Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Between August 1941 and June 1942, the development that led to the destniction of
the European Jews entered an intermediate stage, before the industrialized murder
of Polish and Western European Jews accelerated in the death camps of Belzec,
Treblinka, and Auschwitz.1 Although the decision-making process still is not clear,
many facts are. In the occupied parts of the Soviet Union, the German policy of mass
murder of Jews was transformed in September and October 1941 into a policy of
complete extermination; in Lithuania the change had already occurred in August.2
During the same period the German Army began murdering the Serbian Jews; the
SS finished that job some months later. Mass murders in the Chelmno death camp
near Lodz began in December 1941, in Sobibor in March 1942, and in Belzec in May
1942.3 Hitler gave his permission to deport the German Jews east in the middle of
September 1941.
It is not clear if the German leadership actually intended to resettle the Jews as
60 Holocaust and Genocide Studies, VI1 Nl, Spring 1997, pp. 60-78
it had before4 or whether the phrase "sending the Jews to the East" had now become a
code for murdering them. In fact, some Jews deported in the Soviet Union (all who
came to Kaunas, one entire transport to Riga) were murdered in 1941, whereas the
others—brought to Riga, Minsk, Lodz, and to the Lublin district—survived for sev-
eral months, a few until 1943 and 1944.5 At the Wannsee Conference on January 20,
1942, Heydrich indicated that forced labor was only a temporary placement for some
European Jews; all were to be murdered in the end.6 The early history of the death
camps therefore can provide clues about the origins of the plan to murder not "only"
the Soviet, but also other European Jews, as well as about the locations and methods
of extermination.
During recent years surprising new revelations have emerged about activities
of the SS in the Belorussian city of Mogilev. Jean-Claude Pressac has shown that in
mid-November 1941 the Topf Company of Erfurt received a commission to construct
a huge crematorium at Mogilev; the order came from Amt II of the SS Main Office
for Budget and Building. On December 30,1941, an oven with four cremation cham-
bers was delivered and assembled. Three more ovens were available by August 1942
to be delivered to Mogilev and were then "diverted" to Auschwitz. The SS Building
Administration of "Russia Center" already had paid most of the money for all of these
ovens.7 Gotz Aly argued that the SS intended to ship some of the European Jews
down the Pripet River and up the Dnieper to Mogilev and murder them there.8
Jean-Claude Pressac argued that the crematorium in Mogilev was to remove
the bodies of those German soldiers and Soviet POWs who had died of typhoid fever,
but the epidemic in the rear area of Army Group Center, where Mogilev was located,
was not as serious as Pressac maintained, as far as the German army was concerned.
Out of 300-400,000 soldiers in December 1941, 252 soldiers and officers fell sick
with typhoid fever, 150 more in January, 161 in February, and 27 in the first half of
March 1942, most of them guards of POW camps. During the same period, there
were 4,907, 4,270, 3,776, and 648 cases amongst Soviet POWs, and roughly as many
among Soviet civilians from that area.9 The immense mortality of POWs in the Soviet
territories under German occupation in the winter of 1941/42 was mainly caused by
hunger and cold, only in relatively few cases by typhoid fever.10 Einsatzgruppe A re-
ported from the Belorussian city of Minsk that the situation concerning typhoid fever
was "not to be considered as alarming."11 The SS told companies producing gas vans
that the vans were meant for victims of typhoid fever, but it would have been illogical
to transport the corpses of the people who had died of this disease from a dozen large
camps to one central point in the rear area of Army Group Center.12 The death rate
among Soviets in POW camp Dulag 185 in Mogilev in December 1941 was noticably
lower than in other camps: 50 per day.13 But the estimated capacity of the cremato-
rium the SS had ordered was more than 3,000 corpses a day.14 Moreover, the com-
mander of the POW camp, Major Wittmer, had a very bad relationship with the SS:
for them he was an unlikely partner.15
In the Reichstag I predicted to the Jews that they would disappear from Europe, if the
war would not be prevented (nicht vermieden bleibt). This race of criminals is guilty of
the two million dead of the World War, and for other hundreds of thousands now. No-
body should say to me: we can not send them into the mud! . . . It is good that the fact
that we exterminate Jewry inspires horror in other nations.42
This was far from Hitler's only remark of that sort in those months. But the reference
to the "mud" ("Morast"), usually interpreted as a metaphor, is striking.^Swamps were
almost a synonym for Belorussia to German leaders then. That term may indicate that
Himmler had informed his Fiihrer about plans to deport Jews to Minsk and Mogilev.
Ill
Mogilev is linked to another aspect of German extermination policy. In September
1941 a notorious killing experiment with exhaust gasses took place there under the
command of the head of Einsatzgruppe B, Arthur Nebe. Contrary to the (Western)
IV
Gotz Aly has argued that the German authorities pursued at times a project to deport
a portion of European Jewry by ship to the "reception camps in the East"55 because
the occupied Soviet territories' railways were overburdened.56 Aly also suggested that
the Jews were to be brought to Mogilev on the rivers Pripet and Dnieper; he could
not prove it, but reached the conclusion deductively. Richard Breitman has also con-
V
Any plans to transport Jews to the East by water never even came close to realization.
In the autumn of 1941 time was too short, then the rivers froze over, and before they
thawed out in 1942, transportation and economic authorities had already abandoned
the projects to extend the Dnieper-Bug Canal. The SS apparently did not give up the
idea of an extensive extermination camp in Mogilev until 1942, when the crematoria
intended for Mogilev were delivered to Auschwitz.81 Transportation of Jews across
the Black Sea and upstream to Kiev or Mogilev was practically impossible before
April 1943, but by then the German retreat from the Ukraine was already under way.
It seems that a gas chamber in Mogilev never existed,82 probably because the
deportation plans failed. Instead, three gas vans were at times located in the city, as
in February 1942. This is proven by a newly found report of the Einsatzgruppe B.83
Deportations of Jews by railway failed because the army prohibited them, whereas
transports to Minsk had to be stopped about November 20, 1941, because of the
grave supply crisis of Army Group Center—immediately after the SS had ordered
the crematory for Mogilev.84 The SS and police could not act without the cooperation
of other authorities, but for those officials the war effort had priority. Despite two
testimonies to the contrary, no train with German or Polish Jews ever seems to have
arrived in Mogilev.85 Whether the SS could have carried out major construction in
this half-destroyed city remains unknown. But considering the construction of the
Waffen-SS and police Supply Command in nearby Bobruisk, it should not have been
impossible. In 1942 at least two transports with about 1,500 Jewish workers from
Warsaw arrived in Bobruisk (only 91 were alive one year later).86
Mogilev's labor camp, intended for service as an extermination center, was dis-
solved in September 1943 upon the partial withdrawal of Army Group Center. Ac-
cording to eyewitnesses, the number of prisoners may have remained as high as 4,000
or fallen to 1,000. At the beginning of September there had been 500, 276 of them
Jews, according to Soviet partisans.87 The camp was under the direct supervision of
the Local SS and Police Leader K. and guarded by police units from Waldenburg,
Darmstadt, and Berlin. Prisoners lived in terrible conditions in this overcrowded
camp; according to eyewitnesses, several transports must have arrived. Otherwise it
would have soon become empty. Every Thursday inmates were taken away in a van
to be murdered, and sometimes people were simply shot in a corner of the camp.88
Some transports of unknown origin arrived, and repeatedly mass executions and gas-
sings took place. At once up to 4,000 people were said to be killed.89 Perhaps trans-
ports of Jews arrived from Gomel, Briansk, and Orel.90 For example, on 26 May 1942,
400 Jewish workers from Slonim in the Generalkommissariat of White Ruthenia
Acknowledgments
This article derives from a study of German occupation policy in Belorussia financed
in part by the Hamburger Institut fur Sozialforschung. I also want to thank prosecut-
ing attorney Tonnies (Ludwigsburg) and Mrs. GroBmann (Institut fur Zeitgeschichte
in Munich).
Notes
1. See Dieter Pohl, NS-Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien: Die Organisierung eines staatlichen
Massenverbrechens (Ph.D. diss., Miinchen, 1994), pp. 201-203.
2. Cf. Peter Longerich, "Vom Massenmord zur "Endlosung": Die ErschieBungen von jiid-
ischen Zivilisten in den ersten Monaten des Ostfeldzuges im Kontext des nationalsozialis-
tischen Judenmords," Zwei Wege nach Moskau, ed. Bernd Wegner (Miinchen and Zurich:
Piper, 1991), pp. 251-74; Philippe Burrin, Hitler und die Juden: Die Entscheidung fur den
Volkermord (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1993), pp. 111-28. According to other scholars, the
change came during August 1941: Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsge-
fangener im "Fall Barbarossa" (Heidelberg and Karlsruhe: C.F. Miiller Juristischer Verlag,
1981), pp. 74-93; with some inaccurate conclusions Ralf Ogorreck, Die Einsatzgruppen und
4. See Gotz Aly, "Endlosung": Volkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europdischen Juden
(Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1995); and Burrin, pp. 70-105.
6. "Unter entsprechender Leitung sollen nun im Zuge der Endlosung die Juden in geeigneter
Weise im Osten zum Arbeitseinsatz kommen . . . , wobei zweifellos ein Grofiteil durch natiir-
liche Verminderung ausfallen wird. Der allfdllig verbleibende Restbestand wird, da es sich
zweifellos um den widerstandsfdhigsten Teil handelt, entsprechend behandelt werden mu's-
sen. . . . " Protocol of the Wannsee Conference (no date), Akten zur deutschen auswdrtigen
Politik, Serie E, vol. 1 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), p. 271.
7. See Jean-Claude Pressac, Die Krematorien von Auschwitz (2. impr., Munchen and Zurich:
Piper, 1995), pp. 38-41, 64-65, 75, and 120.
9. Those were precisely 1,596, 2,070, 7,351, and 2,965. See Chief Medical-Sanitary Officer of
the Commander of Rear Area of (Army Group) Center, Bericht iiber Fleckfieber, 21 March
1942, Militarisches Zwischenarchiv Potsdam (MZAP) WF-03/7366, pp. 987-88. The micro-
filmed records of MZAP are now in the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv Freiburg (BA MA).
10. See Situation reports of the Commander of Rear Area Center (Quartermaster) on Novem-
ber, December 9, 1941, MZAP WF-03/7314, p.426; and on December, January 7,1942, MZAP
WF-03/7366, p. 979. Documents of the POW camp Stalag 352 (Minsk), captured by the Red
Army, show that 6,829 out of 9,425 determinable cases of death were directly caused by hunger,
only 665 by typhoid fever. Medical opinion about destruction of Soviet POWs in Stalag 352 in
July 1944 in: Prestupleniia nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov v Belorussii, ed. S.I. Beluga et
al. (Minsk, 1965), p. 199. In the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine in February 1942, fourteen
percent of all dead POWs died of typhoid fever. German Army Commander of Ukraine, Report
No.7 (March 1942), 21 April 1942, BA MA RW 41/1.
11. Chief of Security Policy and SD, Ereignismeldung UdSSR No. 152, 7 January 1942, MZAP
SF-01/28935, pp. 3508-10.
13. See POW District J Commander, Inspection Report, 22 November 1941, MZAP WF-03/
15. See the complaints of Einsatzkommando 8 to HSSPF Russia Center, 3 November 1941
in: Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion, ed. Reinhard Riirup (Berlin: Argon, 1991), pp. 131-32;
Himmler's investigation on Wittmer, BA NS 19/3678, p. 3. But Wittmer had personal contact
with Daluege and his wife since their meeting in Bialystok in early July 1941, when a platoon
of Police Batallion 322 guarded his POW camp. Wittmer to Daluege, 14 April 1943, BA R 19/
360; Pol. Rgt. Mitte, la, to Pol. Btl. 322, 7 July 1941; Tatigkeitsbericht iiber den Einsatz der 3./
Pol. Btl. 322 of 20 July 1941, both BAP F 56754.
16. Notizen aus der Besprechung am 10.10.41 iiber die Losung von Judenfragen, Eichmann
Trial, Document No.1193 (emphazised in original).
17. See for example Gotz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenkerder Vernichtung (Hamburg: Hoff-
mann und Campe, 1991), pp. 458-59, and Aly, p. 356.
19. On this topic, which cannot be treated here, see Commander Rear Area Center, Dep.VII/
War Administration, Administration Orders No. 7 (sic), 29 September 1941, BAP F 40540, p.
774, and Sicherungsdivision 221, Besondere Anordnungen fur die Versorgung, Versorgung-
struppen, Feldkommandanturen, Orts-Kdtren., Dulags with letter of 19 September 1941,
MZAP (BArchP)F 57076, pp. 612-13.
20. See City Administration of Mogilev, Order No. 51, 25 September 1941; interrog. I.S.F.
(then mayor), 2 August 1945 (extracted translation); interrog. of Jewish survivor L.M.N. of 8
April 1970; interrog. A.W.K., 6 April 1970, all in: Der Bundesbeauftragte fur die Unterlagen
des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR (BStU) ZUV 9, vol. 11, pp. 23-25, 33-36,
125, and 143.
21. See Ereignismeldungen Nos. 108, 124, 125, and 133 of 9, 24, and 25 October and 14
November 1941, MZAP SF-01/28933, pp. 2858, 2861, 3040, and 3049, and SF-01/28934, pp.
3186-89; 9./Pol. Rgt. Mitte, Report on 1 to 15 October 1941, Bundesarchiv-Zwischenarchiv
Dahlwitz-Hoppegarten, P 812; list "ErschieBungen" of Police Bataillon 322, BA D-H P 813;
and Andrej Angrick et al., "'Da hatte man schon ein Tagebuch fiihren miissen.' Das Polizeiba-
taillon 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich der Heeresgruppe Mitte wahrend des Sommers
und Herbstes 1941," Die Normalitat des Verbrechens: Festschrift fur Wolfgang Scheffler, ed.
Helge Grabitz et al. (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1994), pp. 346-50.
22. Ereignismeldung No.125, 26 October 1941, MZAP SF-01/28933, p. 3049; "fast judenfrei"
according to No. 133, 14 November, MZAP SF-01/28934, p. 3190.
23. See interrog. of L.M.N., 8 April 1970; K.P.B. (then chief of district administration), 26 July
1944; O.M., 6 June 1945; and P.I.K., 28 January 1963 (extracted translation), BStU ZUV 9, vol.
11, pp. 102, 126ff., 152, and 156.
24. See War Diary of Security Division 286, Supply Officer, 5 October 1941, BA MA RH 26-
25. See Gerald Reitlinger, The "Final Solution" (2. impr, London, 1953), p. 222, and "Leben
eines SS-Generals," Aufbau (New York), 6 September 1946.
26. Interrog. of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 23 March 1946 (in English), Zentrale Stelle
der Landesjustizverwaltungen (ZStL) 202 AR-Z 52/59, doc. vol. 5, pp. 36-37 ("this was only a
small commission that came with some letter of authorization"). Since Bach addressed them
as "gentlemen," they might have been civilians.
27. The second factory, which SS and police had confiscated in Mogilev, the so-called Ford
plant, does not fit Bach-Zelewski's description because it stood a little outside of the city, was
severely damaged, and had no arms repair shop. See Supply Command of the Waffen-SS and
Police, Russia Center, 10 April 1942, BAP F 3341, pp. 781-82, and CStA Minsk 378-1-222.
28. By 1943, for hundreds of kilometers around Mogilev almost no Jews remained alive, and
nobody in the SS could seriously believe in deportations of people so far east any more. No
other group who should be gassed is imaginable. Bach-Zelewski avoided answering a question
to that point (ibid., p. 37).
29. See ibid, and Aufbau, 6 September 1946. It is not clear if the article is based on another
interrogation of Bach-Zelewski or reproduces the known interrogation inaccurately.
30. Programm fur die Reise des Reichsfuhrers-SS vom 23.10. bis 25.10.1941 in Das Gebiet
des Hoheren SS- und Polizeifuhrers RuBland-Mitte, Bundesarchiv (BA) NS 19/1792, p. 60.
This is the actual agenda, which departed from earlier plans (ibid., pp. 63-66). See also "Krieg-
stagebuch Kpmmandostab Reichsfiihrer-SS, 23 October 1941," Unsere Ehre heifit Treue
(Wien: Europaverlag, 1984), p. 59, and Bach's diary (copy), 27 October 1941, BA R 20/45b,
pp. 15-16.
31. See letter of R.S., 25 March 1959, and his interrog., dated 5 August 1958 (actually 1959),
ZStL 202 AR-Z 52/59, vol. 4, pp. 453 and 640 (back); interrog. F.H., 8 October 1959, vol. 6,
pp. 1154 (back)-1155.
33. Bach-Zelewski's diary, 27 October 1941 ("8 andere Herren"), BA R 20/45b, p. 15. Also,
Himmler's "Reiseprogramm" for 23 to 25 October, BA NS 19/1792, p. 61 (Querner's name had
only recently been added, but was already included in a proposal of Himmler's personal staff,
21 October, p. 66: Querner and "8 weitere Herren"); Himmler's Terminkalender, 25 October
1941, Osobyi arkhiv, Moscow, 1372-5-23, p. 389 (the leaves for October 23 and 24 are miss-
ing there).
34. See ibid., 25 October 1941, p. 389. In the evening Himmler talked to Kehrl about the case
for half an hour. On October 22 he had a phone conversation with Chef der Ordnungspolizei
Kurt Daluege about Kehrl's behavior ("Benehmen") (BA NS 19/1438).
35. The Tesch & Stabenow Company, which owned the utilization rights for Zyklon B, was
based in Hamburg. But there is no hint of any relation to an extermination camp in Mogilev,
nor grounds for corresponding conclusions.
37. See interrog. of H.G. on 26 May 1962, ZStL 202 AR-Z 152/59, vol. 2, p. 1029. Thanks to
Andrej Angrick for this reference. Angrick et al. have misinterpreted this statement in so far
as they located Himmler's trip to Mogilev on 2 and 3 October, the time of the first phase of the
liquidation of the ghetto. But the G. to whom they referred made no connection between this
mass execution and Himmler's visit. Ibid., p. 379, n. 120. It is certain that Himmler was in
Kiev on 2 and 3 October (Reiseprogramm fur 2.-5.10.1941, BA NS 19/1792, pp. 70-71). The
discussion which G. described can only have taken place at the end of October 1941 because
it was in Mogilev and Himmler was there only two more times, 9 March and 6 August 1942
(Himmler's Terminkalender, 9 March and 6 August 1942, Osobyi arkhiv, Moscow, 1372-5-23,
pp. 149 and 286). By then Montua was not present, and in March Bach-Zelewski wasn't either.
39. See Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europaischen Juden (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer,
1990), pp. 368-69; interrog. Georg Leibbrandt, 17 October 1961, Staatsanwaltschaft (StA)
Hannover 2 Js 499/61, vol. 2, p. 74; Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Dr.
Wetzel) to the Reichskommissar fur das Ostland, Lohse, 25 October 1941 (draft), Nurem-
berg Doc. NO 365.
42. Adolf Hitler, Monologe im Fuhrerhauptquartier: Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims, ed.
Werner Jochmann (Miinchen: Wilhelm Heyne, 1982), p. 106.
43. See Matthias Beer, "Die Entwicklung der Gaswagen beim Mord an den Juden," Vierteljahr-
esheftefur Zeitgeschichte 35 (1987), pp. 407-409; "Euthanasie" im NS-Staat, ed. Ernst Klee
(Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1986), pp. 112-15; Aly, pp. 342-43; Wilhelm, pp. 543-52;
Angelika Ebbinghaus and Gerd Preissler, "Die Ermordung psychisch kranker Menschen in der
Sowjetunion," Ebbinghaus et al., Aussonderung und Tod (Berlin; Rotbuch, 1985), pp. 83-90.
See interrog. Bruno Franz Mit[t]mann, 15 December 1945, ZStL II 202 AR-Z 179/67, vol. 2,
pp. 171-72. This policeman resided in Novinki near Minsk and is mistaken for the chemist Dr.
Widmann by Ebbinghaus and Preissler. Widmann was not present during the gassing experi-
ment at Novinki.
44. Interrog. Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 27 October 1947, Case 8, English minutes, p.
458, BAP F 47144; statements of Bach-Zelewski, Aufbau, 23 August 1946; interrog. Otto Brad-
fisch, 23 June 1958, StA Munich I 22 Ks 1/61, vol. 1, p. 184.
45. "Generalkommissar Kube and Reichsleiter [sic] Himmler have visited the institution and
have promised its evacuation in the near future." Stabsarzt Dr. Ellinghaus, Visitation Report,
16 September 1941, CStA Minsk 370-l-141a, p. 139; "I inform you that Generalkommissar
Kube agrees to the total liquidation of the mentally sick persons in the . . . kolkhoz Novinki."
SSPF White Ruthenia to Generalkommissar White Ruthenia (von Rumohr), 27 October 1941,
ibid, p. 129.
47. Himmler never entered this hospital (Beer, p. 408, and Aly, p. 343, are wrong). About this
episode see literature in n. 43; interrog. Otto Bradfisch, 23 June 1958, StA Munich 22 Ks 1/61,
vol. 1, p. 185; Notice on number patients in Mogilev Psychiatric Asylum 3 September 1941
(910 patients, before murder), same of 2 November 1941 (217 patients), BStU ZUV 9, vol. 4,
pp. 214 and 216; interrog. A.N.S. (head of the hospital), 20 July 1944, 4 November and 24
December 1948, ibid., pp. 219-34 and 299-306 (all German translations). According to S.,
from 8 p.m. to 9 a.m. about 500 people were gassed.
48. See interrog. Albert Widmann, 11 January 1961 (copy), ZStL 439 AR-Z 18a/60, p. 84, and
diary of Bach-Zelewski, 17 September 1941 (copy), BA R 20/45b, p.14. Widmann said Bach
could not come to the final meeting because he had been wounded during an air attack. Bach
wrote in his diary that he nearly became a victim of a Soviet air attack two times on September
17 when he flew to Smolensk. According to his "sanitized" diary he visited Nebe and Smolensk
only for a sightseeing tour and lunch, which is hard to believe. Evidently Widmann wanted
to protect Bach, whose trial as HSSPF Russia Center was still going on when Widmann was
interrogated. Indeed, Beer (p. 408, n. 37) failed to note that—or that Bach-Zelewski met with
Nebe on 17 September 1941.
50. Interrog. K.K. (former member of Einsatzkommando 8), 31 May 1945, BStU ZUV 9, vol.
19, pp. 224—25 (translated back from Russian to German).
51. Interrog. of E.F., former secretary in the KTI, 3 September 1959, ZStL 439 AR-Z 18a/60,
vol. 1, pp. 68-69; further interrog. of I.L., former secretary in the Kanzlei des Fiihrers, 15 May
1961, ibid., vol. 2, p. 428 ("I admit that with regard to the numerous telephone calls and the
busy correspondence between the Kanzlei des Fiihrers and the Reich Criminal Investigation
Office a close contact existed").
52. See Wetzel to Lohse, 25 October 1941 (draft), NO 365; Nationalsozialistische Massentot-
ungen (lurch Giftgas, ed. Eugen Kogon et al. (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1986).
53. Interrog. Albert Widmann, 27 and 28 January 1959 and 11 and 15 January 1960 (copies),
ibid., pp. 33, 36, 79-80, and 88.
54. Tour report of Major von Payr of 11 August 1941. Quoted from Aly, p. 333. For general
context of the visit to Minsk see Volker RieB, Die Anfdnge der Vernichtung "lebensunwerten"
Lebens in den Reichsgauen Danzig-Westpreufien und Wartheland 1939/40 (Frankfurt/Main:
Peter Lang Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1995), particularly pp. 273-81; and
Jochen von Lang, Der Adjutant. Karl Wolff: Der Mann zwischen Hitler und Himmler
(Munchen and Berlin: Herbig, 1985), pp. 170-73.
56. See fundamental study by Klaus A. Friedrich Schiiler, Logistik im Rufilandfeldzug: Die
Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planting, Vorbereitung und Durchfiihrung des deutschen Angriffs auf
die Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang,
1987).
57. However, Breitman reports his considerations on Riga and Minsk. Shipping people to
Minsk, which is located on the small river Svislotch, was almost impossible. See Richard Breit-
man, The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the "Final Solution" (London: Grafton, 1991),
pp. 214—15. Besides there are considerable doubts about Eichmann's statement that he actually
came to Himmler in the beginning of October, 1941, when Himmler was in Kiev. Eichmann
said Himmler s "Feldkommandostelle" was there, a newly renovated building—impossible two
weeks after Kiev's conquest. More importantly, Himmler requested, according to Eichmann,
a final report on Jewish emigration from Germany which Himmler had prohibited on the occa-
sion of Eichmann's visit (interrog. Adolf Eichmann, 1 June 1960 and 17 July 1961, The Trial of
Adolf Eichmann [Jerusalem, 1995], vol. 7 [part 6, p. 26] and vol. 5, p. 1705). But Himmler told
Heydrich by phone to close "emigration of Jews" as late as 18 October (BA NS 19/1438), and
only on 23 October 1941 did Muller announce that Himmler had prohibited Jewish emigration
(Helmut Krausnick, "Judenverfolgung,' Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. 2 [4. Impr., Miinchen:
Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1984], p. 307). The meeting between Himmler and Eichmann took
place after 1 November 1941 when Eichmann ordered a statistical survey of Jewish emigration
from the "Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland"; (Scheffler, p. 24). Officially, Eich-
mann's statistics about Jewish emigration ended with 31 October 1941 (record of the Wannsee
conference, Akten zur deutschen auswdrtigen Politik, Serie E: 1941-1945, vol. I [Gottingen,
1969], p. 269).
In his interview with Wim Sassen, Eichmann stated that this report to Himmler took
place "near Minsk or Kiev." "The Reichsfuhrer wanted an . . . almost general report,... an
entire survey of the work of the Security Police toward solution of the Jewish question, [so] I
reported the whole case to him here." BA All.Proz.6/95, pp. 20-21. For this I thank Peter
Witte. Possibly Eichmann confused this visit with a journey with Muller to Himmler at Hege-
wald, Ukraine, on 11 August 1942 (Himmler's Terminkalender, Osobyi arkhiv Moscow 1372-
5-23, p.146). Further research is needed to clarify this.
58. See Reich Ministry of Transport (RVM), Certificate of Employment, 28 October 1942,
Berlin Document Center (BDC), personal record Fritz Allihn; RVM, Eastern Branch, Inland
Shipping Department B Ost I 48/41, Binnenschiffahrt im groBen Feld des Dnjepr-Bug-
Systems, 10 September 1941 (two documents, one for the public, one for Allihn), BA MA RW
19/2186 (quotation). See also War Diary of Armaments Inspectorate of Ukraine, 16 October
1941, BA MA RW 30/91, pp. 4-5; speech of Reichsminister Todt of 30 October 1941 in the
Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories, Rolf-Dieter Muller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die
deutsche Siedlungspolitik (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1991), pp. 164ff.
59. See BDC, personal record Fritz Allihn. He was charged with bad supervision of his unit
(which trashed an SS guest house), participation in the opening of a brothel in Auxerre, France,
and a speeding offense.
60. "Only in August 1941 did I receive a letter from the Reichsfuhrer-SS as Reichskommissar
for the Strengthening of Germandom in the Occupied Eastern Territories [sic], that I was
61. "Personal B Ost," BA R 6/425, p. 51; and Lage- und Arbeitsbericht iiber die Gruppe B
Ost, 6 March 1942, ibid., p. 85.
62. RVM, Eastern Branch, Inland Shipping Dep. B Ost I 48/41 (see n. 58).
63. The Pripet River is situated in Belorussia but was given to the Reichskommissariat
Ukraine; the Reich Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories was in ultimate control.
65. In 1942 the Germans briefly held the Volga-Don Canal near Stalingrad, but never made
use of it. The document might be linked to the Baltic-White Sea Canal, also considered in
plans for deportation of Jews (Aly, p. 274), but the Germans never reached it. The same holds
for the Moscow waterways system.
66. Two other participants belonged to the Reich Security Main Office. Reich Minstry of
Transport, B Ost I/II, Aufzeichnung iiber die Sitzung am 11.September 1941, 15 September
1941, BA R 6/425, pp. 9-12. For information about Weinmann I am grateful to Michael Wildt.
67. See Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (RMO), II lc, Notice of 21 No-
vember 1941; RMOIII B Ostl/III, Minutes of the conference of 10 December 1941, 6 January
1942; and Lage- und Arbeitsbericht iiber die Gruppe III B Ost, 6 March 1942, BA R 6/425,
pp. 48, 63 (back), and 85 (back)-86.
68. See Economic Staff East, Main Department Fu/M/T.u.V, Holzschiffbau in Pinsk, 27 Janu-
ary 1942; Economic Staff East, III B Ost, to OKW/War Economy and Armaments Office, 10
January 1942 and other correspondence, all BA MA RW 19/2186.
69. See Brandt to Greifelt, 4 December 1941, BA R 49/981: "The Reichsfiihrer-SS has heard
that the plans of Reichsminister Todt for canals, streets, and railways in the East are almost
ready. The Reichsfiihrer-SS is very interested in these plans, which are very important for the
settlement of the ethnic Germans in the East."
70. On this see Willy Dahlgriin, Erfahrungsbericht iiber den Einsatz der Verwaltungspolizei
in RuBland-Mitte und WeiBruthenien, 16 June 1943, BA R 19/137, p. 125.
71. HSSPF Russia Center, Beurteilung fiir Konrad Breuer, 8 October 1943 (on duty since 1
August 1941), BDC, personal record Konrad Breuer.
72. See Der Reichsfuhrer-SS, SS-Befehl, 15 January 1942, BA D-H ZM 885, A. 10. According
to this the SS and police supplies' base in Russia Center was to be "best in Mogilev," including
accommodations for 3,000, hospitals for 2,000, and a clothing depository for 20,000 men. But
it was erected in Bobruisk.
74. See RVM, Dep. B Ost KSW, 24 July 1942, BA MA RW 19/2186; RVM, Certificate of
Employment, 28 October 1942, BDC, personal record Fritz Allihn.
75. War Diary of Economic Staff East, 27 March 1942, MZAP (BArchP) F 43385, p. 123.
77. See ibid., p. 277 (back); RMO, III B Ost, Minutes of conference of 10 December 1941, 6
January 1942; and RMO, III B Ost, Notice for Deputy Minister Meyer, 4 May 1942, BA R 6/
425, pp. 66 (back) and 95 (back). Aly (p. 345, n. 45) is wrong here; his source ("Final Report
of the Economic Staff East" in Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten sowjetischen
Gebieten 1941-1943, ed. Rolf-Dieter Miiller [Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1991], p. 233) says noth-
ing at all about ship traffic at the ruined dam.
78. See Himmler's contacts with Pohl, Daluege, Wolff, and Police Brigade General Gerloff:
records of Himmler's telephone calls, 3, 5, 7, and 10 February and 21 April 1942, BA NS 19/
1439; Terminkalender Grothmann, 7, 16, and 22 April, 5 May, and 11 and 12 September 1942,
BA NS 19/3959.1 want to thank Peter Witte for this reference.
79. Himmler's daily calendar, 1 November 1942, Osobyi arkhiv Moscow 1372-5-23, p. 57.
80. See Report of Poirier, BAP 46.04, pp. 276-77, and RVM, Certificate of Employment, 28
October 1942 ("on the whole he performed his assignments"), BDC, personal record Fritz
Mlihn.
82. There is no indication of their existence in the cases StA Miinchen I 22 Ks 1/61, BStU
ZUV 9 (both concerning Einsatzkommando 8), ZStL 202 AR-Z 52/59 (against Bach-Zelewski),
and StA Nurnberg-Furth 12 Js 300/67 (against Bach-Zelewski's staff).
83. Tatigkeits- und Lagebericht der Einsatzgruppe B fur die Zeit vom 16. bis 28. Februar, 1
March 1942, BStU ZUV 9, vol. 31, p. 159; also in Osobyi arkhiv Moscow 500-1-770, p. 8.
According to this the Einsatzgruppe received two big "gas vans" ("Gaswagen," the original
expression) on 23 February 1942; they already had two little ones.
84. Prohibition by the Commander of the Rear Area, Army Group Center v. Schenckendorff
on 12 November 1941 according to Hannes Heer, "Killing Fields: Die Wehrmacht und der
Holocaust," Mittelweg 36 3 (1994), p. 25; prohibition by Commander of Army Group Center v.
Bock on 12 November 1941, according to Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau (Stuttgart:
Deutsch Verlags-Anstalt, 1972) p. 189. See also Hans Safrian, Die Eichmann-Manner (Wien
and Zurich: Europaverlag, 1993), p. 150.
85. See letter of R.S., 25 March 1959, and his interrog., 5 August 1958 [i.e., 1959], ZStL 202
AR-Z 52/59, vol. 4, pp. 435 and 641(back)^2 with a detailed description of a supposed execu-
tion of 300 German Jews in October 1941. See further Report of M. Nicaise, Belgian Consul
General in Stockholm, based on an eyewitnesses account of August 1944, U.S. National Ar-
chives, Record Group 226, Plain Number File, Document 102832 (NND 750140). Thanks to
Richard Breitman for drawing my attention to this document. There are other hints at the
arrival of German Jews in Borisov and Bobruisk, but no proof.
86. See the trial StA Hamburg 147 Js 22/70 and several reports to that issue, BAP F 3341,
pp. 781-806.
88. See interrog. H.W., K.J. and A.P. (as in n. 87), letter and interrog. R.S. (as in n. 85).
89. See ibid.; letter and interrog. H.K., 30 May and 6 August 1959, ibid., vol. 4, pp. 634 and
637; interrog. G.M.M., 20 November and judgement against him of 20 December 1949, ZStL
202 AR-Z 184/67, doc. vol. 2, pp. 474-75 and 479-81; StA Nurnberg-Furth 12 Js 300/67, final
report, vol. 4, pp. 1893-95 and 1903-1908.
90. According to Report of Belgian Consul General in Stockholm, August 1944 (as in n. 85).
91. See StA Hamburg 147 Js 29/67, in particular reports of S.S., J.H., and N.K. (all without
date), special vol. J, pp. 12 and 71-72, and special vol. Kl, pp. 46-48; Affidavit K.E., 3 October
1947, special vol. A, p. 28; his interrog., 2 November 1961, vol. 12, p. 2203; interrog. H.V., 31
January 1962, vol. 13, p. 2425 (both survivors of the Mogilev transport); and letter of the Ger-
man witness E.F. based on a diary entry for 26 May 1942, vol. 15, pp. 2992-93; see also En-
zyklopadie des Holocaust (Berlin: Argon, 1993), p. 1321.
92. Conclusion of the Commission of Investigation of the City of Mogilev, 8 October 1944
(German translation), ZStL UdSSR, vol. 425, pp. 277-306. Partly published in: "Gott mit uns":
Der deutsche Vernichtungskrieg im Osten, ed. Ernst Klee and Willy DreBen (Frankfurt/Main:
S. Fischer, 1989), pp. 189-95. See also Report of Belgian Consul General in Stockholm, August
1944 (as in n. 85).
93. See HSSPF Russia Center and White Ruthenia, Verlegung von Dienststellen, 8 Septem-
ber 1943, MZAP SF-01/31688, p. 77; statements of Bach-Zelewski, Aufbau, 6 September 1946;
War Diary Wirtschaftskommando Mogilev, 21-30 September 1943, BA MA RW 31/850.
94. See Dieter Pohl, Von der "Judenpolitik" zum Judenmord: Der Distrikt Lublin des General-
gouvernements (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 104-106.