In This Issue

CALIFORNIA
GEOLOGIC REMOTE SENSING 194
GEOLOGY PLACER MINING CONFERENCE _ ' ' 194
PREPARATION AND USE OF EARTHOUAKE PLANNING SCENARIOS 195
A PU8UCATlOH OF THE
MODIFIED MERCALLIINTENSITY SCALE 203
DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION EARTHOUAKE PLANNING SCENARIO FOR THE
DIVISION OF MINES AND GEOLOGY SAN DIEGO·TIJUANA AREA . 204
Slale 01 c.II!_ PETE WILSON MARINE MINING 2000-APAIL 5·10. 1992 211
Go~ EARTHQUAKE BIBLIOGRAPHY 212
DMG RELEASE
The ~ ~ DOUGlAS P WHEELER
Stcreraty lor ~ SR 162. MINERAL LAND CLASSIFICATION-SAN LUISOBISPQ-
SANTA BARBARA P·C REGION......... .. ,214
DIpIrIIf*'Il 01 eoo-_ EDWARD G HEIDlG BOOK REviEWS..... . 215
a.- STATEMENT OF OWNERSHIP 215
o._olMinft&OeoIogy JAMESF DAVIS MAIL OADEA FOAM 215
SUJI. ~IogJSI CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SUBSCRIPTION FORM 216

CAliFORNIA GEOlOGY

AIMlaIII T«:hncI EdiloI'

.....tam EdotDr
Graphics arod Onogl'l COVER PHOTO: Loma Pneta earthquake damage. 1989
Side VIew ot support column tal lure and collapsed upper deCk
P,...... ~ote..-al s..- ot the Cypress Viaduct. t- 880. Oakland, California, The 7.1
0!tI0I 01 SUIe Pt,nt"'ll magnitude earthquake's epicenter was about 60 miles to the
south PholobyHowardG Wilshire. U.S GeologICa/Survey,
o.-~ "'6_Slt.-"-'o ,)01'
s.a- CA 1511.
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t.o.".,.... 0ffie8 107 Sout!IBroadwIY· ~ 10M
La. ~ _ CA 00012·"0,2 "The Erwlronmencal Research Institute of Michigan is sponsoring the Nmth
213.Q().3$80
Thematic Conference on Geologic Remote Sensing; Exploration. Environ·
81y_~~ It.S_SIr.- ment. and EngUleeling_ The conference wUI be held on February 11.
.5IIro FranoICIII CA 8ol1 Q,). 'S13
"i!>-551-1!OO 1993 in Pasadena. California
CAUFORhJA GEOlOGY lSSH 002t 'SMI • ~
monf'IIro,."~olCol_._' ~01""''''' For infonnatlOn. contact:
_ Geology The ~ c::Jllu 11.1 10S9 V.,. SIrMI, s.....
103 s.c.'menIO,o.95III' s-.cl cIaa PM. II paoclal Nancy J Wallman
Sacr......rno, CA PoIImuret Stndllddtesscna"O"lO CAli·
FOl'INkAGEOlOGYIUSPS350&40 1loJr29llO. S K t _ ERIM
CA \lS812 29ICI PO Box 134001
_ _ _ _ _ _ 10 ... a.oklgyprCIfICII
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_ _ .. __ Ann Arbcw. MI 48113-3234

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313·994-1200. ext: 3234'
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ntE CONCLUSIONS AND OPINIONS EXPflESSED IN Placer Mining Conference

ARTICLES ARE SOLELY 1I;05e OF THE AUTHORS AND
ARE NOT NECESSARILY ENDORSEO llY THE OEPART
"'ENT OF CONSERVATION The 9th Annual Dredging & Placer Mining Conference & Short Course
Co._ _ al/lOllidt. _ _ IOe- CAlIFOA on New Technology for?\acer Land Reclamatoo Planning wiD be hekl at
NlA GEOlOGY, Mel IlIrQlt Onve S - - C/o 151" John Ascuaga's Nugget. Sparks. evada on May 17·20. 1992
0'3'
So' • ..... "0001*'"
s.r.d.-cr-. __ ~ a I
~ _ Sl~.-dL ~

For infonnation. contact,

IllCALFORNlAGEOlOGYP 0 1loJr2llllO S - - CA Dr Philip M Bennett
lliYI22SlllO
Dr Yung Sam Kim or
Conference Director Program Director
Nevada Institute of Technology Department of Engineering
P.O_ Box 8894 Campus Station Professional Development
September 1991NoIume 44 Number 9 Reno. NV 89507 UniveTSiry of Wisconsin. Madison
702-6734466 432 N Lake Street
CGEQA 44 (9) 193·216 (1991)
Madison. WI 53706
608-263-4705·.. .

.
, CAUfORNIA GEOlOGY SEPTEMBER 1991
 Preparation and Use of
Earthquake Planning Scenarios
Dr. Glenn Borchardt is a contributing author
01 four published Division of Mines and
Geology earthquake planning scenarios. He
is a recognized expert In the determination
of amount and age of faull displacement
through interpretation of soil
characlerislics...edilor.
INTRODUCTION
alifomians can expect
C the nexl fev.. decades to
produce several major earthquakes in
large urban areas along the San Andreas
fault system (VJGCEP, 1990). Destructive
as these events may be. there are
numerous ways to reduce their effects.
Slate residents have learned to build with
weed and steel instead of stone or bricks.
They boh their houses to foundations and
their bookshelves 10 walls. Public agencies
are also preparing lor the inevitable.
Advanced planning by State and local
agencies will be critical in reducing the
death. injury, and destruction.
The infrastructure consists of "life-
lines, critical public facilities such as
M
highways, bridges. railroads, airports,
hospitals, marine installations. electrical
transmission systems. and pipelines for
water. natural gas and other petroleum
products. [f we could predict which
lifelines will survive, we could prepare
emergency plans to cope with those that
will not. Search and rescue efforts
implemented during the critical first hours
will be smoother if we have some idea of
what to expect.
Each earthquake teaches us a lesson.
pointing out with stark realism the
vulnerabilities of the infrastructure.
By
GLENN BORCHARDT
Division of Mines and Geology
Thus much of the damage to lifelines One practical and effective methoo is
caused by the magnitude 7.1 Lorna Prieta to develop earthquake planning scenarios,
earthquake of October 1989 was hypothetical yet realistic assessments of
expected {Photos 1-4 and 7-8) and much lifeline performance for particular earth-
was not (Photos 5-6). The knowledge quakes. Scientific- and engineering-based
gained from each earthquake helps us earthquake planning scenarios are
prepare for the next. How should we important tools for planners because:
organize such (1) they approximate the effects of
hard-won earthquakes on lifelines: (2) they provide
information? important insight for use in earthquake
How should
we put it into
preparedness planning by emergency-
response agencies and for law enforce-
action? ment. fire fighting, medicaL and search-
and-rescue services; and (3) they are used
in response exercises which simulate
emergency decision-making.
PREPARATION
Development of an earthquake scenario
for emergency planning in a specific area
incorporates vast amounts of data from
various disciplines. The ability of a
lifeline structure to withstand the
effects of earthquake shaking,
fault rupture, liquefaction.
landsliding, and associ-
ated ground failure
N largely depends on the
site geology and the
intensity of earthquake
\ shaking, as well as the
design and engineering
characteristics of the
structure,
Figure I. Areas of DMG earthquake planning scenariOS: (1) Special Publication 60:
Earthquake planning scenario for a magnilude 8.3 earthquake on the San Andreas fault
in southern California: (2) Special Publicafion 61: Earthquake planning scenario for a
magl1llude 8.3 earthquake on the San Andreas fault In the San Francisco Bay area; (3)
Special Publication 78: Earthquake planning scenario lor a magnitude 7,5 earthquake on
the Hayward fault zone In the San FranCISCO Bay area: (4) Special Publication 99:
Planning scenario for a major earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood fault zone: (5)
Special Publication 100: Planning scenariO for a major earthquake. San Diego-Tijuana
metropolitan area.
CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991 '95
 .. PhOIO I. Lique'ac!lon damage to railroad tracks due to lateral
spreadmg at the Port of Oakland. Damage was caused by
shaking 'rom the Lorna Prieta earthquake. Photo by author.

..
Photo 2. Close·up of damage in Photo 1. Photo byaufhor

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There are two phases in the development of an earthquake

planning scenario. Phase I is the preparation of a Seismic
Intensity Distribution (5[0) map showing the relative degree of
shaking and the areas of ground breakage. Phase lJ is the
preparation of lifeline maps annotated 10 show the hypothetical
status of the infrastructure dUring the first 3 days after the
earthquake. Only 3 days are addressed because the effectiveness
PHASE I: PREPARATION OF THE SEISMIC INTENSITY
of search-and-rescue operations diminishes after a day or two. DISTRIBUTION MAP
Inevitably. postdisaster reality supplants predisaster hypothesis
as alternative lifelines become established and well-known. Earthquake SCenano Selecllon

DMG Scenarios The first phase of scenario development includes choosing an

Five scenarios have been published by the Division of Mines
and Geology (DMGI for expected ma}oT earthquakes in densely
urbanized regions of California (rlgure l) (Davis and others.
1982a. 1982b; Steinbrugge and others. 1987: Toppozada and
others. 1988: Reichle and others. 1990). Each DMG scenario
includes maps showing the expected distribution of earthquake
damage to lifeline facl1illes based on seismology. geology. and
engineering considerations. The two phases 01 the development
and preparation of a scenario are described below.
earthquake-prone urban area based on its earthquake history
(Toppozada and others. 1986: WGCEP. 1990). Although there
is extensive historic documentation of earthquakes in California
during the past 200 years. additional data are required to select
a likely event. Paleoseismology. a recently developed branch of
seismology. includes various methods of investigaling lhe
movement along major fault zones over geologic time. Fault slip
rates. the amOWlt of displacemenl from specific earthquake
events. and the recurrence interval of earthquakes have been
detennined for some fault segments in Califomia.

CALIFORNIA GEOlOGY SEPTEMBER 1991

'"
 1836. In comparison. the magnitude 71
L..oma Prieta earthcf,Jake resulted in 6.5
feet of slip in 1989 (P\afker and GalJo-
woy.19891.

Developing SID Maps

Once the location and magninde of a

seismic event are decided. a SID map is
prepared. Planning areas. usually
centered on the fault. include the densest
population and the most significant
lifelines. If a major earthquake occurred
previously in the scenario area. its
characteristics are incorporated into the
study. If no events of equivalent magni-
tude have occurred in the area. data
from other areas are used to choose the
fault rupture length and amount of
surface displacement. For example. a
magnitude 7.0 event typically causes up
Photo 3. Collapsed porIJOfI 01 State HJghway 101 over Struve Slough, PaJ3ro Valley. near to 3 feet of ground displacement along a
Watsonville. santa Cruz County. Damage was caused by strong ground shaking and
liquelaetlon oj over deposIts dunng the Loma Pneta earthquake. Photo by DaVId Montgomery.
fauh segment over a distance of at least
20 miles.

In his classic sndy. Sieh (1984) was

able 10 dale offset peat and sediment
layers. obtaining a detailed record of the
last dozen events on the southern San
Andreas fauh. Magnitude 8 events. like
the 1857 Fan Tejon eaTttxtuake. seem to
occur at intervals of 145± 8 years. Other
faults. particularly those in the eastern
part of the State. have event recurrence
intervals that are ten times longer. For
example. investigations of offset soils and
volcanic ash along the Honey Lake fault
in northeastern California showed that
only four magnitude 7 events occurred
there dUring the last 7.800 years (Wills
and Borchardt. 1990).

Even where fine stratigraphic detail is

unavailable. infonnalion about the slip
rate and relative movement along fauhs
over geologic rime can sometimes be
determined. For example. cooperative
studies by Division of Mines and <::iedogy
and U.S. GeoklgicaI Survey scientists
show that the H~rd fauh had a slip
rate of between 5.5 and 9mmIyr during
the last 9.000 years (Borchardt and oth-
ers. 1987: Borchardt. 1988a: 1988b:
UenkaemperandBorchardt.I991).
These investigations infer that up to 4.6
feet of strain may have developed at Photo 4. Close-up 01 damage in Photo 3 shoWing columnar supports pierCing the highway.
depth along the northern part of the fault Photo by MIChael Manson.
since the last major earthquake there in

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991

",
 Developing a SID map begins with a computer-generated
isoseismal contour map centered on the scenario fault rupture
(Evemden and Thomson. 1985). Each contour on an isoseismal
map shows the area that would undergo the same amount of
earthquake shaking intensity. Assuming perfectly uniform
bedrock geology. shaking will decrease with distance. Successive
contours from the proposed fault rupture zone indicate areas
that hypothetically undergo progressively less shaking.

Geologic Map

An accurate geologic map is essential to scenario prepara-

tion. The geology of an area is never unifonn. For most
structures. earthquake damage is usually greater on soft sedi-
ments than on hard bedrock. In developing an intensity map. it
is estimated that structures on young unconsolidated sediments.
lor example. will incur damage described by intensities two units

ROCK TYPE AND CORRECTION FACTORS

FOR SHAKING INTENSITY TABLE

Rock types and their respective correction factors illustrate

how the underlying geology affects earthquake shaking. These
correction foctors are added to seismic intensities calculated for
well·consoiidated unweathered bedrock
Correction Factor for
Rock Type Seismic Intensity
lnstrusive igneous and metamorphic rocks 0.0
Photo 5. Collapsed upper section of the San Francisco-Oak-land Bay Volcanic rocks 0.3
Bridge between Verba Buena Island and Oak-land. The collapse MiOCene nonmarine sediments 1.3
caused the death of one person. The canfilever design was Miocene maline sediments 1.5
engineered to have the upper section rest on vertical steel suppon P1ioce11€ ond Pleistocene sediments 18
towers. During the tremor. one such tower swayed, snapped off the Holocene sediments 2.0
2·inch bolts that anached the upper bridge span. and allowed a 50·
foot section to crash onlO the lower deck-.
It took- 1 month to restore service 10 this
important bridge. Photo by Howard Wilshire,
courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey.

Unfortunately. the estimation of

regional patterns of seismic intensity is
not yet as accurate as scientists and engi·
neers would like. Each type of structure
responds in a unique way to seismic mo-
tion. At present. it is not practical to de-
velop the necessary intensity scale for
each type. Nevertheless. researchers have
found that the Modified Mercalli Intensity
(MMI) scale is an effective 1001 for gener-
alizing earthquake intensity at any loca-
tion (see page 203).

Scenario SID maps display intensity,
fault rupture. and ground failure informa-
tion. Some features are developed
especially for the scenario and others
depend on earlier studies.
Photo 6. Collapsed steel rebar and concrete column of the Cypress 1·880 treeway structure.
Oak-land. California. A t-mile length of thiS double·decked reinforced·concrete Viaduct
collapsed onto commuter traffic k-illing 41 and mjuring many others during the Loma Prieta
earthquake. The failed column in the foreground supported the top deck. Built in the 1950s.
the columns had venical steel remforclng rods but lacked the spiral reinforcing rods used in
modern construction. Photo by Michael Rymer. courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey.

", CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991

 Newpon Beach N
a CEA
lF1C
pI' C
o 5
~
I VII IVIII- VIII+ _IX
Figure 2. seismIC intensity distnbution predicted fOf a magnitude 7 earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood lau1l, southern California.
Modified from Toppozada and others (1988).

higher than those on intrusive ingneous rocks (see table. p.1981.

TI1erefore. within 5 miles of the fault rupture of a magnitude 7
earthquake. the MMI ;s estimated to be VII in well-consolklated
bedrock and IX in soft sediments.

The isoseismal contour map is typically developed by DMG at

a scale of 1: 100.000. A composite geologic map al this scale is
used to modify the isoseismal contour map to account for
differences in the geology. The completed SID map (P19ure 2)
also shows areas likely to suffer permanent ground breakage
such as fault rupture, liquefaction. and landslides. 1llese areas
will produce MMls up to Xli that cannot be predicted by the
computer program that generates the isoseismaJ contour map.

Fault Rupture: The scenario postulates a specific rupture

along mapped fault traces shown on the l:24,OOQ-scale maps
that are produced as part of DMGs Alquist-Priolo Special
Studies Zones fault mapping project (Hart. 1988).

liquefaction: Three conditions are present in areas where

liquefaction is shown on scenario maps: (1) presence of a high
water table; (2) layers of loose sand: and (3) earthquake shaking
of sufficient intensity and duration. Flat·lying areas having
shaking intensities greater than VI generally satisfy the third
criterion. Alluvium with groundwater within 10 feet of the
surface is highly susceptible to liquefaction, while alluvium with
groundwater deeper than 30 feet below the surface is not.

Landslides: Because few existing maps delineate areas

sub.iect to seismically induced 1ancIsiiding (SILJ. maps showing
areas of general susceptibility to climatically. as well as Photo 7. Damage trom liquefaction and slumping of fine·
seismically. induced landslides are used in scenario preparation. grained, well-sorted sand fill at the PM of Oakland.
Where landslide maps are not available. topographic maps are Photo by David Montgomery.

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMSER 199\

'"
used to delineate areas of weak rock
having slopes greater than 30 percent.
Future scenarios will subdivide SIL into at
least two categories: falls and slides. Falls
dominate on slopes greater than 70
percent. whereas slides dominate on
slopes between 30 and 70 percent. The
distinction is important because falls
damage lifelines from above and slides
damage them from below.
PHASE II: ASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECTS OF THE DISASTER ON
LIFELINES
The second phase of scenario
development involves the preparation of
separate maps showing the likely effects
of the event on each significant type of
lifeline. This phase involves: (I) compar-
ing the SID map with maps showing
lifelines: (2) assessing the damage
expected at the vulnerable points of
specific lifelines: and (3) projecting the
performance and operational use of each
lifeline system during the first 3 days
following an earthquake.
For example. in DMGs southern
California Newport-Inglewood earthquake
planning scenario. some electrical
facilities are expected to be inoperative
(or at least 3 days following a major
earthquake (Figure 3). These facilities are
in areas of high liquefaction potential
within the MMIIX region of the SID map.
Certain types of modem electrical
substations are highly vulnerable 10
shaking even when liquefaction does 001
occur (Photos 9 and 10).
Lifeline Damage Assessments
Scenario damage assessments rely on
observations of damage to similar lifelines
exposed to comparable shaking or
ground breakage during previous
earthquakes. Lifeline repair times are also
estimated from previous experience.
Structural engineers develop the
damage estimates in collaboration with
DMG earth scientists. The managers of
lifelines included in the scenario are asked
to review the estimates using their
expertise and knowledge of specific
lifelines. The combined background and
experience of professionals from various
disciplines significantly augment our
understanding of earthquake damage
expected for facilities.
200
o
los Angeles
"I
1
!o,,",.-i5~MllES 111111111111I11111
SCALE
CAUFOANIA DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION
DIVISION OF MINES AND GEOlOOY
Figure 3. Predicted e!lact on electrical facilities following a major earthquake on
the NewporHnglewood taull zone. Modified from TOpPOzada andolhers (1988).
SCENARIO USES
Earthquake planning scenarios are
designed to give a realistic image of an
anticipated earthquake. They teach us an
important lesson: some lifeline facilities
will be damaged and others will not. By
pinpointing the areas where extensive
damage is likely, scenarios highlight
locations where lifeline facililies need
special anenlion from emergency
planners. public offjcials. and engineers.
Scenarios identify locations v.mere
lifelines are vulnerable so that emergency
operations can cope with probable lifeline
CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991
ELECTRICAL POWER FACILITIES
- - Major TransmiSSion Routes
oTransmission §>ubstatlon
oPower Plant
Damage
Pasadena
oo Shut down
1-2days
o • Shut down more
• than 3 days
o
Anahe1m
a
NEWPORT - INGLEWOOD
FAULTZQNE
failure. Emergency plans develop contin-
gencies based on important facts brought
to tight in the scenarios.
The scenarios show that major earth-
quakes in densely populated areas produce
abundant synergistic effects. Lifeline
managers must be aware of v.>eaknesses
within their CMIIl systems. and know how
damage to Olher lifelines will impact their
systems. Pre-earthquake planning can be
especially effecttve where two or more
lifelines interact (such as a City water main.
a State highway. and a private pov.!er line),
causing normal jurisdictional lines to
become obscure.
 Scenarios have stimulated site-specific
geotechnical revie\.vs of existing Meline
facilities, For example, Berryman Resen.-oir,
bJilt in the Haoyward fault lOIle, was re-
examined by geotechnical 8Tl31neers after its
failtre was hypothesized in the Hayward
""""". H<Mng ~ tho _«hn<aJ
review. Berryman Resen.uir's I-.;potheticaI
failure no longer can be used for FUJXlSeS
of disaster response planning.

Another example of action taken partly

as a result of the pre-eanhquake planning
promp(ed by the scenarios is the deaberate
kJ.vering of the water table in the dly of San
Bernardino. It has been b.vered to 10 feel
bOOw the surl"", and \ong-rnnge """'
invo/ve k:Jo.vering it pennanently to 30 feet
bOOw the surl"", - the _ boyood um<h
l;q.,eloction. ~~.

Photo 8. Landslide blocking the northbound lanes of Highway 17 through the Santa Cruz "These hypothetical scenarios provide
MountaJns. Photo by Tom Holzer, courtesy of the U.S. GeoJogical Survey. examples of typical problems, It is up to
lifeline managers to open communication links and establish
political arrangements that will facilitate a swift arK! smooth
response. Well-rehearsed managers and personnel can save
'/' many lives during the critical first hours after an earthquake.
v
• "

Photo 9. Damaged electrical insulators caused by ground shaking

0'
by the magnitude 5.9 North Palm Springs earthquake July 8,
1986, The tall porcelaln·glass insulators with lO-foot·high perches
were constructed With very linle lateral support and most add·on
earthquake braces 'ailed, Over $3.5 million in damage was caused
at the Southern California Edison Company's Devers substation,
Coachella Valley. The Devers substalion is within 1 mile ot the
epicenter o! lhe earthquake thaI occurred on the San Andreas faull.
Photo by author,

Photo 10. Damaged Devers substation insulators, Transrrussion ..

substations are particularly vulnerable to earthquake shaking.
However, studies are underway to improve the seismic performance
01 massive trans'ormers and high·voltage porcelain insulators at
substations, The unexpected heavy damage 10 electricallranstorm·
ers and insulators at the Devers substation urged improvements in
earthquake-Iesistant design 'or handling high voltage requirements.
Although such damage is unlortunate, il prOVides valuable lessons
for reevalua\lllg the design al'ld construction ot other electrical
substations Iocaled near active tauIts. Photo byau/hor.

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991

'"
 CONCLUSIONS
The data presented in eanhquake
planning scenarios assist planners and
emergency response agencies in rOOucing
California earthcpJake losses. Scenarios
contain SID maps that show how various
geologic units respco:i to eanhquake
""""" and ground breakage. Map;
sh<;:r.virg critical ~feline SIfilel1lS are superim-
posed on a SID map to highlight facilities
likely to trdergo the IT'lC6t damage in the
_ "'''''''''''''. klenti"""
that v..'iII be unusable follolMng a major
"1_
~ hclp; ~ and """"""'"
response agencies Jessen the impact.
Scenarios stimulate geotechnical review.>
and etlCOUl'CIge the upgrading of certain
critical structures. In crl:Iition to providing a
focus lor ernergeT"Cy planners. earthcp...lake
planning scenarios are becoming an
important tool for infonning the p.hIic of
",ticipotro domag;",~.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Numerous scientists and engineers as well
as hurdreds of piliic ofOCials have contrib-
uted to these scenarios. This methcxI of
preparing them is the cubnination of k:Jeas
firs!: advanced by J.F. Davis, California State
Gedogist. The manuscript was revilaved by
T.R. T~. M.S. _ . and J.F.
Davis of the Qio...;sion of Mines and Geology.
REFERENCES
Borchardt. Glenn. editor. 1988a. Soil
development and displacement along lhe
Hayward fault: Fremont, California:
DIVISIon of Mines and Geology Open-File
Report DMG QFR 88-12. Final technical
report for the U.S. Geological Survey
National Earthquake Hazards Program,
v. 1, 124 p.
Borchardt, Glenn, editor, 1988b, Soil
development and displacement along the
Hayward fault: Point Pinole. California:
Division of Mines and Geology Open File
Report DMG QFR 88-13, Final technICal
report for the U.S. Geological Survey
NatIonal Earthquake Hazards Reduction
Program, v. 2. 233 p.
Borchardt. Glenn. Uenkaemper. J.J.. and
Schwartz. D.P., 1987, Holocene slip rate
of the Hayward fault at Fremont,
CalifornIa: EOS, Transactions 01 the
Amencan Geophysical Union. v. 68,
no. 44, p. 1506.
Davis. J.F.. Bennett, J.H .. Borchardt, Glenn,
Kahle, J.E., Rice, S.J., and Sliva. M.A.,
1982a. Earthquake plannlf'lg scenario for
a magnitude 8.3 earthquake on the San
Andreas fault in southern California:
California DiviSion of Mines and Geology
SpecIal Publication 50, 128 p.
202
DaVIS. J.F.. Bennett. JH.. Borchardt, Glenn.
Kahle, J.E., Rice. S.J. and Silva. M A.,
1982b. Earthquake plannlf'lg scenano for
a magnitude 8.3 earthquake on the San
Andreas fault in the San Franosco Bay
area: California Division of Mines and
Geology Special Publication 61, 160 p.
Evernden, J.F.. and Thomson, J.M" 1985.
PredICting seismIC Intensi\les. in Ziony.
J.I.. editOf, Evaluating earthquake
hazards In the Los Angeles region: An
earth science perspec\IYe: U.S Geologl'
cal Survey ProfeSSional Paper 1360.
p,151·202.
Hart. E.W.. 1988. Faull-rupture hazard zones
in Califorma (revised): DIVision of Mmes
and Geology Special Publication 42. 24 p.
Lienkaemper. J.J.. and Borchardl, Glenn,
1991. Holocene slip rate of the Hayward
fault at Union CUy, California: Geological
Society 01 America Program With
Abstracts. Cordilleran SeclJon. v 23.
no. 2. p.73.
Plalker. G.. and Galloway, J.P.. editors.
1989. Lessons learned trom the Loma
Priela. California earthquake 01 October
17. 1989: U.S. Geological Survey Circular
1045.48 p.
Reichle. M.S.. Kahle. J.E.. Atkinson. T.G..
Johnson. E.H.. Olson, A.A .. Lagono. H.J..
StelObfugge, K.V., Cluff, L.S.. Haney.
T,P., and Powers, J.E., 1990. Planning
scenario for a malor earthquake San
DiegO-Tijuana metropolitan area: DiviSion
of Mmes and Geology Special Publication
100. 182p
DMG Earthquake Planning Scenarios
Ave Division of Mmes and Geology
earthquake planning scenalio5 are available
for purchar.e and prepaid mail order at DMG
ollices in Sacramento. San Francisco, and
Los Angeles. AD prlces include shipping and
handbng. Make checks payable to, Divisioo
of Mu'les and Geology. Send to:
Division of Mil'leS and Geology
PO, Box 2980
Sacramento. CA 95812-2980
SPECIAL Pl/BUCATlQN 60: Earth-
quake planmng scenario for a magnitude
83 earthquake on the San Andreas fault in
southem California ByJ,F Davis. JH
Bennen. Glenn Borchardt. JE Kahle. SJ
Rice.andMA Silv<! 1982. 128p.$1200.
SPECIAL PUBUCATION 61 Earth-
quake planning scenario lor a magnitude
8.3 earthquake on the S<m Andreas fault In
the San Francisco Bay area By J. F. Davis,
J.H Bennett. Glenn Borchardt. J E. Kahle,
S.J. RICe. and MA Silva 1982.160 p.
$12.00
CALIFORNIA GEOLOGV SEPTEMBER 199\
Sleh. K.E.. 1984, Lateral ollsets and revIsed
dates of large prehistoric earthquakes at
Pallet Creek, California: Journal of
Geophysical Research. v. 89, p. 7641·
7670.
Sleinbrugge. K.V., Bennett, J.H.. Lagono.
H.J.. DaVIS. J.F., Borchardt. Glenn.
Toppozada. TR. Oegenkolb. H.J..
Laverty, G.L" and McCarty, J.E" 1987.
Earthquake planning scenario lor a
magnitude 7.5 earthquake on the
Hayward fault in the San Francisco Bay
area: California DIVISion of Mines and
Geology Special PublicatIon 78, 243 p.
Toppozada. T.R.. Benrl8tt. J.H.. Borchardt,
Glenn. saul, A., DaVIS, J.F., Johnson,
C.B.. Lagorio, H.J.. and Steinbrugge, K.
V.. 1988. Planning scenario for a majOr
earthquake on the Newport-Inglewood
fault zone: Division of Mines and
Geology Special Publication 99. 207 p.
Toppozada. T.A.. Real, CR. and Par1<.e.
D.L. 1986, Earthquake hlslory of
California, CatifOfnla Geology v. 39.
no. 2. p. 27-33.
WGCEP (Working Group on California
Earthquake PrObabilities). 1990.
Probabilities of large earthquakes
occurnng in the San FrancISCO Bay
region. California: U.S. GeologICal
Survey Circular 1053, 51 p.
Wills. C.J.. and Borchardt, Glenn, 1990.
Holocene slip rate and earthquake
recurrence on the Honey Lake fault
zone. northeastern California: EOS
Transactions. American Geophysical
UniOn. v. 71, no. 43, p. 1608:-'
SPECIAL PUBUCAllON 78: Eanh-
quake ~nning scenario lor a magnitude
7.5 earthquake on the Hayv.;ard fault zone
in the S<m Francisco Bay area. By K V
Steinbngge. J.H Bennett. H.J.I...agofio.
JF. Davis. Glenn Borchardt. and TR
Toppozada, 1987 242 p. $30.00.
SPECIAL PUBUCAllON 99, Planning
scenario for a major earthquake on the
Newpon-lnglev..'OOd fault zone. ByTR
ToppoZ<tda. JH Bennett. Glenn
Borchardt. R Saul. and J.E Davis 1988
200 p. $22 00,
SPECIAL PUBUCAnON 100
P1<lnning sc('nario for a major earthquake.
S<m Diego-lljuana metropolitan ar('a By
MS, Reichle, J E. Kahle. TG. Atkinson.
EH Johnson. RA Olson. H.J.Lagotio.
KV Steinbrugge. LS ChJff. TP. Haney,
and J,E. PcMoers. 1990. 182 p, $22.00. )0.'
 MODIFIED MERCALLI INTENSITY SCALE
The severity of an earthquake is described by the Modified Mercalli Intensity scaJe introduced in 1931 by American
seismologists Harry Wcxxl and Frank Neumann. They established 12 categories of intensity. The follO\.ving is a con-
densed version-
Not felt except by a very few Wlder favorable
circumstances.
IT Felt only by a few persons at rest. especially on the
upper floors of buildings. Suspended ob.iecls may
swing.
III Felt quite noticeably indoors, especially on upper
floors of buildings. but not necessarily recognized as
an earthquake. Standing cars may rock slightly.
Vibration similar to that of a paSSing truck.
IV If during the day, felt indoors by many: outdoors by
lew. If at night, few awakened Dishes. windows.
and doors rattle. walls creak. A sensation such as a
heavy truck striking the building. Standing cars rock
noticeably.
v Felt by nearly everyone. many awakened. Some
dishes and windol.vs broken. some plaster cracked.
unstable objects overturned. Disturbance of trees.
poles. and other taU objects. Pendulum clocks may
stop.
VI Felt by aU. many people run outdoors. Fallen
plaster. minor chimney damage. Movement of
m<X!erately heavy fumiture.
VlI Everybody runs outdoors. Damage negligible in
buildings of good design and construction. slight to
moderate in well-built ordinary structures: consider-
able in p<Xlrly built or badly designed structures,
Some chimneys broken. Noticed by persons driving
"'"
C~L1FORNIAGEOLOGV
VIII Damage slight in specially designed structures:
considerable in ordinary substantial buikfings. Panel
walls thrOVJl1 OUt of frame structures. Chimneys.
factory stacks. monuments, walls. and columns fall.
Heavy furniture overturned and damaged. Changes in
\Nell water. Sand and mud ejected in small amounts.
Persons driving cars are disturbed.
IX Damage conslderable in specially designed structures:
v.oeU-designed frame structures thrown out of plumb:
great damage in substantial buildings. which suffer
partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations.
ground noticeably cracked, underground pipes
broken.
X Some well-built Vo'OClden structures destroyed. most
masonry structures destroyed. foundations ruined.
ground badly cracked. Rails bent. Considerable
landslides from steep slopes and river banks. Water
splashed over banks. Shifted sand and mud.
XI Few. if any. masonry structures remain standing.
Bridges destroyed. Broad fissures in ground. Under-
ground pipes out of service Earth slumps and land
slips in soft ground. Rails bent greatly,
Xli Total damage. Waves seen on ground surfaces. lJnes
of sight and \evel are distorted. Objects thrown into
the air.">/'
Wood. H.O.• and Neumann, Frank, 1931, ModIfied Mercalii IntenSIty
scale of 1931: Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America,
v.20, p, 277·283.
SEPTEMBER 1991 203
 EARTHQUAKE PLANNING SCENARIO
For the San Diego-Tijuana Area
By
MICHAEL REICHLE
Division 01 Mines and Geology

ThIs is a summary of the DIvISIOn 01 Mines

and Geology Special Publication 100.
Planning SCenario for a Major Earthquake. SEISMIC INTENSITY
San Diego·Tijuana Metropolitan Area, DISTRIBUTION
published last year. A workshop was held in
December 1990 lor emergency response INTENSITY (MM) []]!]
planners for the city and county of San Diego
and lor private industry and utilities. The
workshop prOVIde<:! an opportUnity to diSCUSS
mJ
the Intended uses and potenllal misuses of HIGH LIQUEFACTION
the scenano and to examine its conlents In
POTENTIAL
detall The vanous officials thaI attended are
working wIth others and incorporating what
they learned Into thelf p1anrung efforts In
order 10 reduce losses In the event of a
destructJVe earthquake....editor.

INTRODUCTION .EI Cajon

Mission
CA:'I$
istoricaUy. the San Diego area has
H been rclatively free from the effects
of damaging earthcf.Jakes. Earthquakes
80y

occurring offshore and beneath the

mountains and deserts to the east have
inflicted only minor damage on San
Diego. Stooies by Toppozada and others
(1981) and T oppozada and Parke (1982)
.
list 13 eanhquakes that inflicted at least ~l
"
Mcx!ified MercaUi Intensity (MMi) VI on
San Diego since 1800 (see page 203).
It cannol be assumed. however. that this \
historic quiescence will continue indefi-
o \
nitely. The Rose Canyon fault zone (which
includes the Silver Strand fault). the La .....
~1
•• ----_ .
Nadon fault. the Coronado Bank fault. \
the Vallecitos fault (San Miguel fault zone).
and myriad smaIJer faults pass through. or
ck>se to. the San Diego metropolitan area.
Of these. the Rose Canyon is probably
the most hazardous. foDowed by the
o
o
'".,.... \
ltighly """'" Comn"do Bank ard the San
Miguel fault zone.

The seismic hazard in the San Diego };>

~o £
•...
area is diffICult
cultural to quantify.
development and a Extensive
lack of well- Q \

dated Quaternary deposits have limited

both the quantity and quality of the data
relating to the more recent geologic 0
, 5 MIlES
,
"
Figure 1. Seismic intensity diSlributlon. ..

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991


history of the area's faults. Critical
parameters. such as geologic rate and
sense of movement along local faults.
recurrence timeS of damaging earth-
quakes. and recency of faulting are TlOI
\l.'eD-knoY.n. The recent evidence of
earthquake aeti\ity on the Rose Canyon
fault within the last several thousand years
Il-md-..n <rodome... 19901 _ _, thaI
It wcUd be prudent to asstI1lli!: that
damaging eanhquakes oouId OCCll' in the
San Otego area at al'1!l- time
To assist kxaI and State emergency
response planners in their preparahon for
a da."TlilIgirg~. the Division of
Mmes and Geology has pub.ished an
earthquake p0rming scenan:> for the San
"""'" area (ReKhIe and ome... 19901
This information is intended for those
v.OO have responsIbUIl:es for emergency
response. and 10 facilltale both kx:aI and
internat)onal efforts 10 prepare for such
an occurr6lCe· The scenario does noI
predlct detailed paUem5 of damage lhal
win fobt the occurrence of the postu-
lated ea~ke An assessment of the
degree and Iypes of damage [0 exJ$ling
lifelines and Olhel'" structures is placed in a
regiooal context for ge'lCJ'al response
pLannmg purposes The damage
assessments contained in the
scenario are intended for emer-
gency planning purposes only, and
are not to be construed as site-
specific engineering evaluations.
The data discussed in the scenario
ref1ec:t condItions in San DiegO in the
mid-1980s. Ana~ were conducted
with the cooperation of the various
lifeline opercuors This article summarizes
the scenano
THE SCENARIO EARTHOUAKE
The ~eMrio ~ribes lhe regional
panem of shakirg intensity. ground
fo!llilure. lind impllCts on lifelino of a
l1"la9nitude 6.8 earthqw.ke on the Silver
Strand fault. which lies immediately
offshore of the San Diego waterfroot
(Hgurc I). PcrOOp5 ~ hll-zord0u5lllUlts
exist. and could have been used for a
rl29k:lna1 planning scenario. H~, this
scenario ",'as devdoped for a particular
uw' inlQmationai respooso p;anning.
assunmg an earthquake tnfliets signifICant
damage on both IN San Diego and
T~ rnetroPOltan areas. HOWC\<er.
damage assessments of the lX)Stu1al:ed
earthquake are genercilly confinod 10 U.S.
facilities and lifelines.
For the scenano earthquahe. surface
faultl\lplUu (rJgUl"c 1) el'lends from the
douinlCJI,A." San Dego area approximately
24 m:Ics along the ~l to !he MlUlh.
tenninatmg approximalely 16 miles south
of the intcmalionaf bordeT. Potentially
damagmg shaking contnues 'or 10 to 15
scc:onds .....'ithin 12 miles of the ';:auk.
Frecpml af:ershocks cootlJVJl!: for several
"'-
~ induding events of magnitude 50
Areas subtect to shaking of MMllX
(F"J9UTe 1). indude those areM of re«mt
(l-Iokxene) alIuvilJl1 and amfria1 fill
~ tN:> TIa.Lana River Valley
California portion) and dou."lOlA-'n San
""""'ICornnado
I\rros subJect 10 shiWng of MMI VlII
extend from below Rosanto 10 Dei Mar
along the c~. and as Iar as 23 mile,
hland for poorest ground conditions.
nlUition and the damage distributlom
from histoncal cnfomia earthquakes
suggest that areas 01 firmer ground tsuch
as Pt. Lama and Hillcrest) .....ill shake
olf!erQrlt[y than areas of rccent alluvium
or fill (such as Mission Bay). Less damage
Ylould occur on firmer ground than on
looser ground even lh0t9h both lie WIthin
the area of intensity V111
Areas with high <;uscepllbilily to
hquefac:tion are also shown in Flgure I
Secondarv ground fl'lilurp<; re<;uhing from
hquefaction are expected to be common.
particUarly in areas of hydraulic fill in
Mission Bay. l..om3 Portal. and along the
margins of San Diego Bay. Also. areas of
recent aBlNium. particularly along m<er
channels. such as the western reaches of
Mission Valley and the lla Juana and
Otay River valleys. wiD experience
moderate to 5e\ICre liquefaction effects.
Seismica~ indu::ed lancbbdes pose an
additional threat in those geologic
conditions lMlcfe both ancient and
modem slides have been mapped. Area50
.....nere 1andsI.des could pose particular
probkmls irrlJde the north sde of
Mission Va1k!y. Mu-phy ean.,.oo. MI
Soledad. Torrey Phes Mesa. lhe canyons
of Otay Mesa. and portJoos of La Mesa
CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY St:.PTEcMBER '991
IMPACT ON
TRANSPORTATION LIFELINES
MalOf Freewa~ Routes
The maJOr conidors 01 highway traffic:
in tho San Diego <)rca are illustrated .,
FIgure 2 They incltde:
• Th-ee major north-south routes,
Inllml.ates 5. 805. and 15
• T\\.'0 mapl' easl--\l,'eSt routes:
1-8 and Highway 94
interstate highways 5 and 15 lead into
the area from the oorth. b1terstate 5
Ieacb 10 the MexiCMt txxder on the south
and pa!'JSCS ~' both Mission Bay and San
Diego Bay. Intersta:e 8 is the prlmar~;
access 10 points ea!t. Interstate 805
provides an alernaliYe north-soulh
corridc>f to the area ea5I of 1-5 There are
several akematNe surface streets which
c.1n be used 10 bypass sections of the
freeways. but prirnCYy access to the
secnon of the city \\.'eSl of 1-5 in the
Mission and San Diego Bay areas is
limited 10 a fe.v mlral corridors. There
are sorre citymaintained bOOges ~
these cntlcal corridors.
Damage 10 the freeway syslem in the
San Diego area will result primarily from
ground failure due to liquefaction in areas
of artlfloal fill and recent aDuvial deposits.
aTd also from failure of built-up embank-
ments for road beds and onloff ramps.
Interstate 5 will be dosed from Balboa
Avenue on the north to Palm Avenue on
the south. Both 1-5 and old Route 101
wlJI also be closed \\.here they cross each
of the coastal lagoons soulh of Oceanside.
Illlen.tal\! hlylways 305. 15. MIl 8. Mel
highways 163. 94. and 117 will be open
except wh~le they join 1-5. Long delays
wi'l occur along Interstate 8 and Highway
163. res.dting from dAln",ge 10 theil
interchange. The Coronado Bridge will be
cmed. I'tae5s to Coronado on Highloloay
75 along the Silver Strand wiD be severely
restricled. Although:sornewhi:lt ob-
slJUeted. ma;or routes intO and out of the
grrotcr San DIego arelI will be llVlllloble
However. emergency YChi:1e nansporIa-
rion into and out of :he ITIOSI ~viIy
damaged areas along the coast from
PaciHc Beach to Imperial Beach Iolo;D be
hampered by closures of all main artene5
VJhere they cross areas 01 unstable
ground.
 for automobiles (normally 16 of 24
HIGHWAYS AND AIRPORTS primary inspection lanes aTe used). Truck
MAJOR traffic is primarily handled at the Glay
COMMERICAL border crossing.
&. MlllTARY
AIRPORTS
BuildingS at the border station win be
seYeTety tJamagro. Unreinforced masonry
SECONDARY
AIRPORTS walls of the Old Pon of Entry Building wiD
suffer major structural damage or collapse

._---' and the building will be evacuated. For

planning purposes. the pedestrian bridge
that spans the trafflc lanes will be
clamaged and out of service for 6 months.
Loss of electric poIAIef from the San
IMgo e;" & EJ.ctric Oxnpany ISDG&Ej
\\liD occur. Emergency power generators
Sao on the Site ""ill not function. Umite::i
Diego power supply \\Iill not be reslored for 72
lnfl.
hou".

The San Ysidro Border Station VJiIi be

closed for at least 3 clays for all but emer-
gency use because of severe damage to
buildings. restricted access problems due
to damaged freev.tay bridges, lack of
power and utility services. and kiss of
back-up emergency electric power.
Imperial Damage assessment and clean-up will
Beach ~Brown take 10 days to complete at the site. after
9
NAS Field

.---- .- _.,
_ _.-
..
which the border station VJili function at
50 percent capacity for 6 months and
80 percent for 8 months before full
operation is restore::i,
o Tijuana
o
..
'"...
Inri

The major commercial ail'JX>11S in the

planning area are sho<M1 in Figure 2.
They are:

San Diego International

IUndOOgh P"'~I

•
Tijuana International
{c.ne.aJR_
Secondary domestic airpons inClude:
•, , MILES
~
Brown Field
SCALE
Gillespie Fiekl
McClelland - Palomar
Montgomery Reid
san DIegO Border CrQSSIng The San Ysidra Border Station houses Oceanside Municipal
U.S. CUSloms. U.S. Irmnigralion. the Ramona
1he border station at San Ysidro.
Department of Agriculture. the U.S. Na"'Y
California is the busiest port of entry in Military airports are:
Shore Patrol. the U.S. Drug Enforcement
the world. It operates in conjunction with
Agency. and the International Boundary Naval Air Station, Miramar
the recently constructed border station al
and Waler Commission. II is the principal
Otay. located 5 mlles to the east. TIle Naval Air Station, Nonh Island
port of entry from Mexico for pedestrian
building and related facilities are main- Naval Air Station, lmpertal Beach
and automobile traffic. The station
tained by the General Servk:es Adminis-
presently operates at 70 percent capacity
tration.

206 CALIfORNIA GEOlOGY SEPTEMBER 199\

 San Diego International Airport is
located 2 miles from the center of the ELECTRICAL POWER
downtown business distlict. On its north.
TRANSMISSION LINES
east. and west sides it is surrounded by
_ 500 KILOVOLTS
densely populated military. commercial.
_ 230-287 KILOVOLTS
and residential development. Its south .._ _.. 138 KILOVOLTS
skle faces San Diego Bay. It is owned and
operated by the San Diego Unified Port • POWER PLANT
• MAJOR SUBSTATION
District. This airport handles approxi~
mately II million passengers per year.
averaging 30.000 passengers per day.
Usually 50 commercial passenger planes
are parked overnight at the airport.
Brown Aekl Municipal Airport. ov""ed
by the City of San Diego. is planning for

,} .
intensive emergency use in the event that
Undbergh F'tekl is out of commission for ~
SAN DIEGO
an extended period. Brown Field is
located 18 miles by freeway south and
east of the central San Diego business
district. It is approximately 1·1/2 miles <,
directly north of the Mexican border and
2 miles directly north of Tijuana Interna-
tional Airport.
For planning purposes. San Diego
,,...
~\
.
\ • National CtlV

•
,
/
• Chula I£ifta
International Airport will be closed for all
but emergency operations for 2 weeks
due to liquefaction affecting runways.
access. electric power supply. and the
\
~
--'
• Imperial Beach

East Terminal building. Accessibility by

way of Harbor Drive and the overpass
··.·0:..
0::
_
.--'- .. --- -----
..---_ ..
entrance to the airport will be impaired • • TIJUANA
for 72 hours because of ground failure.
Alternate access routes will have to be
developed.
o
"'"
"2-
\
8ectric power to the airport will be
unavailable for 10 days because of
damage due to ground failure along the
feeder line routes. Impaired electric
power will affect the pumping of aircraft
fuel from underground storage tanks. For
planning purposes. two of the fiw
storage tanks will be out of service so it
\l,111 be necessary to bring in fuel by tank
truck to fuel airplanes directly.
Four airports In the planning area
prO\lide the 5.000 feet of runway
necessary for the landing of C-130 and
,, •
"""
, MlLES
~

Figufe 3. Electric power.

C·141 aircraft. Twe of the four. namely
San Diego International Airport and
Naval Air Station. North Island are in
zones of heavy damage and potential
liquefaction. The other two (Brown Hekl
and avaf Air Station. Miramar) are
located in areas not subject to liquefaction
and where predicted shaking will produce
minimal damage. [n general. only these
two can handle emergency response
operations. Performance of the lifeline
systems for airport operations will be
critical. The success of air operations will
depend more upon the availability of
electric power and fueL and the survival
of crilical buildings. than upon the
condition of the runways.
Railroads
Only the Atchison. Topeka. and Santa
Fe Railroad (ATSF) serves San Diego. The
San Diego and Imperial Valley Railroad
(SDM formerly extended from downtown
San Diego through Tijuana to EI Centro.

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991

 Supp~es can be off-loaded at Oceanside
WATER AND WASTE WATER or Escondido and trucked south. although
FACILITIES travel win be disrupted on major fr€€Ways
• Del Mar due to damaged bridges blocking through-
_ _ MAJOR AOUEDUCT traffic.
- - - WASTE WATER PIPELINE
• WASTE WATER TREATMENT The San Diego and Imperial Valley
Railroad and the San Diego T Tolley cross
• PUMP STATION areas of high and very high liquefaction
susceptibility along San Diego Bay and in
the ria Juana River Valley. Roadbed
damage will prevent use 01 the Unes from
downtown San Diego to the international
border for about 3 weeks.
• EI CalOn
In additk>n to the liquefaction-induced
failures. landslides along coastal bluffs or
in the steeply cut roadbed between
• LelT1Of'l Grove Oceanside and Mission Bay may inhibit
rail traffic for 72 hours or. at worst. take
out the tracks. For planning purposes. the
line will be out of use for 7 days due to
damage by landslides.

1be effects of the scenario earthquakes

on tenninal facilities in downtown San
Diego will be serious. Those tenninals
serving marine facilities on the east side of
San Diego Bay are located in areas that
VJill experience severe ground shaking.

Marine Facilities (POfIS)

1be port area under the jurisdiction 01

o the San Diego Unified Port District
"'" includes portions 01 the cities 01 San
Diego. Chula Vista. Coronado. National
'"" Oty. and Imperial Beach. Approximately
2-1/3 miles of nonmilitary berths are
available at the port facilities. lhey are
\ located at three principal sites: B Street
and Broadway piers. Tenth Avenue
·· Marine Tenninal. and National City

•
,, 5 MllES
,
~"
Figure 4. Water and waste water laclhlJes.
The line has been out of seMce from the
border toWn of Tecate eastward for many
years lh!: to the loss of a major bri:Ige
stnx:ture. rot is stiD open from San Diego to
Tecale. a distance of about 25 miles.
Rail lines to San Diego cross areas 01
high 10 very high liquefaction susceptibil-
ity. Service along the ATSF line from Los
Angeles can be expected 10 be disrupted
south of Oceanside. Tracks are subject to
landslide damage or dislocation due to
liquefaction where they cross me coastal
sloughs. and along Mission Bay. For
planning purposes. service will not be
restored for 3 weeks after the earthquake.
Marine Tenninal. Virtually the entire port
of San Diego is built on artificial fiU.
Extensive liquefaction-induced lateral
spreading is possible all along the bay
front. This VJill affect structures built
behind quay walls and also approaches
(road and rail) to the dock area.
1be B Street Pier was constructed in
the early 1920s in several phases. 1be
Transit Shed No.2 on the B Street Pier
has been renovated to serve as a cruise
ship tenninal. Uquefactk>n will damage
the B Street Pier. Pile-supported docks
and piers. with the exception 01 the B
Street Pier. should fare well. but access
problems may preclLKle their use dUring
the initial post-€<lrthquake period. For

CAlIFOflNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991

response planning purposes, it is
reasonable to assume that the port
facilities will not be fully usable (a fairly
conselVative assumption) for 3 days. The
loss of port facilities will have only
minimal impact on public welfare.
IMPACT ON UTILITY LIFELINES
Communications
This section deals with Emergency
Broadcasting System (ESS) stations and
inter-governmental communication
centers that are vital to emergency
selVices. Both the City and County of San
Diego operate communication facilities
for use as emergency operation centers.
The San Diego County Communications
Center is located at the Overland Avenue
County Operations Center in a part of
the city called Kearny Mesa. The facility is
housed in a mcxlified warehouse of tilt-up
concrete wall and steel frame. metal deck
roof construction. The center is operated
by the San Diego County Sheriffs
Department, The County Office of
Disaster Preparedness has its primary
communications center in this facility.
The City Operations Building in down-
town San Diego contains the fire, police
dispatch. and emergency operations
center in the basement.
The county communications system
for departments other than the Sheriff
(roads. utilities. etc.l operates out of the
County Operations Center in Kearny
Mesa. Although the facility is located in
an area of MMI VII. consoles rest on a
raised floor and on desks with no
anchorage against lateral forces. The
Office of Disaster Preparedness' commu-
nication system operates as part of
"Station x." which includes the VHF two-
way system to the EBS stations KKLQ
and KCBQ. This broadcast equipment for
the EBS is similarly desk-mounted with no
anchorage against lateral forces.
It may be assumed that the microwave
system will be out of use due to the
effects of ground shaking on the align-
ment of the antennae. For purposes of
the scenario. the microwave system will
be no more than 20 percent effective.
and it will not be fully effective for 3 days
following the earthquake.
The City of San Diego Administration
and Operations buildings are in down-
town San Diego. They house fire and
police dispatch and the City emergency
operations center. These are located in
an area of high ground shaking (MMI
VllO. While damage to the buildings may
not be severe enough to cause collapse.
severe nonstructural damage may be
sufficient to cause functional impainnent.
Electric Power
The San Diego Gas and Electric
Company (SDG&E.l distributes practically
all of the electrical power throughout San
Diego County. The actual selVice
territory. which includes southwestern
Orange County. covers 4.100 square
miles (double the size of the state of
Delaware). and it includes over 940.000
customers. Major transmission lines.
power stations, and principal substations
are shown in Figure 3. Two operating
power plants (Encina and South Bay) are
included in the planning area.
Transmission substations are essential
to the routing of locally generated power
and of power available from outside the
region affected by the earthquake. These
major substations. which contain banks of
switches, cireui! breakers. and massive
transformers. are particularly vulnerable
to damage by earthquake shaking. In
addition to the major transmission
substations through which high voltage
(greater than 230 kilovolts) is routed.
many small local substations provide the
vital links in the electrical power distribu-
tion network.
Transmission towers and lines are
principally subject to damage through
secondary effects. such as landslides and
other ground failures. Conductor lines
(usually distribution lines) swinging
together could cause many "bum downs."
The scenario earthquake will have a
definite impact on local power-generating
capabilities. In particular. damage or
disruption to the waler supply to the
power stations will have a critical effect
on the power generation capabilities. For
planning purposes. the South Bay Power
Plant should be considered inoperative for
3 days and significantly reduced in
capacity for 1~ 112 weeks following the
scenario earthquake.
Water Supply
San Diego County is a semi-arid
region and depends almost entirely on
water imported from other areas. An
CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991
adequate supply of water is critical during
emergencies. not only for drinking
purposes and fire fighting. but also for
the operation of other utilities, such as
waste-water treatment.
The San Diego County Water
Authority. which encompasses a
1.412.5-square-mile area. serves a
population of approximately 2,106.000.
It receives its supply of water from the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California (MWDJ within San Diego
County. approximately 6 miles south of
the Riverside!San Diego county line. The
MWD is the sole source of the nonnal
and supplemental water for San Diego
County accounting for 90 percent of the
total water supply to the county (see
Rgure 4). The amount of water storage
in San Diego County varies significantly
among the different districts. The supply
will last from 3 days to several years.
For planning purposes. it is projected
that one of the five San Diego County
Water Authority aqueducts in the north
will fail with an estimated selVice outage
of 1~ 112 months. One member agency
with only a 3-day supply of water will
quickly become dependent on outside
sources of potable water.
Facility operations dependent on
water. such as the Point Loma Waste-
water Treatment Plant (l-day supply of
tvater storage) and the SDG&.E South
Bay Power Plant (2- to 5-day supply of
water storage capacity). will be function-
ally impaired due to the lack of water.
For the scenario earthquake. the areas
of the water distribution system most
vulnerable to damage are those bordering
Mission Bay and San Diego Bay. coastal
areas. western Mission Valley. and the
Otay (ria Juana River) Valley. Mains
(both primary and secondary) passing
through these areas of recent alluvium
and artificial fill will suffer several breaks
per mile of pipe. Landslides in the Mt.
Soledad area. coastal regions of La Jolla.
the north wall of Mission Valley. and the
edges of Otay Mesa may also damage
facilities and distribution mains. As a
result, several of the above-mentioned
areas will be without water for up to 4
weeks following the scenario event. For
planning purposes, we also assume that
parts of La Jolla. Pacific Beach. Ocean
Beach. and Mission Beach will be without
water for up to 4 weeks following the
scenario earthquake.
209
 NATURAL GAS FACILITIES Mexican border and east as lar as Spring

, AND Valley and Alpine. The principal compo-

.Oel Mar , PETROLEUM FUELS nents of the system are illustrated in
Rgure 4. The system collects. transports.
, I
I
MAJOR GAS TRANSMISSION
PIPEliNE
pumps. treats. and disposes of liquid waste
from the cities 01 Chula Vista. Coronado.
,
\ I
I
I •
PETROLEUM PRODUCT
PIPELINE
PETROLEUM TERMINAL
8 CajOn. Imperial Beach. La Mesa.
National City. and San Diego. and from
the Lemon Grove. Montgomery. and
.,_ ........o----'F"'A"'C,,'Le-1T'-'y -j Orlando. and from Spring Valley Sanitation
I -.. .... districts. The city also has an "emergency"
.La Jolla
• TANK FARM • EI Cajon
connection to Tijuana. The total now of
waste liquid. all of which is treated at the
plant on Point Lorna. is currently about
180 million gallons per day.

For planning purposes. the flow

.lemon Grove capacity 01 the collection system carrying
waste water to the sewer system will be
reduced by 50 percent, and 50 percent
of the service area will be nonfunctional.
The main sewer line along San Diego
.:
~
• National City Bay will be out 01 service for 6 weeks.
Rupture of the tunnel below the streets of

'\
downtown San Diego will take it out of
.Chula Vista
service for 4 months, during which time
raw sewage will discharge into San Diego
Bay. Pumping Station No.2. the most

..••.. • Imperial Beach

---- ----' .
vital spot in the entire system. will be
functionally impaired lor 45 days.

_.---_ .. -_.--- ---- .---

~\
As a result of the anticipated damage
.TIJUANA to the San Diego metropolitan sewer
o system described abov€. the waste-water
<>
'".,. \. connector line from Tijuana will be
interrupted for 60 days before nonnal
Z service is restored.

Natural Gas
Three transmission pipelines convey
natural gas to the San Diego area from

•
the north (Figure 5). T we are located
inland. running along the mesas. These
will not be seriously affected by the
,, 5 MILES scenario earthquake. The third runs along
the coast and crosses several areas of
""" high to very high Iiquelaction susceptibil·
ity. This pipeline will be damaged by
Figure 5. Natural gas tacilities and petroleum luels. lateral spreading at Soledad (Sorrento)
Valley and by landslides along Torrey
Pines grade. and will be out 01 service for
Waste Water more than 72 hours.
Because of failures in local water
distribution systems. segments of the
The metropolitan sewer system selVeS The primary impact of the scenario
population will be asked to use emer-
gency supplies. boil their water. or take virtually all 01 the populated metropolitan earthquake will be on the gas-distribution
area of San Diego and adjacent commu- system where it crosses areas of high
other measures against contamination lor
nities south 01 Del Mar. extending to the intensity and ground failure. [n Pacific
1 to 4 days.

CALIFORNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991

'"
 Beach. POG'\t L..oma. and downtown.
repairs WID be completed WIthin 72 hours.
but complete service restorat)oo \l,iB take
2 v..'eeks. Coronado could be
up to
without service for 2 to 4 months. until a
new pipe Is installed across Ihe bay.
Pelro!eum Products
The """'*'"'" _~ P;peIine. like
most of the utilities transmission facilines
from the north.• routoo
pnmoriIy oJong
the mJond '"""" (Rgwe 51. and >hook! be
operational folbl.ing the event The tank
farm is located on liquefiable alluvium
near the nonh v.:alJ of Mission Valley.
Because of lIs distance from the earth-
quake source, damage to the tank farm
should not be severe, Fires may result
where lines break al their junctions WIth
the tanks, The tanks themselves may be
damoged by .Jo.hmg !;quid<
Marine Mining 2000 - April 5 • 10, 1992
The f.nglneenog FOl.IflWllon If\ c0opera-
tion IoWh the Uruversaty 01 Haw.. s Manne
MlOefab Teclvdogy Cen!er, and the Manne
Tochnology Sodely's CommJltee on M;?arine
MlI'leral Resources. announce 1I confcrence
on Marine Mining 2000 to be held ;?at the
Keauhou Beach HOle!. Kooa, H;?awaii The
conference ch<tlr IS "1lChael J CIUickWnk,
and the CO'ChaIr IS Charles L Morgan. both
from thr UflM.>rslty 01 Hawaa
Th~ conference will exal'T'llnt and updato!
tret'llb Ul exploratKWI and exploltahon
technology for marine mineral deposits
COIlCerrung their economic and ecological·
wstainable development. The follCNoing
nIne sessions will provide an overview of
the current ;?activities and prospects In this
relatively ne\olo'disciphne
The Na~ fuel pipeline to Point L..oma
will be damaged where It crosses the
Mission Bay. Lorna Portal area of high to
very high liquefaction susceplibihly. The
10th Avenue Marine Terminal fuel pier
wiD SUSlain heavy damage from lateral
spreading of the liquefJed fiJI along the
margins of San Diego Bay. Access to the
fuel teonlna! and to the damaged
portiOnS of the Nav:i pipehne wiD be
difficUl and &mlted. dclaying repairs for
"""'"" days
REFERENCES
Lindvall. SC. Rockwell. T K" and Llndval,
C.E., 1990, The seismic hazard of san
Diego revised: New evidence for
magnitude 6+ Holocene earthquakes on
the Rose Canyon faull zone. In Proceed-
Ings of lhe 4th US Conlerence on
Earthquake Engmeemg, v 1 Earth·
quake El'IQlneenrlg Research InstJtute. 8
GemIO. Caldorl'll3. P 679-688
• 1'tv re. e llll upd;ne on kntMn
<V1d cVItl(!pllted re5OUJ'Cti
• Mmeral exploration USing remote ~
• MLneral <iep0lt sampling
• MIning system!> for the continental shelf
• Environmental hazards and Impacts
coastal Sites
• Mining ¥lems for the deep wabeds
deep 0CNfI mu'Iing
• Eno.vorwnmktl hazards and mpacts
• Madding technologiCal ~,...
• ~tradaho,laI ccra-pls for manne
~"'
AD conference manbers are encouraged 10
cOlltnbute papers IOf poster sessions or
abstracts lor dJSCU5SlOrI al the time of
appilcatlOll. ProceedIngS for the conference
wiD be publl<Jwd In a special edItion of Marine
MinJng
CAUFORNtAOEOLOGY SCPTEMBER 1991
RetchIe. M.S.. Kahle, JE.. AIIunson, T G,
Johnson, E.H., Olson. A.A.. Lagooo.
H.J. StelnbllJgge, K.V., Cluff. LS..
Haney. T,P" and Powers, J.E.. 1990.
Planning scenario lor a major earth-
quake, san Dleoo-Tijuana metropolitan
area: California Department of Conserva·
hon. DMsion 01 Mines and Geology
Special PubflCation 100, 181 p.
Toppozada, T.R., and Parke. D.L. 1982.
Areas damaged by GDlorna earth-
quakes. 1900-1949. Annual Technical
Report 10 the U.S GeologICal Survey'
Cali10rna 0Msl0n ol M,nes and Geology
Open-File Report 82·17SAC, 65 P
Toppozada. T.R" Real. C.R., and Palke,
D.L, 1981. Preparation of 150SelsmaJ
maps and summaries 01 reported etlects
lor pre-1900 California eaJ1hquakes,
Annual Technical Repon to the U.S.
GeologtcaJ Survey Caldornia DIVISIOfl 01
Mines and Geology Open·File Report 81-
11SAC,182p
EngIneering Fomdbbon conferences were
established in 1962 to pnMde a forum lor
problems and issues relevant to engineers
from many disCIplines. The conference
provides momlng and evening sessions In
\\.-tlich major presentations are made. It
ancIudes lime duTing lhe ahemoons for lid hoc
se!'Slons and informal dscussioos
For infonnanon. Cl:lI'Ud
0lar1es V. FreimaIf\. Director
Ellgq ......:1 iI og Foundalion
345 ~ 47th Street
New York. NY 10017
212·705-7835'
'"
A Page for Teachers
EARTHQUAKE BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following bibliography was compiled by the National Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research. State University of New York at Buffalo.
Selected References for
Teachers
Alexander. T.. Plate Tectonics
Has a Lot To Tell Us About the
Present and Future Earth
(5m;thson;an. 5(11). 38-47, 1975)
Alexander. T" Revolution Called
Plate Tectonics Has Given Us a
Whole New Earth (Smithsonian,
5(10).30-40, 1975)
American Red Cross Safety and
Survival in an Earthquake. Los
Angeles Chapter (Los Angeles. CA:
American Red Cross. 1982)
Anderson. D.L. The San
Andreas Fault (Scientific Ameri-
can. 225(5).52-68,1971)
Ballard, RD., Window on Earth's
Interior (National Geographic,
150. 228-249, 1976)
Boll. B.A.. Earthquakes: A
Primer (W.H. Freeman, 1978)
Bolt, B.A., Earthquakes (W.H.
Freeman. 1988)
Boore, D.M., Seismology
(Geohmes. 22(1). 40-41, 1977)
Brown. B.. & Brown W. Historical
Catastrophes (Addison-Wesley,
1974)
Canby. T.Y .. Can We Predict
Earthquakes? (National Geo-
9,aphk. 149.830-835,1976)
Canby, T.Y .. & Baire, J.
California's San Andreas Fault
(National Geographic. 143.38-52;
1973)
FEMA Guidebook for Develop-
ing a School Earthquake Safety
Pmg<am (FEMA 88, 1985)
Gere, J.M .. & Shah, H.e. Terra
Non Firma: Understanding and
Preparing for Earthquakes.
(W.H. Freeman; 1984)
Golden. F.. The Trembling
Earth: Probing and Predicting
Quakes (Scribner's: 1983)
Hanif. M.. As the Earth
Quakes...What Happens?
(Science and Children, 27(4). 36-
39, 1990)
Hanks. T.e., The National
Earthquake Hazards Reduction
Program-Scientific Status (U.S.
Government Printing Office. U.S.
Geological Survey Bulletin 1659:
1985)
Hodgson. J.H .. Earthquakes and
Earth Structure (Prentice-Hall;
1964)
lacopi. R.. Earthquake Country:
How. Why and Where Earth·
quakes Strike in California
(Lane, 1974)
Miller, M.M .. Our Restless Earth
(National Geographic. 126, 140-
141; 1964)
Mogi. Earthquake Prediction
(Academic Press: 1985)
Tufty. B. 1001 Questions An-
swered about Earthquakes.
Avalanches. Floods, and other
Natural Disasters (Dover Publica-
tions: 1969)
Walker. B.. & the editors of Time-
Life Books. Planet Earth: Earth-
quake \fime-Life: 1981)
Yanev. P.. Peace of Mind in
Earthquake Country, How to
Save your Home and Life (San
Francisco. CA: Chronicle: 1974)
CAUfOflNIA GEOLOGY SEPTEMBER 1991
Selected Books for Grades
K-3
Baker. K.. The Magic Fan
(Harcourt. Brace. Jovanovich,
1989)
Berger. M.. Jigsaw Continents
(Coward, McCann, & Geoghegan.
1977)
Challand. H.J .. Earthquakes
(Children's. 1982)
Curran. E., Mountains and
Volcanoes: What do You See?
(Troll Associates, 1985)
Kaufman. J .. Joe Kaufman's
About the Big Sky, About the
High Hills (Golden Press. 1978)
Lambert. D.. Earthquakes
(Franklin Watts. 1982)
Larson. N.. Why do We Have
Earthquakes? (Creative Education.
1982)
Mallhews. A., Earthquake
(Ballantine. 1986)
May, J .. Why the Earth Quakes
(Holiday. 1969)
Merrians, D.. I Can Read About
Earthquakes and Volcanoes
[froll Associates, 1975)
Radlauer, RS .. Earthquakes
(Children 's, 1987)
Simon. S.. Danger From Below:
Earthquakes Past. Present, and
Future, (Four Winds. 1979)
Stein, Re.. The Story of the San
Francisco Earthquake
(Children's, 1983)
Winner. P.. Earthquakes (Silver.
1986)
Selected Books for
Grades 4-6
Asimov. I.. How Did We Find
Out About Earthquakes?
(Walker. 1978)
Aylesworth. T.. Geologic Disas-
ters: Earthquakes and Volca-
noes (Franklin Watts. 1979)
Baker, K .. The Magic Fan
(Harcourt. Brace, Jovanovich.
1989)
Berger. M.. Jigsaw Continents
(Coward. McCann & Geoghegan.
1977)
Cazeau. c.J.. Earthquakes
(Follett. 1974)
Cole. J .. The Magic School Bus
Inside the Earth (Scholastic,
1987)
Dudman. J .. The San Francisco
Earthquake (Wayland. 1988)
Fodor. R.V .. What Does a Geolo·
gist Do? (Dodd. Mead. 1977)
lacopi. R.. Earthquake Country
(Lane, 1971)
Kiefer. I.. Global Jigsaw Puzzle,
Story of Continental Drift
(Atheneum. 1978)
Larson. N.. Why Do We Have
Earthquakes? (Creative Education.
1982)
Levine. E., If You Lived at the
Time of the Great San Fran-
cisco Earthquake (Scholastic.
1987)
Markle. S .. Digging Deeper
(Lothrop, Lee, and Shepard, 1987)
Merrians. D., I Can Read About
Earthquakes and Volcanoes
[froll Associates, 1975)
Navarra, J.G.. Earthquake!
(Doubleday, 19801
Nixon, H.. & Nixon. J.L, Earth-
quakes: Nature in Motion
(Dodd. Mead. 1981)
Paananen, E., Tremor Earth-
quake Technology in the Space
Age (Julian Essner. 1982)
Rutland, J .. The Violent Earth
(Random House, 1987)
Simon. S.. Danger From Below:
Earthquakes Past. Present, and
Future (Four Winds, 1979)
Sullivan, Earthquake 2099
(fiction) (Dutton. 1982)
Williamson, T., Understanding
the Earth (Silver Burdett. 1984)
CALIFORNIA GEOLOGV SEPTEMBER 1991
Selected Books for Grades
7-9
Asimov, L How Did We Find
Out About Earthquakes?
(Walker, 1978)
Brandreth, G., Amazing Facts
About Our Earth (Doubleday,
1981)
Challand. H.J., Activities in the
Earth Sciences (Children's. 1982)
Fodor, R.V .. Earth in Motion:
The Concept of Plate Tectonics
(William Morrow. 1978)
Fradin. 0.8., Disaster! Earth-
quakes (Children '5. 1982)
Gilfond, H., Disastrous Earth-
quakes (Franklin Watts. 1981)
Jones, P.. The Forces of Nature
(Children·s.1981)
Lauber, P., Earthquakes: New
Scientific Ideas About How and
Why the Earth Shakes (Random
House, 1972)
Raymo, C.. The Crust of Our
Earth (Prentice Hall. 1983)
Rossbacher, LA., Recent Revolu-
tions in Geology (Franklin Watts,
1986)
Tributsch, H.. When the Snakes
Awake: Animals and Earth-
quake Prediction (MIT. 1982) X
 • • • • • DMG Release
SPECIAL REPORT 162
MINERAL lAND CLASSlACATION
Portland cement concrete aggregale and
active mines of all other mineral com-
mochues in the San Luis Obispo-Santa
Barbara production-consumption regK:ln_
By Russel V, Miller. Judy WK!denheft
Cole. and John P Oinkenbean:l, 1991
37. $2500
SpedaI Report 162 provides informa-
tiOn on the estimated availability of. and
demand for. portland cement concrete
(PCQ-grade aggregale resources WIthin
the San Luis ObIspo-Santa Barbara
Pn:xIuction-ConsumptiOn (poQ Region.
The study area COVl."f$ 2.062 square miles
and includes major portions of l4'eStem
San Luis Obtspo and Santa Barbara
counties. Approximateiy 40 percent of
San Luis Obispo County and 45 percent
of Santa Barbara County have been
irrl.Jded within the P-C region and have
been claSSIfied for PCC-grade aggregate.
In this area. as in any urbaniZing area.
importanl Iand-use decisions should be
made \l..ith fuU recognition of the region's
natural resources, This Is particularly
important \/Jith regard to resources of
high-grade construction aggregate used in
portland cement concrete. PCC-grade
aggregate is an Indispensable building
material !hat is costly to lranspon. This
classification report documents lor the
San Luis Obispo-Santa Barbara area:
Coast Rock Products. Inc aggregate plant on the SIsquoc Rrver
'"
I) the location of Pee· grade aggre-
gate resources.
2) the quantIty of PCC-grade aggre-
gate v.ithin those depostlS:
3) the Iocalion of aft actIVe mines
\l,.ithin the regiOn prodocing
commodities other than fill,
4) the demand lor aggregate v.,thm
the regK:ln for the next 50 years
This study "!as concb::lro as speofied
by the Surface MlOmg and Redamalion
At::t (SMARA) of 1975. s,\1ARA was
passed by the California Stale I..egtsIature
to: (I) respond 10 the kY..s of sigrulicant
mineral resources due 10 urban expan-
sion; (2) obtain current information
concerning the location and ~uty of
essential rnineraI deposits; and (3) ensure
adequate mined-land reclamation. To
address mineral resource conservalion.
SMARA mandated a two-phase process
called dassincation-designatK>n. The
objecliw: of lhe classifkation-designatlOn
pnxess is to ensure. through appropriate
local lead agency poOCies and procedures.
that raw material is available when
needed and does not become inaccessible
as a result of inadequate information
during the land·use decision-making
process.
CAlFORNtA GEOlOOY
SEPTEMBER 1991
• • • • •
SMARA mandates that !Pdelines for
classifkation and designation be deYef..-
oped by the State MlI'ling and Geoklgy
Boam The BoanI originally adoptoo
formalSMARA guidelines 00 June 30.
1978. SectjQO I. la of those guidelines
reqares the Stale Geologist to classify
specified areas into Mineral Resource
Zones (MHZ). Classifx:ation is the process
of identifying lands containing signifM:ar'lI
mineral deposits. based solely on geologic
faetOB \l,lthout regard 10 presenlland lbe
or CMor.ership. The Board recogruzes thai
consIrucbon materials (sand. gravel. and
crushed stone) are produced regionally.
are used in every urban area of the Slate.
and require spec:ial classilication data.
Section 1.3 of the guidelines reqwres that
classification repoftS pertaining to
deposIts of constTuCtion aggregale
materials ind.de the folou.ing informa·
1m (I) the location and estimated Iotal
~tlty of construction aggregale
available for mining; (2) limits of the
market {consumptionJ region lhat these
potential resources wouJd supply; arxl
(3) an estimate 01 the total quantity of
aggregate malerial that will be needed to
supply the consumption region lor the
next 50 years. This information will assrst
the Board in detennining the statewide or
regional significance of these typeS of
deposits:'"