LESSON DIRECTIVE

SWC JPFD-09: FORCE MANAGEMENT II: EQUIPPING THE FORCE

.Introduction .1

a. This lesson focuses on equipping the force. "Equipping the force 1' includes
the Force Integration activities of modernizing or upgrading currently fielded equipment;
replacing major "end items" with new and more advanced systems; fielding materiel
solutions to approved capabilities requirements as the last stage of the acquisition
process, and distributing equipment associated with creating new units or changing unit
structures. Equipping functions are linked to DOD and Services' acquisition processes,
sustainment activities, and mobilization and readiness systems. While the
acronymladen systems and planning horizons may differ, the Services all program their
need for equipment and have similar systems and processes that forecast future
requirements, develop appropriate plans and programs, and procure and distribute
equipment.
b. Within Army Force Management, the Equipping function occurs after the
force documentation process and is guided by the Army's Structure and Composition
System (SACS). SACS produces the Army's time-phased demands for equipment over
the current, budget, and program years and then extends it out to a 10-year planning
horizon. Finally, it produces an Objective Table of Organization and Equipment
(OTOE) that depicts target organizational structures for every Army unit at a point
sufficiently in the future so that all projected modernization will have been made
(currently established as the year 2050). The logistical SACS (LOGSACS) output
becomes the input for other related Equipping processes. For instance, LOGSACS
equipment requirements and authorizations are the basis for the Total Army Equipment
Distribution Program (TAEDP) that guides on-going equipment distribution. Moving
Army units towards the OTOE according to the TAEDP -- and even the OTOE itself
--constantly changes as equipment is fielded, upgrades are programmed, priorities are
modified and new equipment and organizations are developed and approved for
implementation. The journey is continuous, with an ever-moving "finish line." It is often
marked by major organizational changes such as conversions, Total Package Fielding
(TPF) for new systems, and reset periods for fielding new equipment. Each of these
approaches -- unit conversions, TPF. And Reset - provide for meeting force structure
Equipping challenges. These approaches are augmented with Joint and Service rapid
fielding initiatives designed to quickly meet emerging Combatant Command operational
needs with existing "off-the-shelf capabilities.

c. The entire military is transforming its equipment in response to new

technological opportunities while at the same time adapting its organizational structure
to meet changing operational and strategic environments. This lesson will examine and
assess the processes used to modernize the force, meet the challenges of
Transformation, and quickly equip units to fight and win.
2. Lesson Learning Objectives.

a. Know the service processes used to equip and modernize the force.

b. Comprehend challenges in concurrently meeting equipping requirements

associated with modernization and operational war fighting needs within budgetary
Restraints and unit life-cycle timelines.

3. Required Readings.

a. U.S. Army Force Management School. Army Force Management Model

"Strategy to Structure", 2009, pp. 21-25 addressed in this lesson.

b Luttwak, Edward N. 'Breaking the Bank: Why Weapons Are So Expensive, 11

The American Interest, Autumn (Sep/Oct) 2007, pp. 48-58.

c. Department of the Army, G-8. The Army Equipping Strategy 2009, pp. 1-12.
Available at: https://www.g8.army.mil/pdf/Army Equipping Strateqy.pdf.

d. Ehrhard, Thomas P, An Air Force Strategy for the Long Haul. Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. 2009, pp. 15-29. Available at
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrarv/R.20090917.An Air Force Strat/R.
20090917.An Air Force Strat.pdf.

e Cordesman, Anthony. Abandon Ships: The Costly illusion of Unaffordable

Transformation. Draft Monograph: Center for Strategic & International Studies, August
19, 2003, pp. 2-14 and 26-28 (Conclusions). Available at http://osis-
org/publication/abandon-ships.

4. Points to Consider.
a. What are some of the factors that limit the equipping function and force to
be spread over significant periods of time?

b. How are priorities established for determining what equipment and which unit
should receive equipment when? What are some of the processes the Services have
developed to identify priority equipping requirements?

c. What are some of the equipping and materiel modernization challenges

facing the Services? How are they different or similar?

2
 Army Force Management Model "Strategy
to Structure"

Pages 1-20 found in previous lesson (JPFD-08) reading "a."

Theory of Victory
J. BOONE BARTHOLOMEES
T he United States is developing a reputation much like Germany had in the twentieth century
of being tactically and operationally superb but strategically inept. Often stated as a
tendency to win the war but lose the peace, this problem has a huge theoretical component that
the national security community has only recently begun to address. In fact, the concept of victory
is the biggest theoretical challenge lacing security professionals today The security profession
needs a basic theoretical construct within which to think about winning wars. Gallons of ink
have been expended over the centuries on how to win wars, but that effort has largely been
uninformed by even a rudimentary theory of victory. Many existing theories pay little attention to
what victory is and why one wins, going instead to the more difficult issue of how one wins.
When theorists do address winning, it is usually in passing, as an assumption, or as an
excursion from their primary topic. Clausewitz is an exception to this assertion, but his musings
on winning are scattered and incomplete. There is a school of thought that claims theory is not
necessary for competent performance, While that might explain how mankind has gone without
a theory of victory for so long, it does not negate the utility of theory. Existing theories of war are
not necessarily wrong; they simply might benefit from some supplemental thought specifically
devoted to victory. Fortunately, the extant theoretical literature contains enough material to
begin constructing a theory of victory 2
The author is not alone in believing a theory of victory is needed. Colin S, Gray wrote a
monograph on the possibility of decisive victory that addresses the concept of winning,
although his primary focus is on the concept of decisiveness.' William Martel published a book
on the theory of victory in 2007.J Martel acknowledges his is not a complete theory of victory, but
he offers an excellent start. This article is not a comprehensive theory of victory either, but is
presented in an attempt to continue the discussion,

Summer 2008 25
What is Winning and Victory?
Victory in war is at the most basic level an assessment, not a fact or condition. It is
someone's opinion or an amalgamation of opinions. Victory in war may or may not have anything
to do with objective criteria such as casualties or territory taken or lost. In winning a war, those
things matter—at least at some level and always in terms of their effect on perception—-but
what mailers most is the ultimate perception of the situation, not the facts. Different people,
depending on their perspective, can legitimately differ in their assessment. The assessment
aspect complicates the issue of winning exponentially since it introduces the uncontrolled
variables of whose assessment takes precedence, for how much, and based on what criteria.

Several points flow from this assertion. Results from any direct interaction of two bodies will be
closely related and interdependent. This is especially true when there is a contest between
them, but because winning is an assessment and not a proven conclusion, the results of wars
are independent for each side and may vary by participant. That's, the fact that one side won
big docs not necessarily mean its opponent lost big. It may not even mean that the other side
lost at all.

Second, winning a war (as opposed to a battle or campaign) is a political condition. If war is a
political act, victory at the highest levels is correspondingly defined in political terms. The
implication is that tactical or operational victory without favorable political outcomes is sterile,
and by any reasonable assessment that is true. But knowing that strategic victory is a political
condition is not a sufficient understanding of victory.
Next, because it is a perception or assessment, victory is heavily dependent on
perspective. In a military sense, this translates into being sensitive to the level of war. It is possible
to have a smashing tactical victory that does not produce operational or strategic results. Is that
really a win? It certainly is from the point of view of the tactical commander; the view from the
perspective of the operational or strategic commander might be quite different. It is this char-
acteristic that allowed Saddam Hussein to claim victory after the First Gulf War, He suffered a
huge tactical and operational loss, but his regime had survived (his strategic objective after the
Coalition intervened). The war was thus a strategic win for him, at least in his eyes and from his
perspective.
Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr,is Professor of Military History at the US Army War College. He is the
course director for the "theory of War and Strategy" and the author of Buff Facings and Gilt Buttons:
Headquarters and Staff Operations in the Army of northern Virginia. 1861-186S

26 Parameters
 The characteristic of perspective allows observers to think of vic tory in war as three-
tiered: tactical, operational, and strategic. Because winning tactically is a fairly straightforward
and almost exclusively military activity, it is best understood and generally assessed using
reasonably quantifiable criteria. Measures of effectiveness such as comparative casualty ratios,
ground taken or lost, and prisoners captured all have weight and can produce a reasonable
estimate of victory or defeat that is likely lobe widely accepted. Operational victory is similarly
transparent at least in its purest form; the campaign succeeds or fails based on criteria that
are usually well understood and quantifiable. Strategic victory, however, is a more
complicated issue.
Which level is most important? It is tempting to respond that all are equally important,
but that would be incorrect. What counts in the end is the strategic outcome. The story comes to
mind of Colonel Harry Summers talking to a North Vietnamese officer after the Vietnam War,
Summers commented that the United States had won all the battles, and the North Vietnamese
replied, 'That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.' 15 Tactical and operational successes may set
the stage for strategic victory, but they are not sufficient in themselves.
Finally, as Colin Gray and William Martel point out, victory occurs on multiple sliding
scales. Victory and defeat, although polar opposites, are not binary. There are
thousands of points along the scale that delineate degrees of success. Winning may
or may not be decisive in the sense of settling the underlying political issues, again
across a whole range of degrees." Gray uses separate scales for achievement and
decisiveness.7 in a sense the two are so closely related that decisiveness might be
considered part of the definition of winning. It is, however, a separate and useful
concept, especially since the important interaction is the effect between levels (not to
discount the fact that one might win on one level and still not produce decisive results).
So a great battlefield victory may not decide anything either militarily in terms of the
campaign or politically in terms of the war just as one can succeed to varying degrees,
one can fail to varying degrees. Thus, the achievement scale has a negative
component.
Defeat Lost Not win Tie Not lose Win Victory
I I I I I I I
Figure 1. Scale of Success

A conceptual scale of success runs from defeat through losing, not winning, tying, not
losing, winning, and victory with shades and gradations between each point (Figure 1). Victory is
completely fulfilling while defeat is catastrophic, but the other possible results contain aspects of
both winning and losing to some extent. Note that this mode I draws distinctions between winning

Summer 2008 27
And victory and losing and defeat. While the words are often used interchangeably, they offer a
unique opportunity to distinguish important gradations that exist in the condition of success in
war. The assertion here is that victory will he essentially total and probably final; that it will resolve
the underlying political issues. It is certainly possible, however, to succeed in a war without
achieving everything one sought or resolving all the extant issues. Winning implies achieving
success on the battlefield and in securing some political goals, but not, for whatever reason,
reaching total political success (victory). Lesser levels of success reflect lesser degrees of
battlefield achievement or lesser degrees of decisiveness in solving or resolving underlying
issues. On the losing end, defeat is also a total concept. It implies failure to achieve battlefield
success or to attain political goals and simultaneously not only not resolving underlying issues
but actually exacerbating them. Thus, the two components of success in war are portrayed here
as the scales of achievement and decisiveness. These are related yet independent variables.
Exacerbated Significant potential Status quo Potential Partial Resolution
Deterioration Deterioration solution solution
I I I I I I I
Figure 2. Scale of Decisiveness
Decisiveness also reflects a range of potential outcomes. The decisiveness scale
(Figure 2) shows potential outcomes varying from completely resolving the political issues at
stake through various degrees of partial resolution to no effect (or status quo), worsened or
deteriorated political conditions, to the final potential outcome mat the war does not solve the
problems for which it was fought, but actually exacerbates them. Decisiveness assesses the
effect on the political issues.
Achievement considers how well one executes his strategy—in a sense, how well he
did on the battlefield or campaign and in the immediate political realm. Achievement (Figure 3)
can range from accomplishing nothing through increasing degrees of success until one is
completely successful.
None Negligible Slight Limited Measurable Significant Total
I I I I I I I
Figure 3. Scale of Achievement

The achievement scale is by far the primary scale used in tactical and operational
assessments

of victory and is often confused with the success scale. The two scales are closely related,

particularly since at the operational and strategic levels the achievement scale encompasses

political issues as well as

28 Parameters
military. The distinction is that one may accomplish political goals without
necessarily resolving the political issues.

Characteristics of Winning
One author has postulated that winning is simply achieving an outcome you like or at
least prefer compared to alternatives. The same author later writes, "'Victory 1 is an all-purpose
word used to describe imprecisely the concept of success in war. '"That descriptor has merit, but
it is a fairly low bar, and only a part of what winning really is. Achieving a preferred outcome or a
success is perhaps the most basic element of conflict termination; theoretically one fights to
achieve a favorable state of affairs or at least an outcome that is preferable to accepting the
alternatives or continuing the war That does not equate to victory. One can postulate a desirable
political or military condition that would be better than losing yet less than victory—for example, a
tie or stalemate.
It is clear that fighting will not stop unless the combatants see peace as more desirable
than a continuation of conflict. In Clausewitzian terms, if the effort required exceeds the value of the
political objective, the fighting has to stop,9 Achieving a desired or acceptable outcome may be a
precondition for conflict termination, but the end of lighting does not necessarily signify victory. In
fact, victory and conflict termination are two distinct and sometimes mutually antagonistic
concepts. It is possible and sometimes desirable to terminate conflicts without producing a
Dinner. Conversely, it is also possible to continue a war unnecessarily in hopes of achieving
victory or avoiding defeat. Winning a war, however, almost certainly implies that a state of peace
exists even if the existence of peace does not necessarily imply victory.
Winning is no different if your goal is positive or negative, that is if you are trying to
accomplish or prevent something. The same is true for limited or total goals. It really makes no
difference if the goal is something existential such as continuing to exist as a nation or
something less vital, for example, "Signaling." Total wars or wars for some concrete object such
as possession of territory are much more likely to be judged by concrete criteria—did you
achieve or prevent the occupation of the territory; who was still standing at the end? There are
also no absolute criteria that ensure victory.
Can both sides win a war? If so, why fight? It would seem that reasonable men could
discover a political solution that probably would be the result of war, without the necessity of all the
killing. That, however, has never been the case, and it is so because of both the nature of war and
the nature of victory. War is a dynamic process. As it progresses the political objectives can
change. Thus, the peace settlement upon which the assessment of victory and defeat

Summer 2008 29
will be made may have little relation to the initial political issues. The issues that provoked World
War 1 (at least the most immediate political issues) could have been resolved short of four years
of total war. Instead, ends grew as the military effort escalated, and the final peace settlement
had almost nothing to do with the original issues. Conversely, unexpectedly stiff resistance can
force politicians to scale back on initial political objectives. The point is that it is impossible to
decipher in advance the likely postwar political settlement,
Additionally, if the presumptive loser's political goals are very limited, such as
demonstrating capability, showing resolve, or sending messages, he may be able to correctly
claim he accomplished the objectives and thus won. At the conclusion of the 1973 Arab-Israeli
War the Egyptians had crossed the Suez Canal, still had forces on the eastern side, and had
stood up
to the Israelis. Politically, they could overlook the fact that the Israelis were conducting a
counterattack, had isolated one of the two attacking Egyptian armies, and were in position to
complete its destruction. The Egyptians were in a difficult military situation, but President Anwar
Sadat was able to negotiate and accept the Camp David peace accord precisely because he
could persuasively (at least to the Egyptian people) claim victory in the war. Thus, one side can
win big without the other side necessarily losing big, or even at all.
It is equally possible for neither side to win. Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart wrote, "Peace through
stalemate, based on a coincident recognition by each side of the opponent's strength, is at
least preferable to peace through common exhaustion—and has often provided a better
foundation for lasting peace. "10 Liddell Hart was implying that not achieving victory is sometimes a
win. Does that mean that not losing can be the same as winning? Why not if that is the political
goal? If one begins a war in an underdog or even a hopeless military position, then isn't
surviving that war a form of victory? While ethicists might question a decision to undertake a
war without true hope of victory, politicians have frequently found doing so is necessary,
Is there a temporal aspect to winning a war either in terms of achieving it or in terms of
sustaining the assessment over time? Obviously winning takes some amount of time, and
equally obviously the amount of time and effort expended will influence assessments of the
postwar political situation. A strategic victory must also have some temporal permanence;
rational assessments of victory will never concede success if a winning status is only sus-
tainable for a matter of weeks or months. Because winning at the strategic level is an
assessment of political results, it is subject to revision. Victory can be reevaluated either in
terms of achievement or decisiveness, and is therefore not necessarily permanent. The degree
of impermanence relates directly to the magnitude of the achievement and its decisiveness.
World War} looked like an Anglo-French-American victory in 1918, over time the degree of
decisiveness

30 Parameters
has been reevaluated. Now the result is generally considered to be a military success that did
not resolve and in some cases aggravated underlying geopolitical issues.
Tactical and operational victories, because of their firmer basis of judgment, tend to
remain fixed. Only very marginal victories at those levels are subject to reinterpretation. That is
also true of significant, very decisive strategic wins. It is much more difficult to reevaluate a total
victory that decisively settles the political issues involved than lo reevaluate a situation that is
positioned lower on the sliding scales.
Does or should the cost affect victory? Of course it does Liddell Hart pointed out that a
victory is useless if it breaks the winner's economy, military, or society," Cost will certainly factor
in to the equation of winning or losing. The statement returns to the point that it is possible to win
tactically at such an expense in men and materiel that a strategic defeat is the final result. The
classic encapsulation of this possibility was by King Pyrrhus of Epirus who in 279 B.C was alleged
to have replied to congratulations on a bloody victory over the Romans that one more such victory
would undo him.13

Who Decides?
Because of the reasonably measurable victory conditions at the tactical and much of
the operational levels, who decides the winner or loser at those levels is not especially
controversial. That is not true, however, at the strategic level, and the operational level can also
get contentious as it merges with the strategic, if victory at the strategic level is an assessment of
the postwar political conditions, then who does the assessment is critical. Does the victor
decide whether he won or lost? The vanquished? Both? Neither? What about a "disinterested" or
uninvolved party? Can the decider be multiple people? If the decider can be multiple, could
several different (and equal ly valid) decisions be made? The issues here are endless, and that is
just to decide who makes the assessment. There is a second set of issues related to the question
of what criteria should he used. Is there an objective set of criteria? Are the criteria culturally
based? Are the criteria different for different kinds of war (total or limited)? Do the criteria vary
over time?
Despite its complexity the question of who decides has a simple answer This narrative
has defined ultimate victory as an assessment of the postwar political condition; therefore it is a
political issue, and everyone gets an opinion. 1 hen the problem becomes not who decides but
whose opinion matters, and that is a much more manageable issue. For Americans the opinions
that matter are in order of priority:(1) the American people; (2) American po litical and military
elites (1 and 2 together might he thought of as American public opinion on military issues); (3)
the opinion of friends and allies; and

Summer 2008 3!
 Traditionally, governments indicate they are beaten by signing some
form of peace accord or treaty, while armies acknowledge defeat by formally
surrendering or perhaps agreeing to an armistice. Those are highly important
symbolic acts as an acknowledgement of victory and defeat; they are an inte-
gral and perhaps essential part of the political and social mythology of vic-
tory. Formal ceremonies acknowledging victory and defeat are extremely
important and significant. Such ceremonies should be authentic to be useful,
however. Contrived ceremonies for the sake of having a formal surrender do
not convince the target audience.
Current thinking supports the belief that there will not be such a cer-
emony at the conclusion of the war on terrorism and is probably correct. The
difference in the war on terrorism is that the enemy is a nonstate actor. There
are no internationally recognized procedures for accepting the surrender of
nonstate actors, and if there were, no state could risk legitimizing such an ac-
tor by formally accepting its surrender. If nonstate actors mimic in some ways
the Trinitarian characteristics of states, the impact of formal surrender might
be similar, but the extent of such similarity is at present unclear.
So, what conclusions can be drawn regarding winning in warfare so
far? It is an assessment of two variables, achievement and decisiveness, at
three levels: tactical, operational, and strategic. At the tactical and in most
cases the operational level winning is a military condition, and the assessment
rests on reasonably well-understood military criteria. At the strategic level
(and the portions of the operational that directly overlap the strategic), public
opinion decides who wins and loses and to what extent based on an
assessment of the postwar political conditions. The military situation as the
public understands or interprets it will, of course, play a huge role in the
assessment, but the overriding criteria will be political. To be effective, a victory
needs to be recognized and accepted by the opponent and sustained over
time. Thus, strategic victory in war is a positive assessment of the postwar
political situation in terms of achievement and decisiveness that is
acknowledged, sustainable, and resolves underlying political issues. Similarly,
tactical victories are battlefield military outcomes that achieve their purpose
and give one side a significant, acknowledged advantage over its opponent.
Substituting "operational" for "tactical" and eliminating "battlefield" in this
definition yields a satisfactory definition of operational victory.
How Does One Win?
Theoretically, how one wins a war is fairly straightforward—achieving it
is difficult. Clausewitz pointed out that war is both a physical and moral struggle-
His recipe for victory was simple: "If you want to overcome your enemy you must
match your efforts against his power of resistance, which can be expressed

Summer 2008 33
(4) world opinion—essentially everybody else. As the
issue fades from the immediate political forum, the
interested audience declines precipitously until eventually
only historians debate the issue. By then the base
assessment of winning and losing has already been
established, and historical debates are adjustments
based on new evidence or consequences revealed by the
passage of time.
How does one determine American public
opinion? The determination results from the confluence of
two processes. First, political leaders try to convince the
public. That attempt is successful or not based on the facts
of the particular circumstances, the persuasiveness of
the message, and the perceived legitimacy and veracity
of the messenger. Credible politicians backed by
convincing evidence of military achievement and political
profit can proclaim victory and simply establish the fact.
The second process is more like
the obscenity test articulated by a US Supreme Court
justice in 1964—people recognize victory when they see
it. They make up their own minds using whatever
evidence is available. This is a much more subjective
process that quickly escapes political control or is
controlled by atypical political forces. As a result, at the
strategic level victory and defeat can be as much issues
of public perception and even partisan politics as they are
of battlefield achievement or diplomatic negotiations.
Of course, an analogue of this process occurs in
the enemy country or organization (if a nonstate actor).
Who decides in the enemy camp and how is a critical but
very situationally dependent fact. It should be considered
in the strategic estimate process, although this article
cannot attempt to speculate on how that might work.
There is another key point to consider. Clausewitz said
victory was tripartite. ''If in conclusion we consider the
total concept of a victory, we find it consists of three
elements: the enemy's greater loss of material strength,
his loss of morale, and his open admission of the above
by giving up his intentions."13 This highlights one
significant fact regarding who decides and how: to be
effective, both sides have to acknowledge its
correctness. Clausewitz was addressing tactical victory
where his three points are usually apparent. At the
strategic level the assessment is much more difficult and
debatable. The admission of loss, however, is an important
caveat for all levels, and at all levels it intertwines with the
issue of who decides. This distinction is particularly evident
at the tactical level, but there are times when one side or
the other refuses to accept obvious defeat for whatever
reason and continues the fight. Acceptance of defeat
makes moot the issue of who decides who won. Both
sides acknowledge the outcome, and it is difficult for even
the most radical re-interpretation to contest the basic
decision.
32 Parameters

as the product of two inseparable factors; the total means at his disposal and
the strength of his will,"14 One can express that as a mathematical formula:
R=MxW
R represents the power of resistance, M is the total means available,
and W is the strength of will. Victory is achieved as R approaches zero; that is,
as the power of resistance drops to an ineffective level. An opponent can
push R toward zero by reducing either M or W (or both).
The traditional concept of winning a war is based on reducing the en-
emy's means of resistance. That usually is done through destroying or neutral-
izing the enemy's military oral least attiriting it to the point of ineffectiveness.
The underlying purpose is to negate the enemy's capability to resist so one
might impose his will without resistance. The trick has always been how one
goes about destroying or attiriting the enemy. Another physical approach at-
tempts to use paralysis to avoid the issues of destruction or attrition. The con-
cept is that one paralyzes vital enemy systems, especially command and
control, to make resistance ineffective,1* The mechanism for achieving victory
is still placing the enemy in a situation where your armed forces can directly
impose their will.
Attacking psychologically to reduce the enemy's will to resist works
differently. The intent of all action is not to place oneself in position to impose
one's will but to cause the enemy to lose his will and quit. If there is truth in
Clausewitz's description of the forces interacting in war as the people, the gov-
ernment, and the military, then it is possible to ascribe a will to each. 16 whose
will counts most? The French general and theorist Andre Beaufre wrote:
Whom do we wish to convince? Ultimately it must be the enemy government
but in some cases it may be easier to work on leading personalities (e.g., Cham-
berlain at Bad Godesberg or Munich), choosing arguments to which they are
most susceptible. Alternatively it may be best to work directly on a certain sec -
tion of public opinion which has some hold over the government or an influential
allied government or through UNO [the United Nations]. 11
 Regardless of the route he followed, Beaufre was focused on break-
ing the will of the enemy government. Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory
provides a different perspective. In COIN the people's support is the object of
the war Thus, the people's will counts most—controlling it is how one wins.
Restated in terms of a theory of victory, the population is the strategic objec-
tive in COIN because winning the population equates almost directly to win-
ning the conflict.
These examples raise the possibility that whose will counts most
may be largely an issue of the type of war one is fighting. This situation re-

34 Parameters
flects Clausewitz's dictum that the first and greatest act of a commander and
statesman is to understand the nature of the war in which he is about to en-
gage.18 In a total war, one probably has to break at least the government's and
the people's will. You may have to break all three elements, and certainly are
required to do so to achieve a lasting settlement. In limited wars, one may
only have to break the will of the government, assuming sufficient govern-
mental control exists to enforce its decision. As a caveat, there is no
guarantee that breaking the will of one of the Trinitarian legs will produce
victory or that both sides will be contesting over the same will. A second
caveat is that the model may not fit nonstate actors well.
In will-oriented approaches, physical effects are also important and
are typically a primary method. The distinction is in intent. The desired result
of a psychological approach is the collapse of will rather than rendering the
enemy incapable of resistance. For example, the Italian airpower theorist
Gulio Douhet wanted to use strategic bombing to attack the will of the enemy
People and government. The bomber could fly over fielded forces and di-
rectly attack enemy cities. The intent was to break morale. 19 this theory,
which is the heart of all strategic bombing theory, has yet to work unambigu-
ously. The one proven way to break will is to convince the enemy that resis-
tance is futile; the cost of resistance exceeds the potential gain.
The only method currently available to directly attack will is infor-
mation operations; all other options attack indirectly through some other as-
pect presumed to influence will. Information operations, however, are very
blunt instruments whose impact is difficult to predict or target. Conversely, if
victory is an assessment, information operations are strategically critical in
deciding the winner. America's inability to come to grips intellectually, phys-
ically, or psychologically with this aspect of war in an age where control of in-
formation is impossible is a huge part of our current perceived inability to
achieve positive strategic results in Iraq and Afghanistan,
What is the bottom line? Victory in war is about breaking will.
Completely eliminating means of resistance is impossible. Theoretically
there will always be one enemy soldier armed with a knife who is willing to
give their life to continue the fight. Destroying the enemy's means without
breaking his will leaves you with a less capable but still hostile foe. Con -
versely, breaking the will to resist ends the war regardless of the enemy's
remaining combat capability. The issue then becomes much more
practical: How does one break an enemy's will? This question is where the
argument loops back. Will is a difficult concept to define, much less attack
directly, so militaries invariably attack the enemy military as a method not to
reduce his power of resistance to zero, but as a means to destroy his will
thereby achieving victory,

Summer 2008
The Implications for War
War is about winning. This is not a new concept. Sun Tzu
expressed it—"Victory is the main object in war"—
thousands of years ago.20 Even fighting in an impossible
situation is done in the hope of victory, if only by miracle or
if only defined as surviving the contest.
The fact that war is about winning does not mean it is
about victory. One can win a war, especially a limited
war, without achieving victory; here the distinction in
words becomes significant. Military force can legiti-
mately be used to obtain goals short of total victory or for
immediate political advantage with no intent of resolving
the underlying issues. The point is that war is about
politics, and consequently victory in the end is a political
matter.
Has this analysis answered (or even asked) all the
relevant questions? Certainly not. There is much work
remaining in this arena. The hope is that these thoughts
can advance the discussion. If not, nations may end the
twenty-first century still bemoaning their inability to turn
spectacular tactical victories into decisive strategic
results.
NOTES

1. See for example Donald Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How

Professionals Think m Action (New
York: Basic Books, 1983).
2. Bradford Lee at the Naval War College has been working on a concept he
calls a theory of victory that is
very interesting; however, it is more a theory of winning specific contests against
specific enemies in the terms
developed in this article.
3. Colin S. Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (Carlisle, Pa.; US
Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute, 2002).
4. William C. Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy
(New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).
5 r Harry G Summers, 3i.t On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle,
Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1981, fifth printing 1989), 1
6. Martel,94-95; Gray, 9-iO.
I. Gray, ibid.
8. Mattel, 2,87.
9. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds,
(Princeton, NJ,: Princeton Univ .
Press, 1989), 92,
10. Basil H, Liddell Hart ,strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954,
reprint 1967), 370.
II. Ibid., 366-70.
12. Plutarch, "Pyrrhus," John Dryden, trans.,
http://classics.mit.edu/Plutarch/pyrrhus.html.
13. Clausewitz, 233-34.
14. Ibid.,77,
15. John A. Warden III3 "The Enemy as a System, 3' Arrpower Journal, 9
(Spring 1995), 41-55.
16. Clausewitz, 89.
17. Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, with Particular Reference to
Problems of Defense, Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age,R.\\
Barry, trans. (London: Farber and Farber, 1965), 24.
IS. Clausewitz, 88-89.
19. David Jablonsky, "Editor's introduction" in David Jablonsky, ed ., Roots of
Strategy, Book 4: 4 Military Classics (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books,
1999), 270-1; Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to
the Cold War (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), 577-81.
20. SunTzu,7fre/Jrfe/W?r,SamueIB. Griffith, trans {New York: Oxford Univ,
Press, 1963, 1973), 73.
36 Parameters

Planning for Conflict

Termination and
Post-Conflict Success
WILLIAM FLAVIN
"No ore starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—-without first being
dear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct
it."
— Carl von Clausewitz

"If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be
too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a
bad one, containing the germs of another war."
— B. H, Liddell Hart^

I t is always easier to get into a conflict than to get out of one. In 1956, for
example, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden with French Premier Guy
Mullet planned to unseat President Nasser of Egypt and reduce his
influence in the region by a combined and coordinated British, French, and
Israeli military operation. The French and British leadership conducted
detailed, thorough planning to ensure that the costs and risks were reduced
to an acceptable minimum. In violation of Clausewitz's guidance above,
however, the operation was launched without a good idea about termination
and what the post-conflict situation would look like. What if landing on the
Suez Canal at Port Said and Port Fuad did not force Nasser to step down?
Were France and Britain then willing to march on Cairo? Would they have
international support for such a move? If they seized Cairo, what would
the new Egyptian government look like? Could it stay in power with-out
keeping British and French troops in Egypt for years to come? Would the
British and French have world opinion on their side for such an
occupation?
In the event, Israel launched the attack and British and French
forces landed on the Suez Canal. But the operation did not turn out as
planned. The
Autumn 2003 95

United States and Soviets, along with world opinion, forced the British
and French to withdraw. President Nasser, rather than being defeated,
became the victor and the leader of the Arab cause, while the British and
the French lost prestige and influence. How could rational decision makers
get it so wrong?1
This article examines the doctrinal basis for conflict termination
planning and provides suggestions and approaches for greater success.
Fundamentals
Conflict termination is the formal end of fighting, not the end of
conflict, US doctrine holds that the goal of military operations is to set
conditions that compel belligerents' decision makers to end hostilities on
terms favorable to the United States and its allies. US joint doctrine and
NATO doctrine state: "If the conditions have been properly set and met for
ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the
adversary from renewing hostilities. , . . When friendly forces can freely
impose their will on the adversary, the opponent may have to accept defeat,
terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as
geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare."4 The definition focuses on conflict
termination, not conflict resolution- The military fight may stop without the
causes of the conflict being resolved.
Current joint doctrine thus recognizes that although coercive
military operations may end, the conflict may continue under other means
such as terrorism, insurgency, cyber war, economic disruptions, political
actions, or acts of civil disobedience. Although the military may be
engaged in a "post-conflict" peace operation, the belligerents may
continue their struggle using these other means. This was definitely the
case in Kosovo and is currently the case in Af ghanistan, where the
military is engaged in stability operations in the midst of conflict- Even in
Iraq, where the coalition military victory is unquestioned, the post-conflict
situation remains unsettled.
Conflict termination and resolution clearly are not the same thing.
Conflict resolution is a long process. It is primarily a civil problem that may
require military support. Through advantageous conflict termination,
however, the military can set the conditions for successful conflict
resolution.
The keys to successful conflict termination include the following
fundamentals: conducting early interagency planning; establishing
workable objectives, goals, and end states; providing for adequate
intelligence and signaling;

Colonel William Flavin (USA Ret) is the Associate Professor of Peace

Operations Concepts and Doctrine for the US Army Peacekeeping Institute. Before
this assignment, he was a senior foreign affairs analyst with Booz Allen and
Hamilton on contract to assist the Peacekeeping Institute for doctrine
development. While on active duty he served in a variety of assignments on Office
of the Secretary of Defense, unified command, service, and NATO staffs.

96 Parameters

ensuring unity of effort; harmonizing the civil with the military effort; and establishing the
appropriate post-conflict organ izatioru5
Early Planning
Planning for termination and post-conflict operations should begin as early as
possible. It must be an interagency, multinational, integrated effort. The first and primary
objective in planning for termination and post-conflict peace operations is to establish an
achievable end state based on clear objectives. Planners and commanders must realize
that this is an initial object that will begin to change over time. They must retain the
flexibility to adjust. As Jeffrey Record
Writers, "Having an exit strategy on the shelf at the beginning of hostilities and sticking to it
until the end assumes away the potent influences of military performance on war aims as
well as the law of unintended political consequences that attends any major military
intervention,"'
The next most important element is achieving unity of effort among
the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational aspects of national
power. National unity must be harmonized with multinational partners and the
community of international organizations and nongovernmental
organizations. The commander and planner must visualize the situation
from the start of war through termination and into post-conflict peace
operations to ensure all of the parts are synchronized. With the concept
harmonized, it is then necessary to consider resources. Conflict resolution
may not be possible if adequate resources are not available.
With the conceptual plan in place, the information operation can
provide the appropriate signaling to the adversaries to provide them an
opportunity to terminate the conflict early. The intelligence community will
need to identify potential opportunities for termination. The leadership must
then have the political courage and will to grasp the opportunity and the
perseverance to carry it through and win the peace.
Objectives and End States
US Joint Publication 5-00, 1 provides the following guidance: "The
National Command Authorities should clearly describe the desired end
state before committing the armed forces of the United States. , . - If the
NCA do not adequately articulate the termination criteria, the combatant
commander should request guidance or clarification, as appropriate.'*7
The commander thus should seek a clear end state, but this is
more the ideal than the reality. The military forces will rarely receive
political objectives that contain the clarity they desire. Such is simply not in
the nature of the system. General Maxwell Taylor, who had a great deal of
experience at the national political level, summarized the most important
reasons for this lack of clarity:
For one thing, busy senior officials capable of providing it [political guidance]
are so engrossed in day-to-day tasks that they have little leisure for
serious

Autumn 2003 97
thought about the future beyond the next federal budget. Also, it is a risky business
for a senior politician to put on public record an estimate of future events which, if
wide of the mark, would provide ammunition to his adversaries. Similarly, a Presi-
dent who announces specific policy goals affords the public a measure of his failure
if he falls short of his hopes. Hence it is common practice for officials to define for-
eign policy goals in the broad generalities of peace, prosperity, cooperation, and
good will—unimpeachable as ideals but of little use In determining the specific ob-
jective we are likely to pursue and the time, place, and intensity of our efforts. 8
Consequently, political objectives by their nature will be broad, but
that is not necessarily bad. Morton Halperin asserts that "unspecified non-
rigid objectives increase the chances of arriving at an acceptable
compromise and eliminate the domestic costs which would stem from a
failure to gain a stated objective."9 Moreover, there are other reasons why
broad objectives are not only appropriate but can also facilitate military
operations. If political leaders place a time limit on US involvement—as they
did for the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia
and the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-flat will influence the
course of action chosen by the belligerents, In Somalia, for example,
General Mohammed Farrah Aideed could just wait until the foreign forces
departed and then continue his quest for power.[0
NATO saw this problem and changed its approach when the
Stabilization Force (SFOR) assumed the responsibility from IFOR,
employing an "end state" rather than an "end date." The Joint Task Force
Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations recognizes that the end
state may be a "moving target, one that needs continuous refinement
throughout an operation." The end state for the first elements of IFOR
that moved into Bosnia in 1995 was different from that of the SFOR that
remains there in 2003. Because the post-conflict period may last for years,
an end state that is general rather than specific may facilitate military
operations."
The most difficult task is to take this general political guidance and
produce concrete military objectives for the day after the shooting stops.
For example, in Operation Just Cause, the removal of Manuel Noriega's
government in Panama, there was little guidance on what to do after the
shooting ended. There is "little evidence to suggest that those planning for
restoration either realistically understood or adequately addressed .. ,
historical and contextual issues" when considering post-conflict plans.
What did "restoration of Panama" mean? "What kind of democracy was
possible in Panama? How long would it take to establish and secure? What
were the major obstacles that had to be overcome? Would an operative
civil government exist once the PDF [Panamanian Defense Force] was
destroyed? What would replace the PDF? What was the stated objective
of the economic and social infrastructure?'* What was the military role?
What would the measures of effectiveness be? What was the end state? AH
of these questions describe pan of the unknown environment that the
military faced on the morning after its successful operation against
Noriega,12

98 Parameters
 Even the supposedly clear political objectives of the 1991 Gulf
War were ambiguous in describing the post-conflict end state. A defense
principal later confided, "I do not think we had political objectives— the
political objectives were to kick Iraq out of Kuwait—that was it. There was no
consideration for conflict termination—where do you want to be politically in
20 years? What are the strategic decisions for this part of the world? None of
that was considered."13
For the 1991 Gulf War, National Security Directive (NSD) 26, NSD
45, and NSD 54 provided clear objectives for the conduct of the
operational battle. After Iraq was ejected from Kuwait, however more
clarification was needed on how to apply these objectives. What did the
goal of "stability in the region" mean how did this goal translate into
military objectives? Was there a time frame associated with this goal or
measures of effectiveness? What was the military expected to do about the
resistance operations of the Shine Marsh Arabs against Iraqi forces being
waged in the front of the coalition forces? What about the Kurds and their
military operations in the north? How did the goal of stability square with
President Bush's public statements broadcast to the region over a
CIA-supported Saudi Arabian radio station urging "the Iraqi people to take
matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step
aside."14 What did the goal of the "destruction of Iraqi military capability"
mean? How did allowing the Hammurabi Division to withdraw with most of
its combat equipment intact square with that objective? What about the Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction? What did "restore Kuwait" mean? Should
the US encourage the Kuwaiti citizens to develop democratic institutions,
or was the objective for Kuwait a status quo ante! What were the goals of
the other countries in the coalition and to what extent should they be
considered? All of these questions and countless others led to interagency
friction and the lack of a synchronized approach to post-conflict termination
in the days following the Gulf War. And this lack of a well-considered
termination and post-conflict strategy left the region and the world with
unresolved issues that would bedevil the international community for a
decade and lead to yet another war.15
Moving Targets
Another reality is that the objective and end state selected at the
start of a conflict most likely will be altered as the conflict proceeds and may
not be the same at termination. End state development in one form or
another will probably occur.
Early and significant success, for example, can cause the end
state to change. The Korean War provides an example. The success of the
Inchon landing in September 1950 and the subsequent collapse of the
North Korean resistance influenced the United States and UN to alter the
end state from status quo ante to a reunified peninsula. This end state was
readjusted when the Chinese entered the war and drove the UN force back
toward the south.16
In the 1991 Gulf War, the stunning success of the coalition forces
also presented an interesting '"end state creep" problem. There was
tension between

Autumn 2003 99
doing more and ending the war early. The Director of Operations for the
Joint
Staff during the war later stated, "We had trouble [deciding] when to stop
Many people had different opinions, even though we knew what the
President wanted. There were some claiming we stopped too soon, others
that we did not stop soon enough, which is to be expected in any
conflict."17 On 27 February 1991, President Bush and his advisors met and
decided that the media portrayal of the war—particularly with regard to the
"highway of death"—would be detrimental to the coalition's achievements in
the region and that the objective of freeing Kuwait was essentially achieved.
However, to end the war at that point meant that the objective of destroying
Iraq's military capability had to be set aside. "The demand for the Iraqis to
leave their equipment [in place] was dropped from Mr. Bush's
speech"18
Post-conflict objectives and end states may be debated and modified up to
and through termination. When this happens, the victor may lose the
strategic
Advantage he possesses at the moment of termination. At the end of the Gulf
War, it took a month for the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 687 to
serve as the final settlement. By then the power of the coalition force had
departed, and the opportunity for a negotiated settlement in the face of
overwhelming military power was lost.19 the psychological initiative had
shifted to Iraq. "The Iraqi foreign minister made it clear that they considered
this resolution a threat to Iraq's sovereignty."20 According to Michael
Ignatieff, Saddam succeeded in winning the propaganda war in the Arab
world by pretending that the sanctions imposed by the UN aggression were
"starving his people, when in fact Saddam himself... frustrated attempts to
assist them."21
The situation after World War II also presented monumental
challenges for our occupation force in Germany:
American planning for the occupation of Germany divided the wartime
Roosevelt administration as did few other issues. Secretary Morgenthau and
the Treasury Department, often joined by Cordell Hull [State] and Harry
Hopkins [personal advisor to the President], favored the harshest possible
 treatment for Germany. Secretary Stimson and the War Department,
frequently joined by the career foreign service, favored a firm occupation and
a swift rehabilitation.22

General Lucius D. Clay, the military governor of the US

occupation, found himself maneuvering between these two political camps,
trying to execute a directive that seemed to be an unworkable compromise.
He was dealing with a government in Washington that he was not sure knew
what it wanted in the center of Europe.23
Haifa century later, General Wesley Clark wrote that it was more
than a month into the air campaign against Serbia over Kosovo before the
international community addressed the issues of termination objectives. He
observed that end states and objectives can slip and change, especially if
the end state is not clear. In his opinion this is a characteristic of modern
war.?fl

100 Parameters

LESSON DIRECTIVE

SWC TWS-18: STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS III: VICTORY,

ARMISTICE AND POST-CONFLICT ORDER
1, Introduction.

The concept of winning is essential to effective strategy. Strategic

leaders and strategists must know what they are trying to achieve and
they must be able to recognize both when it has been accomplished and
when it is no longer within the realm of the possible. Understanding
victory is essential. However, besides understanding winning and
losing—essentially when it is time to quit—strategists must be able to
"operationalize" this understanding. This is done through an
appreciation of conflict termination. Conflict termination encompasses
both the formal end of fighting (often the easiest part of the challenge)
and leveraging the end of hostilities to accomplish all or some of the
strategic objectives associated with that conflict.
The decision to terminate fighting, whether it is taken unilaterally or it
is part of a negotiated settlement, must be based on the ends, ways, and
means that define the conflict in strategic terms. In this context,
understanding the relationship between ending the fighting and
accomplishing strategic objectives is a key element in the strategic art.
The conditions on which fighting terminates typically have significant
implications for post-conflict policies as well as the international system.

Conflict termination must also encompass post-conflict transition

and even the restoration of political order if the overall strategy within
which conflict termination is nested is to "attain a better peace, 1' to use
Liddell Hart's words. Achieving lasting desirable political results when
hostilities cease is not an automatic element of victory it requires
extensive thought, planning, preparation, and resources.
Finally, the view that the U.S. military will be used only to fight and
win the nation's wars is simply naive. The nation has numerous
interests and an extremely capable military in which it has invested
uncounted resources. Strategists should not be surprised to find the
military instrument of power applied to non-combat tasks. This is
particularly true of stabilizing the post-conflict order, which always has a
security component but may also involve the military in institution
building,
2. Lesson Learning Objectives.

a. Comprehend the theory of victory.

b. Comprehend the nature and role of conflict termination,

c. Comprehend the relationships among national interests, political

objectives, and
conflict termination, including the principles involved in conflict
termination such as
justice, reconciliation, ethical conduct (jus post helium), and postwar
institution building
1

3. Required Readings.

a. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr, Theory of Victory, 1' Parameters,

Vol. 68, no. 2
(Summer 2008), pp. 25-36.

b. William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-

Conflict Success/1
Parameters, Vol. 33, No. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 95-112.

4. Points to Consider.

a. What is victory? Who defines victory and do other actors have a

say? Can you
simply say, "I won" and have it be so?

b. Is there a temporal aspect to winning? That is, how long does it

have to last
before a state can declare victory?
 c. Is there a difference between winning and winning decisively?
Why or why not?
d. Can or should the definition of winning change over time in a
particular conflict?
Why or why not?

e. is military victory alone winning? Can you win militarily without

winning politically
and vice versa?

f. What is the role of will in winning? Whose will counts? How is it

expressed?

g. How does a strategist determine when he is beaten—that is,

when the better
good is to surrender or give up on attaining the goal? Alternatively, how
does a
strategist convince his adversary that he is beaten?

h. Is the concept of winning useful in a worldwide conflict against

terrorism, which is arguably based primarily on cultural rather than
military or political factors?