A New Disputed Question of St.

Thomas Aquinas on the Immortality of the Soul

A New Disputed Question of St. Thomas Aquinas
on the Immortality of the Soul

From the Latin text edited by Leonard A. Kennedy and published in

Archives d'Historie Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, Paris; 1979.
Vatican Library, Cod. lat. 781, ff. 47ra-48rb
Translated by John Thomas Mellein, O.P.
Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology
Berkeley, California

The following text is a translation of a disputed question on the immortality of the soul. Fr.
Kennedy edited the Latin text and published the edition in AHDLMA, 1979. In his helpful
introduction, he discusses the condition and relation of the 3 extant manuscripts, as well as the
authenticity of the text. He holds that it is an authentic work of Thomas. Current Thomistic
studies seem to have neglected this text; this may be in part because the authorship of the
question has not been verified. Some scholars are inclined to think it was actually written by
Thomas, and I am inclined to agree. The authenticity, however, is hard to verify, since there is no
record of the disputation in any of our sources of Thomas’ life. Further, it is difficult to
determine when Thomas would have held this disputation, especially since we already have a
disputed question on the immortality of the soul which we know to be authentic. That would
mean that Thomas disputed the same question twice. While this is not impossible, it does cast
some doubt on the authenticity of the following disputed question. In any case, the manner of
treatment, as well as the resolution, is clearly Thomistic. If Thomas did not write it, then it was
written be someone who knew Thomas’ work almost as well as Thomas himself.

[47ra] This question is on the immortality of the soul. And it seems that it is not immortal.

1. For a difference of a higher genus uniformly divisive is participated by all inferior genera.
Corruptible, however, is a difference divisive of being; for being is divided into corruptible and
incorruptible. Therefore, all corruptibles are uniformly corruptible. But stone and plant and brute
are corruptible in such a way that, once corrupted, the forms of their bodies cease to be.
Therefore, when the human being is corrupted, its form, namely the human soul, ceases to be.
Therefore, etc.

2. Moreover, it is proper to the soul to be a form essentially; for if it is in the human being per
accidens, then "human being" is not a substance but a quality. But when what is essential to a
thing is removed, that thing is not able to be. Since, therefore, when the body corrupts, the soul
ceases to be a form, it seems that, after the corruption of the body, the soul is not able to be.
Therefore, etc.

3. Moreover, the first defect of a creature is to be from nothing, and other things follow from
this, such as mutability, corruptibility, and things of this kind. But the soul is from nothing since
it is a certain creature. Therefore, etc.
4. Moreover, the soul according to its own nature is not superior to an angel.1 According to
Augustine, however, an angel receives immortality by grace, not by nature. Therefore neither is
the soul by its own nature immortal.

5. Moreover, wherever there is any composition, there is the possibility of dissolution. In the soul
there is some composition, at least from that by which it is, and what it is. Therefore, it is
dissoluble and not incorruptible.

6. If it is said that only those things are dissoluble which are composed from contraries, this is
against what Plato says in the Timaeus that the celestial 2
bodies by their own nature are
dissoluble; indissoluble, however, by the will of God; and yet the celestial bodies are not
composed from contraries. Therefore, it is not only those things which are composed from
contraries that are dissoluble.

7. Moreover, that which belongs to anything according to itself, is said of it first and more
properly than that which belongs to it through comparison to another. Immortality, however,
belongs to the human soul insofar as it is compared to another, namely, as it is ordered to
beatitude; considered in itself, however, [47rb] it seems to be corruptible, since it is from
nothing. The soul, therefore, is more properly said to be corruptible than immortal.

8. Moreover, according to faith the soul is held to be immortal, since it is able to be a participant
in eternal beatitude. But this is able to happen if, when the body is corrupted, the soul is
corrupted, because the body, although it is corrupted, is restored nevertheless through
resurrection to the glory of immortality. Therefore it seems that nothing prevents us from calling
the soul mortal.

9. Moreover, the soul is as it were a kind of light by which the body is illuminated by God. But
nothing prevents something illuminated by the sun, after it ceases to be illuminated, either
through its own corruption or in some other way, from being illuminated again by the same light.
Therefore, nothing prevents that when the body is corrupted, the soul also ceases to be; and
again, the body being restored, the same soul comes back into being.

10. But it is said that there is not a similarity between light and the soul, because the soul is a
"this something", light however is not. But on the contrary, in book II of De Anima,1
the
Philosopher divides substance in three: into matter, form, and "this something". And he shows
that the soul is neither matter nor form nor this something, but form giving being to the body.
Therefore, since light is also a form of an illuminated body, there is no difference in this respect
between the soul and light.

11. Moreover, just as the Philosopher said in book I of De Anima, if there can be no operation
2
of
the soul without the body, it is impossible for the soul to be separated from the body. But it
seems that no operation of the soul can exist without the body. This is clearly true of the
operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts of the soul. Since understanding does not occur
without a phantasm, and phantasms are not able to be without bodily instruments, the soul is not
able to be separated from the body. And thus when the body corrupts, the soul ceases to be.
Therefore, etc.

12. Moreover, if a possible thing is posited, nothing impossible follows. It is possible, however,
for the world always to have been, for many people maintained this. If, however, the world
always was, and the soul is immortal, it necessarily follows that there would be an actual infinite.
For if the world always was, then there are an infinite number of dead people, the souls of whom
remain, if the soul is immortal. But it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite. Therefore,
since it is not impossible for the world always to have been, as was said, it remains that it is
impossible for the soul to be immortal.

13. Moreover, just as the philosopher proved in the first

1
book of De Caelo et Mundo, everything
which begins to be in time, in time also ceases to be. But the human soul began to be in time;
for it did not always exist. Therefore it ceases to be. Therefore, etc.
2
14. Moreover. the Apostle says in I Tim. 6 that God alone has immortality. The human soul,
therefore, is not immortal.

15. But it is said that God communicates

3
to others the immortality which he has from himself, as
the Gloss on the same passage says. But on the contrary, when the esse of things is contrary,
their mode of existing is contrary also. But the esse of the soul is contrary to the divine esse, as
the created to the uncreated. Therefore, since the mode of the divine esse is that God is immortal,
the mode of the soul is that it is mortal.

16. Moreover, the weakness of the body impedes even the superior part of our intellect, by which
the divine is contemplated, so that it does not proceed freely into act, as is clear in the insane and
others of this kind. Death of the body, therefore, leads the soul totally into non-being.

17. Moreover. The definition4of soul in common is that it is the form of an organic physical
body, having life potentially; and thus it is necessary that this definition applies universally to
every soul. But the vegetative soul is in such a way the form of the body that when the body is
corrupted, the soul also is corrupted. Therefore also the human soul is corrupted when the body
is corrupted.

18. Moreover, it is said in Liber de Causis that every substance which is from contraries or is
supported by contraries is corruptible. The human soul, however, although it is not composed
from contraries, is nevertheless supported by 5
contraries; for it is the form of a body composed
from contraries. Therefore it is corruptible.

19. Moreover, in the human being, the sensible and rational soul is the same according to
substance. If, therefore, the rational soul were incorruptible, the sensible soul would also be
incorruptible. The soul of a horse, however, is corruptible. Since, therefore, the corruptible and1
incorruptible are not of the same genus, as the Philosopher says in book X of the Metaphysics, it
follows that the sensible soul in the human being and the horse are not of one genus. Therefore,
the human being and the horse do not come under the genus “animal”, since a thing is placed in a
genus or species through its own form. This, however, is manifestly false. The rational soul,
therefore, is not incorruptible.
2
20. Moreover, Augustine says in book X of City of God that God guides the things which he
has established in such a way as to permit them to exercise their own proper motion. But it is a
proper motion of the soul and of every creature to tend into nothing. For every creature, insofar
as it is of itself, tends into nothing. Therefore, through divine administration, the soul is not
prevented from tending into nothing. Therefore it is not immortal.

21. Moreover, since the soul is the principle of the operations of life, it is necessary that the
mode of its own substance be demonstrated from its operation. However, there is not found
among the operations of the human soul any operation of a separate substance, because there is
great difference even in the very act of understanding between the soul and a separate substance,
since an angel understands very differently from a human soul. Therefore the soul is not a
substance separable from the body; it ceases, therefore, when the body ceases.

22. Moreover, the soul receives life from God, just as the moon receives light from the sun. But
when an obstacle is placed between the moon and the sun, the moon looses its own light, as is
clear in an eclipse of the moon, which comes to be through the interposition of the earth. Since,
therefore, sin is an obstacle which is placed between the3 soul and God, according to what Isaiah
says in Ch. 59, “your sins separate you and your God”, it seems that the soul is deprived of life
through sin and so it is not immortal.

1. But on the contrary there is what the Philosopher says in book II of De Anima, that the
intellect is separated
1
from other parts of the soul as the perpetual is separated from the
corruptible.
2
2. Moreover, Cassiodorus says about the Psalm, “Truly in a dream humans pass away...”
3
that
the soul would not be the image of God if it were closed up by the limits of death. The soul,
however, by its own nature is the image of God, because it naturally has memory, understanding,
and will, according to which the image of God is considered to be in it. Therefore it is naturally
immortal.

3. Moreover, there ought to be some proportion between the knower and the known. But the
human soul knows truth which is perpetual and incorruptible. Therefore the human soul is also
incorruptible.

In connection with this question it was asked whether any creature would be able to subsist even
for a moment if it were not preserved in being by God, and whether God would be able to give to
any creature the ability to be preserved in being through the principles by which it is constituted
in being, if the operation of God be removed. And it seems that this is so because created artists,
who are of lesser power, are able to give this ability to their own artifacts, so that, when their
own operation ceases, the artifacts remain, as the house remains when the operation of the
builder ceases. Much more, therefore, does it seem that God would be able to give this ability to
his own creature.
[47va] The Solution. It ought to be said that in the order of things the soul is found midway
between corruptible and incorruptible creatures; whence the immortality of the soul is not
irrationally doubted,
4
for as it is said in book II of the Ethics, “The extremes dispute about the
middle region.” For the soul is like incorruptible substances in that it understands; and from this
it seems to be incorruptible. It is like corruptible substances in that it is the form of a corruptible
body; from which it seems that the soul itself is also corruptible.
Nevertheless, it ought to be known that for showing the immortality of the soul, even if one
proceeds through certain signs of its immortality as by certain ways, nevertheless there is one
way demonstrating its immortality, and showing propter quid that it is immortal.
Indeed Plato shows that the soul is immortal since it is self-moving. For since the living are seen
to differ from the non-living in that the living are self-moving, as are animals, while the non-
living are not moved unless moved by others, they held that the life of the living is to be moved
in this way. Whence the body, which is moved by the soul, dies when it is separated form the
soul, which moves it. Since, therefore, the soul is a first self-moving being, it cannot be separated
from its own mover, since nothing is separated from itself. Whence neither in1itself can the
motion of life cease. And from this Plato concluded that the soul is immortal. But since to move
itself, according to Plato, belongs not only to the human soul, but also to the souls of brutes,
which are moved locally by the soul, for the same reason it follows that, just as the souls of2
humans are immortal, so also are the souls of brutes. And Plato maintained this very3 thing. But
this is both repugnant to the faith, as is clear in Liber de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, and is
contrary to reason, since there appears no operation in brutes except that which is exercised
through the body. Also, the reason for this position,
4
namely that the soul is self-moving, is shown
to be false by Aristotle in book I of De Anima. Since, therefore, immortality is proper to the
human soul, it is necessary that the reasons for immortality be taken from that which is proper to
the human soul among the other souls, which is to understand.

1. For since the human soul understands necessary and perpetual things, as truth itself, and
universals, and principles, and the conclusions of sciences, it is manifestly clear that it is
incorruptible. For the object understood is the perfection of the one understanding. It is
necessary, however, that both the perfection and the perfectible be contained under one genus.
Whence if those things which are understood by the human soul are incorruptible in their mode
of being, it is necessary for the human soul to be in the genus of incorruptibles. And this is not an
instance, that the corruptible eye can see the incorruptible body of the sun or the moon. For the
eye does not know an incorruptible thing insofar as it is incorruptible, but rather according to
something which is common to both incorruptible and corruptible things, namely, light. The
human soul, on the other hand, understands incorruptible things according as they are
incorruptible, so much so that it does not even understand corruptible things except insofar as
they are incorruptible, when it understands their universals. From this it is evidently clear that the
human soul was made to be perfected by incorruptibles as by its proper perfections; which would
not be, unless the soul itself were incorruptible.

2. Likewise, since the human soul understands, it is shown that in some way it is of infinite
power, according as it understands a universal, which is virtually infinite, since an infinite
number of particulars are able to be considered under it. But an infinite power cannot be in a
corruptible substance, since the power of a substance is proportioned to it and is founded upon its
principles. Whence it remains that the substance of the intellective soul cannot be corruptible.

3. Likewise, a thing naturally desires to be and to remain in its own being. But this desire is not
found to be the same in all things. For those things which lack cognition desire existence and the
good not as if from themselves, but as having from another an inclination to a naturally desired
end. But in those things which have cognition, desire or appetite follows cognition as something
directing them. Whence it is necessary that the mode of desire is according to the mode of
cognition. Brute animals, however, which have merely sensitive cognition, does not know
existence and the good except as here and now. Whence neither is their desire directed to
existence and the good except as here and now. But the human soul understands existence and
the good absolutely. Its natural desire, therefore, is for existence and the good, not as here and
now, but as simply and for all time. Since, therefore, a natural desire cannot be in vain, it is
necessary that the human soul be immortal.

4. Likewise. The final end of the human soul seems to be to know the first cause of things; which
is clear from this that human beings experience wonder, when they see effects and are ignorant
of their causes, and the wonder itself is 1
a moving force to seeking cognition of the cause, as is
said in beginning of the Metaphysics. And so the natural desire does not rest until some effect
having a cause is found. Since therefore the final end is that in which natural desire is completely
at rest, it is manifest that the final end of the human soul
2
is in the cognition of the first cause.
Whence John says in Ch. 17, “This is life eternal, etc.” But the human 1
soul does not attain to
this end as long as it is conjoined to the body, as is proved elsewhere. It is therefore necessary
that the soul remain after the body; otherwise it would be in vain, if not being able to attain to its
proper end.
These and similar reasons are taken from certain signs of immortality.

5. But there is a reason showing propter quid that the soul is immortal, which is taken from the
mode of its substance. But the substance of the soul is not known except from its operation.
Among the operations of the soul (setting aside the operations of the vegetative soul, from which
a reason for incorruptibility is not able to be taken) the first operation and root [47vb] of the
others is cognition. For it is clear that cognition follows appetite, appetite, however, follows local
motion. Whence from the reason of cognition it is necessary to investigate what is the substance
of the soul.
It is a common conception of all that cognition comes about through a kind of similitude of the
knower to the known. The natural philosophers of antiquity, therefore, judged it necessary that
things known were in the knowing soul according to the same mode of being. But since the soul
knows all things, it seemed to follow that the soul had to be composed of all things, which
seemed absurd. So they chose this way, namely, to say that the soul is composed of the principles
of all things, in order that the soul, because it is composed
2
of the principles, might be found
similar to those things which are from the principles. And so whatever one of them thought
were the principles of things, of such principles did he think the soul to be also. For those who
maintained that fire was the principle of all things, said that the soul was fire. And similarly
those who posited air, or water, or even all four elements, and with these love and hate,
conceived a similar opinion of the soul.
This position, indeed, was not sufficient, because all things are not in common material
principles, except in potency. For this reason, the soul, if composed from principles of this kind,
would not have a similitude with all things, except in potency. But each thing is known precisely 3
because it is in act, and not because it is in potency, as is shown in book IX of the Metaphysics.
Whence such a mode of similitude does not suffice for cognition.
And, moreover, each thing is known more through its own form than through matter. But the
previously mentioned similitude was according to matter alone. Whence the form, the most
important being in reality, would remain unknown according to this position.
Again, if it were sufficient for the soul to have cognition of things that it be composed from the
principles of things, then it would not be knowing things in potency, but in act, since cognition
would come to it from the composition of its own substance. But we see that this is false. For the
soul comes to know in act from knowing in potency as much according to sense as according to
understanding. Whence it is shown that the soul is cognitive of things rather because it is in
potency to all than because it is composed in act from all.
But the soul is not found to be knowing things because it is in potency to known things in the
way that corporeal matter is in potency to forms. For corporeal matter is educed from potency to
act with change and passivity, according as one potency is cast off and another introduced. This,
however, does not happen in the soul when it is knowing in act; for nothing is cast off from it,
but only cognition of the thing is acquired, and likewise of each of the contraries, for through the
one the other is known.
Whence it remains that the knowing power is over against all corporeal power. Whence it [the
knowing power] does not follow from composition or mixture of any of them [the corporeal
powers], or from any property of any of them, but it depends on a higher principle. And granted
that no knowing power follows upon a property of any body, nevertheless there is among them
[the bodily properties] some kind of bodily knowing power, because it uses a bodily instrument
because it is the act of the bodily instrument, namely the sensitive power, because sensitive
cognition is of singulars, which are here and now. And thus reception of forms corresponding to
this kind of cognition can occur in a bodily instrument, which indeed through its sensitive power
as through its own form can know those things whose forms it receives. It is necessary from this,
however, that sensitive cognition occurs through the reception of forms without the casting off of
others, as an organ which receives the forms of sensible things of some genus, considered in its
own nature, lacks every form of that genus in order that it might be able to receive them all, as a
pupil lacks every color, and so it is with the other instruments of the senses. If, therefore, we are
in potency to knowing the natures of all sensible things through the intellect, it is necessary for
that through which intellectual cognition in us is completed to be stripped of every nature of
sensible things. But no body is of this kind. It is therefore impossible that intellective cognition
comes to be in us through any bodily organ.
Therefore, the intellect is something operating per se, that is, having an operation which goes out
from it alone, not through any bodily organ, as in sense. For vision is not an operation of sight
alone, going out from sight alone, but from the eye, which is composed of sight and the pupil.
But each thing is found to act in the way in which it is. The intellect, therefore, is something
subsisting per se, just as it is an agent per se, which is not found in bodily forms, which indeed
are not subsisting per se, but they subsist composed and they have being through their forms. But
that which is subsisting per se and incorporeal is of necessity incorruptible. For it is not able to
be corrupted per se, since it is not moved per se. For nothing is moved except a body, and
something is not corrupted per se unless it is moved, since corruption is an end of motion. And
what is subsisting is not corrupted per accidens. It remains, therefore, that that by which the
human being understands is in every way incorruptible.
But this being supposed, certain people say that that by which the human being understands and
is altogether in potency, and which is called the possible intellect, is a certain
1
separated
substance, nor is it anything of the soul which is the form of our body.
This indeed is not able to be. For it is manifest that the human being is an understanding being,
for we would not speak of the intellect unless we perceive that we understand. But it is
impossible that anything work formally by anything which is diverse from it in substance. For it
is necessary that that by which something operates is its actual form, through which it is in act,
since nothing acts unless it is in act. If, therefore, the human being is an understanding being, it is
impossible for that by which it understands formally to be a2 substance existing separately from it.
Nor does that mode of joining suffice which certain people devised, saying that the phantasms
which are in us are objects of the separated possible intellect, and through them the possible
intellect is joined to us. Since the object of any knowing power is in some thing, the thing
becomes knowable, but not the one knowing; just as the wall is not the one seeing, but the thing
seen, since color is
3
in it. If, therefore, phantasms are the objects of the intellect, as the
Philosopher says, since [48ra] the phantasms are in us, then the intellect would not be joined to
us as to knowing beings, but as to known beings; which is manifestly false. It remains, therefore,
that that by which we understand, namely the possible intellect, be something of our soul or
nature. Whence also Aristotle, beginning to treat of the possible intellect,
4
says, “Concerning the
part of the soul, however, by which the soul knows 1
and is wise. etc.” and later, “I call the
intellect that by which the soul understands.” Whence it is clear that he says that the possible
intellect is separate since it has an operation separate from the body, and not since it is a
substance separate from the human being. It remains, therefore, that if the possible intellect is
incorruptible, as has been said and shown, the human soul is in every way incorruptible.

[Replies to the Objections]

1. To the first objection, therefore, it ought to be said that what is generated and corrupted per se
is composed. A form, however, is not generated and corrupted except per accidens. But the ratio
of the thing is not changed by those things which are per accidens . Whence the ratio of the
corruptible is not changed whether the form be corrupted per accidens or is in every way
incorruptible. And nevertheless it ought to be known that being, and those things which pertain
to being, are not univocally but analogically predicated of things; and therefore in things of this
kind it is not necessary to seek altogether the same ratio.

2. To the second it ought to be said that the soul through its own essence is the form of the
human being. But when the body corrupts, the form, even if it does not remain as forming in act,
remains nevertheless a form as having formative power. For the corruption of the human being is
only from the defect of the body, which becomes indisposed to receiving its being from the soul.

3. To the third it ought to be said that to be from nothing is not the cause of other defects as that
from which they necessarily follow, but since the creature is from nothing, it is liable to other
defects, and each one according to the mode of its own genus and species. Since the creature is
from nothing and is said to return into nothing if left to itself, there is not any power designated
in the creature but in the creator, by whose power the creature is brought into being and
preserved in being; and under whose power it lies, to withdraw his own operation by which he
preserves the thing in being, since he does this voluntarily. Something, however, is not called
corruptible or changeable, except on account of a power which is in itself. Whence, since there is
in the soul no power for corruption, it cannot be called corruptible for the foregoing reason.

4. To the fourth it ought to be said that, according to Augustine, in any change there is some
death and corruption, since something is cast off, just as, when something is changed from white
to black, the white is corrupted. And thus true immortality is true immutability, 1 which no
creature has except through grace. For an angel and souls, which according to substance are
incorruptibles from their own nature, are changeable according to choice. And, if they are fixed
unchangeably in the good, this is only through the gift of grace.

5. To the fifth it ought to be said that the composition which is in the soul cannot be a reason for
its corruptibility. For it is not composed of matter and form, but of that by which it is and from
what it is, or from esse and what it is, which is the same thing, for esse itself is that by which
each thing is. This kind of composition is found necessarily in everything other than God, in
whom alone his substance is the same as his esse. In immaterial but created substances, however,
esse is other than the substance of the thing. But a substance subsisting in esse is its own form. In
material substances, however, there is composition of matter and form; esse, however, following
per se upon the form. Whence a material substance does not lose esse unless the matter is
separated from the form, and this kind of separation cannot be understood in a substance which
is form alone, for nothing is able to be separated from itself. Whence it is impossible for a
substance which is form alone to be corruptible.

6. To the sixth it ought to be said that where there is no contrariety, there can be no corruption.
For since there is no corruption except through the separation of form from matter, as was said
(there cannot be something separating form from matter unless it be something inducing a form;
for nothing acts intending something not to be, but intending something to be and to be good).
Thus it remains that corruption does not come to be unless, by the inducing of one form, another
is driven out, which would not come to be if there were no contrariety between the forms, for
those things which lack contrariety do not drive each other out. And thus only composition
which is from contraries is a cause of corruptibility. The reason presented in opposition,
however, proceeded from contrary opinions. For Plato, who said that the heavenly bodies were
corruptible according to their own nature, maintained that they were composed from contraries; 2
but Aristotle, who maintains that they are not composed1
from contraries, shows from this that
they are incorruptible according to their own nature.

7. To the seventh it ought to be said that, in those things which are for the sake of an end, it is
necessary that the mode of its substance be in accord with what fits its end, just as a saw has
sharp iron teeth in order that it might cut, and not the converse. Whence, since the intellective
soul was made for beatitude, it is necessary that it be such in its own nature that it can obtain
beatitude. This, however, is to be incorruptible. It is not true, therefore, that it is corruptible
according to its own nature and incorruptible through its relation to beatitude.
8. To the eighth it ought to be said that in the final reformation of the world, nothing achieves
incorruption which does not have some order to incorruption, on account of which in that state,
in which every corruption ceases, neither animals nor plants nor minerals will remain. But the
elements
2
will remain because they are incorruptible as a whole, even if they are corrupted in
part. Whence on account of this the human being will be able to obtain incorruptibility, because
some part of it is incorruptible by nature, namely the soul. If, however, the soul were corruptible,
there would not remain in the human body some order to attaining incorruption.

9. To the ninth it ought to be said that [48rb] if there is an intermission of illumination, the light
which is second and which was first was do not seem to be the same light in number, just as
neither in other forms is it the same health in number which is recovered after convalescence and
which was had before the illness, since the motion which ends at each of the two is not the same
in number, and the same reasoning applies to the numbering of motion and the termination of
motion. If, nevertheless, it is granted that the light is same in number, the same reasoning does
not apply to light and the intellective
3
soul, since light is not something subsisting as is the
intellective soul, as it is shown.

10. To the tenth it ought to be said that if by “this something” is understood a complete
individual in some species, the soul is not a “this something,” since it is not perfect, according to
those maintaining that the nature of the human species is not the soul only, but something
composed from soul and body. Otherwise, however, it would be according to the opinion of
Plato, who maintained1
that the human being is a soul using a body, and not something composed
from soul and body. If, however, by “this something” is understood anything subsisting, then
nothing prohibits the intellective soul from being called a “this something.”

11. To the eleventh it ought to be said that a cognitive power needs the body in two ways: in one
way as an instrument, as sight needs the pupil; in another way it needs the body as an object
representing an object, as sight2 needs a stone or a mirror. In the first way the intellect does not
need the body, as was shown, and from this it is held that it is an agent per se, and subsisting,
and incorruptible. In the second way it needs the body, for phantasms which are objects of the
intellect are in corporeal organs, and this is not opposed to the incorruption of the soul.

12. To the twelfth it ought to be said that those maintaining the eternity of the world and the
incorruptibility of the soul escape this objection in three ways, certain people saying that what is
perpetual and incorruptible of the things
3
pertaining to the soul, is only one for all humans,
namely the possible or agent intellect. And certain people, maintaining a multitude of
incorruptible souls with the eternity of the world, lest they be forced to maintain an actual
infinite, maintained revolutions of souls so that souls, which were first set loose from4 bodies,
after some time again returned to bodies.5And this was the position of the Platonists. Others,
however, such as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it is not unbefitting to maintain an actual
infinite, not per se but per accidens. For there is said to be an infinite per se in those things of
which there is a multitude according to some order of one thing dependent on another (just as
when the hand moves the stick, and the stick moves the stone). This cannot proceed into infinity,
neither upwards nor downwards, for 6
it is necessary that something be dependent from infinity,
and its production is never begun. There is said to be an infinite per accidens, however, in those
things whose multitude does not have an order of one to another, just as one worker works by
many hammers in such a way that when one hammer is broken another is substituted. For it does
not matter how the work is done, whether through a finite or infinite [number of hammers] if he
continues for an infinite time, since one hammer does not depend on another. And so they say
that since one soul1 does not depend on another, there is nothing to prevent one from maintaining
many souls in act. The Catholic faith, however, which does not maintain an eternal world, is
freed from these difficulties.

13. To the2 thirteenth it ought to be said that the Philosopher proves in the first book of De Caelo
et Mundo that what is incorruptible is also unbegotten, for what is incorruptible has the power to
be for an infinite time, and thus its time is not able to be limited by its principles so that it was
not before. From this we are given to understand that it is not on account of a defect of its own
power that that which is incorruptible should be from a certain time and not before. Whence it
happens that souls, which are incorruptible, should not always have been, because they have not
always received the power by which they were. This power having been received, however, they
always are; nor is a power of this kind in them diminished through a long duration of time.

14. To the fourteenth it ought to be said that the immortality which belongs to God alone is
altogether immutability, which indeed belongs to God from himself; to others, however, by
divine gift.

15. To the fifteenth it ought to be said that a effect is not contrary to its cause; whence the esse of
the creature is not contrary to the divine esse. For the opposition of created and uncreated is not
according to contrariety, but according to affirmation and negation.

16. To the sixteenth it ought to be said that weakness of the body impedes the operation of the
intellect per accidens, insofar as the inferior powers by which the intellect acquires are impeded;
namely imagination, cogitation, and memory. But when the body is totally corrupted, the soul
then acquires the mode of being by which the separate substances exist. And they attain to the
same mode of understanding [as the separate substances], namely to understand through an
influx of a superior intellect, that is, the divine, a sign of which is that even while it is in the
body, when it is alienated from the senses, it perceives something more abundantly from the
influence of a superior intellect, so that it is able to see the future.
1
17. To the seventeenth it ought to be said that, just as was said above, form is not corruptible
except per accidens. Whence since the vegetative soul is corruptible, and yet the rational soul is
not, it does not follow that each is called a form equivocally. Neither is it necessary that they be
in every way univocal, for form and act and things of this kind are among these things which are
predicated analogically of diverse things.

18. To the eighteenth it ought to be said that form as supported by contraries is understood to be
something which needs a body composed of contraries for the substantiation of its own esse.
Whence through this it is shown that human soul is incorruptible, because it is neither composed
from contraries, and thus it is not corruptible per se; nor is it supported by contraries, and thus it
is not corruptible per accidens.
19. To the nineteenth it ought to be said that forms and any parts are not in the species or in the
genus directly, but through reduction, as principles. Whence the human soul and equine soul are
neither of one species or genus, nor of diverse species or genera, but “man” and “horse” are in
one genus. If, however, the human soul were reckoned in a genus by itself, it would be in another
genus from that in which the soul of a horse would be.

20. To the twentieth it ought to be said that God does not so permit creatures to exercise proper
motions that his own operation is excluded: otherwise he would not rule them. Moreover, by his
operation things are preserved in being, and therefore on account of this things do not tend to
non-being. Nor is it to be said that to tend into non-being is a proper motion of a creature, since
every motion of a creature is toward being and toward the good. But by a kind of metaphorical
speech it can be said that a creature of itself tends into non-being because, if it were abandoned
by God, it would cease to be.

21. To the twenty-first it ought to be said that the soul has some act according to the genus of a
separate substance, namely to understand, although it does not understand according to the same
mode. And thus it is shown that it is separable, but not in the same way as that in which the
separable substances are.

22. To the twenty-second it ought to be said that sin is an obstacle between the soul and God
impeding the influence of grace, but not impeding the influence of natural being.

To the questions proposed at the end, it is finally to be said that since an effect is taken away
when its cause is removed, it is necessary that when the divine operation is removed, the being of
things which is caused by it is taken away. For the operation of God is not only the cause by
which things are made, as the builder is the cause of the house, but it is the cause that things are.
And because God cannot give to any creature the ability not to be his effect, he is not able to give
it the ability to be preserved in being without his operation. Explicit.
1 Elsewhere Aquinas attributes this to St. John Damascene, as in Aquinas' Quaestio Disputata de
Anima, a. 14, obj. 3. It is found in Damascene's De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 3, in J.-P. Migne,
Patrologiae...series graeca (Paris, 1857-1866), vol. 94, col. 868; tr. Burgundio, ed. E. M.
Buytaert, 1955, p. 69. Note: all footnotes in this text are reproduced from Kennedy’s text unless
otherwise indicated.
2 Plato, Timaeus, 41ab; cf. tr. Calcidius, ed. J. H. Waszink, 1962, p.35.
1 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 1, 412a6-21.
2 Aristotle, De Anima, I, 1, 403a10-11.
1 Aristotle, De Caelo et Mundo, I, 12.
2 I Tim 6:16.
3 Glossa Ordinaria (Paris, 7 vol., 1590) at I Tim 6:16 (vol. VI, col. 725).
4 Aristotle, De Anima, II, 1, 412a29-30.
5 Liber de Causis, prop. 27.
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, X, 10, 1058b26-29.
2 Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VII, c. 30.
3 Is 59:2.
1 Aristotle, De Anima,II, 2; 413b 24-25.
2 Ps 38:7.
3 Cf. Cassiodorus, In Ps. XXXVIII,ed. M. Adriaen, C. C. Ser. lat. 97, 1958, p. 357-358; but
probably Cassiodorus, De Anima, cap. 4; ed. J. W. Halporn, C. C. Ser. lat. 96, 1973, p. 542, or
PL (Paris, 1844-1882) vol. 70, col. 1285D.
4 Aristotle, Ethics, II, 7; 1107b32.
1 Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, II, 13, 10; ed. I. Willis, Leipzig, 1963, II, 134.
2 Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, 2, in the translation by Burgundio of Pisa; ed. G. Verbeke and
J.R. Moncho, Leyden, 1975, p. 45, line 92, to p.46, line 15.
3 Gennadius, Liber de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, cap. 16-17, in P.L., 58, col. 984-985.
4 Aristotle, De Anima, I, 3; 405b31-407b25.
1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 2; 982b11-22.
2 Jn 17:3.
1 For example, De Veritate, X, 11; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 47.
2 Aristotle, De Anima, I, 5; 409b23-410a12.
3 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX, 9; 1051a29-30.
1 Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros, III, 5 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1953), lines 556-563.
2 Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros, III, 5 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1953), lines 513-520.
3 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 7; 431a14-16.
4 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4; 429a10.
1 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4; 429a23-24.
1 For example, St. Augustine, Sermon 212.
2 Plato, Timaeus, 41AB, cf. Timaeus a Calcidio translatus; ed. J.H. Waszink, 1962, 35.
1 Aristotle, De Caelo, I, 3; 270a13-23.
2 Aquinas, Quaestio Disputata de Potentia,V, 9, esp. ad. 9.
3 Objection 10.
1 Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, 1, ed. cit., p. 5, lines 25-32; 3, p. 51, line 32, to 52, line 1.
2 In the solution.
3 Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libros, III, 20 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1953) lines 213-219.
4 Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, 2, in the translation by Burgundio of Pisa; ed. cit., p. 45, line
92, to p. 46, line 15. Also St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, X, 30.
5 Avincenna, Metaphysica, tract. VIII, cap.I (1508; repr. Frankfurt, 1961) 97 B. Algazel,
Metaphysics, Part I, tract. i, div. 6; ed. J. T. Muckle, Toronto, 1933, 40-41.
6 Lit. “its generation is never completed.” Trans.
1 Algazel, ibid. I have not been able to find this teaching in any of Avicenna's works available to
Aquinas. (Kennedy)
2 Aristotle, De Caelo et Mundo, I, 12; 283b7-22.
1 Response to the first objection.
1