http://ph.linkedin.

com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

RP-US Defense Relations: The Way Ahead

I. The US as the lone superpower in the next 25 years
US emphasis on innovation, through Research & Development, and on
Information Technology will allow it to maintain its lone superpower status for the
next 25 years. Through technology, the US has reached the limits of the key
parameters of warfare. These parameters are range, lethality, and speed. The
US Armed Forces, unmatched by any other, can reach further, hit harder, and
get there faster. This convergence is a true “revolution in warfare.”

Consequently, the US has developed the AirLand Operations doctrine. It

emphasized the capacity to project power over long distances at high speeds. It
stressed the need for joint operations among the different services and combined
operations with allied forces. It called for “greater scope for initiative” and “greater
reliance on quality soldiers.” Placing time at the center of its concerns, it called
for synchronized simultaneous attacks and “execution control in real time.”
Commanders should “control the tempo of fights.” Finally, knowledge – improved
intelligence and communication – becomes absolutely central to operations.

The US Armed Forces place high stress on versatility – the ability of the army to
switch from one kind of conflict to another quickly. It shifts from a European to a
global focus and from the idea of forward deployment – that is, forces based near
zones of potential conflict – to the idea of a US-based force that can go
anywhere in the world fast. In addition, the new doctrine devotes attention to
what it calls “operations other than war,” which, in its terms, include disaster
relief, civil disturbance, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism & counter-narcotics
activities.

The US has a brain-based military. Its supremacy is due not so much to its
military hardware as to the fact that its military bases are laboratories and its
troops are brains, armies of researchers and engineers. Knowledge has become
its central source of defense and security.

It now reaches for the vastness of space to maintain its military supremacy. The
First Gulf War was the first instance where combat forces largely were deployed,
sustained, commanded, and controlled through satellite communications. Space
added a fourth dimension to the war. It influenced the general direction of the
conflict and saved lives. It provided detailed images of Iraqi forces and gave early
warning of Scud missile launches.

The US Space Command is 1 of the 2 commands in the US Air Force that are
growing. The other being Special Operations. In a future of decreased,
retrenched forces, the US will rely on space even more. This growing emphasis
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

on space changes the entire balance of global military power. And that is why the
US will remain the lone superpower for the next 20 years. With no force matching
this, the US influence on the region and on RP will continue, if not increase, in
the following decades.

II. Regional: Geopolitical importance of the ASPAC and its impact to

RP.
A 2001 study by Rand, the Pentagon think tank entitled The United States and
Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, recognized the need for the
US to re-evaluate its strategy toward Asia. It reported:
• The principal challenge for US regional strategy is to prevent 21st century
Asia from becoming unstable and producing massive conflagrations.
• Toward this goal, the US must begin to formulate policies that will enable
Asia to develop peacefully and in ways compatible with US national
interests.
• The US cannot hope to resolve every regional security issue in Asia, but
together with its allies, it can strive to focus on the larger issues while
shaping the smaller ones so that they remain manageable.
• At the same time, the US must build a framework for greater regional
cooperation in Asia.
• Enhanced communication and more fully integrated economies will reduce
misunderstanding and increase interdependence, thereby diminishing the
likelihood of major-power rivalry and armed conflict. Expanded security
alliances will further aid in deterring aggression.

Cognizant of these, the September 2002 US National Security Strategy stressed

that: To contend with uncertainty and to meet many security challenges we face,
the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western
Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the
long distance deployment of US forces.

Current projects and exercises involving RP, for instance are well within the
principle of temporary access arrangements for the long distance deployment of
US forces as well as dealing with terrorism and long-range security issues
directly confronting RP and most countries, including the US.

The 2001 US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), on the other hand, called for
a reorientation of the US global posture which must take account of new
challenges, particularly anti-access and anti-denial threats. The QDR also raised
the issue of limited access to Asia. It found the alignment of US assets
concentrated in Western Europe and Northeast Asia “inadequate for the new
strategic environment.”
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

According to the QDR, this requires a combination of immediately employable

forward stationed and deployed forces; expeditionary and forcible entry
capabilities; globally available reconnaissance, strike and command and control
assets; information operations; special operations forces; and rapidly deployable,
highly lethal and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of
operations. The development and posturing of long-range strike aircraft and
special operations forces that will provide immediately employable supplement to
forward forces may create more insecurity. China, however, may feel threatened
and in reaction, develop similar capability.

ASEAN members are seriously concerned with China’s rise but remain pragmatic
in dealing with the situation. As such, ASEAN encourages the US and other
outside powers to support it in efforts to persuade and press China to preserve
regional stability. ASEAN expects the US to formulate an appropriate stance
toward China’s increasingly assertive role in Asian regional affairs, which may
include military actions in the South China Sea and near Taiwan. Strategic
deterrence or containment is the emerging strategy.The US seeks to promote a
balance of power so that none emerges as a dominant country or that countries
gang up with other against itself in the future.

Without an alternative security mechanism in place, the US presence is pivotal to

maintaining stability in a time of rapid power distribution. For countries with
bilateral arrangements with the US, a continuing US military presence
strengthens their own national security. For countries without direct security ties
with the US, the US security arrangement potentially defers destabilizing forces
in the region.

In Asia, US force presence plays a particularly key role in promoting peace and
security in regional affairs. US strategic interests in Southeast Asia center on
developing regional and bilateral security and economic relationships that assist
in conflict prevention and resolution and expand US participation in the region’s
economies.

In the month following the end of the war in Iraq, US President Bush has met with
5 key Asia Pacific allies: Australian Prime Minister John Howard, Singapore
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, South Korean Pres. Roh Moo Hyun, RP Pres.
Arroyo, and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. The treatment extended to these
regional leaders reveals much about the Bush Administration’s views of the
importance and potential for relationships in Asia.

Japan and Australia are the 2 anchor points of the US security presence in East
Asia: Japan hosts about 40,000 US forces and Australia is taking on a more
active role as a military ally – so much so that the Howard government has been
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

derisively referred to in some Asian nations as the US deputy in the region. But
as Washington redefines its global military basing posture, Australia and Japan
will become even more critical allies. Already the US is encouraging Japan to
move beyond its pacifist constitution and begin contributing militarily to regional
security – something with which Koizumi appears to agree. The US-Japan
alliance is the lynchpin of US security strategy in Asia. Reduction of US forces
elsewhere will increase the importance of Japan.

The rising sense insecurity among the Japanese people as a result of the growth
of global terrorism in recent years and the military threat from North Korea is
believed to have permitted the Koizumi Administration to succeed where
previous governments had failed due to the Constitution and critics. In fact,
Japan has been involved in a joint technology research project with the US to
develop a missile defense system since 1999.

On June 6, the Upper House of Japan’s Diet passed a set of laws that gives the
nation its first legal framework for responding to military attack since World War
II. Specifically, the 3 war-contingency plans outline the circumstances under
which the government can mobilize the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the
powers the military would have in emergency situations, spell out the
responsibilities of the central government and its power to order local
governments in wartime and, expand the size and scope of the Security Council
headed by the Prime Minister in national emergencies. Among other measures,
the new legislation will make it legal for the SDF to requisition private property
and override peacetime laws in a war situation.

As for Korea, relations between Washington and Seoul have been less than
stellar since Bush took office, and the transition from former President Kim Dae
Jung to Roh left a bitter taste in Washington’s mouth, as Roh’s support base
stemmed from the same groups calling for the ouster of US forces from the
peninsula. The Bush and Roh Administrations disagree on the best way to deal
with North Korea; Bush supports a policy of isolation with the potential for tighter
sanctions, a blockade, or even military action and Roh seeks a more cooperative
attitude toward Pyongyang. But Seoul is seeing its economy hit hard by
uncertainties surrounding North Korea, and even if Pyongyang doesn’t take
physically aggressive actions, Seoul still suffers.

South Korea’s importance to the US is waning. And since Sept. 11, the Bush
Administration has been much less tolerant of dissent, even from its close allies.
With Japan and Australia as firm allies willing to contribute materially to US
security interests – and RP and Singapore serving as a training ground and
smaller forward positions for US operations – South Korea’s role in US Asian
security policy is fading. In Asia, the US maintains significant presence in
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

Singapore, Japan, Guam, Hawaii, Australia, Thailand, & South Korea – which
has the highest contingent. Lessening its presence in South Korea could either
lessen the pressure on North Korea or allow it to continue improving their military
capability.

Two other secondary points in Washington’s evolving Asian security strategy are
Singapore and RP. Singapore, located at the crossroads of the Pacific and Indian
Oceans, long has been a key US ally. RP was the so-called second front in the
war against terrorism. President Bush designated RP as a Major Non-NATO Ally
(MNNA) of the US. But beyond the symbolism of the MNNA status, the
designation will advance Washington’s plans to use RP as a strategically-
located training facility and forward outpost in Southeast Asia, stockpiling
supplies and materiel and keeping a steady rotation of troops in the country.

III. National: Where does RP want to go in the next 25 years?

The AFP as a modern and potentially profitable defense agency

capable of ensuring the nation’s internal and external security.
Republic Act No. 7898 or the AFP Modernization Law makes it the
policy of the state to “modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to a level where it can effectively and fully perform its constitutional
mandate to defend the sovereignty and protect and preserve the
patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines.” The Act also seeks to
provide for a “self-reliant organization responsive to the needs of the
national defense preparedness, while serving peacetime functions
related to the socio-economic development of the country. This
mandate requires 2 tasks, namely: the acquisition of appropriate
technology and equipment and the use of such equipment to protect
the country’s sovereignty and resources.

Cognizant of the budgetary constraints on the modernization plan, an upsurge in attacks

by communists and Moslem separatist rebels, including the threat of narcotics trafficking,
have forced government to change its priorities. The program was reoriented toward
internal security with the Army getting the biggest share at the expense of the Navy &
the Air Force.

Perhaps, as Rep. Eduardo Ermita suggested, a cost-effective way to effect the shift
would be to focus on the area of communications and electronic intelligence. With our
limited military assets, it is imperative that pinpointing predatory or aggressive actions be
done early enough and with precision. In this way, RP can deploy defensive assets for
deterrence and proactive vigilance. Deterrence should be the key to an effective
defensive organization, the way the AFP has been originally designed to be. Hopefully, it
could have limited preemptive offensive capabilities in the future.
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

The current 5-yr. old concept of national security, as well as strategy, don’t seem to have
a right fit with the present situation anymore. It is too complex and broad for the
country’s limited resources. It is defined to encompass the political, social, & economic
aspects of life. Granted, it is better than the traditional concept of protection against
armed threat. An alternative definition of national security could simply be the creation of
conditions for the nation to achieve its goals – its goals being, among others, economic
progress & ecological preservation.

The traditional concept of protection against armed threats is built in to it. This is
because of the fact that as we are unable to protect ourselves against insurgents, we
have then paid the price of instability, economic stagnation, rising criminality and foreign
encroachment. We are weak and scattered with no focus. It is true that we are faced
with so many threats. However, we are a developing country with limited resources. We
must concentrate our limited resources on the immediate internal threats. Crush it and
then deal with external, regional concerns.

Disaster management is an area that could be utilized to further

strengthen RP-US military relations, not to mention, Japan.

Be a credible/equal ally of the US and its neighbors in the

region.
President Bush designated RP as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of
the US. RP joins the ranks of key regional US allies like Australia,
Japan, & South Korea. This would allow RP to:
• Stockpile US defense articles
• Participate in cooperative research and development
programs
• Avail of cooperative furnishing of bilateral training based on
reciprocity
• Purchase depleted uranium anti-tank rounds
• Have priority delivery of excess defense articles
• Reduce or waive non-recurring costs for selected FMS cases

RP as a key player in regional security.

RP defense officials and security experts view Chinese expansionism
in the South China Sea as the main long-term security threat to the
Philippines. US presence in the RP will strengthen its capability in
protecting its territorial waters. It would not only help boost RP’s
external defense posture, but also enable the country to contribute
more meaningfully and substantially to regional security and stability.
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

RP is only now developing the interest and capability to look beyond

a decade in its planning process. The AFP’s successful leadership in
East Timor illustrates the country’s capability in peacekeeping
operations. Given the level of professionalism and adaptability of RP
troops, the AFP is a likely leader in peacekeeping operations in the
region.

IV. Convergence

What are strategic interests of RP with the US

A strong US presence in the region is beneficial for RP in a number
of ways:
1. US presence deters major &minor-power confrontations in the
South China Sea.
2. Peace and stability of the region is enhanced by a strong US
presence. This is advantageous for overall trade and economy
within Southeast Asia.
3. US presence in Southeast Asia can enhance economic, trade,
and investment opportunities.
4. Development and maintenance of existing AFP assets can be
better addressed.

The US is particularly interested in enhancing the AFP’s operations

and maintenance (O&M) capabilities. While it has supplied Excess
Defense Articles (EDAs) to RP in the past, the best way to address
these vital needs and to build the right capabilities is through
continued funding of FMF and IMET programs for RP.

Similarities in RP-US defense policy and objectives

Issues and concerns affecting RP-US defense relations.

V. Transnational and internal factors that would impact RP-US security

relations in the next 20 years.
The nature by which RP-US relations will move and shape in the coming
years will largely depend on trends affecting global affairs. These will deeply
affect the ability of these 2 nations to deal with their respective defense and
security requirements in converging points of interest in the area of
transnational threats

By definition, transnational threats are nonmilitary dangers that cross borders

and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of
that nation’s inhabitants. RP’s porous borders make addressing transnational
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

threats an imperative for the committee and for the defense establishment in the
early 21st century.

The Transnational Security Threats in Asia Conference Report listed narcotics

(shabu) and terrorism (Abu Sayyaf) as RP’s main concern. With Islamic
revivalism, expect the very cost effective and stealthy biological/chemical
terrorism to follow within the decade. Other potential threats are: Economic
disparities; Shortages in energy, foodgrains, water, clothing & shelter;
Technology terrorism; Natural disaster; and Environmental degradation. In fact,
in Eugene Linden’s The Future in Plain Sight: Nine Clues to the Coming
Instability, he foresees economic depression, plagues, floods, & famine. It
mentioned RP omenously:

In the first half of the new century, most of the remaining forest will be cut down,
and as few as 30% of the animal and plant species once present in the country
will survive. Mudslides flowing over denuded fields will wipe out countless
homes, and the silt that washes into rivers and lagoons will destroy fisheries. A
longer, more vigorous typhoon season will play havoc with rice crops, wounding
the economy and forcing the nation to import large amounts of food. Guerilla
warfare, disease and hunger will eventually drive down the birth rate, and by
2050 the population will sink to 55 million, 25% lower than it is now. At that point,
things may start to improve, as the rain forest begins to reclaim the hillsides and
the mangroves return to the ravaged coastline. But, much of the country will be
damaged beyond repair.

In the campaign against cyberterrorism, NBI’s Anti-fraud & Computer Crimes

Division Chief Elfren Meneses, Jr. complained that ISPs take a long time before
giving needed documents in a computer-related crime. ISPs always reason out
that for confidentiality’s sake, they take much time before furnishing the NBI with
documents it requested.

In confirmation of David Paraiso’s study, RP is becoming alarmingly infamous as

a nation of hackers. An emerging predatory culture of hacking is prevalent
among students and professionals. If this isn’t checked the international and
technology communities could rate RP as a pariah state. Enough for us to suffer
sanctions that current rogue-states like Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea have.
Obviously, economic and security interests will be adversely impacted if this
culture isn’t addressed.

The AFP may have to restudy these rebels and criminals carefully in order to re-
evaluate its strategic direction and operational concepts. In particular, it may be
necessary for the government to focus on commercial insurgency, - as practiced
by the Abu Sayyaf and by corrupt PNP/AFP elements, as well as organized
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

crime syndicates - because subversive or defensive insurgents are already

waging this particular type of insurgency in the guise of being true
revolutionaries. That they will continue to subvert the Republic and the
democratic way of life in more sophisticated ways is the emerging trend in the
country. At present and in the future, we will continue to confront the challenges
of various insurgent groups. Knowing their nature and character will go a long
way in effectively dealing with these rebels.

VI. Concluding Statement:

North America will no longer clearly be the richest part of the globe but the US
will remain the only superpower. For another generation its military strength, its
cohesion as a nation and its sheer size will ensure that it will retain political
leadership of the world. Neither of the other two developed regions – Europe or
East Asia – will have this particular combination of strengths. Western Europe
will lack its political cohesion, and will still be preoccupied with the integration of
its fringe areas. Power in East Asia will be split between the two largest
economies, Japan and China, while levels of development elsewhere will be
uneven. The 21st century may turn out to be the age of Asia, but that will not yet
be absolutely clear at end of its second decade.

Meanwhile, the intellectual leadership of the US will remain. It will still be a

magnet for the best brains in the world. This will have the paradoxical effect that
continued leadership may depend on the work of foreigners at US universities
and research establishments. The US will, however, continue to export its
culture, its ideas, and its language. The dominant position of English as the
world’s universal language for both science and entertainment will be even more
secure – even if its hold in the US may be weaker.

How will the US react to the fact that, though global leader, it is no longer the
world’s richest nation? Will it want to continue political leadership of the world?
Perhaps for another it will be prepared to do so: it is hard to walk away from
power. But by 2020 domestic support for its international leadership – and all that
entails – will be wearing thin. Because there is no other candidate for global
military leadership it cannot but continue to play that role, but the physical
support will be reduced: the US will have withdrawn all but token forces from
Europe, and in East Asia forces will have been slimmed down to a fraction of the
1990s’ levels. Europe will be expected to defend itself; so will Japan.

Instead the preoccupation of the US military will be defense of the US itself and
control of international terrorism, which will rightly be perceived as more of a
threat to world peace than the conventional armies of the major nation states.
The US will naturally retain particular areas of special interest, for example in the
Middle East and in Latin America, and it will retain an overall interest in stability in
http://ph.linkedin.com/pub/gene-gregorio/2/455/b0a
http://gene-gregorio.blogspot.com/p/about-gene-gregorio.html
http://twitter.com/#!/genegregorio
http://www.facebook.com/gene.gregorio
http://www.scribd.com/home

the rest of the world. It will be particularly concerned about the way in which the
military power of the former Soviet Union is managed, a process which will not
yet be complete by 2020. But direct threats to US interests will diminish, and it
will be reluctant to intervene in trouble hot-spots unless it feels its own interests
are directly at stake. The US will not have reverted to isolationism, but it will have
accepted that it cannot solve the world’s problems on its own.