Basic Information

Climate Change or Global Warming?

The term climate change is often used interchangeably with the term global warming, but according to the National
Academy of Sciences, "the phrase 'climate change' is growing in preferred use to 'global warming' because it helps
convey that there are [other] changes in addition to rising temperatures."

Climate change refers to any significant change in measures of climate (such as temperature, precipitation, or
wind) lasting for an extended period (decades or longer). Climate change may result from:

• natural factors, such as changes in the sun's intensity or slow changes

in the Earth's orbit around the sun;
• natural processes within the climate system (e.g. changes in ocean
circulation);
• human activities that change the atmosphere's composition (e.g.
through burning fossil fuels) and the land surface (e.g. deforestation,
reforestation, urbanization, desertification, etc.)

Global warming is an average increase in the temperature of the atmosphere near the Earth's surface and in the
troposphere, which can contribute to changes in global climate patterns. Global warming can occur from a variety
of causes, both natural and human induced. In common usage, "global warming" often refers to the warming that
can occur as a result of increased emissions of greenhouse gases from human activities.

The Earth's climate has changed many times during the planet's history, with events ranging from ice
ages to long periods of warmth. Historically, natural factors such as volcanic eruptions, changes in the
Earth's orbit, and the amount of energy released from the Sun have affected the Earth's climate.
Beginning late in the 18th century, human activities associated with the Industrial Revolution have
also changed the composition of the atmosphere and therefore very likely are influencing the Earth's
climate.

Climate Toolbox

• Frequently Asked Questions About Global Warming and

Climate Change: Back to Basics (PDF) (8 pp, 1.6MB, About PDF)

• Household Emissions Calculator

• Indicators Report and Slideshow

Fact Sheets

• Climate Change Science Facts (PDF) (2 pp, 351K, About PDF)

• Climate Change and Ecosystems (PDF) (2 pp, 391K, About PDF)

• Climate Change and Health Effects (PDF) (2 pp, 331K, About PDF)
 • Climate Change and Society (PDF) (2 pp, 589K, About PDF)

The EPA climate change website has four main sections on climate change issues and another section
on "What You Can Do" to reduce your contribution. A "Frequent Questions" section is available, and
EPA has provided a frequent questions database where users can search for more specific questions
and answers on climate change. An eight-page brochure entitled Frequently Asked Questions About
Global Warming and Climate Change: Back to Basics (PDF) (8 pp, 1.6MB, About PDF) provides illustrated
answers to frequent questions.

Science | U.S. Climate Policy | Greenhouse Gas Emissions | Health and Environmental
Effects | What You Can Do

Science

For over the past 200 years, the burning of fossil fuels, such as coal and oil, and deforestation have
caused the concentrations of heat-trapping "greenhouse gases" to increase significantly in our
atmosphere. These gases prevent heat from escaping to space, somewhat like the glass panels of a
greenhouse.

Greenhouse gases are necessary to life as we know it, because they keep the planet's surface warmer
than it otherwise would be. But, as the concentrations of these gases continue to increase in the
atmosphere, the Earth's temperature is climbing above past levels. According to NOAA and NASA
data, the Earth's average surface temperature has increased by about 1.2 to 1.4ºF in the last 100
years. The eight warmest years on record (since 1850) have all occurred since 1998, with the
warmest year being 2005. Most of the warming in recent decades is very likely the result of human
activities. Other aspects of the climate are also changing such as rainfall patterns, snow and ice cover,
and sea level.

If greenhouse gases continue to increase, climate models predict that the average temperature at the
Earth's surface could increase from 3.2 to 7.2ºF above 1990 levels by the end of this century.
Scientists are certain that human activities are changing the composition of the atmosphere, and that
increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases will change the planet's climate. But they are not
sure by how much it will change, at what rate it will change, or what the exact effects will be. See the
Science and Health and Environmental Effects sections of this site for more detail, or review the
answers to some frequent science questions.

Top of Page
U.S. Climate Policy

The Federal government is using voluntary and incentive-based programs to reduce emissions and has
established programs to promote climate technology and science. This strategy incorporates know-
how from many federal agencies and harnesses the power of the private sector.

EPA plays a significant role in helping the Federal government reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
greenhouse gas intensity. EPA has many current and near-term initiatives that encourage voluntary
reductions from a variety of stakeholders. Initiatives, such as ENERGY STAR, Climate Leaders, and our
Methane Voluntary Programs, encourage emission reductions from large corporations, consumers,
industrial and commercial buildings, and many major industrial sectors. For details on these and other
initiatives as well as other aspects of U.S. policy, visit the U.S. Climate Policy section of the site.

Top of page

Greenhouse Gas Emissions

In the U.S., our energy-related activities account for over 85 percent of our human-generated
greenhouse gas emissions, mostly in the form of carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels.
More than half the energy-related emissions come from large stationary sources such as power plants,
while about a third comes from transportation. Industrial processes (such as the production of
cement, steel, and aluminum), agriculture, forestry, other land use, and waste management are also
important sources of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.

For a better understanding of where greenhouse gas emissions come from, governments at the
federal, state and local levels prepare emissions inventories, which track emissions from various parts
of the economy such as transportation, electricity production, industry, agriculture, forestry, and other
sectors. EPA publishes the official national inventory of US greenhouse gas emissions, and the latest
greenhouse gas inventory shows that in 2008 the U.S. emitted slightly less than 7 billon metric tons of
greenhouse gases (a million metric tons of CO2 equivalents (MMTCO2e) is roughly equal to the annual
GHG emissions of an average U.S. power plant.) Visit the Emissions section of this site to learn more,
or review the answers to some frequent emissions questions.

Top of page

Health and Environmental Effects

Climate change affects people, plants, and animals. Scientists are working to better understand future
climate change and how the effects will vary by region and over time.
Scientists have observed that some changes are already occurring. Observed effects include sea level
rise, shrinking glaciers, changes in the range and distribution of plants and animals, trees blooming
earlier, lengthening of growing seasons, ice on rivers and lakes freezing later and breaking up earlier,
and thawing of permafrost. Another key issue being studied is how societies and the Earth's
environment will adapt to or cope with climate change.

In the United States, scientists believe that most areas will continue to warm, although some will
likely warm more than others. It remains very difficult to predict which parts of the country will
become wetter or drier, but scientists generally expect increased precipitation and evaporation, and
drier soil in the middle parts of the country. Northern regions such as Alaska are expected to
experience the most warming. In fact, Alaska has been experiencing significant changes in climate in
recent years that may be at least partly related to human caused global climate change.

Human health can be affected directly and indirectly by climate change in part through extreme
periods of heat and cold, storms, and climate-sensitive diseases such as malaria, and smog episodes.
For more information on these and other environmental effects, please visit the Health and
Environmental Effects section of this site, or review the answers to some frequent effects questions.

Top of page

What You Can Do

Greenhouse gases are emitted as a result of the energy we use by driving and using electricity and
through other activities that support our quality of life like growing food and raising livestock.
Greenhouse gas emissions can be minimized through simple measures like changing light bulbs in
your home and properly inflating your tires to improve your car's fuel economy. The What You Can Do
section of the climate change site identifies over 25 action steps that individuals can take to decrease
greenhouse gas emissions, increase the nation's energy independence and also save money.

State and local governments and businesses play an important role in reducing greenhouse emissions
and greenhouse gas intensity. For example, major corporations, states and local organizations are
taking action through participation in a wide range of EPA and other federal voluntary programs.

You can start by assessing your own contribution to the problem, by using EPA's Household Emissions
Calculator to estimate your household's annual emissions. Once you know about how much you emit,
you use the tool to see how simple steps you take at home, at the office, on the road, and at school
can reduce your emissions. Visit the What You Can Do section of this site to learn more.
 An Overview of the Climate Change Problem

Figure — Details of Earth's energy balance (source: Kiehl and Trenberth, 1997).
Numbers are in watts per square meter of Earth's surface, and some have a range of
uncertainty of as much as +/- 20%. The greenhouse effect is associated with the
absorption and re-radiation of energy by atmospheric greenhouse gases and particles,
which results in a downward flux of infrared radiation from the atmosphere to the
surface (back radiation) and therefore, a higher surface temperature. Note that the total
rate at which energy leaves Earth (107 W/m2 of reflected sunlight plus 235 W/m2 of
infrared [long-wave] radiation) is equal to the 342 W/m2 of incident sunlight. Thus, Earth
is in approximate energy balance in this analysis.

Throughout human history, climate has both promoted and constrained human activity. In
fact, humans only very recently have been able to substantially reduce the degree to which they
are affected by climate variability, mainly through advances in technology and the development
of more sophisticated infrastructure. For example, high-yield agriculture and efficient food
distribution and storage systems have virtually eliminated famine in most countries with
developed or transitioning economies.

On the other hand, human activity can and has also affected the climate. From Swedish
scientist Arrhenius' 1896 study of how changes in carbon dioxide (CO2) could affect climate, to
English engineer G.S. Callendar's assertion in 1938 that a warming trend caused by increases
in CO2 was underway, to Massachusetts Institute of Technology scientist Lorenz's suggestion at
a 1965 conference in Boulder, CO, that climate change could cause catastrophic "surprises", to
the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988,
support has increased for the idea that there exists a complex, and perhaps dangerous,
society-nature cycle: climate influences human activities that, in turn, influence climate, etc.
(For much more information on the history of climate change research, see Spencer Weart's
website, The Discovery of Global Warming.)

However, climate change didn't jump onto the global public's radar screen, politicians, and
the media as an important issue until 1995, when the IPCC first announced in Working Group I's
contribution to the Second Assessment Report, or SAR (which was released in final form in
1996), that "the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on
global climate." The record high temperatures in the last few decades (see a 2003 article in The
Guardian), with 1998, 2002, and 2003 being the warmest years on record, as well as dramatic
increases in storm damage between the 1960s and 1990s, have lent credibility to the IPCC’s
finding (see a Trend Graph from the IPCC and a similar figure from page 4 of a presentation
given by Ray Bradley; original Mann et al., 2003). Then, in its "As the climate continues
Third Assessment Report (TAR) in 2001, the IPCC to change —and in most
mainstream scientific
estimated that by 2100, the planet would warm by between
studies, change is expected
1.4ْ and 5.8ْC, up from the range of 1.0ْ to 3.5ْC that had been to accelerate substantially
estimated in the SAR. While warming at the low end of this during the twenty-first
range, of say 1.5 ْC, would likely be relatively adaptable for century— we can expect
natural systems to become
most human activity, it would still be significant for some
highly stressed."
“unique and valuable systems.” Warming of 6ْC could have
widespread catastrophic consequences, as a temperature change of 5ْ to 7ْC on a globally
averaged basis is about the difference between an ice age and an interglacial period. The 2001
IPCC assessment both reinforced the original (1996) claim of detection of an anthropogenic
climate signal and brought to the forefront a new “discernible” statement — this time that recent
observations of wildlife, marine systems, ice layers, and the timing of vegetation lifecycles
suggest that there now appears to be a discernible impact of regional climatic variations on
natural systems (see IPCC Working Group II Report and Root/Schneider: Wildlife
Responses to Climate Change: Implications). The prime implication of this new finding is that
as the climate continues to change —and in most mainstream scientific studies, change is
expected to accelerate substantially during the twenty-first century— we can expect natural
systems to become highly stressed.
 This website is divided into sections reflecting the four major components of the climate
change debate: 'Mediarology', Climate Science, Climate Impacts, and Climate Policy. I will
summarize all four below.

"Mediarology"
Special interest groups followed the IPCC proceedings
"“End of the world” and
“good for the Earth” are, in closely. Given the broad range of possible outcomes,
my experience, the two proponents of the many sides of the climate change debate
lowest probability cases."
(often dichotomized into “ ignore the problem ” versus “stop it ”
camps, though it is actually an issue with many, many sides)
deliberately selected and continue to select information out of context that best supports their
ideological positions and their or their clients' interests. They frequently practice a phenomenon
I call "courtroom epistemology": refusing to acknowledge that an issue (climate change, in
this case) is multifaceted, and presenting only their own arguments, ignoring opposing views.
Deep ecology groups point to the most pessimistic outcomes, using their warnings of climate
catastrophe to push for the creation and implementation of energy taxes, abatement policies,
and renewable energy promotion and subsidies (as many believe renewable energy is “the
solution). Clearly, such policies would affect the industries that produce and use the most
energy, especially the oil and auto industries. The auto, oil, and other fossil fuel-intensive
industry groups, uncoincidentally, tend to be the extreme optimists in the global warming debate
though, ironically, they often are the pessimists when it comes to estimating the costs of fixing
the problem. They attempt to trivialize the potential hazards of climate change and focus on the
least serious outcomes and the most expensive mitigation policies to discourage political action.

This plays into the media's tendency to engage in "balanced" reporting: polarizing an issue
(despite its being multifaceted) and making each "side" equally credible. The media dutifully
report the dueling positions of ecology and industry, further confusing policymakers and the
public with an endless parade of op-eds and stories quoting those suggesting that global
warming is either “good for the Earth and too expensive to fix anyway” or “the end of the world
but nonetheless relatively cheap to solve with solar or wind power.” “End of the world” and
“good for the Earth” are, in my experience, the two lowest probability cases (as are "it would
bankrupt us to mitigate climate changes" and "technology will solve climate change at no cost").
Neither side usually offers probabilities of such outcomes.
 Eliminating this confusion and misrepresentation of the climate change debate requires the
participation of scientists, citizens, and journalists alike. First, scientists should not be
discouraged on principle to enter the public debate on climate change both as scientist-
advocates and scientist popularizers; if they don't, popularization of potential probabilities
and consequences of climate change will occur without their input and will likely be more
inaccurate. A scientist should also transcend prejudices against non-frequentist (i.e., subjective)
analysis and treat climate change like the issue that it is: one for which future empirical data
cannot be obtained (as it is simply impossible to obtain hard data for events occurring in the
future) and which therefore necessitates the use of Bayesian, or subjective, probabilities and
projections/models — our 'cloudy crystal balls' — that compile "Just because we
all the information we can possibly bring to bear on the scientists have Ph.D.s we
problem, including, but not limited to, direct measurements should not hang up our
citizenship at the door of a
and statistics. It is scientists, not policymakers, who should public meeting."
provide subjective probabilistic assessments of climate
change. Just because we scientists have Ph.D.s we should not hang up our citizenship at the
door of a public meeting — we too are entitled to advocate personal opinions, but we also have
a special obligation to make our value judgments explicit. If they do express opinions, scientists
should attempt to keep their value judgments out of the scientific assessment process but
should make their personal values and prejudices clear regardless. It is then the role of the
scientist-popularizer to propagate and promote these assessments and values in an
understandable manner in the public realm so that the scientific community's findings and the
scientist's ideas are heard and his/her suggestions are available. An effective scientist-
popularizer must balance the need to be heard (good sound bites) with the responsibility to be
honest (see "the double ethical bind pitfall") as well. Doing both is essential.

Citizens must demand that scientists provide honest, credible assessments that answer the
"three questions of environmental literacy": 1) What can happen?; 2) What are the odds of it
happening?; and 3) How are such estimates made? Citizens must also achieve a certain level
of environmental, political, and scientific literacy themselves so that they feel comfortable
distinguishing climate change fact from fiction and making critical value judgments and policy
decisions, in essence becoming "citizen scientists". Just as popularization of potential
probabilities and consequences will occur with or without input from scientists, policy decisions
will be made with or without input from an informed citizenry. I hope that citizens will take
 responsibility for increasing their scientific, political, and environmental literacy and recognize
the importance of the positive effect that an informed public will have on the policy process.

Citizens and scientists clearly can't operate as completely separate entities in the climate
change debate. Their interaction is essential, especially when it comes to "rolling
reassessment". Given the uncertain nature of climate change, citizens and scientists should
work together to initiate flexible policies and management schemes that are revisited, say, every
five years. The key word here is flexible. Knowledge is not static — there are always new
outcomes to discover and old theories to rule out. New knowledge allows us to reevaluate
theories and policy decisions and make adjustments to policies that are too stringent, too lax, or
targeting the wrong cause or effect. Both scientist-advocates and citizen-scientists must see to it
that once we’ve set up political establishments to carry out policy that people do not become so
vested in a certain process or outcome that they become reluctant to make adjustments, either
to the policies or the institutions.

In addition, citizens and scientists must coordinate with

"Citizens should make sure
that the public debates take journalists and other media figures to ensure accuracy in the
into account all knowledge media portrayal of climate change (see The Journalist-
available on climate
Scientist-Citizen Triangle). We scientists need to take more
change."
proactive roles in the public debate. We need to help journalists
by agreeing to participate in the public climate change debate
and by using clear metaphors and ordinary language once we do so. We should go out of our
way to write review papers from time to time and to present talks that stress well-established
principles at the outset of our meetings. Before we turn to more speculative, cutting-edge
science; we should deliberately outline the consensus before revealing the contention.
Citizens should make sure that the public debates take into account all knowledge available on
climate change. Hopefully, their actions will encourage reporters to replace the knee-jerk model
of "journalistic balance" with a more accurate and fairer doctrine of "perspective": one that
communicates not only the range of opinion, but also the relative credibility of each opinion
within the scientific community. (Fortunately, most sophisticated science and environment
reporters have abandoned the journalistic tradition of polarization of only two "sides", but
nevertheless, especially in the political arena, such falsely dichotomous "balance" still exists).

To further clarify the climate change issue, we must consider its three main components:
Climate Science, Climate Impacts, and Climate Policy (see below).
Climate Science
Figure — Indicators of human influence on the atmosphere since 1000 A.D. (source:
IPCC, Working Group I, Summary for Policy Makers, figure 2).

The climate change debate is characterized by deep uncertainty, which results from factors
such as lack of information, disagreement about what is known or even knowable, linguistic
imprecision, statistical variation, measurement error, approximation, subjective judgment on the
structure of the climate system, among others (see Decision Making Under Uncertainty).
These problems are compounded by the global scale of climate change, which produces
varying impacts at local scales, long time lags between forcing and its corresponding
responses, very long-term climate variability that exceeds the length of most instrumental
records, and the impossibility of before-the-fact experimental controls or empirical observations
(i.e., there is no experimental or empirical observation set for the climate of, say, 2050 AD,
meaning all our future inferences cannot be wholly “objective,” data-based assessments — at
least not until 2050 rolls around). Moreover, climate change is not just a scientific topic but also
a matter of public and political debate, and degrees of uncertainty and various claims and
counterclaims may be played up or down (and further confused, whatever the case) by
stakeholders in that debate (see Post-Normal Science).

However, it is important to understand that the

greenhouse phenomenon is well-understood and solidly "In the past few
grounded in basic science (see Climate Science). It is centuries, atmospheric
carbon dioxide has
scientifically well-established that the Earth's surface air
increased by more than 30
temperature has warmed significantly, by about 0.7°C since percent, and virtually all
1860, and that an upward trend can be clearly discerned by climatologists agree that
the cause is human activity,
plotting historical temperatures. Such a graph would show a
predominantly the burning
rapid rise in temperature at the end of the twentieth century. of fossil fuels and, to a
This is supported by the fact that all but three of the ten considerable extent, land
uses such as deforestation.
warmest years on record occurred during the 1990s. In
"
addition, it is well-established that human activities have
caused increases in radiative forcing, with radiative forcing
defined as a change in the balance between radiation coming into and going out of the earth-
atmosphere system. In the past few centuries, atmospheric carbon dioxide has increased by
more than 30 percent, and virtually all climatologists agree that the cause is human activity,
predominantly the burning of fossil fuels and, to a considerable extent, land uses such as
deforestation.

More controversial is the extent to which humans have and are contributing to climate
change. How much of global warming up to this point has been natural versus
anthropogenically-induced, and by how much will humans and natural changes in the Earth
each contribute to future disturbance? The IPCC has attempted to tackle this in its Special
Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES), which contains a range of possible future emissions
scenarios based on different assumptions regarding economic growth, technological
developments, and population growth, arguably the three most critical determinants of future
climate change. These have been used to project the increases in CO2 concentrations (and
other radiative constituents) out to 2100, and it is hoped that they will help policymakers weigh
action to stem potentially devastating consequences in the future. (For more information, see
Scenarios).
 These and other climate change projections depend on detailed modeling. The most
consistent way scientists codify our knowledge is by constructing models made up of the many
subcomponents of the climate system that reflect our best understanding of each subsystem.
The system model as a whole cannot be directly verified before the fact — that is, before the
future arrives — but it can be tested against historical situations that resemble aspects that we
believe will occur in the future (see Climate Modeling). The most comprehensive models of
atmospheric conditions are three-dimensional, time-dependent simulators known as general
circulation models (GCMs) — see Climate Science. The most useful GCMs are those that also
project "surprise" events, and are able to test emissions scenarios that can avoid such
surprises.

While modeling has become both more complex and more accurate as computing abilities
have advanced and more is understood about the climate problem, scientists still have to deal
with an enormous amount of uncertainty, as mentioned above. In climate modeling, one major
unknown is climate sensitivity, the amount by which the global mean temperature will increase
for a doubling of CO2 concentrations. Many scientists have done extensive empirical and
modeling research on this subject, and most have found that most climate sensitivity estimates
fall somewhere within the IPCC's range of 1.5-4.5oC. However, more recently some have
estimated it could be lower than 1.5oC or it could be an alarming 6oC or higher (see Karl and
Trenberth, 2003). (Remember that a 5-7oC drop in temperature is all that separates Earth’s
present climate from an ice age).

Climate Impacts
 Figure — Reasons for concern about climate change impacts (source: IPCC WG 2
TAR, figure SPM-2). The left part of the figure displays the observed temperature
increase up to 2000 and the range of projected increases after 2000 as estimated by
IPCC, WG I (IPCC, 2001a) for scenarios from the Special Report on Emission Scenarios
(SRES — see the Emission scenarios). The right panel displays conceptualizations of
five reasons for concern regarding climate change risks evolving through 2100. White
indicates neutral or small negative or positive impacts or risks, yellow indicates negative
impacts for some systems, and red means negative impacts or risks that are more
widespread or greater in magnitude. This figure shows that the most potentially
dangerous impacts (the red colors on the figure) typically occur after a few degrees
warming — thus, my later use of 3.5oC as a tentative “threshold” for serious climate
damages is very conservative. The risks of adverse impacts from climate change
increase with the magnitude of climate change.

It is important that scientists continue to develop more credible models and probe the issue
of climate sensitivity, as improvements in the science will lead to improvements in our
understanding of the potential impacts of various levels of temperature change. Despite
uncertainties surrounding sensitivity, the IPCC has projected that, if its latest estimate that on a
global average basis, the Earth's atmosphere near the surface will warm somewhere between
1.4 and 5.8oC by 2100 is correct, likely effects will include: more frequent heat waves (and less
frequent cold spells); more intense storms (hurricanes, tropical cyclones, etc.) and a surge in
weather-related damage; increased intensity of floods and droughts; warmer surface
temperatures, especially at higher latitudes; more rapid spread of vector-borne disease; loss of
farming productivity in warm climates and movement of farming to other regions, most at higher
latitudes; rising sea levels, which could inundate coastal areas and small island nations; and
species extinction and loss of biodiversity (see table - Projected effects of global warming).
Schneider, Kuntz-Duriseti, and Azar (2000) have argued that the best way to estimate the full
extent of such damages comes from examining not just quantifiable monetary ("market")
damages, but several metrics, termed the "five numeraires": monetary loss (market category),
loss of life, quality of life (including coercion to migrate, conflict over resources, cultural diversity,
loss of cultural heritage sites, of hunting grounds, etc.), species or biodiversity loss, and
distribution/equity. Use of multiple metrics should ensure a fairer, more comprehensive
assessment of the actual benefits of avoiding global warming.

Estimating climate damages that are expected to occur gradually and their effects is simple
relative to forecasting "surprise" events and their consequences (see Climate Surprises). The
IPCC and others have stated that "dangerous" climate change, including surprises, could occur,
especially with more than a few degrees Celsius of additional
"Policymakers are better
warming. Surprises, better defined as imaginable abrupt
able to determine what is
events, could include deglaciation or the alteration of ocean 'dangerous' and formulate
currents (the most widely-used example of the latter being the effective legislation to avoid
such dangers if
collapse of the Thermohaline Circulation, or THC, system in
probabilities appear
the North Atlantic). Rather than being ignored, surprises and alongside scientists'
other irreversibilities like species extinctions should be treated projected consequences."
like other climate change consequences by scientists
performing risk assessments, where risk is defined as probability x consequence. The
probability component of the risk equation will entail subjective judgment on the part of
scientists, but this is far preferable to avoiding the risk equation entirely. Policymakers are better
able to make a judgment about what is "dangerous" and formulate effective actions to avoid
such dangers when probabilities appear alongside scientists' projected consequences.

These probabilities and consequences will vary regionally (see Regional Impacts). In
general, temperature rises are projected to be greatest in the subpolar regions, and to affect the
winter more dramatically than the summer. Hotter, poorer nations (i.e., developing nations near
the equator) in the political "South" are expected to suffer more dramatic effects from climate
change than their cooler developed neighbors in the political "North". This is partly due to the
 lower expected adaptive capacities of future societies in developing nations when compared
with their developed-country counterparts, which in turn depend on their resource bases,
infrastructures, and technological capabilities. This implies that impacts may be asymmetrically
felt across the developed/developing country divide. The scenario in which climate change
brings longer growing seasons to the rich northern countries and more intense droughts and
floods to the poor tropical nations is clearly a situation ripe for increasing North-South tensions
in the twenty-first century, especially since the economic benefits of using the atmosphere as a
"dump" for our tailpipes is disproportionately in favor of the wealthy.

Regardless of the different levels of vulnerability and

"All people, governments,
and countries should adaptive capacity that future societies are expected to have and
realize that 'we're in this the need for regional-level assessments, all people,
together'."
governments, and countries should realize that "we're in this
together". In all regions, people's actions today will have long-
term consequences. Even if humanity completely abandons fossil fuel emissions in the 22nd
century, essentially irreversible long-term concentration increases in CO2 are projected to
remain for centuries or more. Thus, the surface climate will continue to warm from this
greenhouse gas elevation, with a transient response of centuries before an equilibrium warmer
climate is established. How large that equilibrium temperature increase is depends on both the
final stabilization level of the CO2 and the climate sensitivity. One threat of a warmer climate
would be an ongoing rise in sea level. Warmer atmospheric temperatures would lead to warmer
ocean water (and corresponding volumetric expansion) as the heat becomes well-mixed
throughout the oceans — a time known to be on the order of 1,000 years. Instead of only up to
a meter of sea level rise over the next century or two from thermal expansion — and perhaps a
meter or two more over the five or so centuries after that as the warming penetrates all depths
of the ocean — significant global warming could very well trigger nonlinear events like a
deglaciation of major ice sheets near the poles. That would cause many additional meters of
rising seas for many millennia, and once started might not be reversible on the time scale of
thousands of years (see figure - CO2 concentration, temperature and sea level). Thus, the
behavior of only a few generations can affect the sustainability of coastal and island regions for
a hundred generations to come.

Climate Policy
 "The decision on whether
to take actions on climate
change entails a value
judgment on the part of the
In the face of such uncertainty, potential danger, and policymaker regarding what
long-term effects of present actions, how should climate constitutes "dangerous"
change policy be approached? climate change, ideally
aided by risk assessments
provided by scientists."
Climate change and almost all interesting socio-technical
problems with strong stakeholder involvement fall into the
post-normal science categorization: they are riddled with “deep uncertainties” in both
probabilities and consequences that are not resolved today and may not be resolved to a high
degree of confidence before we have to make decisions regarding how to deal with their
implications. With imperfect, sometimes ambiguous, information on both the full range of climate
change consequences and their associated probabilities, decision-makers must decide whether
to adopt a "wait and see" policy approach or follow the "precautionary principle" and hedge
against potentially dangerous changes in the global climate system. Since policymakers operate
on limited budgets, they must determine how much to invest in climate protection versus other
worthy improvement projects — e.g., new nature reserves, clean water infrastructure, or
education.

Ultimately, the decision on whether to take actions on climate change entails a value
judgment on the part of the policymaker regarding what constitutes "dangerous" climate change,
ideally aided by risk assessments provided by scientists. These risk assessments can be
enhanced by explanations of integrated assessment models (IAMs), which are important tools
for studying the impacts of climate change on the environment and society (see Climate
Impacts), as well as the costs and benefits of various policy options and decisions (see Climate
Policy). As evidenced by interactions at international climate negotiations and the different
degrees to which climate change abatement and/or adaptation policies have been adopted by
different countries (see "Come On, Everybody Else Is Doing It"), not all policymakers' value
judgments are equal.

While a decision-maker must make the final decision on

"The most robust policy
strategies are often those policy, many scientists have encouraged the "better safe than
which provide “ancillary sorry" approach and have advocated the practice of hedging:
benefits..."
initially slowing down our impacts on the climate and then
adopting flexible policies that can be updated as future climate
conditions occur and are better understood. As Christian Azar and I (Schneider and Azar,
2001) mentioned: "In our view, it is wise to keep many doors — analytically and from the policy
perspective — open. This includes acting now so as to keep the possibility of meeting low
stabilization targets open. As more is learned of costs and benefits in various numeraires and
political preferences become well developed and expressed, interim targets and policies can
always be revisited." In addition to being based on "rolling reassessment", as described in the
quote above, the most robust policy strategies are often those which provide “ancillary benefits”
— that is, policies which help to solve more than one problem at once. (See Climate Policy).
For example, reducing the unfiltered burning of coal, which is highly polluting, in crowded cities
like New Delhi and Beijing by replacing it with more efficient, less polluting natural gas power
sources not only reduces the emissions of greenhouse gases that cause climate change, but
also reduces the conventional “criteria” air pollutants that are well-known to adversely affect
human health (see the EPA and Harvard School of Public Health websites on air pollution
hazards to health).

Cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) are also useful in deciding the ifs and whats of climate
change policy, but uncertainties make this exercise difficult as well, especially when attempting
to estimate the costs of surprise and other catastrophic events. A few economists have
concluded that stringent measures to control emissions of CO2 would be very costly even when
the benefits of reducing the emissions (i.e., avoided climatic changes) are taken into account,
but many others have found that much stronger cuts in emissions are defensible on economic
efficiency grounds alone. At present, it seems that CBAs applied to the problem of global
climate change can largely justify a wide range of emission reduction targets, marginal or
substantial. The latter will be particularly justifiable if nasty surprises are taken into account.

Any policies that are implemented should provide incentives for, and possibly even go so
far as to subsidize, technological change. Encouraging technological change through energy
policies in particular is of critical importance when addressing
climate change. For example, rapid early growth in alternative "Encouraging
technological change
energy sources like wind and photovoltaic (PV) technology
through energy policies in
largely depends on government efforts to build these markets particular is of critical
through subsidies. If/when the government supports such importance when
initiatives, they gain mainstream popularity and encourage addressing climate
change."
further private investments, oftentimes above and beyond
what the policy provides. On the other hand, if policy
measures are delayed, public acceptance will likely be delayed as well. If the world decided to
defer implementation of the Kyoto Protocol for another twenty years, for instance, it is likely
that private and government research, development, and demonstration of carbon-efficient
technologies would drop rather than increase. An overview of the climate-energy-policy debate
(including a summary and critique of the Bush climate response) can be found in Holdren 2003
(see also "Report by the E.P.A. Leaves Out Data on Climate Change" and "The Science
and Politics of Global Climate Change: Does the Bush Administration Think It Can Fool
Mother Nature?").

Future international climate change agreements should certainly consider the contributions
of the developed (high per capita emissions) versus developing (low per capita emissions)
countries to climate change. Aubrey Meyer of the Global Commons Institute has long argued
for the principle of "contraction and convergence." "Contraction" entails the shrinking of the
developed countries' "share" of CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. In Meyer's view, rich
countries, who are appropriating a disproportionate fraction of the atmospheric commons, need
to cut back their emissions and allow poorer countries to emit more and catch up. Eventually,
the two groups will "converge" at a level at which per capita emissions will be equal across
nations while at the same time meeting "climate safe" emissions targets for the world as a whole
(see "Trading Up to Climate Security").

For all countries, a main factor influencing implementation of climate policy today is based
on a clarification of the overall costs of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 levels (see Political
Feasibility). More pessimistic economists generally find deep reductions in carbon emissions to
be very costly — into the trillions of dollars. For instance, stabilizing CO 2 in 2100 at 450 ppm
(current level is about 360 ppm) would, according to Manne & Richels (1997), cost the world
between 4 and 14 trillion USD (this is the present value for the whole century). Other top-down
studies report similar cost estimates (see IPCC 2001c, "Substantial reductions of
chapter 8), but we must note, paradoxically, that the results carbon emissions and
of even the most pessimistic economic models support the several fold increases in
economic welfare are
conclusion that substantial reductions of carbon compatible targets."
emissions and several fold increases in economic
welfare are compatible targets. To support this, Christian Azar and I developed a simple
economic model and estimated the present value (discounted to 1990 and expressed in 1990
USD) of the costs to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 350 ppm, 450 ppm, and 550 ppm to be 18
trillion USD, 5 trillion USD, and 2 trillion USD, respectively, assuming a discount rate of 5% per
year (see Azar & Schneider, 2002). Obviously, 18 trillion USD is a huge cost, considering that
the output of the global economy in 1990 amounted to about 20 trillion USD and is about 37
trillion in 2003. However, viewed from another perspective, an entirely different analysis
emerges: the 18 trillion USD cost represents the present value of lost income over the next 100
years. In the absence of emission abatement and without any damages from climate change,
GDP is assumed to grow by a factor of ten or so over the next 100 years, which is a typical
value used in long-run modeling efforts. If even the most stringent target, 350 ppm, were
pursued, the costs associated with it would only amount to a delay of two to three years in
achieving this tenfold increase in global GDP in 2100. Meeting the 350 ppm CO2 stabilization
target would imply that global income would be ten times larger than today by April 2102 rather
than 2100 (the date at which the tenfold increase would occur for the no-abatement-policies
scenario). This trivial delay in achieving phenomenal GDP growth is replicated even in more
pessimistic economic models. These models may be very conservative, given that most do not
consider the ancillary environmental benefits of emission abatement, among other
shortcomings.

For further information

Throughout this website, I will try to distinguish the well-established components of the
climate change debate, contrast them with the speculative aspects (and the overly contentious
media/political debate), and ultimately put this problem in the context of so-called Integrated
Assessment (see Integrated Assessment) of policy responses to the advent or prospect of
global warming. I will also provide hundreds of links to other websites and literature that
elaborate on various aspects of each of the many components of the debate, and will be sure
that most points of view — some diametrically opposed to mine— are all represented. I will, of
course, provide my own views on discordant opinions and their contexts that seem at variance
with the increasingly concerned mainstream assessments that have emerged in the past
decade (see “Mediarology”). The critical role of uncertainty will be frequently highlighted. (See,
e.g., “When Doubt is a Sure Thing”, the Moss-Schneider Guidance Paper and a Climatic
Change editorial on uncertainties). Finally, I suggest areas for further consideration.

Water and Climate Change: Understanding the Risks and

Making Climate-Smart Investment Decisions
 Climate change is real, and taking prudent measures to plan for and adapt to climate
change must become an integral part of the Bank's water practice. There is now ample
evidence that increased hydrologic variability and change in climate has and will continue have
a profound impact on the water sector through the hydrologic cycle, water availability, water
demand, and water allocation at the global, regional, basin, and local levels. This report and the
analytical work leading to it are focused on key topics related to the impact of climate change on
the water cycle and water investments.

This report contributes to the World Bank agenda on climate change and more specifically,
informs the water sector investments on climate issues and climate-smart adaptation options.
Using the existing knowledge and additional analysis commissioned. The report illustrates that
climate change is affecting the hydrologic cycle and the projected future hydrology will have a
direct impact on the water resources base availability, usage, and management. Depending on
the type of the water investment, this impact can be positive, negative, or neutral. The report
addresses the stress on and vulnerability of the water systems through use of reliability,
resilience, and robustness as the key indicators of sensitivity of water systems for climate
induced failure. Current practices in the sector are examined in order to better understand the
state-of-the-science for incorporating current and future variability and change in hydrology and
climate in the Bank's portfolio for project planning and design. New and innovative practices
taking into account adaptation options for water systems and risk-based decision making in
water investments are reviewed and assessed for application to investments in infrastructure.
The climate change dimension is placed within the context of the impact of other factors (within
and outside the sector) such as population growth (and associated increase in demand) and
land management (particularly as related to water), which in some cases may be far more
significant and critical than that of climate change in some parts of the world. Finally,
recommendations for a progressive agenda on water and climate change are made.

Download

URL to Publication

Author( Vahid Alavian, Halla Maher Qaddmi, Eric Dickson, Sylvia Michele Diez,
s) Alexander V. Danilenko, Rafik Fatehali Hirji, Gabrielle Puz, Carolina
Pizarro, Michael Jacobsen, Brian Blankespoor
Publish World Bank
ed by

Year 2009

Pages 174

Topics WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

• About Us
• Strategy and Policies
o CWRAS
• Topics
o Water Supply
 Rural Water
 Urban Water
o Sanitation and Hygiene
 Improving Access
 Hygiene Promotion
o Agricultural Water Management
 Irrigation
 Drainage
 Rainfed Agriculture
o Environmental Services
 Aquatic Ecosystems
 Environmental Flows
 Invasive Aquatic Plants
 Strategic Environmental Assessment
o Hydropower
o Water Resources Management
 Basin Management
 Groundwater
 Floods and droughts
 Water quality
 Water and Climate Change
• Water Partnership Program
o Impact Stories
o WPP Contacts
• Water Expert Team
• Projects and Operations
• News and Events
o Upcoming Events
o News Releases
o Videos
o Presentations
o News feed (RSS)
o Media Contacts
o Subscribe
 • Publications
o Water Unit
 Discussion Papers
 Working Notes
 P-Notes
o Videos
• Data and Research

Related Content
• Guiding Principles for Successful Reforms of Urban Water Supply and
Sanitation Sectors
• Improving Wastewater Use in Agriculture : An Emerging Priority
• Zambia - Managing water for sustainable growth and poverty reduction : a
country water resources assistance strategy for Zambia
• The Zambezi River Basin: a Multi-Sector Investment Opportunities Analysis
(Vol. 2 of 4): Basin Development Scenarios
• The Zambezi River Basin: a Multi-Sector Investment Opportunities Analysis
(Vol. 1 of 4): Summary Report

Related Links
• (4) allocation
• (7) basin
• (7) demand
• (7) Economic and Sector Work
• (3) hydrologic cycle
• (67) Water and Climate Change

Biofuels: How business can make smart choices

7 Mar 2008 | Author: CCC Newsdesk | Print version | Send to a friend
 But can we eat it if we need to?

Related Articles

Biofuels or food production: South Africa’s dilemma

Renewable energy: Business must see beyond the biofuels
bonanza
Biofuels: Brazil reaction to wave of environmental concerns

Michael Blok and Joop-Joost Hietbrink offer some advice for companies thinking about
making use of the controversial energy source

The amount of news concerning biofuels has increased dramatically in the last six months.

Governments and companies alike appear to be in a race to state commitments concerning the current
and future use of biofuels.

This race is a result of the increased focus on climate change and a desire for energy independence
from the traditional oil-producing regions, in addition to (at least in some jurisdictions) pork-barrel
politics favoring farmers.

In addition, the rise in the oil price has made biofuel more economical relative to fossil fuels.

For instance, the U.S. is aiming to diversify its transportation energy mix towards ethanol, biomass
and hydrogen and spends some USD $7bn a year on biofuel subsidies.

The EU has stated a 10% target for 2020 as the share of biofuel in the overall transportation fuel
consumption.

On the corporate front, McDonald’s recently launched a biofuel program in the UK, converting all its
delivery trucks to biodiesel within the year.
This biodiesel consists of 85% of the restaurants’ recycled cooking oil and 15% rapeseed (canola) oil.

Also in the UK, retailer Tesco now fuels 75% of its distribution fleet with 50% biodiesel blend.

And Essent, a Dutch energy company, is now one of the world’s largest consumers of biofuels for
power production and has converted a number of energy plants to allow adding biofuels to their burn
cycle.

Biofuel programs need a more rational framework

All biofuel programs share one thing: good intentions. However, there are uncertainties concerning the
benefits and sustainability of biofuel schemes.

In addition, many companies fail to integrate their biofuel policy with their strategy and specific needs.

Concerns on the benefits and sustainability of biofuels have been extensively researched and can be
divided into three general groups; economical, environmental and social.

Issues include the cost of biofuels vs. fossil fuels, their net CO2 emissions and the results of increased
demand on pollution and biodiversity.

On the social side, issues include diversion of food resources away from the hungry, working
conditions on the plantations, child labor and the expropriation of land.

A recent polemical discussion between the UN, major NGOs and academics even questions the modest
biofuel targets that many Governments have set.

The thinking is that any use of food as biofuel in the current economic, technological and social
environment is indefensible, but that biofuel does have a significant role in the future as technology
improves.

Having a clear overview of concerns like these is a real challenge, and actions undertaken with good
intent have more than once resulted in a negative outcome.

Nuon, another Dutch energy company, started mixing palm oil with fossil fuels as fuel in their
production process out of purely good intentions.

After some months, NGOs discovered that there were strong indications that Nuon's palm oil program
was driving rainforest destruction, as well as using bad labor practices.

In hindsight, issues like these may seem straightforward, but identifying them in advance while
making business decisions requires both good data and good thinking.
Counting biofuel initiatives

Concerns over biofuel feedstock sustainability (environmental and social responsibility) predate the
use of agricultural products as fuel.

Growers, processors, distributors and retailers have responded by creating initiatives which bring
together a variety of major players in several issue-prone agricultural value chains.

The aim is to develop a set of rules and guidelines to assure that the feedstock is produced more
sustainably.

Examples include the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil, the Round Table on Responsible Soy and
the Better Sugarcane Initiative.

Now that the use of such products as (transportation) fuel has taken off, new players have entered
such initiatives, including major oil companies (BP, Shell).

In 2006, The Swiss Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne’s Energy Center initiated the
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels, designed as an umbrella initiative for biofuels, to complement the
focus on specific feedstock such as palm oil.

The stated aim is to create a tool to help assure that that biofuels are sustainable.

Of course, the launching of an initiative does not mean that the feedstock in question is sustainable; if
anything, it is testimony to the opposite.

This means that those joining such initiatives (and those unable to join but affected by decisions
taken) have a good hope that in the future (perhaps 2 to 10 years) the desired level of sustainability
will be reached.

Given the extent of concerns with respect to biofuels, any biofuel commitment should be treated as a
strategic decision requiring thorough analysis of costs, benefits and risks, a clear rationale, and a clear
and visible link to the corporate CSR program and vision.

Four strategic postures

As a framework to base biofuel decisions on, we present a matrix with four strategic postures between
which companies should choose.

This matrix is the result of the two relevant axes for basing choices on. The first axis is “Influence”.

Influence is a relative indicator, defined as the buying power of the company as a fuel user and the
resulting influence the company has in decision-making in the industry or value chain. The second axis
is “Necessity”.

This necessity reflects the net gains a company can achieve from implementing an aggressive biofuel
program.

Such gains can be external, when a biofuel program creates positive visibility and reduces regulatory
and/or reputation risks.

Internal benefits can be achieved when a biofuel program brings a company closer to its stated
environmental or social goals.

The two axes logically lead to four possible strategic postures, each with their own set of implied
actions.

1. Do nothing

A company which reaches the conclusion it has little to gain by adopting a biofuel program, and which
cannot influence industry/value chain decisions on biofuels, should shy away from biofuel
commitments and wait for things to develop.

Any such commitment carries significant risks. Biofuel costs could rise, prompting a default on
commitments made, or the industry or value chain could adopt standards which could then become
difficult to meet.

Of course, in this posture, legal requirements to use biofuels will need to be met in any case.

2. Talk

This applies to companies which do not see great immediate benefits in adopting a biofuel program,
but which do have the opportunity to influence the development of biofuel adoption in their industry or
value chain.

Given the potential future impact of biofuels on all businesses, joining initiatives that seek to work
towards the sustainability of specific feedstock (such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil) is
worthwhile.

You will gain influence, increasing the chances that future measures reflect costs and benefits relevant
to you and your customers.

As in the posture of Do Nothing, you can to move into biofuels for your own fuel sourcing when the
time is right, perhaps 3 to 5 years from now.

3. Source Locally
If your company has a very thorough CSR policy or is in a position to make hay from moving into
biofuels, but cannot influence events in its value chain, making a biofuel commitment makes sense.

However, having no control over the provenance and sustainability of the biofuels you buy on the
open market would put your company at significant risk, amplified by the fact that your company is
likely to widely publicize your biofuel enthusiasm.

The sober approach here is to source biofuels locally from a value chain you verifiably trust, where you
know you are not likely to run into trouble.

If volumes are greater, making local sourcing impractical, sourcing from "European" feedstock
(rapeseed/canola, corn, wheat) is a relatively safe option.

4. Build

The last posture applies when your company can benefit strongly from a biofuel commitment and you
have the ability to influence decision-making in your value chain.

You are then faced with very high volume needs for biofuels, making local sourcing impractical.

Your influence over developments, however, will not lead to immediate risk reduction, since it can
take years before an industry can assure itself and others that its biofuels are sustainable.

All this time, you face an unacceptable choice between not using biofuels or running grave risks. A
logical choice is then to set up your own supply chain for biofuels, preferably using local feedstock.

This approach has been taken by French bus company Veolia, which is building a biofuel plant near
Paris.

Buying and processing your own fuel reduces or eliminates risks, can reduce cost, and perhaps even
lead to new products or capabilities.

If circumstances do not permit building your own supply, a consortium approach can bring the same
benefits at minimum cost.

The current biofuel hype undeniably involves both great risk and opportunity for a large section of the
business world. It seems many businesses are aware of the opportunities from biofuels, but many are
underestimating the risks.

Others seem oblivious to both. For all, only a sound analytical approach to biofuels, imbedded in a
larger CSR/sustainability program, will allow your business to capitalise on this phenomenon.
Michael Blok is a Managing Director and Joop-Joost Hietbrink is an Analyst with The Anders & Winst
Company, a sustainability strategy consultancy. joopjoost@anderswinst.com / www.anderswinst.com

Back to Opinion

Respond:

Write to the Editor at zara@climatechangecorp.com.

ClimateChangeCorp welcomes your comments - click here.

Hot Jobs on ClimateChangeCorp

Find out how to advertise your recruitment vacancies here.

Subscribe to our free twice monthly newsletter:

Go

» Newsletter archive

Conferences

• Benchmark against the best, and figure out how to communicate your positive sustainability
messages
• Ethics, values and corporate compliance – how to persuade employees to do the right thing
• Find out about upcoming events, subscribe to EC conference updates

Ethical Corporation Reports for sale

• Get the inside track on how to cut costs using water strategies
• Find out how your competitors report on greenhouse gas emissions
• Learn how new UK carbon rules affects your business
• Big businesses reveal their carbon trading strategies

Find out how to advertise your recruitment vacancies here.

Ethical Corporation Magazine

Browse the March 2009 issue of our sister

publication.
Download your free copy here
Subscribe to Ethical Corporation magazine now - click here

Poll

Should business be more involved in negotiating a global post-2012 climate change plan?

No

Yes

Vote
 Download our
business intelligence
brochure now

ClimateChangeCorp.com © Ethical Corporation 2011

About Us | Feedback | Ethical Corporation | Links

Incentives For Women Obtaining Business Loans

By admin · Saturday, March 14th, 2009

Making working capital, business loan financing, and other funding available to women is
even more important in today’s growing small business industries. More women are becoming
business owners, and the result is a growing need for small business loans from banks and
other financial institutions. Due to the number of growing enterprises, the offer of incentives by
lenders is becoming more prevalent.

Competition for the best rates, along with easy application processes make it attractive for
women in business to obtain the loans they need in their business venture. Women business
loans may consist of commercial lending programs from banks and institutions, community
development organization financing or private funding.

Women entrepreneurs and business owners can gain access to business capital and work
with local community partners of their lending institution as soon as their application is complete.
Obtaining a loan from a commercial bank offers options to extend services to personal bank
accounts: checking, savings, and credit card accounts can all be managed in one place and
provide extra benefits for both parties.

Some community development organizations offer business coaches or mentors as an

incentive to obtain funding through them. This can be a very valuable resource for women to
work with, network, and socialize with area committees and members. Being listed in a business
funding directory, community newsletters, websites, and other promotional campaigns becomes
much easier. Gaining marketing and advertising exposure naturally through these networks can
be an added incentive for women who choose to work with different lenders and programs.
Finding the right match through a variety of funding sources is part of the task of obtaining the
small business loan. Some corporations and private investors may offer additional perks and
incentives as part of the offer extended to women looking for a business loan.

For women who are creating a small business from home, a lender may offer options to
refinance the house in addition to increasing the line of equity. This can help considerably on a
personal level, as the startup capital can be increased from a boost in savings from the house
proceeds. Other valuable incentives may include additional credit card packages, extended
lines of credit (credit worthiness is increased significantly over time, and if women continue to
make payments on time, this can help them boost their credit scores for maximum potential.),
and reduced rates on premium products throughout the year.

Other business loan incentives can include ongoing referrals and bonuses, exclusive
access to discounted rates, a rate decrease, easy transfer of a loan, merchant accounts, invoice
factoring, key contacts to purchase supplies and inventory, and a stronger chance of obtaining
future financing from the same lending institution. Each financial institution or lender will outline
or make an offer of the incentives program offered with each program. Women especially have
a strong chance of making use of these incentives since they can improve their status as a
business owner considerably in a short period of time.