IN Tl-I[ APR 2 1 2011

COURT or t\PPLJ\LSOt MARYLAND

September Term 2010

Docket 127

Ariel Rosita King

Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

Michael Herbert Pfe iffer

Respondent-Appellee.

On Appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery County

(Honorable Judge Craven, Case No. 70620FL)

Pursu ant t.o a Writ of Certiorari for the Court ofSpecial Appeals

(Petition Docket No. 460, September Term, 2010; No. 1007, Sept. Term, 2009)

REPLY FOR APPELLANT

Paul G. Griffin
1875 Connecticut Ave ., N.W. Ste. 710
Washington, D. C. 20009
(301) 254-2745; p-griffin@comcast.I'let

Roy Morris
PO Box 100212
Arlington, Virginia 22210
(202) 657 5793; Rov Morris@alum.mit.edu

Attorneys for Appellant

April 21, 2011

 IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
September Term 2010
___________________________

Docket 127
___________________________

Ariel Rosita King

Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

Michael Herbert Pfeiffer

Respondent-Appellee.
___________________________

On Appeal from the Circuit Court of Montgomery County

(Honorable Judge Craven, Case No. 70620FL)
Pursuant to a Writ of Certiorari for the Court of Special Appeals
(Petition Docket No. 460, September Term, 2010; No. 1007, Sept. Term, 2009)
__________________________________

REPLY FOR APPELLANT

__________________________________

Paul G. Griffin
1875 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Ste. 710
Washington, D.C. 20009
(301) 254-2745; p-griffin@comcast.net

Roy Morris
PO Box 100212
Arlington, Virginia 22210
(202) 657 5793; Roy_Morris@alum.mit.edu

Attorneys for Appellant

April 21, 2011

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ARGUMENT…………………………………………………………...1
I. The Appellee’s Argument Cannot Be Reconciled with Any Reasonable
Interpretation of the Domestic Violence Statutes ....................................... 5
A. The DV Statute’s Text, History, Structure, and Purpose Preclude the
Premature Termination of Temporary Protective Orders .................................. 8
1. The DV Statute Does Not “Shield Extrinsic Fraud From Prompt Review” ................... 8
2. The Text of Md Code FL §4-507 of the Domestic Violence Statute Does Not Permit
Motions to Prematurely Quash TPOs ............................................................................... 10
B. Assuming. Arguendo, that TPO’s Could Be Prematurely Quashed Under
MD FL §4-507, Appellee Does Not Dispute the Facts That Show Its
Procedural Requirements Were Not Met ......................................................... 12
II. Appellee Provides No Valid Support for His Proposition That a TPO
Cannot Issue to Protect a Child and Her mother Against Abuse in
Maryland If a Custody Case Is Pending in Another State Where No Party
Was Living. ................................................................................................... 14
III. The Appellee Misapplies Many Legal Concepts and Facts, Often
Misrepresenting Them ................................................................................. 16
IV. There Was No Urgent Need to Rush to Quash the TPO; Duty Judge
Craven Did Not Find the Mother to Be A Threat to the Child ................ 19
V. Clear Mistake, Fraud and Irregularity Justified the Vacating of Judge
Craven’s June 5, 2008 Decision to Vacate the TPO .................................. 21
Mistake ............................................................................................................. 22
Extrinsic Fraud ................................................................................................. 22
Irregularity ....................................................................................................... 23
Abuse of Discretion ......................................................................................... 24
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………….25

i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Autobahn Motors v. Baltimore, 321 Md. 558, 583, A.2d 731 (1989) .................... 22
Billingsley v. Lawson, 43 Md. APP 713, 406 A.2d 946 (1979) ............................. 22
Coburn v. Coburn, 674 A.2d 951 (1996) ............................................................... 25
Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Md. App. 54, 940 A.2d 1109 (2008) ................................ 8
Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 775 A.2d 1249 (2001) .......... 8
Maryland Lumber v. Savoy, 286 Md. 98, 405 A.2d 741 (1979). ........................... 23
Mutual Benefit Society of Baltimore, Inc. v. Haywood, 257 Md. 538, 263 A.2d
868 (1970) ........................................................................................................... 23
Phillips v. Venker, 557 A.2d 1338 (1989) .............................................................. 13
Tandra S. v. Tyrone W, 336 Md. 303, 648 A.2d 439 (1994) ................................. 22
Torboli v. Torboli, 365 Md. 52, 775 A.2d 1207 (2001) ............................. 11, 13, 22
Weitz v. MacKenzie, 273 Md. 628, 331 A.2d 291 (1975) ..................................... 23
Yopp v. Hodges, 598 S.E.2d 760, 43 Va.App. 427 (2004) .................................... 16

STATUTES
MD Code FL § 9.5-201 .......................................................................................... 19
MD Code FL §4-501, et seq ......................................................................... 1, 10, 12
MD Code FL §4-501(p) .......................................................................................... 11
MD Code FL §4-505 ................................................................................................ 8
MD Code FL § 4-506(a), (b)(1) ................................................................................ 8
MD Code FL §4-507 .................................................................................. 11, 12, 22
MD Code FL §4-507(a)(1) ......................................................................... 10, 11, 12
MD Code FL §4-508.1 ....................................................................................... 4, 17
MD Code FL §9.5-101(h) ....................................................................................... 19
MD Code FL §9.5-109 ........................................................................................... 20
MD Code FL §9.5-305 ........................................................................................... 17
MD Code Human Services §1-201, 1-202 ............................................................ 24

OTHER AUTHORITIES
2002 Md. Laws Ch. 235 ......................................................................................... 12

RULES
MD Rule §2-535 ............................................................................................... 21, 23
MD Rule §8-131 ....................................................................................................... 1
MD Rule §8-501(k) .................................................................................................. 1
MD Rule §16-102 ................................................................................................... 22
ii
  

iii
 ARGUMENT

The critical question of this case -- for which Appellant’s Petition for writ of certi-

orari was granted -- is whether a TPO may be prematurely quashed at an unscheduled, ex

parte hearing before a duty judge (other than the original TPO judge) during the “most

vulnerable time” between the TPO hearing and the court-scheduled Final Protective

Order Hearing (“FPO Hearing”).1,2

This case presents the rare opportunity to affirm Maryland’s Domestic Violation

Statute’s protections (DV Statutes, MD Code FL §4-501, et seq.), and assure that those

statutes carry out the role and function for which they were primarily intended, namely to

protect domestic violence victims from further abuse by their alleged abusers. As urged

by Amici,3 the Court should tread carefully so as not to upset the delicate balance of

Maryland’s DV Statutes, particularly given that victims seeking TPO relief are typically

                                                                                                               
1  Appellant notes that Appellee’s Brief raised novel issues that were not certified for

certiorari – MD Crt of Appeals Rule §8-131. Compare, Appellant Petition for Certiorari
at 5-6, Appellant Br. at 7, and Appellee Br. at 13.
2  In  this  Reply,  Appendix  References:  “E/App.-­‐“  refers  to  Appellant’s  Appendix  with  Record  

Extract  originally  filed  at  Court  of  Special  Appeals,  and  now  before  this  Court,  per  MD  Crt  of  
Appeals  Rule  §8-­‐501(k),  and  “Apx.-­‐“  Refers  to  the  Appendix  filed  by  Appellee  before  this  
Court  on  April  1,  2011.  
3
Brief Of Amici Curiae The Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment And Appeals Pro-
ject Et Al. In Support Of Appellant, March 3, 2011 (Amici Brief). Amici joining in that
brief were: Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (“DV LEAP”),
a partnership between the George Washington University Law School and a network of
participating law firms; Legal Resource Center on Violence Against Women (“Legal
Resource Center”), a Takoma Park, Maryland-based national non-profit public interest
organization that works to improve legal representation for domestic violence survivors
in interstate custody cases so that victims are not forced to choose between their children
and their safety; and Battered Women’s Justice Project – Domestic Abuse Intervention
Programs, Inc., Duluth, MN (“BWJP”), a national technical assistance center. Amici
asked this Court to overturn the decisions below. See, Amici Brief at 1-3.

1
pro se, and traumatized during the statutorily protected “most vulnerable time” between

the issuance of the TPO and the court-scheduled FPO. It is during this “most vulnerable

time” period that the parties are instructed – by the directives clearly printed on the TPO

– to obtain counsel and gather their evidence to present at the court-scheduled FPO

hearing date specified in the TPO (which is set by the Court for seven days from the TPO

issue date). Furthermore, where – as here – the TPO judge ordered an investigation into

suspected sexual and physical abuse (including medical neglect) by the Department of

Social Services (DSS), this critical time-period provides the bare minimum time neces-

sary for the investigation to be properly done and its findings properly presented at the

court-scheduled FPO Hearing.

The Appellee goes to great lengths to justify the clear irregularities, fraud, and

mistake of the unscheduled ex parte June 5, 2008 hearing before Duty Judge Craven

below. At that hearing, Duty Judge Craven engaged in an unprecedented act of prema-

turely quashing Judge Boynton’s June 2, 2008 TPO and explicitly second guessing Judge

Boynton’s judgment of the Appellant (Mother)’s testimony of June 2, 2008 – which Duty

Judge Craven never heard or read, and thus knew nothing of its content. Rather than

being able to rely solely on the trial court record below, Appellee attempts to prove that

Duty Judge Craven was correct in retrospect, by flooding this court with hundreds of

pages of documents, most of which Duty Judge Craven never saw or read.4 But, no

                                                                                                               
4
The Appellee filed hundreds of pages in an Appendix accompanying his brief but failed
to identify which pages were in the record and which were not. Appellant filed a Motion
to Strike those pages that were not part of the record, duplicative and/or irrelevant,
amounting to some two-thirds of Appellee’s total submission. See, Appellant’s Motion to

2
amount of documents from outside of the record can prove Duty Judge Craven’s only

conclusion to be sound. Judge Craven’s sole “reasoning” for vacating the TPO is clearly

erroneous, and defies logic:

"I find she knows about this, has chosen not to be here and there is reason to be-
lieve that the testimony given to Judge Boynton a few days ago is false."

- June 5, 2008 Tx at 22, E/App.-84

The undisputed fact is that Judge Craven neither heard or read pro se Appellant’s

June 2, 2008 testimony before Judge Boynton, which testimony showed an extensive

discussion between Judge Boynton and Appellant concerning the Virginia custody case

and Judge Boynton’s views on its relationship, if any, to the Maryland TPO. [See, June 2,

2008 Tx at 9-12, E/App.-27–30;and infra at pp. 13-15.] Contrary to Appellee’s claims,

Appellee Br. at 33, the June 2, 2008 testimony showed that Judge Boynton had no interest

in whether there was Virginia-licensed GAL assigned to the Virginia custody proceeding,

which had no relevance to a Maryland TPO proceeding. Appellant Br. at 29-30.5 If

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Strike Unauthorized Portions of Appellee’s Appendix, filed April 12, 2011. In response,
Appellee filed over 13 pages of new argument, three pages of undecipherable lists, and a
four page affidavit of Counsel for Appellee in a belated attempt to justify why this Court
should uphold the trial court based on documents that, for the most part, the trial court
neither saw nor heard argument on. See, Appellee’s Opposition to Appellant’s Motion to
Strike Portions of the [Appellee’s] Appendix, filed April 18, 2011. The extent to which
Appellee had to go to supplement the record on appeal further demonstrates why the TPO
should not have been prematurely quashed prior to the court-scheduled FPO hearing
where both sides could have presented evidence under the rules of evidence and with
counsel. Appellee also fails to note the pending appeal of December 2009 DC Superior
Court Order found at Apx. 233. [King v. Pfeiffer, DC Crt of Appeals, Case No. 09·FM-
1484, Oral Argument heard on October 20, 2010)]
5  Appellee Brief’s extensive argument regarding child custody jurisdiction is irrelevant as

to whether the TPO was improperly issued. Under the laws of Maryland, Judge Boynton
had the power to issue a TPO to protect persons within Maryland as he did on June 2,

3
Judge Boynton felt that a GAL was required for the Maryland TPO proceedings, he had

the option to assign a Maryland-licensed GAL to the case, but he did not. The fractured

cornerstone of Appellee’s argument -- namely alleged “fraud” by pro se Appellant– is not

supported by the record (or any other documents). Appellee Br. at 14 and 33.

Appellee advanced in its brief a “red herring” argument that there was a threat to

the child if the TPO had not been lifted. E.g. Appellee Br. at 17. However, there is

nothing in either Judge Craven’s rulings or his dicta that suggest that he perceived any

credible threat to the child that would justify the premature quashing of the TPO. More-

over, if Duty Judge Craven had found such a threat, the proper remedy would have been

to issue a removal order to place the child in the safety of the Montgomery County

DSS/CPS until the Court-scheduled FPO hearing – not to prematurely quash the TPO

issued in the good judgment of Judge Boynton. The lack of credibility of Appellee’s

claim that Appellant was somehow a threat to the child is underscored by the failure of

both Appellee and the DSS/CPS to ask Duty Judge Craven for such removal relief below,

and that Duty Judge Craven did not order the child to be removed from the Appellant. In

fact, Duty Judge Craven left the child in the legal custody of the Appellant for the rest of

the June 5, 2008 – “as normal” under the previously existing custody/visitation regime.6

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
2008 with regard to abuse and neglect of the child, and violence towards the Appellant.
Appellant Br. at 29-30. In a failed attempt to make an out-of-state custody order rele-
vant, Appellee misapplies MD Code FL §4-508.1(a) (Appellee Br. at 11) by ignoring 4-
508.1(a)(2) ("’Order for protection’ does not include a support or child custody order.”)  
6
See, February 21, 2008 Virginia “Amended” Custody Order, at Apx. 162.

4
I. The Appellee’s Argument Cannot Be Reconciled with Any Reasonable
Interpretation of the Domestic Violence Statutes

Appellee’s position is antithetical  to  the  purposes  of  the  DV  statutes  (MD  Code  FL  

§4-­‐501,   et.   seq.)   and   provides no effective procedural protections against a motion to

prematurely quash a TPO,  particularly  in  the  case  of  a  pro  se  DV  victim        

Appellee cannot dispute that TPO Judge Boynton engaged pro se Appellant (accom-

panied by her daughter) in extensive questioning after being referred for a TPO by her

Montgomery County Abused Persons Program (APP) assigned counselor [June 2, 2008

Tx. at 7-9, E/App.-25-27]. After that hearing, TPO Judge Boynton issued a TPO on June

2, 2008 that explicitly set forth that:

1) Appellee “SHALL NOT abuse, threaten to abuse, and/or harass , or “contact” “by
any means” the Appellant and her daughter;

2) “The terms of this order shall be effective until June 9, 2008.”

3) both were “eligible for relief,” and there were “reasonable grounds to believe that
Respondent committed ....Statutory abuse of a child (Physical and Sexual) (Forward
to DSS for Investigation).”

4) a “FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER HEARING SHALL BE HELD ON June 9,

2008 at 9:30 AM AT CIRCUIT COURT AT 50 MARYLAND AVENUE, Rockville,
MD 20850.”

5) “Each party should have a lawyer. If you are the petitioner and cannot get a private
lawyer, there are support agencies that may be able to help you .... , all of the Rules of
Evidence will apply to the case ....

- See, TPO, found at E/App.-6-9

In the transcript of the June 2, 2008 TPO hearing, TPO Judge Boynton specifically

instructed the Appellant as to what she should expect next. He told her that the date of

5
the next hearing would be “next Monday,” and that the case would be listed on the

Court’s docket (which is listed electronically “downstairs” on the “monitors upon the

wall” of the courthouse). See, June 2, 2008 Tx. at 32, E/App.- 50.

Without question, TPO Judge Boynton, consistent with the DV Statutes, created

clear expectations for the pro se Appellant about how the TPO process would roll out

over the week leading up to the FPO Hearing. In order for those expectations to be met

and the parties to be properly prepared for the FPO Hearing, all of the procedural protec-

tions set forth in the DV Statutes of Maryland and the words of the TPO must be fully

followed in every case by all courts. The need for these procedural protections are

particularly acute when the person seeking protection is pro se and had not yet had an

opportunity to obtain counsel – as happened below.

It has long been recognized by law-enforcement officials that:

“[T]he most vulnerable time for domestic violence victims is immediately fol-
lowing the issuance of a temporary protective order.”

- (emphasis added) Chief Deputy Popkin, Montgomery County Sheriff’s Of-

fice, Temporary Protective Orders to be Heard via Video in Montgomery
County, (Sept. 28, 2009) (E/App.-110).

It is inappropriate to cut procedural corners that weaken the protections of a TPO dur-

ing that “most vulnerable time” between the issuance of the TPO and the FPO hearing.

Indeed, there was no ambiguity in the June 2, 2008 TPO’s words (which are mostly

dictated by statute and by the standard form for compliance). There also was no ambigui-

ty in TPO Judge Boynton’s directives to pro se Appellant about how the process was to

proceed between June 2, 2008 and the June 9, 2008 FPO Hearing. Appellee ignores

6
those words and directives of TPO Judge Boynton, along with the expectations they

reasonably create per the statutory roadmap of the DV Statutes.

Contrary to the position of the Appellee, it is clearly unreasonable and inconsistent

with the DV statute to expect that a pro se domestic violence victim – who just received a

TPO – to be expected to follow any directives from the alleged abuser or his counsel.

However, that is exactly what happened in this case. The alleged abuser’s counsel

unilaterally demanded that the victim go – on at most only a few hours notice – to an

unscheduled, non-court-set hearing without her assigned lawyer from the House of Ruth

or completion of the sexual physical abuse (including medical neglect) DSS/CPS investi-

gation. The direct and indirect directives by the alleged abuser’s counsel were incon-

sistent with the words of the TPO, Judge Boynton’s directives, any response to queries to

either the Court clerk or even the chambers of the Duty Judge Craven – all of whom were

unaware of any scheduled hearing for this case for June 5, 2008 as of that morning.

These inconsistencies and the widespread lack of knowledge of any hearing were not

surprising in that there was no court-scheduled hearing for that day.7

Appellee’s conduct below demonstrates how, under Appellee’s view of the issues, an

alleged abuser and his counsel can continue to use unilateral aggressive and intimidating

tactics to further perpetuate the abuse that the TPO – which contained a “no contact”

provision – was designed to halt for the seven-day “most vulnerable time” between the

TPO and court-scheduled FPO hearing. It highlights why these procedural protections
                                                                                                               
7
Arguably, the Appellee’s counsel’s attempt to directly contact Appellant just prior to the
June 5, 2008 hearing was a violation of at least the spirit, if not the intent, of the TPO’s
“no contact” provision.

7
must be strictly adhered to.

A. The DV Statute’s Text, History, Structure, and Purpose Preclude

the Premature Termination of Temporary Protective Orders

1. The DV Statute Does Not “Shield Extrinsic Fraud From

Prompt Review”

Addressing arguments made by Amici, Appellee asserts that alleged abusers need

the ability to prematurely terminate TPOs to prevent the DV Statute from “shield[ing]

extrinsic fraud from prompt review.” Appellee Br. at 33. As a threshold matter, Duty

Judge Craven did not find “extrinsic fraud” nor did the record show any had occurred.8

Furthermore, even if extrinsic fraud did exist, Appellee ignores the General

Assembly’s built-in protection to respondents against fraud or other potential defects with

TPOs: one of the shortest TPO periods in the country. See Amici Br. at 7, 14 & App. A.

Within seven days, respondents are given an FPO hearing and “shall have an opportunity

to be heard on the question of whether the judge should issue a final protective order.”

MD Code FL § 4-506(a), (b)(1).

The short uninterrupted seven-day period – which Appellee refers to as “quiet

time” for abuse victims (Appellee Br. at 21, 32) – is part of a deliberative balance struck

by the General Assembly. See Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 135-

36 (2001); Amici Br. at 7-8, 11. The brevity of the period provides alleged abusers a
                                                                                                               
8
As Appellee’s own brief states: “Fraud is extrinsic when it actually prevents an adver-
sarial trial but is intrinsic when it is employed during the course of the hearing which
provides the forum for the truth to appear, albeit, the truth was distorted by the com-
plained of fraud." Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Md. App. 54, 73, 940 A.2d 1109, 1119 (MD
Ct. Spec. App. 2008). The court-scheduled FPO hearing provides both parties the
opportunity to fully provide the Court with their views. The TPO, by statutory design,
is ex parte, and allows for the issuance after ex parte questioning of only the party seek-
ing the TPO. MD Code FL §4-505.

8
means to quickly address any defects he/she believes exists with a TPO at the FPO

hearing, which is set by the court to be within seven days of the TPO’s issue. The limit

on premature termination of the TPO protects victims from the disruption attendant to

having to respond to motions to quash TPOs during the very period in which they are

seeking refuge from the abuse and preparing to meet their heavy burden of securing more

permanent protection through a FPO – which is outlined in the TPO itself. In short, the

General Assembly did not include procedures for prematurely quashing TPOs among the

statutory protections afforded to respondents, choosing instead one of the shortest TPO

periods in the country. Amici Br. at 7, 11.

To be sure, it may be the “rare” case where “the average batterer or abuser is . . .

going to be able to show up with proof that the TPO was obtained by fraud.” Appellee

Br. at 21. But that will not prevent abusers from bringing any number of motions to

quash based on any number of grounds as a means of attempting to regain control of

victims through intimidation, unnecessary contact, and harassment of their victims, as

was done here. See Amici Br. at 19. And Appellee’s concession that instances where

alleged abusers can offer proof of fraud will be “rare” only confirms that the

uninterrupted seven-day period provides sufficient protection to respondents. In any

case, no reasonable reading of the full transcript of June 2, 2008 TPO hearing, along with

the application for TPO, arguably supports the Appellee’s claim that there was “extrinsic

fraud.” Appellant answered all questions posed by Judge Boynton, as best as one would

expect of a pro se party who is terrified might do so in such an intimidating situation.9

                                                                                                               
9
As noted above, that Appellee saw the need to flood this court with a multihundred page
appendix filled with documents that were not before the trial court below in order to

9
 2. The Text of Md Code FL §4-507 of the Domestic Violence
Statute Does Not Permit Motions to Prematurely Quash TPOs

Appellee incorrectly asserts that because MD Code FL §4-507(a)(1) permits a

court to modify or rescind a “protective order” before the order expires, that necessarily

applies to temporary protective orders. Appellee Br. at 33-35. The General Assembly

included no general definition of “protective order” that applies to all provisions of the

DV Statute, see Md. Code FL §4-501, and thus the term “protective order” in Section 4-

507(a)(1) should be interpreted in accordance with its longstanding meaning and in a way

that makes sense given the overall purpose of a TPO.

In this regard, Appellee does not dispute that when the General Assembly enacted

MD Code FL §4-507(a)(1) in 1992, the section applied only to FPOs. At that time,

throughout the DV Statute, a “protective order” was synonymous with what is now called

a “final protective order.” See Amici Br. at 11-13. Nor does Appellee contest that the

General Assembly did not change Section 4-507(a)(1)’s application when in 2002 it

renamed what were previously called “temporary ex parte orders” as “temporary

protective orders,”10 and that other provisions of MD Code FL §4-507 that refer to

“protective orders” make sense only if applied to FPOs, not TPOs. Id. at 13. And

Appellee nowhere disputes that there are no judicial decisions applying MD Code §4-

507(a)(1) to the premature quashing of TPOs. Id. at 14.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
rationalize what occurred below; further driving home that a premature quashing of a
TPO by an ex parte unscheduled hearing is not proper.
10
Appellee incorrectly states that the term “temporary protective order” was first
used in the DV Statutes in 1992. Appellee Br. at 33. From 1992 until 2002, however, the
term “protective order” in the DV Statutes referred only to what is now called a “final
protective order,” while what is now called a “temporary protective order” was called a
“temporary ex parte order.” Amici Br. at 12-13.

10
 Citing Torboli v. Torboli, 365 Md. 52, 63, 775 A.2d 1207 (2001), however,

Appellee argues that the Court should ignore the longstanding interpretation of

“protective order” in MD Code FL §4-507 because this Court purportedly has already

found “the language of Section 4-507 to be clear and unambiguous.” Appellee Br. at 34.

But Torboli was not addressing the application of Section 4-507 to TPOs. To the

contrary, Torboli held that the statute was “clear” that a FPO could be modified only:

“by the court that issued it, during the term of the order and after notice and a
hearing before the expiration of the order.”

- (emphasis added) Torboli, 365 Md. at 63 (2001).

Indeed, Torboli was decided in 2001 when, throughout the DV Statute, a

“protective order” was synonymous with what is now called a “final protective order.”

Amici Br. at 12-13. Given that FPOs ran for typically for a year, the provision made

sense for them. Torboli also recognized that only the court that issued the “protective

order” was in a position to modify it – a requirement that was not followed below.11

It is true that a separate provision, MD Code FL §4-501(p), states that a TPO is “a

protective order issued under §4-505 of this subtitle.” But that provision does not

reference MD Code FL §4-507. And it cannot overcome the longstanding interpretation

of 4-507(a)(1) as applicable to only FPOs. Had the General Assembly intended to

expand the settled meaning of MD Code FL §4-507(a)(1) for the first time to apply to

TPOs it would have done so explicitly. At a minimum, it would not have departed from

                                                                                                               
11
In any case, the Duty Judge Craven below deviated from Torboli’s requirement that the
modification be done “by the court that issued it.” i.e, Judge Boynton’s court.

11
the long-held interpretation of 4-507(a)(1) through an oblique reference in a provision

unanchored to Section 4-507.

Indeed, in 2002, when the General Assembly renamed “temporary ex parte

orders” as “temporary protective orders,” and added to MD Code FL §4-501 definitions

of “temporary protective orders” (4-501(p)), “interim protective orders” (4-501(j)), and

“final protective orders” (4-501(h)), it declined to add a definition of the more general

“protective order” that applied to all provisions of the DV Statutes. See, 2002 Md. Laws

Ch. 235. Further, concurrent with these changes, the Legislature also added explicit

references to “temporary protective orders” throughout the DV Statutes, see Id., yet it

declined to add such a reference to Section 4-507.

The Court should thus construe MD Code FL §4-507(a)(1) – consistent with its

longstanding meaning and the text, structure, history, and purpose of the DV Statutes – as

applicable to only FPOs. Any other interpretation would have devastating consequences

to domestic-abuse victims, see Amici Br. at 16-20, which cannot have been the intent of

the General Assembly. The legislature did provide a mechanism for modifying a

TPO, it is the Court-scheduled and Court-noticed FPO – along with the necessary

procedural protections for both parties as specified by the DV Statutes.

B. Assuming. Arguendo, that TPO’s Could Be Prematurely Quashed

Under MD FL §4-507, Appellee Does Not Dispute the Facts That Show
Its Procedural Requirements Were Not Met

Assuming arguendo that the MD Code FL §4-507 applied to TPOs, the Appellee’s

argument must still fail. As noted above, Torboli held that the statute was “clear” that a

12
FPO could be modified only: “by the court that issued it, during the term of the order

and after notice and a hearing.” (emphasis added) Torboli, 365 Md. at 63 (2001).
 
  Certainly the “notice” required could be expected to be no less than the notice for

the FPO, which the statute requires to have at least the following elements:

a) a court hearing set and noticed by the Court

- Appellee does not dispute that he unilaterally called a hearing without it
being set or noticed by the court,
b) personal service by the Sheriff
- Appellee does not dispute that the notice was not personally served by a
Sheriff – necessary to avoid contact between the alleged abuser and the
DV Victim, in violation of the TPO’s “no contact” provision,
c) enough advance notice to provide adequate time to prepare and obtain counsel
(Phillips v. Venker, 557 A.2d 1338 at 1343 (1989))
- Appellee does not dispute that, at most, there was, only a limited few
hours informal notice before the unscheduled ad hoc June 5, 2008 ex parte
hearing, that Appellant was pro se, and that Appellant did not have time to
obtain an attorney, and that the area around the court was subject to severe
weather during the night/morning of the “hearing” on June 5, 2008.12
d) a hearing by “the court that issued it.”
- Appellee does not dispute that the June 5, 2008 ex parte, ad hoc hearing
was before Duty Judge Craven who had no familiarity with or access to the
June 2, 2008 testimony before Duty Judge Boynton when he issued the TPO
– thus violating the “same court” requirements of Torboli .

In sum, even if one accepts, arguendo that MD Code FL §4-507 applies to TPOs

the requirements of that provision were not satisfied below.

                                                                                                               
12
The “Opposition” that Appellee points to in his brief, Appellee Br. at 30 was NOT
personally filed or served by Appellant (see service certificate), and does not evidence
any knowledge of when any upcoming hearing was to occur, other than the court-
scheduled June 9, 2008 FPO Hearing. Thus the existence of that Opposition does not
demonstrate in any way that Appellant knew that there was to be a bona fide hearing nor
that she had notice that an evidentiary hearing was to be held on June 5, 2008, with
witnesses, nor does it evidence that she was available for any unilaterally called hearing.

13
II. Appellee Provides No Valid Support for His Proposition That a TPO
Cannot Issue to Protect a Child and Her mother Against Abuse in Maryland If
a Custody Case Is Pending in Another State Where No Party Was Living.
 
The Appellee relies upon extensive repetitive and/or outside-the-record materials

(over 170 pages of the Appellee’s 249 pages “Appendix”) in a desperate attempt to prove

Appellant “failed to disclose” to Judge Boynton when he issued the TPO on June 2, 2008,

somehow invalidating that TPO. Appellee Br. at 14. A careful reading of the transcript

of the June 2, 2008 hearing before Judge Boynton clearly shows that all questions were

answered as best a layman who is pro se could be expected to answer them, and, more

importantly, that Judge Boynton was satisfied with those answers. Appellee’s Brief

repeats his counsel’s false proffers to Duty Judge Craven that TPO Judge Boynton was

not made aware of the Virginia custody proceedings. The record shows otherwise:

Q (Judge Boynton)-- is there any pending suit to establish custody?

A (Appellant Dr. King, accompanied by her daughter) --Yes, there is.
Q And where is that?
A That's in Virginia. I live in Maryland, he lives in D.C., but I had to, I told you
that I was actually homeless with no money. He graduated, I think, June 8th from
Georgetown neurology program and then decided that, for whatever reason which
is fine, he didn't want to be with us, but we were left with no housing and no mon-
ey. And for three weeks, I lived in various parts of Montgomery County, we lived
on Lilystone Drive, which is in Bethesda, Maryland. The house went into foreclo-
sure. The people that owned it did something strange, took the money and went to
Nigeria, and the house was in foreclosure. When that happened, he moved to
Washington, D.C., in an apartment. Even at that time, I said can we please stay
with him temporarily. He told me no. I said what am I supposed to do about our
daughter. He basically said to me, “You decided to have her, you figure it out.”
Q Well, so, my question was, is there a pending lawsuit --
A Yes.
Q -- to deal with the assignment of custody and visitation and those issues regard-
ing your daughter?
A That's correct. Yes. He put it in Virginia after 29 days and right now, it is being,
I don't know what you call it, disputed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, they

14
 call it, and lack of continuing jurisdiction [through a then-pending Petition for
Writ of Mandamus to the Virginia Supreme Court]. I've lived back in Montgomery
County since October 15th.
Q All right.
A And I've lived here before that.
Q So you live in Montgomery County, he lives in D.C., why is he filing in Virgin-
ia?
A We don't know, sir. Oh, I was there, I'm sorry. I was there for 29 days, I needed
temporary emergency housing.
Q Right.
A I couldn't find any here so I found housing in Arlington, Virginia. And at the
time, before he filed, he was working with a lawyer to do a parenting agreement or
something.
Q To do what?
A A parenting agreement.
Q Okay.
A He went out to do a parenting agreement and said that he would have that, but
while I was waiting for that, I mean, literally, I mean, literally while I was waiting
for that, he filed in Virginia. I was there for 29 days.
Q Well, I guess my, I understand the whole, the history of what's happened here.
A Yes, I'm just trying to tell you everything as truthfully as I can.
Q And that's fine. But this is a particular petition that has limited use. The purpose
of this is to protect against domestic violence and child abuse which is ongoing.
A Yes, sir.
Q That's happening now.
A Yes, sir.
Q Not a year and a half --
A That's right, sir, that's right.
-- See, June 2, 2008 Tx at 9-12, E/App. – 27 – 30.

Furthermore, Judge Boynton rightly understood that a custody proceeding in an-

other state does not prevent the issuance of a TPO in Maryland for protection of those

within Maryland’s borders. Appellee cites no case law to support his illogical view that a

custody proceeding in another state requires that a DV victim in Maryland travel to that

state outside of Maryland in order to obtain TPO protection in Maryland. Given that a

custody proceeding in another state could not pre-empt a TPO from being issued to

domestic violence victims who are located – including living or attending school – within

15
Maryland’s borders, it follows that each excruciating detail of an out-of-state custody

proceeding would not be relevant to the issuance of a Maryland TPO. If one of the

parties believes that some key element of such an out-of-state custody case is relevant,

they may raise it at the court-scheduled FPO Hearing, where competent counsel can

argue with supporting facts on both sides of that issue. However, Appellee identifies

nothing relevant and material that Appellant omitted from her testimony that could have

prevented the issuance of a valid TPO by Judge Boynton on June 2, 2008.

Appellee goes so far as to argue that a Virginia-licensed Guardian Ad Litem

(GAL) – who has a limited role of representing the “best interests” in a Virginia custody

proceeding – is essential to a TPO proceeding in Maryland for the mother and her child.

Appellee’s Brief at 33. In fact, the Virginia courts have ruled that GALs are not “neces-

sary or indispensible” parties to Virginia custody cases to which they are assigned.

Yopp v. Hodges, 598 S.E.2d 760, 43 Va.App. 427 (Va. App. 2004). In addition, if Judge

Boynton felt that a GAL was needed in the Maryland TPO proceeding, Judge Boynton

had the power to assign a Maryland-licensed GAL to the child – but he did not.

III. The Appellee Misapplies Many Legal Concepts and Facts, Often
Misrepresenting Them
 
Appellee’s Brief presents very inaccurate and misleading treatment of legal con-

cepts and facts before this court. For example, Appellee self-servingly mischaracterizes

the February 21, 2008 Virginia custody order, which specifies visitation and custody for

both parents, as providing “limiting access” to only the Appellant. See, Appellee’s Brief

16
at footnote 1.13 To the contrary, the February 2008 custody order divided the child’s time

between both parties – with the mother having most weekends, along with Wednesdays

and Thursdays of each week, while the father had the remaining time. See, February 21,

2008 Custody/Visitation Order, Virginia JDR Court, found at Apx. 162.

Appellee further promotes a novel theory that the June 6, 2008 custody order –

which is clearly labeled “Custody Order” – is somehow to be treated as an out-of-state

“protective order.” See, June 6, 2008 Virginia “Final” Custody Order, found at E/App.-

87; also, Appellee’s Brief at 11. Appellee cites MD Code FL §4-508.1(a)(1), but ignores

section MD Code FL §4-508.1(a)(2) – which specifically excludes “custody orders” from

being recognized as “protective orders.” (MD Code FL §4-408.1(a)(2) "Order for pro-

tection" does not include a support or child custody order”). Thus, despite Appellee’s

attempts to convince this court otherwise, the out-of-state Virginia custody orders are not

subject to the automatic recognition of a “protective order” but must be shown to meet

the standards of UCCJEA-registration to be enforced in Maryland. E.g., MD Code FL

§9.5-305 (Out-of-state custody determination – Registration).

                                                                                                               
13
That footnote also incorrectly suggests that the Appellant had lost her appeal of that
Virginia custody case on substantive grounds. However, as noted in Appellant’s Br. at 4,
and 21-22, Appellant was arrested in New York for having taken her child to New York’s
Montefiore Hospital, based on false charges of non-parental kidnapping instigated by
Appellee and his counsel (as revealed in the extensive discovery produced by the state in
that case). Appellant was confined to Rikers prison in New York just long enough for
the expiration of the period for appeal of the June 6, 2008 Virginia order and Judge
Craven’s June 5, 2008 order. Being pro se in both Maryland and Virginia, and unable to
freely communicate with the outside world in Rikers, Appellant was unable to file a
timely appeal of the almost simultaneous orders. As a result, no timely appeal occurred
in Virginia; ultimately dismissed solely on procedural grounds. No appellate court has
ever reviewed the merits of the Virginia custody proceeding, nor has Appellee attempted
to UCCJEA-register the Virginia “custody order(s)” in another state due to its defects.

17
 Appellee states that it “admits” that “with permission of the court noticed the

hearing for 11:00 a.m., Thursday on June 5. 2008.” Appellee’s Br. at 17. Appellee

presents no facts to support this claim, and can point to no entry in the docket showing

such “permission” being granted, nor any other notice being issued by the court below for

a hearing on June 5, 2008. Appellee’s wording is simply legerdemain designed to leave

a false impression with this court. As noted in Appellant’s Brief, the June 5, 2008 hear-

ing was not set by the circuit court, nor docketed in advance, nor was the Montgomery

County clerk’s office or even Judge Craven’s chambers aware as late as that very morn-

ing that a hearing was to take place on June 5, 2008. See, Appellant’s Brief at 15.

Appellee also falsely claims that Appellant was “in the same building” as the

Court on the morning of June 5, 2008. Appellee’s Br. at 25. However, the testimony of

Ms. Catron, who testified at the June 5, 2008 hearing, clearly indicated otherwise. Ms.

Catron testified that she saw Appellant the morning of June 5, 2008, and Ms. Catron

further testified that she had been at the Treehouse Child Assessment Center for Mont-

gomery County. June 5, 2008 Tx. At 11, found at E/App.-73. The Montgomery County

Child Assessment Center is located at 7300 Calhoun Place, Rockville, MD

(http://treehousemd.org/contact-us), which is 2.3 miles from the Montgomery County

Circuit Court house at 50 Courthouse Square, Rockville, MD. (www.googlemaps.com).

Obviously, Appellant was not “in the same building.”

Finally, although not relevant to the merits of Appellant’s case here, Appellee

extensively misuses the UCCJEA term “home state,” without regard to its statutory

meaning – claiming Virginia to have been the child’s “home state.” Appellee’s Br. at 18.

18
Appellee’s confuses “home state” with “custody jurisdiction.” In order for any state to

have been the child’s home state, the child had to live in that state for six months. MD

Code FL §9.5-101(h). Appellee does not cite any case that specifically found Virginia to

be the child’s “home state,” including the March 14, 2008 opinion of Maryland Circuit

Court Judge Algeo. 14 This is not surprising because at no time did the child live in

Virginia for the required minimum of six months required by the UCCJEA “home state”

definition. On the other hand, Maryland had met the criteria for being the child’s “home

state,” as the child had lived there most recently lived for that long. “Home state” is only

one of four possible bases for a state to take custody jurisdiction. MD Code FL § 9.5-201

(When court has jurisdiction). Just because Virginia may have asserted child custody

jurisdiction does not mean that Virginia was found to be the child’s “home state.”

IV. There Was No Urgent Need to Rush to Quash the TPO; Duty Judge
Craven Did Not Find the Mother to Be A Threat to the Child
 
The pressing question that Appellee fails to answer is “Why couldn’t Duty Judge

Craven simply defer the Appellee’s Motion to Quash to the court-scheduled and properly

noticed FPO hearing two business days later?” Appellee gives two flawed reasons.

First, Appellee argues that there was a previously scheduled hearing in the custody

proceeding in Virginia on an unrelated matter for June 6, 2008, and this somehow re-

quired the quashing of the Maryland TPO for protections of both the mother and the
                                                                                                               
14
Judge Algeo’s ruling at his hearing on March 14, 2008 specifically stated that he was
dismissing Appellant’s divorce and custody case in Maryland because Virginia had,
asserted child custody jurisdiction, and he said he did not want to have “dueling
jurisdictions on issues of divorce and custody.” King v Pfeiffer, Case No. 56890, March
14, 2008 Transcript at 14.

19
child. This argument holds no water because Appellee fails to explain how this Mary-

land TPO issued to protect both a child and her mother in Maryland necessarily interfered

with any alleged hearing in a custody proceeding in Virginia – assuming one had been

properly scheduled and noticed. As noted above, Judge Boynton was fully aware that

there was an ongoing proceeding in Virginia for custody. See, June 2, 2008 Tx at 9-12,

E/App. – 27 – 30. Appropriately, Judge Boynton did not see any conflicts with his entry

of a TPO for both the mother and the child and the Virginia custody proceeding. If there

were concerns of conflict, the proper action under the UCCJEA was a conference with

the Virginia Court to assure proper uninterrupted protections and investigation for Judge

Boynton’s concerns for sexual and physical abuse by the father involving a child in

Maryland. (MD Code FL §9.5-109) The unilateral lifting of a TPO in Maryland is not –

by any measure – the proper remedy. The unilateral lifting of the TPO in Maryland

created a vacuum offering no protections to address the concerns of TPO Judge Boynton

– namely abuse by the Appellee, Mr. Pfeiffer. Duty Judge Craven gave no explanation

of why he could not have left the TPO in place until the court-scheduled, and properly-

noticed, June 9, 2008 FPO hearing.

The second flawed reason Appellee gives for the need to have the TPO quashed

before the FPO hearing on June 9, 2008 is the Appellee’s baseless contention child was

“in danger.” Appellee Br. at 8 and 17-19. If Duty Judge Craven believed the child was

in danger by being left with the mother (Appellant), then the proper emergency remedy

was to issue an immediate removal order for the child – not to quash the TPO. Neither

the father, his attorney, nor even the CPS asked the Duty Judge Craven to issue such an

20
immediate removal order. Because the Virginia custody order filled any vacuum created

by the quashing of the TPO on June 5, 2008, Duty Judge Craven’s actions left the child

with her mother (Appellant) for the remainder of that Thursday, June 5, 2008 (and, under

the pre-existing temporary custody order of Virginia, Apx. 162, also for the following

weekend starting that Friday after school). Thus, the lifting of the TPO did nothing to

“protect the child” from any alleged concerns that the Appellee had with regard to Appel-

lant. Duty Judge Craven expressed no alarm or concern for the safety of the child in

being with her mother (Appellant). The “safety of the child” does not justify Duty Judge

Craven’s rush to quash the TPO.

V. Clear Mistake, Fraud and Irregularity Justified the Vacating of Judge

Craven’s June 5, 2008 Decision to Vacate the TPO

Duty Judge Craven’s entire “reasoning” for vacating the TPO is clearly erroneous:

"I find she knows about this, has chosen not to be here and there is reason to be-
lieve that the testimony given to Judge Boynton a few days ago is false."

- June 5, 2008 Tx at 22, E/App.-84

Duty Judge Craven ignored the defects in the hearing’s notice, inconsistencies of

the holding of the June 5, 2008 hearing with the TPO’s instructions that indicated the

only other hearing was to be June 9, 2008, had not referred the case back to TPO Judge

Boynton to determine what he had actually heard at the June 2, 2008 TPO hearing (which

turns out not to have been false), had not read the TPO hearing transcript but expressed

an opinion based on clearly false proffers from Appellee’s counsel regarding the June 2,

2008 hearing, and did not, as a Duty Judge, have the authority to dispose of such matters.

21
MD Crt. Rule §16-102 (Duties of the Chambers Judge); see also Torboli.

The three bases for vacating Duty Judge Craven’s June 5, 2008 decision vacating

the June 2, 2008 TPO are: “mistake,” “fraud,” and “irregularity.” MD Rule §2-535

Mistake
 
As Appellee notes (Appellee Br. at 31), “mistake” occurs when a Judge does

something for which it does not have the power. Autobahn Motors v. Baltimore, 321 Md.

558 at 562, 583 A.2d 731 at 733 (Md. App. 1989); Tandra S. v. Tyrone W, 336 Md. 303,

317, 648 A.2d 439, 445 (Md. App. 1994). As noted above, under MD Crt. Rule §16-102

(Duties of the Chambers Judge) and Torboli, Duty Judge Craven did not have the power

to prematurely quash the TPO issued by Judge Boynton. In addition, even under MD

Code FL §4-507, there was mistake by holding a hearing with inadequate notice and

without a court-set hearing before the same Court.

Extrinsic Fraud
 
Fraud is extrinsic when "it actually prevents an adversarial trial..." Manigan v.

Burson, 862 A.2d 1037, 160 Md. App. 114, 120-121 (Md.Sp.App. 2004) (quoting

Billingsley v. Lawson, 43 Md. APP 713, 719, 406 A.2d 946, 951 (Md. Ct App. 1979).

Appellee never explains how pro se Appellant was to obtain counsel on such short notice

due to Appellee’s failure to provide proper and adequate notice to his June 5, 2008 ad

hoc, ex parte hearing, nor how she was supposed to have adequate time to prepare any

meaningful defense to the unannounced testimony of unnoticed witnesses. Appellee’s

counsel never fully explains why he proffered false claims about the June 2, 2008 TPO

22
testimony, causing Duty Judge Craven to grant his motion based on those false represen-

tations. Appellee’s rush to have a flawed hearing assured no opportunity to obtain, and

read and/or hear a transcript of what was actually stated at the hearing before Judge

Boynton on June 2, 2008, denying the Court an alternative to his false proffers. His rush

also assured that the CPS/DSS investigation for abuse and neglect would not be complet-

ed, including an interview of Appellee that was scheduled for the afternoon of June 5,

2008 – which, because of the rushed hearing, was prevented from taking place. Of

course, in the totality, Appellee prevented Appellant from her fair adversarial FPO

Hearing, with counsel, as provided for by the DV Statute.

Irregularity
This Court has defined “irregularity” in Weitz v. MacKenzie, 273 Md. 628, 630-31,

331 A.2d 291 (1975) as follows:

Under our cases, an irregularity which will permit a court to exercise revisory
powers over an enrolled judgment has been consistently defined as the doing or
not doing of that, in the conduct of a suit at law, which, conformable to the prac-
tice of the court, ought or ought not be done [citations omitted.]

It has been held that the types of irregularities contemplated by MD Rule §2-535

are: the dismissal of a case without giving notice as required by the Maryland Rules,

Mutual Benefit Society of Baltimore, Inc. v. Haywood, 257 Md. 538, 263 A.2d 868

(1970), and the failure of a clerk to send the required notice upon the entry of a default

judgment, Maryland Lumber v. Savoy, 286 Md. 98, 405 A.2d 741 (1979).

Such irregularities existed below. Appellee Brief does not dispute that Duty Judge

Craven quashed a properly issued TPO based solely on his claim that testimony of June

23
2, 2008 was “false” even though he had neither heard nor read its contents. Appellee

Brief also does not dispute that Duty Judge Craven did not provide any notice for the

hearing of June 5, 2008. Appellee Brief does not dispute that Duty Judge Craven’s

hearing on Appellee’s Motion to Quash the TPO issued by TPO Judge Boynton was not

provided for by the TPO. Appellee Brief does not demonstrate how the Virginia custody

proceeding had any true bearing on whether a TPO could be validly issue for Appellant,

as well as for her daughter in Maryland. Appellee Brief does not credibly dispute that

Duty  Judge  Craven  allowed  unauthorized  testimony  by  Ms.  Catron  and  Ms.  Hoffman  

of  CPS/DSS  about  an  ongoing  child  abuse  investigation  in  open  court  before  a  public  

audience,   in   violation   the   law.       Contrary   to  Appellee  Br.  at  26,   disclosures   in   a   public  

open   court   do   not,   constitute   disclosure   to   “authorized   persons”   under   MD   Code  

Human  Services    §1-­‐201,  1-­‐202,  without  subpoena  or  court  order.  

Abuse of Discretion
 
On  June  5,  2008,  Duty  Judge  Craven  did  not  know  the  contents  of  nor  had  he  

heard   Appellant’s   June   2,   2008   testimony   to   TPO   Judge   Boynton.       Judge   Craven  

abused   his   discretion   when   he   held   the   June   5,   2008   hearing   and   ruled   to   vacate  

TPO   Judge   Boynton’s   decision   based   the   alleged   truthfulness   of   the   June   2,   2008  

testimony  that  Duty  Judge  Craven  had  not  reviewed  or  heard.        Duty  Judge  Craven  

further  abused  his  discretion  by  later  failing  to  vacate  his  June  5,  2008  decision  in  

light  of  the  obvious  mistake,  fraud,  and  irregularity.    Duty  Judge  Craven’s  decisions  

were  “violative  of  fact  and  logic.”  

24
 CONCLUSION
Despite Appellee’s attempts to remove focus from it, the primary cert issue re-

mains whether a TPO issued to protect a pro se Appellant (mother) and her then five year

old daughter, along with the abuse investigation initiated by that TPO, can be premature-

ly quashed at an ad hoc, unscheduled, inadequately noticed, ex parte hearing held before

a Duty Judge during the “most vulnerable time” between the issuance of the TPO and the

only court-scheduled Full Protective Order Hearing (FPO) that was noticed in that TPO.

If allowed to stand, the case below opens up the proverbial Pandora’s box. The

case below invites alleged abusers to rush into court and appear before a duty judge who

is unfamiliar with the facts of the case –including the testimony underlying the original

grant of the TPO – seeking to vacate a TPO along with its protections and any investiga-

tion of the abuse that is at the core of the TPO’s issuance.

For the reasons set forth in the Amici Brief, and Appellant’s Brief and this Reply,

the Court is respectfully requested to vacate the decision below, even if moot per Coburn

v. Coburn, 674 A.2d 951 (1996), and provide explicit guidance that a TPO may not be

quashed prior to the properly scheduled FPO hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul G. Griffin
1875 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Ste. 710
Washington, D.C. 20009
(301) 254-2745, p-griffin@comcast.net

Roy Morris
PO Box 100212
Arlington, Virginia 22210
(202) 657 5793, Roy_Morris@alum.mit.edu
Counsel for Petitioner-Appellant Font: Times New Roman, 13 pt,

25
  

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 21nd day of April, 2011, I caused to be sent two copies
of the forgoing Brief, by first class mail, postage prepaid, to: Sean O'Connell, 4113
Lee Highway, Arlington, VA 22207, and Cameron W. Arnold, ARNOLD & POR-
TER LLP, 399 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022.

__________________
Roy Morris