high-
2 x 2 ANOVA were examined. The analysis revealed power role that participants typically play out when
two significant main effects, both of which were in with their significant other is stored in memory, within
line with this prediction. A significant main effect a significant-other representation, and activated during
emerged in which participants in the Own-SO condi- transference. As hypothesized, participants in the ex-
tion reported a greater level of optimism regarding periment undergoing transference showed evidence of
the interaction (M = 1.76) relative to participants in representation-consistent evaluations and inferences
the Yoked-SO condition (M = 0.85), F(1,45) = 8.02, p about an interaction partner who resembled their sig-
< .05 (see Figure 2). An additional significant main ef-nificant other, relative to participants not undergoing
fect was also discovered such that participants in the transference. Moreover, these same participants un-
Power-Role Match condition reported more optimism dergoing transference displayed elevated optimism and
regarding the upcoming interaction (M = 1.81), than positive affect in anticipation of the interaction. This
did participants in the Power-Role Mismatch condition is consistent with the optimism and positive affect they
(M = 0.81), F(1,45) = 9.70, p < .05. No other significant
presumably typically experience in their high-power
effects were found for this measure (F < 1). role with their significant other. Importantly, these ef-
fects remained independent of the manipulated power
Affect role of the upcoming interaction partner, even though
The second prediction was that participants under- participants primed for a high-power role experienced
going transference would experience elevated positive elevated positive affect and optimism, relative to par-
affect and reduced negative affect, consistent with the ticipants in a low-power role.
Volume 4 | Spring 2011 7

Interestingly, an additional main effect that was not new individual.

predicted occurred for the power-role manipulation. Finally, participants were instructed to describe
Specifically, participants perceiving a new interaction a significant other whom they regarded in a positive
partner who held the same power role as their signifi- manner. It would be useful to test the effects of power
cant other showed evaluation and inferences that were and transference when the participant expects to meet
consistent with the significant-other representation, a new person who resembles a significant other whom
relative to participants perceiving a new interaction they regard negatively. In this case, transference effects
partner with a different power role. The fact that the should still occur, but the positive affect and optimism
power-role matching activated transference processes experienced should be diminished by the overall nega-
suggests that the single role-consistent attribute held tive affect and expectations for an interaction generally
by the interaction partner was enough to activate felt when with that significant other.
transference for these individuals (e.g., Andersen et al.,
1995). Conclusion
Overall, the present study represents an advance It was found that role information related to pos-
in transference research by providing preliminary evi- sessing high social power within a relationship does
dence that social roles are activated in transference and appear to become activated during the transference
impact interactions in a significant-other representa- phenomenon. It may be possible that many types of
tion-consistent fashion. role information are being unconsciously accessed and
utilized during transference. Gaining additional insight
Future Directions into this process could allow for a deeper understand-
Additional work in this area includes examining ing of how interpersonal interactions occur across a
the effects that additional types of role dynamics (e.g., broad range of social situations.
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Volume 4 | Spring 2011 9

Appendix A: Optimistic Perception of Risk Measure

Now we would like you to rate how likely you think that each of the following events will occur in your up-
coming interaction with your partner. Again, there are no right or wrong answers, and your partner will not
see your responses. Please use the following scale.

-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
very unlikely neither very likely
likely nor unlikely

1.______My partner will not enjoy interacting with me.

2.______My partner will desire to interact with me.

3.______My partner will be nothing like me.

4.______ I will be able to be myself with my partner.

5.______My partner will argue or disagree with me.

6.______My partner will like me.

7.______I will feel artificial in my interaction with my partner.

8.______I’ll need to change myself to get along with my partner.

9.______My partner and I will share common interests.

10._____My interaction with my partner will go smoothly.

11._____It will be easy to express my true feelings and attitudes with my partner.
10 Sexual Nourishment | Wesley Jackson

Sexual Nourishment: Transcultural sexual metaphors and the

framing of sexuality

Wesley Jackson
University of California, Berkeley

The framing of human sexuality is largely metaphorical. Sexual experiences are commonly expressed in terms of
nurturance, nourishment, and reproduction, which in turn frame the perception of sexuality. The metaphors used to
understand sexual experiences typically emphasize either sexual roles or personal relationships, framing sexuality as
discrete (heterosexual versus homosexual) or continuous (without strict boundaries). Most research on sexual meta-
phor in the past has been limited to the domain of lust, precluding the formation of a comprehensive, coherent model
of sexuality in the larger social context of heterosexism and homophobia. The conceptual metaphor of Sex and
Sexuality as Nourishment, which pervades Tantric sexuality in India, explains how people understand the sexual
behavior of all sexualities without segregating sexuality into categories such as “heterosexual,” “homosexual,” and
“bisexual.” It explains a cohesive complex of sexual expressions not understandable from the more popular Sex as
Reproduction and Sexuality as Personhood metaphors . Personal testimonies across various cultures and sexuali-
ties along with historical evidence demonstrate the universality of this metaphor as a tool to conceptualize sexual
behavior and expectations.

Conceptual Metaphor and Problems With Current
Understandings of Human Sexuality
Though the intelligibility of alternative, or non-
heterosexual, sexualities in the West is surfacing after
decades of sexual liberation movements, homophobia
still dominates Western discourse. The institutionalized
privileging of heterosexuality, or heterosexism (An-
dermahr, Lovell & Wolkowitz, 1997), is largely a cultur-
al phenomenon, as cultures vary greatly in their accep-
tance of sexual behavior, and what is deemed “normal”
sexual behavior changes over time. This suggests that a
large component of one’s sexual tolerance may be cul-
tural. Although sexual tolerance varies across cultures,
systematic patterns exist in the linguistic expressions
used to describe sexual experiences. Three of the most
prominent of these are the conceptual metaphors Sex
and Sexuality as Nourishment, which frames sexuality
as fluid and diverse, and Sex is Reproduction and Sexu-
ality is Personhood, which frame heterosexism. The
metaphor of nourishment has been historically promi-
nent in the East, whereas the latter two have become
dominant in the West.
To understand how sex and sexuality are concep-
tualized in Western thought, it is necessary to under-
stand lust. This form of sexuality is complex because
it is experienced in multiple and varied ways, such as an
external force upon the experiencer, or a part of their
identity. Consequently, lust is understood differently un-
der different circumstances, giving rise to various con-
ceptual metaphors which frame the abstract concept of
lust through the framework of more concrete concepts
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).
Beneke’s Men on Rape is a compilation of interviews
revealing American cultural attitudes towards rape. Sev-
eral common conceptual structures, including the Sexu-
ality is a Physical Force metaphor and Sexual Emotions
are a Part of Human Nature, frame one man’s justifi-
© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/
cation of rape. The man suggested the woman would
be “giving off very feminine, sexy vibes.” Emphasis in
italics is added to indicate use of the Physical Force and
Human Nature metaphors in interpreting sexual expe-
riences. Beneke’s interviewee further explained that the
woman would be using her sexuality to control the man
by making him feel “degraded,” which would cause him
to “just turn off ” (as cited in Lakoff 1987, pp. 412–14).
The man frames sexuality in terms of external force
transfer and personal integrity: some foreign force over-
powers him and diverts his sexuality. His argument is
coherent and interpretable because the metaphors he
uses are commonplace.
Conceptual metaphors, such as those explained
above, are grounded in basic experiences of concrete
concepts such as space, physical force and warmth be-
cause these domains are relatively basic and consequent-
ly learned first. Because they are experientially moti-
vated from infancy, conceptual metaphors are learned
before language and thus comprise a cognitive phenom-
enon that “allows conventional mental imagery from
sensorimotor domains to be used for domains of subjec-
tive experience” (Lakoff, 1999, p. 45). Consequently, “no
metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately
represented independently of its experiential basis” be-
cause the experience constitutes the metaphor (Lakoff
& Johnson, 1980, p. 19).
Extensive psychological evidence supports the claim
that conceptual metaphors such as those suggested by
Lakoff and Johnson frame the unconscious understand-
ing of abstract concepts. Another common metaphor,
Affection is Warmth, constitutes an understanding of
statements such as “That was a cold thing to do” or
“She is warm-hearted.” In an experiment by Zhong and
Leonardelli (2008), participants who recalled times of
social exclusion judged the room temperature to be sig-
nificantly colder than people asked to remember times
Volume 4 | Spring 2011
of social inclusion. Two studies by Williams and Bargh
(2008) supported this finding with similar results. In the
first experiment, participants who briefly held a cup of
warm coffee judged people described in a personality
profile as warmer or kinder. In the second, participants
who held cold compress pads were later more likely to
choose a gift if it was framed as a personal reward rath-
er than a “treat for a friend.” Their physically experi-
enced coldness may have primed their social coldness.
Thus, metaphors used to understand affection in terms
of warmth reflect a trend in social behavior.
Because many latent experiences, such as lust, tend
to be abstract and thus understood metaphorically, it
should not be surprising that lust is commonly framed
by the more familiar experiences of hunger and nour-
ishment via the Lust as Hunger metaphor (Lakoff, 1987,
p. 409). This is illustrated by common metaphors and
terms which convery desire as if it were literally hun-
ger. Keith Harvey and Celia Shalom, who research Ap-
plied Linguistics and gender in English, respectively,
compiled many such metaphors from published sources
such as literature and magazines. They cite common
phrases such as “hungry for sex,” “craving sex,” and
“sex-starved,” which are metaphors which motivate no-
tions of “sexual appetite” (Harvey, 1997, p. 30). Sex is
further conceptualized as fuel, which is a more intense
metaphor for nourishment. This metaphor follows from
two experiences: “love and sex...create heat and energy”,
and “sex is a requirement to sustain life.” This motivates
metaphors such as “I’ll fill up your tank” (ibid., p. 153).
Love and sex blur through the metaphor of nourish-
ment; common pet-names that lovers use for each other
are derived from the experiential domain of food, such
as honey and sweet (Harvey, 1997, p. 30). The Bibli-
cal “forbidden fruit” may be considered a metaphor for
sexual union between Adam and Eve (Stavans, 2007, p.
52). Sexual metaphors in terms of nourishment corre-
late with conceptualization of sexual behavior as well.
Veronica Albin emphasizes the nourishing quality of
sexual affection: “kissing is about conveying affection,
whereas sucking is about being nurtured” (as cited in
Stavans, 2007, p. 52).
Why should a direct sensation such as lust or love be
understood in terms of food? Michele Emanatian (1996)
suggests that “sex is mysterious, in a way that eating re-
ally is not; for instance, we might not understand why
we are attracted to certain people, or why we feel lust-
ful at times” (p. 225). Although it may be difficult for
someone to understand why lust is directed towards a
specific person, this experience may be easily related to
interactions with food because both gustatory and sex-
ual experiences share similar schemas. Initially, one has
a certain desire and she searches for a way to satisfy her
desire. Then she obtains the object of desire, executes a
specific motor schema to satisfy the desire and finally is
satisfied (ibid., p. 205). It has been found that many cul-
tures around the world understand sexual behavior and
knowledge in terms of food and nourishment.
For instance, one New Guinea euphemism for se-
© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/
11
men is “male food” (Stavans, 2007). In Malawi, sexual
etiquette is described by idioms such as “you can’t eat
[candy] while it’s in the wrapper” and “sometimes, it
is better to [have] sex ‘meat to meat’ because if a per-
son wants to eat a banana, do they eat it along with the
peels?” (Undie, Chi-Chi, Crichton, & Zulu, 2007). Eti-
quette and preparation are necessary for both eating and
having sex. The more familiar experience of “eating” is
a source for understanding the sex process. This fram-
ing of sexual behavior in terms of gustatory behavior is
not culturally limited.
Michele Emanatian (1996) found that when Chagga
men speak of their sexual desire for a partner, they use
statements such as, “I want to eat her;” “I feel hunger;”
“I’m going to look for a little something to eat.” The
English metaphorical understanding of sex as hunger
is similar enough to the Chagga for even novel construc-
tions such as these to be understandable. Crucially, the
metaphor outlined above is actually reflected in cultur-
ally-relevant sexual behavior, evidencing its universality
as a tool in conceptually organizing sexual behaviors.
Linh, Khanh and Harris (2009) researched Vietnam-
ese male sexuality and its reflection in the language.
They state, “the Vietnamese have an underlying assump-
tion that men are inherently sexual [whereas women are
inherently asexual], and, therefore, premarital sex for
[men] is socially acceptable.” A related cultural expecta-
tion is that men cannot subsist sexually on their wives
alone, which follows from the premise that “women’s
sexuality exists only for serving men.” This primacy
of gender roles is reflected in their sexual metaphors,
which frame heterosexism under the general Sex and
Lust as Food metaphor (Linh, Khanh & Harris, 2009).
For example, “The husband takes his “rice” [wife] to
have noodles for breakfast, then takes his “noodle” [ex-
tramarital sweetheart] to have rice for lunch.” Further-
more, if a man has sex with his extramarital “sweet-
heart,” she is referred to as his “meaty roll,” whereas she
is just his “vegetarian roll” if no sex is involved. Since
in Vietnam sex is an act to satisfy the needs of a single
person and is understood in terms of different foods for
men, the metaphor expresses the cultural promiscuity
of the male sex. Thus, systemic cultural expectations of
male and female sexual roles are preserved via the Lust
as Hunger metaphor.
Why does Lust as Hunger frame heterosexist sex
roles in Vietnam even though this was not shown for
the Chagga or New Guinea cultures? Though all three
cultures share similar understandings of lust, they do
not necessarily share the same sexual categories (e.g.
“heterosexual” versus “homosexual”). Hence, sexuality
is not exclusively framed by lust. Indeed, analysis shows
the conceptualization of the sex act to be another cru-
cial determinant of how sexuality is understood. That
is, “sex” can shift the frame of love from that of selfless
nourishment to selfish desire. In this vein, Dr. Spurgeon
English notes that “Man’s love for woman is accepted
as a great, unselfish thing. But man’s sexual [sic] love
for woman is regarded by almost everyone as another
12
matter entirely. Few realize that man’s longing to give
to and share with his mate also exists in his sexual love
for her” (as cited in Montagu, 1953, p. 163). This illus-
trates that sex is commonly excised from a nurturing
emotional context and placed in a medical framework in
which the man merely “gives,” and the woman “takes;”
the man “must always play the role of pursuer and ag-
gressor” (ibid., p. 165). English laments that “there is
no universal word which can be applied to the act of
lovemaking which expresses the...mutual fulfillment of
both sexes” (ibid., p. 168). Thus, the conceptualization
of “sex” underlying the Vietnamese use of Lust as Hun-
ger may inherently frame heterosexism.
Indeed, the common metaphor of Sex as Reproduc-
tion may inhibit thinking of “mutual fulfillment” in sex-
ual contexts. In the West, this metaphor is often taken as
an absolute fact: sex is defined as an act of reproduction
with necessary active masculine and passive feminine
roles. For example, historically lesbian sexuality has
been thought of as impossible since sex requires a defi-
nite active penetrator and a passive recipient (Facing,
1999). Akshay Khanna explains that Western discourse
about sexuality is governed by the metaphor “Sexuality
as Personhood” in which sexuality is something “inside
the person...that needs to be ‘expressed’” (as cited in The
Phobic, 2007). Consequently, one’s desires determine
how one is categorized, which allows different sexuali-
ties to create different kinds of people. As a result, if
you are male and you desire men, you are a separate kind
of person who may be thought of in terms of sexuality
as dichotomy; e.g. you are a “homosexual.” When sex is
constrained to a reproductive context and one’s sexual
desire determines a category to which a person belongs,
sexuality is framed in terms of concrete heterosexist re-
productive roles. As both homosexuals and heterosexu-
als can find alternate sexualities intelligible, however,
another conceptualization of sexuality enabling such
understandings should be hidden by the Sexuality as
Personhood metaphor.
Sexuality as Nourishment
Sex as Reproduction is not the only way sex is un-
derstood. In fact, it is contradicted by geneticist Bryan
Sykes: “Although we naturally combine the two process-
es [sex and reproduction] into one...they are not...quite
so dependent.” Indeed, many species reproduce asexu-
ally; thus, “sex just cannot be essential for reproduction”
(2004, pp. 80-2).
A natural objection at this point would be that for
humans sex has the purpose of reproduction, so there is
no practical reason to divide sex and reproduction in hu-
man sexuality. This conclusion, however, is still in error.
Reproduction is just one potential consequence of sex in
humans. Sex as Reproduction is an incomplete explana-
tion of the sex act because it ignores the diverse, com-
plex and nurturing role sex has played in human evolu-
tion. Sex strengthens trust, solidifies bonding, and even
plays a significant role in the evolution of monogamous
relationships by enabling the female to “entice or force
© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/
Sexual Nourishment | Wesley Jackson
him [her monogamous male partner] to stay at home
with her, and to get him to provide lots of protection
or help for her baby” (Diamond, 1997, pp. 86-7). This
may still sound like a reproductive function, but there is
direct selection pressure for mutual trust and bonding
between the sexes. These nurturing aspects of sexuality
are obscured when sex is constrained to a reproductive
framework. Thus, human sex and sexuality cannot be
reduced to reproduction because sex plays a significant
role in areas of survival independent of heterosexual
reproduction. Although Western culture often reduces
sex to mere reproduction, not all cultures have.
The psychological effects of framing sex in terms
of reproduction are emphasized when cultures lacking
this metaphor are analyzed. The ancient Indian religion
Tantra makes the Western notion of discrete sexuality
unintelligible. Whereas Western thought necessitates a
strict sexual binary of male versus female, “sexual dual-
ism [one’s ability to have both masculine and feminine
qualities] in each individual was a principle enunciated
in ancient traditions in India” (A lotus, 1993, p. 24). Sex-
ual coupling in Tantric religion did not require “male”
and “female” sexual roles because biological sex was a
continuous category. In this way, sex is not thought of
as the means of reproduction: “importance was not at-
tached to the ‘male-female couple...sexuality was based
on fertility and pleasure, but not on progenity” (A lo-
tus, 1993, p. 25). There is a critical distinction between
“fertility” and “progenity”. Fertility implies nourish-
ment, as land is often called “fertile.” “Progenity” is a
strictly reproductive term, however, which inhibits one
from thinking in terms of mutual nurturance and nour-
ishment. Instead, the frame of reproduction is evoked,
which emphasizes sexual roles. The difference between
experiencing sexual roles versus sexual relationships as
a mutual process is emphasized by the disparity between
Sex as Reproduction and the Tantric understanding of
desire.
Although the West has long believed desire to be a
part of nature and, as such, immoral or animalistic, the
Tantra claims that if “the Divine” exists everywhere,
then it must also be present in the body and in bodily
desires (Feuerstein, 1998). Consequently, sexual ener-
gies are divine, and hence sexuality mediates the two
primal male and female energies of the universe: Shiva
and Shakti, respectively. As Fuererstein (1998) states,
sexuality is “a seamless continuity of Consciousness and
Power” (p 79) and “sex is love play between Shiva and
Shakti” (p 227). The phrase “love play” places sex in a
framework of nurturance and nourishment because the
process and relationships are emphasized over the roles
of agent and patient, or the objects of desire.
The Tantric emphasis of sexual processes and re-
lationships over sexual roles is reflected in a statement
made by Hanne Blank, a heterosexual interviewed on her
sexuality: “being a cocktease is filled with the emotional,
intellectual, and very, very physical awareness that sex
is about desire, not completion.” (as cited in Sex, 2000,
p. 8) This distinction between “desire” and “completion”
Volume 4 | Spring 2011
is crucial. “Desire” facilitates nurturing and maintaining
the emotional process whereas “completion” emphasizes
the object of desire.
Because sexual roles are recognized, Tantric sexual-
ity does not evoke Sex as Reproduction and thus per-
mits the intelligibility of non-heterosexual sexualities.
Indeed, the god Shiva is often represented as ardhanari
(“half woman”), symbolizing the union of male and
female energies (A lotus, 1993). Also, family structure
comprised not a father and a mother but “multiple moth-
ers.” In fact, “the first notion of ‘heterosexuality’ ap-
peared under the terminology of a-jami, that which is
not jami [“paired” or “fused”]” (ibid., p. 26). The lack
of mutually exclusive sex roles constrained by repro-
duction permits alternate sexualities to exist. This also
motivates metaphors emphasizing processes and rela-
tionships without discrete roles. Sex as Nourishment
is congruent with this framing of sexuality and would
conceptually preserve it.
When one analyzes the way in which non-hetero-
sexuals speak of sex and sexuality it is clear that Sexu-
ality as Nourishment more effectively models how they
experience sexuality than Sexuality is Personhood. For
example, non-heterosexuals commonly refer to their
sexual repression as “silencing” or “being invisible”
(Facing, 1999). The term “silencing” evokes a power
dynamic in which the speaker wishes to be heard but
mutual communication is refused by the listener. “Invis-
ibility” similarly entails that the repressed sexuality is
denied public recognition. For example, Claudie Lesseli-
er quotes one French lesbian who claimed, “I had a long-
ing for communication, for recognition, more than for
justification” (ibid., p. 117). For this woman, awareness
of the label “lesbian” lacks the interpersonal connection
necessary for communication and recognition. Homo-
sexual Pam Mitchell said, “a fog had descended between
myself and...[my] sexuality” (as cited in Smash, 2009,
p. 187). “Fog” evokes a barrier between himself and his
sexuality. All of these metaphors entail an outside force
preventing some kind of connection. Sexuality as Nour-
ishment provides the inferential structure of nurturance
and nourishment necessary for these metaphors to make
sense.
The metaphors of being “closeted”, “silenced”, or
“invisible” are intelligible because they evoke the experi-
ence of communication as connection, as characterized
by Reddy’s conduit metaphor (Reddy 1979). Sexuality as
Nourishment allows sexuality to be understood in terms
of interpersonal connections, as required by metaphors
used to describe sexual repression. Sex as Reproduction
and Sexuality as Personhood, however, do not emphasize
these crucial relationships and thus cannot explain why
many non-heterosexuals speak of sexuality in terms of
connections and communication.
Most challenging to the Sexuality as Person-
hood metaphor is that many queer people neither desire
nor understand sexual labeling, a phenomenon congru-
ent with Sexuality as Nourishment. Lesselier notes that
“the very large majority of [lesbian] women I inter-
© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/
13
viewed simply affirm the ‘naturalness’ of lesbianism…
[which] need not be justified” (as cited in Facing, 1999,
p.p. 118-9). Also, many lesbians claimed not to under-
stand why their sexuality should be labeled, “seeing it as
a label for others…even when confident in [their] sex-
uality” (ibid., p. 121). Sexuality as Personhood entails
that sexual differences have specific causes and labels. If
people of alternate sexualities deny this, then Sexuality
as Personhood cannot model their experience of sexu-
ality. Within the framework of Sexuality as Nourish-
ment, however, the labeling of sexuality or suggesting
its causes would be nonsensical because neither of these
is part of its conceptual structure. Consequently, Sexu-
ality as Nourishment explains the common denial of
sexual categories.
Sexuality as Nourishment may extend into the do-
main of health. According to Link, Al, and Copeland
(2007): “Affectionate touch and satisfying sex nourish
you and your relationship. Sensual nutrition is not just
in your head” (p. 6). Emphasis has been added to show
which words evoke nourishment, William Lloyd (1964)
writes, “desire...for hugging, kissing, caressing, contact,
closeness and the most pressing and intimate touch, is
not vicious or suspicious, but a physiological, a food de-
sire. One needs meats of sexual touch, just as one needs
meals of food.” If sexuality can evoke the concept of
health or well-being, then the concept of ill-being may
also arise. Because any nutriment in excess or abuse
may be harmful, this argument may extend to “sexual
gluttony” and “poisonous...sexual contacts” (ibid., p. 27).
Crucially, Sex as Reproduction does not motivate state-
ments such as these, since the well-being of the indi-
vidual is irrelevant to the act of reproduction
Annie Sprinkle, a bisexual (sexually interested in
both sexes [Andermahr et al., 1997]) interviewed on
her sexuality extends Sexuality as Nourishment to the
domain of healing and medicine. She states that “sex is
not about sticking a penis into a vagina...[but] about
tapping into, building, sharing, and utilizing sexual
energy...I use sex as a healing tool, as a meditation, a
way of life, and as a path to enlightenment.” (as cited
in Bi, 1991, p.p. 103-4) Sexual “energy”, “sharing” and
“healing” evoke nurturance and nourishment and are
unintelligible if sexuality is framed as gender preference
and sex is just a reproductive act. In a similar interview,
Leonard Tirado states: “Bisexuality can be soul-healing
at its deepest. Through it we can tap into a commonal-
ity, an empathy, a state of communion that shares with
others all of life’s fullness” (ibid., p. 122). Emphasis has
been added to reveal words made coherent by the frames
“nurturing” and “nourishment.”
Sexuality as Nourishment even may explain the be-
havior of sadomasochist (S/M) couples, which ostensi-
bly involve anything but nourishment and well-being.
Sadism is the sexual pleasure in physical or emotional
domination, humiliation, or infliction of pain; whereas
masochism is pleasure in the reception of such treat-
ment (“Sadomasochism”). Meg Weber speaks of her
lesbian S/M partner in an interview: “Alex’s adulation
14
nourished me in ways I can’t fathom...[she] captivated
my entire being—mind, heart, soul, cunt.” (as cited in
Sex, 2000, p.p. 41-2) For Meg, S/M is about “nourish-
ment” and “trust,” (ibid.) as she is at the complete mercy
of her partner. According to Meg, “pleasing Alex was
all that mattered...[the] opportunity to earn her praise
and attention...infused with a personal strength...to con-
cede...[it is about] pain and power, not as static polar en-
tities but as intricate amalgams of experience” (ibid., p.
44). Thus, power roles within a framework of sexuality
as nourishment may be independent of sexual gender
roles. Since power differences are not necessarily gen-
der differences, dominance and submission in sex can be
nourishing and pleasurable for both partners.
The failure to realize the independence of sex roles
and heterosexist power roles is a source of confusion
and anxiety for many non-heterosexuals. For example,
Mara Math recounts the difficulty of being accepted by
lesbians for her bisexuality: “[lesbians thought] I was
ripping them off somehow [by being bisexual rather
than “a ‘real’ lesbian”]...There was the pervasive sense
that pure sexual attraction was invalid and invalidating”
(as cited in Smash, p.p. 71-3). The inability to think out-
side of the Sex as Reproduction metaphor explains this
guilt and her rejection by lesbians. If sex is constrained
to reproductive roles, then sexual attraction must tar-
get a single role. Furthermore, if sexuality is a part of
personhood, then a “real lesbian” is a woman who de-
sires only women. Consequently, having sex with men
and women contradicts the category of “lesbian” and is
an invalid sexuality. Even lesbians who are comfortable
with sex, however, may hold contradictory definitions
of what “sex” is. concepts. If a visual prime requiring processing in the
Many lesbians define sex according to the hetero-
sexist definition of penetration: “Lesbians were asked,
‘What would have to happen between you and another
woman for you to call it sex?’ And they answered... ‘mu-
tual fucking’...’feeling her in me’...[and] ‘penetration’”
(Creith, 1996, p.p. 66-7). Still others seemed to follow
the Sexuality as Nourishment conceptualization of mu-
tual emotional connection: “For us to agree that what
we both had was sex;” “Varies according to the partner;”
“It’s the working towards the wetness [nurturing the
desire] that is a big part of sex;” and “The more intense
the desire, the less has to happen for me to feel I am
‘having sex’” (Creith, 1996, p.p. 67-69). Thus obviously
many sexually active lesbians are not turned off by a
heterosexist definition of sex. They either experience
sex as nourishment and nurturance or, if they still use
the penetrative definition, they do not perceive sexual
roles as heterosexist. Again, Sexuality as Nourishment
explains this sexual behavior because reproductive sex
roles are ignored and instead sexual nurturance is em-
phasized.
Conclusions and Implications
Awareness of the conceptual metaphors used to un-
derstand sexual behavior is crucial since each has its own
logic and social implications. The common metaphors
© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/
Sexual Nourishment | Wesley Jackson
of Sex as Reproduction and Sexuality as Personhood
constrain sexuality to reproductive roles and divide it
into strict categories, ignoring its potential to nourish
relationships and promoting heterosexism by ignoring
aspects of sexuality captured by Sexuality as Nourish-
ment. This latter metaphor, however, emphasizes the
impact of sexuality on well-being and ablates the need
for sexual categories. Thinking of sexuality in terms
of mutual nourishment is not only more physically and
spiritually fulfilling, but it is also already common, as
evidenced by its prevalence across various cultures and
time periods. The perception and acceptance of sexu-
ality would be healthier if the nourishing and nurtur-
ing roles of sexuality were emphasized more in public
speech. Thus, the bond between love and sexuality re-
mains unbroken and the fluid myriad nature of human
sexuality may be fully appreciated.
Suggestions for Experimental Research
A plethora of linguistic and historical evidence in-
dicates that human sexual behavior and sexuality may
be modeled by the Sex is Reproduction and Sexuality is
Nourishment metaphors. It is unlikely that a complex
relationship of concepts such as these should have spon-
taneously arisen in language and sexual behavior across
the world.
If neural networks used in human experience of
sexuality exploit preexisting networks that process in-
formation regarding nourishment and nurturing behav-
ior, as suggested in George Lakoff ’s Neural Theory of
Metaphor (Lakoff 2009), then a simple priming experi-
ment should reveal a deeper relationship between these
domain of nourishment facilitates processing of sexual
information, then this would suggest that nourishment
schemas may be used similarly to sexual schemas in the
processing of sexual information. Such a finding would
indicate the Sexuality as Nourishment metaphor is au-
tomatic and unconscious. A similar process must be ap-
plied to Sex is Reproduction to determine its role in
sexual categorization.
References
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of feminist theory. New York, NY. Arnold.
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© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/

16 Susceptibility to the Framing Effect | Marissa Sharif

A Developmental Study on Susceptibility to the Framing Effect and

Individual Differences on Decision-Making

Marissa Sharif
University of California, Los Angeles

Adolescents stereotypically make risky decisions. Research suggests that emotional and societal factors, in addition
to cognitive processes, influence decision-making. This study addresses a previously untested theory that adolescents
make poor decisions more frequently than adults due to differences in affective processing across development, which
may cause adolescents to be more susceptible to the framing effect than adults. The framing effect states that presenting
the same problem in different ways (e.g., in terms of a loss or a gain) can reverse people’s risk-taking preferences
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Participants in this study were given three tasks: the ADMQ, the Flinders Adolescent
Decision Making Questionnaire; the WASI, a test of intelligence; and the CUPS task, a decision-making task which
requires participants to make decisions under different contexts. Data revealed that adolescents performed similarly
to adults in decision-making tasks, regardless of the choices’ framing. The results of this study provide further
insight into the decision-making patterns across various age groups and suggest that decision-making may be more
influenced by individual differences in personality than by differences in affective processing due to developmental
changes.

A lthough adolescents engage in riskier and often

more life-threatening activities than adults
in the real world (Easton, Kinchen, Ross,
Hawkins, Harris, & Lowry, 2006), both have similar
logical-reasoning abilities and are equally capable of
assessing risks (Steinberg, 2005; Fischhoff, 1992; Van
Leijenhorst, Westenberg, & Crone, 2008). Adolescent
risk-taking has typically been studied under the
cognitive framework, which is to say that risk-taking
is considered a product of a series of reasoned
decisions, involving evaluation and computation of
the relative costs and benefits of particular courses of
action. However, this cognitive approach of studying
decision-making may bear little resemblance to
the real world adolescents live in, as it neglects the
emotional influences involved in making decisions.
Decision-making is now being thought of as
more than just a cognitive process (Steinberg, 2005).
Many daily decisions involve intuition, or “gut
feelings,” which appear to result from the brain’s
affective systems. These systems are responsible for
the emotions associated with the possible positive
or negative consequences of a decision, and unlike
cognition, they perform computations that are
mostly outside of conscious awareness (Lowenstein
& Lerner, 2003; Steinberg, 2005). These affective
processes, which are a component of decision-
making, may change throughout maturation (Spear,
2000; Steinberg, 2004). During adolescence many
developmental changes occur in the prefrontal cortex,
which is activated during tasks involved in planning,
inhibitory control, and decision-making. These
changes may account for the potential differences
between adolescents and adults in emotional
© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/
responses to risky situations. Additionally, according
to fMRI studies, adolescents show greater brain
activity than adults when presented with a potential
reward, which suggests that adolescents may focus
on the potential rewards of a risky action more than
adults do (Galvan, 2006). Thus, adolescents and adults
may experience different emotions when making a
decision. In short, adolescents and adults differ in
affective processing, yet they have similar cognitive
processing when making decisions. Since both
affective and cognitive processing influence decision-
making, the potentially different affective influences
on decision-making could explain adolescents’
increased risk-taking compared to adults’.
Affective processing is an important component
of the framing effect. The framing effect states that
presenting the same problem in different ways can
reverse people’s risk-taking preferences (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981). Tversky’s and Kahneman’s
participants showed a statistically significant
tendency to take risks in the loss frame, where
their choices are presented as losses, and to choose
the guaranteed outcome in the gain frame, where
choices are presented as gains. If participants were
operating solely on logic, their results should have
shown no preferences for one option or the other,
as the two options in the study were statistically
the same outcome. Their tendencies to prefer one
choice over another is therefore not determined by
logic (cognitive processing), but rather by the other
component of decision-making: affective processing.
According to the motivational theory of the framing
effect, participants base their decisions on their fears
of possible negative consequences and their hopes
Volume 4 | Spring 2011
for possible positive consequences, and their fear of
negative consequences evokes a stronger emotional
response than their hope for possible positive
consequences does (Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, &
Just, 2005). As affective processing is an important
component of the framing effect, and it changes
during development, adolescents may experience
the framing effect differently than adults do. The
current study examines differences in various age
groups’ susceptibilities to the framing effect. In
this study, when participants have the possibility of
winning money, they are thinking about the potential
risks in terms of gains, and when participants have
the possibility of losing money, they are thinking
about the risks in terms of losses. Thus, the general
thought frames of “gain” and “loss” are present, and
may potentially affect participants’ willingness to
take risks. This is how the current study looks at the
framing effect.
Of course, there are other characteristics
of people that influence their decision-making
capabilities. Intelligence also affects decision-making
across all ages. The ability to anticipate and override
emotional responses might be related to intelligence
(Stanovich & West, 2008). Based on scores from the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), individuals with
higher intelligence scores make significantly riskier
choices when the risk is presented as a gain and
significantly fewer risks when the risk is presented
as a loss, as compared to individuals with lower
intelligence scores (Frederick, 2005). Individual
differences in personality characteristics, such as
impulsivity and shyness, also significantly affect
decision making. Impulsivity is positively correlated
with risk-taking in young children, and shyness is
negatively correlated with risk-taking (Levin & Hart,
2003). Prior studies indicate that individuals take
fewer risks if they are more socially assimilated and
have a higher need for achievement (Scodel, Ratoosh,
Minas, 1959). Thus, personality characteristics
also influence decision-making. This study predicts
that adolescents and adults will significantly differ
in their susceptibility to the framing effect due to
differences in their affective processing, which will
affect their willingness to make risky decisions.
Additionally, participants will be measured to assess
if their individual personality characteristics and
intelligence levels affect the decisions they make in
this experiment.
Methods
Participants
The experiment included 31 participants (M
=18.32 years, SD = 5.72 years) divided into three
groups: 11 younger adolescents (ages 10-14), nine
older adolescents (ages 15-17), three younger adults
(ages 18-21) and 11 adults (ages 22-30), mostly from
Los Angeles County. Participants from the five-to-
eight-year-old age group were excluded because
17
they were either confused about or failed to complete
the ADMQ or the CUPS task. Participants from the
18-to-21-year-old age group were a very small sample
and did not complete the ADMQ, so they were not
used in analysis. Participants were asked to complete
the ADMQ, the Matrix section of the WASI, and the
computerized CUPS tasks to be considered eligible for
analysis. Subjects were paid $15/hour to participate or
were given class credit.
Procedure
Participants were required to provide consent to
participate in the study. Participants under 18 years
of age provided assent and their legal guardians
provided consent. If participants or their parents
consented, a trained research assistant would orally
administer a portion of the Weschler Abbreviated
Scale of Intelligence (WASI). The WASI is a
nationally-used standardized intelligence test used
to assess specific and general cognitive abilities
(“Wechsler”). The WASI includes four subtests, but
only the matrix reasoning subtest was used in this
study. This subsection is an untimed test consisting of
series of logical patterns that measures the abstract
nonverbal reasoning ability of each participant. Each
question consisted of a logical pattern of various
different shapes, with one piece of the pattern
missing. The participants were asked to choose which
of five shapes would best follow the pattern.
After completing the WASI, participants
completed the computerized CUPS task, a game
that assesses decisions made under different frames
of a situation. The participants played this game in
two different conditions: a gain frame condition and
a loss frame condition. In each frame, participants
saw a computer screen divided into two options:
a guaranteed monetary outcome and a gamble. In
the gain frame condition, participants could choose
the guaranteed monetary outcome, in which they
would definitely gain $2, or the gamble, in which
they had either a one-half chance of receiving $4, a
one-third chance of receiving $6, or one-fifth chance
of receiving $10. These two options were shown to
the participants as one upside-down cup with two
dollars under it, and either two, three, or five upside-
down cups with money under only one of the cups
(see Figure 1). Participants were required to choose
either the certain side with a guaranteed amount of
money, or the risky side with a possibility of winning
money. If they chose the risky option, the computer
randomly picked one of the cups from the risky side
of the screen for them. The computer revealed the
result after each round. Thus, if participants chose
the guaranteed cup, they would see “+$2” on the
following screen. If participants chose the risky
side with multiple cups and the computer randomly
chose the cup with the money, they would see their
winnings on the screen (e.g. “+$10”). If participants
chose the risky side with multiple cups and the
18 Susceptibility to the Framing Effect | Marissa Sharif

1500  
ms  
 

3000
 
ms
  *
 
Time
 
Jitter

  Figure 2. The Effect of Frame on Decision-Making. Gain vs.

  Loss Frame: Individuals make more risky decisions when the choice
is presented as a gain rather than as a loss. There is no significant
difference between age groups.
1500
Figure 1. The Cups Task in the Gain Frame. Individuals questionnaire was used to assess if individual
msare forced to
choose one side, a guaranteed monetary outcome (right side) or a higher
personality characteristics affected the decisions
but uncertain monetary outcome (left side) in different frames (gain vs.
loss). participants made, and to account for other potential
differences in individuals’ risk-taking. These
computer did not choose the cup with the money, personality characteristics, specifically proven to
they would see “+$0.” Although the two choices were influence decision-making, may further explain why
presented as a guaranteed win and a risk, the expected some participants make riskier choices than others.
end values of both sides were equal. For example, if a
participant chose the guaranteed $2 for five rounds, he Results
or she would end the game with $10. If a participant In examining the effect of frame on decision-
chose the risky side with a one-fifth chance of making, a one-way within-subjects analysis of
receiving $10 for all five rounds, it is expected that he variance (ANOVA) yielded a significant interaction
or she would receive $10 approximately once and $0 between frame (gain frame and loss frame) and risk
approximately four times, resulting in a total of $10. (F(2, 52) = 11.55, p < .001). Individuals took more
The game followed the same pattern for the “loss” risks in the gain frame than in the loss frame (F(1, 26)
frame, but with negative monetary values. = 7.39, p = .01) (see Figure 2). This effect was equally
Lastly, participants completed the Flinders present in each age group (Frame x Age Group: ns, p
Adolescent Decision Making Questionnaire. The = .76).
Flinders Adolescent Decision Making Questionnaire Participants’ reasoning skills and risk-taking
(ADMQ), (Mann, Harmoni, Power, Beswick, & tendencies showed a negative correlational trend
Ormond, 1988), is a 30-item self-report questionnaire (r(31) = -.34, p = .06). Analysis also showed a
that measures self-confidence, vigilance, defense significant negative correlation between adaptive
avoidance, hypervigilance, and complacency. The decision-making characteristics and risky behaviors,
questionnaire measures “adaptive” and “maladaptive” in that individuals from all age groups with higher
decision-making patterns. The adaptive decision- adaptive scores on the ADMQ had a lower percentage
making characteristics in the questionnaire are of risky choices in the gain frame on the CUPS
vigilance, which is defined as “careful appraisal Task (r(30) = -.55, p < .005) (see Figure 3). Analysis
of options and consequences,” and self-esteem, revealed no significant correlation between adaptive
which is defined as the “respondent’s confidence decision-making characteristics and risky choice in
in making decisions.” The maladaptive decision- the loss frame (see Figure 4).
making characteristics in the questionnaire
are defense avoidance, which is defined as Discussion
“procrastination, rationalization, and ‘passing the This study predicted that susceptibility to the
buck;’” hypervigilance, which is defined as “rapid framing effect would be significantly different
and impulsive choice;” and complacency, which between adolescents and adults, and that variations
measures “tendencies to apathy and noninvolvement in participants’ cognitive abilities and personality
in decisions” (Mann et al., 1988). The participants characteristics related to decision-making would
completed this questionnaire in the lab under also affect the amount of risky decisions participants
the supervision of a research assistant. This made, but less so than age.
Volume 4 | Spring 2011
Figure 3. The Relationship between Decision-Making Characteristics
and Risky Choice When Winning Money: In the gain frame,
individuals in all age groups with higher ADMQ scores had a lower
percentage of risky choices in the gain frame on the Cups Task (r(30) =
-.55, p < .005).
Study results revealed that adolescents and
adults are equally susceptible to the framing effect,
demonstrating that age is not a significant factor in
the framing effect. Individuals in every age group
made significantly different choices based on the
context of the decision, and participants made more
risks in the gain frame than in the loss frame. This
data differs from other findings on the framing effect,
where participants took more risks in the loss frame
than in the gain frame (Levin & Hart, 2003). Perhaps
participants were more excited by the possibility of
gaining money from the task than they were afraid
of losing money, as the money they lost was given to
them by the experimenter for the game and did not
come from their own wallets.
However, individual differences in cognitive ability
and personality characteristics related to adaptive
decision-making patterns, such as self-confidence,
vigilance, and self-esteem, did significantly affect the
decisions that adolescents and adults made. Results
showed a negative correlation between scores on the
matrix section of the WASI and number of risks
taken in the CUPS task. In other words, individuals
with higher reasoning ability took fewer risks than
individuals with lower scores. One explanation for this
could be that participants who scored higher on the
WASI matrix reasoning section had higher reasoning
abilities, making them more likely to calculate the
expected outcomes, which were the same for both
choices. They might have been able to determine
that it was safer to guarantee the expected outcome,
rather than risk winning nothing. Individuals with
lower reasoning scores most likely relied on emotional
processes more than cognitive processes (Stanovich
& West, 2008), choosing the risky choice more often
without contemplating the situation logically. Thus,
these findings re-confirm previous literature that
suggests reasoning skills are an important factor in
determining decision-making patterns.
19
Figure 4. The Relationship between Decision-Making Characteristics
and Risky Choice When Losing Money: In the loss frame, there was
no significant correlation between the ADMQ score and the % Risky
Choices in the Loss Frame (ns, p=.74).
In the subsections measuring vigilance and
self-esteem of the ADMQ, higher scores mean
more adaptive decision-making tendencies. In the
gain frame, individuals with higher scores on these
subscales took fewer risks than individuals with
lower scores. One explanation for this could be that if
participants were more vigilant, they were more able
to carefully weigh the expected values for each choice
they were to make. Instead of impulsively making
a decision, these participants may have carefully
thought about their choices, and subsequently took
fewer risks and made more reasonable choices.
Future studies should examine why personality
characteristics related to adaptive decision-making,
such as vigilance and self-esteem, only affected
participants’ decisions in the gain frame but not in the
loss frame. As suggested earlier, this finding may have
resulted from participants gambling money that was
not theirs.
The framing effect significantly influenced
the decisions of all participants, regardless of
their ages. In addition, the data also reveals how
individual differences largely affected the choices that
participants made. Adolescents and adults were both
affectively influenced by the framing of the situation,
but contrary to the initial hypothesis, the framing
effect did not affectively influence adolescents more
than their adult counterparts. Rather, individual
differences in personality characteristics related to
adaptive decision-making and reasoning abilities
appear to be more influential in determining
susceptibility to the framing effect than age. Thus,
additional unexamined factors must be affecting the
differences in decision-making between adolescents
and adults in real-world situations.
A few limitations of the study should be taken
into consideration. The study only had 31 participants
and excluded the 18-to-21-year-old age group as well
as the five-to-eight-year-old age group. Individuals
from the five-to-eight age group were excluded
20
because they were either confused about or failed to
complete the ADMQ or the CUPS task. Individuals
from the 18-to-21 age group were a small sample
and did not complete the ADMQ, and so they were
not used in analysis. Participants were also given
money to use in the CUPS task. Their decisions
may have been influenced by the fact that they
were not gambling their own money, but rather, the
experimenter’s money.
There is also a possible confound in the
cognitive ability assessment of this study. The
matrix reasoning subsection of the WASI may not
be accurately reflecting all of the components of
cognitive ability that may be involved in decision-
making. Furthermore, younger participants may have
interpreted the CUPS task differently than the adults,
as the value of money may be different to each age
group, causing them to take different risks. A task
that uses something of equal value to all participants,
rather than money, may reduce this confounding
variable.
Future studies should focus on searching for
other personality characteristics that influence risky
decision-making in both adolescents and adults. The
effects of money ownership on participants’ decisions
could also be further studied. Participants could be
led to believe that they were gambling their own
money, then compared with participants who did
not believe they were gambling their own money.
Adolescents and adults may act differently in these
conditions. Additionally, research should look at the
influence of the framing effect on social situations.
Adolescents have already been shown to make riskier
decisions in the presence of peers. Future studies
could examine how the influence of peers may affect
their susceptibility to the framing effect. Other
methods of examining affective processes that are
involved in real-life decisions for adolescents could
be further explored. The current study demonstrated
that adolescents and adults are equally susceptible
to the framing effect, despite their differences in
affective processing, and demonstrated that individual
differences in personality characteristics and cognitive
ability were more influential than age in predicting
risky behavior. Hopefully, future research can provide
further insight into the influences of affective
processing on adolescents’ risky decisions.
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Volume 4 | Spring 2011 21

Fonts, Stars and Cockroaches: The Differential Weighting of Informational Cues

in Judgment-Based Decisions

Tawny Tsang
University of California, Berkeley

When people make decisions, they often stray from using objective strategies and instead put more emphasis on heu-
ristics tending to the surface features of a cue. Previous research has shown that participants place greater weight on
cues that are fluent, or easy to process. This was demonstrated by manipulating the perceived affect and the font of
cues. However, these studies have not shown which heuristic, affect or fluency, has the stronger influence on decision
making. This study investigates the weighting of information when both affect and fluency are manipulated. Par-
ticipants were asked to judge hotels based on an image and consumer rating. Participants placed greater importance
on the affective content of the review than the fluency of it. Positive reviews consistently yielded higher participant
ratings than negative reviews regardless of hotel quality or fluency of the review. These findings have numerous
implications, including support for the efficacy of certain marketing techniques that may privilege the use of visuals
over content.

I nformation inevitably influences how decisions are

made and is readily available in a variety of forms
and mediums. With so many sources of information
to consider, how does one factor in which cues to weigh
most heavily in making decisions? Previous studies have
shown that judgments are readily swayed by heuristics,
or surface features, such as how a particular stimulus
looks (Zajonc, 1982; Finucane, 2000). Heuristics provide
individuals with a generalized rule of how to guide be-
havior in specific situations.
Ideally, people would use objective features of a cue
to make rational decisions. These types of cues provide
information about the class or category a particular ob-
ject belongs to. For example, the price of an electronic
device typically provides high cue validity towards the
quality of it (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007). An individual
deciding to purchase an electronic device would ideally
use these types of objective cues before making a de-
cision. This is in accord with the “weighted averaging
model” (Himmelfarb, 1970), which states that people
use all possible pieces of informational cues to form a
particular judgment, and differentially weigh each cue
based on its validity, which is how successfully the cue
will predict an outcome. While this process may lead to
optimal choices, it is extremely taxing to calculate and
thus inaccurately represents how people actually make
decisions. The concept of bounded rationality states
that the ability to engage in this type of rational behav-
ior is restricted by available cognitive resources such as
attention (Simon, 1990). In practice, individuals often do
not follow these principles of logic and reason to form
decisions. When the task domain presents many alter-
natives to consider, people unconsciously apply strate-
gies to simplify and reduce the analytical requirements
of the task (Winkielman, 2003). One such strategy is to
use heuristics to reduce the effort involved in making a
choice (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).
© 2011 Psychology at Berkeley | http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb/publications/
Among heuristics, previous research has shown that
the perceived ease of processing of a cue can influence
how much weight people place on it in information pro-
cessing. Shah and Oppenheimer (2007) demonstrated
that subjects weigh information that is fluent, or easy
to read, more heavily than information that is disfluent,
or difficult to read. Moreover, ease of processing, or
cue fluency, indirectly affects judgments by influencing
which cues to attend to rather than directly influencing
mood states. By paying greater attention to fluent cues,
individuals place higher value on information that can
be processed faster or easier (e.g. Johnson, 1985; Jacoby
& Brooks, 1984). Reber and Schwarz (1998) believe that
this reflects the greater sense of trust and believabil-
ity that fluent information provides for individuals who
perceive it. Privileging information that is perceptually
easier to process may guide decision-making behaviors
especially when confronted with contradictory informa-
tion.
Cue fluency is not the only type of heuristic that
can guide judgment-based decisions. Other studies
suggest that people use affective cues, or emotional
content, to facilitate decision-making processes (e.g.
Winkielman, 2003; Zajonc & Markus, 1982; Santos-
Pinto, 2009). While positive affect towards stimuli can
be mediated by cue fluency (Winkielman, 2003), the
emotional valence (the positivity or negativity) of the
cue itself can influence cognition and information pro-
cessing (Zajonc & Markus, 1982; Santos-Pinto, 2009).
Researchers have found that, in general, individuals are
biased towards stimuli paired with positive affects, but
are not typically aware of this. For example, Zajonc
and colleagues (1997) showed that participants consis-
tently liked Chinese ideographs more when they were
subliminally exposed to smiling faces beforehand. An-
other example of this is demonstrated by how people
employ the “affect heuristic” to evaluate objects and
22
situations (Finucane, 2000). Rather than using objective
bases to make decisions, individuals rely on automatic
emotional responses to guide decision-making behavior.
Within the affective domain, individuals are in-
clined to be more critical of negatively-valenced in-
formation. When subjects were evaluated to be in a
negative mood, they were more likely to process in-
formation more analytically and systematically than
subjects in a positive mood (Lewicka, 1992). Lewicka
cites other studies that also demonstrated that negative
information is also received more critically than posi-
tive information. A common example of this is found
in the economic domain, where people judge losses to
be greater than equivalent gains. In considering the
higher cogntive resources required to process negative
information, the theory of bounded rationality would
predict that people would prefer receiving positive
information because it is easier to process.
This experiment examined how decisions and judg-
ments are influenced by the perceptual features of cues,
such as font type, and the contextual information they
provide. Specifically, the ease (fluency) of positive and
negative reviews for hotels were manipulated in order
to investigate cue weighing in making judgment-based
decisions. It was predicted that participants would place
greater trust in fluent consumer reviews and pay less
attention to the negative reviews of hotel ratings.
While previous studies have examined how cue
fluency and affect individually influence judgments,
few have examined how people would behave when
confronted with both dimensions. In a study that did
look at the effects of cue fluency and affect on decisions,
participants considered the affective component greater
when it was conveyed in a fluent font, such as Arial or
Times New Roman (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007). That
is, cue fluency, rather than affect, guided judgments.
However, only negative affect was used. This experi-
ment employed both positive and negative stimuli to
examine whether cue fluency or affect has a greater
weight in influencing judgments. Moreover, previous
research has not examined how fluent information is
also weighted in these judgment-based decisions. An
additional component was included by pairing re-
views with images of hotels in order to assess whether
participants use objective, physical cues if given an
easy opportunity to do so. Therefore, in this study,
participants were asked to make judgments based on
three types of information: images, positive or negative
reviews, and fluent or disfluent text.
Providing these types of information would allow
participants to face a more realistic situation. Several
advertisements include digital graphics that use a logo
with a relatively difficult to read font (i.e. Coca-Cola’s
logo versus Pepsi’s logo). Thus, the findings from this
study would be more applicable to reality and provide a
greater understanding of the factors that guide con-
sumer behavior.
Based on previous studies regarding cue fluency
and emotional content in information weighing, it
Fonts, Stars and Cockroaches | Tawny Tsang
was predicted that if emotional content has a greater
weight, then subjects would consistently factor posi-
tive reviews more heavily in their decisions. Given
that information containing negative affects is often
discounted, it was predicted that participants would
rely on objective information (the image) to make their
judgments. If cue fluency has greater weight, then sub-
jects would make their ratings based on whichever re-
view is easiest to read. Moreover, it was predicted that
participants would perceive fluent reviews to be more
trustworthy and believable. It was also hypothesized
that participants would only use the image in making
their judgments when the reviews were difficult to read
(disfluent). If there is an interaction between affective
valence and cue fluency, then subjects should give posi-
tive and fluent reviews the greatest weight (and there-
fore higher rating) and ignore negative and disfluent
reviews. In the latter case, it was predicted that ratings
should reflect the quality of the hotel based on the im-
age (objective information). This study hopes to gain
insight into how individuals use information to make a
decision.
Methods
Participants
A total of 174 participants were recruited via email
and social networking websites, such as www.facebook.
com. The ages of participants ranged from 18-31 years
(M = 21). Of those who participated, 72 were males
and 102 were females. Participants gave informed
consent to engage in the experiment and completed the
survey.
Apparatus
The experiment was conducted using Qualtrics, an
online survey platform. Participants were given a link
to the experiment and completed it using their personal
computers.
Stimuli
Participants were asked to rate how likely they
were to stay at particular hotels based on each hotel’s
exterior image and consumer review. Each participant
saw twelve images of hotels, which differed in three
levels of quality as described by a corresponding “star”
rating. Hotels with one star were deemed poor, those
with three stars were neutral, and those with five stars
were deemed great. Participants saw two hotels for
each level. In most instances, the quality of the hotel
was obvious by the given age and design. For example,
a hotel with chipped paint and a wooden sign was obvi-
ously in worse condition than a hotel with fountains,
palm trees, and a pool. Hotels were given star ratings
to counter the potential ambiguity in determining a
hotel’s quality from an image. Therefore, the quality of
the hotel was objectified—participants were told that
ratings were pre-determined by hotel critics. Hotel im-
ages were taken from various travel websites.
In addition, participants read either a positive or
Volume 4 | Spring 2011
Figure 1: Example of Fluent and Disfluent negative consumer reviews.
negative consumer review for each hotel. The consumer
reviews were modified versions of actual reviews taken
from various travel websites such as www.expedia.com.
Each review was limited to 80 words and commented
on the service, features and amenities, and location of
the particular hotel. Reviews were manipulated for cue
fluency; six were in a clear to read font (12-point Times
New Roman) and six were in a difficult to read font
(12-point italicized Monotype Corsiva font) (see Figure
1). This fluency manipulation is the same as that used
by Shah and Oppenheimer (2007) in a similar experi-
ment.
Procedure
This study was adapted from a similar experiment
conducted by Shah and Oppenheimer (2007), in which
participants indicated how much they would spend
on an MP3 player based on the fluency of a neutral
or negative consumer review. At the beginning of
this experiment, participants were asked to imagine a
hypothetical situation in which they won a trip to any
destination of their choice. The participants’ task was
to rate how likely he or she would stay at each of the
twelve hotels based on an image and consumer review.
To ensure that participants would equally attend to
the text and images, they were told that a memory test
would be held at the end, which was not actually ad-
ministered. When the subjects completed their ratings,
they were informed of the intent of the memory test
statement.
Participants were shown an exterior image of a
hotel with its star rating. The star rating was a simple
graphic that displayed one, three, or five yellow-filled
stars out of five stars, depending on the quality of the
corresponding hotel. Following the hotel image was
either a positive or negative consumer review. Fluency
was displayed by blocks—the participant either saw all
fluent reviews on the same page in the first block and
all disfluent reviews on the same page in the second
block or vice versa. The purpose of this was to mini-
mize participant’s awareness of the manipulation. This
order depended on which survey the participant was
randomly assigned to.
After reading the consumer review, participants
were asked to rate on a 9-point Likert scale how likely
they would stay at that hotel. A “1” ranking was
equivalent to “absolutely would not stay at this hotel”,
23
a “5” ranking was equivalent to “neutral sentiment/
would maybe stay at this hotel”, and a “9” ranking was
equivalent to “definitely would stay at this hotel”. This
continued for a total of twelve ratings—six in a fluent
condition and six in a disfluent condition.
Consumer reviews were randomly paired with hotel
images. Within a fluent/disfluent block, the order of
hotels was also randomized. In addition, there was a
random presentation of fluent or disfluent blocks. This
ensured that exposure or ordering effects would not
influence the participants’ judgments. By the end of the
study, participants saw the twelve positive and negative
reviews in both fluent and disfluent fonts.
Results
Data of four participants who did not complete the
survey were not used in the analysis. Since the experi-
ment was meant to compare the difference in ratings
among different cues, keeping the incomplete data
would not have produced an accurate account of how
people weigh cues in decision making. Moreover, data
of participants who completed the survey in less than
two minutes (M = 8.03 minutes to complete, SD = 2.17
minutes) were also not included, as this does not seem
to be an adequate amount of time to read the twelve
hotel decisions and make ratings.
Three factors were considered in analysis: affect
of the consumer review, hotel quality, and fluency. The
mean rating given for all positive reviews was 6.47 (SD
= 1.54) and the mean rating for all negative reviews
was 2.63 (SD = 1.385). These differences were very
significant (F(1, 172) = 1027.26; p < 0.001), suggesting
that participants did read the consumer reviews for the
hotels regardless of fluency condition. As expected, the
mean ratings for hotels increased with higher quality
hotels.1-star hotels received a mean rating of 2.93 (SD
= 1.52); 3-star hotels received a mean rating of 4.88
(SD = 1.61); 5-star hotels received a mean rating of
5.84 (SD =1.71). These differences were also significant
(F(2, 344) = 351.149; p < 0.001). In addition to these
two main effects of hotel quality and affect, there was
also a significant interaction between these factors (F
(2, 344) = 55.818, p < 0.001). The star-rating of the
hotels was not weighed as heavily in the participants’
ratings when they read negative reviews compared to
when they read positive reviews (see Figure 2).
There was not a main effect of fluency (F(1, 172) =
24
(a) (b)
Figures 2a-c: Hotel Ratings by Hotel Quality, Fluency, and Consumer Review Affect. a: Hotel Rating by star quality and consumer review affect;
b: Hotel Rating by star quality and fluency; c: Hotel Ratings by consumer review affect and fluency.
Review
Positive Negative
Mean Rating1 6.47 2.63
Standard
1.55 1.38
Deviation
F-values
F (1,172) = 1027.26***
***p < 0.001, 1Ratings for hotels ranged from 1-9
Table 1: Summary of results
0.794; p > 0.05). The mean rating for hotels with fluent
consumer reviews did not differ from those with disflu-
ent reviews (Mdisfluent=4.53, SD =1.71; Mfluent = 4.78;
SD = 1.69).
Fluency did influence judgment when it was
weighed with hotel quality and consumer review af-
fect (see Figure 2b and 2c). For 1-star hotels, disfluent
reviews yielded higher participant ratings than fluent
ones (Mdisfluent = 3.28; Mfluent = 2.58). The opposite was
true for 5-star hotels—disfluent reviews yielded lower
ratings than fluent ones (Mdisfluent= 5.62; Mfluent = 6.06).
3-star hotels yielded similar ratings (Mdisfluent = 4.83;
Mfluent = 4.93), demonstrating that the perceived qual-
ity of those hotels were indeed neutral. This interac-
tion was significant (F(2, 244) = 37.798, p < 0.001).
Similarly, there was a significant interaction between
fluency and the affect of the consumer review F(1, 172)
= 20.682, p < 0.001). Positive reviews yielded higher
ratings when texts were difficult to read (Mfluent = 6.63;
Mfluent = 6.3) whereas negative reviews received lower
ratings when they were difficult to read (Mdisfluent =
2.52; Mfluent = 2.75). A summary of results is displayed
in Table 1.
Fonts, Stars and Cockroaches | Tawny Tsang
(c)
Hotel Quality Text
1-star 3-star 5-star Fluent Disfluent
2.93 4.88 5.84 4.53 4.58
1.52 1.61 1.71 1.71 1.69
F (2, 344) = 351.149*** F (1, 172) = 0.794
Discussion
When making judgments on quality, affect seems
to matter more than fluency. Positive reviews consis-
tently yielded higher participant ratings than negative
reviews regardless of hotel quality or fluency of the re-
view. This means that participants were more willing to
trust a stranger’s subjective experience than a less sub-
jective star-rating. This is interesting because it contra-
dicts what would be expected by following the fluency
heuristic (Jacoby and Brooks, 1984), which states that
higher value is placed on the object that is more easily
processed. Regardless of font, the consumer reviews
seem more difficult to process than photographs be-
cause the comprehension involved with reading makes
it a more complex task. 5-star hotels with a negative
review were on average rated lower than 1-star hotels
with a positive review. Thus, participants did not rely
on objective cues to guide decisions even when they
were relatively easy to process.
It can be argued that the affect heuristic is the more
influential heuristic for decisions. In fact, Plassmann
and colleagues (2006) suggested that emotions can
have a dominating effect on guiding decisions because
they are both consciously and subconsciously expe-
rienced. However, these results do not support that
Volume 4 | Spring 2011
effect or the proposed general preference for positive
stimuli (Zajonc, 1997). If positively-valenced cues were
weighed more, then ratings for negatively reviewed
hotels should be higher, especially for 5-star hotels.
In comparing negative reviews with hotel images, the
hotel image should have been relatively more “positive”
and therefore given more weight in participant ratings.
However, the star rating did not largely influence par-
ticipants’ ratings in the negative condition. It appears
that participants were considering the content of the
review in their judgments rather than the affective cue.
This may have been due to the nature of the study—
participants were specifically told to carefully read the
consumer reviews. It is uncertain whether individuals
in real world conditions place as much weight on con-
tent as perceptual cues. A future study can correct for
this by either eliminating the memory test manipula-
tion or by presenting information in a bullet-point for-
mat. This would involve less reading comprehension.
Interestingly, fluency alone did not influence judg-
ment. Participant ratings based on fluency depended
on the quality of the hotel and the affect of the review.
Fluency may not have affected judgments because it
may not have been a useful cue to attend to. Individuals
tend not to rely on the fluency heuristic if they inter-
pret it to be unimportant (Westerman, 2003). More-
over, when fluency did influence judgment, it went in
the opposite direction than expected. It was originally
predicted that easy to read reviews would be perceived
to be more important to the ratings than disfluent
reviews. This follows what was found by Shah and Op-
penheimer (2007). However, for disfluent texts, posi-
tive reviews yielded higher ratings whereas negative
reviews received lower ratings than the same reviews
in fluent texts. This suggests that the content of the
review was taken in consideration more when the font
was difficult to read. Participants may have spent more
time reading the text when it was disfluent and thus
better internalized the material.
Similarly, disfluent reviews had more weight across
hotel quality. Fluent reviews received higher ratings for
1-star hotels than disfluent reviews. This suggests that
when texts were easy to read, participants may have
weighed the image just as much, if not more, in their
own ratings of the hotel. For 5-star hotels, fluent re-
views yielded higher ratings than disfluent ones. Con-
sumer reviews were taken into greater consideration in
the disfluency conditions because the score was slightly
more towards neutral, suggesting an averaging of the
positive and negative affect. This also contradicts previ-
ous findings that fluent cues are more readily trusted
and believable (Reber and Schwarz, 1999). Participants
in this study seemed to be more rational than expected
because they evaluated each piece of information and
differentially weighed it before making ratings. Their
decisions did not rely entirely on either the affect or
fluency heuristics, even if they were easier, less analytic
strategies (Slovic et al., 2004). This analytic behavior
may have been due to something similar to the Haw-
25
thorne effect in which people modify their behaviors to
conform with what is expected (Adair, 1984).
While the current study yielded significant results,
there are many potential confounding factors. Due to a
technical issue, all of the hotels in a block appeared on
the same page. It is possible that participants changed
their ratings and compared it with other hotels in the
same block. Moreover, some participants reported that
some of the reviews were more believable because
they seemed to better match the hotel images. This
perceived unevenness could have caused participants
to consistently weigh either the review or hotel image
more heavily. It would also have been ideal if all images
were of the same size or dimension. However, this was
difficult to do while preserving the resolution of the
photographs. This study could be further explored by
using images with low, grainy resolution to see those
effects on cue weight.
Nonetheless, the findings from this study have
strong implications for marketing techniques in guid-
ing consumer behavior. Providing consumer reviews
may be a salient way to promote trials or purchases of
products. The practical understanding of how indi-
viduals weigh types of information is evident in daily
life. It also gives credence to consumer-based websites
such as www.yelp.com. The weight that individuals in
this study placed on the content of review could influ-
ence marketing techniques. For example, rather than
focusing on developing a unique logo or catchy slogan,
companies may benefit from revealing product qual-
ity or positive testimonials while promoting products.
The results from this study suggest that the content of
consumer reviews strongly influence judgments.
Moreover, the attention the subjects of this study
paid to the affective content of the reviews supports a
functional view of emotion. This view holds that emo-
tions possess communicative value for the perceiver
(Nadel & Muir, 2005). More than just an expression of
an internal feeling state, emotions assist in goal-direct-
ed behaviors. In applying this concept to the current
study, the affective content of the review effectively
facilitates the participant to meet his or her immediate
goal of making decisions. Therefore, making decisions
is not completely an independent process. Decisions are
made with the implicit support from others.
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 About the Authors 27

Bryan Dickerson
Bryan Dickerson graduated from UC Berkeley in 2010 with honors in psychology. Bryan
was President of the Association of Psychology Undergraduates at Berkeley for 2009. He
is currently the Associate Director of Research and Education for the Heroic Imagination
Project, a bay area non-profit run by Professor Phillip Zimbardo, where he is helping to
design education interventions encouraging personal development and social growth. He
plans to continue his career in research and education and to obtain his PhD in Psychology.

Wesley Jackson
Wesley Jackson is majoring in Cognitive Science with a minor in Music. He is fascinated by
cognitive linguistics, and in particular the embodiment of concepts. He also studies music
cognition and electronic music technology. He is currently an undergraduate research as-
sistant to both the Bao Laboratory of Auditory Perception and the Center for New Music
and Audio Technologies. He plans to develop audio technology founded in cognitive mod-
els of audition and embodied cognition.

Marissa Sharif
Marissa Sharif is a junior at the University of California, Los Angeles, majoring in
psychobiology. She thanks Professor Adriana Galvan, lab manager Kristine McGlennen,
and post-doc Linda van Leijenhorst for all of their help in her research. She plans to apply
for a PHD program after she gradautes.

Tawny Tsang
Tawny Tsang will graduate from UC Berkeley in May 2011. She will receive a Bach-
elor’s degree in Psychology and a minor in music. She is absolutely fascinated by the
mind and intends to pursue research within the field of Autism Spectrum Disorders
for graduate studies.
 28

For more information about Psychology at Berkeley,

visit http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~ujpb or email berkpsychjournal@gmail.com