[Unofficial Copy]

REPORT
of the

Disciplined Forces Commission

May 2004

[Unofficial Copy]

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 Introduction
Commission

1. Pursuant to powers under article 197 A(5) of the

Constitution, the National Assembly, on the 16th May
2003, passed Resolution No.21 of 2003 for the
constitution and appointment of a Disciplined Forces
Commission. In accordance with the terms of that
Resolution, the President appointed persons nominated
by himself and the Leader of the Opposition as
members of the Disciplined Forces Commission (The
Commission).

2. Mr. Ian Neville Chang SC, Justice of Appeal, was

appointed Chairman; and Mr. Charles Rishiram Ramson
SC, Mr. Mohabir Anil Nandlall, Brigadier (ret) David
Arthur Granger MSS, and Ms. Maggie Beirne were
appointed members. The Chairman and members were
sworn in on the 30th June, 2003 save Ms. Maggie Beirne
who was sworn in on the 16th July, 2003.

3. On the 1st December, 2003, Ms. Beirne resigned from

the Commission after the submission of the Interim
Report on the Guyana Police Force to the National
Assembly. On the 14th January, 2004, Professor Harold
Alexander Lutchman was appointed and sworn in as a
member in her place. Thereafter, the membership of
the Commission remained unchanged.

4. The Commission was ably supported by a four –

member team comprising Ms. Bertlyn G. Reynolds,
Legal Counsel; Mr. Gino Peter Persaud, Secretary; and
Mr. Trevor King, Registrar. Apart from the youthful
office assistant, Mr. Jerome Bobb, it had no clerical and
support personnel.

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Mandate

5. The Commission had a broad mandate “to examine any

matter relating to the Public Welfare, Public Safety,
Public Order, Defence or Security including the
Structure and Composition of the Disciplined Forces,
and make recommendations generally with a view to
promoting their greater efficiency, and giving effect to
the need in the public interest that the composition of
the Disciplined Forces take account of the ethnic
constituents of the population.”

6. In accordance with its Terms of Reference, the

Commission was required to submit to the National
Assembly an Interim Report on the Guyana Police Force
within 3 months of the commencement of the inquiry
and a Final Report on all the Disciplined Forces within 6
months. Due to circumstances beyond the
Commission’s control, however, these deadlines could
not be met and approval was sought from, and granted
by, the National Assembly for the respective reports to
be presented on the 1st December, 2003 and 4th May,
2004. The Interim Report submitted on the Guyana
Police Force is now superseded by this Final Report.

Rules of Procedure

7. It was agreed among the members of the Commission

that the rules which appear at Appendix C would be
followed in conducting the inquiry. In brief, the rules
prescribed that,

a) Public advertisement would be made throughout

the country for individuals, institutions and
groups to submit statements and documents to
Counsel for the Commission who would advise the
Commission on what was considered relevant.

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 b) Witnesses would be summoned to be examined
by Counsel for the Commission and by members
of the Commission.

c) The Disciplined Forces were to be afforded the

opportunity of being represented by Counsel of
their choice throughout the inquiry. Cross-
examination of witnesses would not be as of right
but within the discretion of the Commission.

d) Visits would be paid by the Commission to

selected locations of the four Disciplined Forces to
enable the Commission to examine the
environment and conditions in which the Forces
were required to function. In this context the
Commission condemns the unexplained refusal of
the GDF to permit its visit though unannounced at
its Lethem location.

Forces

8. The Commission was required to inquire into the

Guyana Police Force (GPF), the Guyana Defence
Force(GDF), the Guyana Prison Service (GPS) and
the Guyana Fire Service (GFS) and all their
branches, departments and units, focusing on
identifying their shortcomings and making
recommendations for remedial measures, sustained
professional development and structural reform
(where necessary).

9. The Commission was acutely aware that the Disciplined

Forces constitute a large percentage of the State’s
employees and attract a significant portion of
budgetary allocations. The implementation of some
of its recommendations, therefore, is likely to be
prioritised in terms of relatively scarce budgetary
resources and competitive claims thereto.

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10. However, the Commission was also conscious of the
fact that the Forces play a vital role in ensuring the
well-being of the State and ensuring and maintaining
political stability in a democratic constitutional
framework and in promoting social safety and
security which cannot be measured with an economic
yardstick.

Analysis

11. The Disciplined Forces are all of statutory creation

and their functions, duties and responsibilities are
necessarily governed by public law. Any analysis of
the composition, function and operations of the
Disciplined Forces could hardly be done without
looking through a public law lens and the applicability
of public law considerably informed the Commission’s
methodology and deliberations.

12. The Commission was also cognisant of the absence of

substantial revision of the relevant Acts and
Regulations over the past thirty years. While the
Commission would have been happy to be able to
confine its analysis to the existing legislative
framework which applies to the Forces without
seeking to influence future parliamentary action, such
a limited approach to its task did not commend itself
to it.

13. The advent of transnational dangers to national

security and public safety posed by narco-trafficking,
weapons-smuggling, money laundering, illegal
migration and terrorism, compelled examination
whether the existing statutory framework needed
changes to enable the Forces to meet the challenges
posed by such baneful phenomena. The Commission,
nevertheless, in deference to the competence of
Parliament to debate and discuss issues of legislative

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changes, attempted as far as possible to limit its
recommendation on legislative changes to the
necessary minimum.

6
 Executive Summary

General Overview
In accordance with its Terms of Reference, the Disciplined
Forces Commission considered a limited range of issues
pertaining to the Guyana Police Force (GPF); Guyana Defence
Force (GDF); Guyana Fire Service (GFS); and Guyana Prison
Service (GPS). The methodology employed by the Commission
involved: the examination of 163 written memoranda from the
public; oral examination of 97 witnesses, and visits to 8 selected
installations of the four Forces. Lists of witnesses examined and
installations visited are at Appendices E and F, respectively.

The Commission was satisfied that, in general, the various

Forces sought to meet their testimonial obligations and received
adequate responses from interested individuals and
organisations. The Commission did not, however, have the
benefit of comprehensive presentations of the strategic plans for
the respective Forces.

The Commission was of the view that some of the matters

which were brought to its attention could have been
satisfactorily dealt with by the Ministries responsible for the
respective Forces/Services. It is an urgent necessity, therefore,
for these Ministries to draft ‘strategic plans’ for all four Forces,
possibly within the current calendar year. Such plans could form
the bases for the rational development; the guidance of the
heads (i.e., Chief of Staff, Commissioner, Director and Chief Fire
Officer, respectively); the establishment of mechanisms to
identify problems and to rectify faults; and the information of the
general public.

Statutory Framework
In spite of the existence of certain “Joint Service”
mechanisms, the Commission wishes to emphasise that each
Force is independent of the other and functions in a unique
manner. The Commission therefore paid very close attention to
the statutory framework defined by the Defence Act, Police Act,
Firearms Act, Coroners Act, Fire Service Act and Prison Act.

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 As far as possible, the Commission refrained from
recommending statutory changes but there are deserving cases
for introducing, modifying and modernising regulations in
accordance with changes within the environment and in the
Forces over recent decades. It should be a normal requirement,
say on a decennial basis, to revise regulations for the better
management of the forces.

Work Programme
The Commission started its work in August 2003 and
ended in April 2004. In the course of its work, Ms. Maggie Beirne
resigned on the 1st December, 2003 and Professor Harold A.
Lutchman was appointed to the Commission on the 14th January,
2004.

Despite its commitment to complete the Inquiry as

contemplated by its instrument the Commission was obliged to
seek minimal extensions of the deadlines for the submission of
the Interim Report and the Final Report to the National Assembly
owing to the unusually large number of witnesses and visits to
several locations, infrastructural dislocations and inadequate
support staff, among others.

Hearings were principally held at the Law Library, Supreme

Court compound, Georgetown.

Recommendations
The Commission makes the following recommendations:

Guyana Police Force

Functions and Operations:

(1) A preventative policing policy should be revived and
effectuated.
(2) The investigative capabilities of the GPF should be
strengthened.

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(3) Non-entry, in addition to non-exit, of illicit drugs should
be made a focus of preventative policing.
(4) A sound national criminal intelligence system should be
established and maintained.
(5) GPF members should be encouraged to identify potential
informants and gain their trust.
(6) Ill-considered transfers of Force members, so as not to
disrupt well-established information networks, should be
avoided.
(7) The name and place within the Force structure of that
special squad known as the ‘Black Clothes’ squad should
be clarified for public information.
(8) Strict control; careful selection; training; re-training;
discipline; special rotation of membership and the
requirement that those who are not working on under-
cover duties wear clearly identifiable uniform, should be
enforced for members of special squads.
(9) The means to conduct DNA testing should be acquired.
(10) The recruitment of scientific experts from society at large
to serve the GPF scientific laboratory, and who would not
be inhibited by the requirement to carry GPF rank,
should be pursued.
(11) More personnel should be trained in handwriting,
fingerprinting, ballistics and related fields and they
should be deployed in the divisions so as to reduce the
need for all such investigations to come to CID HQ.
(12) The control and command structure of the GPF, as it
pertains to file transmission, should be relaxed so as to
obviate the need for extensive minutes and to expedite
receipt of legal advice from the DPP.
(13) The means for greater use of legal expertise within the
GPF should be established and the secondment of Force
members, who are Attorneys to the DPP’s Chambers, for
about two years to acquire professional experience
should be considered.
(14) A consistent level of ‘service and protection’ to the public
on a 24 hours basis should be provided. If necessary, the
shift system, especially at rural and hinterland stations,
should be restructured appropriately.

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 (15) Civilians should be contracted to perform functions that
do not require police training as follows:
(a) Examination of vehicles for road fitness
certificates
(b) Processing of passport applications
(c) Typing and secretarial work

The serving of summonses and similar or related duties in rural

areas should be done by Rural Constables.

(16) The use of common excuses (such as “there’s no

transportation”) to cover-up neglect of duty should be
eliminated.
(17) GPF members should be trained to remain unmoved and
dispassionate especially in the face of provocation.

Structure:
(18) Some elements of the training and disciplinary activity
that may be perceived as ‘military’ should be
maintained.
(19) More sub-divisions and police stations should be
established and police presence increased, especially in
new housing areas such as Sophia and high-crime-risk
areas such as Lethem, after careful analysis of the risk of
criminal activity.
(20) Divisional commanders should be empowered to act for,
and on behalf of, the Commissioner in their Divisions.
(21) The numerical strength of the GPF should be augmented.
(22) Rural Constables should be paid and they should be
issued precepts, as provided by statute.
(23) The burden of training private security personnel should
be removed from the GPF.
(24) Members of the Special Constabulary should be relieved
of guard duties and be allowed to function as true GPF
reserves.
(25) Part XIV of the Police Act should be repealed.

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 Recruitment and Training:
(26) Career attractiveness should be enhanced by e.g.,
review of salary structure and substantial increases in
remuneration.
(27) The probationary period should be used to dispense with
personnel with undesirable character traits before they
become entrenched in the Force.
(28) Urgent consideration should be given to the examination
of the three cadet schemes to determine whether any
changes are necessary, and what should be done to
place the selection and training of cadets on a regular
basis. A revitalised cadet scheme could be canvassed
among successful secondary school and university
graduates.
(29) Efforts should be made to remove the misperception that
the GPF is the preserve of any one ethnic group and to
promote instead the concept of a unitary national Force.
(30) Recruits should be offered a confidential avenue to air
their grievances.
(31) The minimum educational criterion for recruitment
should be raised from a sound primary education to at
least a sound secondary education.
(32) All GPF members should be made aware of the limits of
their statutory powers.
(33) GPF members should be trained to appreciate the value
of being community-friendly, so as not to alienate the
public.
(34) GPF members should also be trained in courtesy and
politeness.
(35) Investigators should be trained to fully and
comprehensively investigate criminal allegations.
(36) Proper instruction classes about constitutional
safeguards relevant to police functions such as powers of
arrest and granting of bail should be conducted.
(37) A Police Academy should be established (with at least
one intake of cadets every year) due to the need to
produce well-educated officers who are skilled in police
duties.

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 Ethnic Balance:
(38) It should be an aim to achieve a Force representative of
the ethnic diversity of the nation without employing a
quota system, which would be constitutionally offensive.
(39) A forensic audit should be carried out of current trends
of recruitment and the results and subsequent reviews
should be placed in the public domain.
(40) Ethnically diverse recruitment and promotion panels
should be employed as openly and extensively as
possible.
(41) A policy, distinct from that for recruitment, should be
employed to provide inducements, such as better
conditions of work, for all ethnic groups to remain in the
GPF.
(42) Inter-racial teamwork should be fostered to engender
inter-racial cohesiveness.
(43) The rules and practices of the GPF should be adapted to
cater for the needs of an ethnically-diverse workforce,
especially as regards religious beliefs, meals and racial
equality.
(44) The membership of the GPF should be augmented,
especially as regards Indo-Guyanese, without
introducing conscription.
(45) Effective disciplinary measures must be introduced to
counter any racial or sexual harassment. Additionally, a
commitment should be secured from senior ranks for a
change of attitude in dealing with lower ranks.

Community Policing:
(46) The membership of these groups and other interested
members of the communities should be carefully
screened for induction into the Rural Constabulary and a
proper system of training and instruction relevant to
community policing and other rural constabulary duties
should be implemented for those selected and appointed.
Those who are not fit to be inducted into the Rural
Constabulary should be encouraged to act merely as the

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 `eyes and ears’ and not the `coercive arm’ of their
communities.
(47) There is need to legitimise the practice of community
policing within some legislative framework, so as to
ensure that community-policing functions are
institutionalised, strictly supervised and monitored.
(48) The criteria for the grant of firearm licences should not
hinge on membership of a community policing group.
(49) The Officers-in-Charge of police stations should maintain
records of licensed firearm holders and their firearms,
whenever they allow them to be used on community-
policing duty.

Extra-Judicial Killings:
(50) During training, emphasis must be placed on the fact
that the use of minimum necessary force is always to be
preferred, even in confrontations with armed and
dangerous criminals.
(51) Appropriate instruction and training should be given to
policemen about the circumstances under which they
may resort to the use of the firearm.
(52) Permission to carry firearms should be restricted to GPF
members who clearly demonstrate a high degree of
responsibility. On occasion, where it is necessary to
equip junior ranks with firearms for frontline duties and
the responsibility element is doubtful in such ranks, they
should be under the control of a mature, responsible and
experienced supervising rank.
(53) In anticipation of the abolition of the felony-murder rule,
immediate steps should be taken to re-orient the
attitude of the GPF regarding the use of deadly force.

Accountability to Civilian Authorities:

(54) On account of the DPP’s constitutional powers, the GPF
should be mindful of its conventional obligation to give
effect to advice from the DPP; only in rare cases should
a different course be taken.

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 (55) Parliament should establish a Commission on Public
Safety to which the Minister of Home Affairs would be
answerable.
(56) Matters of priority for such a Commission could include
the police annual report and the collection and
dissemination of crime statistics.

Complaints against Police:

(57) Training and instruction should be provided for GPF
members to create awareness of their responsibilities
under the Police Complaints Authority Act.
(58) The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) should be
provided with an investigative team consisting of trained
police investigators who are directly responsible and
accountable to the Authority.
(59) All investigators functioning in such a capacity should be
seconded and transferred to the PCA for the purpose of
transparency.
(60) Staffing of the PCA should be completed in accordance
with its legislation utilising retired police officers and
others with requisite skills and competence.
(61) The independence of the PCA should be maintained by
providing more administrative and financial resources.

Firearm Licences:
(62) Regulatory amendments to the Firearms Act should be
introduced in order to bolster supervisory control over
divisional commanders who grant firearm licences, in
keeping with the general objective of GPF Standing
Order 91/64.
(63) The Commissioner of Police should continue to have
strict supervision and control over divisional
commanders with regard to the granting of firearm
licences.
(64) The GPF should adhere strictly to the statutory criteria
for the grants of firearm licences.
(65) No attempt should be made to correct previous
indiscriminate grants of firearm licences by a general
recall and re-issue of existing licences.

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 (66) The Minister of Home Affairs should utilise his statutory
powers to make standard and uniform regulations with
regard to firearm licensing so as to guard against
allegations of political interference.

The Coroners Act:

(67) The definition of “coroner” in section 2 of the Act should
be amended to make every magistrate of each
Magisterial District a coroner for such District.
(68) Section 17 of the Act should be amended to allow a
magistrate of another Magisterial District to hold either
an inquest or inquiry where the magistrate of any
Magisterial District is unable to do so.
(69) A coroner’s office should be administratively established
to hold inquests or inquiries where the magistrate or
magistrates of any Magisterial District is unable to do so.
It should be staffed with magistrates with national
jurisdiction and fall under the administrative
superintendence of the Chief Magistrate.
(70) Coroners should be provided with investigative resources
to reduce their dependence on Police investigations to
enable them to conduct independent investigations
expediently rather than to continue to rely solely on
Police investigations.
(71) There should be a holistic review of the Coroners Act to
achieve its high ideals and remedy its current
deficiencies and application.

Guyana Defence Force

Functions and Operations:

The Coast Guard

(72) Adequate increase in manpower should be achieved, if
possible, within the present calendar year (2004); and
the Defence Board should seriously review the support
given to the Coast Guard.

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(73) Adequate funds should be granted to permit the
financing of regular, long-range maritime patrols.
(74) Adequate inshore patrol vessels should be acquired to
enable the suppression of illegal fishing, narcotics
trafficking, gun-running, illegal migration and contraband
smuggling. There should be a presence in the Corentyne
area, in particular, to suppress smuggling.
(75) Adequate aerial and radar surveillance resources should
be acquired.

Reserve Force
(76) There should be an increase in the stipend for reservists
to attend periodic training.
(77) There should be a schedule of incentives to attract
reservists with academic qualifications and skills.
(78) Regulations should be promulgated to protect the jobs of
reservists when they are called out on duty or training.
(79) The Drill Halls [training centres] in Regions 3, 7, 8 and 9,
should be reactivated and those in other regions should
be improved.
(80) There should be a special budget to help it to perform
effectively.
(81) The Guyana Defence Board should create a separate
establishment and organisation structure, similar to that
of the regular Force, showing the strengths and detailed
descriptions of the various units.

Air Corps
(82) The aerial surveillance capacity of the GDF should be
greatly improved through recapitalisation efforts. Such
efforts should include the completion of repairs to its
helicopter (which is the only one in Guyana) and one of
its two Skyvans which currently needs overhauling.
(83) Adequate arrangements should be made for recruitment
as well as local and overseas training of pilots and
engineers, and retention in service of all skilled
personnel.
(84) There should be increased operational employment of
aviation resources in coastal, maritime and border

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 surveillance and the Air Corps should be assisted in a
more concrete manner to conduct routine patrols in
cooperation with the ground forces and Coast Guard,
respectively.
(85) Reconnaissance/surveillance aircraft should be acquired.
(86) Any resulting benefits to the Force from employing the
Air Corps as a revenue earning arm of the Force should
be compared with the benefits likely to accrue to the
country from the interdiction of contraband activities on
the country’s border and the detection of illegal fishing
and other violations of its maritime zone.

Joint Operations
(87) The Guyana Defence Board should give serious
consideration to the role of the Guyana Defence Force in
maintaining internal order with the Guyana Police Force
and other civilian agencies and make concrete plans for
their joint training.
(88) Members of the GDF be should be conferred with powers
of arrest and detention limited to the occasions such as
may be necessary for the express purpose of maintaining
order thereby giving effect to the wisdom and foresight
underlying the statutory imposition on the GDF of a
public duty to maintain public order.

Structure
(89) There should be improved and regular aerial patrols and
surveillance by the Air Corps.
(90) There should also be improved and regular maritime
patrols and surveillance by the Coast Guard.
(91) The strength of the reserve Force should be increased in
all regions which possess coastlines or international
borders; that is to say, all regions except the Upper
Demerara- Berbice Region.
(92) The Defence Board should adopt and treat as a priority
the GDF’s proposal of outlining a National Defence
Strategy.

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 (93) The Chief of Staff should submit draft regulations for the
consideration of the Defence Board.

Ethnic Balance:
(94) The GDF should adopt recruitment procedures which
must take into consideration cultural, sociological and
psychological imperatives, designed to attract Indo-
Guyanese in particular to the membership of the GDF.
(95) Recruitment procedures should have a particular focus
on the Indo-Guyanese community because of its general
disinclination to join the GDF; these should not be to the
neglect or exclusion of other ethnic groups.
(96) No person should be excluded from enlisting in the GDF
except on the basis of competitive merit.
(97) The GDF should conduct a public information campaign
designed to remove negative misperceptions about its
recruitment policy with particular focus on Indo-
Guyanese communities.
(98) The public information campaign should highlight the
inclusionary ethnic recruitment and retention policy of
the GDF in terms of:
a) the need for greater Indo-Guyanese
representation in the interest of achieving
greater ethnic balance;
b) the benefits of military training to individuals,
communities and the nation at large;
c) the non-exclusionary measures such as the
provision of a bill of fare which caters to an
ethnically diverse military population;
d) due respect and regard for diverse religious
practices; and
e) secure from all officers including senior ranks
an attitude of respect for lower ranks.

(99) A multi-ethnic recruitment panel should be formed to

exemplify an ethnically diverse GDF and to conduct
recruitment in all the regions.
(100) Recruiting officers should be sensitised to the logistical
problems which can physically impede recruitment in

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 some regions and the cultural, sociological and
psychological factors which can stand in the way of the
recruitment process, particularly in the Indo-Guyanese
community, and should be willing and able to deal with
such impediments with reasoned persuasion. Promotion
Boards or Panels should also be similarly reflective, if
possible.
(101) Without prejudice to military demands and efficiency,
members of the GDF should not be assigned duties away
from their nuclear family for unnecessarily prolonged
periods.
(102) The disciplinary codes of the GDF should specifically
proscribe racial harassment and provide for effective
disciplinary sanction.
(103) The Defence Board should consider whether the
minimum period of contractual service can be reduced to
two years without prejudicing the effectiveness of the
GDF as a whole.

Accountability to Civilian Authorities

(104) There is no need for the creation of a Ministry of Defence
and a dedicated Minister of Defence.
(105) The relationship between the Board and the Force should
be referred to the Board for serious re-examination in
light of the provisions of section 12 of the Act.
(106) There should be a bridging device between the Board
and the Force in the form of a ‘Defence Bureau’ or a
cognate grouping, as an agent of the Board under
section 12, answerable exclusively to the Board.
(107) The Force should be accountable to the National
Assembly because of its central importance to national
defence, its internal security functions, and the size of its
budgetary allocation.

Financial Accountability:
(108) Capital expenditure should not be placed under the
administrative responsibility of the GDF.
(109) The GDF should not be granted additional financial
responsibility.

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 (110) There should be a measured increase (commensurate
with increased cost) in the limits to contracts for supplies
and services to meet increased costs.
(111) A collaborative relationship between those responsible
for capital expenditure and those responsible for current
expenditure should be established.
(112) An imprest based on programme budgeting under the
control of a responsible financial officer in the Office of
the President should be considered.

Guyana Fire Service

Functions and Operations:

(113) The Minister should cause a needs assessment of the
Service to be done in light of changing social conditions
and appropriate action should be taken in order of
priority.
(114) Since the supply of water is of paramount importance to
fire-fighting efforts, the Minister should use his office to
ensure that fire hydrants are supplied with adequate
water for fire–fighting purposes.
(115) Select personnel from the rank of Leading Fireman /
Woman must be trained to function at the rank above
this, without delay.
(116) Salary increases should be made for the lowest ranks
(Leading Fireman / Woman) apart from any across- the-
board increase.
(117) The Public Service Ministry should be approached for
assistance in recruitment of clerical personnel, as a
matter of urgency.
(118) Immediate efforts should be made by the Minister to
acquire at least one fire boat for the GFS in the short
term.
(119) The issue of who bears legal responsibility for the
maintenance of the fire hydrants should be speedily
resolved, even if it requires legislative intervention.

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 (120) Additional fire stations must be established between Ogle
and Rosignol and Georgetown and Timehri, with
dispatch.
(121) Communities that benefit from the presence of fire
stations should bear part of their maintenance costs.

Structure:

(122) The Minister should amend the Schedule to the Fire

Service Act to increase the number of Divisional Officers
pari passu with the number of units.

(123) The Anna Regina Fire Station should be upgraded and

designated a unit and be placed under the “command,
direction and general management” of a Divisional
Officer.

(124) The administrative structure of the GFS should be so

fashioned that every station or location, which is not a
unit, should be made a sub-unit of a particular unit so
that devolution of central authority can occur in a
structured manner in consonance with its command
structure.

(125) The Minister should amend the Regulations to correct the

present structural anomaly whereby the rank of
Assistant Divisional Officer, which is provided for by the
Regulations, does not exist in the structure of the GFS
but there is in existence a rank of Cadet Officer for which
there is no provision in the Regulations.

(126) Both the authorised and actual strength of the clerical

and office support staff should be increased to
adequately address the needs of the GFS and the
practice of utilising fire-fighting personnel to perform
such functions should cease forthwith.

(127) The auxiliary membership of the GFS should be

increased significantly.

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 (128) There should be a comprehensive review of the
Regulations to bring them in conformity with social
changes and current economic and other realities.

Ethnic Balance:

(129) The GFS should conceive, design and promulgate such

policies and practices that make it an attractive option in
the open labour market and portray the image,
particularly to the Indo-Guyanese and other non Afro-
Guyanese, that the GFS is an organisation which caters
to ethnic diversity within its membership.

(130) The necessary measures should be implemented to

rectify the ethnic imbalance in the GFS.

(131) Measures should be designed to ensure that membership

of the GFS does not entail unnecessary hardship or
inconvenience to any ethnic group.

(132) In its quest to redress the ethnic imbalance, the GFS

must be cautious not to sacrifice training, discipline and
operational efficiency at the altar of ethnic balance or
greater ethnic diversity.

(133) Whilst the GFS must strive to enlarge its pool of human
resources for recruitment, this must be aggressively
pursued without lowering the entry qualification levels.

(134) Recruitment should at all times be based on the

principle of competitive merit.

Accountability to Civilian Authorities

(135) The promotion policy must be regularised to become

consistent with constitutional changes, so that the PSC
or its delegate is not fettered by the acts of the Ministry
of Home Affairs.

22
 Guyana Prison Service

Functions and Operations:

(136) As the prison population increases, there must be a

commensurate increase in the actual and authorised
strength of the security personnel of the GPS.

(137) Timely efforts should be made, within the constraint of

available budgetary resources, to increase the salaried
and non-salaried benefits currently accorded to prison
officers, in order to attract suitably qualified applicants.

(138) The GPS should desist from the practice of utilising

Assistant Prison Officers to independently perform
functions of a security nature or any statutory function
and should confine them to the role of auxiliaries to
Prison Officers.

(139) Commensurate with the recruitment of more suitably

qualified persons as Prison Officers, there should be less
reliance on the services of Assistant Prison Officers.

(140) The recommendations of the Criminal Law Review

Committee approved by the Commission in this Report
should be implemented by the Judiciary, Magistracy and
other relevant public authorities.

(141) Adequate monitoring devices and warning technology

should be installed or upgraded in prisons such as
Georgetown, New Amsterdam and Mazaruni to enhance
their physical security capacity and capability.

(142) Firearms provided to the GPS should be restricted to

firearms which can be employed discriminately in target
selection.

(143) In addition to monitoring devices, warning technologies

and appropriate firepower, there should be periodic
checks of prisoners and prisons for weapons, implements
for breaking, and other unauthorised items.

23
 (144) There should be a constructive regime of activities
geared to beneficially occupy prisoners’ time, such as
learning useful skills e.g. masonry, carpentry, joinery,
agriculture; or, in reading books e.g. in electronics and
mechanics.

(145) In this regard the GPS should secure the assistance of

the relevant State institutions and non-governmental
organisations to provide instructors and teachers on a
periodic basis.

(146) The Mazaruni Prison should be expanded and provided

with the requisite human and material resources for
greater prison intake as a solution to the overcrowding
problem in the Georgetown Prison.

(147) The Georgetown Prison should be rehabilitated and its

facilities improved and modernised if found to be
economically feasible.

(148) There should be a female remand prison in the vicinity of

Georgetown.

(149) The Director of Prisons should be given more autonomy

generally and in relation to recruitment and promotion in
particular.

(150) The Director of Prisons should be given the co-operation

of all the related agencies such as the Magistracy and
Judiciary, the Parole Board, the Probation and Welfare
Department, the Ministry of Home Affairs and
Government institutions which provide technical training
and instructions.

Structure:

(151) Immediate attention should be paid to promoting

suitable Assistant Prison Officers to the next level; then
gradually reducing the ‘authorised strength’ of Assistant
Prison Officers and increasing the ‘authorised strength’ of
Prison Officers, as a consequence.

24
 (152) The Public Service Commission should consider
delegating to the Director of Prisons its appointment and
promotional function regarding subordinate staff.

(153) The risk of over-burdening the Georgetown prison with

too many high-security-risk prisoners should be reduced
by the transfer of the convicted to the more commodious
Mazaruni Prison after completion of its physical
rehabilitation and structural expansion.

(154) Efforts should be directed to making the gender

composition of the prison staff rationally proportional to
the gender composition of the inmates.

(155) At the Timehri Remand Centre, where release of most

inmates is imminent, the GPS should emphasise their
rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

(156) The Chief Medical Officer must be apprised of his duty to

ensure that daily visits are made to prisoners by medical
officers, as required by regulation 48.

(157) Placement of staff members at specific prison locations

should relate to the functional objectives of that prison.

Ethnic Balance:
(158) Efforts to attract the services of qualified Guyanese of all
ethnicities should be bolstered by better levels of
remuneration.

Accountability to Civilian Authorities

(159) The Chancellor of the Judiciary should be asked to alert
the Magistrates and Judges as to their responsibility for
oversight of the prison system and encourage them to
make prison visits since such visits would enable them to
make informed decisions on sentencing.
(160) The Minister should establish a Board of Visiting Justices
for each prison in compliance with section 46 of the Act.
(161) The Visiting Committee should ensure the satisfaction of
the prisoner’s dietary requirements and report to the
Director of Prisons if necessary; hear complaints from

25
 prisoners and report to the Minister if necessary; and
bring to the attention of the Director administrative
matters requiring his attention.
(162) The Chief Medical Officer in furtherance of his statutory
duties should ensure that a government medical officer
is assigned to each prison and that he makes daily visits
thereto.
(163) Officers-in-Charge should discharge their responsibility
for ensuring that sick prisoners are not left without
medical attention.
(164) Staff of the Georgetown prison and other prisons should
especially be apprised of their liabilities for involvement
with prisoners in financial transactions, food smuggling
and other racketeering and should be duly sanctioned for
misconduct in these respects.

26
 Part 1

The Guyana Police Force

27
 Section 1: Functions and Operations

In this section, the Commission examines the changing

context of the functions and operations of the GPF, taking
into consideration national and international
developments.

The Guyana Police Force (GPF) is a statutory body established

under section 3(1) of the Police Act, Chapter 16:01. Its functions
are defined in section 3(2) of the said Act which provides:

The Force shall be employed for the prevention and

detection of crime, the preservation of law and order, the
preservation of peace, the repression of internal
disturbance, the protection of property, the apprehension
of offenders and the due enforcement of all laws and
regulations with which it is directly charged and shall
perform such military duties within Guyana as may be
required of it by or under the authority of the Minister.

Functions
Since the prohibitions and mandatory duties imposed by the
criminal law exist for the purpose of preserving peace and good
order in the country, the basic and essential function of the GPF
can be compendiously described as ensuring and enforcing
compliance with the negative prohibitions and positive mandates
imposed by the criminal law. The performance of this basic and
essential function is therefore largely co-existent with the
performance of the statutory functions outlined in section 3(2).

As stated in section 3(2), the primary function of the GPF is

the prevention and detection of criminal conduct. Therefore, the
functional operations of the GPF must be necessarily
dichotomised into the main categories of preventative policing,
and investigative policing.

Since crime prevention is causally related to the non-

occurrence of criminal conduct and crime investigation is
premised on the occurrence of criminal conduct, crime
prevention is pro-active in that it seeks to prevent even the
commission of inchoate crimes, while crime investigation is re-
active in that it responds to criminal conduct which has already

28
taken place i.e., after the public interest has been criminally
offended. As a matter of simple prudence, crime prevention
must take precedence over crime investigation in the order of
the functional operations of the GPF. The time-worn adage
“Prevention is better than cure” is of beneficent relevance.
However, it would be a mistake to take the view that the
dichotomy of crime prevention and crime investigation is hard
and fast, or distinctly separate since crime investigation does
enjoy some causal relationship with crime prevention. An
energetic and effective investigative capability can have a
deterrent effect on criminal activities since the belief or
perception that a crime can be committed without discovery or
without subsequent apprehension and punishment, is often an
effective cause for its commission; while a contrary belief often
provides a powerful deterrent to an inclination to commit it.

Crime may be triggered by personal considerations and/or

societal factors. People may be motivated to commit crimes by
reason of need, greed, malice, revenge and so on and as the
Guyana Trade Union Congress (GTUC) pointed out in its
presentation:

Considerations such as retarded economic growth,

unemployment and the level of consensus and
cohesion in the society, reflective of the approach to,
and state of, politics in the State must also be taken
into account.

Whatever the personal and societal causes, which are

extrinsic to the GPF and over which it has no control, the GPF
holds a statutory responsibility for crime prevention and must
prevent such causes from being translated into criminal conduct.
The more these causes exist, the greater must be the capacity
and efforts of the GPF in the area of crime prevention. The lesser
the efforts at crime prevention are an operational success, the
greater becomes the need for crime investigation and detection.

In terms of the priority of functional operations,

investigative policing must take second place to preventative
policing. However practically, it is the extent to which the need
for investigative policing increases that determines the extent to

29
which the effectiveness of preventative policing has decreased.
Therefore, paradoxically, the need to strengthen the
investigative capabilities of the GPF reflects the shortcomings of
preventative policing — though it is recognised that “no society
is ever free of crime” as stated by the GTUC.

Most presenters who appeared before the Commission

placed emphasis on the need to improve the investigative
capabilities of the GPF. The Commission is of the view that, while
not denying the necessity of improving and expanding the
investigative capabilities of the GPF, the mistake can easily be
made of addressing the need for developing the investigative
capabilities of the GPF without first addressing the need to
strengthen its foremost preventative capacity. It is a defeatist
position to seek to place reliance more on the reactive function
of investigative policing rather than on the pro-active function of
preventative policing.

Policing
It is interesting to note that some presenters place
increases in crime rates squarely at the feet of Guyana’s social
and governance problems and advocate that the solution to the
increases in crime rates is to be found in the resolution of the
country’s social and political problems. They have therefore
stated that “increases in the crime rates do not necessarily
reflect failure on the part of the Police.”

While the Commission is of the view that social and

political instability may contribute significantly to increases in
criminal conduct and that the resolution of the country’s societal
and political problems may result in a subsidence in the crime
rates, the Commission is unable to find that “increases in the
crime rates do not necessarily reflect failure on the part of the
Police.” The Commission finds it more accurate to say that
increases in crime rates do not necessarily wholly reflect fault on
the part of the Police, since there may be failure without fault.

It is the Commission’s view that increases in crime rates

must be viewed from the perspective of the failure of the GPF to

30
the extent that the GPF has the statutory responsibility for crime
prevention. However, there may be a reasonable and plausible
explanation for such failure which may absolve the GPF from
fault. The chain effects of a debilitated and ineffective
preventative policing policy or capability should not be under-
estimated. Not only does it necessitate more investigative
policing but also it eventually puts unnecessary and greater
pressure on the judicial system in criminal proceedings. To the
extent that the criminal justice system has gradually become
clogged with the increase in the number of criminal charges and
the resultant delay in the delivery of criminal justice, to that
extent has pro-active preventative policing yielded ground to
reactive investigative policing. Even the prison system has
become overburdened by the large numbers of convicted
prisoners, and prisoners on remand awaiting trial.

The point must be strongly made that the GPF cannot

adopt a policy that facilitates or enables the commission of
criminal offences by negative preventative policing, and then
react to the commission of such offences with positive
investigative policing. Preventative policing must always be
recognized as the foremost operational function of the GPF.

The progressive increase in the number of offences relating

to drug-trafficking and back-tracking (illegal emigration or alien
smuggling) are caused by need and greed — the need of the
consumers of illicit drugs and the greed of those who seek to
exploit such need; the need of persons to enjoy a perceived
better quality of life in the North American metropoles and the
greed of those who seek to exploit such need.

In both of these areas of criminal activity, the preventative

measures adopted by the GPF to counter the inclination of those
involved have been either non-existent or ineffective. This is
evidenced by the large number of charges relating to drugs and
illegal emigration which the Police lay before the Courts, and by
the place of origin of the offences. Whatever preventative
measures are being employed by the GPF seem to be directed
principally at preventing the successful completion of criminal

31
enterprises rather than the initiation of those enterprises. For
example, forgeries of documents for illegal emigration are
committed long before the “back-trackers” arrive at the Cheddi
Jagan International Airport. Yet, it is principally at that location
that preventative measures are directed and focused. Similarly,
drug related offences commence before or at the time that
importation of drugs commences; but few or no resources are
directed to stemming the tide of importation.

If Guyana is a recognised trans-shipment point for drug

trafficking to the industrialised and wealthy nations, surely
preventative measures must be directed to preventing Guyana
from being so used. Non-entry rather than non-exit should be
the principal objective of preventative policing with regard to
illicit drugs. Preventative measures seem to focus principally on
preventing exportation rather than preventing importation. The
preventative barriers seem to be so erected as to protect the
welfare of foreign states rather than the national welfare.

In these two areas of criminal conduct, the protection of

Guyana’s welfare coincides, and is not inconsistent, with the
protection of the welfare of other states. However, Guyana’s
commitment to international co-operation in combating crimes
with a foreign element is no justification for not taking effective
preventative measures in the protection of Guyana’s welfare in
particular. There is absolutely no reason why the GPF should
structure its functional operations to fulfil Guyana’s commitment
to international police co-operation to the neglect of its own
welfare, especially since, in the sphere of illicit drug-trafficking,
Guyana’s welfare coincides with the protection of foreign states
when Guyana is being used as a trans-shipment point. The
focus of preventative policing in the areas of drug-trafficking and
back-tracking should be more in the direction of preventing the
initiation, rather than the completion, of criminal enterprises.

There is reason to believe that the number of persons

arrested and prosecuted from the efforts of preventative policing
at the Cheddi Jagan International Airport Timehri evidences the
tip of an iceberg of criminal activities relating to the lucrative

32
enterprises of drug-trafficking and back-tracking which precede
whatever offences take place at that airport. The objective of the
GPF in its preventative police function and operations must be
the elimination of the entire iceberg and not just its tip which is
merely the belated manifestation of a series of related criminal
activities. After all, the objective must be to prevent all criminal
activities within the jurisdiction and not just to prevent the illegal
exportation of illicit drugs and people from the jurisdiction.

While it is recognised that the GPF has limited resources to

physically police the 214,970 square kilometres of Guyana with
its sprawling and porous overland borders, cognisance must be
taken of the fact that the population is relatively small (less than
800,000) and live essentially in large or small communities. In
order to offset the disadvantage of the inability to physically
police the entire area, it is absolutely necessary that a sound
national criminal intelligence system be established and
maintained. It is an impossibility to effectively practise
preventative policing in the context of Guyana without a proper
information network.

The Commission received testimony that persons are

generally not disposed to provide information to the Police
because of the danger of leakages and the fear of reprisals.
However, persons are usually not too unwilling to provide
information to the Police on the basis of personal confidence and
trust. For this reason, members of the GPF must be encouraged
and supported to identify potential sources and to win over their
confidence and trust on the personal level. This necessarily
means that the identities of Police informers must be a matter of
strict confidentiality even within the GPF itself. Personal trust
and confidence sufficient to induce the provision of confidential
and sensitive information take time to cultivate and should not
be unduly nullified by inconsiderate transfers. It is believed that
the effectiveness of the functional operations of the GPF in both
the spheres of preventative and investigative policing has been
adversely affected by the disruption of lines of information
through ill-considered transfers of officers and ranks in the not
too distant past.

33
 The escape of five dangerous inmates from the
Georgetown Prison on the 23rd February, 2002, was followed by
an unprecedented high spate of criminal activities which involved
robbery, murder, kidnapping for ransom and so on. The
preventative policing arm of the GPF was so paralyzed that the
very maintenance of law and order was under threat and the
Force itself became “fair game” for violent attacks and
executions. The Buxton/Friendship area was so infected with
lawlessness that it virtually acquired the status of state within a
state.

It was very clear from the inception that the escapees

were being joined and supported by other criminal elements
within society and the clear objective was not to leave the
jurisdiction in flight but to raise funds by robberies and
kidnappings for ransom for the purpose of arming and equipping
themselves to challenge the forces of law and order. The
situation demanded timely, resolute and decisive preventative
action by the GPF that was not forthcoming. Consequently, the
lack of a timely and appropriate response by the GPF gave the
forces of lawlessness the time and opportunity to gain the upper
hand. The criminals were so emboldened by their successes that
members of the GPF were executed and criminals with AK 47
and other ‘military’ type weapons attacked Police stations with
gunfire. The response of the GPF to all of this was even more
unsatisfactory. The gates of Police stations were locked and
sandbag defences in the compounds were erected. The situation
at that stage forcibly highlighted not merely the debilitated
condition of the preventative policing arm of the GPF but also the
significance and relevance of article 32 of the Constitution which
provides:

It is the duty of the State, the society and every citizen to

combat and prevent crime and other violations of the
law...

Eventually, it took a combined effort by the GPF, the

Guyana Defence Force (GDF) and society to quell lawlessness
and restore law and order to an acceptable level.

34
Special Units
In light of the enormity and nature of the threat to law and
order by the five escapees and their supporters, it was not
surprising that most presenters recognised the need for a squad
of well equipped and well trained police personnel to deal with
armed and dangerous criminals. However, the Commission also
received extensive complaints about police excesses and
unlawful killings, and these were often blamed on the so-called
Target Squad (or Black Clothes), which is currently intended to
perform the specialist function of dealing with serious violent
crimes.

The Commission was urged by some to recommend that

this unit be disbanded or at least the re-deployment of all its
serving officers elsewhere in the GPF. Experience in other
countries, however, suggests that the problem of human rights
abuses is due less to one of individual wrongdoing than to the
very nature of the specialist unit itself. Accordingly, disbanding
the unit to merely replace it with another unit might not resolve
the underlying problems. The Commission therefore
concentrated its attention on considering how best to make any
such unit, or ideally small teams of specialist officers deployed
on a regional basis, properly accountable for their activities.

The first problem noted was the organisational and

administrative ambiguity that seems to surround this unit. The
special unit was variously called by senior police officers, the
Anti- Crime Task Force, the Target Squad, the Target Special
Squad, the Target Anti-Crime Unit, and the only thing that could
be agreed on was that the unit being discussed wore a distinct
uniform, coloured black. Perhaps more worryingly, the Unit does
not feature on the organisational chart provided by the police, so
its line of command is not immediately obvious.

The Commission was informed that the special unit was

created on September 19th, 1996, and is part of the Criminal
Investigation Department. The 2000 Symonds report which
carried out a forensic study of current arrangements in the GPF,
referred to this unit as the Anti-Crime Task Force, but also

35
confusingly called it the “Quick Response Unit”, when there is a
separate Quick Reaction Group, which has apparently very
different duties (handling petty crime). At least, the name and
its place within the organisational structure need to be clearly
explained to the general public. Moreover, the Commission
endorses Symonds’ conclusion that “it is recognised that (this)
area of work is very difficult and there is a clear need for written
terms of reference and written operating procedures” (page 51).

Secondly, given that it is this unit more than any other

that is likely to be engaged in the use of force (and potentially
the lethal use of force); there is a special need for strict control
over, and discipline in, members of any such squad. The
Commission believes that any members of such an expert squad
must be specially selected and trained. They must be subject to
regular integrity testing, and regular training and re-training, not
merely in the accuracy of their weapons, but in the
circumstances in which the use of force is lawful and when not.
There should also be a regular rotation in the membership of any
such squads, to ensure that the necessity of having occasionally
to use force does not become a matter of routine.

Thirdly, any officers of this unit — like all officers of the

GPF except those engaged in under-cover work — must wear
authorised uniforms and make every effort to identify
themselves to suspects.

The Commission has been made aware of the alleged

existence of a so-called Phantom Squad (or even squads). It
has not been possible for us to determine if any such body
exists, although there is considerable anecdotal evidence
suggesting that there is a practice of ‘organised killings’
underway. Some allege that these killings are totally unrelated
to the police, and are simply the result of organised crime.
Others suggest that the failures in policing to tackle serious and
violent organised crime have facilitated (and some would argue,
necessitated) the emergence of an alternative form of
deterrence. Yet others allege that these killings have the
connivance of, and may even be organised, by the authorities

36
themselves, by way of off-duty or unidentified members of the
‘Black Clothes’ squad.

It is not possible for the Commission to come to a formal

determination as to which, if any, of these allegations is
grounded in fact. It can, however, say that: (a) any Anti- Crime
Task Force must always be clearly identifiable; (b) all killings
must be adequately investigated, and (c) the authorities must
distance themselves from all such killings and reinforce the fight
against such crimes. The Commission believes that if its
recommendations in this report about better investigative
techniques, tighter disciplinary systems, and greater
accountability are endorsed and implemented, any such Phantom
Squads should disappear.

Investigation
While both crime prevention and crime detection depend
heavily on the existence of reliable information networks
between the GPF and the communities, crime detection is
particularly heavily dependent on scientific investigations.

The emergence of DNA as a highly reliable tool for crime

investigation has not escaped the attention of the GPF since the
GPF often solicits the assistance of their counterparts in Trinidad
and Tobago for DNA to be carried out. Despite this recognition,
there has been no aggressive drive on the part of the
administration of the GPF to attain any level of capability in this
area of crime detection. It is not prudent to continue to rely on
Trinidad and Tobago for assistance in this area. Trinidad and
Tobago is having more than its fair share of criminal activity with
attendant crime detection problems and it is not unreasonable to
assume that, in the utilisation of its DNA capability, the national
interest of Trinidad and Tobago will take precedence over that of
Guyana. Timely responses and results can hardly be expected.
Moreover, the utilisation of the DNA capability of Trinidad and
Tobago will necessitate the testimony of DNA experts from that
country in the courts of Guyana. The local courts have no extra-
jurisdictional power of compelling their appearance to testify.

37
The GPF should at least commence to take steps towards
achieving a satisfactory level of DNA capability.

The scientific laboratory of the GPF must be served by

scientific experts. The system of rank and regimentation will
always be a deterrent to such experts joining the membership of
the GPF. The GPF should contract the services of such experts
from the society at large without any requirement that such
experts be members of the GPF. Such a policy has been adopted
in accessing the services of forensic pathologists and there is no
reason why it should not be extended to other specialized areas
of forensic investigation. The GPF cannot afford to continue to
simply rely on its own internal limited expertise and
unnecessarily deny itself the services of competent forensic
experts to be found in the society at large.

It should be noted that courts are generally more inclined

to accept the scientific opinions of experts, who are not
members of the GPF, when such opinions are in consonance with
the case for the prosecution. The rationale for such inclination
lies in the fact that an expert who is not a member of the GPF is
unlikely to have his opinion influenced or coloured by the
prosecutorial interests of the Police since his interest lies in
science and not the obtaining of convictions.

The office of the DPP has drawn attention to the paucity of

Police experts in the fields of handwriting, fingerprinting,
ballistics and so on. Training in these areas is usually offered to
members of the GPF. There is no reason why a sufficient number
of persons should not be trained for deployment in all the
Divisions so as to obviate the necessity of having such
investigative examinations conducted centrally at Eve Leary,
Georgetown.

Legal Advice
The office of the DPP has also expressed dissatisfaction
with the conduct of the Police in precipitately instituting serious
criminal charges before obtaining its advice and then submitting

38
the file later for legal advice. Dissatisfaction has also been
expressed by the same office with the length of delay caused by
the system of transmitting Police files to and from the Office of
the DPP.

The complaint is that Police Files destined for the office of

the DPP have to pass through and be ‘minuted’ by a series of
ranks and officers in the chain of command structure on their
way to the Office of the DPP and then ‘minuted’ again on their
way from the Office of the DPP to the investigating ranks. It is
quite possible that the precipitate institution of serious criminal
charges before legal advice is sought has much to do with the
internal recognition of the time-consuming practice which
obtains in the transmission of police files to and from the Office
of the DPP.

The Commission sees no reason why the control and

command structure of the GPF should not be relaxed to ensure
the expeditious receipt of legal advice. It should suffice that
Police files for advice are ‘minuted’ to the DPP by the officers in
charge of the investigations to enable direct transmission to and
from the office of the DPP. Investigating ranks should be free to
access the advisory services offered by the Office of the DPP
without necessarily going through the long and tardy command
and control structure of the GPF. The seeking of legal advice
should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Moreover,
investigating ranks are afforded the opportunity of discussing the
legal issues relevant to their cases with the Office of the DPP and
of presenting their own views of the matter to the legal adviser.
The same applies to Police prosecutors who encounter legal
problems in court.

There is no legal prohibition against the GPF having their

own in–house legal advisers to assist investigating ranks.
However, it must be noted that the DPP can assume
constitutional control over all criminal proceedings. Therefore,
such legal advice will always be subject to the overriding
constitutional powers of the DPP. There are at present members
of the GPF who are lawyers. It is recommended, however, that

39
before such persons can be allowed to officially proffer legal
advice to the GPF in criminal matters, they should be seconded
to the Office of the DPP for about two years. Thereafter, subject
to the opinion of the DPP as to whether a longer period of
attachment is necessary, they can be attached to various
divisions of the GPF as in-house legal advisers. The office of the
DPP can always function as de facto consultants to such legal
advisers. It should be noted that, in the past, when the Office of
the DPP seconded Attorneys-at-Law to the Police as legal
advisers they had to attain the level of Senior State Counsel and
could have always consulted with the Office of the DPP whenever
consultations were viewed as necessary.

Duties
Two organisations and other presenters have vigorously
submitted to the Commission that all ‘military’ functions should
be removed completely from the GPF. The premise of these
submissions seems to be the mistaken but, widely-held, notion
that everything to do with drill, parades and chain of command
by rank is ‘military’. One organisation in particular expressed
the view that the structure and training of members of the GPF
are too ‘militaristic’ and detracts from its ability to be service-
oriented.

The Commission has noted that among the statutory

functions of the GPF are “the preservation of law and order, the
preservation of peace, and the repression of internal
disturbance”. In the view of the Commission, such functions
cannot be removed from the GPF and therefore some basic
public order training is necessary for all members of the GPF.
Moreover, any unit that is created specifically to deal with the
repression of internal disturbance must necessarily undergo
more than basic `military’ training.

The Commission has further noted that there may be

Police duties that can arise which do not necessarily have
anything to do with the repression of internal disturbance but
which may necessarily involve a military-style exercise e.g., the

40
illegal influx of a large civilian Brazilian contingent into the
mining areas of Guyana which requires mass expulsion.

The Commission recognises the need for the GPF to be

service-oriented and community-friendly. However, the
Commission is of the view that the traditional structure and
training of the GPF are not necessarily inconsistent with, nor do
they necessarily detract from, its duty to serve.

Management
Various presenters have submitted to the Commission that
the GPF has a ‘militaristic’ command and control structure, which
inhibits the satisfactory performance of its duties. Such
presenters have argued that there is over-centralisation of power
and authority in the GPF that stifles the initiative of ranks within
the structure and that power and authority ought to be devolved
commensurate with the devolution of function.

Reference has already been made to the ‘minuting’ of files

for legal advice through the rank structure on its way to and
from the Office of the DPP. Another example referred to by
presenters is the granting of station bail. Even though a person
has been arrested and detained by a policeman of a particular
station and section 21 of the Police Act confers on the member
of the GPF for the time being in charge of the Police station the
power to grant bail, the policeman in charge of the station does
not feel free to exercise this statutory power unless he receives
clearance from a senior officer of the division.

If a policeman has been assigned the function of being in

charge of a station, he ought to be sufficiently responsible to
exercise his discretion as to the granting of bail in accordance
with section 21 of the Act. Even though a member of the GPF is
legally authorised to seize and detain property, he is
administratively prohibited from returning that property without
the approval of a senior officer even though investigations have
clearly revealed the further detention of that property to be
unnecessary.

41
 The point is that though function has been delegated or
devolved, there is a tendency not to delegate or devolve power
and authority to a commensurate extent. Power and authority
remain unnecessarily over-centralised and decision-making
becomes bottlenecked to central authority. The system seems to
be more control-oriented than service-oriented. A balance has
to be struck to ensure that the public interest is not sacrificed at
the altar of administrative control.

The protection and service offered by the GPF should be at

the same level for 24 hours every day. Although Police stations
are open 24 hours per day, it is common knowledge that the
level of service after 16.30 hours is not on par with the level of
service offered between 08:00 hours and 16:30 hours. Very
often, the night duty policemen are juniors who cannot make
decisions or are women who do only desk work. Prompt and
effective action can hardly be expected on reports made during
the night. This is particularly so in police stations outside of
Georgetown. Indeed, members of the public are told by such
policemen that they cannot deal with their report and are
instructed to return the following day.

There is need for some operational re-structuring to

redress this lack of service and to ensure that the level of service
offered during the night is at least satisfactory if not on par with
that offered during the daytime. One presenter, in referring to
this situation, described the senior officers as “bureaucrats”
whose duties end at 16:30 hours. The Commission appreciates
that the GPF may be suffering from manpower shortage but is of
the view that this lack of service can be addressed by a
restructuring of the shift system.

The Commission recognises the limited manpower

resources in relation to membership of the GPF. In such a
situation, there is need for proper human resource management
to make the best use of and obtain the maximum output from
the limited resources available. Trained members of the GPF
must be allocated to the performance of core police functions
and contracted civilians can perform functions that do not

42
require police training. For example, it makes no sense using
members of the GPF, trained in policing, to examine vehicles for
road fitness. Such a function can be performed by contracted
mechanics.

Neither is it sensible using trained members of the GPF to

process passport applications. Trained clerks can perform such
duties. It is also senseless to use members of the GPF trained in
policing to do typing and secretarial work. Rural constables can
effect service of summonses or other documents in the rural
areas.

In all these areas, police training is not essential and

scarce Police human resources are being wasted. This also
undermines the important sense of responsibility that should
accompany the conferring of police powers. It would be
particularly important if the Commission’s recommendations
about pay are to be accepted in principle; that policemen and
officers concentrate on police duties, not the various ancillary
tasks that could and should be delegated to others. The Police
administration should practise better human resource
management so that the essential or core functions of the GPF
can be more expansively attended to by trained members of the
GPF.

Conduct
The very beneficent nature of the primary function of the
GPF i.e., to protect and serve the public should endear members
of the GPF to the public and attract public co-operation. If, as it
now appears to be the case, there is a growing alienation
between sections of the public and the GPF, then either the GPF
is not performing this function or is performing it in an improper
manner.

Members of the GPF, especially those whose duties involve

dealing and inter-facing with the public, must be properly
educated and instructed as to become inseparably wedded to the
fundamental notion that they have a public duty to protect and
serve the society and the society has the right to their service

43
and protection under public law. They must fully appreciate that
the conferment of statutory powers and authority is not for the
purpose of elevating them to a position of repressive domination
over the public but to provide protective service to the public.
Bombastic and egotistic demonstrations of the exercise of such
powers are not merely inconsistent with the rationale underlying
the conferment of such powers but constitute disreputable and
discreditable conduct that can only alienate the public.

Their superiors must constantly remind members of the

GPF that the conferment of public power carries with it the
burden of public responsibility and that the exercise of public
power necessarily involves the responsible exercise of discretion
governed by the public interest. The proper exercise of Police
powers earns public respect while the despotic and repressive
exercise of such powers, while it may induce fear, earns
disfavour and disrespect.

Members of the GPF who see no distinction between fear

and respect are likely to be shunned and avoided and are likely
to provoke non-co-operation from the public. Yet, the successful
performance of their statutory duties often necessitates a co-
operative public and such members are forced to rely on more
intimidation to induce involuntary co-operation. The GPF can
neither achieve the reputation, nor fulfil its role of public
protector by dint of conduct that alienates and induces public
fear. Public co-operation with the GPF will be voluntarily
forthcoming only if the public perceives the GPF as a body of
disciplined and responsible persons imbued with statutory
powers for their (public) protection and therefore as persons who
must be befriended and supported. The Commission has heard
evidence from several persons who have attested to the
unwarranted use of force and intimidation by members of the
GPF.

Public disenchantment and loss of confidence in the GPF,

however, are not caused only by the wrongful or improper
exercise of statutory powers but also by neglectful omissions to
perform their statutory duties. The Commission has been

44
apprised of cases in which reports of criminal conduct to Police
stations are met with “bureaucratic excuses” for non-
performance. Reporters are often told by policemen that: there
is no one present at the station to deal with the report; the
matter cannot be dealt with by the particular station; there is no
Police vehicle available to transport investigators to the scene;
there is no driver available to transport investigators to the
scene; or there is no gas or fuel in the Police vehicle. These
excuses are often seen as frivolous and mundane and they do
not go down well with the public, causing disappointment and
loss of confidence in the ability or willingness on the part of
members of the GPF to perform their statutory functions.

Members of the GPF have the duty of enforcing the

criminal law; as such, their conduct must be exemplary. Various
presenters have taken the view that falling ethical standards are
rendering our society less law-abiding and more undisciplined
and the GPF, being a mere extract from this society, necessarily
reflects the lawlessness and indiscipline which pervade and
permeate society.

The Commission recognises that the lowering of such

standards in society poses a problem of recruiting personnel of
the right quality. However, since those entrusted with upholding
the law must themselves be capable of reflecting the standards
of conduct which the law demands of every citizen, proper and
effective training and strict discipline must be considered as all-
important for all members of the GPF. Members of the GPF
simply cannot portray themselves as mere extracts of a lawless
and undisciplined segment of society. They cannot allow
themselves to be provoked into uncouth behaviour, uncivil
language and oppressive conduct.

Individuals have testified before the Commission of being

assaulted or otherwise mistreated by members of the GPF simply
because they questioned their modus operandi or their authority.
Such responsive conduct on the part of members of the GPF is
inimical to and inconsistent with the basic function of the GPF to
protect and serve. Members of the GPF must be trained to

45
remain unmoved and dispassionate under the strain of
provocation. Unlawful retaliation to resentfully critical or
provocative conduct from members of the community with whom
their duties bring them into confrontation cannot be allowed to
become or to remain a characteristic or feature of the Police
operational behaviour. This is an area in which the evidence
suggests that the GPF has shown an operational weakness and
in which criticisms have been made with some justification.
Corrective efforts in training need to be focused on this area.

Authority
The main opposition party, the PNC/R and others have
alleged and cited instances of political interference in the
functional operations of the GPF. The PNC/R has claimed that
such interference undermines the independence of the GPF as a
national institution and erodes public confidence in the manner
in which the GPF discharges its statutory duties.

It is therefore instructive to analyse the scope and effect of

section 7 of the Act which provides:

The Commissioner shall, subject to the general orders and

directions of the Minister, have the command and
superintendence of the Force, and he shall be responsible
to the Minister for the peace and good order throughout
Guyana, for the efficient administration and government of
the Force, and for the proper expenditure of all public
moneys appropriated for the service thereof.

It is clear that section 7 confers upon the Commissioner

the overall power of command and superintendence of the GPF.
The power to command and superintend is inherently an internal
power and cannot be shared with someone extrinsic to the GPF.

Since the Commissioner has the statutory power of overall

internal command and superintendence of the GPF, section 7
further confers upon him the responsibility or accountability to
the Minister for peace and good order throughout Guyana, for
the efficient administration and government of the GPF and for
the proper expenditure of all public moneys allocated to the GPF.
The Commissioner therefore has a statutory power of internal

46
control and command coupled with commensurate statutory
responsibility to the Minister.

Section 7 also confers upon the Minister a power to issue

general orders and directions to the Commissioner and has
rendered the power of internal command and superintendence of
the Commissioner, subject to such general orders and directions.
Since the Minister is extrinsic to the structure and composition of
the GPF, his power to issue general orders and directions can be
only to the Commissioner.

Unlike the Commissioner, the Minister is conferred with a

statutory power without a statutory responsibility. But the
burden of responsibility always accompanies the conferment of
power. The Minister may be without statutory responsibility but
this does not at all mean that he has been conferred power
without responsibility since he, as the Minister responsible for
internal security, bears an executive responsibility to the
National Assembly for matters of internal security. It is in
recognition and furtherance of this executive responsibility that
Parliament has seen it fit to confer upon him the power to give
general orders and directions to the Commissioner to which the
power of the Commissioner to command and superintend the
GPF is made subject.

Since the statutory power of the Minister relates to an

executive function and responsibility, the power to issue general
orders and directions to the Commissioner is necessarily limited
to general orders and directions of an executive nature and not a
power to issue general orders and directions which involves
encroachment on the internal power of the Commissioner to
command and superintend the GPF. The words “subject to” must
therefore be interpreted to mean “in accordance with” or “not
inconsistent with” and not as implying any overriding power in
the Minister to command and superintend the GPF. The
Minister’s executive power to give general orders and directions
to the Commissioner is for the purpose of enabling him to
establish and define the parameters within which the power of
internal command and superintendence of the Commissioner is

47
to be exercised. It enables the Minister to establish executive
objectives by which the Commissioner must be guided in the
exercise of his internal power to command and superintend. But
the Minister’s power to give general orders and directions to the
Commissioner does not extend to ordering or directing him how
the GPF is to be commanded or superintended.

The Minister may, in consonance with his power of

executive control, give general orders or directions as to what
functional operations should be carried out but cannot direct how
such functional operations should be carried out. The proper test
seems to be whether the particular order or direction falls within
the executive decision-making powers of the Minister or the
administrative decision-making powers of the Commissioner. A
useful analogy is perhaps the executive powers of an executive
director and the administrative power of a general manager. It is
the view of the majority of the Commission that the statutory
powers to give general orders and directions conferred on the
Minister by section 7 are not to enable him to exercise any
power of command and superintendence of the GPF (which is
internal to the GPF) but to lay down the goals and objectives
which will give direction to the Commissioner in his command
and superintendence of the GPF.

Joint Operations
The primary function of the GPF is to maintain internal law
and order (section 7 of the Police Act). One of the statutory
functions of the Guyana Defence Force is the maintenance of
order in Guyana (section 5 of the Defence Act). Thus, both of
these bodies have the statutory function of maintaining internal
law and order. However, it is instructive to note that, while
members of the GPF are conferred with powers of arrest under
section 17 of the Police Act, the Defence Act does not confer
similar powers on members of the GDF. Section 17(1) of the
Police Act provides:

It shall be lawful for any member of the Force to arrest

without a warrant –

(d) any person whom such member of the Force finds

disturbing the peace; or

48
 (e) any person whom he has good cause to suspect of
having committed or being about to commit any felony,
misdemeanour or breach of the peace.

As a matter of practice, the GDF normally does not

perform internal security functions. Such a task is normally left
to the GPF some of whose primary functions are:

the preservation of law and order, the preservation of the

peace, the repression of internal disturbance…” (section 3
of the Police Act).

In the recent Buxton episode of pervasive lawlessness, the

GPF proved unable to quell such lawlessness and the GDF had to
be called upon to help to restore and maintain law and order and
to provide a safe corridor for persons using the East Coast Road
passing through Buxton. Even though some presenters
expressed the view that the GDF should not at all be used for
internal security purposes, it is clear from section 5 of the
Defence Act that the GDF has a statutory function of internal
security for which Parliament can be credited with wisdom of
foresight and precaution. The Commission is of the view that
there will be occasions when joint action is required and
therefore proposes no legislative change.

The view has been expressed that, in deploying the GDF to

Buxton, its effectiveness was handicapped by the absence of a
clear mandate by the Defence Board. The Commission however
finds it difficult to express its concurrence with this view. The
Commission is of the view that the limited effectiveness of the
GDF could have been due largely to the fact that the Defence Act
(section 5) imposed upon the GDF a policing function of internal
security without conferring upon it enabling Police powers
relevant to that function e.g. GDF has no statutory power of
arrest or apprehension. In the absence of such enabling
statutory powers, it was essential that the GPF which has the
primary Police function with enabling Police powers should have
had the primary role of internal security since the GDF has no
enabling police powers. In matters of internal security, whenever
it becomes necessary to deploy the GDF, the operations should
always be joint between the GPF and the GDF with the GDF

49
performing the supporting role. The role played by the GDF has
been more fully addressed by the Commission later in this
Report.

Issues
The Commission has concentrated in this chapter on the
general thrust of the GPF’s operations and functions. It is
extremely important in our view to address in some detail issues
of investigative and preventative policing, the changing nature of
crime, the concerns about excessive use of force and the role of
special squads, the need to place modern scientific technology at
the service of crime detection skills, and the overlap between
policing and military-type functions. These were all issues that
were alluded to explicitly in our Terms of Reference. However,
there is a whole range of other issues about police functions and
operations that were brought to the Commission’s attention by
witnesses, and it would not disregard them. They all seem to
have some merit, and we will transmit them onwards with little
comment to the Assembly and others for their attention.

Cases were made for the following:

• A plan of action to deal effectively with allegations of

domestic violence, special areas for interviewing victims, a
specific log book to record such crimes (in accordance with
the Domestic Violence Act), the importance of having
female staff in attendance, the need for standardised
domestic violence report forms, and for the police to
develop the capacity and willingness to lend support to
victims, or re-direct them to other agencies for
counselling;

• Arrangements for appropriately trained persons on duty to

take statements, especially from children, and more
generally, increased awareness in policemen about the
needs of particularly vulnerable groups (children, domestic
violence victims, Amerindians in lock-ups, people with
mental disabilities);

50
 • The introduction of, or stricter compliance with, existing
guidelines on the handling of evidence and scene-of-crime
incidents, response to victims’ rights and need for feed-
back on case development, the importance of early
medical help to injured people (whether witnesses, victims
or alleged criminals), the maintenance of hygienic
conditions in lock-ups, the importance of effective record-
keeping for later court action, the securing of constitutional
safeguards for detainees and the proper grant of bail, as
well as information regarding the penalties which will
follow from any tampering with evidence, etc.

• Effective enforcement of the disciplinary codes which exist

to deal with police officers involved in any allegations of ill-
treatment of detainees, or associating with known
criminals. More emphasis needs to be placed on the
importance of respecting the rules of confidentiality, so
that witnesses will more willingly come forward to assist
the police with their inquiries.

An extensive series of very practical, detailed and concrete

recommendations was also made in the Symonds report,
specifically with reference to the improvements necessary to the
Criminal Investigation Department. The Commission was
somewhat surprised to learn that the current Crime Chief was
unfamiliar with these recommendations, and would urge that
they be examined. Elsewhere, the Commission has suggested
that a detailed plan of action for improvements in the GPF be
developed and submitted for its consideration. Unfortunately no
such plan was submitted in time for the Commission’s
consideration.

Recommendations
With regard to the “functions and operations” of the GPF
the Commission recommends as follows:

1. A preventative policing policy should be revived and

effectuated.

51
2. The investigative capabilities of the GPF should be
strengthened.

3. Non-entry, in addition to non-exit, of illicit drugs should

be made a focus of preventative policing.

4. A sound national criminal intelligence system should be

established and maintained.

5. GPF members should be encouraged to identify

potential informants and gain their trust.

6. Ill-considered transfers of Force members, so as not to

disrupt well-established information networks, should
be avoided.

7. The name and place within the Force structure of that

special squad known as the ‘Black Clothes’ squad should
be clarified for public information.

8. Strict control; careful selection; training; re-training;

discipline; special rotation of membership and the
requirement that those who are not working on under-
cover duties wear clearly identifiable by uniform, should
be enforced for members of special squads.

9. The means to conduct DNA testing should be acquired.

10. The recruitment of scientific experts from society at

large to serve the GPF scientific laboratory, and who
would not be inhibited by the requirement to carry GPF
rank, should be pursued.

11. More personnel should be trained in handwriting,

fingerprinting, ballistics and related fields and they
should be deployed in the divisions so as to reduce the
need for all such investigations to come to CID HQ.

52
 12. The control and command structure of the GPF, as it
pertains to file transmission, should be relaxed so as to
obviate the need for extensive minutes and to expedite
receipt of legal advice from the DPP.

13. The means for greater use of legal expertise within the
GPF should be established and the secondment of Force
members, who are Attorneys to the DPP’s Chambers,
for about two years to acquire professional experience
should be considered.

14. A consistent level of ‘service and protection’ to the

public on a 24 hours basis should be maintained. If
necessary, the shift system, especially at rural and
hinterland stations, should be restructured
appropriately.

15. Civilians should be contracted to perform functions that

do not require police training as follows:
a. Examination of vehicles for road fitness certificates
b. Processing of passport applications
c. Typing and secretarial work

The serving of summonses and similar or related duties in rural

areas should be done by Rural Constables.

16. The use of common excuses (such as that “there’s no

transportation”) to cover-up neglect of duty should be
eliminated.

17. GPF members should be trained to remain unmoved

and dispassionate especially in the face of provocation.

Note: Annexed herewith is the independent view of

section 7 of the Police Act provided by Commissioner C. R.
Ramson S C.

53
 S. 7 of the Police Act CAP 16:01

In determining the extent of the legitimate involvement of

the Minister of Home Affairs in connection with the operations of
the Guyana Police Force one has to consider S. 7 of the Police
Act CAP 16:01 and its ramifications in the wider context of the
political responsibility which the Executive, through the Cabinet,
has under the Constitution.

By ART 106 (1) of the Constitution CAP 1:01 there shall be

a Cabinet for Guyana which shall consist of the President, Prime
Minister, Vice Presidents and such other Ministers as the
President may appoint to it and by ART 106 (2) the Cabinet shall
be collectively responsible for the general direction and control of
the Government to Parliament. Furthermore, the President may
assign to any Minister responsibility for any business of the
Government, including the administration of any department of
Government: ART 1O7. The Minister of Home Affairs is the
Minister assigned responsibility for internal affairs. The reason
for the underscorings will become evident when the provisions of
the Police Act CAP 16:01 are examined in relation to the
functions of the Commissioner of Police (COP) and his
accountability to the Minister of Home Affairs (MOHA).

More particularly, reference to S. 7 of the Act above will

not be helpful without an understanding of the philosophy and
history relating to its enactment. Historically, the G.P.F. has
been the enforcement agency of the Government which is
elected to govern the State of Guyana and being a Department
of the Government, its administration falls within the
responsibility of the M.O.H.A., as contemplated by ART 107. The
philosophical underpinnings of the GPF have their origins in a
militia-type agency primarily geared to maintain Order and
prevent disruption of the orderly business of the State.

The GPF is responsible for the prevention and detection of

crime, the preservation of law and order, the preservation of the
peace …. and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations ..
…. (S. 3 (2)); and S. 7 provides:

54
 “The COP shall, subject to the general Orders and
directions of the Minister, have the command and
superintendence of the Force, and he shall be responsible
to the Minister for the peace and good order throughout
Guyana, and for the efficient administration and
government of the Force …..”

It is axiomatic that peace and good order are inextricably

bound up in the Security of the State, (as explained in another
section of our Report) and, being responsible to the Minister, the
COP is accountable to him for the peace and good order
throughout Guyana and for the efficient administration and
government of the Force. The draftsman of this section could
not with greater pristine clarity have articulated the intentions of
the legislators who gave their studied and undivided attention to
the relationship which they found necessary to give effect to the
security concerns of the State. It bears repetition (see discourse
on Firearms Licence at p.149-154.) that, the segment of that
section under scrutiny is so excruciatingly plain that it would be
pleonastic to attempt any further expatiation of the rudiments of
its construction and interpretation by means of any empirical
analysis but the obvious, at times, eludes the invigilant and
therefore some elucidation is not without justification.

In this context, although it is common ground that the COP

has a statutory power of internal control and command coupled
with a commensurate statutory responsibility to the Minister, a
notion seems to have gained currency that the intrinsic nature of
the COP’s authority and the extrinsic power and duty of the
MOHA are mutually exclusive. Left uncontradicted, it would
present a danger greater than the mischief it purports to
address.

It therefore has become necessary to seek such semantic

and judicial assistance as may be available in support of the
integrated nature of the mutual and overlapping roles of these
office holders. S. 7, as a whole, has not been judicially
interpreted in Guyana as far as I am aware and, for this reason,
the clause “subject to the general orders and directions of the

55
Minister” has been made the subject of much controversy by
laymen, lawyers and politicians alike, thereby creating
perceptions which compound the security dilemma facing our
country. Laymen, understandably, take their cue from the
lawyer and politician but, regrettably, the last two have not
demonstrated the inclination to guide them by informing
themselves of the provisions governing the exercise under
scrutiny. Before this Commission, few witnesses, if any,
articulated with sufficient conviction, their awareness of the
purport and intent of this much misunderstood provision.

Megarry J in C and J Clark Ltd –v- Inland Revenue Comrs.

(1973) 2 ALL E.R. 513 in considering the phrase “subject to” in
relation to two provisions in a Statute ruled that “the words
merely had the effect of demonstrating which provision was to
prevail in the event of a conflict.”
At p. 520. letter “e”, he excruciates:
“In my judgment the phrase “subject” is a simple
provision which merely subjects the provisions of the
subject subsections to the provisions of the master
subsections. Where there is no clash, the phrase does
nothing: if there is collision the phrase shows what is to
prevail. The phrase provides no warranty of universal
collision”; and at p. 521, letter “e” he expatiates:
“An Act must be construed so as to be workable,
even if its language is in some degree inept, and it
must be construed so as to cure whatever mischief is
being aimed at” – UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM
PEREAT.

And Lord Simonds in the House of Lords, explained in

Smith –v- London Transport Executive (1951) 1 ALL. E.R. 667 at
p. 672, letters “B-C”:
“subject to …… are naturally words of restriction.
They assume an authority immediately given and
give a warning that elsewhere a limitation on that
authority will be found”

56
 Transposed into context of the relationship between the
COP and the MOHA it is pellucidly clear whose authority must
prevail in the event of a conflict and the interpretation above
postulates the subject and master configuration of power in the
form of the COP and MOHA. In other words, although the COP
has command and superintendence of the GPF this is subject to
the general orders and direction of the MOHA. Should the
Minister fail to execute this statutory duty he would be guilty of a
grave dereliction, the consequences of which may lead to
irreversible insecurity.

It may not be without some significance that in

determining dissimilar provisions of the Constitution and
legislation of Papua New Guinea, the Chief Justice, Sir Buri Kidu,
in Re-Philip Bouraga PNGLR. 175 at p. 185-186 had this to say:
“It does not say that a Minister has no power of
direction or control whatsoever over a department of
government of which he has political responsibility
…,” but he went on to assert that the Police Act (of
Papua New Guinea) “does not confer on the Minister
any power of direction or control over the
Commissioner of Police or the Police Force.”

In fact, Art 196 (2) of their Constitution expressly provides that

the Minister has no power of command within the Police Force
except to the extent provided for by a Constitutional law or an
Act of Parliament. (See p. 139 of AIGILO .V. MORAUTA 2002
4 L.R.C. p. 129.) In Guyana, the reverse is patently obvious.

It would therefore be self-evident that, given the simple

and precise words used in the Police Act of Guyana, any attempt
to exclude the MOHA from the command and superintendence of
the GPF could not, by the very nature of the exercise, be
achieved without doing irreversible violence to the plain
language of the legislation and the Constitution. Read in their
most neutral sense neither seems to have been attended by
phraseological convolutions that require forensic analysis.

57
 As Massiah C reminds us in AG .V. MOHAMED ALLI et al
(Civil App #15/86) where the legislation “is drawn with
consummate preciseness and declarative lucidity in absolute and
unambiguous terms” its ordinary dictionary meaning should be
given to it. To do otherwise would be violative of the norms
relating to the canons of statutory interpretation.

For the reasons outlined above the claims of political

interference in the operations of the GPF, in general, and with
the functions of the COP, in particular, do not meet with my
approbation and cannot be sustained.

(all underscorings are for emphasis)

58
 Section 2: Composition and Structure

In this section, the Commission examines the

composition and structure of the GPF.

Although the GPF was founded in 1839, it was established

in 1957 under section 3 (1) of the Police Act, Chapter 16:01, as
a public body. It has been described as a para-military Force
because, while its statutory functions are primarily related to
internal security and the enforcement of law and order within
Guyana, the Minister may require the Force to perform military
duties within Guyana under his authority. Section 3(2) of the Act
provides:

The Force shall be employed for the prevention and

detection of crime, the preservation of law and
order, the preservation of the peace, the repression
of internal disturbance, the protection of property,
the apprehension of offenders and the due
enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it
is directly charged and shall perform such military
duties within Guyana as may be required of it by or
under the authority of the Minister.

Role
One presenter recommended that the law should be
amended to remove from the duties of the GPF the necessity for
training in e.g., parades, drills and manoeuvres. There appears
to be a perception that the GPF in so doing performs military
functions and that if this were not so, more time and effort could
be expended on training relevant to core police functions.

The Commission has learnt that some of this training and

disciplinary activity are not, strictly speaking, military activity.
However, two of the main functions of the GPF are the
preservation of law and order and the repression of internal
disturbances, which may require operations perceived to be of a
‘military’ nature. The Commission therefore holds the view that
the GPF still needs some amount of relevant training and
discipline that may be perceived as ‘military’.

59
 Following criticism that the structure of the GPF is “too
militaristic” is the recommendation that its control and command
structure, which is linked to its military genesis, should be re-
structured to allow for greater decentralisation and devolution of
authority, so that individual initiative can come to the fore and
not be unnecessarily or unduly stifled. The Commission would
expect that the Commissioner should, within his administrative
discretion, devolve and diffuse power and authority within the
GPF in accordance with the dictates of circumstances. A legal
structure which itself decentralises and distributes functions,
duties, powers and authorities may prove to be too inflexible to
meet changing circumstances and can give rise to serious
internal conflicts and disputes over the limits of authority.
Conflicts and disputes, which have their origin in legal structure,
cannot be administratively resolved.

Under section 7(1) of the Police Act (Chapter 16:01) the

Commissioner has general command and superintendence of the
GPF but is subject to the general orders and directions of the
Minister. The Commissioner, consistent with his general power to
command and superintend the GPF, is responsible to the
executive Minister for the general management and
administration of the GPF and the Minister himself has executive
responsibility to the National Assembly for matters of internal
security.

The principal assistants to the Commissioner in the

performance of his statutory functions and the discharge of his
statutory responsibilities are the Deputy Commissioners. During
the absence or incapacity of the Commissioner, a deputy
Commissioner can exercise the full power and authority of the
absent or incapacitated Commissioner (section 8). Since there
are now several Deputy Commissioners, each assigned specific
responsibility and duties along administrative and departmental
lines by the Commissioner, there will be need for close
collaboration among them in the general management of the
GPF, unless one of them is appointed to perform the duties of
Commissioner during his absence or incapacity. In order to avoid
such a cumbersome system of general management, it is always

60
preferable that one of the Deputy Commissioners be appointed
to perform the duties of the Commissioner during any prolonged
period of his absence or incapacity.

Under section 9, Assistant Commissioners perform such

duties as directed by the Commissioner. Under section 28, the
Commissioner is empowered to divide Guyana into Police
divisions and sub-divisions. Guyana has been divided into six
divisions with sub-divisions. As a matter of practice, Assistant
Commissioners are usually assigned the command of divisions
with superintendents placed by the Commissioner in charge of
sub-divisions to work under the command of the divisional
commander. There may be divisions that are commanded by
officers below the rank of Assistant Commissioner. Depending on
the population of divisions, the Commissioner may divide a
division into several sub-divisions. However, the ability of the
Commissioner to do so may be circumscribed by the
unavailability of buildings and premises and proper
accommodation and facilities which are outside the control of the
Commissioner.

Administration
Under section 29 of the Act, it is the Minister who has the
responsibility for providing buildings and premises for the use of
the GPF and suitable accommodation for policemen. Complaints
have been received by the Commission about the poor state of
accommodation and facilities provided for policemen. This has
forced a liberal attitude of allowing policemen the option of
returning to their homes even though circumstances may dictate
that they reside within easy reach of their stations in the event
that their services are urgently needed.

It is recommended that the matter of the availability of

premises, buildings and proper accommodation for policemen be
addressed since there are several divisions that require more
sub-divisions, police stations and in-house policemen to provide
satisfactory service. The proliferation of new and vast housing
areas e.g., Sophia, Eccles, Diamond etc., and the greater use of
Lethem as a trade route to and from Brazil, require more Police

61
stations and Police presence. The Commissioner of Police should
discuss the needs of the GPF with the Minister so that the
Minister may perform his statutory function under section 29.

Presenters have recommended to the Commission that

there should be more decentralisation and devolution of
authority along demographic and regional lines, and have even
recommended that, consistent with the decentralisation of
governmental and administrative authority along regional lines,
there should be regional Police Forces commanded by regional
commissioners of police. The Commission recognises that, with
the need for more effective policing in regions which are
geographically distant from the central command in Georgetown,
there is some justification for the recommendation not only for
the decentralisation and devolution of the power and authority of
the Commissioner, but also the need for essential facilities and
services to be made readily available within the various divisions
e.g., forensic and legal services and training facilities.

Delimiting the power and authority of divisional

commanders should be the exception rather than the rule so as
to enable them to stand in the shoes of the Commissioner in
decision-making within the confines of their respective divisions.
If divisional commanders are sufficiently empowered and
authorised to act for, and on behalf of, the Commissioner in their
respective divisions and in-house essential facilities and services
are made available to the Divisions to meet their respective
needs, there should be no basis for the call for a multiplicity of
regional Police forces, each with its own regional commissioner.

Under section 10 of the Act, all other officers of the GPF:

shall be stationed in such divisions and attached to
such branches as the Commissioner may direct and
they shall perform such duties as the Commissioner
may direct.

Under section 12 (1),

There shall be such number of subordinate officers and
constables as may be required and the Commissioner
may determine the duties to be performed for such
subordinate officers and constables.

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It is the Commissioner who has the administrative responsibility
of structuring the duties of officers, subordinate officers and
constables and determining their assignment to the various
divisions and stations. While it is the Minister who, under section
12(2), determines the classes and number of constables, who
are the frontline operatives of the GPF, it should be noted that
his power to do so is necessarily conditioned by the numerical
strength of the GPF. The GPF is currently well below its approved
numerical strength1 — caused by recruitment problems — and
therefore the Commissioner is hampered and circumscribed in
the formation and implementation of an effective deployment
policy. There is the danger that, unless the numerical strength is
augmented, the GPF may well find itself with too many officers
and sub-ordinate officers relative to the number of constables,
for deployment for frontline duties. This can cause the GPF to
become too bureaucratically top-heavy rather than functionally
effective.

Special Constabulary
Under section 71 of the Act,

There shall be maintained a supplemental body of

police styled the “Special Constabulary…

Section 78 (1) provides:

Every member of the Special Constabulary when called out

for full-time service shall be deemed for all purposes a
member of the Force and shall be subject to all the
provisions of this Act as regards the discipline, powers and
immunities of constables under Part IV, and shall be paid
for his services as may be provided by Parliament, at the
same rate as a member of the Force of equivalent rank.

The members of the Special Constabulary are divided into two

categories (1) those called out on full time service, and (2) those
not called out on full time service. The former are, for the
purpose of the Act, treated as regular members of the GPF and
paid accordingly for their services. But the Act is silent on the
position of the latter. According to the Act, there ought to be
members of the Special Constabulary who have not been called
out on full-time service unless the true position is that all
1
For regular Police this is 540 below authorized strength. The Special Constabulary is actually
164 more than authorized strength.

63
members of the Special Constabulary have been called out on
full-time service and are being paid for their services according
to the rates of regular members of the GPF. The Commission
observed that many members of the Special Constabulary, who
are being treated and paid like regular members of the GPF, do
no more than regular guard functions at public institutions and
the private homes of public officials. It is a waste of training and
financial resources to have such members of the Special
Constabulary performing guard functions especially at this time
when the GPF is below its numerical strength.

It does appear that guards should be employed to do

guard service. Personnel trained to perform as regular policemen
and policewomen should perform frontline and core police
functions. The Commission is of the view that a special review is
needed in relation to the structure of the Special Constabulary
since section 71 clearly provides:

There shall be maintained a supplemental body of

police styled the “Special Constabulary,” any
member of which may be called out for service by
the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, any
Assistant Commissioner, or any officer in charge of a
division in any case where additional police are
required for the preservation of good order.

The Commission does not understand how the calling out of

members of the Special Constabulary on full-time service to
perform guard functions can satisfy the purpose of preservation
of good order. The Commission does not understand why
members of the Special Constabulary, trained to perform as
regular members of the GPF, should be assigned guard duties at
public or private premises instead of being put to perform
frontline duties in the preservation of good order. It seems that
the very raison d’ etre of the Special Constabulary has been
largely disregarded, and the Special Constabulary is largely used
for unintended purposes.

Rural Constabulary

64
 Section 84 of the Act provides

The rural constabulary shall be maintained under

this Act and shall consist of subordinate officers of
the rural constabulary and rural constables as
hereinafter provided;

and section 85 of the Act provides:

The principal objects for which the rural constabulary is

established are that its members may be capable –

(a) in time of peace, of acting as an efficient

auxiliary to the Force in the performance of
such of their ordinary duties as the
Commissioner shall deem fit; and

(b) in the time of internal disturbance or of

external aggression, of at once assuming to
the extent found requisite by the
Commissioner the ordinary duties of the Force.

Unlike members of the Special Constabulary, members of the

Rural Constabulary are members of the GPF without being called
out for active duty by the Commissioner in exercise of the
powers under section 91(1), and have all the powers and are
entitled to all the privileges and immunities conferred by law
upon any constable (See sections 2 and 90(1)).

The Minister is empowered under section 88 to direct the

number and grades of subordinate officers and rural constables
who are to form the structure of the GPF from time to time. The
Commission is of the view that, at the present time when there
is some degree of reluctance on the part of young adults to join
the GPF, attention should be directed to the utilisation of the
auxiliary services which can be provided by the Rural
Constabulary — particularly in hinterland locations.

The Commission is of the view that the importance of the

auxiliary services which can be provided by the Rural
Constabulary, particularly in the Amerindian communities and
border areas, is being under-estimated and overlooked. For
example, it is difficult to see how the regular GPF can be
effective in policing the Guyana — Brazil border against the
importation and exportation of illicit items e.g., narcotics and

65
firearms and cross-border cattle rustling without the assistance
of members of the Rural Constabulary who reside in the districts,
who are au fait with the terrain and modus operandi of those
involved in such illegalities, and are skilled in horse-riding.

For this reason, the Commission disapproves of the neglect

in issuing precepts to many members of the Rural Constabulary
who have already taken the requisite oath and are performing
policing functions in those districts.

The Commission notes that, even though section 93 of the

Act provides for members of the Rural Constabulary to be
remunerated for their services, members of the Rural
Constabulary do not receive their remuneration. While the
Commission is aware that many members of the Rural
Constabulary are prepared to provide voluntary services without
compensation, the existence of the Rural Constabulary would be
placed on shaky ground if it were to depend wholly on voluntary
service.

The Commission has received complaints from members of

the Rural Constabulary that they are finding it difficult to provide
auxiliary services in the Guyana / Brazil border districts without
any remuneration, or at least, some form of compensation for
the utilisation of their own resources. The fact that the present
rates of remuneration for members of the Rural Constabulary are
woefully inadequate and in need of review and revision is a
powerful indication that the importance of the Rural
Constabulary has been overlooked for too long.

The Commission is of the view that the Rural Constabulary

is an important statutory auxiliary to the GPF and can play a
vital role in assisting the GPF to maintain and preserve law and
order and enforcing the rule of law-especially at this time of
numerical deficiency in the regular GPF. To overlook its
importance for much longer can prove to be a mistake of
gravity.

Supernumerary Constables

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 The Act provides for the Commissioner to appoint
Supernumerary constables, subordinate officers and/or
inspectors to be employed in the services of persons or entities
on special duties. Section 82 of the Act provides:

1) If in any case application is made by a person

to the Commissioner for constables,
subordinate officers and /or inspectors to be
employed in his service on special duties, the
nature of which duties shall be specified in the
application, the Commissioner may, if he
thinks fit, appoint men as supernumerary
constables, subordinate officers and inspectors
to be employed on special duties specified in
the application.

2) The Commissioner may appoint fit and proper

persons to be officers

3) The men so appointed and employed shall be

subject to all the provisions of the Act and the
regulations made thereunder relating to
discipline, punishment, powers and immunities
of constables.

4) The person requiring their services shall defray

the pay, expenses and the cost of uniform of
supernumerary constables, subordinate
officers, inspectors or officers. The cost of the
uniform shall be paid annually in advance and
the pay and expenses shall be paid monthly in
advance to the Commissioner.

5) Proceedings for any sum payable under this

Section may, on the complaint of an officer of
police, be taken before any magistrate against
the person liable to pay the sum.

The Commission does not see the need for the

Commissioner of Police to assume the responsibility of training
persons to be employed by private persons or entities on special
duties so that they can exercise police powers on such special
duties. The Commission is of the view that police powers should
be conferred in the public interest and not in private interests.
The notion of private policemen conferred with public law police
powers to serve private interests is not attractive to the
Commission.

The Commission does not see wisdom in the GPF being

burdened with the unnecessary responsibility of training and

67
disciplining personnel and ensuring that they are properly
uniformed and paid simply because they have been appointed to
exercise police powers. The Commission questions the rationale
underlying the appointments themselves since public powers
should not be utilised to serve private interests. The Commission
recognises that if people are to work full-time in security work
and have access to firearms, their recruitment and training are
very important. A system of oversight for such work should be
introduced, but this should not be the responsibility of the police.

Authority
While the Commission does not perceive any fundamental
defect in the current legal structure of the regular GPF, the
Commission sees the necessity for the proper legal interpretation
to be put on section 7(1) of the Act so that the lines of authority
between the executive power of the Minister and the
administrative power of the Commissioner to command and
superintend the GPF can be defined with sufficient clarity. The
Commission feels that there are important administrative
adjustments that can be made in the GPF but such
administrative shortcomings that may currently exist do not
arise out of structural legal defects. The Commission is of the
view that once functions are assigned to persons with proven
capabilities, there should be commensurate decentralisation or
devolution of authority to them, without undue reservation.

While the Commission is cognisant of the fact that the

legal structure of the GPF does not decentralise the powers of
the Commissioner, but leaves it upon him to so do, the
Commission recognises the decentralisation of authority by
structure is inherently rigid and does not open itself to ready
administrative remedy as circumstances demand. The
Commission prefers administrative flexibility to structural rigidity
in the context of the GPF.

The Commission is of the view that the Special

Constabulary is being abused and it seems to have lost its way
in relation to its functions and operations. It is not necessary to
comprehensively review its structure and operations since it

68
does appear to be satisfactorily fulfilling its statutory function as
a supplementary body to the regular GPF.

The Rural Constabulary is viewed by the Commission as

the most important auxiliary to the GPF and ought not to be
neglected or overlooked- as appears to be the case. On the other
hand, the Commission does not see the public importance of
supernumerary ranks and views the statutory responsibilities of
the Commissioner in relation to supernumerary ranks as
unjustified under public law and an unnecessary burden. The
Commission recommends that Part XIV of the Act be reviewed
with a view to repealing it in its entirety.

The official organisational chart used by the GPF did not

appear to the Commission to accurately reflect the current
administrative structure of the GPF. It is little wonder that, the
testimony of very senior officers was at variance with it and
some irreconcilable factual details given at that time have since
prompted a written response by the GPF re-aligning the chart
with the acknowledged structure.

Recommendations
With regard to the “Composition and Structure” of the GPF the
Commission recommends as follows:

18. Some elements of the training and disciplinary activity

that may be perceived as ‘military’ should be
maintained.

19. More sub-divisions and police stations should be

established and police presence increased, especially in
new housing areas such as Sophia and high-crime-risk
areas such as Lethem, after careful analysis of the risk
of criminal activity.

20. Divisional commanders should be empowered to act for,

and on behalf of, the Commissioner in their Divisions.

69
21. The numerical strength of the GPF should be
augmented.

22. Rural Constables should be paid and they should be

issued precepts, as provided by statute.

23. The burden of training private security personnel should

be removed from the GPF.

24. Members of the Special Constabulary should be relieved

of guard duties and be allowed to function as true GPF
reserves.

25. Part XIV of the Police Act should be repealed.

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 Sections 3: Recruitment, Training and Promotion

In this section, the Commission examines the “terms

and conditions of employment, remuneration, training …
[and] criteria for promotion.”

Given the importance of the statutory functions of the GPF

and the fact that each and every member of the GPF is conferred
ex officio with considerable statutory powers and authority to
transgress civil rights in order to enable the GPF to fulfil its
statutory mandate to protect and serve the society, it is of
crucial importance that members of the GPF are endowed with
sufficient intelligence and sense of responsibility for the proper
exercise of such powers in fulfilment of the statutory functions of
the GPF.

Recruitment
It is instructive to bear in mind that persons of limited
intelligence but who are, nevertheless, conferred with official
powers are likely to bring to bear on the performance of their
duties not the power of intelligence but the power of office. The
induction into the GPF of persons of low or insufficient
intelligence is likely to result in a dilution of the quality of service
offered to the public and the abuse or misuse of statutory power
and authority to the detriment of the respectability and good
image which the GPF must command in the society.

It is a known fact that the GPF, for many years, has been
unable to attract an adequate number of high calibre persons to
enable it to discharge its statutory mandate. This would appear
to be one reason for the low esteem in which the Force is
currently held.

In order to attain the numerical level of personnel

essential, relative to the size of the population and the high
level of criminal activity with its changing face and new social
dangers, the inclination or temptation to relax or lower the level
of qualification must have been great or seen as compelling. But,
yielding to such a temptation or inclination would undoubtedly

71
have resulted in the induction into the ranks of the GPF of a
number of persons who may be unable to satisfactorily function
even under strict supervision. In such a case, it is obvious that
the likelihood of misfeasance and malfeasance would have
assumed preference over the likelihood of non-feasance.

It was a choice hardly worth making and it is not

surprising that the general public is displeased and discontented
with the quality of service which is offered by the GPF. The
indeterminate number of incidents of criminal conduct which
remain unreported due to the expectation of inadequate or
ineffective police responses testifies to the level to which public
confidence in the GPF to perform its statutory duties and to fulfil
its statutory mandates has been eroded.

It is a matter of urgent necessity for the GPF to be re-

invigorated by a substantial infusion of quality membership. The
disinclination on the part of qualified Guyanese to join the GPF
has considerably shrunk the recruitment pool. This disinclination
is unfortunately common among Indo-Guyanese who comprise
approximately 48% of the population, causing quality to be
sacrificed at the altar of quantity. The twin requirements of
quality and quantity are not necessarily inconsistent with each
other provided that the disinclined can be attracted to
membership. Thus, it is essential to take urgent steps to
increase the attractiveness of membership of the GPF.

Presenters have emphasised the need for policing to be

perceived as an honourable and rewarding career, a view which
the Commission endorses. Additionally, steps should be taken to
make a career in policing attractive. Many witnesses argued that
current pay scales are unacceptable and too low to provide an
adequate standard of living; others thought that low pay might
be used as a justification for financial corruption; and yet others
thought that the level of pay should signal the importance of
policing as a profession, and one that is associated with a high
level of risk. Current salaries were cited as an important reason
why some traditionally under-represented groups were not
attracted to the Force.

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 The Commission recommends that the Government
should, as a matter of priority, review the salary structure of the
GPF with a view to making a substantial increase in
remuneration (subject to the imperatives of social welfare
programmes and economic development). The objective is not to
entrench existing incompetence within the GPF but to enhance
the career-attractiveness of policing to attract career-minded
recruits of quality from every sector of the society. Since the
objective is to attract persons of quality for recruitment, it is
recommended that consideration be given to a substantial
increase of pay at the lowest level with diminishing progression
towards the higher levels.

Whenever such increases can be implemented, the

disciplinary and administrative authorities should concomitantly
seek to divest the GPF of the incompetent persons within
enabling statutory provisions. The efforts of the Government and
the disciplinary and administrative authorities of the GPF must
necessarily be complementary to each other to ensure that the
process of reversing the personnel-dilution does not become
unaffordably slow.

Under section 30 of the Act, the probationary period of

service for a person who joins the GPF as a constable is two
years. During this period of probation, security of tenure is
limited and the Commissioner is authorised to dispense with the
services of a probationary constable on the ground of physical
and mental unfitness to perform policing duties or the
unlikelihood of his becoming an efficient or well-conducted
constable at the end of the probationary period. If the constable
is found to be efficient and of good character, mentally and
physically capable of performing the duties of his office and is
well-conducted, he is confirmed in his appointment. It is
important to note that section 30 provides an outline of the
fundamental attributes required of each and every member of
the GPF. These are (1) Mental fitness (2) Physical fitness (3)
Efficiency (4) Good Character and (5) Discipline.

73
 It may well be that section 30 has not been applied with
any degree of seriousness and that many ranks who ought not to
have been confirmed have been confirmed to the detriment of
the image of the GPF and the quality of service provided to the
public. It is necessary that section 30 be applied with due
strictness to ensure that the image of the GPF is restored and
that services of recruits who do not display the qualities required
of membership of the GPF are dispensed with inside their
probationary period of service.

The administrative authority is further empowered to rid

itself of the undesirables within the GPF under section 35 of the
Act. Subject to substantive and procedural fairness which
includes the right to be heard, members of the GPF below the
rank of inspector can be discharged on the ground that, having
regard to the conditions of the Force, the usefulness of the
particular rank or any other relevant circumstance, such
discharge is desirable in the public interest.

The present shortage of personnel of the GPF may militate

against the inclination of the Commissioner to exercise his public
interest power conferred by section 35. However, since section
35 premises the exercise of discretionary power to discharge on
considerations of public interest, the public interest should
dictate whether or not the Commissioner should exercise this
statutory power to discharge. It cannot be in the public interest
to continue to retain members of the Force whose competence is
doubtful or whose continued presence in the GPF can only be
detrimental to the GPF and the public welfare.

The disciplinary codes of the GPF as embodied in the Police

(Discipline) Act are, perhaps, the least objectionable manner by
which the services of members of the GPF can be terminated.
Under those codes, after being charged with, and found guilty of,
a departmental offence, the penalty of dismissal can be imposed
if the circumstances of the case so warrant. Serious or repetitive
breaches can justifiably be visited with the penalty of dismissal.
The Commissioner of Police is constitutionally empowered to
impose such a penalty on defaulting members holding the rank

74
of sergeant or below while the Police Service Commission (PSC)
is constitutionally empowered to so do in the case of defaulting
members of the rank of inspector and above.

The Commission has adverted to the statutory provisions

enabling termination of service to make the point that there are
adequate provisions to facilitate the recommended process of
reversing the personnel-dilution.

The Commission is of the view that the GPF needs not only
to give greater attention to the quality of new basic recruits, but
to plan more effectively for its future officer contingent. There is
a need to develop a strong command structure and recruit
candidates capable of quickly achieving officer and senior
management grades. The Commission comments, elsewhere in
this section, on the issue of cadet schemes and recommends
that these schemes be re-examined.

In its recruitment drive to attract persons of quality to the

GPF, apart from the necessity of substantially increasing salaries,
the administration must aggressively target secondary schools.
Most of the distinguished senior officers in the not too distant
past were recruited as cadet officers from the top secondary
schools. Successful secondary school graduates should be
informed of the accelerated promotion scheme within the GPF
upon completion of cadet officers training with good prospects of
reaching the top echelons of the GPF at an early age. Moreover,
they should be informed that being a member of the GPF does
not stand in the way of obtaining a tertiary education but rather
facilitates and rewards it in the interests of both the officer and
the GPF. Indeed, some witnesses before the Commission urged
that financial and other incentives be provided to GPF members
to reward them for particular skills (e.g., language skills,
management diplomas etc).

Secondary school graduates who have not attained

academic success to enable them to proceed to tertiary level of
education should also be targeted. They should be informed that

75
the GPF offers them an alternative avenue to a successful career
once a sense of commitment and discipline is displayed.

Ethnicity
The ethnic imbalance between the Indo- and Afro-
Guyanese members of the GPF is noted elsewhere in this Report.
This imbalance points in the direction of a marked general
disinclination on the part of the Indo-Guyanese to join the GPF.
Such a general disinclination on the part of the largest
component of the Guyana population has contributed in no small
measure to the numerical deficiency of the GPF to the extent
that the GPF has been, and is being, deprived of the availability
of a substantially larger pool of human resources from which to
select its recruits.

It seems reasonable to suspect or even believe that the

administration of the GPF has felt impelled to make the difficult
choice between quantity and quality in the recruitment policy of
the GPF largely because Indo-Guyanese, who comprise
approximately 48% of the national population, have been
generally disinclined to offer their services to the GPF.

It is unfortunate that Indo-Guyanese who have contributed

so significantly to national development have not felt able to
contribute in proportionate numbers to the GPF when the very
security of the State depends so heavily on an effective, efficient
and professional GPF. The Commission has already made
recommendations to attract Indo-Guyanese to join the GPF when
dealing with the subject of “Ethnic Balance”.

The Commission wishes to point out that, despite the fact

that Indo-Guyanese have invariably been disproportionately
under-represented in the GPF, there has been and is a significant
number of Indo-Guyanese who have achieved commendation,
distinction and high office in the GPF. The achievements of these
Indo-Guyanese members and former members of the GPF belie
the perception among certain segments of the population that
the GPF is an institution in which the contributions of Indo-
Guyanese are unwelcome, unrecognised or unrewarded. They

76
also contradict the uninformed notion that Indo-Guyanese are
physically or attitudinally unsuited to the duties which
membership of the GPF entails.

It is important that such misperceptions be replaced by a

perception that the GPF is a truly national institution that
welcomes, recognises and rewards the contributions of service of
Guyanese of every ethnicity and offers fair and reasonable
opportunities for self-advancement based on merit and
satisfactory work performance and not on ethnicity. The GPF
must promote itself by public dissemination of such relevant
information.

It is not unnatural that recruits unfamiliar with the new

terrain of the GPF, and being at the lowest rung in its rank
structure, suffer from diffidence and are naturally reluctant to
voice any perceived or real grievance or report any problem
which besets them. They are more inclined to abandon the GPF
rather than suffer in silence. Such a problem or grievance may
arise from inter-personal relationships with each other or with
their superiors or from the operations of the system itself.
Recruits must be offered an avenue of having their grievances or
problems addressed in confidence without fear of victimization,
as an alternative to abandoning the GPF.

Training
The academic requirement of a sound primary education
for admission into the GPF seems somewhat archaic and may be
responsible for the lowering of the standards in the GPF. It is
arguable that a sound primary education in the not too distant
past entailed a higher standard of literacy and powers of
reasoning than in the present era. Nevertheless, the kind and
level of training which the duties of being a member of the GPF
demand must be related to the quality of the recruits.

Presumably, there is a minimum of literacy and

comprehension that all recruits must have to be receptive of the
basic training which is to be undergone. The Commission

77
recommends that the minimum educational criteria should be
raised to at least the level of a good secondary education.

It is essential that members of the GPF be properly

instructed as to the extent of their functions, duties, powers and
authority and responsibilities. Since the function of the GPF
involves, essentially, the prevention and investigation of criminal
conduct, members of the GPF must be armed with sufficient
knowledge to distinguish between conduct which is criminal and
conduct which, even if unlawful, is not criminal. Underlying the
functions, duties, power and authority of all members of the GPF
is criminal conduct, whether by commission or omission.
Members of the GPF, therefore, must be able to distinguish
criminal conduct from non-criminal conduct in order to
determine the extent to which their own power and authority can
be exercised. Instances of police involvement in non-criminal
matters have been brought to the attention of the Commission.
Such abuse of police powers is a source of public indignation and
disrespect for the Force.

Since the statutory powers of arrest, seizure and detention

are in derogation of the fundamental civil rights of citizens,
members of the GPF must be made acutely aware of the extent
and limits of their statutory powers under the provisions of the
Act. Any misuse of such power by a member of the GPF would
constitute a violation of the fundamental right of a citizen and
open the GPF to an allegation of abuse of police powers. It must
be clearly understood that the conferment of power under
statute is a responsibility imposed, and not a privilege accorded,
and therefore all statutory powers must be reasonably and
responsibly exercised and not abused or misused.

The law permits members of the GPF to use reasonable

force in effecting arrests. Members of the GPF must be instructed
that the use of excessive force is criminally unlawful and, as
enforcers of the criminal law, they should not infringe it. Since
members of the GPF are normally allowed to carry firearms in
the performance of their duties, they must be properly instructed
as to the circumstances in which it is permissible to resort to its

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use. Training in the proper use of a firearm is an absolute
necessity and those who have not sufficiently been receptive to
such training should not be allowed to carry it. Manuals which
provide members of the Force with guidance as to the proper
use of firearms should be readily available.

Members of the GPF should appreciate the value of

community-friendliness and must be trained to conduct
themselves in a manner that would not alienate or antagonise
the public. Since the very nature of police function is public, and
requires interfacing with members of the public on a daily basis,
members of the Force must be imbued with the understanding
that the public comprises people with an infinite variety of
attitudes and dispositions that will often be at variance with their
own personal values. They must be trained to exercise tolerance
and restraint uniformly so as not to be provoked into the
unreasonable or unlawful use of their statutory powers. They
must be trained to deal with intemperate and unsavoury conduct
without allowing themselves to be provoked into similar conduct
in response. An eminent Guyanese jurist once remarked in a
celebrated case that a member of the GPF cannot be heard to
say that the unpatriotic conduct of a member of the public was
likely to induce him to commit a breach of the peace i.e., he
must behave professionally regardless of the circumstances.

Members of the Force should be trained in courtesy and

politeness. Presenters have expressed disappointment with the
manner in which members of the GPF answer telephone calls and
have described their manner of speech as discouraging. No
doubt, the same impoliteness and discourtesy are often
experienced by members of the public who access police stations
seeking service. Such conduct does not inspire confidence in the
GPF since it reflects fallen standards to the detriment of the
image of the GPF. Some GPF members insensitively display an
open lackadaisical attitude in dealing with complaints and reports
to the dismay of complainants and reporters who leave the
police stations despondent in the justifiable belief that “nothing
will come out of this.” Such conduct is a reflection of a lack of
proper training and a lack of appreciation of the fundamental

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function of the GPF i.e., to protect and serve rather than to
accord a favour of voluntary service.

Police investigators should be trained to fully and

comprehensively investigate allegations of criminal conduct.
Since the objective of the investigator is not simply to discover
the perpetrators of crimes but to obtain evidence to enable
prosecutors to present as much relevant evidence as possible to
the court, investigators cannot be trained to focus simply on the
obtaining of admissions or confessions. Too often, investigations
comprise little more than the arrest of suspects and the
obtaining of admissions or confessions. Many prosecutions fail
for the simple reason that courts refuse to admit into evidence
such admissions or confessions which indicates a lack of training
on the part of ranks performing investigative duties.

Modern criminal investigations tend to utilise and rely on

more scientific methods of investigation and it is therefore
necessary for members of the Force to be specially trained in
various areas of forensic investigation e.g., fingerprint
comparisons, handwriting comparisons, ballistic comparisons,
blood comparisons and hair comparisons. The necessity for the
CID to seek to acquire DNA capability has already been
mentioned and members of the CID should be selected and sent
overseas for specialist training at recognised institutions to
obtain or improve or update their capabilities. The enforcement
of the provisions of the Money Laundering Act will require
investigators with specialist training.

The high incidence of gun crimes and the recent

phenomenon of the use of military weapons by criminals who
operate in gangs and execute criminal enterprises with well-co-
ordinated efficiency matched only by their ruthless and terroristic
slaughter of their victims, speak with clarity to the need for a
highly-trained, well-equipped squad to confront such criminals
with a view to bringing them to justice. In order to avoid human
rights violations, this squad should be continually under training
and must be well-supervised, well- controlled and well-
disciplined. Even though such a squad will be called into

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operation only sporadically as the need arises, its existence
should be a necessity and should have a deterrent effect on
those who are inclined to use firearms and terror indiscriminately
and ruthlessly in the commission of crimes.

One presenter recommended that members of the GPF

should be trained in the martial arts of self-defence such as
judo. Another presenter recommended that members of the GPF
should be armed with electric shock devices which cause
temporary disability. The point made by these presenters is that
the use of a firearm should not be the only means of self-
defence available to members of the GPF. The level of self-
defence responses which must be reasonable depends on, and
varies according to, the circumstances and therefore there is
merit in the point that the use of firearms should not be the only
means of self-defence available to members of the GPF. The
recommendations of presenters for alternative weaponry are
therefore worthy of consideration.

The Commission has noted that members of the GDF are

being trained in martial arts self-defence techniques. If so,
members of the GPF who have the legal duty of enforcing the
law against the unlawful and dangerous on a daily basis would
have a better claim to such training. It has also been pointed out
to the Commission that such training assists in improving
discipline. The Commission is attracted to the idea that members
of the GPF should receive such training especially as section 30
of the Act emphasises the requirement of physical fitness as a
criterion for confirmation of probationers.

The Commission is of the view that the lower the quality of

recruits, the greater the need for extensive and intensive
training to mould or remould the quality of their personalities.
Revision training should also be continuing since the negative
influences of society can overtake the benefits of training with
the passage of time.

The GHRA has recommended that members of the GPF

should be trained in “problem-solving” which, in this context, is a

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technical term meaning that police officers are trained in
considering how best to resolve problems with the minimum
level of force or confrontation -whether it be handling a protest,
interrogating a suspect or handling an irate burglary victim at
the station desk. Police recruits should be trained in defining the
problem, acquiring and analysing information, working out
different possible approaches, and then adapting their approach
to the specific problem to be dealt with.

The Red Thread and Help and Shelter organisations

commended the GPF for committing its members to training in
developing proper attitudinal response to incidents of domestic
violence and child abuse. However, these organisations informed
the Commission that junior ranks have pleaded with them to
ensure that senior supervisory staff are also trained since the
latter give orders which run counter to the training the juniors
receive. These organisations therefore recommend that senior
supervisory staff be exposed to such training in order to avoid
such anomaly and conflict.

The organisations also testified that transfers of trained

staff from frontline areas are at times effected to the
disadvantage of communities benefiting from their services. The
Commission therefore recommends that the placement of staff
should be done after deliberate and careful consideration by
those charged with such duties in which competences they
should be well trained.

The Commission is of the view that recruitment and

training are the two most important factors that affect the
quality of service, reputation and image of the GPF. The need for
quality recruits and proper and relevant training cannot be over-
emphasised. The Commission is of the view that a strategic
approach to training for the GPF is required. Concerns were
expressed about the extent to which the GPF has developed
short-, medium-, and long-term plans for training. The changing
nature of crime, the police response to it, international human
rights standards, and domestic legal developments all require
pro-active, rather than reactive, training programmes. Clear

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objectives need to be set in these plans with emphasis on linking
training with the wider policies in order to ensure effective
succession planning within the Force.

Reference was frequently made in the GPF testimony to its

reliance on foreign training. While this may on occasion be
worthwhile, motivational, and even necessary, the Commission
felt that an over-reliance on training abroad was not necessarily
cost-effective or wise.

Moreover, basic training needs to be conducted to address

the many concerns raised before the Commission. It would seem
for example, that many recruits are unaware of basic
constitutional safeguards around powers of arrest, bail provisions
etc. and that proper instruction on these issues by competent
legal practitioners is essential.

Promotion

It is reasonably safe to assume that all career-minded

members of the GPF are desirous of being promoted. This ought
to motivate members of the GPF, whatever their rank, to
perform competently. But promotion cannot be based only on
competent or satisfactory performance at any given level, rather
there also has to be demonstrated the potential to perform
competently or satisfactorily at the next higher level. Competent
or satisfactory performance at any given level cannot sensibly be
sacrificed or foregone for incompetent or unsatisfactory
performance at the next higher level.

Members of the GPF, who have attained a satisfactory level

of competence in the performance of the various duties at their
level, must be allowed to perform at that level so that the GPF
can benefit from their competence. However, such ranks can, in
the meantime, be identified for possible promotion and be
exposed to training relevant to performance at the next higher
rank. The satisfactory nature of their work performance cannot
and should not per se guarantee promotion but rather guarantee
their identification for, exposure to, and participation in such
training. The level of responsiveness to such promotion training

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should determine whether a particular policeman is considered
for promotion. Only those policemen who have clearly
demonstrated a pre-determined level of satisfactory
responsiveness to promotion training should be considered as
qualified for promotion. This necessarily means that the GPF
must have in place systematic training programmes for staff at
all levels on the basis of which promotions will be made.

The Commission is of the view that GPF members who

have passed promotion training tests should not be promoted
immediately. Rather, successful GPF ranks should understudy,
for a specified period of time, those positions they are
earmarked to replace. Such an approach will impose a
responsibility upon superior officers who are to be promoted, to
share on-the-job information and training with those who are
about to take over their duties. To this extent some measure of
continuity will also be achieved.

Presenters expressed concerns about promotion being left

to the whims and fancies of the personnel making
recommendations to the Commissioner or the Police Service
Commission. As stated above the Commission recommends that
promotion should be based on the passing of standard promotion
examinations that will apply to all who have undergone
promotional training.

The Commission also noted concerns about the lack of

transparency surrounding the current arrangements for
promotion within the Force. The Commission is of the view that
good management practice would suggest that effective and
transparent processes can only exist where adequate systems of
performance appraisal, good record keeping, and appropriate
training are provided for supervisors.

It is vital for the well-being of the Force, and for attracting

highly qualified candidates, that there be a strategic approach to
personnel management that would incorporate recruitment,
training, retention, and appropriate reward via promotion, for
good officers. Promotion Boards must be so composed as to

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inspire confidence in the Force and in the general public as to
their fairness and transparency.

Officers
Of particular relevance to the question of developing the
future leadership of the GPF, the Commission studied the
command and superintendence of the GPF, noting that these
functions are chiefly the responsibility of gazetted officers who
occupy the seven highest grades of the Force from assistant
superintendent to commissioner. In accordance with section 10
of the Act, officers are charged with performing such duties as
might be directed by the Commissioner. These would include
the command of various divisions, departments, branches and
stations, and such officers, subordinate officers and constables,
as may be assigned to them.

The Commission is convinced that the changing nature of

crime in the country and the wider world, and the prevalence of
offences of a trans-national, financial and scientific nature,
require a higher standard of `officer-ship’ than in previous
times. Unfortunately, the method of selecting and training
officers has evidently not been substantially improved to prepare
officers for these changing conditions. It is therefore necessary
to re-examine established methods of selection, training and
appointment in order to determine changes that could be made
to produce officers capable of leading the Force in the future.

Evidence was led to the effect that three schemes

currently exist in the GPF for the selection of cadet officers as
follows.

(1) The “Internal Cadetship Scheme”, established in

accordance with Force Standing Order no. 22, and amended by
Force Order no. 23/85, outlines rules for the appointment of
suitable constables. The Commission is not satisfied that the
basic education and qualification criteria set are rigorous enough
to attract only those of high intelligence, especially in view of the
current requirement for entrants to possess only a sound

85
primary education and the undoubted decline of educational
standards at this level.

(2) The “Accelerated Promotion Scheme” presents

members of the Force below the age of 35 years and with a
sound educational background with the opportunity to be
identified for selection, special training and advancement, once
they have demonstrated commitment and desire to remain in
the Force for at least ten years. The Commission is not satisfied
that this scheme is wide enough to attract the most suitable
citizens, since selection and advancement are uncertain.

(3) The “Direct Entry Scheme”, established in accordance

with Force Standing Order no. 22, and amended by Force Order
no. 23/85, outlines rules for the appointment of suitable citizens
who wish to become cadet officers of the Force. This scheme
which was successfully used in the past to recruit officers who
subsequently held senior positions in the GPF, seems to have
been abandoned as a regular means of selecting cadet officers.
Evidence was also received that there has been resistance to the
scheme by the Police Association.

The Commission raised its concerns about these matters

with the Hon. Ronald Gajraj, Minister of Home Affairs who
affirmed that a scheme would be put in place in the near future
for the training of cadet officers. Notwithstanding these
assurances, the Commission firmly recommends that urgent
consideration be given to the examination of the three schemes
to determine whether any changes are necessary, and what
should be done to place the selection and training of cadets on a
regular basis.

The Commission also recommends that, subject to the

rules for the selection of cadets, because of the number of
vacancies that exist, and the need to produce well-educated
officers, who are skilled in police duties, a Police Academy be
established with at least one intake of cadets every year.

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Recommendations
With regard to “recruitment, training and promotion” in the GPF
the Commission recommends as follows:

26. Career attractiveness should be enhanced by e.g.,

review of salary structure and substantial increases in
remuneration.

27. The probationary period should be used to dispense

with personnel with undesirable character traits before
they become entrenched in the Force.

28. Urgent consideration should be given to the

examination of the three cadet schemes to determine
whether any changes are necessary, and what should
be done to place the selection and training of cadets on
a regular basis. A revitalised cadet scheme could be
canvassed among successful secondary school and
university graduates.

29. Efforts should be made to remove the misperception

that the GPF is the preserve of any one ethnic group
and to promote instead the concept of a unitary
national Force.

30. Recruits should be offered a confidential avenue to air

their grievances.

31. The minimum educational criterion for recruitment

should be raised from a sound primary education to at
least a sound secondary education.

32. All GPF members should be made aware of the limits of

their statutory powers.

33. GPF members should be trained to appreciate the value

of being community-friendly, so as not to alienate the
public.

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34. They should also be trained in courtesy and politeness.

35. Investigators should be trained to fully and

comprehensively investigate criminal allegations.

36. Proper instruction classes about constitutional

safeguards relevant to police functions such as powers
of arrest and granting of bail should be conducted.

37. A Police Academy should be established (with at least

one intake of cadets every year) due to the need to
produce well-educated officers who are skilled in police
duties.

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 Section 4: Ethnic Balance

In this section the Commission examines, how to

“(give) effect to the need in the public interest that the
composition of the Disciplined Forces take account of the
ethnic constituents of the population” and give “particular
attention to …the methods and processes of achieving
greater ethnic balance.”

Ethnicity
Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese comprise the two
largest ethnic components of the Guyanese multi-ethnic society
(approximately 48% Indo-Guyanese and 36% Afro-Guyanese).
In the decade before Guyana secured political independence
from Britain, Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese competed for
dominant political space resulting in a rivalry which has been
sharpened by further religious and cultural differences, though
such differences have been overshadowed by the ethnic-political
rivalry.

In a society beset with such ethnic, political, religious and

cultural differences between the two largest ethnic components,
the rule of law must hold firm to prevent social fragmentation
and to ensure social cohesiveness. Not only must the law be fair,
but it must be fairly administered and enforced. A police force
stands in the forefront of law administration and enforcement
and therefore it is absolutely necessary that the GPF should
enjoy general public confidence in its capacity and resoluteness
to administer and enforce the rule of law without being
improperly influenced by the ethnic-political and other
differences which threaten the integrity of the social fabric.

It is a fact that the numerical strength of the Afro-

Guyanese in the membership of the GPF overwhelmingly
outstripped that of the Indo- Guyanese membership by a ratio of
5 to 1 for at least the past 30 years. Given the acknowledged
cleavages which permeate the body politic, except in rare cases,
this disproportionate Afro-Guyanese numerical superiority has
induced serious feelings of ethnic insecurity within the Indo-

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Guyanese population. Such feelings have not escaped the
activism of Indian rights’ advocates and organisations who have
renewed and re-echoed the historical call for an “ethnic
balancing of the composition of the GPF.”

Significantly, even though the Indo-Guyanese ethnic

insecurity concerns stem from treatment, perceived and/or
actual, by the Afro-Guyanese component of the GPF, few
submissions called for formal quotas. The call has not been so
much for the equating of the numerical strength of the Indo-
Guyanese membership with that of the Afro-Guyanese
membership, but rather for the membership to be so comprised
that the demographic disparity would be lessened to a significant
degree.

It is claimed that underlying the Indo-Guyanese feelings of

ethnic insecurity arising from the Afro-Guyanese domination of
the membership of the GPF is the greater degree of exposure
and vulnerability of the Indo-Guyanese population to racially-
motivated attacks, and the use or non-use of police powers by
the majority Afro-Guyanese membership of the Police in
responding fairly to these criminal acts. Moreover, propaganda
by politicians and some sections of the media seem designed to
exploit the ethnic composition of the Force (e.g., through
references to ‘kith and kin’).

The objective should not be the proportionate or even

equitable sharing of the risk of racial discrimination by members
of the GPF, but the elimination of such discrimination, as far as is
practicable. The concept of an ethnically reconfigured GPF must
be so premised that it would not transfer the negatives of the
ethnic-political rivalry into the membership of the GPF.

Indian rights’ advocates have also submitted that the

Indo- Guyanese cannot, and do not, rest comfortably in the
knowledge that their security and protection lie in the willingness
of a predominantly Afro-Guyanese police force to perform their
statutory duties fairly and to exercise their statutory powers
without regard to any racial/ethnic consideration. Such

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advocates also submitted that there is the ever-present danger
that Afro-Guyanese members of the GPF may, for improper
racial considerations, be unwilling or reluctant to perform their
statutory duties in the protection of Indo-Guyanese, especially
when their interest or security is being violated or threatened by
Afro-Guyanese. Here, the danger may be the result of omission
or neglect by Afro-Guyanese policemen. It is therefore argued
that there is the need to ethnically balance the GPF so that the
Indo-Guyanese population can be served and protected by Indo-
Guyanese membership of the GPF thereby obviating the danger
referred to above. Such an argument is based on the belief of
Indo-Guyanese victims that Afro-Guyanese police officers might
in the past have been disinclined to act in protection of Indo-
Guyanese against Afro-Guyanese offenders with the
consequence that justice was denied to them.

If one were to accord validity to such assumptions, then

the induction of Indo-Guyanese in greater numbers into the GPF
would be principally for the specific purpose of providing
increased protection and security to Indo-Guyanese. Such a
racial polarisation of function could, however, cause racial
cleavages within the GPF. The Indo-Guyanese members might
be inclined to perceive their function mainly as protectors of
Indo-Guyanese, while the Afro-Guyanese members might
likewise be inclined to perceive their function as protectors of
Afro-Guyanese.

The existence of the GPF as a unitary body could be

racially assailed with disastrous consequences for the national
welfare or society at large. In actuality, if the desire on the part
of segments of the Indo-Guyanese population to be protected
and served primarily by their `kith and kin’ were to be causally
related to the induction of a greater number of Indo-Guyanese
into the GPF, this might well be a preliminary step in the
direction of the institutionalising of segregation as a solution to
ethnic-political problems between Afro- and Indo-Guyanese in
general. This would surely be a retrograde step that could
fragment the State itself.

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 Instead, the GPF needs a fair and equitable recruitment
policy that will provide all with an equal opportunity to have their
fears, complaints and interests addressed free of the notion that
racial/ethnic considerations influence their resolution or
determination.

Another submission sought to suggest that Indo-Guyanese

police officers should be enlisted and should be stationed in
predominantly Indo-Guyanese communities. The Commission
considered this suggestion in earnest and is of the opinion that
such a recommendation is fraught with danger.

On the practical level, if an Indo-Guyanese were to level

an allegation of criminality committed against him by an Afro-
Guyanese in a predominately Indian community served and
protected predominantly by Indo-Guyanese members of the GPF,
would the Afro-Guyanese suspect be comfortable with being
investigated by Indo-Guyanese members of the GPF assigned to
protect and serve that predominantly Indian community? It is
hardly likely. His or her discomfort may lie not so much in being
investigated by Indo-Guyanese members of the GPF, but in the
fact that those Indo-Guyanese members of the GPF have the
function and duty of protecting that predominantly Indian
community.

It is therefore difficult to accept the submission that the

desire for Indo-Guyanese communities to be protected by Indo-
Guyanese members of the GPF provides a valid or pragmatic
rationale for reconfiguring the GPF.

Assume that the GPF were to have an ethnic composition

of Afro- and Indo-Guyanese proportionate to their respective
demographic strengths. Assume again that there is public
disorder in which members of one such ethnic group are being
assaulted by members of the other ethnic group for no other
reason than their ethnic differences. Does the fact that the
victims are of a particular ethnicity justify assigning only a
contingent of that ethnicity to restore order? Does the fact that
the aggressors are of a particular ethnicity justify assigning a

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contingent of that ethnicity? It is obvious that from either
perspective of victim or aggressor it would be wrong to exclude
members of either ethnic group from the contingent.

A policy of making lawful efforts to achieve some degree of

balance between Indo-Guyanese and Afro-Guyanese in the
membership of the GPF cannot be faulted in principle especially
as these two largest ethnic components of the Guyanese
population have a history of rivalry for dominant political space.
But such a policy cannot be premised on a rationale which places
emphasis on the negatives of an Afro-Guyanese dominated GPF
while disregarding the same negatives for an Indo-Guyanese
dominated GPF. This may lead to ethnic implosion within the
GPF itself. Any rationale for achieving greater ethnic parity must
consist of positives for both Afro and Indo-Guyanese, and the
nation as a whole, rather than the mere reduction of the
negative effect on one ethnic group at the expense of other
ethnic groups.

The Commission, however, is of the view that the allaying

of ethnic security fears which stems from the predominance of
Afro-Guyanese presence in the GPF must be addressed.
Redressing the ethnic imbalance between the Indo-Guyanese
and Afro-Guyanese within the permissible legal parameters is a
necessary pre-condition to allaying such fears. It is obvious
that, if the fears stem from ethnic imbalance then logically such
imbalance which causes the fears must be redressed. If the
imbalance can be removed, however, the objective should not be
simply to allay Indo-Guyanese ethnic insecurity fears but to
ensure, in so doing, that no similar insecurity fears are caused to
the Afro-Guyanese community, thereby ensuring that such fears
are allayed on all sides.

It is the Commission’s view that this objective can be

achieved by a further policy of admixture and joint deployment
of both Afro- and Indo-Guyanese members of the GPF to
condition their minds to the goal of national rather than ethnic
security. Attitudinal change is extremely important and each
member of the GPF, regardless of his or her ethnicity, must be

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imbued with the ethics of professionalism supported by a strong
sense of team spirit or esprit de corps that transcends racial
sentiments.

In furtherance of this objective, the Commission

recommends that both Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese be
admixed and deployed to face the challenges of criminality as
cohesive units of a cohesive national body. Inter-racial teamwork
must be fostered to engender inter-racial cohesiveness. As one
Indo-Guyanese witness who testified before the Commission put
it, on entering a police station, he must not be made to feel that
he is entering an Afro-Guyanese preserve. Similarly, an Afro-
Guyanese, on entering a police station must not be made to feel
that he or she is entering an Indo-Guyanese preserve.

A national personality must be presented and be made to

function nationally. In reality, other ethnic groups will rarely see
themselves reflected in the personnel when visiting a police
station but, if there is a focus on creating a truly national
personality and on serving all members of the nation equally,
even members of much smaller ethnic groups will benefit from a
greater sense of inclusion.

A policy of admixture and deployment of all the races,

where possible, to work jointly and cohesively will have the
benefit of portraying the image of the GPF as a truly national
institution rather than a one dimensional ethnic organisation.
Such a policy will itself reduce ethnic insecurity fears on all sides
of the societal racial divide and would have an internal deterrent
effect on any police officer tempted to engage in any form of
ethnic bias. Moreover, any Government will be afforded some
comfort in the knowledge that the Police Force, as the foremost
civilian enforcement arm of the State on which the security of
the State is largely dependent, is so ethnically composed as not
to pose any serious threat to governmental stability, even if the
Government has been elected on the basis of ethnic voting.

The implementation of a policy of joint ethnic deployment

and assignment necessarily requires an augmentation in the

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membership of the GPF, principally with respect to Indo-
Guyanese. However, to avoid an imbalance in their favour which
can arouse ethnic insecurity fears, it appears that parity between
the Afro-Guyanese and Indo- Guyanese membership is the most
commendable `balance’ and the desirable goal. As far back as
1965, this was the recommendation of the ICJ Commission, and
we see no reason to alter this highly rational approach.

Incentives
This chapter has concentrated very much to date on issues
of parity as between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese in the GPF.
However, the Commission was aware of the importance of
providing equal opportunities and ensuring adequate
representation for all Guyanese. Therefore, we believe that
efforts to achieve some level of adequate representation for all
the ethnic groups of Guyana in the Police Force must be
informed by a policy of recruitment designed and adapted to
attract under-represented groups, but which at the same time
does not discriminate against any specific ethnic group. Since
admission into the GPF is best achieved on the overriding
principle of non-discriminatory competitive merit, it must be
recognised that complete parity of representation between the
two major ethnic groups may well prove to be an elusive
objective. This objective may well nigh be unachievable simply
because merit may prove to be an unruly horse which resists
being steered in a particular direction. It is for this reason that,
while the idea of ethnic balancing cannot generally be opposed
on principle, there has been a marked reluctance to embrace a
`quota’ system for such balancing. The objective must therefore
be to attain a fair and acceptable level of ethnic representation
based on the ethnic diversity of the nation.

Evidence has been adduced before the Commission that

the ethnic composition of the GPF may be in large part driven by
demographic factors – for example, the differing traditions of
places of residence and occupations of Indo-, Afro- and other
Guyanese. The view was advanced that the Force must be able
to offer competitive salaries and non-salaried benefits which are
sufficient to induce Indo-Guyanese to join the GPF and, while

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this may not be the sole reason for the upgrading of
emoluments, this submission ought to be accorded serious
consideration (depending of course on the availability of
resources) in view of the impact it may have on the prospective
stability of the country.

Some presenters have sought to give the impression that

Indo-Guyanese are intrinsically not suited to the rigorous
training schedule but statistics gleaned from the records of the
British Guiana Special Services Unit in 1964-65 do not support
this misguided notion and an Assistant Commissioner of Police in
his evidence made it quite clear that they are able to cope with
the physical requirements of training.

Anecdotal evidence has also been received by the

Commission of instances of Indo-Guyanese recruits being unduly
pressured by their superiors and trainers to ensure that they
leave the GPF and this may well have led, in the past at least, to
a higher attrition rate. If true, such superiors and trainers do
untold damage to the image of the GPF and it may be necessary
to apply to those superiors and trainers section 39 of the Act
which provides:

Any person who causes or attempts to cause or does

any act calculated to cause disaffection amongst the
members of the Force, or induces or attempts to
induce or does any act calculated to induce any
member of the Force to withhold his service or
commit a breach of discipline, shall be liable on
summary conviction to a fine of twenty-six thousand
dollars and to imprisonment for six months, and in
either case, if a member of the Force, shall forfeit all
pension rights and be disqualified from being a
member of the Force. (emphasis added)

The rules and practices which obtain in the GPF must be

adapted to cater for the needs of an ethnically diverse
workforce. It has been suggested, for example, that Indo-
Guyanese tend to marry and develop family ties early and,
therefore, do not like to be far away from their homes for
extended periods. Indeed, it is unlikely that any Guyanese
police recruits may wish to be stationed for long periods away
from their families, and the Commission believes that no-one

96
should be unnecessarily assigned to police stations which are not
within reasonable reach of their family homes. Where this is not
possible, and it is necessary to assign police officers to stations
far away from their family homes, these assignments should not
be for too extended a period. It is also important to provide
improved family accommodation and family-friendly
arrangements to facilitate such postings.

Other issues raised concerned the need to cater for the

dietary practices of Indo-Guyanese. In order to attract more
Indo-Guyanese, the GPF must be able to provide traditional
Indo-Guyanese meals in a manner which ensures their non-
contamination by pork or beef. People also have diverse religious
beliefs and, while the GDF makes provision for the services of a
full- time Chaplain, catering to the needs of its Christian
members, a Moulvi and Pandit should be officially appointed to
cater for the spiritual needs of Muslims and Hindus. Time off
should be given for religious worship in so far as this is possible.

Whatever non-exclusionary innovative practices are

implemented which may lead to more Indo-Guyanese into the
GPF must be made public for the information of the Indian
community, in particular. There can be little response without
publication.

The Commission wishes to point out that the submission

made by some that a recruitment policy of 75% Indo-Guyanese
to 25% Afro-Guyanese for a period of 5 years (or for any greater
or lesser period) in order to achieve an ethnic balance between
Afro-Guyanese and Indo- Guyanese is constitutionally offensive,
and pregnant with emotive repercussions. Such a
recommendation which was made by the International
Commission of Jurists (ICJ) in 1965 and is referred to in the
terms of reference of this Commission is now repugnant to
article 149 (4) of the Constitution in that it is obviously ethnically
discriminatory. However, the Commission has also given serious
consideration to an alternative process of implementation which
would be predicated upon a provision akin to article 149 (6),
designed to augment the participatory opportunities of the

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Amerindian Community, but the Commission has concluded that
prudence dictates that this procedure should be considered only
as a last resort.

Similarly, any need to achieve a fair and acceptable level

of ethnic balance in the upper ranks of the Force cannot be
satisfied by an ethnically discriminatory policy, which effectively
disadvantages and excludes on the basis of ethnicity.

The Commission recognises and appreciates the practical

difficulties attendant on legitimate non-discriminatory efforts to
achieve even a fair and acceptable level of parity in the Force.
The Commission foresees the real possibility that, despite the
best of non-coercive measures taken, the desirable objective
may still prove illusory — at least in the short term.
Nevertheless, the Commission does not see conscription of Indo-
Guyanese into the GPF as an option. Such conscription would
violate the constitutional provision against forced labour (see
article 140 of the Constitution) and ethnic discrimination (article
149). Nor does the Commission see it as constitutionally
permissible to conscript Guyanese of all ethnicities into the GPF
since, while not infringing article 149; any such action would still
infringe article 140 (forced labour).

In any event, it would not be fair to implement a coercive

system of national conscription because Indo-Guyanese
entertain ethnic insecurity fears but are disinclined to voluntarily
offer their services as members of the GPF. Among the non-
discriminatory measures undertaken in the recent past has been
the establishment of training schools in the two other counties
i.e., Berbice and Essequibo, and the recruitment ratio is
indicating a dynamic which makes for a marked reduction in the
ethnic disparity.

Despite the legal and other constraints, therefore, the

Commission is of the view that, with these permissible inclusive
measures and positive inducements, a movement to the
objective of ethnic balance between the Afro-Guyanese and
Indo-Guyanese membership of the GPF is probable. The

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Commission, however, wishes to caution that the attainment of
ethnic balance will only be skin deep without further effective
efforts to meld or gel the entire membership of the GPF into a
composite unit to remove any attendant or resultant internal
ethnic division which will in turn impact on the level of protection
and service meted out to the public.

The Commission recognises that social engineering, short

of unlawful discrimination, is not only desirable but is justifiable
if the ends result in a more stable society. The recent period has
seen brazen attacks on the GPF resulting in unprecedented
fatalities, leading to a serious reduction in applications to join
the Force and many members leaving. Figures supplied by the
Force suggest that, since 2000, proportionately more Indo-
Guyanese are being recruited than previously. It is important
for the Force to maintain this trend and to attract as wide a pool
as possible of potential recruits. The quality of those recruits
also needs to be improved since, without this, there could be a
tendency for the Force to sacrifice quality for quantity to
maintain its human resource capacity.

The Constitution (particularly article 149) is predicated

upon the existence of equality among the various ethnic
components of the society (except the Amerindians) and that no
ethnic group is less able to qualify and occupy the constitutional
space accorded them on a competitive basis. The fact that Indo-
Guyanese as a group are under-represented in the GPF does not
mean that they are less able or unequal to Afro-Guyanese who
predominate. Equally, the fact that Afro-Guyanese may be
disproportionately under-represented in the area of business
does not mean that they are less able or unequal to their Indo-
Guyanese counterparts.

The ethnic under-representation of Indo-Guyanese in the

GPF is reflective of the historical nuances, cultural cum religious
difficulties and, more generally, the societal patterns which
developed over the last 40 years. Therefore, the ethnic under-
representation of Indo-Guyanese in the GPF cannot attract a
remedy based on ethnic discrimination in favour of Indo-

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Guyanese or any other ethnic group (except, perhaps,
Amerindians). It is the Commission’s view that ethnic under-
representation not caused by, or reflective of, social inequality or
social under-privilege can best be dealt with at this juncture of
our socio-ethnic history by way of social engineering, and not by
ethnic discrimination — even to a limited extent.

The Commission understands that one of the reasons for

its establishment was the notable under-representation of the
largest ethnic group i.e., Indo-Guyanese. Accordingly, this
chapter has focused almost exclusively on the issue of greater
ethnic balance between Indo- and Afro-Guyanese. It is,
however, aware that other groups in society are also under-
represented (e.g., Amerindians and women) and we believe that
many of the proposals made with regard to Indo- and Afro-
Guyanese, will have significance for others as well.

Recommendations
With regard to “ethnic balance” in the GPF the Commission
recommends as follows:

38. It should be an aim to achieve a Force representative of

the ethnic diversity of the nation without employing a
quota system, which would be constitutionally offensive.

39. A forensic audit should be carried out of current trends

of recruitment and the results and subsequent reviews
should be placed in the public domain.

40. Ethnically diverse recruitment and promotion panels

should be employed as openly and extensively as
possible.

41. A policy, distinct from that for recruitment, should be

employed to provide inducements, such as better
conditions of work, for all ethnic groups to remain in the
GPF.

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42. Inter-racial teamwork should be fostered to engender
inter-racial cohesiveness.

43. The rules and practices of the GPF should be adapted to

cater for the needs of an ethnically-diverse workforce,
especially as regards religious beliefs, meals and racial
equality.

44. The membership of the GPF should be augmented,

especially as regards Indo-Guyanese, without
introducing conscription.

45. Effective disciplinary measures must be introduced to

counter any racial or sexual harassment. Additionally, a
commitment should be secured from senior ranks for a
change of attitude in dealing with lower ranks.

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 Section 5: Community Policing

In this section, the Commission examines “ways in

which increased public support and confidence can be
achieved. For example, examine ways of improving (a)
police/community relations; …and (c) the establishment
and functioning of Community Policing Groups.”

The concept of policing communities by communities has

no statutory basis in Guyanese law, but the concept of policing
communities by the police forms part of the general statutory
functions of the GPF and belongs to the realm of public law.

Private Rights
In or about 1986, communities began to take steps to
safeguard and protect their members in response to increased
criminal activities and this has given birth to the formation of a
number of community policing groups (CPG) made up of
volunteer members of their respective communities. These
groups have resorted to the private law remedy of self-help. No
doubt, the perception of the need for self-security and self-
protection is a direct result of failure of the GPF to respond with
some satisfactory degree of expedition, resoluteness and
effectiveness to the increase in crime.

Given the inadequate resources of the GPF, active

encouragement and support are given by the Government and
GPF for the formation of community policing groups. However,
since the activities of such community policing groups are
necessarily limited to the private law remedy of self-help, it has
become necessary for a collaborative approach to be used to
give some legitimacy to this otherwise private endeavour. The
participants are more accurately described as volunteer security
personnel from within their respective communities and a
doubtful form of legitimacy is conferred by the presence of an
on-duty member of the GPF within their group when patrols are
undertaken, or where rural constables are detailed to patrol with
the CPG.

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 Promoters of community policing groups ought not to
induce in the minds of members of such groups the erroneous
belief that, because of the nature of their function, they have
and can exercise police powers without being members of GPF.
It is not the function, but membership of the GPF, which can
clothe them with police statutory power. Such a misconception
can induce conduct which is not merely outside the powers of
private citizens and, therefore, unauthorised by law but which
may itself provoke resentment and breaches of the peace. It
simply poses a danger to the public welfare to have untrained
and unauthorised persons purporting to exercise police powers
under the guise of performing police functions. If there exists
the problem of curbing excesses in the exercise of statutory
police power by trained members of the GPF, it is likely that
there will be an even greater problem by having untrained
persons purporting to exercise police powers.

In view of the present numerical under-strength of the GPF

coupled with inadequate means of communication,
transportation and other equipment, the Commission recognizes
the temptation to encourage communities to fill the vacuum and
make efforts to safeguard their communities against criminal
predators. However, “policing” by community policing groups is
neither a proper nor reliable substitute for policing by members
of the GPF. Not only do members of such groups lack the
statutory powers to enable them to more effectively perform this
function but, since they are under no legal duty to protect even
their own communities, there can be no minimum guarantee of
continuation of such protective service. Indeed, their very
existence as groups is not a matter of institutional certainty. It
would be foolhardy, therefore, to entrust as a matter of policy
the security of communities to community policing groups. The
fact that communities have decided to address their own
communal security concerns, by way of the private right and
remedy of self-help, should provide no inducement to the GPF to
ignore or abdicate its public law responsibility to protect and
serve all communities. It has been said that policing is too
important a function to leave to the Police alone. It may also be

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said that policing is too important a function to be left to the
communities.

Constabulary
It is obvious that, as many presenters on community
policing have pointed out to the Commission, there is need to
institutionalise community policing groups within some
legislative framework. While the Commission endorses this
recommendation, the Commission does not view it as necessary
or sensible to create an elaborate new institutional framework
for community policing. The Commission is of the view that the
existing Rural Constabulary (with the appropriate emendation to
its nomenclature), which is presently under-utilised, should be
used to accommodate and absorb persons who do not wish to
become full-time members of the GPF but who are nevertheless
willing to perform police functions for the limited purpose of
serving, protecting and safeguarding their own communities.

The structure and purpose of this renamed Constabulary

seem tailor-made to accommodate persons who do not wish to
be full-time regular members of the GPF but wish to perform
police functions part-time within their specific communities or
residential localities. Section 2 of the Act defines “member of
the Force” as including rural constables.

Under section 15 of the Act:

Every member of the Force so long as he continues to

be a member thereof, shall have all rights, powers
and authorities, privileges and immunities and shall be
liable to such duties, responsibilities, immunities and
penalties as any member of the Force duly appointed
now has or is subject or liable to, either by the
common law or by virtue of any law which now is or
may be hereinafter in force in Guyana.

Section 90 (1) further provides:

Every rural constable-

(a) shall have all the powers and shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities conferred upon any

104
 constable by any law or Act for the time being in
force.

Members of the Rural Constabulary are members of the

GPF and have the same powers and authorities as regular
members of the GPF. The Commission has noted that many
members of community policing groups have already been sworn
in as members of the Rural Constabulary. The beneficial effect of
having members of community policing groups brought within
the ranks of this Constabulary is not merely to confer them with
statutory power and authority so as to enable them to more
effectively perform community policing functions, but also to
bring them within the administrative control of the officers of the
GPF who serve in their communities.

Section 86 of the Act provides:

Every officer of the Force shall, within the limits of

the place in which he exercises authority in matters
relating to the Force, have the control and command
of the Rural Constabulary and perform the duties in
relation thereto directed by the Commissioner or as
prescribed by the regulations.

Section 90 (1) provides:

Every Rural Constable-

(a) …
(b) …
(c) shall obey all lawful orders given to
him by a magistrate or a justice of
peace, or by a superior officer,
inspector or subordinate officer.

Members of community policing groups are essentially

volunteers. Those members, who have been or are sworn as
members of the Rural Constabulary, fall under the control and
command of officers of the GPF who serve in their respective
communities or respective localities. They must obey the lawful
commands of such officers and the orders of every magistrate,
justice of peace, inspector or subordinate officer in those
communities.

If this proposal is accepted, and it is the objective of the

Commissioner of Police or the Minister to numerically strengthen

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the Rural Constabulary to enable community policing to be
performed by the Rural Constabulary which falls within the
command structure of the GPF, this should eventually eliminate
the danger of civilian vigilantism by motley groups of
uncontrolled and self-interested but concerned citizens. In order
to achieve this, it is important that the membership of these
groups and other interested members of the communities be
carefully screened for appointment to the Rural Constabulary
and that a proper system of training and instruction, relevant to
community policing and other rural constabulary duties, be
implemented for those selected and appointed.

It is instructive to note that mere empowerment with

police powers has the grave danger of substituting civilian
vigilantism with police vigilantism. Moreover, it is imperative
that the performance of community policing functions be
systematically and strictly supervised and monitored. The
Commission received evidence of allegations of physical and
verbal abuse by community policing groups. Such allegations
speak to the need for the training, instruction, supervision and
monitoring referred to above.

The Commission has been made aware that persons are

motivated to join community-policing groups so as to provide
themselves with a `good reason’ for possessing a firearm by
applying for firearm licences. The prescribed authority for the
grant of firearm licences should be alive to such improper
motivations. In any event, the Commission does not believe that
the fact that an applicant for such licence is a member of a
policing group, or even a member of the Rural Constabulary, is a
proper and sufficient basis for the grant of a firearm licence. If
such membership were a `good reason’ within the meaning of
section 18 of the Firearms Act, every member of the GPF, a
fortiorari, would have a `good reason’ for the grant of a personal
firearm licence. But those members of the Rural Constabulary,
who are licensed firearm holders, may be allowed by the officer-
in-charge of the district police station to use their firearms while
on community policing duties — with the proviso that a record

106
be made of such firearms and their holders whenever such
firearms are allowed to be so used.

The Commission is of the view that community policing is

in essence a public law function of the GPF and not a private law
function. Although everyone has a private right to employ the
private law remedy of self-help in protection of his or her
community, the private law remedy of self-help does not extend
to enforcing the public laws relating to criminal conduct but is
restricted and circumscribed by the private law interests of self-
preservation and self-defence. Members of the GPF have the
public law function of protecting and safeguarding all the
communities and such function is not motivated by narrow self-
interest. As such, they are statutorily conferred with enabling
public law powers to stop, search, arrest or detain which are not
available to civilians.

For this reason, the GPF should take the opportunity of

inducting into the Rural Constabulary those members of
community policing groups who are not desirous of joining the
GPF on a full-time basis but who have nevertheless
demonstrated a sufficient degree of public responsibility and
intelligence as to be receptive to training, instruction and
discipline to enable them to perform community policing
functions. Those who are not fit to be so inducted should be
encouraged to act merely as the `eyes and ears’ and not the
`coercive arm’ of their communities.

Recommendations
With regard to “community policing” in the GPF the
Commission recommends as follows:

46. The membership of these groups and other interested

members of the communities should be carefully
screened for induction into the Rural Constabulary and
a proper system of training and instruction relevant to
community policing and other rural constabulary duties
should be implemented for those selected and
appointed. Those who are not fit to be inducted into the

107
 Rural Constabulary should be encouraged to act merely
as the `eyes and ears’ and not the `coercive arm’ of
their communities.

47. There is need to legitimise the practice of community

policing within some legislative framework, so as to
ensure that community-policing functions are
institutionalised, strictly supervised and monitored.

48. The criteria for the grant of firearm licences should not
hinge on membership of a community policing group.

49. The Officers-in-Charge of police stations should

maintain records of licensed firearm holders and their
firearms, whenever they allow them to be used on
community-policing duty.

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 Section 6: Extra-Judicial Killings

In this section the Commission examines “extra-

judicial killings, summary executions and the involvement
of sections of the GPF in illegal activities.”

The term ‘extra-judicial killings’ can be problematic in its

use. In its literal sense, such a term would seem to have no
relevance in a country that does not have the death penalty.
However, the term is normally used to describe killings by law
enforcement agencies whether or not the country has the death
penalty. Killings by law enforcement agencies may be either
lawful or unlawful and, there is a popular tendency of using the
term ‘extra-judicial killings’ even if such killings are plainly
lawful. Therefore, the term ‘extra-judicial killings’ is used to refer
to killings by law enforcement agencies, which may or may not
be unlawful whether or not the country has the death penalty.

Right to Life
The right to life is the most primary of all fundamental
human rights. The Commission received sufficient testimony to
raise serious concern about the alleged violations of this most
basic right, in Guyana, in recent years. Indeed, it is the unusual
level of killing by the police that in part led very directly to the
establishment of this Commission. It is of grave concern to the
people of Guyana that in the period January 2002 to the end of
June 2003, the GPF has lost more police officers than in its
previous 164- year existence. Twenty-one police officers have
been killed following the infamous jail- break of 23rd February
2002. Regardless of the particular circumstances, these deaths
were generally seen as calculated attacks on the very fabric of
law enforcement. Individuals expected by society to protect and
serve it were killed in the line of duty.

Of particular concern to many witnesses was the fact that

police were in turn actively engaged in killing others. The level
of fatal shootings carried out by the police is extremely high.
According to figures supplied to the Commission, sixty-two
people were killed by the police or in joint forces operations

109
between early 2002 and the end of June 2003. Without seeking
to justify this spate of killings the Commission is not unmindful
of the great upsurge in violent crimes in which high-powered
weapons were used.

Guyana has the death penalty. However, even in countries

that have abolished the death penalty, the right to life has
always been recognised as not being absolute since it can be
overridden or superseded by the rights of others. The common
law has always recognised the right of one person to deprive
another of his life in lawful self-defence or defence of property.
Members of the GPF are no less entitled to so do in self-defence
or in defence of another or of property, to effect lawful arrests,
to prevent escape from lawful custody, to maintain public order
or to prevent the commission of a crime – provided that the use
of deadly force is not unreasonable. It is not the killing per se,
whether by a private citizen or a member of the GPF, but the
circumstances in which it has occurred which determine whether
or not the killing is lawful. Our Constitution itself, while
recognizing the primacy of the right to life, speaks to the nature
of that right not being absolute.

Article 138 (1) provides:

No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save

in execution of a sentence of a court in respect of an
offence under the law of Guyana of which he has been
convicted.

while article 138 (2) provides:

Without prejudice to any liability for a contravention of any

other law with respect to the use of force in such cases as
are hereinafter mentioned, a person shall not be regarded
as having been deprived of his life in contravention of this
article if he dies as a result of the use of force to such
extent as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of
the case —

(a) for the defence of any person from violence or

for the defence of property;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the

escape of a person lawfully detained;

110
 (c) for the purpose of suppressing a riot,
insurrection or mutiny; or

(d) In order to prevent the commission by that

person of a criminal offence...

For the purposes outlined in article 138 (2) (a), (b), (c) or (d),
where a killing has resulted from the use of force, such killing is
not in violation of the right to life under article 138 (1) if the
degree of force is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of
the case.

The fact that a citizen or a member of the GPF has the

lawful authority to apprehend, to prevent an escape from lawful
custody or to maintain law and order does not translate into a
right to use deadly force. However, circumstances may exist or
arise which may render even the use of deadly force justifiable.

One issue which came to the attention of the Commission

was the fact that there may well be some misperception that
arises in relation to the legal use of deadly force. In the context
of Guyana, where the old common law distinction between
felonies and misdemeanours still obtains and where the old
common law doctrine of implied or constructive malice still has
application, the distinction between reasonable force and deadly
force can be very illusory unless it is clearly understood that the
killing of a member of the GPF in the course of resisting a lawful
arrest by him for a felonious crime constitutes murder in the
resistor despite the absence of an intention to cause even
serious bodily harm on the part of the resistor.

In Archbold (Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal

Law) 36th Edition p. 937, the learned author stated in para. 2522
(a):

If an innocent person is charged with a felony, and an

attempt is made to arrest him for it without warrant, and
he resists and kills the party attempting to arrest him; if
the party attempting to arrest were a constable, the killing
would be murder; if a private person, manslaughter;
because the constable has authority by law to arrest in
such a case but a private person has not. And it is the
same in all cases where the arrest is made or attempted to
be made upon a reasonable suspicion of felony.

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The logical corollary of the law is that, when a person against
whom there exists an allegation of the commission of a felony
resists an attempted lawful apprehension for that felony by a
member of the GPF, he may not be simply resisting lawful
apprehension for that felony but may be doing a dangerous act
which has the potentiality of resulting in the commission of
murder rather than manslaughter despite the absence of any
subjective or objective intention to cause serious bodily harm to
the member of the GPF. Since the common law views any such
dangerous act of resistance as an act committed in the course of
a forcible felony, and since the member of the GPF is acting
under legal authority or duty to effect the arrest, the common
law renders justifiable the use of deadly force by the member of
the GPF in order to defend himself against such a dangerous act
of resistance. Nevertheless, in so doing the police ought to be
guided from their training by the cardinal doctrine that such
force must be the minimum necessary to achieve the objective.

The learned author of Archbold 36th Edition stated in para.

2527 (1) at p. 940:

Where an officer is resisted in the legal execution of his

duty, he may repel force with force; and if in so doing, he
kills the party resisting him, it is justifiable homicide; and
this in civil as well as criminal proceedings...And the same
applies to persons acting in aid of such officer. Thus, if a
peace officer has a legal warrant against B for felony, or if
B stands indicted for felony, if B resists and in the struggle
is killed, the killing is justifiable... So if a private person
attempts to arrest one who commits a felony in his
presence or interferes to suppress an affray, and is
resisted and kills the person, this is also justifiable
homicide…And this is so not merely on the principle of self-
defence (for the officer or private person is not bound to
retreat...) but upon that principle and the necessity of
executing that duty the law has imposed upon him jointly…
Still there must be apparent necessity for the killing; for if
the officer were to kill after the resistance had ceased ...or
if there were no reasonable necessity for the violence used
on the part of the officer, the killing would be
manslaughter at the least. Also, in order to justify an
officer or private person in these cases, it is necessary that
they should, at the time, be in the act of legally executing
a duty imposed upon them by law, and in such
circumstances that if the officer or private person were
killed prior to the Homicide Act 1957 it would be murder.

112
Reasonable Force
The law which presently obtains in Guyana is that which
obtained in England prior to the passing of the English Homicide
Act 1957. The above dicta illustrate the extent to which the
common law frowns upon felonious crimes and to which it
provides protection to persons acting with lawful authority or in
the execution of a legal duty to suppress such crimes. The
resistor to an arrest is constructively invested with at least an
intention to cause serious bodily harm whenever resistance is
done with dangerous force and the arresting member of the GPF
becomes entitled to use reasonable force to prevent serious
bodily harm to himself.

The question of whether the degree of force used is

reasonable pales into insignificance and the issue becomes
simply whether the resistance reasonably poses harm to the
arresting member of the GPF. If it does, the use of even deadly
force is justifiable on the basis that it is reasonable to use such
force to prevent the infliction of serious bodily harm to the lawful
arrestor. To this extent, the use of deadly force is then equated
with reasonable or even minimum force, which is the
underpinning of the principle by which members of the GPF are
guided.

The extent to which the common law operates in

protection of persons acting in lawful execution of their duty or
with lawful authority to effect arrest for a felonious crime is
further illustrated by the following passage in para. 2528 (3) of
Archbold’s 36th Edition at p. 941:

When an officer or private person having legal

authority to apprehend a man, attempts to do so,
and the man, instead of resisting, flees or resists
and then flees, and is killed by the officer or private
person in the pursuit: if the offence with which the
man was charged were a treason or felony, or a
dangerous wounding or he could not otherwise be
apprehended, the homicide is justifiable.

Thus, the common law therefore permits members of the

GPF to use deadly force to prevent the escape by flight of a
person who is accused of, or reasonably suspected of, the

113
commission of a felony if such force is the only means of
preventing his escape.

The common law therefore permits members of the GPF to

use deadly force in dealing with dangerous resistance to, or
flight from, apprehension for felonies which, were the offences
not felonies, the degree of force may not be reasonably
justifiable. Article 138 (2) (b) of the Constitution draws no
distinction between felonies and other offences in relation to
lawful arrests or the prevention of escape of lawfully detained
persons. However, the common law does make such a
distinction, which is neither expressly nor impliedly inconsistent
with article 138 (2) (b), and such a distinction is of great
significance in determining whether the use of deadly force is
reasonably justifiable in effecting lawful arrests or preventing
escapes of persons accused or reasonably suspected of
commission of felonies. In effect, despite article 138 (2) (b), the
common law lays down that the use of deadly force is in fact
reasonably justifiable where there is dangerous resistance to
lawful arrests for felonies or the escape of persons accused or
reasonably suspected of the commission of felonies cannot be
prevented except by the use of deadly force.

The Commission has received evidence that there is a

perception that members of the GPF are allowed to commit
extra-judicial killings with impunity. Such a perception seems to
have resulted from the fact that members of the GPF are not
often the subjects of criminal charges before the Courts for
‘extra-judicial killings’ or the fact that the Office of the DPP has
sometimes intervened to terminate privately instituted criminal
proceedings for such acts in favour of inquests. The Commission
has seen it fit to highlight with some degree of extensiveness the
application of the felony-murder rule since the application of this
rule may not be fully understood and may be of explanatory
relevance to the decisions of the prosecutorial agencies. This
pivotal rule has always been and still is part of the criminal law
of Guyana. The Commission has been led to conclude that
perception-driven rather than knowledge-based conclusions by
some sections of the Public tend to criminalise, perhaps

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unjustifiably, these ‘extra-judicial killings’. The Commission has
been at pains throughout its work to ensure that its
recommendations address the real underlying problems, and it
seems to us that at least one of the causes of the perception of
police impunity rests on this legal distinction between felonies
and misdemeanours, and therefore needs to be addressed.

No presenter, including the Office of the DPP, the GBA

(Guyana Bar Association) or the GHRA, has made any
recommendation for the abolition of the felony-murder rule.
However, the Commission has seen it fit to raise this issue with
the acting DPP and the President of the GBA. It is interesting to
note that neither has expressed the view that the felony-murder
rule should be abolished at this time. The view was expressed
that the hands of the prosecution and the GPF should not be
weakened at this time when there is an upsurge of felonies of
violence. Accordingly, the Commission does not feel able to
recommend simply that the felony-murder rule be dropped,
given that it will have implications beyond the problem of police
killings.

The Commission has received a large body of evidence in

which the GPF has been accused of summary execution of
suspects who have not resisted arrest or have surrendered. It
would be unlawful for a member of the GPF to use deadly force
in the course of arresting even a felon if the felon has not
resisted arrest, has ceased to do so, or has surrendered. It
would be likewise if the felon resists lawful arrest without posing
any danger of physical harm to the arrestor.

One must distinguish between mere resistance and

resistance which poses the danger of physical harm. If the
resistance does not pose any danger of physical harm, there can
be no constructive or implied malice under the felony-murder
rule (i.e. an intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm), and the
use of deadly force is unjustifiable. Should the allegations be
true, the Commission is driven to emphasise that members of
the Police Force cannot lawfully use deadly force in the course of
arresting felons or suspected felons who have not resisted or

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have surrendered, or even on those who have resisted without
posing any danger of physical harm to the arrestor.

The view has been expressed that the difficulties of

obtaining convictions because of reluctant witnesses and
perceived weaknesses both in prosecutorial processes and the
judicial system may be the rationale for members of the GPF
summarily executing persons known or even perceived to be
guilty of serious violent felonies. Sections of the society may
have added to this impetus by approving of such Police vigilante
justice. A citizen’s right to life cannot be lost at the instance of
unlawful vigilante justice even with societal approval.

One presenter forcefully and vociferously submitted that

those who take up arms against the forces of law and order
should not be allowed to call in aid constitutional protection.
Such a view is representative of a fundamentally flawed
perception that, because the right to life is not absolute, it can
be forfeited or surrendered. As a public law right, the right to life
cannot be privately surrendered, though it can be superseded by
the right to life of others or the public interest. The right to kill in
self-defence is premised not on the surrender of the right to life
by an attacker but by the supersession of that right by the
absolute right of the defender to act reasonably in his own self-
preservation. The death penalty also is premised on the
supersession of public interest over the right to life.

The actions of members of the GPF must be premised on

and informed by their own right to act reasonably in self-
defence, preferably by the use of minimum necessary force, in
the course of their public duty and not on the false notion that
certain types of criminals have forfeited their right to life. It is
crucially important that members of the GPF appreciate that
criminals do not surrender or forfeit their human rights by their
actions, however heinous. Failure to appreciate this concept on
the part of members of the GPF, and indeed on the part of
society, fuels vigilante justice.

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 The fact that society often expresses satisfaction and even
happiness when members of the GPF kill suspected criminals,
whether in circumstances of justification or not, indicates that
Guyana has moved perilously close to accepting vigilante justice
as a solution to its crime problems. This does not augur well for
its social and institutional health since it represents a no-
confidence vote in the overall legal system of criminal law
enforcement. Therefore, urgent attention should be given to
effecting improvements in the entire system of criminal law
enforcement- the police, prosecution agencies and the Judiciary.
This holistic approach is recommended since the remedy lies not
in tinkering with the symptoms but in rooting out the causes.

Use of Force
It is important to distinguish between the use of force
which was intended to cause death and the use of force, which
was not intended to cause death. Article 138 (1) is concerned
with an intentional killing which is reasonably justifiable. Article
138(2) is concerned with the use of force which causes death
whether or not death was an intended consequence but which
was reasonably justifiable in the particular circumstances.

Article 138 (1) would be violated if there is an intentional

killing of a wanted man without any intention of arresting him or
of bringing him to face the court processes. This would occur
where a member of the GPF intentionally kills a wanted man
without any intention of arresting him to face the court
processes. However, article 138 (1) is not violated where the
intentional killing is reasonably justifiable or where there is no
intention to kill. The Constitution is silent on the circumstances
of killing where there is no intention to kill but the degree of
force used is not reasonably justifiable. However, the common
law is not; it provides for conviction for manslaughter. Cases of
summary execution are clearly confined to article 138(1) i.e.,
where there is an intentional killing without reasonable
justification.

While the view has been expressed that the GPF must be
sufficiently equipped with effective firepower to deal with the

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military-type arms currently being used by criminal elements,
presenters have expressed concern about arming members of
the GPF with firearms that they are not sufficiently trained or
sufficiently responsible to use. The mere fact that a member of
the GPF is allowed the use of a firearm for the performance of
his duties should carry with it the presumption that (1) he is
permitted to use it in the proper execution of his duties (2) he is
sufficiently trained to use the firearm and (3) he is sufficiently
responsible to exercise a proper discretion as to when he can
resort to the use of the firearm. It is doubtful whether members
of the public can safely rely on the third presumption. The
quality of personnel who are allowed to be equipped with
firearms for the performance of their duties leaves much to be
desired. It has already been mentioned that quality seems to
have been sacrificed at the altar of quantity and the ranks who
are usually assigned frontline duties which have the potential for
danger seem to be those junior ranks to whom firearms are
thoughtlessly issued.

The Commission feels impelled to recommend that not

only should ranks be trained and properly instructed as to the
circumstances in which the use of the firearm can be resorted to
but that, despite such training, only those who have clearly
demonstrated a requisite degree of responsibility should be
allowed to carry firearms. Too often, junior ranks who have
been issued with firearms seem to view the possession of a
firearm as a privilege and source of power rather than the
conferment of an onerous responsibility. On occasion, where it
is considered necessary to equip junior ranks with firearms for
frontline duties and the responsibility element is doubtful in such
ranks, they should be under the control of a mature, responsible
and experienced supervising rank. This would no doubt occur
when ranks are required to do patrol duties in dangerous
localities.

The Commission is of the view that, with the current

international emphasis on greater respect for human rights input
in policing operations, it will eventually become necessary to
review the felony-murder rule whenever the social conditions

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seem conducive to such a legal development. The consequence
will be that the latitude of the police to employ deadly force will
be severely curtailed. The Commission recommends that
immediate steps be taken to re-orient the attitude of the GPF in
the employment of deadly force in anticipation of such abolition.
The Commission has received no recommendation that this rule
should be immediately abolished but foresees that Guyana
cannot for much longer have an important aspect of its criminal
law hinging on a fictional intent which renders the primary right
to life less absolute especially as the death penalty has been
held to be constitutional.

In addition to better training for police officers, the

Commission has made a number of proposals elsewhere in its
report that should have an impact on the dramatic level of
killings by the police, for instance:

• To establish a dedicated or distinctly identifiable Coroner’s

Court to reduce the backlog on inquests and inquiries.
• To provide the Coroners with independent investigative
resources.
• To make it obligatory to hold an inquest in all cases where
police officers were involved in a person’s death.
• To ensure greater independence in the arrangements for
investigating complaints against the police.
• To introduce clearer terms of reference and lines of
command for any specialist units likely to be involved in
confrontations with armed and dangerous criminals.

Indeed many witnesses have indicated that the problems

underlying the high level of killings by police can be laid at the
door of poor recruitment standards, weak investigative skills and
expertise, corruption and/or failings in the wider criminal justice
system and these also have been addressed elsewhere in this
report.

It is to be hoped that the combination of all these changes

will make a dramatic impact on this scourge of questionable
killings by police. It is vital that crime prevention and thorough,

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professional investigation become the bedrock of future policing
in Guyana. Killing supposed criminals is at best a short-sighted
approach to protecting society and the killing of innocent by-
standers debases human life. Over the longer term, the
indiscriminate and lethal use of force risks seriously undermining
the rule of law, and everyone’s security. People’s safety can
only be truly secured by having a law enforcement service, and a
criminal justice system, that work effectively in tandem to
uphold the rule of law.

Recommendations
With regard to “extra-judicial killings” by the GPF the
Commission recommends as follows:

50. During training, emphasis must be placed on the fact

that the use of minimum necessary force is always to
be preferred, even in confrontations with armed and
dangerous criminals.

51. Appropriate instruction and training should be given to

policemen about the circumstances under which they
may resort to the use of the firearm.

52. Permission to carry firearms should be restricted to GPF

members who clearly demonstrate a high degree of
responsibility. On occasion, where it is considered
necessary to equip junior ranks with firearms for
frontline duties and the responsibility element is
doubtful in such ranks, they should be under the control
of a mature, responsible and experienced supervising
rank.

53. In anticipation of the abolition of the felony-murder

rule, immediate steps should be taken to re-orient the
attitude of the GPF regarding the use of deadly force.

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 Section 7: Accountability to Civilian Authority

In this section, the Commission examines, among

other things, the “relationship with, and responsibility to,
the civilian authorities” and “financial and public
accountability.”

The GPF is a statutory body charged with statutory

functions (section 3 of the Police Act). Under section 7 of the
Act, the Commissioner of Police is charged with the general
command and superintendence of the GPF. The rights and
powers of all members of the GPF derive from and are set out in
the provisions of the Act.

Jurisdiction
Since the GPF is a public body with public law functions
and its members are all public officers who exercise public law
powers in the performance of their public law duties, all acts and
omissions by members of the GPF are open to review by the
High Court at the instance of any aggrieved member of the
public. The GPF has not been established as a corporate body
under the Act and therefore the Commissioner as the person
having the command and superintendence of the GPF is the
official whom the High Court calls upon to answer for the acts or
omissions of members of the GPF.

The Commissioner of Police, at the instance of any

aggrieved member of the public, can be called upon to answer
for the misfeasance, malfeasance or non-feasance of the
statutory functions and duties of the GPF. The High Court usually
calls upon the Commissioner to show cause why any one or
more of the prerogative writs of Habeas Corpus, Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus should not be issued against him on
the basis of prima facie evidence of unlawfulness, irrationality,
procedural irregularity or omission to do what ought to be done
according to law.

Of course, anyone can approach the High Court for

constitutional redress on an allegation that his or her

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constitutional right has been contravened or is likely to be
contravened by the GPF or any of its members and the High
Court has a wide discretionary power under article 153 of the
Constitution to provide appropriate redress. But, the invocation
of the High Court can be a costly exercise beyond the financial
affordability of many citizens. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of
the High court is often seen and invoked as the most effective
and reliable avenue for making the GPF and its members
account for their actions or inactions.

There is a popular misconception that public criminal

proceedings can be instituted only by members of the GPF and
that the GPF is the sole arbiter as to whether or not public
criminal proceedings should be instituted. The Commission
wishes to point out that, under article 187 (1) of the
Constitution, the Director of Public Prosecutions has the power
and authority:

(a) to institute and undertake criminal

proceedings against any person before any
court, other than a court-martial, in respect
of any offence against the law of Guyana

(b) to take over and continue any such criminal

proceedings that may have been instituted
by any other person or authority; and

(c) to discontinue at any stage before judgment

is delivered any such criminal proceedings
instituted by him or any other person or
authority.

Thus, the DPP can institute and undertake criminal proceedings

against any person where the GPF has omitted to do so and can
discontinue criminal proceedings instituted by the GPF where the
DPP is of the opinion that the criminal proceedings should not
have been instituted. Moreover, the DPP can take over and
continue criminal proceedings instituted by the GPF where the
DPP sees it fit to do so e.g., if the DPP is of the opinion that it is
not in the public interest for the GPF to conduct the prosecution
against a member or members of the GPF. It should be noted
that only the DPP can take over and continue or discontinue
criminal proceedings without the leave of the court.

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Article 187 (3) provides:
The powers conferred upon the Director by
subparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph (1) shall be
vested in him to the exclusion of any other person or
authority.

Provided that, where any other person or

authority has instituted criminal proceedings,
nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the
withdrawal of those proceedings at the instance of
that person or authority and with leave of the court.

Article 187 (4) provides:

In the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by

this article the Director shall not be subject to the
direction or control of any other person or authority.

The DPP is therefore functionally independent and has the

power to assume exclusive control over all criminal proceedings
to the extent of discontinuance without leave of the court. Such
constitutional power brings all prosecutions instituted by the GPF
within the over-arching power of the DPP. The GPF needs to be
mindful of its conventional obligation to give effect to the advice
by the DPP in light of the constitutional powers of the DPP.

Accountability
In an effort to ensure that improper or unlawful conduct on
the part of members of the GPF can be reported, investigated
and redressed, Parliament in 1989 established the Police
Complaints Authority (PCA) and conferred it with functional
independence. While the PCA is extrinsic to the GPF and is
functionally independent, the effectiveness of its functional
independence is necessarily limited by, and to the extent of, its
statutory functions.

In the crucial area of investigative supervision, the

Commission has recommended in section 8 of this Report that
the supervisory investigative power of the PCA should in time be
extended to other categories of serious offences e.g., corrupt
practices and that the Minister, in the performance of his duty
under section 6 of the PCA Act, should provide the PCA with
officers capable of assisting him in his supervisory investigative
function. Such officers should not be members of the GPF even

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though former officers of the GPF can be appointed. The idea is
not only to extend or expand the statutory powers of the PCA
but to strengthen its institutional capabilities so that the GPF can
be made more effectively accountable to civilian authority for
alleged professional misconduct which has a serious criminal
element.

The PCA must possess the institutional capability to

discharge its statutory functions. Otherwise, as a legal institution
which is crucial to the accountability of members of the GPF for
criminal and less serious kinds of misconduct to civilian
authority, it will remain weak and ineffectual and fail to inspire
public confidence.

It has been mentioned in section 10 of this Report that the

Coroners Act, Chapter 4:03, mandates any member of the GPF
to whose knowledge an unnatural death has been reported, to
report the same forthwith to the coroner and mandates the
coroner to investigate the circumstances in which such death has
occurred by way of an inquest or inquiry. Therefore, whenever
there is a killing of a person by anyone, including any member of
the GPF — whether lawfully or unlawfully — the coroner must
investigate by way of inquest or inquiry. Such investigation is
separate and distinct from any police investigations into the
killing. The GPF is therefore accountable to the coroner for all
cases of police killings whether any such killing is alleged to have
been committed lawfully or unlawfully.

It is instructive to note that, under section 15 of the

Coroners Act:

(1) An inquest shall be held in every case of the

death of any person confined in any prison, or in any
lock-up or place of confinement for persons accused
or convicted of having committed any offence except
in cases where it is not practicable to obtain the
services of a sufficient number of jurors.

(2) No person connected with the prison service or

with the Police Force shall be summoned to serve as
a juror on the inquest.

Thus, the GPF is accountable to the coroner in an

independent investigation by way of inquest or inquiry for the

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death of any prisoner, however caused, which occurs in a police
lock-up.

As the Commission has noted in this Report, coroners have

not been able to perform their duties satisfactorily in accordance
with the Act and this omission has detracted from the
accountability of the GPF for killings which have been committed
by the GPF or which have occurred in police lock-ups. The
Commission has highlighted in section 10 of this Report some
institutional weaknesses of coroners.

Under section 7 (1) of the Police Act, the Commissioner of

Police is responsible to the executive authority of the Minister
responsible for Home Affairs. It has already been mentioned that
section 7 (1) must be construed as limiting the executive
authority of the Minister to giving orders and directions of an
executive nature to the Commissioner and not as to extending to
intrusion on a case-by-case basis into the administrative
authority of the Commissioner to command and superintend the
GPF. While the Minister is accountable to the National Assembly
for the exercise of his executive authority to give general orders
and directions to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner is
responsible to the Minister for the general administration of the
GPF, the Minister has no disciplinary control or authority over the
Commissioner who holds constitutional office.

The Commissioner can be suspended from office only if the

Prime Minister or the Chairman of the Police Service Commission
(PSC), acting in accordance with article 225 (4) of the
Constitution, advises the President that the question of removing
the Commissioner from office for inability to perform his duties
should be investigated and the President, having referred the
matter for investigation to a tribunal appointed by him in
accordance with article 225 (4), is advised by the PSC that the
Commissioner should be suspended from holding office pending
the investigation. Only if the tribunal, after concluding its
investigation, recommends to the President that the
Commissioner ought to be removed from office, the President
can exercise his power to do so.

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 In the view of the Commission, while the Commissioner is
responsible to the Minister for the general administration of the
GPF, it is fit and proper that the Minister remains powerless to
discipline the Commissioner since this would render the
Commissioner institutionally dependent on the political Minister.
However, it seems fit and proper that the Commissioner should
be responsible to the executive authority of the Minister for the
general administration of the GPF, since the Minister has
executive responsibility to the National Assembly for the internal
security of the country.

While the disciplinary arrangements for the Commissioner

are clear in the Constitution, it appears that the GPF is unsure as
to whether the exercise of disciplinary control over Deputy
Commissioners of Police is equally clearly prescribed by the
Constitution. The Commission has examined the provisions of
the Constitution, along with related statutory provisions, and is
convinced that the Constitution does provide for the exercise of
disciplinary control over Deputy Commissioners.

While Deputy Commissioners are appointed in accordance

with the procedure which applies equally to the Commissioner of
Police (article 211(1)), it is correct that they cannot be removed
from office or otherwise disciplined by the same constitutional
processes which apply to the Commissioner.

Article 211(4) provides:

The provisions of article 225 (which relate to

removal from office) shall apply to the
Commissioner, and the prescribed authority for the
purposes of paragraph (4) of that article shall be the
Prime Minister or the Chairman of the Police Service
Commission, and for the purposes of paragraph (6)
of that article shall be the Police Service
Commission.

Thus, article 211 (4) applies to article 225, and article 225,
while it applies to removal from office of the Commissioner, does
not apply to Deputy Commissioners.

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Article 212 (1) provides:

Subject to the provisions of article 211(1) the power to

make appointments to any offices in the Police Force of or
above the rank of Inspector, the power to exercise
disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such
offices and the power to remove such persons from office
shall vest in the Police Service Commission. (emphasis
added)

Clearly, article 212(1) vests the power to exercise

disciplinary control over and to remove all persons holding or
acting in offices of or above the rank of inspector in the PSC.
Deputy Commissioners, being holders of offices above the rank
of Inspector, can therefore be disciplined or removed from office
by the Police Service Commission.

But, under article 212 (2) of the Constitution, the Police

Service Commission may, by written directions, delegate any of
its powers under article 212 (1) to either the Commissioner of
Police, or any one or more of its members, or any other member
of the GPF. Therefore, the power to exercise disciplinary control
over, or to remove a Deputy Commissioner from office, lies in
the Police Service Commission or its delegate which may be the
Commissioner, or any one or more of its members, or any
member of the GPF (which is quite unlikely in the case of a
Deputy Commissioner).

Under section 3(1)(a) of the Police (Discipline) Act,

Chapter 17:01, there is no right of appeal where a decision is
made by a majority of the members of the Police Service
Commission. But an appeal would lie to the Police Service
Commission if that power has been exercised by the
Commissioner or any member or members of the Police Service
Commission as delegates (not being a majority of the Police
Service Commission) (Section 3 (1) of the Police (Discipline) Act.

While Deputy Commissioners are appointed in the same

manner as the Commissioner of Police, the procedure governing
disciplinary control and removal from office is different. It

127
should be noted, however, that under the Police (Discipline) Act,
there is a variety of penalties which can be imposed upon
Deputy Commissioners for misconduct. On the other hand, when
article 225 is applied to the Commissioner, the only issue is
whether he should be removed from office, either for inability to
discharge the functions of his office or misconduct. Those are
the only two grounds on which the Commissioner can be
removed from office.

Acting inconsistent with the general orders and directions

of the Minister made under section 7(1) of the Police Act may
constitute such misconduct. However, if the Minister acts ultra
vires his statutory power to give general orders and directions,
the Commissioner cannot be guilty of misconduct. The
importance of defining the nature and extent of ministerial
power under section 7 (1) of the Police Act is not insignificant.

Proposals
In addition to testimony regarding the existing statutory
relationship between the Commissioner of Police and the
Minister, the Commission received a number of testimonies
proposing further models for ensuring civilian accountability. It
would be impossible to cite them all, or explore each of them in
the depth required, but all of them seek to ensure that the police
are held to account effectively for their actions.

One series of proposals related to having some kind of

civilian involvement in the oversight of policing. The GHRA
proposed a Civilian Oversight Board such as found routinely in
other countries. Its duties would include developing a national
policy on crime and security, producing an efficient police force
which could attract good candidates, and establishing an
impartial mechanism for complaints.

The Guyana Bar Association (GBA) proposed a civilian

board appointed by the National Assembly and responsible to the
Minister for the general administration of the police. Whereas,
the Commissioner would act as the day-to-day manager of the

128
police, the board (which would meet on a regular basis) would
have overall management responsibility.
In other submissions, civilian panels were proposed for
specific areas of work e.g., a civilian panel to determine the
granting or revocation of firearms licences. The Minister of Home
Affairs indicated that the Government is considering establishing
an advisory body (a National Commission on Law and Order)
that would include politicians, religious leaders, labour
representatives and other members of civil society.

Other contributors concentrated on the role of Parliament

in the oversight of the police. The PNC-R noted that the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has recommended that there
should be parliamentary oversight committees in each member
country to oversee law enforcement. The African Cultural and
Development Association (ACDA) argued that a parliamentary
oversight committee should oversee the work of the Police
Services Commission. The Rise Organise and Rebuild Guyana
Movement (ROAR) argued for a parliamentary Protective Forces
Commission.

Yet others commented on, and often proposed changes

to, the systems that already exist, for example, the role and
composition of the Police Services Commission. The Guyana
Private Sector Commission argued that the Police Service
Commission needs to be broadly based and address key policing
issues such as promotion, discipline, addressing corruption, and
the development of good practice guidance. Another submission
argued for a Judicial Services Commission that would look at
both policing and criminal justice issues and be independent of
political control with members of civil society.

The Commission recognised that several of these options

might have merit, but thought it particularly important to
comment on the responsibility of the Minister to report to
Parliament on policing issues. Policing is carried out for the good
of the general public and, therefore, the public has a right
through elected representatives to hold the police to account.
Ensuring the accountability of the police in matters of public

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safety is an issue of paramount importance in terms of national
security.
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that a
Commission on Public Safety be established by Parliament to
safeguard this public interest. It envisages that this body would
hold the Minister of Home Affairs accountable to Parliament in a
way similar to the function performed by the Public Accounts
Committee in relation to the Finance Minister. If this
recommendation is accepted, it will be a matter for Parliament to
decide the exact terms of reference for the new Commission.

Consideration might however be given to issues such as

the need for the Police to report regularly to the public on its
work both by an annual report and other such materials; the
collection and dissemination of statistics about levels of crime
(and different kinds of crime), and police success and failure
rates, which would allow the public to assess what is and is not
working well; and the need for the police to improve its public
relations function.

Recommendations
With regard to “accountability to civilian authority” the
Commission recommends as follows:

54. On account of the DPP’s constitutional powers, the GPF

should be mindful of its conventional obligation to give
effect to advice by the DPP; only in rare cases should a
different course be taken.

55. Parliament should establish a Commission on Public

Safety to which the Minister of Home Affairs would be
answerable.

56. Matters of priority for such a Commission could include

the police annual report and the collection and
dissemination of crime statistics.

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 Section 8: Complaints against Police

In this section, the Commission examines, among

other things, issues of public accountability and discipline.

Public confidence in the police can be greatly strengthened

by the existence of clear mechanisms for ensuring transparency
and accountability. Effective police complaints systems are an
important building block in ensuring a weeding out of the bad
elements and encouraging good practice by all officers. In an
effort to ensure that misconduct by members of the GPF can be
reported, properly investigated and, if necessary, be the subject
matter of appropriate disciplinary or criminal charges, Parliament
passed the Police Complaints Authority Act 1989, under which
the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) was established.

Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the Police Complaints Authority is
invoked by (1) a complaint made under section 8 of the Act by
any person who has reasonable cause to believe that a member
of the GPF is guilty of some form of professional misconduct; (2)
a complaint made or information given under section 12 of the
Act that a member of the GPF has unlawfully caused the death of
a person or has committed an offence under sections 48, 49, 50,
55, 56 or 57 of the Criminal Law (Offences) Act, CAP. 8:01
(Offences relating to injury to the person).

It should be noted that any member of the GPF who has

received a complaint or information that any of the offences
mentioned in section 12 has been committed by any member of
the GPF commits an offence against discipline if he or she omits
to forthwith inform the PCA of the particulars of the complaint or
information.

Where an allegation of misconduct under section 12 of the

1989 Act is made, the PCA refers the complaint to the
Commissioner of Police for an investigation to be conducted.
After completion of investigations, the Commissioner must
submit a report to the PCA for its comments thereon; these

131
comments must be taken into account in deciding whether to
institute disciplinary charges against the suspected offender. On
the conclusion of investigation into the disciplinary charges, the
Commissioner must submit another report to the PCA for its
comments. These must be taken into account before punishment
is imposed by the Commissioner or, depending on the rank of
the offender, the Police Service Commission. Thus, while the PCA
has no investigative role into such allegations, its
recommendations must be taken into account at both stages of
the disciplinary process.

The situation is different where the complaint or

information relates to offences within the purview of section 12
(i.e., charges of causing unlawful death or injury to the person).
The PCA is required by statute to supervise the investigations,
which must be conducted by an appropriate member of the GPF,
approved by the Chairman. After completion of investigations,
the policeman or woman must submit to the PCA a report
containing a summary of the steps and proceedings taken into
the investigations, and the PCA’s conclusions. The PCA, after
considering the evidence and other matters relevant to the
investigations, must submit to the DPP a statement containing
(1) whether the investigations were conducted to his
satisfaction; (2) any particular(s) in respect of which the
investigations were not conducted to his satisfaction; and (3)
any other prescribed particulars. Copies of this statement must
be forwarded to the Commissioner and the Minister. In deciding
whether a prosecution should ensue, the DPP or the
Commissioner must pay due regard to that statement of the
PCA.

Additionally, by section 10 of the 1989 Act, where a

complaint to the PCA relates to the refusal or failure of any
member of the GPF in charge of a police station or breach to
record any complaint or information, the PCA, upon being
satisfied that the complaint or information ought to have been so
recorded and investigated, is empowered to direct that member
to record the information and investigate the same. Any failure
or refusal without lawful excuse to comply with such a direction

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constitutes misconduct for the purposes of the Police (Discipline)
Act. Section 10 therefore confers a useful intrusive power into
the command and operational structure of the GPF,
notwithstanding the amplitude of power reposed in the
Commissioner under section 7 of the Police Act CAP. 16:02.

By section 18 of the Act, the functional independence of

the PCA is assured since it “shall not be subject to the direction
or control of any other person or authority”, an independence
akin to that of the DPP.

The PCA has been in existence since 1989 – 14 years. Yet,

for a 14-year-old public institution, its impact on public
consciousness and public confidence has been very limited.
Several persons appearing before the Commission, who alleged
that they were the victims of unlawful police violence or other
misconduct, testified that they never knew of the PCA’s
existence. Other witnesses attributed their failure to contact the
PCA to a lack of confidence in that institution. Others claimed
that they made reports to the PCA, but either heard nothing
from it, or received no positive results.

The Commission was made aware of a variety of recent

initiatives taken by the present incumbent of the office to make
his office and his functions better known, including visits outside
of Georgetown, the production and distribution of a leaflet,
contact with the police and individual lawyers, etc. It is however
clear to the Commission that the functions, powers and duties of
the PCA must be made a matter of much greater public
awareness. Complainants, in particular, must be kept aware of
actions taken by the PCA on their concerns.

As noted, section 12 requires the PCA to supervise certain

police investigations. The Commission is concerned that this
does not appear to always happen, and it has been advised by
the Chairman that the PCA’s supervisory investigative power is
considerably constrained by the lack of information, human
resources and/or dilatory responses from the GPF. In other
words, while the COP and the Chairman may enjoy a good

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working relationship, the flow of the requisite information to
enable the PCA to undertake and perform statutory supervisory
investigative duty needs serious review.

It is a breach of discipline for any member of the GPF who

has received a complaint or information of any unlawful killing by
a member of the GPF or the commission of any offence under
sections 48, 49, 50, 55, 56, or 57 of the Criminal Law (Offences)
Act to fail to forthwith inform the PCA. No case of any member
of the GPF being disciplined for such an omission has been
brought to the attention of the Commission. It is possible that,
even 14 years after the PCA Act has been passed, members of
the GPF are generally unaware of their responsibilities under the
said Act. This is a matter of police training and instruction
lagging behind social reality and, therefore, in need of attention.

The Commission has been informed that the police

generally investigate such complaints or reports, and then
forward the results of the completed investigations to the Office
of the DPP for advice. In such cases, it does appear that the PCA
is completely side-lined or disregarded, even if inadvertently.
The result is that, in the more serious matters i.e., allegations of
criminal offences committed by members of the GPF as
mentioned in section 12, the supervisory investigative
jurisdiction of the PCA is circumvented.

The main criticism levelled against the PCA Act by

presenters is that it leaves the Police to investigate the Police,
albeit under the supervision of the PCA in relation to the more
serious complaints mentioned in section 12. Presenters have
advocated that PCA should have its own civilian investigative
body to conduct its investigations in this regard. The
Commission, however, is of the view that such investigations are
more suited to persons who are trained, empowered, and are
likely to achieve the desired results. This means that such
investigations should be conducted by trained police
investigators. To inspire in such investigative activities greater
confidence the Commission believes that they must be officers
approved, and directly responsible and accountable to, the PCA.

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 Moreover, disciplinary offences are eminently suited for
investigations by members of the GPF since they are basic to the
welfare and function of the GPF. However, the Commission is of
the opinion that police investigators who are approved by the
PCA to conduct investigations under its supervision should carry
such investigations from the office of the PCA and not from the
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) within the GPF.
Additionally all approved investigators should be seconded and
transferred to the office of the PCA so as to facilitate the
requisite level of effective supervision by the PCA, and remove
any misperception that their investigations are supervised and
controlled by the GPF rather than the PCA.

It should be noted that under section 20 of the PCA Act:

It shall be the duty of every member of the Force to

render to the Authority and the officers and
employees provided to the Authority under Section 6
such assistance as the Authority may request for the
purpose of discharging the functions of the
Authority.

Under section 11 of the PCA Act, the refusal or failure

without lawful excuse by a member of the GPF to comply with
any direction or request made to him by the Authority
constitutes misconduct or misbehaviour. Therefore, even though
investigations are carried out by members of the GPF, such
investigators and other members of the GPF are not free to
frustrate the investigative supervision of the PCA, or its
supervisory investigative officers, with impunity.

The Commission received credible evidence that the office

of the PCA is under-staffed and otherwise under-resourced and
that, if it were to perform all its statutory duties, it would be
hard pressed even if it had its full staff complement. Allegations
of police misconduct have increased appreciably and the
Commission therefore recommends that the Minister fulfil his
statutory responsibility as mandated by section 6 of the Act
which states:

The Minister shall provide the Authority with a

Secretary and such other officers and employees as

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 are required for the proper performance of his
functions.(emphasis added)
It is recommended that these officers and employees
should include persons drawn from the pool of retired police
officers (particularly from the CID) and others with the requisite
skills-related competence. With this injection of resources, and
important new authority to investigate all serious complaints
against the police, it is to be hoped that the PCA will become a
much more dynamic and energetic office. The Chairman, and
other panel members, should do much more media and public
outreach work and should continue to organise routine and
regular sessions outside of Georgetown. In the longer term,
serious consideration should be given to the PCA having
additional offices outside of the capital.

It is vitally important that the PCA be, and be seen to be,

independent. One issue which concerned the Commission was
how best to ensure the PCA’s financial independence. No formal
recommendations about the necessary arrangements were
agreed, but the issue is sufficiently serious to engage
parliamentary attention.

Furthermore, the Commission believes that, in time, it may

be appropriate to increase the range of serious offences,
including corruption, made subject to the oversight and
investigation by the PCA and, in this regard, the PCA may truly
achieve the desired objective in the eyes of the general public.

Recommendations
With regard to “complaints against Police” the Commission
recommends as follows:

57. Training and instruction should be provided for

policemen to create awareness of their responsibilities
under the Police Complaints Authority Act.

58. The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) should be

provided with an investigative team consisting of
trained police investigators who are directly responsible
and accountable to the Authority.

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59. All investigators functioning in such a capacity should
be seconded and transferred to the PCA for the purpose
of transparency.

60. Staffing of the PCA should be completed in accordance

with its legislation utilising retired police officers an
others with requisite skills and competence.

61. The independence of the PCA should be maintained by

providing more administrative and financial resources.

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 Section 9: Firearm Licences

In this section, the Commission examines the “rules,

regulations, criteria for granting and controls regarding
issuance of firearm licences.”

Since, in Guyana, there is no fundamental or constitutional

right to bear arms, whether in self-defence or in defence of
others or in defence of property or country, Parliament has the
absolute authority to make provision for the importation, sale,
possession and use of firearms and for the registration and
licensing of firearms.

Authority
Parliament has exercised this authority by enacting the
Firearms Act, Chapter 16:05. The grant of firearm licences is
governed by section 18 of the Firearms Act. Section 18(1)
provides:

An application for the grant of a licence under this section

shall be made in the prescribed form to the prescribed
officer for the area in which the applicant resides…

Section 18(2) provides:

A licence or permit shall be granted by the

prescribed officer in such cases only in which he is
satisfied that the applicant has a good reason for
purchasing, acquiring or having in his possession the
firearm or ammunition… and can be permitted to
have in his possession that firearm or ammunition
without danger to the public or to the peace:

Provided that a licence or permit shall not be

granted to a person whom the prescribed officer has
reason to believe to be prohibited by this Act from
possessing a firearm to which this Part applies, or to
be of intemperate habits or unsound mind, or to be
for any reason unfitted to be entrusted with such a
firearm.

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Under Section 45(1),

The Minister may make regulations for any of the

following purposes-

(b) appointing a person to be the prescribed officer

for any purpose under this Act and prescribing the
area within which such person shall exercise
authority.

It can readily be seen from sections 18(1) and 45(1)(b)

that Parliament did not itself prescribe a person to be the
authority for the granting of firearm licences but empowered the
Minister to do so by regulation. Parliament must have intended
that the Minister himself should not have the direct statutory
function of granting firearm licences but rather should be
statutorily responsible for appointing a fit and proper person to
do so. It is instructive to note that, by comparison, under section
32, Parliament has directly conferred the Minister himself with
the power to authorise the possession of fully automatic firearms
or machine-guns (as such firearms are commonly called). This
power is usually employed for the purpose of arming
enforcement agencies in consonance with the nature of their
duties.

Under Regulation 3 of the Firearm Regulations made by

the Minister under section 45(1)(b) of the Act, it is provided:

For the purposes of sections 18,19,20,27 and 40 of the

Act, the prescribed authority for every police division
(within the meaning of the Police Act) shall be the police
officer for the time being in command of the Police in that
division and any police officer under his command not
below rank of assistant superintendent.

Thus, the prescribed officers for the purpose of section 18

are the divisional commanders and officers of or above the rank
of assistant superintendent under their command — not because
Parliament has so designated but because the Minister has so
designated by uniform Regulations made under section 45(1).

Presenters on behalf of the GPF informed the Commission

that the procedure which is applied to the assessment of firearm
licence applications is contained in Standing Order 91/ 1964 of

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the GPF. On the application of the procedure contained in the
said Standing Order, it has historically been the practice for a
firearm licence to be granted by divisional commanders only if
the Commissioner of Police and /or the Minister approve the
application of the grant. On the other hand, a firearm licence is
not granted if the Commissioner or Minister disapproves of any
proposed grant. The practice has become so commonplace and
ingrained that applications for firearm licences are routinely
addressed to the Commissioner of Police rather than to the
prescribed authority, i.e., the relevant divisional commander for
the area in which the applicant resides.

It is the considered view of the Commission that Standing

Order 91/64 cannot be lawfully substituted for the provisions of
section 18 of the Firearms Act and Regulation 3 of the Firearms
Regulations. A standing order made by a Commissioner of Police
cannot replace section 18 of the Firearms Act and regulation 3 of
the Firearm Regulations. The procedure that applies to the
applications for firearm licences is the procedure prescribed
under the Firearms Act and not the procedure made by a
Commissioner of Police, whether or not made under the Police
Act.

The Commission believes that Standing Order 91/64 has

originated from a misperception of the application of section
7(1) of the Police Act. The fact that section 7(1) of the Police Act
confers on the Commissioner that overall function of command
and superintendence of the entire GPF subject to the general
orders and directions of the Minister might well have long
inclined those officials to the erroneous view that they have the
statutory authority to arrogate to themselves the statutory
function of Divisional Commanders (as prescribed officers under
regulation 3 of the Firearms Regulations) under section 18(2) of
the Firearms Act on the principle of administrative or executive
superiority.

The power of the Commissioner to command and

superintend the GPF and the power of the Minister to give
general orders and directions to the Commissioner, are powers

140
conferred under the Police Act and have nothing to do with the
statutory function of divisional commanders as prescribed
officers under the Firearms Act and, vice versa. If it were
otherwise, the powers conferred on the Commissioner and the
Minister under section 7(1) of the Police Act would necessarily
entail a power to procedurally amend section 18(2) and
Regulation 3 on the principle of administrative and executive
superiority –a clear transgression of the principle of separation of
powers. Certainly, neither the Commissioner nor the Minister has
the power of statutory amendment of the Firearms Act or
Regulations made thereunder by virtue of sections 7(1) of the
Police Act.

The Commission accepts that there might have been good

and valid reasons for the making of Standing Order 91/64 and
that such reasons may still be of current relevance. If, however,
the Minister believes that Divisional Commanders cannot be
relied upon to properly perform their statutory function, the
remedy lies not in administrative or executive usurpation of their
statutory functions under the Firearms Act but rather in the
utilisation of his ministerial regulatory powers under section 45
(1)(d) of the said Act, especially having regard to section 45(2)
of the Act. Under section 45(1) of the Act:

The Minister may make regulations for any of the

following purposes-

(a) prescribing the form of firearm licence and of all

other documents required by this Act;

b) appointing a person to be the prescribed authority

for any purpose under this Act and prescribing the
area within which such person shall exercise
authority;

(c) prescribing any other thing which under this Act

is to be prescribed;

(d) regulating the manner in which any person is to

carry out his duties under the Act

while section 45(2) provides:

Regulations under this section may be of such a nature as
to render more strict the operation of any of the provisions
of this Act and in such case the said provisions shall have
effect as limited by regulations as aforesaid.

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 The Minister can, under section 45(1)(d), make regulations
under which prescribed officers (divisional commanders) are to
execute their statutory duties and such regulations can
effectively limit and restrict the operations of the provisions of
the Act in relation to the granting of firearm licences. Thus, while
the Minister cannot, by regulation, amend the statutory criteria
for the grant or refusal of firearm licences, he can by regulation
prescribe a procedure by which prescribed officers are to be
satisfied that such criteria have been met-particularly if such
procedure entails limiting the scope of the statutory authority of
such prescribed officers to grant licences. It is recommended
that the Minister utilise his regulatory power under section 45 of
the Firearms Act (1) to impose upon divisional commanders the
procedural duty of seeking the opinion of the Commissioner as to
whether there is any reason why an applicant is unfit to be
entrusted with a firearm and (2) to render the opinion of the
Commissioner that an applicant is so unfit presumptively
conclusive on prescribed officers in every original application for
a firearm licence. Such a regulatory procedure would be in
consonance with Standing Order 91/64 and section 45 (2) of the
Firearms Act since it would relate not to widening but to
restricting procedurally the authority of prescribed officers to
grant firearm licences.

It is the Minister who has statutory responsibility for

carrying the provisions of the Firearms Act into effect (Section
45(1)(b)) and it is the Minister who appoints prescribed officers
(Section 45(1)(b)) and can prescribe the procedure by which
such prescribed officers are to carry out their duties under the
Act (Section 45(1)(b)). It is the Minister on whom Parliament
has reposed general responsibility for firearms control. However,
it is important to note that Parliament intended that his powers
should be exercised by uniform and standard Regulations and
not by direct supervision.

While the Minister regulates by such Regulations, there is a

need for some authority to have a supervisory function over
such prescribed officers to ensure that they comply with the
provisions of the Act and the ministerial Regulations. It does

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appear to the Commission that the Commissioner of Police who
already has administrative control over divisional commanders in
the performance of police functions under the Police Act, is the
fit and proper person on whom this supervisory power over
divisional commanders as prescribed officers in the performance
of their functions under the Firearms Act, should be reposed. The
Commissioner should, in turn, be responsible to the Minister for
the performance of his supervisory functions.

It is therefore recommended that Regulation 3 of the

Firearms Regulations be amended by the insertion of the words
“and every such prescribed officer shall be under the supervision
of the Commissioner of Police who shall be responsible to the
Minister for the performance of his supervisory function” at the
end of Regulation 3. Such an amendment falls within the ambit
of section 45(1)(d) and (h).

Interpretation
The above recommendations in the nature of regulatory
amendments will impose the requisite supervisory control over
the authority of divisional commanders as prescribed officers in
consonance with the objective and substance of Standing Order
91/64, which has been misconceived and misapplied as far back
as in 1964. It must be noted that the Minister takes the view
that Standing Order 91/64 has not been misconceived and is
being applied intra vires the Police Act. But the Police Act has
nothing to do with the granting of firearm licences.

The Commission is of the view that the Standing Order is

ultra vires the Firearms Act and that the two Acts cannot enjoy a
marriage of convenience so as to allow executive and
administrative authority conferred by section 7(1) of the Police
Act to override the statutory authority of the divisional
commanders as prescribed officers under section 18 of the
Firearms Act. The Commission sees the need for this irregular
practice to be regularised in accordance with the law and has
accordingly made recommendations for such regularisation given
the wisdom which underlies Standing Order 91/64 which has

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been applied by successive Commissioners and Ministers since
1964.

It is significant that the function imposed or conferred by

section 18(2) of the Firearms Act on the prescribed officers
involves the performance of a duty rather than the exercise of a
discretionary power.

Section 18(2) provides:

A licence or permit shall be granted by the

prescribed officer in such cases only in which he is
satisfied...(emphasis added)

while the proviso to section 18 (2) states:

Provided that a licence shall not be granted…

(emphasis added)

While the word “shall” can be interpreted to mean “may”

depending on its contextual use, the words “shall” and “shall
not” do appear to be mandatory in the context of section 18(2)
and not discretionary. Section 18(2), therefore, mandates a
prescribed officer to grant firearm licences on application but
only where he is satisfied that (1) the applicant has good reason
for possessing the firearm applied for ; (2) possession of the
firearm by the applicant will be without danger to the public
safety or the peace and where he does not have any reason to
believe that (a) the applicant is prohibited by the Act from
possessing a firearm; or (b) the applicant is of intemperate
habits or unsound mind; or (c) the applicant is unfit for any
reason to be entrusted with a firearm.

If all of these statutory criteria or requirements for the

grant of a firearm licence have been satisfied, the prescribed
officer has no discretionary power to refuse the grant. On the
other hand, if any single statutory criterion has not been met,
the prescribed officer has no discretionary power to grant the
application.

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 Section 18(9) of the Firearms Act confers on the applicant
the right of appeal by way of written petition to the President
from a refusal by the prescribed officer. But, significantly, there
is no provision that enables any other authority, except the
prescribed officer himself, to revoke a licence that has been
granted in disregard of the criteria specified by the Firearms Act
(section 18(8)). In effect, only the prescribed officer can review
and revoke his own grant while the refusal to grant is appealable
to no less an authority than the President himself. What happens
if the prescribed officer does not review and revoke his own
grant which has been made in disregard of a criterion specified
by the Act? Nothing happens. More significantly, it would seem
to be an anomaly that section 18(8) appears to confer a
discretionary power, rather than a duty, on the prescribed officer
to revoke a licence on grounds that specifically relate to non-
compliance with the statutory requirements for the mandatory
grant. Section 18(8) provides:

A firearm licence may be revoked by the prescribed officer

for that area in which the holder resides if

(a)the prescribed officer is satisfied that the

holder is prohibited by this Act from
possessing a firearm to which this Part
applies, or is of intemperate habits or
unsound mind, or is otherwise unfit to be
entrusted with such a firearm, or for any
reason cannot be permitted to have in his
possession without danger to the public
safety or to the peace such firearm as may
be included in the licence; or

(b) the holder fails to comply with any notice

under sub-section (6) requiring him to
deliver up the licence. (emphasis added)

It is the view of the Commission that if the prescribed officer

becomes satisfied that the holder of the licence does not meet or
no longer meets any of the statutory criteria for the grant,
revocation should be mandatory and not discretionary.

Moreover, if it is desirable to enlarge the scope of remedial

action against any unlawful or improper grant made by a
prescribed officer or any improper omission to revoke a grant
which does not satisfy, or no longer satisfies, any of the

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statutory criteria, the Commissioner should also be conferred
with the statutory power and duty of revocation. In other words,
section 18(8) should be amended to read as follows:

A firearm licence shall be revoked by the prescribed officer

for the area in which the holder resides or by the
Commissioner

(a) if the prescribed officer or the

Commissioner is satisfied that…

Such a revocation can be the subject matter of

an appeal to the President under Section
18(9).

Implementation
The Commission does not view it as inappropriate that the
Minister has, by Regulation 3, appointed divisional commanders
of the GPF as prescribed officers. The issue of the granting of
firearm licences is a matter of internal security and it is prudent
to confer such a function on officers who ought to know the
people in their respective divisions or are at least in a position to
readily acquire such knowledge. However, the Commission does
see the need for strict supervision and control by the
Commissioner of such Commanders in the granting of firearm
licences.

The Commission has been made aware of a significant

number of revocations of licences made on the ground of
improper or unwarranted use or breach of the conditions subject
to which the grants have been made (See Form 1). The
Commission wishes to point out that such revocations,
individually and collectively, point in the direction of ill-
considered grants and insufficient regard to the criteria which
govern such grants. The Commission has been alerted,
anecdotally, to the possibility that many grants have been, or
are being made on the basis of extra-legal considerations. In
fact, some presenters have recommended the revocation of all
firearm licences and for re-grants based on individual reviews of
all grants made. The Commission is of the view that revocation
cannot be done generally without infringing important legal
procedural safeguards, and can be done only on proper grounds
in each individual case. However, the Commission finds it

146
instructive to bring to the notice of all concerned in the
processes of granting firearm licences that the Act leans heavily
against liberal grants. Section 18 (2) of the Act provides:

A license or permit shall be granted by the

prescribed officer in such cases only… (emphasis
added)

while the proviso to section 18(2) states:

Provided that a licence or permit shall not be

granted…(emphasis added)

Due reverence must be paid to the prohibitory words “in

such cases only” and “shall not be granted”. Such words are
severely restrictive, tightly circumscriptive and are binding on
prescribed officers.

The Commission has been made aware that the word

“grant” used in section 18 may lead to some confusion since,
under section 18(5), firearm licences continue in force until the
end of the calendar year-and are “re-granted” thereafter
annually. The Commission takes the view that prescribed officers
are entitled under the law to review every existing grant
annually and may refuse to re-grant a licence. However, the
exercise of such a power of refusal to re-grant cannot be
exercised except for good cause and after affording the applicant
a right to be heard. An unsuccessful applicant can appeal to the
President under section 18(9) or apply to the High Court for
Writs of Certiorari and Mandamus to be issued against the
relevant prescribed officer. It should be noted that the
Commission, in its previous recommendation for regulatory
changes, has recommended that the prescribed officer must
seek the opinion of the Commissioner of Police as to whether an
applicant, who is not already the holder of a firearm licence, is fit
or unfit to possess a firearm. Such a regulatory duty would not
apply to an application for an annual re-grant. The Commission
sees the necessity of clarifying this issue since every annual
firearm licence commences with the words:
Licence is hereby granted...

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 Even though the firearm licence may be an annual re-
grant, it does not appear that the Firearms Act views the re-
grant as a mere renewal of an expired annual licence for revenue
purposes.

Concerns have been expressed about the manner in which

firearm licences are being granted and the involvement of the
Minister of Home Affairs in the process. It does appear to the
Commission that such concerns are rooted in an irregular
practice that began since 1964. The Minister of Home Affairs has
general overall responsibility under the Firearms Act for
regulating and controlling the grant of firearm licences and it
seems meet that the supervising authority should be accountable
to him for ensuring that the provisions of the Act and the
Regulations made by him are duly complied with. However, it
does not appear that the Firearms Act contemplates that the
Minister should have a veto over proposed individual grants or
refusals. While nothing appears to be intrinsically wrong with
prescribed officers seeking to ascertain whether any person,
including the Minister, has any ground for objecting to any
proposed grant of a firearm licence, any objection or non-
objection should not be viewed by prescribed officers as
conclusive of the issue as to whether to grant or refuse an
application, but merely as a factor to be taken into account in
deciding the factual issue as to whether the applicant is fit to
possess a firearm. Objection or non-objection certificates issued
by the Ministry of Home Affairs have to be so viewed.

Even though members of the GPF are conferred with

functions and authority under the provisions of the Firearms Act,
and the Regulations made thereunder, such functions and
authority fall under the governance of the Firearms Act and not
under the Police Act. Under the Firearms Act, the Minister is
conferred with power to make Regulations that can be restrictive
of the operation of any of the provisions of the Act itself (Section
45 (2). Regulatory control over firearms must therefore be
exercised by the Minister under such wide powers to make
Regulations and not erroneously under any provision of the
Police Act that gives him the authority to give general orders and

148
directions to the Commissioner. To purport to exercise
regulatory control under the Police Act is to needlessly attract
allegations of unlawful political interference in the processes
relating to the grant or refusal of firearm licence applications. No
doubt, such allegations have been made against many Ministers,
perhaps — from a purely legal point of view — with justification.

Recommendations
With regard to the process governing the grant of “firearm
licences” the Commission recommends as follows:

62. Regulatory amendments to the Firearms Act should be

introduced in order to bolster supervisory control over
divisional commanders who grant firearm licences, in
keeping with the general objective of GPF Standing
Order 91/64.

63. The Commissioner of Police should continue to have

strict supervision and control over divisional
commanders with regard to the granting of firearm
licences.

64. The GPF should adhere strictly to the statutory criteria

for the grants of firearm licences.

65. No attempt should be made to correct previous

indiscriminate grants of firearm licences by a general
recall and re-issue of existing licences.

66. The Minister of Home Affairs should utilise his statutory

powers to make standard and uniform regulations with
regard to firearm licensing so as to guard against
allegations of political interference.

Note: Annexed herewith is the independent view of

Commissioner C.R. Ramson S C on his interpretation of
the process governing the grant of firearm licences.

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 FIREARM LICENCES

This area of concern contained in the Terms of Reference

of the Commission has received a great deal of attention both at
the time of the receipt of testimony and when the Commission
met in caucus to deliberate on the collective Report. For the
avoidance of doubt I set out hereunder the issue contained in
paragraph 2 (a) (v) of the TORS:
“The Rules, Regulations criteria for granting and controls
regarding issuance of firearm licences.”

This development was not totally unexpected in the light of

the misperceptions based on rumours at worst, and second-hand
information at best, from the presenters, other than the COP and
the MOHA. Some of the testimony sought to suggest a level of
nuanced skullduggery at the highest Executive levels, while
others insinuated a usurpation of the functions of the Competent
Authority, leading to general public disapprobation. If these
asseverations were indeed established it would have lent some
endorsement to the recent allegations of Executive Lawlessness,
conduct to which this Commission could not without some
imprudence and perversity give its imprimatur.

This polemical aspect of the Commission’s remit may not

readily be allowed to evaporate in the season of contention
which itself spawned its creation, but those citizens justifiably
concerned by the prevalence of the allegations of political
interference and discrimination may be assuaged by this
objective analysis, more informed by reference to the legal basis
for the interaction between the “Prescribed Officer” (competent
authority) the highest levels of the Police Force and the member
of the Executive responsible for the Guyana Police Force than the
ad hominem exhortations prevailing at this juncture of our
history.

In the discourse that follows reference will inevitably be

made to the Firearms Act, CAP 16:05 and its Regulations made
thereunder, the Police Act, CAP 16:01 and Standing Order 91 of
1964 of the GPF, in the light of the irrefragable contention that

150
in the context of any civilised country, the grant or issuing and
control of firearms are matters that inexorably touch and
concern the security of the State. This trilogy of regulatory
authority contains the framework without which the integrity of
the organic structure of the enforcement agency would be
substantially impugned and/or dismantled, with resultant
consequences both retrospective and prospective.

This Commission has received testimony that the

procedure required to be followed consequent upon application
for the grant of a licence to purchase, acquire or possess a
firearm is as follows: -
(a) the application must be made to the Commander of
the Police Division (within the meaning of the Police
Act CAP 16:01). See S. 18 (1) of the Firearms Act
CAP 16:05 and Firearms Regulation 3 made under S.
45 of the said Act.
(b) The Prescribed Officer will submit a Report together
with search Forms C-17 and C-49 to the Head of
Special Branch. The Report must include full
particulars of the Applicant’s character as known and
the number of licensed firearms in the area in which
the Applicant desires to use the firearm. (Rule 1 –
Standing Order 91/1964.)
(c) Head of Special Branch will cause the normal
screening procedure to be carried out and will: -
(i) if there is a Security Objection, inform the
C.O.P. who will instruct the Prescribed Officer
to refuse the application, or;
(ii) if there is no Security Objections, endorse the
Application accordingly and pass it to the Ass.
Com. “Crime”. (Rule 2. S.O. 91/64).
(d) The Ass. Com. “Crime” will carry out exactly the
same procedure with respect to his responsibility for
the maintenance of a Record at the Firearm Section
of the Criminal Record Office and the General
Criminal Record Office and no Prescribed Officer shall
grant a licence to anyone whose name is on this
Record without the approval of the Commissioner. It

151
 follows that this Record must be examined before
any new firearm licence is granted (see Rule 10 S.O.
89 and Rule 3 S.O. 91/64). He then forwards the
Application to the C.O.P. indicating whether it should
be refused on the grounds of a criminal record or
not.
(e) Thereafter if the C.O.P. is satisfied that the
Application was cleared as indicated in (c) and (d)
above, he shall forward it to the Hon. Minister with
his recommendations once the Application falls
within 4 categories. (See rule 4 S.O. 91/64)

There is some contention that Standing Order 91/1964 has

no statutory basis but it has been brought to the attention of the
Commission that the GPF is regulated by the provisions of the
Police Act, Standing Orders, Regulations made under the Police
Act and Force Orders. Neither Standing Orders nor Force Orders
have their genesis in any identifiable Statutory provision save
and except that the COP may give such orders and directions to
the Officers and Ranks in pursuit of his command and
superintendence of the Force under S. 7 of the Police Act.

The Prescribed Officer’s grant of a licence under S. 18 (2)

of the Firearms Act CAP 16:05 is predicated upon him being
“satisfied that the applicant has a good reason for purchasing,
acquiring or having in his possession the firearm … and can be
permitted to have in his possession that firearm … without
danger to the public or to the peace.”

This power is further hobbled by a proviso that no grant

shall be made to an applicant who “the Prescribed Officer has
reason to believe to be prohibited by this Act from possessing a
firearm to which this Part applies, or to be of intemperate habits
or unsound mind or to be for any reason unfitted to be entrusted
with such a firearm.”

A Prescribed Officer is, by regulation 3 of the Firearms

Regulations made by the Minister under S. 45 of the Firearms
Act, declared to be “the Police Officer for the time being in

152
command of the Police in that Division” (usually an Assistant
Commissioner) “and any Police Officer under his command not
below the rank of Assistant Superintendent.”

The word “Police” is defined in Webster’s Lexicon as a

Department of Government responsible for the preservation of
Public Order, detection of crime and enforcement of civil law.
The collective agency is called the Police Force and by S. 3 (2) of
the Police Act its functions include the “prevention and detection
of Crime, the preservation of law and order, the preservation of
the peace, the repression of internal disturbance, the protection
of property, the apprehension of offenders and the due
enforcement of all laws and regulations…… and by S. 7, the
C.O.P shall “subject to the general orders and directions of the
Minister, have the command and superintendence of the Force
…… for the peace and good order throughout Guyana …..”.
Significantly, S. 9 provides that Assistance Commissioners shall
perform such duties as the COP may direct and S. 12 gives a
similar power with respect to Subordinate Officers and
constables.

In effect, these provisions could only be understood as

conferring on the COP a directional control either by way of oral
commands or if the situation warrants it, by way of written
orders, one of which is S.O. 91/64.

Fundamental to the resolution of this controversy is the

recognition that since 1964 the “policing” functions involved in
the current application process have been in practice found not
only necessary but this uninterrupted policy was adopted by
every Executive Administration since Independence. This ought
to be the surest index that the interlocking character of the
Firearms Act and the Police Act in an essentially security concern
is not to be treated with askance. There is a notion that the
major purpose for the mischief which informs the enactment of
one piece of legislation precludes the application of the general
law which governs the area of concern under review. In this
regard it has been canvassed that the provisions of the Police
Act and the procedural controls established thereunder by the

153
COP eg. Standing Orders, etc, have no place in regulating the
grant by the Prescribed Officer of a firearm licence, the
command structure of the GPF and/or the security sensitive
nature of the process involved, notwithstanding.

Significantly, S. 7 mandates that the COP be responsible to

the Minister for the peace and good order throughout Guyana. It
therefore cannot but be understood as meaning that the Minister
is inextricably configured in the overall process of securing the
peace and good Order of the State. It is with this backdrop that
the view that the issue and grant of firearms, being a matter
which touches and concerns the security of the State, in every
sense of that expression, may be validated by reference to the
marriage of these Statutes. It cannot therefore be over-
emphasised that the foregoing provisions are so excruciatingly
plain that it would be pleonastic to attempt any expatiation of
the rudiments of their construction and interpretation by means
of an empirical analysis.

The incongruity of the contrary view lies in, inter alia, the
notion that the Prescribed Officer replaces or displaces the
Divisional Commander qua Police Officer, assuming thereby a
cognate character with imperial power de hors the chain of
command established not only by Standing Order 91/64 but also
de hors the command structure of the Guyana Police Force (of
which he is a part) as set out in the Police Act itself. I am
fortified in my view by the absence from S 18 (2) of the Firearms
Act CAP. 16:05 that, in the exercise of the power thereunder,
the Prescribed Officer must act “in his own deliberate judgment”
or with any such parallel conspectus/perspective. This Officer is
required to perform such duties and carry out such directions as
may be given to him by the COP. A concatenation of these
spurious notions understandably provides fertile ground for the
equally fallacious argumentation which leads to the ineluctable
but erroneous conclusion promised upon the view that the
Prescribed Officer has a “firearms” function, simpliciter. Even if
this were to be conceded, given the “policing” functions
conferred generally by the Firearms Act, and, in particular, the
intrinsic “policing” contributions before the application can be

154
validly processed, it would not be unfair to conclude that that
function bears a symbiotic, if not a peculiar Siamese relationship,
with the provisions of the Police Act. Aliter, the Prescribed
Officer would be seriously handicapped in properly processing
the application if he were to meet the strict requirements of
S.18(2).

Thus, it would be an act of delusional masochism to

persuade oneself that a Prescribed Officer, whoever he may be,
could validly comply with the circumscribed criteria under S. 18
(2) of the Firearms Act without reference to the procedure set
out in Standing Order 91 of 1964. Regnant wisdom dictates that
the screening procedure set out in the Standing Order is a sine
qua non to the fulfillment of the prescription under S. 18 (2)
above.

Compelling testimony has been received by the

Commission from the major functionaries who are
unquestionably best qualified to justify the procedure adopted
but it is conceded that lay presenters have voiced their concerns
based upon their opinions and fears of abuse, and therefore it
would be remiss if the Administration were to overlook the axiom
that eternal vigilance is the price of freedom.

(All under scorings are for emphasis)

155
 Section 10: The Coroners Act

In this section, the Commission examines concerns

about the adequacy and application of the Coroners Act.

Every person in Guyana has a right to life. However,

contrary to public belief, the right to life, even though it is an
individual right, is not a private law right but a public law right.
Thus, the public law prohibits a person from attempting to take
his or her own life. Since the right to life is a right in public law,
the state and society have a public interest in the life of each
and every citizen.

Thus, whenever the life of anyone has been terminated

unnaturally, it becomes a matter of both public interest and duty
to have the circumstances connected with and the cause of
death determined. Such public interest and duty are intended to
be served by the provisions of the Coroners Act, Chapter 4:03
which are designed to ensure that every unnatural death is the
subject matter of a public investigation. Section 4 of the Act,
prescribes that:

Everyone who becomes aware of an unnatural death

shall notify it to the coroner or at the nearest police
station.

while section 39 renders the neglect to do so a criminal offence

punishable with a fine of nine thousand five hundred dollars.
Section 5 mandates a member of the GPF to whom an unnatural
death has been reported or who has become knowledgeable of
an unnatural death :

...shall forthwith cause a report thereof to be

made to the coroner (emphasis added)

while section 6 mandates that a coroner to whom an unnatural

death has been reported or who becomes knowledgeable of such
a death shall:

forthwith cause due investigation to be made as to

the cause of death and, if necessary, hold an inquest

156
 or, if the circumstances so require, shall hold an
inquiry.(emphasis added)

Thus, after the coroner causes due investigation to be

made as to the cause of death to determine whether the death is
due to a natural or unnatural cause, and finds that death is due
to an unnatural cause, he must hold an inquest or, if the
circumstances so require, an inquiry. Section 6 should be read
conjointly with sections 12 and 14. Section 12 provides:

Where the death of any person is reported to or first

comes to the knowledge of the coroner as an
unnatural death, he may make a preliminary
investigation, and if he considers after doing so that
it is unnecessary to hold an inquest or an inquiry, he
may issue an order for the burial of the body;

while section 14 provides:

Where an unnatural death is reported to or comes to

the knowledge of the coroner, he shall, subject to
section 12, hold an inquest, except when he is
authorised or required under this or any other Act to
hold an inquiry and then he shall hold an inquiry.

Inquests
It can readily be seen that the preliminary investigation is
for the purpose of determining whether the death is an unnatural
death and, if it is not, then it is unnecessary to hold either an
inquest or an inquiry. But, if it is, the coroner must hold an
inquest unless he is authorised or required under the Act or
other Act to hold an inquiry. Under section 6, he can hold an
inquiry “if the circumstances so require.”

An inquest is defined in section 2 as:

...an investigation as to the cause of death

held by the coroner with a jury as hereinafter
provided (emphasis added)

while an inquiry is stated therein as meaning:

investigation held by a coroner without a

jury. (emphasis added)

157
 Contrary to popular belief, the holding of an inquest or
inquiry is not necessarily dependent on the conclusion or results
of police investigations. Section 6 provides:

Where an unnatural death is reported to or comes to the

knowledge of the coroner, he shall, subject to the other
provisions of the Act, forthwith cause due investigation to
be made as to the cause of death and, if necessary, hold
an inquest or, if the circumstances so require, shall hold
an inquiry.

Clearly, an unnatural death can be reported to or can come

to the knowledge of, the coroner by way of information provided
by a person or persons who are not members of the GPF and the
fact that it is so reported does not relieve him of his statutory
duty to hold an inquest or inquiry. It is instructive to note that
section 21(2) provides:

Where a coroner whose duty it is to hold an inquest is

informed prior to the commencement of the inquest that
some person has been charged before a magistrate with
the murder or manslaughter of the deceased, he shall,
unless directed in writing to the contrary by the Director of
Public Prosecutions, abstain from holding an inquest.

Thus, section 21(2) contemplates that the duty of the

coroner to hold an inquest can arise before the police conclude
their investigations. The Police ought not to charge without
sufficient evidence and section 21(2) contemplates a duty to
hold an inquest or inquiry even before the Police can charge- let
alone complete their investigations into a death. Section 35
further provides:

An inquest or inquiry may be adjourned by the coroner, if

he sees fit, from place to place and from time to time until
the whole of the evidence touching and concerning death
or the cause thereof has been obtained.

Section 35 clearly envisages that the coroner can

commence holding an inquest or inquiry without obtaining all the
evidence and can adjourn such inquest or inquiry to obtain
further evidence. The duty of a coroner to hold an inquest or
inquiry cannot therefore be premised on the receipt of a copy of
Police investigations since the police can hardly be expected to
send a file of incomplete investigations to the coroner.

158
 It has, however, long been the practice of the GPF to make
available to the coroner the copies of all statements taken in the
course of their investigations into an unnatural death after the
completion of investigations but only when a negative decision is
made as to whether a charge of murder or manslaughter should
be instituted. If a decision is made to institute such a charge,
copies of the statements are not sent to the coroner simply
because no inquest can be commenced where such a charge is
to be instituted unless the DPP directs otherwise in writing
(section 21(2)).

Coroners have become so dependent on such police

investigations that, even though the duty to hold an inquest or
inquiry arises upon being informed of the unnatural death, no
inquest or inquiry is commenced without the receipt of the
copies of such statements from the GPF. In effect, such a
practice not only renders section 21(2) quite useless but
coroners tend to excuse their failure to commence inquests or
inquiries on the omission of the police to transmit to them copies
of the statements. The result is that the GPF is being blamed for
the coroners’ omissions to perform their statutory duties when
their duty at least to initiate action does not necessarily depend
on the police investigations. Section 38 provides:

Every coroner who neglects or refuses without

reasonable excuse to hold an inquest or inquiry which is
his duty to hold or to perform any duty which he is
required to perform under this Act, shall be liable to a
fine of forty- eight thousand seven hundred and fifty
dollars recoverable before the High Court in its criminal
jurisdiction on the motion of the Director of Public
Prosecutions.(emphasis added)

Since there is no period specified by the Act within which a

coroner must commence the holding of an inquest or inquiry,
section 39 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act,
Chapter 2:01, becomes applicable. Section 39 provides:

In any written law, where no time is prescribed or allowed

within which anything shall be done, such thing shall be
done with all convenient speed, and as often as the
prescribed occasion arises. (emphasis added)

159
 Therefore, section 38 of the Coroners Act prescribes in
effect that inquests or inquiries should be held with all
convenient speed and there should be no undue or unreasonable
delay. The use of the words “forthwith” in sections 5 and 6 and
“all convenient speed” in section 22(1) combined with section 38
emphasise the need for urgency, or at least, no undue delay, in
the holding of inquests or inquiries by coroners.

Coroners
There can be no doubt that there have been undue delays
in the holding of inquests or inquiries by coroners despite the
fact that such undue delays can attract criminal sanctions under
section 38. The Commission has received complaints of such
undue delays. Yet, there has been no known case in which the
DPP or the police have moved to prosecute any coroner for
neglecting or refusing to hold an inquest or inquiry “with all
convenient speed.” But there may be a quite interesting
explanation as to why inquests or inquiries have not been, and
are not being, held without undue delay with impunity. Under
section 2 of the Coroners Act, “coroner” is defined as:

The magistrate of the magisterial district in which an

unnatural death occurs and, if the magistrate cannot
conveniently or speedily be found or is unable to act,
the nearest justice of peace who is able to act.
(emphasis added)

Most magisterial districts e.g., Georgetown, Berbice and

Corentyne, have several magistrates serving the same
magisterial district. In those magisterial districts that have more
than one serving magistrate, the definite article “the” is most
inappropriate since it does not lend itself to identifying any
particular magistrate as the coroner. Therefore, responsibility
cannot attach to any particular one of those serving magistrates
with the result that there is room for avoidance of statutory
responsibility with impunity. The Commission therefore
recommends that the definition of “coroner” in section 2 should
be amended to read as follows:

…The magistrate of the magisterial district in which

an unnatural death occurs and, in the case of a
magisterial district which has more than one

160
 magistrate, every such magistrate and if a
magistrate cannot conveniently or speedily be found,
or is unable to act the nearest justice of the peace
who is able to act.

Such a definition would make every magistrate a coroner

for the district in which he or she is serving. Liability will attach
to any magistrate to whom an unnatural death has been
reported and who fails to hold an inquest or inquiry with all
convenient speed. The loophole that currently exists in the
definition of “coroner” allows for frustration of the provisions of
the Act and may be responsible for the state of helplessness that
currently attends efforts to have inquests or inquiries held
expeditiously.

Section 17 of the Coroners Act should also be amended to

allow a magistrate of another magisterial district to hold an
inquest or inquiry where the magistrate of any magisterial
district is unable to do so. In its present form, section 17 relates
only to inquiries and not inquests. No reason for such a
jurisdictional restriction is apparent.

Since section 6 already requires the coroner to hold an

inquest where necessary and an inquiry if the circumstances so
require, the power of the DPP under section 19 “to require a
coroner to hold an inquest or inquiry into the death of a person”
is a power to decide whether the coroner should hold either an
inquest rather than an inquiry and vice versa.

Normally, the coroner must hold an inquest rather than an

inquiry (section 14). But, exceptionally, he must hold an inquiry
rather than an inquest e.g., when the DPP requires him under
section 19 to do so. Section 6 authorises the coroner to hold an
inquiry if the circumstances so require. The circumstances would
so require where an unnatural death is not suspected or alleged
to have been caused by the unlawful act of another. Under
section 15, the coroner must hold an inquest and not an inquiry
in every case:

… of the death of any person confined in any prison

or in any lock-up, or place of confinement for

161
 persons accused or convicted of having committed
any offence except in cases where it is not
practicable to obtain the services of a sufficient
number of jurors.

The right to life is the most primary of all fundamental

rights as reflected in article 138 of the Constitution. The
importance of this right underlies and informs the provisions of
the Coroners Act that place emphasis on urgency in the holding
of inquests or inquiries. Prolonged and inordinate delays by
coroners not only give rise to the perception of insensitivity to
the fundamental right to life but of disregard for the express
mandates of the Coroners Act itself. While section 38 does
criminalise and penalise the neglect or refusal to hold an inquest
or inquiry without reasonable excuse, it prescribed no fixed
period within which an inquest or inquiry should be held and
leaves the issue of criminality to be resolved on the
indefiniteness of the statutory implication of “with all convenient
speed” (section 39 of the Interpretation and General Clauses
Act). Bearing in mind that section 35 of the Coroners Act allows
for adjournments of inquests or inquiries for obtaining relevant
evidence, the Commission has reason to question the
effectiveness of this penal provision (Section 38).

Coroner’s Office
Since the application of the provisions of the Coroners Act
with its clear emphasis on urgency in the holding of inquests and
inquiries can do much to restore public confidence and to allay
public disquiet over the many cases of killings by, and of,
members of the GPF, there is need for the administrative
establishment of a coroner’s office staffed with some magistrates
with national jurisdiction to give effect to the provisions of the
Act. This office should fall under the administrative
superintendence of the Chief Magistrate and should be tasked
with the responsibility of holding inquests or inquiries where the
magistrate or magistrates of any magisterial district is or are
unable to do so. Since it has been recommended that section 17
of the Coroners Act should be amended to include both inquests
and inquiries, the Commission does not perceive that the
establishment of such a coroner’s office will require further
statutory amendment.

162
 It has been mentioned that coroners conduct
investigations by way of inquest or inquiry on the basis of
statements taken by the police in the course of police
investigations but the Act does not contemplate such
dependence. The current practice is not consistent with but
rather tends to negative the independence of their
investigations. There is need for coroners to have resources that
will enable them to place less reliance on police investigations.
In any event, police investigations may take a long time to
complete and, since the Act contemplates the expeditious
holding of inquests and inquiries, coroners cannot depend on the
completion of police investigation for the performance of their
statutory duties.

A holistic review of the Coroners Act seems to be

necessary. Its provisions seem too removed and distant from
socio-legal realities and the objective of speedy independent
inquests and inquiries is difficult to achieve with its existing
provisions. Coroners have a duty to investigate by way of
inquest or inquiry but have no supporting information resources.
They are forced to depend on police investigations. In the more
populous magisterial districts, which have more than one
magistrate, it is difficult to identify the magisterial coroner since
the Act contemplates only one magisterial coroner. Justices of
the Peace, who are coroners in the absence of the magisterial
coroner, can hardly be viewed as having the requisite
competence to hold inquests or inquiries. It is therefore hardly a
matter of surprise that, despite efforts to have inquests and
inquiries expedited, little success has so far been achieved.
Public confidence in the judicial system, to the extent that
inquests and inquiries are not being held expeditiously, remains
low and public disquiet over cases of killing by or of members of
the GPF remains unquelled. The Coroners Act seems to be high
on ideals but low on achievement, partly through its own
inherent deficiencies and even inconsistencies. These need to be
corrected.

163
Recommendations
With regard to “the Coroners Act” the Commission
recommends as follows:

67. The definition of “coroner” in section 2 of the Act should

be amended to make every magistrate of each
Magisterial District a coroner for such District.

68. Section 17 of the Act should be amended to allow a

magistrate of another Magisterial District to hold either
an inquest or inquiry where the magistrate of any
Magisterial District is unable to do so.

69. A coroner’s office should be administratively established

to hold inquests or inquiries where the magistrate or
magistrates of any Magisterial District is unable to do
so. It should be staffed with magistrates with national
jurisdiction and fall under the administrative
superintendence of the Chief Magistrate.

70. Coroners should be provided with investigative

resources to reduce their dependence on Police
investigations to enable them to conduct independent
investigations expediently rather than to continue to
rely solely on Police investigations.

71. There should be a holistic review of the Act to achieve

its high ideals and remedy its current deficiencies and
application.

Note: Annexed herewith is an independent view of

certain provisions of the Coroners Act by Commissioner
C.R. Ramson S C.

164
 THE CORONERS ACT

I have had the benefit of participating in the discussions

leading to the text of this Report and while, in general,
agreement has been reached on the issues therein it was found
necessary to prepare this Annexure which more accurately
reflects my conclusions on particular concerns contained herein.

While S. 4 of the Coroners Act CAP 4:03 requires any

person who becomes aware of an unnatural death to notify the
Coroner, S. 5 requires a Policeman to whom an unnatural death
is reported or to whose knowledge it has come, to forthwith
cause a report thereof to be made to the Coroner.
These two Sections contemplate two separate situations,
viz: -
(i) Where a private individual is aware of an unnatural
death he is required merely to notify the Coroner;
and
(ii) Where a Policeman becomes aware or receives a
report of an unnatural death he is required to
forthwith cause a report to be made to the Coroner.

“Notification” in (i) places a mere obligation on a private

individual to let the Coroner know of the unnatural death
whereas “cause a Report” imports into the obligation for the
Policeman, a requirement that a Report be given forthwith.

These respective obligations are essentially different in

substance in that a “Report” as interpreted in the Concise Oxford
Dictionary (10th ED) means “an account given of a matter after
investigation or consideration”; and he shall do so “forthwith”
which has been judicially interpreted in Guyana in the case of
Sookraj .v. Comptroller of Customs (G.C.A). This latter
expression allows for a lapse of time relative to the period during
which a Report is prepared after investigation and submitted to
the Coroner and does not mean “immediately” as is popularly
assumed.

165
 The process aforementioned is a prelude to the imperative
investigation by the Coroner under S. 6 as to the cause of death.
In the event it is found necessary, the Coroner is required to
hold either an Inquest or an Inquiry to determine if someone
was responsible for the unnatural death.

Therefore it becomes clear that the Coroner’s obligation to

conduct an Inquest or Inquiry is triggered after a Police
investigation, albeit it may not necessarily be completed at that
time, since by S. 21 (2) of the Act, the Coroner must “abstain
from holding an Inquest” where prior to him commencing an
Inquest a charge for murder or manslaughter has been
instituted. This assumes that charges would only be laid after
investigations are completed.

The Act therefore contemplates the necessary involvement

of the Police Force, as the sole enforcement agency of the
Government, without which the Coroner would be unable to
carry out his mandate. In this regard, members of the GPF need
to co-operate with the Coroner if Inquests are to be conducted
as contemplated by the Act i.e. forthwith.

More importantly, some uncertainty has been identified in

the definition of a Coroner and this is in need of review to avoid
the rationale for delay or non-performance currently in vogue.

Apart from that minor amendment, the Act as a whole is

adequate to meet the purpose for which it was designed. To
achieve this end, Agencies, e.g. GPF, Government Pathologist
and the Registrar of the Supreme Court who provides the
Coroner with a pool of Jurors, which are required to support the
functionality of the Office of Coroner, must be prepared to play
their part in a meaningful way. Therefore, any holistic review of
the Act would be tantamount to a legislative excess.

(all underscorings are for emphasis)

166
 Part 2

The Guyana Defence Force

167
 Section 1: Functions and Operations

In this section, the Commission examines the

changing context of the functions and operations of the
Guyana Defence Force, taking into consideration national
and international developments.

Composition
The Guyana Defence Force (GDF) is a public body
established and maintained under the authority of section 4 of
the Defence Act, Chapter 15:01. It is a unitary body even though
it comprises a regular Force and a reserve Force. Section 4 of
the Defence Act provides:

There shall be established and maintained in

Guyana a force to be called the GUYANA
DEFENCE FORCE consisting of --

(a) a regular Force; and

(b) a reserve Force.

It is a fundamental mistake to take the view that the

reserve Force is supplementary to the GDF. The reserve Force is
an organic part of the GDF and to view it otherwise would
denude the Force of an essential statutory component and this,
perhaps, may account for the lack of focus by the GDF in this
regard.

Functions
Section 5 of the Defence Act provides:

The Force shall be charged with the defence of

and maintenance of order in Guyana and with
such other duties as may from time to time be
defined by the Defence Board.

It can readily be seen that the functions and duties of the

GDF prescribed by Parliament are (1) the defence of Guyana; (2)
maintenance of order within Guyana; and (3) such additional
functions and duties as may be imposed by the Defence Board.

168
 A major function of the GDF is the defence of Guyana from
external aggression. Guyana has the misfortune of having border
disputes with two of its neighbours, Venezuela and Suriname.
Both countries, in view of their claim to portions of territory
which form part of the constitutional area of Guyana, not merely
pose serious threats to its territorial integrity but are positively
instrumental in impeding its economic and national development
as evidenced by the recent strident objections to the Beal
Aerospace Corporation Satellite launch project and the Jaling
Forest Industries investment plan and the forcible eviction of the
CGX Energy petroleum platform, in relation to areas claimed by
them, respectively.

While the Commission recognises that it is in Guyana’s

interest to pursue not a military, but a peaceful, solution to its
border dispute problems, the possibility that Venezuela and
Suriname may seek to assert their claims even in a limited way
by force of arms cannot be discounted. Guyana continues to rely
essentially on the principles of international law and on
diplomatic efforts coupled with the forging of strategic
relationships based on its interests. But the need for military
support of its peaceful efforts has occasionally manifested itself
and has brought home to the nation-state the importance of
military preparedness and vigilance as part and parcel of its
territorial defence efforts. As stated by the current United
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “You can do a lot with
diplomacy but, of course, you can do a lot more with diplomacy
backed up by firmness and force.”

In the context of Guyana, the deterrent effect of firmness

and force must find meaning in the attitude and capability of the
GDF.

Capability
The defence capability of the GDF should rest on the
quality and quantity of its personnel and the availability of
military materiel and equipment relevant to its defence functions
against territorial incursions. The Commission recognises that,

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because of national budgetary constraints, acquisition of such
resources would necessitate prioritisation.

While recognising the need for early warning capabilities in

the air, on land and at sea; speed and mobility over operational
terrain; adequate fire support; and the ability to conduct
sustained operations, the GDF has placed priority on the
development of its human capital. The GDF has stated:

The Force is nonetheless embarking on a

procurement policy that addresses early warning
capabilities in the air, on land and at sea. Having
regard to the current threat and the concomitant
demand for appropriate technology, it has addressed
as well, speed and mobility over operational terrain,
adequate fire support, and the ability to sustain
operations. This is a national security imperative
given the increased level of tasking. However, it
does little good for the GDF to acquire state-of-the-
art equipment (purchase or gift) if the soldiers do
not know how to read and calculate sufficiently to
operate them. Development of human capital
therefore is not only a useful deduction but also
crucial to operational effectiveness….

The Commission is of the view that military operations in

furtherance of training should not be unduly limited or curtailed
by financial considerations since defence is dependent on the
quality of trained soldiers and cannot be valued in monetary
terms. However, the GDF cannot lose sight of the fact that
financial resources must be managed in such a way that
maximum benefits are derived from the utilisation of such
limited resources. Therefore, the choice and conduct of training
for military operations must be informed by comparative
advantage and the objective of maximum benefit.

The Commission recognises that there often exist apparent

conflicts between the concepts of military necessity and
economic feasibility and that the two concepts are often
perceived as not being in consonance with each other. The
Commission is of the view that since the importance of territorial
defence cannot be properly measured with an economic
yardstick, what is in fact a military necessity should not be
viewed from the standpoint of economic feasibility. The label

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`military necessity’, however, cannot be so used to justify
expenditures on training manoeuvres or operations which have
little or doubtful value.

The Commission noted that the issue of recapitalisation of

military equipment is also being addressed so that the GDF can
have the capability of early warning in the air, on land and at
sea, of speedy mobility over operational terrain and of adequate
fire support and the ability to conduct sustained military
operations. Coupled with its drive to improve its human resource
capability so that its military equipment can be manned and
operated by trained and capable personnel, the GDF should be in
a position at least to present a credible defence posture which
would complement the nation’s diplomatic efforts and act as a
deterrent to territorial aggression.

Ground force
The GDF recommended that, in order to meet the
demands of a rapidly changing security environment, the Military
Police Corps should be upgraded; the artillery unit should be
strengthened; and another infantry battalion should be created.
The Commission is not convinced that, despite the level of the
threats posed by Venezuela and Suriname to Guyana’s territorial
integrity and the non–traditional transnational dangers to
national welfare posed by terrorism; drug-trafficking; illicit arms
trafficking; uncontrolled refugee migration; and trafficking in
human beings, there is a necessity for the creation of an
additional infantry battalion.

The Commission is aware that Venezuela and Suriname

have not ruled out the use of military force in asserting their
claim against Guyana’s territorial sovereignty. It is important
that Guyana should be perceived as having the military will and
capacity to effectively respond in defence of its territorial
integrity against armed incursions. It is equally important that
there should be no undue emphasis on the enhancement of
military capability disproportionate to manifest diplomatic and
other efforts towards a peaceful solution. Enhancement of
military capability, though desirable, must be accompanied by

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proportionately strenuous diplomatic and other peaceful efforts
towards an amicable solution. Military capacity must always be
portrayed as a defensive back-up to, and not a diminution of
reliance on, such efforts.

The Commission noted that international terrorism; drug-

trafficking; illicit arms trading; and trafficking in human beings,
etc., increasingly pose transnational dangers to the vulnerable
social and economic fabric of small developing countries such as
Guyana. However, since the Guyana Police Force (GPF) has a
greater functional relevance to crime prevention and law
enforcement than the GDF, it is the view of the Commission that
such dangers should primarily be met by augmenting the
capacity and the capability of the GPF and by strategic
international and bilateral agreements supported by appropriate
domestic legislation. Augmentation of the capacity of the GDF
should be premised upon its complementary role in this regard.

Coast Guard
The Commission is mindful of section 208 of the Defence
Act (as amended by section 2 of the Defence (Amendment) Act
1990) under which the Coast Guard was established and very
wide-ranging duties and responsibilities were imposed on it. In
order to enable the Coast Guard to carry out such duties and
responsibilities which relate to the enforcement of civil law,
members of the Coast Guard were conferred with Police powers,
authorities and privileges. Section 208 A (2) of the Act provides:

The members of the Coast Guard shall be primarily

employed as a coast–watching force, maintaining a
state of readiness to function as a specialised
service, enforcing or assisting in the enforcement of
all applicable laws on and under the high seas and
waters subject to the jurisdiction of Guyana.

Section 208 A (4) further provides:

For the purposes of carrying out their duties the

members of the Coast Guard shall have the same
powers, authorities and privileges as are conferred
by law on, and shall be liable to all the
responsibilities of, members of the Police Force.

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 Members of the Coast Guard have responsibility for
enforcing the laws relating to every river, harbour or port,
quarantine, immigration, fisheries, territorial sea, continental
shelf, exclusive economic and fisheries zone and narcotic and
psychotropic substances (Section 208 A (3)). Among the laws
which fall for enforcement by the Coast Guard are the
Passengers Act; Transport and Harbours Act; River Navigation
Act; Maritime Boundaries Act; Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances (Control) Act, etc. (see Third Schedule to the
Defence (Amendment) Act).

The Coast Guard has only one vessel which can sail on the
high seas i.e., the flagship Essequibo, and four smaller vessels,
and suffers from a one-third manpower deficit. In light of the
fact that the Coast Guard is now being relied upon to be the
primary maritime enforcer of all laws, the Commission strongly
recommends that the Coast Guard should be enhanced both
qualitatively and quantitatively in terms of vessels, equipment
and trained manpower.

Members of the Coast Guard are statutorily empowered to

stop, search and detain vessels and persons engaged, or
suspected to be engaged, in unlawful acts as far as the limits of
the fishery and economic zone i.e., 200 miles out at sea. The
Coast Guard cannot satisfactorily fulfil its statutory functions and
duties without an adequate number of vessels, up-to-date
surveillance equipment and trained personnel. The current
capability of the Coast Guard renders it unequal to its
monumental task and, although the Coast Guard has claimed
that it is satisfactorily fulfilling its statutory mandate, such a
claim is considered to be relative to its existing resources.

Even though members of the GDF on land operations

may not be conferred with powers of arrest, seizure and
detention similar to those of the Police, it is clear that members
of the Coast Guard do have such powers of arrest and detention.
They should, therefore, be specially trained and instructed in the
lawful exercise of those powers.

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 The Coast Guard has been engaged largely, though not
exclusively, in protecting the country’s fishery zone from
exploitation by unauthorised foreign predators and, so far, apart
from the CGX incident, there has been no serious threat posed to
the integrity of Guyana’s territorial sea.

In order to fulfil its statutory mandate under section 208,

the Coast Guard must make its presence seen and felt not
merely in defence of the territorial sea and the fishery zone but
also in the prevention of smuggling activities, particularly
relating to illicit drugs and firearms. Small but swift vessels
would be effective in the inland waters while larger and powerful
vessels would be better suited to patrolling and overseeing
activities in the open territorial sea and the fishery zone.
Adequate surveillance and communications equipment would be
particularly useful.

The Commission must point out that it received evidence

that the Pomeroon River, which provides coastal access to and
from Venezuela, is an area where smuggling activities take place
but which is not adequately policed. The Commission
recommends that this area should be given special attention by
the Coast Guard.

The Commission has borne in mind testimony from the

GDF itself that, in spite of many constraints, it has so far
managed to fulfil its defence mandate. If so, the removal of
constraints which do not relate to numerical strength ought to
make the satisfactory fulfilment of its defence mandate
achievable without undue stresses and strains. With the current
human resource recruitment and equipment capitalisation
processes, and with the establishment of a commensurately
improved maintenance system, the GDF would be in a better
position to discharge its statutory mandate.

The Commission has been informed that, despite the fact

that the actual numerical strength of the GDF as a composite
whole matches its authorised strength, the Coast Guard is
understaffed both in the navigation and maintenance

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departments. The Commission has already noted with concern
that the Coast Guard has a 35% personnel deficit relevant to its
current needs. This necessarily means that, while the GDF has
no problem in recruiting a sufficient number of persons to its
regular ground forces, it is experiencing serious difficulty in
recruiting and retaining trained personnel for the Coast Guard.

With any increase in its present fleet of vessels, such

personnel shortages are likely to become much more acute. With
its full complement of maritime and maintenance personnel, the
Coast Guard will be in a much better position to discharge both
its military and civil duties with greater effectiveness and
efficiency.

The Commission is aware that, as far as Guyana’s

territorial controversies are concerned, a major difficulty with
Suriname has been the delimitation of its maritime boundary.
Failure to resolve this dispute over the years resulted in the
forcible expulsion of the CGX Energy petroleum platform from a
position in the Atlantic Ocean well within Guyana’s waters.

The Commission is of the view that, since this issue has

not yet been resolved by peaceful means, the Coast Guard
should be equipped to provide adequate protection to any future
petroleum exploration operations and to fishing and other
commercial activities. The Commission is also aware that the
waters between Guyana and Suriname are a notorious zone for
contraband, piracy and illegal immigration (or ‘backtracking’)
activities. The Commission recommends that the Coast Guard
should also be deployed to the Corentyne area to suppress
smuggling.

The Commission is aware, too, that the Government of

Guyana has embarked on a course of action which will result in
the arbitral settlement of the Guyana-Suriname boundary
controversy. Up to and beyond this point, the maritime units,
rather than the ground forces, will be required to define
aggression and maintain the territorial integrity of Guyana.

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 The Commission is further aware that the Government of
Guyana has stated its reservations with respect to the Treaty
between the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Republic of
Venezuela on the Delimitation of Marine and Sub-Marine Areas
(April 1990) in which both signatory states sought to protect
their own interests to the prejudice of those of Guyana and
Barbados, the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of which intersect
those of Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, respectively.
Guyana and Barbados entered into an Exclusive Economic Zone
Co-operation Treaty (December 2003) undertaking to work
together for the protection and exploitation of their EEZ.

Given the extensive powers of the Coast Guard under

section 208A above, the Commission considers that, at present,
the Coast Guard is the only agency that can effectively enforce
the laws of Guyana in the country’s maritime space and protect
Guyana’s national interest with respect to these international
agreements.

In this regard, the Commission was disappointed that a

presentation on the maritime challenge and the Coast Guard’s
capability did not constitute a central feature of the GDF’s
presentation and, in effect, did not enjoy the prominence or
emphasis shown to the ground forces.

The Commission is of the considered opinion that the

present international security situation in which Guyana finds
itself warrants greater emphasis on the Coast Guard relative to
the ground forces, and the GDF should consider
reconceptualising its functions and operations to give effect to
this new strategic reality. In specific terms, the Commission
strongly recommends that the Coast Guard should be provided
with the following:

(1) Adequate (manpower) strength as quickly as possible,

but certainly within the present calendar year (2004).

(2) Adequate funds to permit the financing of regular, long-

range maritime patrols.

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 (3) Adequate inshore patrol vessels to enable it to suppress
illegal fishing, narcotics-trafficking, gun-running, illegal
migration and contraband.

(4) Adequate aerial and radar surveillance resources.

The Commission recommends that, in light of the changing

maritime scenario since 2000, the Guyana Defence Board
seriously review the support given to the Coast Guard and
urgently make plans for improvement.

Reserve Force
The Commission sees the need to emphasise that the
reserve Force of the GDF should not be overlooked or neglected.
The reserve Force should always be sufficiently trained and kept
at full strength to provide ready support to the regular Force
whenever the need arises. It is always beneficial that the
reservists should be recruited regionally, especially from those
regions in which the regular Force cannot maintain a ready or
regular presence. Since all reservists are members of the GDF,
the reservists can serve as its military eyes and ears as they are
in duty bound to the Force’s statutory mandates.

While the Commission does not support the GDF’s

recommendation that an additional regular infantry battalion be
created, it recommends for consideration that the reserve
capacity of the GDF be increased in numerical strength. Given
the small size of the Guyanese population relative to its
geographic area, the GDF can have a large and wide military
presence only through the participation of the general population
itself. This points in the direction of increasing the reserve Force
rather than the regular Force which would mean that the GDF
would have a presence and support within the population itself.

In a separate memorandum submitted by the GDF at the

request of the Commission, it was pointed out that it was the
policy of the Government “to have a small versatile regular Force
with a strong Reserve to supplement it”. The Commission noted

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that, contrary to that stated policy, the reserve Force was both
small and weak relative to the regular Force. In three regions
(Regions 7, 8 and 9) there was no reserve and in one Region
(Region 1), there was only one platoon, equivalent perhaps, to
one third of the desired strength. Even the most populous
regions (e.g., Regions 2 and 3, and Regions 4 and 5,
respectively) shared companies, and only Regions 6 and 10
seemed to be represented by full strength units. Although the
GDF did not present actual numbers for reservists, the
memorandum indicated that the reserve Force was significantly
smaller than the regular Force.

The Commission recommends that there should be a

separate establishment and organisation structure of the reserve
Force, similar to that of the regular Force, showing the strengths
and detailed descriptions of the various units.

As far as the functions and operations of the reserve Force

were concerned, the Commission learnt that its main task is to
augment the strength of troops of the regular Force and for first
response to emergencies. The Commission also learnt that the
continuity of service and efficiency of the performance of
members of the reserve Force were affected by their job
commitments and the attraction to other activities for which they
were better paid.

The GDF complained that its ability to mobilise satisfactory

levels of manpower in the Regions was affected by
transportation and communication difficulties and the
unavailability of equipment. On the basis of the evidence
presented, the Commission is of the view that the reserve Force
has not received the level of attention, organisation and
administration it requires. The Commission therefore supports
the recommendations proposed by the GDF as follows:

(1) There should be an increase in the stipend for

reservists to attend weekend training.

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 (2) There should be a schedule of incentives to attract
reservists with academic qualifications and skills.

(3) Regulations should be promulgated to protect the

jobs of reservists when they are called out on duty or
training.

(4) The Drill Halls [training centres] in Regions 3, 7, 8

and 9, should be reactivated and those in other
regions should be improved.

(5) There should be a special budget for the reserve

Force to help it to perform effectively.

The GDF did not offer an explanation as to why these

recommendations had not been acted on.

The Commission emphasises that its understanding of

section 4 of the Defence Act is that the regular Force and reserve
Force should stand on a similar, if not equal, footing. The
functioning of the GDF should, therefore, give effect to this
principle. The Commission therefore recommends that the
Guyana Defence Board give serious consideration to the present
state of organisation and administration of the reserve Force and
make concrete plans for its improvement.

Air Corps
The Commission recognises the crucial importance of an
aerial surveillance capability in the GDF. The greater part of the
vast expanse of Guyana is unpopulated and cannot be patrolled
by infantry or even an expanded reserve Force. Such a situation
speaks loudly for aerial surveillance capacity not merely for the
protection of territorial integrity but also in providing assistance
to the Guyana Police Force in internal security operations when
so requested. The Commission recommends that the aerial
surveillance capacity of the GDF be greatly improved through
recapitalisation efforts. Such efforts should include the
completion of repairs to its helicopter (which is the only one in

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Guyana) and one of its two Skyvans which currently needs
replacement of some of its component parts.

Deficiencies similar to those which affect the Coast Guard

also affect the Air Corps. The latter has about 50% of the
number of aircraft pilots it requires and needs more aircraft
mechanics and engineers.

The Commission received evidence that contraband

activities were prevalent along Guyana’s three land borders with
Brazil, Suriname and Venezuela, respectively, and along the
coastline. Conscious of the fact that the country’s small
population and limited financial resources could not provide
adequate occupation of, or protection for, its vulnerable borders,
the Commission is of the view that the Air Corps should be
assisted in a more concrete manner to conduct routine patrols in
cooperation with the ground forces and Coast Guard,
respectively.

In this regard, the Commission is of the view that serious

attention should be given to the problems of staffing, tasking,
training and equipment of the Air Corps. In particular, the
Commission recommends that the following measures be
considered by the Guyana Defence Board:

(a) Adequate arrangements be made for the recruitment,

local and overseas training of pilots and engineers, and
retention in service of all skilled personnel.

(b) Increased operational employment of aviation resources

in coastal, maritime and border surveillance.

(c) Acquisition of reconnaissance/surveillance aircraft.

The Commission recommends that any resulting benefits

to the Force from employing the Air Corps as a revenue earning
arm of the Force should be compared with the benefits likely to
accrue to the country from the interdiction of contraband

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activities on the country’s border and the detection of illegal
fishing and other violations of its maritime zone.

Public order
The Commission noted and recognised that section 5 of
the Defence Act imposes upon the GDF the civic duty of
“maintaining order in Guyana”, but omits to confer on its
members the coercive public law powers of arrest, detention and
interrogation. It must be assumed that such a significant
omission by Parliament was deliberate and not inadvertent. A
distinction has to be drawn therefore, between a duty of
“maintaining order” and a duty of enforcing public order laws.

It does appear that Parliament intended that the GDF

should be charged with a public duty of maintaining public order
but should not be empowered with, or be responsible for,
enforcing public law in the criminal courts. In this regard, it is
instructive that among the core functions of the Guyana Police
Force is “the preservation of law and order” (section 3(2) of the
Police Act) while section 5 of the Defence Act speaks of the
“maintenance of order” only. Members of the GDF, as soldiers,
are not expected to be functionally acquainted with public order
laws and, therefore, have not been empowered to act in the
enforcement of such laws. They are, however, under a statutory
duty to act in preservation of public order.

When specifically asked by the Commission whether it was

desirable that its members be conferred with enabling powers of
arrest and detention in furtherance of the performance of their
statutory duty of “maintaining order,” the GDF responded with
an unequivocal negative. In the opinion of the GDF, such civil
powers are undesirable since soldiers are not trained to exercise
them, as are their Police counterparts who have the public duty
of enforcing the criminal laws. It is clear to the Commission that,
in so far as its internal security function of “maintaining order” is
concerned, the GDF is not trained to play a role in “maintaining
order”, except in support of the GPF.

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 Even though the Defence Act does not prescribe that the
GDF should perform its statutory duty of “maintaining order” in
Guyana in conjunction with, or in support of, the GPF (or any
other relevant law enforcement agency), the absence of powers
of arrest and detention renders it prudent that it should
generally not seek to perform this civil duty otherwise than in
support of, or at least in conjunction with, the GPF.

In the recent episodes of public disorder on the East Coast

of Demerara, the GDF was deployed to perform its statutory
duty of maintaining internal public order. The GDF was criticised
for failing to enforce the criminal law (i.e., to arrest and detain)
against criminal elements. Society, it appears, could not fathom
such omissions on the part of the GDF. It should be known,
however, that the GDF enjoys no more than the private common
law power of civilians to arrest and, perhaps, it was in the
purported pursuance of this power that members of the GDF
claimed to have effected the arrest of the three persons found in
possession of the cache of arms and monitoring equipment at
Good Hope, East Coast Demerara in the latter half of 2002.

From the standpoint of the GDF, its duty was the

maintenance of public order and did not extend to enforcement
of the criminal law. From the point of view of society, the duty of
the GDF as an arm of the State endowed with coercive powers
was not merely to maintain public order but to arrest all those
who were engaged in criminal conduct. Consequently, and
perhaps due to its alleged statutory impotence and doctrinal
assertions, the GDF’s recent operations on the East Coast have
drawn both commendation and condemnation.

Joint operations
The Commission is of the view that, whenever it is deemed
necessary to deploy the GDF to carry out this public function,
there should be joint operations between the GDF and the GPF,
with the GDF performing the supporting role. In such joint
operations, each Force will complement the other for effective
performance of its respective statutory functions. It is apposite
to note at this point section 18 of the Police Act which provides:

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 Any member of the Force [Police] may call on any
person to assist him if while acting in the execution
of his duty, he is resisted or assaulted or is
otherwise in need of assistance, and anyone so
called on who, without reasonable excuse refuses or
neglects to render assistance shall be liable on
summary conviction to a fine of nine thousand seven
hundred and fifty dollars or to imprisonment for
three months.

This section not only empowers, but obligates, any person to

render assistance to a member of the Guyana Police Force if, in
the execution of his duty, such member is assaulted or resisted
or is otherwise in need of assistance and requests the assistance
of such a person. This section is of particular relevance to joint
operations between the GPF and the GDF in the suppression of
internal public disorder since it permits the Police to empower
members of the GDF to become directly involved in preventing
violations of the criminal law by simply calling upon them
whenever the need arises.

Apart from this provision, a similar obligation arises by

virtue of article 32 of the Constitution which makes it the “joint
duty of the state, society and every citizen to combat and
prevent crime and other violations of the law.”

The concept of joint operations between the GPF and the

GDF necessarily involves a pro-active programme, command
structure and training exercises to reduce, as far as possible,
operational hiccups and complications. In such operations, there
must be planned co-ordination and well-practised execution. In
view of the fact that the maintenance of public order and
enforcement of public order laws are core functions of the Police
Force, it is recommended that overall command in such
operations continue to reside in a senior officer of the Police
Force.

For the removal of lingering perceptions of statutory

impotence, the Commission recommends that members of the
GDF be conferred with powers of arrest and detention limited to
the occasions such as may be necessary for the express purpose

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of maintaining order thereby giving effect to the wisdom and
foresight underlying the statutory imposition on the GDF of a
public duty to maintain public order.

Recruitment
The GDF informed the Commission that, given the present
levels of salaried and non-salaried benefits, it is decidedly
disadvantaged in the labour market in its efforts not merely to
recruit, but also to retain, qualified Coast Guard and Air Corps
personnel. It is losing out to public and private sector
entrepreneurial organisations which have the advantage of
higher salaries and non-salaried benefits.

The GDF found that apart from external recruitment, even

though it embarked on training programmes to create its own
trained pool of personnel to meet its needs, it eventually loses
the services of such personnel to the lure of higher salaries and
better non-salaried benefits of external agencies.

Quite apart from a straight application of the economic

principle of supply and demand, a significant factor justifies a
discriminatory wages and benefits package in favour of the Coast
Guard and Air Corps. Members of the Coast Guard and Air Corps
have to receive military training before they can have specialised
maritime and aviation training. They should be remunerated on
the basis of their dual training and, therefore, should have a
different wages and non-salaried allowances structure which
should reduce the disadvantage of the GDF in the labour market
in its efforts to recruit, train and retain Coast Guard and Air
Corps personnel.

Training
The Commission was concerned that, given its importance
to the “Operational efficiency and effectiveness of the Force”,
training was not the subject of a major presentation and did not
form a significant section of the written submission.

In light of the recent conduct of ‘joint operations’ between

the GDF and GPF, particularly on the East Coast of Demerara,

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the Commission is of the view that it ought to have been
apparent to the GDF that there should be regular, planned and
intensive training between commanders and units of the two
Forces which are likely to work together, from time to time, in
the conduct of internal security operations.

The Commission called attention to the responsibility of the

GDF under section 5 of the Defence Act which includes the
“maintenance of order in Guyana”. This should be regarded as a
normal obligation and, given the GPF’s pre-eminent
responsibility for public order, necessitates a regular pattern of
joint training between the GDF and GPF. The Commission was
concerned that neither the GDF nor the GPF saw it fit to pay
much attention to this matter in their presentations. This
inattention may have led to the perception that one, or the
other, or both were unwilling to perform the statutory duties
required of them in the recent spate of public disorder or that
there might have been no executive direction to that effect.

The GDF expressed its satisfaction that it has been able to

meet most of its manpower needs by recruitment. In fact, the
actual strength stated was just 20 below the authorised
strength. No evidence was presented, however, on the
placement of personnel or the appropriateness of training to the
employment of members of the Force.

The GDF painted a complex picture of military operations

which included countering threats of “terrorism, drug-trafficking,
illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migration, trafficking
in human-beings etc.”

In the view of the Commission, transnational threats such

as these also require regular, inter-service and inter-agency
training. Indeed, the Coast Guard complained that some organs
which had responsibility for such coordination had ceased to
function at the governmental level. The Commission was
concerned that, if there was a perception that the threats to
national security had changed, there should be a commensurate
change in training by the Force to counter the new threats.

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 The Commission recommends that the Guyana Defence
Board give serious consideration to the role of the Guyana
Defence Force, both alongside the Guyana Police Force and with
other civilian agencies and make concrete plans for joint
training.

Recommendations
The Commission is of the considered opinion that the
present international security situation in which Guyana finds
itself warrants greater emphasis on the Coast Guard relative to
the ground forces, and the GDF should consider re-
conceptualising its functions and operations to give effect to this
new strategic reality. With regard to the “Functions and
Operations” of the GDF, therefore, the Commission recommends
the following with respect to:

Coast Guard
(72) Adequate increase in manpower should be achieved, if
possible, within the present calendar year (2004); and
the Defence Board should seriously review the support
given to the Coast Guard.

(73) Adequate funds should be granted to permit the

financing of regular, long-range maritime patrols.

(74) Adequate inshore patrol vessels should be acquired to

enable the suppression of illegal fishing, narcotics
trafficking, gun-running, illegal migration and contraband
smuggling. There should be a presence in the Corentyne
area, in particular, to suppress smuggling.

(75) Adequate aerial and radar surveillance resources should

be acquired.

Reserve Force
(76) There should be an increase in the stipend for reservists
to attend periodic training.

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(77) There should be a schedule of incentives to attract
reservists with academic qualifications and skills.

(78) Regulations should be promulgated to protect the jobs of

reservists when they are called out on duty or training.

(79) The Drill Halls [training centres] in Regions 3, 7, 8 and 9,

should be reactivated and those in other regions should
be improved.

(80) There should be a special budget to help it to perform

effectively.

(81) The Guyana Defence Board should create a separate

establishment and organisation structure, similar to that
of the regular Force, showing the strengths and detailed
descriptions of the various units.

Air Corps
(82) The aerial surveillance capacity of the GDF should be
greatly improved through recapitalisation efforts. Such
efforts should include the completion of repairs to its
helicopter (which is the only one in Guyana) and one of
its two Skyvans which currently needs overhauling.

(83) Adequate arrangements should be made for recruitment

as well as local and overseas training of pilots and
engineers, and retention in service of all skilled
personnel.

(84) There should be increased operational employment of

aviation resources in coastal, maritime and border
surveillance and the Air Corps should be assisted in a
more concrete manner to conduct routine patrols in
cooperation with the ground forces and Coast Guard,
respectively.

(85) Reconnaissance/surveillance aircraft should be acquired.

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(86) Any resulting benefits to the Force from employing the
Air Corps as a revenue earning arm of the Force should
be compared with the benefits likely to accrue to the
country from the interdiction of contraband activities on
the country’s border and the detection of illegal fishing
and other violations of its maritime zone.

Joint Operations
(87) The Guyana Defence Board should give serious
consideration to the role of the Guyana Defence Force in
maintaining internal order with the Guyana Police Force
and other civilian agencies and make concrete plans for
their joint training.

(88) Members of the GDF be should be conferred with powers

of arrest and detention limited to the occasions such as
may be necessary for the express purpose of maintaining
order thereby giving effect to the wisdom and foresight
underlying the statutory imposition on the GDF of a
public duty to maintain public order.

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 Section 2: Composition and Structure

In this section, the Commission examines the

composition and structure of the GDF.

The Defence Force, as previously mentioned, consists of a

regular Force and a reserve Force (section 5 of the Defence Act)
but the numerical strength of either has not been specified. It
may be that Parliament, in its wisdom, intended that such
matters should be left to executive discretion and the
Commission sees no reason to recommend otherwise.

Guyana Defence Board

Section 9(1) of the Defence Act imposes responsibility for
the command, discipline, administration of, and all other matters
relating to the Force on the Guyana Defence Board (GDB) under
the general authority of the Minister. Section 9(1) prescribes:

There shall be a board to be called the Guyana

Defence Board which shall, subject to subsection (2),
be responsible under the general authority of the
Minister for the command, discipline and
administration of, and all other matters relating to,
the Force.

The interpretation and ramifications of this provision has

been the subject of extensive review in section 4 of this Report
and there is no need to repeat our findings here. Suffice it to say
that the responsibility of the Defence Board for the command,
discipline and administration of the Force is not imposed as its
own responsibility but rather as part and parcel of the executive
responsibility of the Minister. Section 9(1) does not prescribe
simply that the Defence Board shall be responsible for such
functions but that it shall be responsible “under the general
authority of the Minister.” In effect, by virtue of section 9(1),
the Defence Board is the mandatory statutory agency by or
through which executive ministerial responsibility is discharged.

This responsibility of the Defence Board under section 9(1)

is “subject to subsection (2)”, which prescribes:

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 The responsibility of the Defence Board shall not
extend to the operational use of the Force, for which
use responsibility shall be vested in the Chief-of-Staff
subject to the general or special directions of the
Minister.

The Chief-of-Staff who is under, section 169, the officer

vested with command of the Force, is the most appropriate
authority to bear responsibility for this function of the Force.
Though appointed by the President (the Commander-in Chief of
the armed forces of Guyana) who can limit his power of
command by the terms of his appointment, section 9(2) renders
the responsibility of the Chief-of-Staff for the operational use of
the GDF “subject to the general or special directions of the
Minister.” (emphasis added)

The Minister
The Commission noted that since the Defence Act was
promulgated, no President (or Prime Minister) ever assigned
responsibility for defence to a dedicated Minister. This calculated
decision may have much to do with the extensive overall
responsibilities which are statutorily imposed upon the Defence
Board, the member-Chairmanship of the President (formerly
Prime Minister) of that Board, ministerial rather than presidential
control over the operational use of the Force, and the anomalies
which would have been occasioned had a dedicated Minister
been appointed.

In response to the recommendation by the GDF that a

substantive Minister/Ministry be appointed/created, in the course
of the oral presentation of the Force, the Commission was
obliged to draw attention to article 107 of the Constitution which
provides:

The President may assign to any Minister responsibility

for any business of the Government of Guyana,
including the administration of any department of
Government, and shall be charged with all
responsibility not assigned to any Minister; in respect
of responsibility so charged, the President shall
appoint a Minister or Parliamentary Secretary to be
answerable to the National Assembly therefor on his or
her behalf. (emphasis added)

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 Provided that the authority to exercise any
power or discharge any duty that is imposed by any
provision of this Constitution or by any other law on
any person or authority shall not be conferred by
this article. (emphasis added)

Thus, where there is no specific assignment of the

Defence portfolio, it is clear that the President is the de jure
Minister of Defence. However, any assignment of responsibility
by the President under article 107 is not intended to, and cannot
override or detract from, any responsibility imposed by law (or
the Constitution) upon any person or authority. Therefore, the
responsibility imposed by section 9(1) upon the Defence Board
could not be transferred to a Minister even if the President were
to assign responsibility for defence to him or her. Such a
responsibility would still remain with the Defence Board under
the proviso to article 107.

While the Defence Board has been created to exercise

executive function, inter alia, to formulate and issue policy
directives to the Chief of Staff, the implementation of these
directives is a function of the Force itself and would remain so
whether or not a Ministry of Defence is created but, as stated
elsewhere, the Chief of Staff is accountable to the Board, except,
with respect to operational use of the Force, for which the
Minister has specific overall responsibility. These functions would
remain with the Defence Board even if a dedicated Ministry of
Defence were created. Nor does the need to formulate
regulations persuade the Commission that such a Ministry is
required.

The Commission recognises that this is already a function

of the Defence Board and not of the Minister, under section 212
of the Defence Act. Further, under the proviso to article 107 of
the Constitution, such a function would remain with the Defence
Board even if a dedicated Ministry of Defence were to be
created. As provided in section 212:

Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Act, the

Defence Board may make regulations for the better
carrying out of the provisions of this Act and generally
for the good government and organization of the

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 Force and for providing for matters required by this
Act to be prescribed and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing, such regulations
may make provisions with respect to any of the
following matters…. (emphasis added)

If, perchance, there is a perceived need for regulations

relating to any of the matters mentioned in section 212, the
Chief of Staff as the commander of the Force should so advise
the Defence Board which could formulate the
Regulations or direct, by delegation or otherwise, that this be
done.

The Commission has been advised that, apart from the

designated statutory members of the Defence Board, i.e., the
President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Home Affairs and
the Chief of Staff, the three other members who have been
appointed by the “Minister” to be members of the Defence Board
are the Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Commissioner of Police.

The Secretary to the Defence Board is the Head of the

Presidential Secretariat or such person as the Chairman of the
Defence Board (i.e., the President) may nominate to perform the
duties of Secretary at any meeting of the Board in the event of
the inability of the Permanent Secretary to perform his or her
secretarial duties (section 12).

The statutory requirement that the Head of the Presidential

Secretariat should ordinarily be the Secretary to the Board tends
to indicate parliamentary understanding that the nature of that
responsibility is more becoming that of the Office of the
President than that of a Ministry.

Since the Chairman of the Defence Board is the President,

it would seem to justify his retention of the Defence Portfolio,
having regard to his power to assign responsibility for
parliamentary representation of the Force under article 107 of
the Constitution.

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 The Commission has noted that section 16(1) of the
Defence Act empowers the “Minister”, rather than the Defence
Board, to make regulations by which Officers of the Force are
governed. Section 16(1) provides:

Subject to this Act, the Minister may make regulations for

the better carrying out of the provisions of this Part and,
without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, such
regulations may make provisions with respect to all or any
of the following matters, that is to say the commissioning
of officers, their terms of service, appointment, transfer,
promotion, retirement, resignation, removal from office
and such other matters concerning officers as may seem
to him necessary.

While these Regulations relate to officers only, it is the

Board which, in the discharge of its responsibility for the
command, discipline and administration of and all other matters
relating to the Force, under the general authority of the
“Minister” (President), is required to make all other regulations
as described earlier.

In its presentation, the Force argued for the promulgation

of a National Defence Strategy and was firmly of the view that
such a responsibility should fall on the Defence Board in its
collective wisdom rather than on the President, whether as
President or as Minister holding responsibility for Defence. Since
the Defence Board has the statutory authority to make its own
rules for the performance of its duties and even for consulting
with persons other than its own members under section 12(1),
the Commission recommends that this important strategic
function should be undertaken by the Defence Board as a matter
of priority.

Organisation Structure
The Force emphasised that, in addition to ‘traditional’
territorial security and border problems, there were what it
called ‘non-traditional’ threats which do not respect national
borders and often arise from non-state actors such as terrorists
and criminal organisations. These threats include “terrorism,
drug-trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee

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migration, trafficking in human beings, particularly women and
children, and other international crimes.”

In reviewing its organisation structure, the Force pointed

out that “there has been a gradual increase in tasking beyond
our resource capabilities”. It presented a case mainly for an
increase in the strength of the Force by an additional infantry
battalion, and a strengthened Artillery Corps and Military Police
Corps. Further, the Force recommended an increase in the
authorised establishment from 2,650 to 3,450, i.e., 823 or about
31 per cent above the present level.

The Commission is of the view that, given the current

security assessment and the reported increase in tasking, careful
consideration should indeed be given to increasing the human
resource base of the Force. However, it is less inclined to accept
that the Force’s proposals for the employment and placement of
such additional troops well within national borders reflect an
appropriate response to the challenge which was outlined in its
presentation. The Commission is of the view that, to the extent
that the threats are perceived as trans-border issues, the thrust
of the military response should be, principally, to allocate
military resources to the most vulnerable areas, i.e., the
borders. Guyana’s coastline and borders are in excess of 2,500
km and greater emphasis must be placed by the Force on
guaranteeing the security of its more vulnerable areas.

The Commission is unable, on the available evidence, to

determine whether the proposal to increase the strength of the
Force by 823 members is justified. Nor has the Commission
received information about the likely cost of such an increase.
The Commission is satisfied, however, that in relating response
to threat, the Force’s proposals should engage the Board’s
policy- makers in greater focus on external operations, and the
air and maritime units to enable the Force to perform its tasks
with greater efficiency.

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Recommendations
With regard to the ‘Composition and Structure’ of the GDF,
the Commission recommends the following:

(89) There should be improved and regular aerial patrols and

surveillance by the Air Corps.

(90) There should also be improved and regular maritime

patrols and surveillance by the Coast Guard.

(91) The strength of the reserve Force should be increased in

all regions which possess coastlines or international
borders; that is to say, all regions except the Upper
Demerara- Berbice Region.

(92) The Defence Board should adopt and treat as a priority

the GDF’s proposal of outlining a National Defence
Strategy.

(93) The Chief of Staff should submit draft regulations for the
consideration of the Defence Board.

195
 Section 3: Ethnic Balance

In this section, the Commission examines the

methods and processes of achieving greater ethnic
balance within the GDF.

Ratio
The authorised strength of the GDF is 2,650 but the actual
strength is 2,630 which is 20 short of the authorised figure. Of
this figure Afro-Guyanese comprise 80% while Indo-Guyanese
comprise only 8%. The remaining 12% are Guyanese of other
races.

Although Indo-Guyanese constitute approximately 48%,

and Afro-Guyanese 36%, of the Guyanese population the latter
outnumber the former in the GDF by a ratio of roughly 10 to 1.
Thus, the assertion is heard that Indo-Guyanese are under-
represented in the GDF by about 82%. On the other hand, Afro-
Guyanese are over-represented by about 122% while other
ethnic groups are cumulatively under-represented by about
25%.

Clearly, the argument that there should be a reasonable

relationship between ethnic composition of the population and
ethnic representation in the GDF raises the issue of the
formulation and implementation of appropriate policies.
Satisfactorily resolving this matter however, is not without its
problems. In seeking to correct any perceived imbalance
between the two sets of factors, it may be questioned whether it
is desirable to fix an absolute standard of ethnic participation in
the GDF.

While Guyanese society as a whole does not seem to

entertain ethnic insecurity fears with regard to the operational
use of the GDF to the same extent as they do with regard to the
GPF (i.e., on account of its ethnic composition) it is nevertheless
desirable that the GDF be re-configured so as not to cause an
increase, but rather a diminution, in whatever fears exist.

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 The historical rivalry and conflict between Indo-Guyanese
and Afro-Guyanese and their undoubted negative consequences
point to the need for national institutions such as the GDF to be
more balanced in their composition and functioning, moreso, in
the case of the GDF since it is invested with the coercive function
of defence of Guyana and with maintaining order. Thus, the
ethnic imbalance in the GDF has given rise to some ethnic
insecurity fear among sections of the Indo-Guyanese population.

This problem was highlighted by the Rise Organise and

Rebuild (ROAR) Guyana Movement which, in testimony before
the Commission, lamented the failure of Indo-Guyanese to join
the GDF and to make a meaningful contribution to national
security relative to their demographic strength. The GDF, too, in
its presentation acknowledged the existence of this problem
when it stated that:

At any rate, the question of ethnic balance in the

GDF is a reality which needs to be addressed. It is
reasonable to assume that ethnic balance in the
military is achievable if the ethnic groups that
perceive that their safety and security are being
threatened by the present composition of the
military use the opportunity to join the ranks of the
military via the open-door policy of the Force.

Policy
The GDF, mindful of the fact that the ethnic imbalance in
its ranks might be responsible for the perception that there is
discrimination against non-Afro Guyanese, defended its
recruitment policy over the past 38 years on the bases that it
“has been open, fair and non-discriminatory” and that “its equal
opportunity policy is designed to provide equal opportunity for all
personnel within an environment free from all discrimination,
harassment and intimidation. Further, that Indo-Guyanese have
largely kept themselves out of the GDF.”

The GDF compared and contrasted the ethnic imbalances

of the GDF with the ethnic imbalances of other armies in
Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan and concluded that, unlike
those of the GDF, the imbalances of those foreign armies

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resulted from deliberate ethnic discrimination in recruiting
certain ethnic groups over others, with the result that their
actions in internal conflicts were ethnically discriminatory and
repressive. In contrasting the GDF with those armies, the GDF
stated:

The Guyana situation is different. Even though the

GDF is a coercive arm of the government, its record
would attest to its professional conduct and cannot
be categorized as a repressive force. This does not
remove the perception that the present ethnic
configuration of the GDF makes it unresponsive to
the security needs of the minority ethnic groups in
the military. It is true that ethnic fears appear to be
more perceived than real. It is also true that there is
no force readily available for ethnic integration. What
is not true is the perception in the external
community that the GDF does not allow other ethnic
groups to be part of its membership.

The GDF, while resolutely denying any policy of ethnic

discrimination in its recruitment and retention policy, forthrightly
accepted that its ethnic composition has given rise to ethnic
insecurity fears which, even though unwarranted, have not been
dissipated or removed by its claimed professional record.
Perception can be as potent in its consequences as reality which
cannot be readily assuaged. Such fears, even if mere
perceptions and not based on reality, cannot be adequately
addressed by mere professionalism but also by a recruitment
system which is designed to attract cadres of recruits in
sufficient numbers from all ethnic groups to build the image of
the GDF as a national organisation reflective of the ethnic
composition of this multi-racial country. It is clear that the
existing recruitment system and practices of the GDF have failed
to attract Indo-Guyanese in sufficient numbers and must
therefore be improved.

Since there is no, or insufficient, evidence that those

responsible for recruitment have shown the requisite vision or
initiative to encourage and/or devise a plan likely or calculated
to persuade Indo-Guyanese in larger proportions to enlist, the
system must therefore be re-designed and re-formulated.

198
Recruitment
The Commission does not find the present recruitment
system exclusionary in its objective. The Commission, however,
finds that, given the fact that the recruitment data have revealed
that, “among the various ethnic groups offering to enlist in the
GDF, while the Africans and to a lesser extent the Amerindians
were consistently higher, the reverse is true for East Indians and
other ethnic groups”, positive efforts should be made to identify
and overcome, as far as possible within the constitutional
prohibitions of article 149, the distractions which have hitherto
disinclined Indo-Guyanese in particular from seeking enlistment
in the GDF.

While the recruitment and retention system which obtains

cannot be faulted as exclusionary, the GDF should be concerned
that Indo-Guyanese, who constitute about 48% of the
population, consistently demonstrate reluctance to enlist. This
suggests the need for a more pro-active inclusionary approach,
rather than a merely non-exclusionary approach.

It is obvious that, while Indo-Guyanese remain disinclined

to enlist, the GDF is being denied a much larger pool of human
resources from which to select many qualified and likely suitable
recruits. No doubt, despite the fact that GDF has claimed so far
that it has satisfactorily fulfilled its statutory mandates, it has
done so despite the consistent unavailability of a larger pool of
human resources from which recruits of the highest quality could
have been selected on the basis of competitive merit.

It is, to the credit of the training programmes of the GDF

that it is able to satisfactorily fulfil its mandates although it only
has access to a restricted pool of human resources from which to
recruit. Nevertheless, it is in the interest of the GDF as a national
institution having coercive public law functions that it should
seek to have available to it a full and nationally representative
pool of human resources so that not only the best can be chosen
but also its image as a truly national institution can be improved
and misperceptions of ethnic insecurity can be allayed.

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 The GDF has taken the position that, unlike foreign armies
which have practised a policy of ethnic discrimination in
recruitment, the task of re-configuring the GDF to achieve some
acceptable level of ethnic balance without the necessity of
conscription, is achievable. It is the Commission’s view that
difficulties notwithstanding, the GDF is sympathetic to the need
for reform and change. In this context, the GDF candidly made
two significant admissions as follows:

(1) At any rate, the question of ethnic balance

in the GDF is a reality which needs to be
addressed.
and

(2) Admittedly, the GDF policy, allowing for all

ethnic groups to join its ranks is not well
known and should be widely advertised as part
of allaying any perceived security fears.

The Commission commends the GDF for its recognition of the

limitations of its recruitment policy and endorses its perception
of the need for public edification as an important aspect of this
policy. However, the Commission takes the view that if such
perceived ethnic insecurity fears exist principally among the
Indo-Guyanese population and have been significantly
contributory to their general disinclination to join the GDF, it
would be prudent to target Indo-Guyanese principally.

Systems
The GDF has also conceded that there is an external
perception that the bill of fare (menu) offered by the GDF does
not adequately cater to a multi-ethnic membership. If such a
perception is not founded on reality then it is a misperception
which it behoves the GDF to effectively dispel by public
information principally in the Indo-Guyanese communities. The
same applies to religious practices in respect of which it must be
the public understanding that membership of the GDF does not
stand in the way of freedom of religion and religious practices.

While the GDF has drawn the attention of the Commission

to the possibilities that the three-year minimum contractual
service period may be too long for some ethnic groups and the

200
long separation from nuclear family may prove too burdensome
and saddle the administration with problems of desertion, the
Commission has serious doubts whether any compromise or
concession can be made on such issues without adversely
affecting military competence and efficiency. Certain conditions
of service are integral to military administration and operations
and cannot be sacrificed on the altar of social convenience.

The GDF has also advanced the notion of the loss of

cultural identity as a possible reason or as one of the critical
factors which can affect efforts to ethnically balance the GDF.
The Commission is of the view, however, that this is a
sociological phenomenon which itself is the result of the ethnic
imbalance which now besets the GDF. Greater ethnic diversity
may therefore itself be a solution to the loss of cultural identity.

The GDF also emphasised differences in the socialisation of

racial groups in Guyana as among the factors negatively
impacting the ability to achieve the objective of ethnic balance
among its personnel. While this may well be a contributory
factor, the Commission is of the view that the GDF should take
all necessary measures to ensure that any such obstacle is
removed or mitigated.

In this context, the GDF should initiate programmes

geared towards promoting camaraderie, strong esprit de corps
and professional values among its rank and file. The Force
should take cultural practices into account to the extent that
these practices would not allow of any unfavourable treatment
among the ethnic groupings.

Discrimination
The Commission detected some reluctance on the part of
the GDF in paying particular attention to the Indo-Guyanese in
its recruitment efforts, notwithstanding its recognition of a
disinclination on the part of Indo-Guyanese to offer their services
to the GDF. In this respect, the GDF seems to be of the view that
any special effort aimed at attracting Indo-Guyanese applicants
would violate article 149 of the Constitution which proscribes

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ethnic discrimination. Such a view might well have hitherto been
responsible for the insufficiency of positive efforts to procure
Indo-Guyanese applicants. It is the Commission’s view that such
special efforts e.g., those aimed at removing whatever
misperceptions may exist generally in the Indo-Guyanese
mindset and therefore must necessarily be directed at the Indo-
Guyanese communities, would not constitute ethnic
discrimination in favour of Indo-Guyanese or against another
ethnic group.

Article 149 (2) of the Constitution states:

In this article the expression “discriminatory”

means affording different treatment to
different persons attributable wholly or mainly
to their respective descriptions by race, place
of origin, political opinions, colour or creed
whereby persons of one such description are
subject to disabilities or restrictions to which
persons of another such description are not
made subject or are accorded privileges or
advantages which are not afforded to persons
of another such description. (emphasis added)

Efforts directed at removing misperceptions from the Indo-

Guyanese mindset to nullify their disinclination to join the GDF
cannot be viewed as a privilege or advantage accorded to Indo-
Guyanese (or any other ethnic group). Nor can such efforts
subject any other ethnic group to any disability or restriction.
Such efforts are directed to the inclusion of Indo-Guyanese into
the GDF on the basis of merit and not to the exclusion of any
other ethnic group on the basis of race.

The GDF has seen the need for intensified efforts in the
various regions in conducting recruitment. The Commission
wishes to emphasise that the problem is not recruitment per se
but the creation of a pool of applicants among whom (having
regard to the demographic strength of the Indo-Guyanese
population) there may be Indo-Guyanese applicants in
particular. While all regions should be targeted to attract
applicants for enlistment into the GDF, the Indo-Guyanese
communities will require intensified efforts to achieve a
satisfactory level of response from them.

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 The GDF complained that their current salary levels are too
restrictive in comparison with those of major private industries.
They recommended that their levels be made more competitive
with those of other major public and private sector entities.
While the Commission agrees in principle with such a
recommendation to the extent that such entities vie with the
GDF for relevant qualified personnel, the Commission is
disinclined to accept that the implementation of such a
recommendation would have more than a remote relevance to
the issue of ethnic balance in the GDF.

The actual strength of the GDF with 80% Afro-Guyanese

membership approximates its authorised strength and the
Commission has no evidential basis for finding that such private
and public sector entities generally discriminate against Afro-
Guyanese in favour of Indo-Guyanese (or other ethnic group) in
their employment policies. Even if it is assumed that some
general level of discrimination does exist, the Commission
cannot reasonably say that it is so high as to have caused such a
disproportionately great imbalance in the ethnic composition of
the GDF, particularly between its Afro-Guyanese and Indo-
Guyanese membership.

The Commission is more inclined to the view that the

ethnic imbalance in the GDF has a much greater causal
relationship with cultural, sociological and psychological factors
than with levels of salaries and allowances. Increases in salaries
and allowances have more to do with the attraction of higher
quality recruits than with attracting personnel of any particular
ethnicity.

Unlike the Guyana Police Force, the GDF does not appear
to be beset with a problem of recruitment as such. However, it
does appear to have an even greater problem than the Guyana
Police Force in attracting Indo-Guyanese in particular to its
membership. The efforts which must be made to attain an
acceptable level of ethnic representation in the GDF must
therefore be more vigorous and directly focused on the
perceived disinclination of Indo-Guyanese to enlist in the GDF.

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Recommendations
With regard to ‘Ethnic Balance’ in the GDF the Commission
recommends that:

(94) The GDF should adopt recruitment procedures which

must take into consideration cultural, sociological and
psychological imperatives, designed to attract Indo-
Guyanese in particular to the GDF.

(95) Recruitment procedures should have a particular focus

on the Indo-Guyanese community because of its general
disinclination to join the GDF; these should not be to the
neglect or exclusion of other ethnic groups.

(96) No person should be excluded from enlisting in the GDF

except on the basis of competitive merit.

(97) The GDF should conduct a public information campaign

designed to remove negative misperceptions about its
recruitment policy with particular focus on Indo-
Guyanese communities.

(98) The public information campaign should highlight the

inclusionary ethnic recruitment and retention policy of
the GDF in terms of:
a) the need for greater Indo-Guyanese
representation in the interest of achieving
greater ethnic balance;
b) the benefits of military training to individuals,
communities and the nation at large;
c) the non-exclusionary measures such as the
provision of a bill of fare which caters to an
ethnically diverse military population;
d) due respect and regard for diverse religious
practices; and
e) secure from all officers including senior ranks
an attitude of respect for lower ranks.

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(99) A multi-ethnic recruitment panel should be formed to
exemplify an ethnically diverse GDF and to conduct
recruitment in all the regions.

(100) Recruiting officers should be sensitised to the logistical

problems which can physically impede recruitment in
some regions and the cultural, sociological and
psychological factors which can stand in the way of their
recruitment process, particularly in the Indo-Guyanese
community, and should be willing and able to deal with
such impediments with reasoned persuasion. Promotion
Boards or Panels should also be similarly reflective, if
possible.

(101) Without prejudice to military demands and efficiency,

members of the GDF should not be assigned duties away
from their nuclear family for unnecessarily prolonged
periods.

(102) The disciplinary codes of the GDF should specifically

proscribe racial harassment and provide for effective
disciplinary sanction.

(103) The Defence Board should consider whether the

minimum period of contractual service can be reduced to
two years without prejudicing the effectiveness of the
GDF as a whole.

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 Section 4: Relationship with and Responsibility to
Civilian Authority

In this section, the Commission examines the

relationship with, and responsibility to, civilian authority
by the GDF.

As previously discussed the Guyana Defence Force

(hereinafter referred to as the Force) was created under section
4 of the Defence Act to perform the duties mentioned in section
5.

Section 5 prescribes:

The Force shall be charged with the defence of and

maintenance of order in Guyana and with such other
duties as may from time to time be defined by the
Defence Board.

Duties
It can readily be seen that Parliament imposed the specific
duties of defence and the maintenance of order on the Force and
such additional duties which the Defence Board, a non-military
statutory body, may define from time to time.

The Defence Board was charged with responsibility for the

command, discipline and administration of, and all other matters
relating to the Force under section 9(1) which provides:

There shall be a board to be called the Guyana

Defence Board which shall, subject to sub section(2),
be responsible under the general authority of the
Minister for the command, discipline and
administration of, and all other matters relating
to the Force.

The Commission considered, at some length, the

statutory composition and responsibilities of the Guyana Defence
Board and the duties of the Minister and the Chief of Staff of the
Guyana Defence Force on the one hand, and the specific
recommendations of the Force at section 17 of its memorandum
on the other.

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 Since the Force was established under section 4 and the
Defence Board was established under section 9(1), it is clear
that the Force and the Defence Board are two separate and
distinct legal bodies, with the latter having responsibility for the
former, save for its “operational use”. The Force is a military
statutory creature which cannot function in the manner
contemplated by the Act without, ex necessitate, giving effect to
and/or taking into account the directions/orders/decisions
(command) of the Board. Thus, in essence, the Board may fairly
be regarded as essential to the Force since the responsibility
vested in it “pertains to the very nature of” the Force’s creation,
viability and sustainability.

Under section 2, “the Chief of Staff” means “the officer

appointed by the President under section 169 to have command
of the Force.” Section 169 provides:

The President shall appoint an officer being a

member of the Force in whom the command of the
Force shall be vested and, subject to the terms of
such appointment, such officer shall have
command of the Force.

From a joint reading of sections 2 and 169, the President is

empowered to appoint a serving officer from the Force to have
command of the Force (subject to the terms of his appointment)
and that officer, when so appointed by the President, is
statutorily designated “Chief of Staff”.

Authority
The Chief of Staff is the officer who has virtually exclusive
authority for the direction, coordination and control over the
ranks under his command (operational command), whereas, the
Defence Board bears responsibility for the command, discipline
and administration of the Force and all other matters relating to
it subject, of course, to the idiom of section 9(2) which deals
specifically with operational use of the Force (infra). It is
important to note that such responsibility is expressly stated to
be “under the general authority of the Minister” i.e., an
executive responsibility is vested in the Defence Board as if it
were the Minister. Thus, the Chief of Staff, who by section 10 is

207
a member of the Defence Board but who has no independent
executive authority, is answerable directly to the Board for the
manner in which he exercises his authority in commanding,
disciplining and administering the Force.

Under section 10(1) of the Defence Act, apart from the

Chief of Staff, the Defence Board is constituted by:

(a) The President, who is its Chairman;

(b) The Prime Minister;

(c) The Minister responsible for Home Affairs; and

(d) Not more than three other persons appointed by the

Minister.

The Commission has been advised that, at present, these other

persons are the Attorney General and Minister of Legal Affairs,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Commissioner of Police.

In the context of the country’s internal and territorial

security situation, it is self-evident why these persons have been
co-opted by the President onto the Board.

Sections 9 and 10 are by no means without structural

difficulties and these can sometimes lead to a lack of clarity in
command and management, but retention by the President of
the Defence portfolio has tended to cushion any anomalous
situation by the exercise of his presidential authority, both
ministerially and as Chairman of the Defence Board.

Ministerial responsibility to the National Assembly for the

manner in which the Chief of Staff commands, disciplines and
administers the GDF and all other matters relating thereto where
there is no substantive Minister, is, in practice, assigned to a
named Minister or a Parliamentary Secretary by the President
under article 107 of the Constitution since any executive

208
authority not specifically assigned by him is retained by him
under articles 99 and 107 of the Constitution.

The President is not a member of the National Assembly

and, therefore, cannot “speak for” the Force in Parliament. Since
he may exercise that authority “either directly or through officers
subordinate to him” under article 99, it must be assumed that
any portfolio not specifically assigned is retained by the
President not by inadvertence but for calculated reasons; and
this prerogative attaching to the Presidency ought to be
reviewed or whittled away only in exceptional circumstances.

The Commission also considered the Force’s proposal at

section 19 of its memorandum that a Ministry of Defence be
established and that such a Ministry: “…would be responsible for
implementation of policy directives, facilitating civil-military
relations, parliamentary representation and formulation of
regulations.”

The Commission is aware of the responsibility of the Board for

“the command, discipline and administration of, and all other
matters relating to the Force.” Except for the “operational use of
the Force,” it is clear that the Board is the supreme authority
and the Commission has not been persuaded that grounds exist
for such a high responsibility to be transferred, diluted or lightly
set aside. In any event, statutory functions cannot be
transferred to the Minister without legislative intervention. (See
proviso to article 107 of The Constitution).

The Commission is not convinced, also, that the mere

establishment of a Ministry of Defence, as proposed by the
Force, would necessarily better perform the functions suggested,
particularly since satisfactory mechanisms already exist and are
shared between the Board and the President performing the
functions of Minister. Where there are deficiencies or problems,
their solution seems to be in improving the performance of
existing mechanisms, rather than in proposing the establishment
of new ones.

209
 The Commission has been informed by officers of the
Coast Guard, for example, that certain inter-agency,
governmental coordinating organisations which are essential to
maritime operations, do not function. The Commission also
received evidence of queries by the Auditor General’s
Department and complaints from the public about the conduct of
the Force during the recent spate of criminal violence.

The Board may feel that it would be inappropriate for the

Force itself to investigate matters such as these. It would,
however, require the most irrefragable testimony for this
Commission to agree to a recommendation which would directly
impinge upon that executive authority reserved by the
Constitution for the President. Apart from this, any such
recourse may, without justification and unwittingly, lead to a
conclusion that the Commission supports any trifling
condemnation of the manner in which the Portfolio is being
administered now, or was in the past, by all previous Presidents.
The recommendation by the Force for a dedicated Minister is,
therefore, not supported by the Commission.

Responsibility
The responsibility of the Defence Board under section
9(1) is not a responsibility to the Minister but rather “under the
general authority of the Minister. It is both an executive and
administrative responsibility. Therefore, whatever executive
decisions could be made by the Minister in relation to the
command, discipline and administration of the Force “shall” be
made by the Defence Board and, pariter, the Chief of Staff would
have to execute those decisions as if they were made by the
Minister. Since the Defence Board, as a matter of law, makes
those decisions under the general authority of the Minister, it
bears a mandatory executive responsibility in lieu of the Minister.

The words “command”, “discipline” and “administration”

in section 9(1) are all of equal contextual strength and the
authority of the Chief of Staff is exercised under the control and
directions of the Board subject only to the limitation imposed by
section 9(2). Since the responsibility of the Defence Board under

210
section 9(1) is “subject to subsection (2)” it is axiomatic that
these words of limitation curtail/restrict that responsibility to the
extent that such responsibility is inconsistent with section 9(2).
Section 9(2) provides:

The responsibility of the Defence Board shall not

extend to the operational use of the Force for
which use responsibility shall be vested in the
Chief-of-Staff subject to the general or special
directions of the Minister. (emphasis added)

Given that the responsibility of the Defence Board does not

extend to the operational use, of the Force, which is merely one
facet of the notion of “Command”, the Chief of Staff, by section
9(2), is relieved of the obligation of accounting to the Defence
Board for such use of the Force. But that sub-section does not
relieve him from executive control and accountability. This is
precisely why Parliament has vested responsibility for
operational use in the Chief-of-Staff and, at the same time, has
made such responsibility “subject to the general or special
directions of the Minister”. The Chief of Staff is not a member of
the Executive and, therefore, his operational use of the Force is
limited to the extent that the executive Minister has issued
general or special directions to him. In such cases, his
responsibility is limited by such general or special executive
directions.

But there is Parliamentary wisdom in excluding

responsibility for operational use from the responsibilities
imposed on the Defence Board under section 9(1).
Operational use is more suited to the Officer identified in section
169 and the Minister i.e., the President. In the interest of clarity
and for the avoidance of doubt, (and Commissioners Ramson
and Nandlall after studied reflection have concluded that this
doubt was triggered by the baneful influence of a mindset
cultivated over a period of monolithic governance and the
systemic failure of duly appointed personnel to be guided by the
parametric limitations inherent in the governing statutory
provisions), the Commissioners find some assistance from a
recent judicial exposition of section 9(1) expressly, and section
9(2), inferentially, in A.G et al -v- C. Crum Ewing (Civil Appeal

211
#46/2001). Singh JA, in delivering the judgment of the Court,
acknowledged that the “Defence Board is responsible for the
command, discipline and administration of the Force” and
later reiterates that “the overall discipline and administration
of the Force vests with the Board.” In this latter assertion, due
deference was given to the limitations set out in section 9(2)
with respect to “operational use”, hence, no reference to overall
“command” is made. In the former, the learned Judge
recognises that the Chief of Staff remains subordinate to the
Board in general and, with respect to operational use, to the
Minister, in particular.

This interpretation of section 9 of the Act lends support to

the view that the Chief of Staff may justifiably be regarded as
the “Managing Director” executing functions for which the Board
and the Minister respectively are responsible. (Commissioner
Ramson prefers to refer to the Chief of Staff analogously as the
tropological Postmaster General of the Board). Section 169 vests
in him functions relating to “Command” on a routine diurnal
basis, subject to the oversight authority of the Board and the
Minister in their respective statutory configurations of
supervision. It would not be unfair or inaccurate to state that he
is free to give such orders, directions or instructions to the
extent that the Board or the Minister (in the case of operational
use) has not indicated otherwise.

In view of the Board’s responsibility for the command,

discipline and administration of the Force, the Chief of Staff can
hardly be deemed or expected to have unbridled power over the
Force, save as may be expressly prescribed by the Statute. The
plenitude of this prescription contained in section 9(2) is
understandable as expedition is required for operational matters.
However, this freedom from restraint which the Chief of Staff
enjoys is itself limited by the power of the Minister arising from
the countervailing limitations contained therein.

212
Defence Bureau
The Force in its presentation to the Commission drew
attention to the Board’s overload and insensitivity to the main
focus of the Force’s operation and efficiency, and submitted that:

…it is becoming increasingly clear that the Defence

Board needs to divest itself of the routine
administrative matters and devote the time saved
to formulating broad policy directives. In
this regard, this submission proposes as an
alternative the introduction of parliamentary and
ministerial mechanism as complementary to the
Defence Board.

It has already been pointed out that the words “under the
general authority of the Minister” connote that the responsibility
of the Defence Board for administration under section 9(1) is a
statutory executive responsibility which allows for directions of
an executive nature relating to the administration of the Force
and it is the function of the Chief-of-Staff to act in accordance
with those directions.

The Commission has already pronounced on the call for

alternative parliamentary and ministerial mechanism but there is
a gnawing tug of circumstantial evidence which predisposes the
Commission to conclude that the Defence Board’s performance
negatively impacts upon the Force’s operations and efficiency.

The Board needs to constantly remind itself about the

onerous and overall responsibilities imposed by section 9 since
any shortfall in performance would be inexcusable. Statutory
provision is available in section 12(1)(b) for delegation by the
Board of its executive functions where necessary, to any
member or members thereof by notification in the Gazette. The
Board may therefore wish to adopt this procedure in the interest
of convenience, expedition and greater efficiency, should its level
of proficiency for whatever reason, not meet the demands
articulated by the Force.

The Commission recommends that this matter of the

relationship between the Board and the Force be referred to the
Board for serious re-examination in light of the provisions of

213
section 12 of the Act. Notwithstanding such a re-examination,
however, the Commission recommends that, indeed, there needs
to be a bridging device between the Board and the Force, in the
form of a ‘Defence Bureau’ or a cognate grouping, as an agent of
the Board under section 12, answerable exclusively to the Board.

The proposed `Bureau’ should be civilian in composition,

emphasising the subordination of the Force to the Board. Given
the hybrid nature of its proposed tasks, being both civil and
military, however, the Commission suggests that consideration
be given to tapping into the reservoir of retired service personnel
who could provide the patulous assortment of skill and
experience to complement the executive administration of the
Board.

It is suggested that the proposed `Bureau’, or other

cognate grouping, should be charged with facilitating the
organisation of the work of the Board; executing the orders of
the Board, and “any other matters for which the Board may
consider it necessary or desirable to provide in order to secure
the better performance of the functions of the Board”, in
accordance with section 12 of the Act.

The Commission emphasises that the proposed `Bureau’,

or other cognate grouping, should be regarded as an agent of
the Board in the nature of a quasi-military research and
development organ and should not be employed in a manner to
derogate from the statutory powers of either the Minister or the
Chief of Staff.

The Commission does not wish to provide a detailed

description of the proposed `Bureau’ or grouping referred to
above which would be best arrived at after due deliberation of
the Board, but suggests that, in accordance with section 11 of
the Act, the Secretary of the Board will also be designated as the
Head of the proposed `Bureau’ or grouping referred to above.
In reality, it is intended that the change will simply result in the
strengthening of the professional personnel available to the
Board under the direct supervision of its Secretary. The

214
Commission is of the view that the establishment of the
proposed `Defence Bureau’ or cognate grouping will:

(1) not necessitate a change in the law;

(2) provide a mechanism for enhancing the efficiency of

the Board in its relations with the Force; and,

(3) enhance the relationship between the Board and

Force as contemplated by the Act.

The Commission is satisfied that, the extant Defence Act

makes adequate provision for all matters relating to the manner
in which the Force should be administered and commanded. The
Commission is also satisfied that the Act makes adequate
provision for the subordination of the Force to civilian authority.

Civil courts
Members of the Force do not enjoy immunity from criminal
prosecution in the civil courts and they can be charged before
these Courts even if a military charge for the same offence has
already been instituted (section 127). The civil court, however,
must take into account whatever punishment has been inflicted
by the military court for any act or omission wholly or partly
constituting the offence under civil law.

Further in the case of murder, manslaughter, treason,

treason–felony, or rape committed in Guyana, a criminal charge
for any such offence is the only legal possibility. In other words,
such offences, once committed in Guyana, must be tried and
punished in the civil courts (section 76(4)). It is clear that the
Defence Act does not in any way seek to compromise the
accountability of members of the Force to the civil courts for
criminal misconduct.

The Director of Public Prosecutions, while he or she has no

power or control over Court-Martial proceedings, can institute
and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before
any civil court in respect of any offence committed against the

215
laws of Guyana even if the acts or omissions constitute military
offences.

The Force is an unincorporated agency of the State, and in

the name of the Attorney-General, it can be sued along with the
military personnel (except a member of the Coast Guard under
section 208 B(3)) for any loss or damage resulting from any
tortious act or omission committed by that person in the course
of his official duties. However, the assets of the Force are not
liable to be levied upon in execution of judgment but the assets
of individual members do not enjoy the same immunity from
levy in execution of judgment.

Parliament has not sought to protect the Force or its

members (except members of the Coast Guard) from the civil
law processes. At the same time, there has been no special
parliamentary effort to make the Force accountable to civilian
authorities other than executive officials.

Such a parliamentary approach can hardly be faulted since

it is undesirable that a military body should be accountable to
civilian non-executive authority. However, it is important that
the Force be accountable to the National Assembly because of its
central importance to national defence, its internal security
functions, and the size of its budgetary allocation.

Recommendations
With regard to “relationship with, and responsibility to,
civilian authority” the Commission recommends as follows:

(104) There is no need for the creation of a Ministry of Defence

and a dedicated Minister of Defence.

(105) The relationship between the Board and the Force be

referred to the Board for serious re-examination in light
of the provisions of section 12 of the Act.

(106) There should be a bridging device between the Board

and the Force in the form of a ‘Defence Bureau’ or a

216
 cognate grouping, as an agent of the Board under
section 12, answerable exclusively to the Board.

(107) The Force should be accountable to the National

Assembly because of its central importance to national
defence, its internal security functions, and the size of its
budgetary allocation.

217
 Section 5: Financial and Public Accountability

In this section, the Commission examines the

financial and public accountability of the GDF.

The accounting system of the GDF is governed by the

Financial and Audit Act, Chapter 73:01 and the Financial and
Stores Regulations.

Control
Capital expenditure falls under the control of the Office of
the President since the President has not assigned responsibility
for defence to any Minister. The Office of the President has a
sub-accounting status for capital expenditure relating to the GDF
and is therefore accountable to the National Assembly for such
expenditure from budgetary allocations made to the Office of the
President. The GDF submitted that the control of capital
expenditure should fall directly under it in the interest of direct
accountability, greater efficiency and flexibility.

The Commission is not convinced however, that capital

expenditure should be placed under the administrative
responsibility of the GDF. Capital expenditure is more a matter
executive than administrative responsibility and would appear
more suited to executive than to administrative decision-making.
It is evidently not so much a question of who disburses capital
funds as who decides on the objective of such disbursement.

Administrative responsibility, which includes administrative

financial responsibility, is statutorily imposed on the Defence
Board. If capital expenditure were to be placed under the direct
administrative control of the GDF, the Chief of Staff would be
answerable to the Defence Board. Since the Chief of Staff is
himself a statutory member of the Defence Board, there is no
reason why decisions involving capital expenditure should be
made by him rather than the collective membership of the
Board.

218
 Given the critical comments in the report of the Accountant
General in relation to current account expenditure, the
Commission does not recommend that the GDF be granted
additional financial responsibility. Capital expenditure would
appear to rest more appropriately and securely with the Defence
Board which functions under the general authority of the Office
of the President (in the absence of a substantive Ministry).

Current expenditure falls under the control of the GDF,

which has non sub-accounting status. Such expenditure is well
suited to day-to-day administrative decision-making to meet the
expenses involved in the administration of the GDF. The GDF
has, however, recommended that limits to contracts for supplies
and services should be increased to meet increased costs. The
Commission is in favour of a measured increase commensurate
with such increased costs. It wishes to caution that, whatever
the increase, such contracts, whatever the value, should not be
related to supplies or services of a capital nature. Even contract–
splitting cannot change a capital expenditure into a current
expenditure.

Expenditure
The Commission is concerned that in 2003 the expenditure
for transportation services amounted to the astronomical sum of
$137 million (one hundred and thirty-seven (137) million
dollars). If such expenditure were legitimate (and the
Commission has no basis for saying that it was not), there may
be a need for the Defence Board to approve the purchase of
means of transportation as a capital expense. However, the
Commission prefers to leave such matters for consideration by
the National Assembly and the Public Accounts Committee.

The Commission wishes to point out that it might have

been more economical to acquire some capital assets in the form
of a few vehicles rather than to have incurred current
expenditure for transportation services of such magnitude. There
may well be need for a collaborative relationship between those
responsible for capital expenditure and those responsible for
current expenditure so that choices between capital and current

219
expenditures can be made on the basis of knowledge and
economic wisdom.

The GDF advocated that funds should be made available

according to a system of programme budgeting since this would
allow for timely release of funds to the improvement of
operational efficiency. The GDF informed the Commission that
the current system whereby funds are released is “line item”
level, which tends to be disruptive of smooth planning and
operational efficiency.

The Commission recognises the desirability for the timely

release of funds in the interest of operational efficiency and
recommends that an imprest based on programme budgeting
under the control of a responsible financial officer in the office of
the President can be considered.

Recommendations:
With regard to the “Financial and Public Accountability” of
the GDF, the Commission recommends:

(108) Capital expenditure should not be placed under the

administrative responsibility of the GDF.

(109) The GDF should not be granted additional financial

responsibility.

(110) There should be a measured increase (commensurate

with increased cost) in the limits to contracts for supplies
and services to meet increased costs.

(111) A collaborative relationship between those responsible

for capital expenditure and those responsible for current
expenditure should be established.

(112) An imprest based on programme budgeting under the

control of a responsible financial officer in the Office of
the President should be considered.

220
 Part 3

The Guyana Fire Service

221
 Section 1: Functions and Operations

In this section, the Commission examines the

functions and operations of the Guyana Fire Service.

The Guyana Fire Service (GFS) was established in 1957 as

a public body under section 3(1) of the Fire Service Act (the Act)
Chapter 22:02. The Act does not contain any provision which
specifically defines or sets out the duties and responsibilities of
the Service. Therefore, it is necessary to peruse its relevant
provisions to ascertain what duties and responsibilities
Parliament intended should be imposed on the GFS.

Responsibility
From such a perusal, more particularly of section 12 (2)(c)
and section 17 (1), it appears that the duties and responsibilities
of the GFS are essentially fire prevention, fire fighting and the
protection of life and property from destruction by fire or during
acts done for fire-fighting purposes. Even though there exists a
separate Act governing fire prevention i.e., the Fire Prevention
Act, Chapter 22:01, it is expressed in the Act that enforcement
of the provisions of that Act is the responsibility of the GFS
(section 12(2) (c)).

The risk of damage by fire and the likely seriousness of

such damage are magnified in Guyana by the number and
nature of the structures which exist and are increasingly being
erected throughout the country. This is particularly so in areas
already under dense occupation and in which there is an
increasing tendency to erect multi-storied buildings. The number
of wooden structures and a history of catastrophic fires in
Guyana also have to be borne in mind.

Construction for the purpose of providing increased

accommodation ought not to be unduly impeded or restricted by
the extent of the capacity and capability of the GFS to fight fire.
It is therefore imperative that it be adequately equipped to be
responsive to changing challenges and circumstances.

222
 An increase in the number of multi-storied and high-rise
buildings necessitates that fire tenders be equipped with
hydraulic lifts for the attainment of height by fire-fighters. The
use of ladders, while not obsolete, no longer suffices in the
changing structural landscape.

The construction of buildings in locations distant from main

canals and waterways necessitates the nearby presence of
functional fire hydrants from which the GFS can easily and
conveniently access water in their fire-fighting efforts. Such
water can be provided through pipelines from the closest canal,
waterway or river or from the installations of the Guyana Water
Inc. (GWI).

The attention of the Commission was drawn to a pipeline

in Georgetown through which water from the Demerara River
could be accessed by the GFS. Unfortunately, this important
supply line was allowed to become non-functional and could not
have played a part in recent fire fighting efforts by the GFS in
the Lombard Street area.

The risks of damage by fire are further increased by the

more widespread use of electric energy and the Guyana Power
and Light’s (GPL) limited success in ensuring safe systems of
generation and transmission of electricity. The risks of fire
necessitate that more efficient measures be designed and
implemented to eliminate or reduce such risks. Use of
independent power supply has its attendant risks and strict
licensing procedures by the GFS need to be implemented to
ensure fires due to faulty electrical supplies are kept to a
minimum.

Personnel
The authorised strength of the GFS is 400 while its actual
strength stands at 355. The shortage of 45 personnel, ranging
from Chief Fire Officer to clerical and support staff represents
11% of the Service.

223
 The Deputy Chief Fire Officer had for some considerable
time been acting as the Chief Fire Officer and no one had been
appointed to perform the duties of Deputy Chief Fire Officer. It
might be that this was due to the delay in the appointment of
the Public Service Commission (PSC). With the recent
constitution of that Commission, the Commission is pleased to
note the appointments of the Chief Fire Officer and the Deputy
Chief Fire Officer.

The Commission has noted that there is a shortage of 6

Section Leaders from an authorised strength of 23. Yet, the
position of leading Fireman/Woman has only one vacancy out of
an authorised strength of 53. In view of the fact that promotion
from Leading Fireman/Woman to the next higher post of Section
Leader does not require the PSC’s involvement, the Commission
fails to understand why none of 52 leading Firemen / Women
has demonstrated a capability to perform and therefore earn
promotion to the next higher level of Section Leader.

While the Commission is of the view that promotion must

be based on merit and must not be used as a means to merely
fill existing vacancies, this curious state of affairs ought not to
persist. Surely, out of 51 leading Firemen /Women, there must
be a few who could be trained to perform at the next higher level
of Section Leader.

The Chief Fire Officer should address this apparent

anomaly which, if it persists, can have an adverse effect on the
operational effectiveness of the GFS.

The Commission is particularly concerned that currently

there exists a shortage of 20 Firemen /Women out of an
authorised strength of 277. Personnel at the level of Firemen
/Women are the frontline functionaries in any fire-fighting
operation and, therefore, it is not in the public interest to have
so many vacancies at this level.

The Commission accepts that a monthly salary of $23,854

with $8,950 allowances may not be sufficient to attract persons

224
with the educational level to assimilate training and favours an
increase in salary at the level of Fireman/Woman. Having regard
to the monthly salary differentials which currently exist among
the positions of Section Leader ($44,630), leading
Fireman/Woman ($29,572) and Fireman/Woman ($23,845), the
Commission is of the view that there is a case for salary
increases at the lower levels of Leading Fireman/Woman and
Fireman/Woman — quite apart from any across-the- board
increase in salaries.

The Commission therefore recommends that such

adjustments should be effected not merely to remove
disproportionate differentials but also to help to alleviate the
shortage in frontline personnel. Such adjustments can be easily
effected by ministerial regulation made under section 28 (g) of
the Act.

The authorised strength of the clerical and office support

staff of the GFS is eight but its actual strength is zero. Apart
from finding such a state of affairs puzzling, the Commission
considers it unacceptable that an important national institution,
such as the GFS, has no clerical or office support staff. This
results in fire-fighting personnel performing clerical and office
support functions which can lead to low morale among these
servicemen.

The Commission finds it difficult to understand how the

GFS could have allowed itself to reach such an undesirable and
untenable position — except through nonchalance and
mismanagement on its part and on the part of the Ministry of
Home Affairs. The Commission is of the view that the Public
Service Ministry (PSM) should be approached to assist with the
recruitment of such personnel and recommends that this be
done without delay.

Section 7 of the Act provides:

The Service may be composed of regular members

or of auxiliary members or of both regular and
auxiliary members.

225
The Commission has been unable to elicit information on the
strength of the auxiliary component of the GFS and has formed
the distinct impression that little or no attention has been paid to
maintaining an auxiliary unit as approved by Parliament. The
Commission recommends that measures be taken to resuscitate
an auxiliary unit in order to strengthen the GFS reserve capacity
in the event that its regular unit should find any fire-fighting task
overwhelming. Employers can be approached to encourage their
employees to join the auxiliary force and receive fire-fighting
training at no cost to the employer. Such training can be
beneficial not only to national safety but also for the safety and
welfare of the employer’s enterprises.

The GFS is frequently accused of tardiness and lethargy in

its responses to reports. Whether or not there is some
justification for such allegations, the Commission wishes to draw
attention to regulations 7 and 22 of the Fire Service Regulations
which mandate as follows:

Regulation 7

All members of the Service shall carry out the lawful

commands of their superior officers and shall devote
their time and energies to fire fighting, fire
prevention, the protection of life and property and
aiding the sick and injured. They shall at all times
carry out their duties without fear or favour, malice
or ill-will, and with strict impartiality and courtesy
towards members of the general public.

Regulation 22

Every member of the Service shall at all times

punctually and promptly perform all appointed duties
and attend to all matters within the scope of his
office, and whether a member of the Service is
nominally on duty or off duty his responsibility shall
be the same and it shall be his duty to take action
for the protection of life and property against fire.

Regulations 7 and 22 cumulatively contain the duties of each

member of the GFS in both their functional and attitudinal
aspects. The GFS would do well to acquaint its members with

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these two regulations to induce in them the required attitudinal
approach for the better performance of their duties. The
disciplinary procedures of the GFS must also provide sanctions
for breach of these regulations, which must also be faithfully
applied.

Equipment
The Commission received evidence of the high risk of
damage by fire which is likely in the absence of a fireboat within
the fire-fighting armoury of the GFS. It is public knowledge that
there are several wharves which, at any given time, have
sizeable quantities of goods and other capital assets. Vessels
with and without cargo can invariably be found moored thereto
or nearby. Should there be an outbreak of a major fire, either on
one of the wharves or on one of the ships or vessels moored
nearby, the lack of a fire boat will either severely or totally
handicap the GFS in rendering assistance in fighting such a
conflagration. Should a ship or vessel off the shore of Guyana
have a major fire on board and request assistance from the GFS,
it will be unable to respond because of this deficiency. These
circumstances point unerringly in the direction of the necessity
of the GFS having at least two fireboats.

The Commission therefore recommends that efforts be

made by the Government to assist the GFS to acquire two fire
boats or at least one in the short term. It should be noted that
Parliament contemplated fireboats among the fire-fighting
equipment of the GFS. Thus, section 12 (2) of the Act provides:

It shall be the duty of the Chief Fire Officer —

(b) to see that the fire engines, fire boats and
other fire equipment are kept in good order
and thorough repair and are used to the best
advantage for fire-fighting purposes;
(emphasis added)

The GFS has had fireboats in the not-so-distant past and it is

therefore unacceptable that a national fire-fighting service
should be without such an important asset especially in view of
the circumstances set out above.

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Hydrants
It is lamentable that, out of a total of about 580 fire
hydrants located in the City of Georgetown, fewer than 90 are
functional. Such a state of affairs could have been occasioned
only by prolonged neglect. The Commission has been informed
that this is in part due to uncertainty as to which statutory
authority is legally responsible for maintaining the fire hydrants
in the city and a tendency of denying responsibility by such
agencies. By any measure, this is an unsatisfactory state of
affairs.

The GFS maintained that its responsibility in the matter is

limited to checking on the condition of the fire hydrants (among
other things) and reporting on their condition to the Minister at
the end of each financial year (see section12 (1) (a) of the Act).
The GFS contends, however, that it has never been its
responsibility to maintain them.

The Commission has noted that, under section 279(1) of

the Municipal and District Councils Act, Chapter 28:01, the City
Council has the responsibility of providing the City with proper
and sufficient water, not only for sanitary and domestic purposes
but also for “extinguishing fires” and is empowered to do and
execute “all works, matters and things necessary for, and
incidental to, such purposes” (section 279 (2)). Town Councils
have the same responsibilities and powers (section 280); (see
also section 282 for similar powers of District Councils).

Under section 14 of the Georgetown Sewerage and Water

Act (now repealed) the Georgetown Sewerage and Water
Commissioners (GS&WC) had specific responsibility for the care /
inspection, maintenance, repair, working and management of
the waterworks of Georgetown; and, under section 15, the
Commissioners held the sewerage system and the waterworks in
trust for the inhabitants of Georgetown.

The issue as to which authority or organisation bears, or

should bear, legal responsibility for the maintenance of the fire
hydrants in the City and Towns and the water supply lines to

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such hydrants should be resolved with expedition through
discussion among the relevant authorities. Clear delineations of
lines of authority and responsibility should be the objective of
such discussion.

It is a sad state of affairs for the GFS to continue to be

handicapped in its fire–fighting operations through non-
functional fire hydrants while the subject of responsibility for
maintaining the fire hydrants and the connecting water supply
lines continues to provoke denials from the relevant authorities
and remains unresolved. Parliament should not hesitate to
intervene if legislative intervention is necessary to finally remove
doubts and confusion.

Stations
The Commission has been alerted to the density of housing
and population in the areas between Ogle and Rosignol and
between Georgetown and Timehri, consequent upon the
establishment of new housing schemes and industries in those
areas in recent years. In view of the fact that there is no fire
station in those two areas, the Commission recommends that
the GFS should locate an additional fire station in each of those
areas with due regard to logistic convenience and functional
effectiveness. The Commission strongly recommends that this
issue be treated with the urgency which it deserves.

The Commission is mindful of the fact that additional fire

stations can impose an undesirable burden on Central
Government but wishes to point out that a portion of the total
maintenance cost of any unit must be borne by the local
authority or authorities of the areas serviced by that unit.
Section 6 of the Act provides:

(1) Anything in section 5 to the contrary

notwithstanding a portion of the total cost of
maintaining any unit shall be borne by the
local authority or local authorities as the
case may be of the area in respect of which
the unit is primarily maintained.

(2) The contribution to be made by a local

authority towards the maintenance of any

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 unit under the preceding section shall be
determined by the Minister after
consultation with the local authority or local
authorities concerned, and shall be deemed
to be expenditure which the local authority
is by law authorised to incur.

It seems fit and proper that communities which enjoy the

additional security of being serviced by fire stations within their
localities should be made to bear part of the maintenance costs
of such stations.

Recommendations
With regard to the ‘Functions and Operations’ of the GFS
the Commission recommends the following:

(113) The Minister should cause a needs assessment of the

Service to be done in light of changing social conditions
and appropriate action should be taken in order of
priority.

(114) Since the supply of water is of paramount importance to

fire-fighting efforts, the Minister should use his office to
ensure that fire hydrants are supplied with adequate
water for fire–fighting purposes.

(115) Select personnel from the rank of Leading Fireman /

Woman must be trained to function at the rank above
this, without delay.

(116) Salary increases should be made for the lowest ranks

(Leading Fireman / Woman) apart from any across-the-
board increase.

(117) The Public Service Ministry should be approached for

assistance in recruitment of clerical personnel, as a
matter of urgency.

(118) Immediate efforts should be made by the Minister to

acquire at least one fire boat for the GFS in the short
term.

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(119) The issue of who bears legal responsibility for the
maintenance of the fire hydrants should be speedily
resolved, even if it requires legislative intervention.

(120) Additional fire stations must be established between Ogle

and Rosignol and Georgetown and Timehri, with
dispatch.

(121) Communities that benefit from the presence of fire

stations should bear part of their maintenance costs.

231
 Section 2: Composition and Structure

In this section, the Commission examines the

composition and structure of the GFS.

Organisation
The Guyana Fire Service (GFS) was established under
section 3 (1) of the Fire Service Act, Chapter 22:02. By section
12 (1) of the Guyana Independence Order 1966, section 10 A of
the Act continued to have effect as if it were a delegation made
by the Public Service Commission under article 96 (2) of the
1966 Constitution.

Under section 17 (2) of the Constitution of the Co-

operative Republic of Guyana Act, that delegation was deemed
to have been made by the Public Service Commission (PSC)
under the 1980 Constitution. The GFS is, therefore, a
department of the Government and its members, who are
appointed by the Chief Fire Officer under section 10 A of the Fire
Service Act, are appointed by him as delegate of the PSC.
Section 10 A reads:

Subject to the provisions of this Act and of the

Regulations, the Chief Fire Officer may appoint fit
and proper persons to be subordinate fire officers
and firemen of the Service.

The GFS comprises one or more units constituted in

accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Act itself
establishes 4 units: (1) the Guyana Fire Service Unit in the City
of Georgetown; (2) the New Amsterdam Fire Service Unit in the
Town of New Amsterdam; (3) the Timehri Fire Service Unit at
Timehri; and (4) the Linden Fire Service Unit in the Town of
Linden.

These units have been described in the Schedule to the

Act pursuant to section 4(1). In order to avoid the inconvenience
of legislative inflexibility and to meet changes in social conditions
and needs, the Act itself provides for amendments of the
Schedule to be made by ministerial order. Section 4 (2) provides

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that: “the Minister may by order from time to time amend the
Schedule.”

The Minister, therefore, has been empowered to increase or

decrease the number of units by amending the Schedule. The
power to increase the number of units of the GFS allows for
decentralisation of administrative authority from the Chief Fire
Officer to the officers in charge of the units. It is instructive that
Regulation 5 of the Fire Service Regulations provides:

Subject to the general control and orders of the Chief Fire

Officer, an officer in charge of a unit shall have the
command, direction and general management of the unit
and shall be responsible to the Chief Fire Officer for all
matters relating to interior economy, fire fighting and fire
prevention and the performance of all executive Service
duties in the unit.

The more units the Minister creates by amending the Schedule,

the more he devolves the administrative authority of the Chief
Fire Officer to the officers in charge of the units.

The Commission noted from the presentation made by the

GFS that there are only three positions of Divisional Officers but
there are four statutory units. The Commission is of the view
that there should be as many Divisional Officers as there are
units since, ideally, every unit should be under the “command,
direction and general management” of a Divisional Officer. The
statutory authority to fix the number of Divisional Officers
resides in the Minister under section 8 which provides:

The Service shall consist of a Chief Fire Officer, a

Deputy Chief Fire Officer and such number of
officers, subordinate fire officers and firemen as the
Minister may from time to time direct.

The Commission recommends that consideration be given to an

increase in the number of Divisional Officers pari passu with the
number of units.

The Commission is of the view that, having regard to the

size, housing and population on the Essequibo Coast, coupled
with the distance which separates the Essequibo Coast from any

233
other fire station, there are valid reasons for upgrading the Anna
Regina fire station and designating it a unit. If this is done, it
should then be placed under the “command, direction and
general management” of a Divisional Officer.

The GFS currently operates out of eleven locations

countrywide, only four of which have been designated as units.
The Commission does not recommend that the Minister should
designate every major fire station a unit. However, the
Commission is of the view that the administrative structure of
the GFS should be so fashioned that every station or location
which is not, should be a sub-unit of a particular unit so that
devolution of central authority can occur in a structured manner
in consonance with its command structure. Regulation 7
provides:

All members of the Service shall carry out the lawful

commands of their superior officers….

Regulation 8 provides:

All members of the Service shall perform such duties

as may be assigned them by their superiors in rank.

Each Divisional Officer, apart from having administrative charge

of his own unit, will also exercise administrative authority over
Station Officers in charge of the sub–units attached to his unit.
Divisional Officers, in turn, will be administratively answerable to
the Chief Fire Officer (or his Deputy) in accordance with
regulation 5. As it becomes necessary to establish more fire
stations, the need for more units under which such fire stations
can function as sub-units will also grow. Commensurately, there
will then be devolution of administrative authority from the Chief
Fire Officer to Divisional Officers and to Station Officers.

It should be noted that while the Act provides for an office

of Chief Fire Officer and that of Deputy Chief Fire Officer, it does
not limit the number of other officers, subordinate fire officers
and firemen who make up the bulk of the GFS. Rather, in
furtherance of executive flexibility, it confers upon the Minister
discretionary power to increase or reduce its membership to suit

234
changing social conditions (section 8). Further, the Act allows
the Minister to do so by “direction” in contradistinction to “order”
or “regulation” which makes for even greater executive
flexibility.

The Minister by way of Regulations made under section 28

of the Act has designated the ranks of the GFS below that of
Chief Fire Officer in order of seniority as follows:

(1) Deputy Chief Fire Officer,

(2) Divisional Officer,
(3) Assistant Divisional Officer,
(4) Station Officer,
(5) Sub Officer,
(6) Section Leader,
(7) Leading Fireman,
(8) Fireman.

As was mentioned above, apart from Deputy Chief Fire Officer,

the Minister can by direction fix the strength of each of those
ranks. From the written presentation of the GFS, the
Commission notes the absence of the rank of Assistant Divisional
Officer and the presence of the rank of Cadet Officer in the
structure of the GFS. The rank of Cadet Officer has been placed
lower than that of Assistant Divisional Officer (if the latter rank
were to be inserted in accordance with the Regulations).

The Commission is not aware that regulation 3 of the Fire

Service Regulations has been amended to accommodate such a
change and, while there may have been good and valid reasons
for the change, the Commission recommends that the necessary
regulatory amendment be made by the Minister to correct this
innovation.

Although the Act does not provide for clerical and office
support, the GFS must be supported by office structure and
staff. As a department of the Public Service, the GFS is
dependent on the PSC to meet such needs since the structure

235
and personnel for such support services are not dealt with by the
Act.

The GFS has mentioned that the authorised strength of

Clerical and Office Support Staff stands at eight. This leads the
Commission to believe that there exists a clerical and support
staff structure, though unmanned by any such personnel. The
Commission is concerned that the authorised strength of such
support staff is only eight when the GFS operates from eleven
locations with four units. The practice of utilising fire-fighting
personnel to staff such a structure is not commendable as it
represents a wasteful and inefficient use of scarce resources.
Both the authorised and actual strength of its clerical and office
support staff should be increased to adequately address the
needs of the GFS.

Duties
The authority to command and superintend the GFS
resides in the Chief Fire Officer subject to the general order and
direction of the Minister. He is responsible to the Minister for the
efficient conduct and administration of the Service and for the
proper expenditure of all public money appropriated to it.

Section 12 (1) provides:

The Chief Fire Officer shall, subject to the general

order and direction of the Minister have the
command and superintendence of the Service and he
shall be responsible to the Minister for the efficient
control and administration of the Service and for the
proper expenditure of all public moneys appropriated
for the service thereof.

The GFS was statutorily carved out of the Guyana Police Force in
1957 when the latter bore responsibility for fire prevention and
fire-fighting. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the words
used in section 12 (1) are in pari materia with section 7(1) of the
Police Act except that the words “The Chief Fire Officer” have
been substituted for the words “The Commissioner.” The
Commission has already dealt quite extensively with section 7(1)
of the Police Act in its analysis of that sub-section and there is

236
no need to repeat that analysis here. Suffice it to say that such
analysis applies mutatis mutandis to section 12(1).

The duties of the Chief Fire Officer are specifically defined

in section 12 (2) and section 12 (3) places his headquarters in
the city of Georgetown. In the performance of his duties, the
Deputy Chief Fire Officer is tasked by section 13 with acting as
his principal assistant. Section 13 further empowers the Deputy
Chief Fire Officer “to do or suffer any act or thing which may by
law be done or suffered by the Chief Fire Officer” whenever the
Chief Fire Officer is absent or incapacitated or when so
authorised by him. Thus, not only is the Deputy Chief Fire Officer
the principal assistant to the Chief Fire Officer but he can
exercise the powers of the Chief Fire Officer during his absence
or incapacity or even during his presence or even when he is not
incapacitated, if authorised by him (the Chief Fire Officer). Thus,
in certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief Fire Officer may
exercise the powers of the Chief Fire Officer but ordinarily he
acts as the principal assistant to him. Section 13 should be
interpreted with the distinction between “duty” and “power” in
mind and reads as follows:

The Deputy Chief Fire Officer shall act as principal

assistant to the Chief Fire Officer in the performance
of his duties in respect of the Service, and shall
have power, during the absence or incapacity of the
Chief Fire Officer, or when authorised by him, to do
or suffer any act or thing which may by law be done
or suffered by the Chief Fire Officer.

Section 14 gives recognition to the need for and enables

the devolution of authority by the Chief Fire Officer himself and
by the Minister by way of regulations. It provides:

(1) The officers of the Service shall perform such

duties of the Chief Fire Officer as may be legally
delegated to them and all such duties as devolve
upon them under the regulations.

(2) The subordinate fire officers and firemen of the

Service shall perform such duties as devolve upon
them under the regulations and such other duties as
the Chief Fire Officer may determine.

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An example of devolution of authority by regulation is regulation
5 to which reference has already been made.

Composition
Section 7 provides:

The Service may be composed of regular members

or of auxiliary members or of both regular and
auxiliary members.

Despite the legal possibility of the GFS being composed of

auxiliary members only, the Commission is unable to envisage
the GFS being capable of fulfilling its statutory mandates with an
auxiliary membership only.

At present, regular members comprise the GFS with some

indeterminate number of auxiliary members. Since the Act does
not provide for the number of auxiliary members to be limited, it
is in the interest of the GFS not merely to ensure its regular
membership attain its authorised strength but to co-opt as many
fit and proper persons as auxiliaries. It does appear to the
Commission that no positive effort is being made to do so and
that the auxiliary membership of the GFS, if there exists any, is
being allowed to dwindle. Such an attitude will eventually have a
nullifying effect on section 15 which provides:

It shall be lawful for the Chief Fire Officer in any case

where in his opinion additional assistance is required
for fire-fighting purposes to call out for service any
auxiliary members of the Service….

The Commission is of the view that since the Act contemplates

an auxiliary membership within its structure, this membership
should be strengthened in the interest of public welfare and
safety.

In order to remove doubt or confusion which is evident

from the presentation of the GFS, the Commission wishes to
point out that regular members of the GFS are public officers,
and are subject to the Regulations and General Orders which
regulate the service of public officers. However, such
Regulations and General Orders apply only in so far as the

238
Regulations made by the Minister under section 28 of the Act are
silent. Regulation 28 of the Fire Service Regulations provides:

All regular members of the Service shall in respect of

any matter not provided for in the Regulations, be
subject to the provisions of such Regulations and
General Orders as from time to time regulate the
service of public officers.

Regulations cover such matters as pay and allowances (including

housing allowance); admission; promotion; training; uniform;
leave; retirement and discipline. Standardised regulations tend
to eliminate arbitrary behaviour and discriminatory practices.
However, the Commission recommends a comprehensive review
to bring them in conformity with social changes and current
social realities.

The Commission sees the need to point out that Parts 11

and IV of the Police Regulations, Chap 77 (King’s Ed 1953) still
apply to the GFS. Regulation 23 A of the Fire Service Regulations
reads:

The provisions of Parts 11 and 1V of the Police

Regulations relating to discipline shall, subject to
paragraph (2) of this regulation, apply to the Fire
Service.

Part 11 of the Police Regulations in its application to the GFS

deals with suspension or dismissal of subordinate fire officers
and firemen while Part 1V deals with the discipline of
subordinate fire offices and firemen. Regulation 54 of Part 1V
specifies the disciplinary offences. The Commission recommends
that the GFS as an entity, now separate from the Guyana Police
Force, should have its own code of disciplinary offences since
those relating to the Guyana Police Force will not be all relevant
to the GFS while there may also be need to create other
offences.

Recommendations
With regard to the “Composition and Structure” of the
GFS, the Commission recommends:

239
(122) The Minister should amend the Schedule to the Act to
increase the number of Divisional Officers pari passu
with the number of units.

(123) The Anna Regina Fire Station should be upgraded and

designated a unit and be placed under the “command,
direction and general management” of a Divisional
Officer.

(124) The administrative structure of the GFS should be so

fashioned that every station or location which is not a
unit, should be made a sub-unit of a particular unit so
that devolution of central authority can occur in a
structured manner in consonance with its command
structure.

(125) The Minister should amend the Regulations to correct the

present structural anomaly whereby the rank of
Assistant Divisional Officer, which is provided for by the
Regulations, does not exist in the structure of the GFS
but there is in existence a rank of cadet Officer for which
there is no provision in the Regulations.

(126) Both the authorised and actual strength of the clerical

and office support staff should be increased to
adequately address the needs of the GFS and the
practice of utilising fire-fighting personnel to perform
such functions should cease forthwith.

(127) The auxiliary membership of the GFS should be

increased significantly.

(128) There should be a comprehensive review of the

Regulations to bring them in conformity with social
changes and current economic and other realities.

240
 Section 3: Ethnic Balance

In this section, the Commission examines the

methods and processes of achieving greater ethnic
balance within the GFS.

It is rather paradoxical that the words “ethnic balance”

should be used in the context of a national institution in
Guyanese society when society itself is ethnically imbalanced.
Even if the words “ethnic balance” were to be interpreted as
meaning ethnic representation according to demographic
strength, such an interpretation would have its own self-
contradiction since proportional ethnic representation would
entail ethnic imbalances in our ethnically imbalanced society.
The idea of an “ethnic balance” cannot, therefore, ignore the
disproportionate ethnic composition of the society itself.

Ratio
It is desirable for public institutions in a multi-ethnic
society to present a multi-ethnic face reflecting, thereby, the
image of its people. But, apart from form and image, the
desirability of all ethnic groups to play an inclusive role in the
membership of public institutions usually has to do with the need
for a wider pool of national human resources across ethnic lines
if the various public institutions are to reflect the country’s ethnic
composition.

The GFS, as a public institution, has never been the

subject of expressed serious concern as to its ethnic composition
despite the fact that there has always been an ethnic imbalance
in its membership in favour of Afro-Guyanese. At present, there
is a ratio of 14 Afro-Guyanese to 1 Indo-Guyanese with the
percentage of other ethnic groups at almost nil. This lack of
expressed serious concern may be due principally to the fact that
the GFS has never been viewed as a public institution which is
endowed with coercive public law powers which can be used
oppressively against any particular ethnic group or groups.

241
 The core functions of the GFS are not of such a nature as
to bring it in confrontation with members of society, unlike those
of the GPF and, to a lesser extent, the GDF. Any desirability for
greater multi-ethnic inclusiveness in the GFS must therefore be
viewed as reflective of a desire that the recruitment pool from
which members of the GFS are selected should be so augmented
as to include not just Afro-Guyanese in the main but a greater
number of qualified applicants from all other ethnic groups so
that better quality recruits can be selected on the principle of
merit, to the enhancement of the efficiency of the GFS and its
national image.

The GFS stated in its presentation to the Commission that:

Throughout the years an ethnic imbalance was

always present in the Guyana Fire Service where
Afro-Guyanese dominate the organization much
more than the Indo-Guyanese at the rate of
14:01.The failure to have this situation rectified
should not be seen as administration inefficiency but
lies squarely on the mindset of the Indo-Guyanese
and other ethnic groups.

Recruitment
The Commission does not gainsay the contention that the
mindset of Indo-Guyanese and other ethnic groups is an
impediment to whatever efforts have been made or whatever
strategies have been implemented to increase the level of
representation of Indo-Guyanese and other non Afro–Guyanese
in the membership of the GFS. However, the Commission cannot
endorse the submission that the failure of such efforts must be
laid squarely on the mindset of the Indo-Guyanese and other
non Afro-Guyanese, since such a mindset may exist even among
some sections of the Afro-Guyanese population.

If certain sections of the population have a negative

mindset towards service in the GFS, then it behoves the GFS
itself which has the responsibility of seeking to attract the best
recruits from the population at large to eliminate such a mindset.
Misperceptions may have caused such a mindset among those
sections of the population. Hence, the GFS should make positive

242
efforts to remove or minimise such misperceptions. The GFS, as
a national institution, cannot rest complacently in the knowledge
that the majority of the population (Indo-Guyanese and other
non Afro-Guyanese) have a mindset which effectively restricts its
recruitment pool to Afro-Guyanese in the main.

The Constitution outlaws forced labour and guarantees

freedom of association. Indo-Guyanese and other non-Afro-
Guyanese may not see it fit to enlist in the GFS. But it is
certainly not in the interest of the GFS that any ethnic group, or
indeed any citizen, should have negative perceptions of the
implications of service within its membership.

The GFS should take positive steps to remove such

misperceptions by policies and practices designed to ensure that
service in the GFS becomes an attractive option in the open
labour market and that the GFS is portrayed to all ethnic groups,
particularly the Indo-Guyanese and other non-African groups, as
an organisation which caters to ethnic diversity.

The GFS itself identified some factors which could have

had some deterrent and negative effects on recruitment and
could have contributed to the ethnic imbalance which has always
beset its membership. The GFS recommended measures which
can be implemented in an effort to rectify this imbalance. The
Commission agrees with measures designed to ensure that
membership of the GFS does not entail unnecessary hardship or
inconvenience to any ethnic group, e.g., posting of personnel to
stations which are closest to their nuclear homes; allowing time-
off for religious worship; and the provision of meals which cater
to, or at least do not disregard, peculiar religious tenets or
cultural tastes.

The Commission wishes to caution that training, discipline

and operational efficiency, however, cannot be sacrificed at the
altar of ethnic balance or greater ethnic diversity. The
Commission is of the view that high training standards and
operational efficiency are not inconsistent with greater ethnic
diversity and it would be foolhardy to reduce entry qualification

243
levels and training standards in any effort to attract ethnically
diverse recruits. The GFS should seek to enlarge its pool of
human resources for recruitment without the lowering of such
standards. Should the GFS succeed in so doing, a system of
recruitment based on the principle of merit is likely to yield the
best recruits and this, in turn, would conduce to greater
efficiency. Greater ethnic diversity, though desirable, provides no
rational basis for the lowering of entry or training levels.

Recommendations
With regards to “Ethnic Balance” in the GFS, the
Commission recommends the following:

(129) The GFS should conceive, design and promulgate such

policies and practices that make it an attractive option in
the open labour market and to portray the image,
particularly to the Indo-Guyanese and other non Afro-
Guyanese, that the GFS is an organisation which caters
to ethnic diversity within its membership.

(130) The necessary measures should be implemented to

rectify the ethnic imbalance.

(131) Measures should be designed to ensure that membership

of the GFS does not entail unnecessary hardship or
inconvenience to any ethnic group.

(132) In its quest to redress the ethnic imbalance, the GFS

must be cautious not to sacrifice training, discipline and
operational efficiency at the altar of ethnic balance or
greater ethnic diversity.

(133) Whilst the GFS must strive to enlarge its pool of human
resources for recruitment, this must be aggressively
pursued without lowering the entry qualification levels.

(134) Recruitment should at all times be based on the

principle of competitive merit.

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 Section 4: Relationship with and Responsibility to
Civilian Authority

In this section, the Commission examines the

Guyana Fire Service’s relationship with, and responsibility
to, civilian authority.

Responsibility
The Minister of Home Affairs holds executive responsibility
for the Guyana Fire Service (GFS). The Chief Fire Officer has the
statutory authority to command and superintend the GFS but the
Minister is statutorily empowered to give him general orders and
directions to which his authority to command and superintend is
subject. The Chief Fire Officer must exercise his power of
command and superintendence to accord with, and to give effect
to, any such ministerial order or direction. Section 12 (1) of the
Act provides that: “The Chief Fire Officer shall, subject to the
general order and direction of the Minister have command and
superintendence of the Service….” Although the Minister does
not have the internal power of command and superintendence,
he has the executive authority to influence, command and
superintendence by the Chief Fire Officer by the issuance of
general orders or directions.

The Minister is also empowered to make regulations

relating to a number of matters affecting the GFS. Section 28
provides:

The Minister may from time to time make

regulations relating to all or any of the following
matters:

(a) the admission of members into the

Service, and the period of service and
training of the men belonging to the same;

(b) the scale of issue, and the type of uniform

to be worn by, the hours of training and
exercise of, and the distribution of duties
among, the members of the Service;

(c) the speedy attendance of members of the

Service with engines, fire escapes, fire

245
 boats, and all necessary equipment on the
occasion of any alarm of fire;

(d) for the attendance of members of the

Service with or without engines, fire
escapes, fire boats and all necessary
equipment on the occasion of any call for
the special services of the Service;

(e) the maintenance of the Service in a due

state of efficiency;

(f) the hours of duty and leave of absence of

members of the Service;

(g) the ranks, pay and allowances of members

of the Service;

(h) generally for the better carrying out of the

provisions of this Act.

It can be seen that Parliament has empowered the Minister to

make wide-ranging regulations for the admission, training,
discipline, conditions of service and functional efficiency of the
GFS. As subsidiary legislation, such regulations uniformly apply
to the general membership of the GFS. The Minister, in
consonance with his executive responsibility, is accountable to
the National Assembly for the proper administration of the GFS.

Accountability
In order to allow members of the GFS to perform their
statutory duties and functions free from fear of incurring criminal
or civil liability, Parliament has immunised them against liability
for acts done in good faith in the course of such duties. Section
23 provides:

No member of the Service acting bona fide in the

exercise of powers conferred upon him under this
Act shall be liable for any damage or for any act
done under this Act.

It should be noted that the immunity conferred under section 23

is immunity not from the curial processes but from liability. This
means that any claimant must satisfy the court that the
serviceman was not acting in good faith in the exercise of
powers conferred upon him under the Act. To succeed, the
claimant must prove either that the act causing damage was

246
contrary to the Act or, if within the parameters of the Act, was
not done in good faith.
Parliament has sought to balance the public interest of the
GFS with the private interest of individuals who may suffer
damage from acts done by members of the GFS. Despite the
immunity conferred upon members of the GFS under section 23,
members of the GFS are still accountable to the court for
unlawful acts and mala fide acts. Only lawful acts done bona fide
are covered by section 23.

Insubordination and neglect of duty by members of the

GFS are not merely departmental disciplinary offences under
regulation 54 of the Police Regulations but are also criminal
offences under section 27 of the Act since section 27 states:

Any member of the Service who neglects or refuses

to serve or refuses to obey any lawful command,
shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of
nine thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars.

Thus, members of the GFS may be charged and placed

before the courts for refusing or neglecting to serve, or refusing
to obey a lawful command. To this extent, discipline is a matter
of public accountability.

Authority
Under section 10 A, the Chief Fire Officer may appoint fit
and proper persons to be fire officers and firemen. But such
appointments are made by him as if he were a delegate of the
Public Service Commission.

The Chief Fire Officer is also solely responsible for

promotion below the rank of sub-officer but promotion to the
rank of sub-officer is made only with the approval of the
Minister. Under paragraph (1) of the Fourth Schedule to the Fire
Service Regulations, “promotion” means “promotion to any rank
of subordinate fire officer” and, under paragraph 2:

All promotions shall be made by the Chief Fire Officer

provided that promotions to the rank of sub–officer shall
be made only with the approval of the Minister.

247
The Chief Fire Officer, in consonance with paragraph 2, promotes
up to the rank of section leader which is immediately below that
of sub-officer, without ministerial approval. However, the
Commission questions the legal validity of paragraph (2) in so
far as it purports to empower the Chief Fire Officer as delegate
of the PSC to make promotions to the rank of sub-officer only
with the approval of the Minister rather than the PSC. This
appears to impose a ministerial fetter on the authority of the
PSC since the Chief Fire Officer is really exercising the delegated
authority of the PSC itself.

According to the presentation made by the GFS:

Promotions to the rank of leading firemen/women is

[sic] by the Ministry of Home Affairs upon the Chief
Fire Officer’s recommendation. Hence, promotion to
Section Leader and other Senior Ranks are [sic]
made with the approval of the Public Service
Commission.

The Commission does not accept the accuracy of this aspect of

the presentation and is advised that, since regular members of
the GFS are public officers, promotions must be made by the
PSC or its delegate.

The Commission finds it perplexing that promotion to the

rank of leading firemen can be made by the Ministry of Home
Affairs. So, too, the Commission is perplexed that promotion to
Section Leader is made with the approval of the PSC since
paragraph (2) of the Fourth Schedule provides for any promotion
to any rank below that of sub-officer to be made by the Chief
Fire Officer who is a delegate of the PSC.

The Commission has already drawn attention to regulation

28 which provides that regular members of the GFS are subject
to the Regulations and General Orders which regulate the service
of public officers but only in so far as the Regulations made by
the Minister under the Act are silent. As members of a disciplined
service which is concerned with internal security and Public
Safety, they fall primarily under the Fire Service Regulations and

248
only secondarily or residually under the Regulations and General
Orders applicable to public officers.

Recommendation:
With regards to “Relationship with, and
Responsibility to, Civilian Authority” in the GFS, the Commission
recommends the following:

(135) The promotion policy must be regularised to be

consistent with constitutional changes, so that the PSC
or its delegate is not fettered by the acts of the Ministry
of Home Affairs.

249
 Part 4

The Guyana Prison Service

250
 Section 1: Functions and Operations

In this section, the Commission examines the

changing context of the functions and operations of the
Guyana Prison Service, taking into consideration national
and international developments.

The Guyana Prison Service (GPS) was established under

section 4A of the Prison Act, Chapter 11:01, as a public
authority, but there is no provision in the Act which specifically
sets out or outlines its essential functions. Parliament may not
have seen it desirable to do so because the GPS simply executes
court orders for keeping offenders or alleged offenders safely
and securely in custody.

Functions
It can therefore be said with some justification that the
core function of the GPS is ensuring the safe and secure custody
of persons in the prison system in accordance with the orders of
the courts. It is apposite to note that the GPS in its presentation
stated that:

The core function of the Guyana Prison Service

is to ensure the safe custody of the offenders
who have violated the law of the land and are
placed in physical confinement (Prisons) in
order to protect the society.

That assessment of the core function of the GPS is limited

because the courts frequently remand unconvicted persons, who
have not been granted or cannot provide bail, into the care and
custody of the GPS. Whether or not persons are committed to
prison to protect society is an issue with which the GPS ought
not to concern itself since the purpose or object of sentencing is
a matter purely for the court and not the Prison Service.

The Act is principally concerned with the establishment of

a prison service as a necessary adjunct to the criminal justice
system and regulating that service to safeguard the public
interest and welfare. Both free individuals of society and those in

251
confinement are catered for since, despite their incarceration,
prisoners remain part of society. The preamble to the Act reads:

An Act to make better provision for the Regulation of

Prisons.

Therefore, apart from its core function, the GPS discharges

such statutory duties and functions which are ancillary thereto.

Personnel
The involuntary nature of prisoners’ incarceration demands
security personnel and, as the prison population grows, there
ought to be a commensurate increase in the actual and
authorised strength of security personnel.

The GPS has not complained that the authorised strength

of its security personnel is insufficient to cope with the number
of prisoners. However, the actual strength of 369 lags behind its
authorised strength of 452, reflecting a deficit of 83 officers.
This translates into a shortage of over 18%. This shortage exists
although the actual strength of Assistant Prison Officers matches
its authorised strength.

The Commission has drawn two inferences from this state

of affairs. First, the GPS is making serious efforts to ensure that
it has a sufficient number of frontline personnel; and second,
persons are being recruited, presumably out of necessity,
although they do not satisfy the qualifications criteria.
Undoubtedly, such practices will impact negatively on the basic
training programme of the GPS. The Commission was not
surprised, therefore, when the GPS in its presentation stated:

The greatest challenge to the training programme,

however, is the recruiting of persons with the
requisite qualifications/academic ability.

The Commission therefore recommends that timely efforts

be made, within the constraints of available budgetary
resources, to increase the salaried and non-salaried benefits
currently accorded to prison officers in order to attract suitably

252
qualified applicants. In a study of the prison system by British
consultants in 2002, it was observed:

The staffing establishment was set some time ago

and is out of date. Yet even these figures have never
been realized. The low status and poor pay and
conditions of the prison service make it difficult to
recruit staff of the right quality and then to train and
develop them. The high proportion of women
frontline staff reflects this. An encouraging feature
is the cadet scheme but the numbers recruited in
this way are inevitably very small.

Assistant Prison Officers

The Commission was informed that the post of Assistant
Prison Officer has been created administratively to provide a
qualitative alternative in the absence of suitably qualified
applicants to perform functions of a security nature. The
Commission’s view is that such a sacrifice of quality for quantity
may be justified when qualified security personnel are in
critically short supply but that, even so, such a practice carries
with it inherent weaknesses and potential dangers.

Since the post is not created or recognised by the Act, the

appointment of Assistant Prison Officers is not subject to the
Public Service Commission. They are merely contractual
employees in the GPS who have no statutory duty and,
consequentially, no statutory power, privilege or immunity. They
cannot therefore independently perform the statutory duties of
Prison Officers and can do no more than play an auxiliary role to
Prison Officers in the discharge of their statutory duties.

To utilise such employees to perform statutory functions

beyond the role of auxiliaries to Prison Officers is, therefore, not
only ultra vires the Act but wholly unwise and fraught with risks.
It is the Commission’s view that as more suitably qualified
persons are recruited as Prison Officers, there should be
commensurately less reliance on the services of Assistant Prison
Officers.

253
 It would certainly impose considerable strain on the limited
training resources of the GPS to enlist unqualified personnel as
Assistant Prison Officers in the hope that training would
eventually produce efficient Prison Officers albeit without the
requisite statutory entry qualification. However, since the
authorised and actual strength of Assistant Prison Officers is 196
in comparison with the authorised strength of only 92 Prison
Officers, it does appear that the GPS has committed itself deeply
to such a course of action.

The Commission is concerned that if this practice is

allowed to continue, the quality of security personnel of the GPS
can become consistently diluted unless its limited training
resources can consistently sustain the challenge it has
undertaken. The Commission therefore recommends that the
better option would be to offer a remuneration package which
would attract suitably qualified persons to seek enlistment as
Prison Officers rather than continue to place heavy reliance on
auxiliaries.

Rather than increase the total authorised strength of

security personnel, the Commission is of the opinion that the
authorised strength of Prison Officers should be increased and as
the situation improves vis-à-vis the ratio of officers to prisoners
there should be less reliance on the employment of Assistant
Prison Officers.

Criminal Law Review Committee

The Criminal Law Review Committee has identified a
number of shortcomings in the practices of the criminal justice
system which have contributed significantly to the problem of
overcrowding (mainly Georgetown Prison) and has made
appropriate recommendations. The Director of Prisons informed
the Commission that these recommendations have had a
positive effect in reducing the overcrowding. A co-ordinated and
sustained collaborative effort between the judiciary and the GPS
needs to be kept in focus at the latter’s instance since it is the
prison system which suffers directly from particular shortcomings
in the criminal justice system.

254
 At this juncture, the Commission finds it necessary to set
out in extenso some of the recommendations of the Criminal Law
Review Committee in its interim report with which it largely
agrees and wishes to adopt the following:

(1) Priority should be given to the expeditious

hearing of cases in respect of which prisoners are in custody
awaiting trial. Top priority should be given to cases of murder
(or treason) since the grant of bail is a virtual impossibility.

(2) Where persons have been committed to stand

trial in the High Court and have not been granted bail, the
preparation of the depositions should be a matter of priority. Top
priority should be given to committals for murder (or treason).

(3) Where persons have been indicted for offences

and have not been granted bail, officers of the DPP office should
make every effort to present their indictments before judges for
trial at assizes. Again, top priority should be given by officers of
the DPP to murder (or treason) cases.

(4) Magistrates should forthwith cease the

unlawful practice of remanding without bail or with high bail with
a distant remand date for the purpose of forcing a plea of guilty.
This is a perversion of justice. Magistrates guilty of this practice
should be disciplined.

(5) Bail should not be refused for minor offences

which do not carry a custodial sentence.

(6) Due reverence to and compliance with Article

139 (4) mandate the grant of bail where the prisoner has not
been tried within a reasonable time.

That Committee opined that an active Parole Board and a

greater use of community service and suspended sentences by
the criminal courts can significantly contribute to alleviating the
problem of overcrowding. It further recommended that
legislative sanction to “plea bargaining” should be considered as
a measure which can also expedite the disposal of criminal
cases.

Significantly, that committee was of the view that judicial

officers must be cognisant of the physical conditions of the
prisons since such awareness ought to inform the exercise of
their discretion in ordering incarceration. Since their decisions
and actions impact very directly on the prison system, judicial

255
officers and other functionaries must regard the prison system
as an indispensable adjunct of the criminal justice system and
must be always cognisant of, and sensitive to, the conditions and
resources of the prisons. Such knowledge and sensitivity are of
crucial importance to a rational relationship between justice and
incarceration.

In sum, the Commission is of the view that the practical

recommendations of the Criminal Law Review Committee, if
consistently implemented, would alleviate the degree of over-
crowding in the prisons.

There are other intrinsic mechanisms that can be utilised

beneficially to the prisoners and the prison system. These
include, but are not limited to, buying prison time with voluntary
work and exemplary conduct.

Security
The Commission has received evidence that there is an
increase in the number of violent prisoners. This poses a security
threat both to the prison staff and fellow inmates. Apart from the
notorious case of the five escapees who callously killed and
seriously injured prison officers in their successful escape, there
are cases in which prisoners killed or wounded fellow inmates.
The prisons must be appropriately equipped to prevent such
occurrences and deal with such prisoners.

The GPS in its submission stated:

It must be noted that the security equipment

available in the Guyana prisons do not match the
security needs of the increasingly violent, aggressive
and dangerous inmates population. The three major
prisons (Georgetown, Mazaruni and New
Amsterdam) are most vulnerable to security threats
such as escapes, riots, hostage-taking and fires.

The changing nature of prisoners’ character and the

increasingly violent environment necessitate the
quality and type of weapons, communication system
and technology (monitoring cameras, scanners and
other devices) be improved to prevent /suppress any
threat to the security of those locations.

256
The Commission recognises the need for adequate monitoring
devices and warning technology to be installed in prisons such as
the Georgetown, New Amsterdam and Mazaruni Prisons to
enhance their physical security capacity and capability.
However, while the Commission recognizes the necessity for
adequate, reliable and accurate firearms, it is mindful of section
13(6) of the Prison Act which provides:

The use of firearms under this section shall be as far

as possible to disable and not to kill.

The Commission therefore is inclined to the view that the type of

firearms provided to the GPS should be restricted to firearms
which can be employed discriminately in target selection.
However, it wishes to emphasise that, in addition to monitoring
devices and warning technologies and appropriate firepower,
there is need for periodic checks of prisoners and prisons for
weapons, implements for breaking out and other unauthorised
items.

Rehabilitation
The Prison Act and Rules made thereunder do not place
emphasis on the training of inmates so that they can become
responsible, industrious and useful citizens on their discharge.
Instead, they place greater focus on security and discipline.
However, an idle prisoner is a potentially dangerous one and it is
in furtherance of security and discipline that there should be a
constructive regime of activities geared to beneficially occupy
prisoners’ time.

Prisoners should be encouraged to spend their prison time

in learning useful skills such as masonry, carpentry, joinery,
agriculture, or, in reading books e.g., in electronics and
mechanics.

It will be beneficial to both prisoners and society if the GPS

could secure the assistance of the relevant State institutions and
non-governmental organisations to provide instructors and
teachers on a periodic basis. While the prison should be a place
of incarceration, it should not be a place which inhibits human

257
development. Nor should it be a place where criminals can meet
and learn from one another to become more proficient and
versatile in crime. Otherwise, judicial orders for compulsory
imprisonment would not only fail to achieve their desired
objective but would be counter-productive both to prisoners and
society.

In order to protect vulnerable inmates from other inmates,

the Prison Act mandates separations in certain cases but does
not prohibit separation in desirable cases. Section 30 provides:

(1) No male prisoner shall be detained in the

same part of any prison as any female
prisoner.

(2) No civil prisoner (so far as possible) shall

be detained in the same part of any prison as
any criminal prisoner.

(3) No young prisoner shall be detained (so far

as possible) in the same part of any prison as
any other prisoner.

(4) No person awaiting trial or remanded shall

(so far as possible) be detained in the same
part of any prison as any other prisoner.

Such mandatory separations are intended to minimise physical

abuses and protect vulnerable categories of prisoners from the
negative influences of other categories. Apart from mandated
separations under section 30, the GPS is not prohibited from
separating other categories of prisoners to prevent dangerous,
unhealthy and unnatural associations.

The Commission was concerned particularly with the

protection of vulnerable prisoners from the abusive actions and
designs of other prisoners and with the prevention of acts of an
unnatural nature. The Director of Prisons has, however, assured
the Commission that the GPS is alert to such kinds of misconduct
and has put in place a system of preventative action whereby
prisoners are screened and appropriate action taken.

Accommodation

258
 Given the location of the Georgetown Prison and its
proximity to busy streets on all sides, there is no room for
structural expansion to cope with any sizeable increase of the
prison population. Therefore, any increase will require additional
accommodation in other prisons which are capable of structural
expansion or in the construction of other prisons.

The Commission, as mentioned before, is of the view that

efforts can be made by judicial officers to reduce the prison
population by the utilisation of available appropriate coercive
remedies other than imprisonment without compromising public
justice. The Commission recognises that such efforts, subject to
the demands of public justice, can be unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, the solution does not lie in overcrowding the
Georgetown Prison to the extent that it becomes dangerously
unmanageable and an impediment to social reform efforts but
rather in expanding the capacity of other prisons which have
room for expansion, where possible. If not, additional prisons will
have to be constructed.

The Mazaruni Prison has considerable room for expansion

which renders the construction of a new all-male prison
unnecessary. Attention should be given to expanding the
Mazaruni prison and providing it with human and material
resources for greater prison intake as the solution to the
overcrowding problem in the Georgetown prison.

The Commission is not persuaded that the Georgetown

Prison ought to be abandoned since, excepting the problem of
over-crowding, its location can be functionally convenient for
certain categories of prisoners. However, the Commission is
convinced that it needs major rehabilitation and its facilities need
to be improved and modernised. Whatever option is preferred
this should be based solely upon its economic feasibility.
It appears to the Commission from a visual inspection of
the interior of the prison that efforts at rehabilitation have been
very piece-meal and have not achieved much. The interior of the
prison reveals its colonial past and forced spasmodic efforts at
greater inmate accommodations with enhanced security

259
measures. Resources must, therefore, be made available for its
modernisation if its status as a prison is to be maintained.

Since the New Amsterdam Prison is the only prison in

Guyana which accommodates female prisoners, the escorting of
female remanded prisoners to and from this Prison to courts in
Georgetown and further afield, tends to strain the limited
resources of the Guyana Police Force which usually assists in the
performance of such escort duties.

On its visit to the New Amsterdam Prison, the Commission

heard complaints from female prisoners awaiting trial that the
Police, on many occasions, default in these duties resulting in
their incarceration being unduly prolonged. No doubt, such
defaults are due to the fact that New Amsterdam is far removed
from the respective courts. The problem is more pronounced
when the court is in some interior location.

The Commission is of the opinion that there should be a

female remand prison in the vicinity of Georgetown which has
the largest number of courts. This would considerably reduce the
difficulty of having to escort all remanded female prisoners to
and from New Amsterdam. Those remanded female prisoners
can be kept either in New Amsterdam or in Georgetown
depending on which prison is closer to the respective court.

The Commission has noted the problem-management style

of the Director and his management team and is quite satisfied
that despite a serious shortage of qualified staff; a surfeit of
inmate population relative to prison accommodation; an increase
of violent, aggressive and dangerous prisoners; limited security
equipment and limited resources, he has managed to
satisfactorily cope with the very difficult task of making the
prison relatively safe for both staff and inmates at the same
time. He has sought to develop a constructive regime of
activities geared to the reforming of inmates into becoming
responsible, industrious and useful citizens upon their discharge
from the prisons.

260
 The Commission is inclined to the view that he will be
greatly assisted in his tasks should he be granted more
autonomy (particularly in recruiting and promotion) and receive
the co-operation of all the related agencies such as the
Magistracy and Judiciary, the DPP’s office, the Parole Board, the
Probation and Welfare Department, the Ministry of Home Affairs
and government institutions which provide technical training and
instruction.

Recommendations:
With regard to the “Functions and Operations” of the GPS,
the Commission recommends as follows:

(136) As the prison population increases, there must be a

commensurate increase in the actual and authorised
strength of the security personnel of the GPS.

(137) Timely efforts should be made, within the constraint of

available budgetary resources, to increase the salaried
and non-salaried benefits currently accorded to prison
officers in order to attract suitably qualified applicants.

(138) The GPS should desist from the practice of utilising

Assistant Prison Officers to independently perform
functions of a security nature or any statutory function
and should confine them to the role of auxiliaries to
Prison Officers.

(139) Commensurate with the recruitment of more suitably

qualified persons as Prison Officers, there should be less
reliance on the services of Assistant Prison Officers.

(140) The recommendations of the Criminal Law Review

Committee approved by the Commission in this Report
should be implemented by the Judiciary, Magistracy and
other relevant public authorities.

(141) Adequate monitoring devices and warning technology

should be installed or upgraded in prisons such as

261
 Georgetown, New Amsterdam and Mazaruni to enhance
their physical security capacity and capability.

(142) Firearms provided to the GPS should be restricted to

firearms which can be employed discriminately in target
selection.

(143) In addition to monitoring devices, warning technologies

and appropriate firepower, there be periodic checks of
prisoners and prisons for weapons, implements for
breaking, and other unauthorised items.

(144) There should be a constructive regime of activities

geared to beneficially occupy prisoners’ time such as
learning useful skills e.g. masonry, carpentry, joinery,
agriculture; or, in reading books e.g. in electronics and
mechanics.

(145) In this regard the GPS should secure the assistance of

the relevant State institutions and non- governmental
organisations to provide instructors and teachers on a
periodic basis.

(146) The Mazaruni Prison should be expanded and provided

with the requisite human and material resources for
greater prison intake as a solution to the overcrowding
problem in the Georgetown Prison.

(147) The Georgetown Prison should be rehabilitated and its

facilities improved and modernised if found to be
economically feasible.

(148) There should be a female remand prison in the vicinity of

Georgetown.

(149) The Director of Prisons should be given more autonomy

generally and in relation to recruitment and promotion in
particular.

262
(150) The Director of Prisons should be given the co-operation
of all the related agencies such as the Magistracy and
Judiciary, the Parole Board, the Probation and Welfare
Department, the Ministry of Home Affairs and
Government institutions which provide technical training
and instructions.

263
 Section 2: Composition and Structure

In this section, the Commission examines the

composition and structure of the Guyana Prison Service.

The Guyana Prison Service (GPS) was established under

section 4A of the Prison Act, Chapter 11:01, as a department of
the Government. It falls under the executive responsibility of the
Minister of Home Affairs whose functions under the Act include
the following:

1. issuing orders of an executive nature to the Director

of Prisons;

2. making rules for good management and governance

of the prisons and the prisoners under section 56 of
the Act;

3. carrying out the general objects of the Act.

Director
The administrative head of the GPS is the Director of
Prisons with the Deputy Director of Prisons as his principal
assistant. Section 5 (1) provides:

There shall be a Director of Prisons and a Deputy

Director of Prisons.

Section 5A provides:

The Deputy Director shall act as principal assistant

to the Director in the performance of his duties and
shall have power, during the absence or incapacity
of the Director, or when so authorised by him, to do
or suffer any act or thing which may by law be done
or suffered by the Director.

To enable the Deputy Director to be of maximum

assistance to the Director, section 5A allows him to exercise the
powers of the Director during his absence or incapacity of the
Director and permits the Director to share with his Deputy his

264
statutory powers with his Deputy which, can be exercised by the
latter at any time.

The Director is charged with the general administration of

the prisons and the control and direction over the prison staff
but this authority, however, is circumscribed by whatever
executive orders are given by the Minister. Section 4 (1)
provides:

Subject to the orders of the Minister, the general

charge and administration of prisons and the control
and direction of the prison staff shall be vested in
the Director who may make such transfers, and
direct the employment and distribution of the prison
staff as he may think fit.

The Director cannot therefore exercise his administrative

authority inconsistent with, or in disregard of, the executive
orders of the Minister. On the contrary, his authority must be
exercised to give effect to such orders. It should be noted that
the Director can issue Standing Orders not inconsistent with the
Act or the Prison Rules made by the Minister under section 57.
The making of Standing Orders is a useful tool for giving effect
to administrative decisions of a non-temporary nature.

Prison Officers
Parliament has not left it to the administrative initiative of
the Director to decentralise or devolve administrative authority
on the officers in charge of the various prisons but has legislated
for such devolution to the extent that no orders retaining control
have been issued by the Director. Section 4(2) provides:

Subject to the orders of the Director, the

administration of each prison and the control and
direction of the prison staff attached thereto shall be
vested in the Senior Superintendent, the
Superintendent or the Assistant Superintendent in
charge of such prison.

In addition, section 8 provides:

Subject to the orders of the Director, every Senior

Superintendent, Superintendent and Assistant
Superintendent shall have, in relation to the prison

265
 of which he has charge, all the powers, duties, rights
and privileges of the Director.

Accordingly, there is no necessity for the officer in charge

of any prison to seek the approval of the Director or his Deputy
in making administrative decisions respecting that prison.
Sections 4(2) and 8 confer full administrative authority to
officers in charge of prisons to the extent that there is no
applicable superior order issued by the Director or his Deputy.

Rules
But while the Act provides for such administrative
authority, by Rule 20 of the Prison Rules, the Minister has
specified the responsibilities of the officers in charge of prisons.
This Rule provides that: “the officer in charge of a prison
(hereinafter referred to as “the officer in charge”) shall hold a
rank not lower than that of Assistant Superintendent and shall
be responsible for—

(a) the good order, discipline and management of

the prison under his control;

(b) the safe custody of the prisoners;

(c) the care of all buildings and other property of

the prison;

(d) the economical use of money and stores;

(e) ensuring that advantageous use is made of the

labour of prisoners;

(f) the keeping of such books and the making of

such returns as may be required,

(g) ensuring that every prisoner is released on the

day on which he is entitled to release;

(h) ensuring that male and female prisoners are

kept apart and that no key of the male division can be used to
unlock any door or gate of the female division of the prison.

Other duties of these officers are detailed in Rules 21-45. Even

though officers in charge of prisons have authority to administer
their respective prisons, this authority is subject to the orders of
the Director, if any, and the ministerial Rules, which must take
precedence. The Director cannot issue orders which are contrary
to exisiting Ministerial Rules.

266
 While the Act provides for a single Deputy Director, the
numerical strength of the Prison Staff is left to executive or
administrative discretion. Section 5(2) provides:

There shall be—

(a) so many Senior Superintendents of Prisons,

Superintendents of Prisons and Assistant
Superintendents of Prisons, and

(b) so many prison officers and clerks

as may be necessary for carrying into effect the provisions of

this Act.

Such executive or administrative flexibility allows for expeditious

decisions in increasing or decreasing the numerical strength of
the GPS to meet changing conditions in the prisons. Apart from
the Director and his Deputy, the authorised strength of the GFS
stands at 450, to service 5 prisons with an inmate population of
about 1600.

Duties
It should be noted that the Act allows for clerks to provide
clerical and office support service. However, such clerical staff
are not prison officers (see section 2) and do not have the
duties, powers, authorities, immunities and privileges which
attach to Prison Officers. It is significant that the legislature did
not contemplate or intend that Prison Officers should be
assigned ordinary clerical duties which have no relevance to their
training and status as Prison Officers.

Authority
Every Prison Officer, while acting in the execution of
his or her duty, is ex officio conferred with the powers,
authorities, immunities and privileges of regular members of the
Guyana Police Force. Section 12 provides:

Every prison officer while acting as such shall have

by virtue of his office all the powers, authorities,
immunities and privileges of a constable appointed
under the Police Act for purposes of his duty as such
prison officer.

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Correspondingly, section 13(7) of the Act allows for security
assistance by members of the GPF to the GPS and confers upon
such members of the GPF all the powers and privileges granted
to prison officers under section 13 in relation to the use of
weapons i.e., firearms in the course of their duties. Section
13(1) provides:

Every prison officer may use weapons against any

prisoner escaping or attempting to escape:

Provided that resort shall not be had to the use of any

such weapons unless such officer has reasonable grounds
for believing that he cannot otherwise prevent the escape;

while section 13(7) provides:

Every member of the Police Force who is for the time

being serving in the capacity of an escort, or of a
guard in or around any prison or lock-up, for the
purpose of ensuring the safe custody of any
prisoners or persons detained in a prison or lock-up,
shall be deemed to have all the powers and
privileges granted to prison officers under this
section for the purpose of his duties in relation to
such prisoners or persons.

In this regard any joint training and instruction classes on

the use of firearms between the Guyana Police Force and the
GPS must take this section into account.

Assistant Prison Officers

The Commission noted that the GPS has 196 Assistant
Prison Officers (who are not public officers and are non-
pensionable) as against only 83 Prison Officers out of an
authorised strength of 92. While these Assistant Prison Officers
perform mainly frontline security functions, they do not have the
statutory duties, powers, authorities and privileges with which
prison officers are clothed. Although section 2 defines “Prison
Officer” as meaning: “any person holding an office or performing
a duty in or in connection with a prison, but does not include a
person appointed to perform clerical duties only,” it may be
argued that such a definition is sufficiently wide to embrace
Assistant Prison Officers.

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 It must be noted, however, that Assistant Prison Officers
were not contemplated by the Act and therefore have no
statutory duties. Moreover, sections 10A, 12A and 13A which
relate to disciplinary enquiries and punishment for departmental
offences against “members of the subordinate staff”, do not
apply to Assistant Prison Officers simply because the disciplinary
powers conferred on the Director, Deputy Director and other
senior officers are exercised by them as delegates of the Public
Service Commission and the Public Service Commission has
jurisdiction only over its appointees i.e., public officers. Assistant
Prison Officers cannot be considered public officers for the
purposes of some provisions of the Act but not for the purposes
of sections 10A, 12A and 13A. The Commission’s view is that
they are not public officers.

It is clearly undesirable that Assistant Prison Officers, who

perform mainly frontline security functions as employees of the
State, are not conferred with the statutory authority, powers,
privileges and immunities which attach to Prison Officers. This
state of affairs is fraught with the dangers and risks which attach
not only to unlawful functional authority but also to sub-standard
functional performance.

The Commission does not recommend that in the interest

of regularisation, the definition of “Prison Officer” in section 2 be
amended to include “Assistant Prison Officers” since such an
amendment would necessarily entail not merely a reduction of
the qualification requirements for Prison Officers but also their
enlistment by the Public Service Commission.

The Commission is minded to support the elevation of

those Assistant Prison Officers, who have demonstrated
sufficient proficiency, to the rank of Prison Officer. This in turn
will entail a considerable increase in the authorised strength of
Prison Officers. There should then be a gradual reduction of the
authorised strength of Assistant Prison Officers constrained only
by the demands of necessity until these Officers are eliminated
from the structure of the GPS. A moderate increase in the

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salaried and non-salaried benefits to Prison Officers and other
subordinate officers can do much to ensure the timely
completion of this process.

The Act does not authorise the Director to make

appointments to the GPS since this is a function of the Public
Service Commission under article 201 of the Constitution.
However, it is not necessary for the Public Service Commission
to be directly involved in all such appointments and it may be
more convenient and expedient for the Commission to delegate
to the Director its authority to appoint and promote up to the
subordinate staff level of the GPS i.e., up to officers below the
rank of Assistant Superintendent. Such delegation may enable
the Director to make desirable strategic adjustments to the
lower rank structure without unnecessary delay. Since efforts at
recruitment are made by the GPS and not by the PSC and
recruits in recent times generally enter the Service at the level of
Assistant Prison Officer, delays in promotion of the subordinate
staff, who are dependent upon the PSC for promotion, can
stultify the efforts of the GPS to enlist recruits. The
recommended delegation of authority by the Public Service
Commission to the Director will ensure that promotions up to the
subordinate staff level are promptly made. Recruitment can
then take place to fill vacancies created at the lower level
without unnecessary delay which will greatly facilitate better
strategic staffing.

Prison Locations
The Minister is empowered under section 3(1) to establish
prisons by declaratory orders. At present, there are 5 prisons,
viz:

(1) Georgetown Prison: this is the main admission

and dispersal prison in Guyana. This prison
accommodates all categories of male prisoners-
remanded, committed and convicted (including
condemned prisoners and appellants).

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 (2) Mazaruni Prison with annex, Sibley Hall: the
main block accommodates adult male prisoners
with previous convictions while the annex
accommodates the young and first offenders.

(3) New Amsterdam Prison: this is the only prison

in Guyana which accommodates female
prisoners. This prison, however, accommodates
both male and female prisoners and, in fact, its
prison population comprises largely male
prisoners.

(4) Lusignan Prison: this prison caters essentially

for prisoners serving sentences of less than 18
months and to prisoners who have only a short
part of their sentences remaining to be served.

(5) Timehri Remand Centre, which now caters for

prisoners whose sentences are nearing
completion.

The Georgetown Prison is one of two prisons established by

ministerial order under section 3(2). Although it accommodates
male prisoners only, its inmates comprise about half of the total
prison population. It can justifiably be viewed as the central
prison in Guyana. Its functional dominance is not due simply to
the number of prisoners it accommodates but also to the fact
that all categories of male prisoners (remanded, convicted,
committed, long-term and death-penalty convicts) are therein
housed. In fact, most of the high-security-risk prisoners are
kept at this prison. As a result of such functional dominance, it
is essential that the officer-in-charge should be the most capable
of the Senior Superintendents.

The Commission notes that the authorised strength of the

rank of Senior Superintendent is 4 even though the actual
strength is only 2. This shortage of Senior Superintendents has
possibly been caused by the delay in the constitution of the
Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission has

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since been constituted and is now functional and the Commission
is therefore hopeful that current vacancies at this level will be
swiftly addressed.

The Mazaruni Prison accommodates convicted persons and,

because of its interior location, it should be utilised principally for
the accommodation of convicts who have received relatively long
prison sentences. This facility should be rehabilitated,
resuscitated and appropriately upgraded to perform its intended
function. The Commission is of the view that there is grave
danger in having too many high-security-risk prisoners in the
Georgetown Prison. This risk can be considerably minimised if
those convicted among such prisoners are accommodated at
Mazaruni Prison. It is more than enough that the Georgetown
Prison is used to accommodate high-risk prisoners who are on
remand awaiting trial and other remand and short term
prisoners.

On its visit to the Mazaruni Prison, the Commission

observed that it is being rehabilitated and structurally expanded
to accommodate a greater number of persons than it customarily
accommodates. If it is given an adequate number of prison
officers for effective supervision, the Commission is of the
opinion that the Mazaruni Prison offers the greatest prospect for
relieving the congestion which currently obtains at the
Georgetown Prison and for prisoners to be engaged in
constructive activities such as agriculture, tailoring, joinery and
even sports. The Commission hopes that the rehabilitation and
structural expansion of the Mazaruni Prison will take into account
an improvement in the supply of electricity — whether by solar
energy or otherwise.

The Timehri Remand Centre was intended to accommodate

remand prisoners who do not pose a high degree of security risk.
From the presentation made by the GPS, this prison is being
used to accommodate prisoners whose release is imminent. In
the light of its location, the Commission agrees with its current
usage. Since the prisoners whose release is imminent would not
be as high-risk as other prisoners, the main objectives of the

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GPS should be their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
The Timehri location is ideally suited for soon-to-be released
prisoners.

At the Lusignan Prison, the level of security need not be as

high as at the Georgetown or Mazaruni Prisons but it should not
be as low as that of the Timehri Prison. Like the Timehri Prison,
the focus should be on rehabilitation and the re-integration of its
inmates into society.

The Sibley Hall annex accommodates young offenders.

Here, the emphasis should be on proper supervision, guidance,
education and the teaching of useful and relevant skills. This
location appropriately removes young offenders from the bad
influences of the other prisons to an environment conducive to
the reformation of young inmates.

While the functional objectives of each prison should

determine the kind of personnel to be assigned thereto, the
Commission has noted that there is a disproportionate increase
in the female composition of the staff of the GPS. This is perhaps
due to recruitment problems; but the Commission wishes to
caution that the gender composition of the GPS should bear a
rational proportionality to the gender composition of the prison
population. The application of the principle of rational
proportionality to the recruitment policy of the GPS should not
be considered as constituting unlawful gender discrimination
since such a policy cannot be attributed wholly or mainly to the
gender of prospective applicants but wholly or mainly to the
fluctuating gender composition of the prison population and the
peculiarities of the functions and duties relevant to that
population.

Since the prison population has increased over the years to

the extent that it became necessary to engage the additional
services of 196 Assistant Prison Officers, it is necessary to cater
for their upward mobility in the rank structure. This could be
achieved by increasing the authorised strength of the higher

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ranks relative to the number of personnel at the bottom level
i.e., Assistant Prison Officer.

Medical Duties
Section 9 of the Act imposes upon the Chief Medical Officer
the duty of assigning to each prison, a government medical
officer who, on assignment, takes general control of the health
and medical care of the prisoners therein and its sanitation. The
medical officer must perform whatever duties are imposed upon
him by the Act or the Prison Rules. It appears that a government
medical officer may be assigned to more than one prison; but
each prison must have a government medical officer assigned to
it.

Even though such medical officers are required under the

Prison Regulations to report certain matters to the officer in
charge of the respective prisons, they are not part of the GPS
and fall under the supervision of the Chief Medical Officer and
the executive portfolio of the Ministry of Health. The Director of
Prisons has no administrative jurisdiction over medical officers.
They are not accountable to him. But the Director can himself, or
through the Minister, express his concerns about their work
performance to the Chief Medical Officer or the Ministry of
Health.

The Commission observed that, while the infirmary at the

Mazaruni Prison is served by an in-house trained nurse
(Regulation 46) who works on a full-time basis, due to non-
compliance with Regulation 48, the nurse is constrained by
necessity to perform functions which properly falls within the
competence of a trained medical officer, e.g., diagnosing
ailments and prescribing and dispensing drugs. Such a state of
affairs poses a danger not only to the health of prisoners but to
the liability of the State. The Chief Medical Officer should be
alerted to his duty under section 9 of assigning a government
medical officer to each prison and to the duties of such assigned
medical officer under regulation 48.

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 The Prison Regulations mandate that each prison should
have its own infirmary staffed by properly trained officers
(regulation 46); but there is no requirement for the full-time
attendance of the Medical Officer. Regulation 48, however,
requires daily prison visits by the medical officer to see any
prisoner who is (a) sick (b) undergoing dietary punishment (c)
under a sentence of death and (d) to whom his attention is
specially directed. The Commission has received information
from prisoners that regulation 48 is not being complied with and
visits by medical officers are made no more than once or twice
per week. The Chief Medical Officer should be requested to take
remedial action to ensure that this statutory duty is performed
rather than neglected.

There may be an over–reliance on paramedics to perform

the functions of medical officers to the prisons due to the
shortage of qualified medical doctors for such assignments. The
Commission is of the view that it was in the contemplation of
Parliament that medical officers should be persons qualified to
perform serious operations (see regulation 53).

In this regard, it is instructive to note that the

responsibility for the health and medical welfare of prisoners and
the sanitary conditions of the prisons does not lie with the
Minister of Home Affairs or the Director of Prisons but with the
Ministry of Health and the Chief Medical Officer. Failure by the
Ministry of Health and the Chief Medical Officer to ensure that
the duty, imposed by the Act, of regular attendance on prisoners
by competent medical officers is performed can attract liability
for breach of statutory duty under the Act.

Even though by virtue of section 7 of the Act the general

control of the health and the medical welfare of prisoners and
the sanitation of the prisons resides in the medical officers
assigned to the prisons by the Chief Medical Officer, by rule 37
of the Prison Rules, all officers-in-charge of the prisons must
ensure that no sick prisoner is left without medical attention and
that the directions of the medical officers are at all times strictly
and carefully carried out.

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Recommendations
The Commission is satisfied that the level of administration
of the prison system can be greatly increased by improved
recruitment and availability of resources. The efforts of the
Director and his management team are significantly stymied by
the limited authority of the Director to recruit and promote; the
lack of up-to-date security equipment; limited space and
facilities for accommodation of prisoners and for engaging them
in constructive activities, and, of course, an insufficient number
of qualified recruits.

The Commission recommends the following:

(151) Immediate attention should be paid to promoting

suitable Assistant Prison Officers to the next level; then
gradually reducing the ‘authorised strength’ of Assistant
Prison Officers and increasing the ‘authorised strength’ of
Prison Officers, as a consequence.

(152) The Public Service Commission should consider

delegating to the Director of Prisons its appointment and
promotional function regarding subordinate staff.

(153) The risk of over-burdening the Georgetown prison with

too many high-security-risk prisoners should be reduced
by the transfer of the convicted to the more commodious
Mazaruni Prison after completion of its physical
rehabilitation and structural expansion.

(154) Efforts should be directed to making the gender

composition of the prison staff rationally proportional to
the gender composition of the inmates.

(155) At the Timehri Remand Centre, where release of most

inmates is imminent, the GPS should emphasise their
rehabilitation and reintegration into society.

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(156) The Chief Medical Officer must be apprised of his duty to
ensure that daily visits are made to prisoners by medical
officers, as required by regulation 48.

(157) Placement of staff members at specific prison locations

should relate to the functional objectives of that prison.

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 Section 3: Ethnic Balance

In this section, the Commission examines the

methods and processes of achieving greater ethnic
balance within the GPS.

The coercive powers of prison officers relate to their prison

duties and therefore affect the welfare of prisoners rather than
the general population in any direct way. Ethnic balance in the
Guyana Prison Service cannot, and does not, assume the same
level of controversy and importance and, indeed, has not
provoked the same socio-political concern as it does in the case
of the Guyana Police Force and the Guyana Defence Force — the
remit of which directly relates to the protection and service to
the country as a whole. Moreover, no evidential basis exists to
lead to a finding of any general racially discriminatory practice
by prison officers in the performance of their duties which can
generate ethnic insecurity fears in any group of the prison
population. These two factors tend to diminish any urgency for
the need for ethnic balance in the GPS and therefore to limit the
room for justification for urgent positive efforts aimed at
achieving a greater level of ethnic balance in the GPS than that
which currently obtains.

However, adequate ethnic representation in all public

sector institutions is certainly desirable even if for the limited
purposes of reflecting the national ethnic composition and of
dispelling perceptions of ethnically discriminatory practices in
public sector employment.

The Director of Prisons in his presentation to the

Commission stated:

It is important to note that the Prisons

Administration has never employed implicit and/or
deliberate policy to prevent and/or frustrate the
recruitment and retention of other ethnic
constituents (non Afro-Guyanese). As a matter of
fact, they were deliberately encouraged to remain in
the Service.

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The Commission has received no evidence or allegation that the
Prisons Administration or the Public Service Commission in its
recruitment or promotion policies for the GPS has discriminated
against non-Afro-Guyanese. Yet, the current ethnic composition
of the prison staff is as follows:

Indo-Guyanese - 5%
Mixed-race Guyanese - 4%
Amerindian Guyanese - 1.5%
Afro-Guyanese - 89.5%

The statistical truth is, therefore, that Afro-Guyanese heavily

predominate in the GPS. Despite this, there is no perception
existing in the Guyanese society that this is a result of any
deliberate act of discrimination.

Recruitment
In his analysis of the current ethnic composition of the
GPS, the Director of Prisons stated:

Interviews with retired senior prison officers pointed

out that Indian members of staff were seen as
equals to their African colleagues in terms of
competence and ability to execute assigned tasks
within the prison, even though they were more
inclined to work in the farms, medical, clerical and
technical fields.

However, slow promotion opportunities and

poor salaries were principal reasons why many of
the Indian officers did not remain on the job. A
significant point to note is that most of the Indian
officers on joining the Service were already married
and having children, unlike young African recruits.
The salaries made it difficult for the Indian ranks to
support this family structure. Hence they sought
alternative employment and left the service.

It was noted that many of the Indian officers

came on the job and at the same time having
alternative income generating ventures in terms of
family business, farming, rearing of cattle, swine and
livestock and other micro enterprises. These income
generating ventures gave them options in terms of
employment and some were loathe to leave their
families and investment when transferred, fearing
their absence may bring about a failure of their

279
 investments. Hence, some opted to leave the
Service.

A number of Indian officers also left the job

because of intimidation from burly and aggressive
prisoners who knew some were afraid and would
threaten them, but this percentage was insignificant.

The above analysis reveals at least the following four significant

points: (1) Indo-Guyanese are not unsuited to the duties of
prison officer and are equal in competence and ability to Afro-
Guyanese; (2) Indo-Guyanese are often deterred from making a
career of service in the GPS mainly because of too slow
promotion and inadequate salaries; (3) Indo-Guyanese assume
family responsibility at an early age and are generally not
attracted to employment which separates them from their
nuclear families; (4) Indo-Guyanese officers tend to engage in
other income generating ventures which often provide them with
a viable alternative to service in the GPS. The Commission has
already identified some or most of these factors as being
responsible for Indo-Guyanese under-representation in the other
Disciplined Forces.

Since the pre-dominance of Afro-Guyanese in the GPS

does not give rise to ethnic insecurity fears either among the
general population or among the prison population and has not
given rise to perceptions of ethnic discrimination in the
recruitment and retention policies of the GPS, the Commission
was not too troubled by the current under-representation
reflected in the prison personnel. However, it does appear that
the unattractiveness of the GPS to Indo-Guyanese in particular
and the under-representation of non-Afro-Guyanese in the GPS,
relative to their respective demographic strengths, must
negatively impact on its operational effectiveness or must
impose an unnecessary strain on its training resources. The
negative effects of this ethnic under-representation rather than
its causes were a matter of grave concern to the Commission
and some deliberate process must be put in train to reduce these
to a minimum.

It is clear to the Commission that the inability of the GPS

to attract qualified personnel in its recruitment drive has caused

280
the GPS to employ less qualified persons as Assistant Prison
Officers. These recruits have to be trained to perform the
functions designed for Prison Officers and severely strain the
training capacity and resources of the GPS.

If Indo-Guyanese and other non-Afro Guyanese were to

offer their services to the GPS relative to their demographic
strengths, then there would have been no need to sacrifice
quality at the altar of quantity to satisfy the demands of
necessity. Such a dilution cannot be allowed to continue.
Otherwise, the same level of inappropriate competence and skill
will eventually seep into the upper echelons of the GPS. As in the
case of the other Disciplined Forces, there is some inescapable
causal relationship between ethnic imbalance and functional
limitations or inefficiency. The GPS, like the other Disciplined
Forces, simply cannot get the best personnel if a substantial part
(perhaps more than one half) of the qualified personnel do not
make themselves available to it.

It does appear that a better level of remuneration for

members of the Disciplined Forces can do much to attract the
services of qualified Guyanese of all ethnicities. The Commission
must point out that a distinction must necessarily be made
between public officers in the civil service and public officers in
the Disciplined Forces and therefore the common constraints
peculiar to the former ought not to fetter the Administration in
relation to the latter. Additional guidance in this respect may be
had by reference to the methodology adopted overseas.

The Commission wishes to highlight that officers in the

Disciplined Forces are expected to subject themselves to
standards that their counterparts in the civil service do not have
to endure. Breach of their particular disciplinary codes exposes
them not merely to departmental disciplinary action but very
often exposes them to criminal liability for offences specially
created by statute. In general, the statutory duties of officers in
the Disciplined Forces expose them to ever-present risks of
death or bodily harm and often even criminal prosecution. Such
risks can be minimised but not eliminated and an attractive

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remuneration package may compensate for these distinctive
burdens.

Unlike their counterparts in the civil service, officers of the

Disciplined Forces are often legally prohibited from being
members of legitimate but partisan organisations such as trade
unions etc. so that the execution of their statutory duties may
not be affected by partisan interests. Their hours of work are
unlimited and they must respond to the call of duty at any time.
They are more liable to location transfers than officers in the civil
service. Such significant differences which attend their conditions
of service must be reflected in their salaried and non-salaried
benefits in comparison with public officers in the civil service.

Recommendation
With regard to “ethnic balance” in the GPS, the Commission
recommends the following:

(158) Efforts to attract the services of qualified Guyanese of all

ethnicities should be bolstered by better levels of
remuneration.

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 Section 4: Relationship with and Responsibility to
Civilian Authority

In this section, the Commission examines the

Guyana Prison Service’s relationship with, and
responsibility to, civilian authority.

The Guyana Prison Service (GPS) which has been

established under section 4A of the Prison Act, Chapter 11:01,
falls under the executive authority of the Minister of Home
Affairs. As the responsible Minister, he is accountable to the
National Assembly for the administration of the prisons by the
Director of Prisons.

Authority
While section 4(1) vests general charge and administration
of the prisons and control and direction of the prison staff in the
Director of Prisons, the exercise of such authority by him is
subject to the orders of the Minister. Section 4 (1) prescribes:

Subject to the orders of the Minister, the general

charge and administration of prisons and the control
and direction of the prison staff shall be vested in
the Director who may make such transfers, and
direct the employment and distribution of the prison
staff as he may think fit.

The Director must exercise this administrative authority in such

a manner as to give effect to whatever executive orders the
Minister may issue to him but, apart from such orders, he is at
liberty to administer the prisons as he sees fit.

Section 56 of the Act empowers the Minister to make rules

generally for the good governance and management of the
prisons and prisoners and for carrying out the objects of the Act.
Similarly, section 9 empowers the Director to issue Standing
Orders in furtherance of his administrative functions. But the
subordination of his administrative power to executive authority
is again exemplified by the express provision in the section that
such Standing Orders must not be inconsistent with the Prison
Rules made by the Minister (and, of course, the Act itself).

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Board of Visiting Justices
Apart from executive oversight, the Act contains provisions
for more direct civilian oversight. Section 46 mandates the
establishment of a Board of Visiting Justices for every prison in
Guyana and its members are appointed by the Minister. Apart
from this Board, it must be noted that every High Court Judge
and every magistrate is ex officio a visiting justice.

A visiting justice is authorised under section 47 to visit any

prison at any time in respect of which he is a visiting justice,

and may inspect any part of such prison, may

enquire and examine the food, diet, clothing,
treatment and conduct of prisoners, may question
any member of the prison staff or prisoner, may
hear all complaints from any prisoner, may enquire
into any abuses and irregularities in any prison and
shall ascertain as far as possible whether the
provision of this Act and the Prison Rules are being
complied with and may report such matters to the
Minister.

It can readily be seen that section 47 confers considerable

investigative and inquisitorial authority in visiting justices
thereby seeking to ensure that every aspect of the system and
its operations is subject to responsible civilian oversight.
However, the Commission has been informed that there is no
Board of Visiting Justices. Moreover, it doubts whether judges of
the High Court or magistrates are aware of their ex officio
oversight authority as visiting justices. Consequently, it does
appear to the Commission that section 46 is largely ignored and
a most valuable and important aspect of civilian oversight of the
prisons seems to be now lacking. Prisoners are incarcerated on
the orders of justices and it seems meet that justices should
have an interest in the prison welfare even if only for the
purpose of making informed decisions relating to incarceration.
The Commission recommends that the Minister should establish
a Board of Visiting Justices for each prison in compliance with
section 46 and that the Chancellor be requested to bring to the
attention of all High Court judges and magistrates their ex officio
public responsibility for oversight of the prison system and to
encourage them to make prison visits.

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 It may be interesting to note that visiting justices are
empowered to exercise even some of the disciplinary authority of
the Director. Section 47(2) states:

A court composed of two visiting justices appointed

under section 46(1) or of one ex officio visiting
justice, sitting in prison shall have all the powers of
the Director in relation to the trial of any major or
other prison offence or in relation to any appeal
under section 42.

While the Act itself provides for civilian oversight of the

prisons by visiting Justices, the Prison Rules also provide for
civilian oversight by a Visiting Committee made up of five
persons appointed by the Minister on an annual basis and this
Committee, once appointed, has considerable oversight duties
under the Rules.

Visiting Committee
Under the Rules, the visiting Committee is under a duty to
visit each prison not less than once every month and must bring
to the notice of the Director or the Minister all matters connected
with its administration which, in its opinion, require his attention.
The Visiting Committee has power to access all parts of the
prison and all prisoners in their cells or in some room out of the
sight and hearing of prison officers. The Committee must ensure
that the dietary requirements of prisoners are satisfactorily
maintained, and, if not, must report its finding to the Director.
They may direct the Director to ensure and maintain a supply of
suitable food to prisoners. The Committee must investigate
complaints from prisoners and, if necessary, report to the
Minister. They can inquire into the state of the prison buildings
and may advise or suggest to the Director necessary repairs.

The Visiting Committee has the duty of co-operating with

the Director in promoting the efficiency of the prison and of
assisting with advice and suggestions to as the employment,
education, recreation and welfare of the prisoners.

This Visiting Committee seems to be designed generally to

provide intrusive civilian supervision over the prisons and to

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provide assistance to the Director and his management team. It
is under a duty to make a report at the end of each year to the
Minister with regard to all or any of the matters referred to in
the Prison Rules or other matters pertaining to the prison. It may
also report to the Minister on matters to which, in its opinion,
attention should be directed. The Visiting Committee is
therefore an agency created by the Minister by which he ensures
that the prison is overseen and managed to a substantial extent
by civilian authority. It is therefore important that the committee
be composed of responsible civilians who are interested in and
committed to the public welfare.

Coroner
Under section 49 of the Act, it is the duty of the coroner,
having jurisdiction in the locality of the prison, to hold an inquest
upon the body of any prisoner executed under a death sentence
or who dies in prison whether from unnatural causes or not. The
death of a prisoner in prison is a matter of public interest and
when this comes to the knowledge of the officer in charge of the
prison, he must immediately notify not only the Director but also
the relevant civilian authorities such as the Chairman of the
Visiting Committee, the Coroner and the nearest relative of the
deceased (where practicable).

Director as Delegate
The Commission has already drawn attention to the fact
that the Director of Prisons has no authority to appoint or
promote any prison officer. Such authority resides solely in the
Public Service Commission; but the Commission has
recommended that this authority to make appointments up to
the rank of subordinate officer should be delegated to the
Director. Such a recommendation, if implemented, would involve
no more than the devolution of the authority of the Public
Service Commission and no practical loss of authority. The Public
Service Commission usually acts on the recommendations of the
Director and, in any event, would retain residual control since,
under article 202(1) of the Constitution, any person or officer
aggrieved by his non-appointment can appeal to the Public
Service Commission.

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 As a disciplined Service, the GPS has its own statutory
disciplinary codes under which action is taken. There is no good
reason why the Public Service Commission should not also
delegate to the Director the power to exercise disciplinary
control over, and to remove from office, officers up to the rank
of subordinate officer. The Commission must point out that the
Commissioner of Police and the Chief Fire Officer do have such
limited statutory powers. It appears rather anomalous that the
Director of Prisons is not similarly empowered even as delegate.
In any event, as the head of a disciplined service which has a
command line management structure, it seems fitting that such
disciplinary authority should reside in the Director. The
Commission wishes to point out that delegation of such powers
by the Public Service Commission to the Director can now be
effected only with the consent of the Prime Minister (Article
201(2) of the Constitution).

Discipline
In order to ensure that security is not compromised by
corruption and discipline is not eroded by disrespect for
authority, Parliament has made certain types of misbehavior
punishable by the courts as criminal offences. Section 11 of the
Act provides:

Every member of the prison staff, or any person who is

employed in any prison in any capacity who-

(a) has either directly or indirectly, any pecuniary

interest whatsoever in or derives any benefit or
advantage from, the sale or purchase of any
prison supplies or of any article to or for the use
of any prisoner or of any prison, or

(b) has any dealing, whereby he obtains or might

expect to obtain at any time either immediately
or in the future any benefit of any nature
whatsoever, with any prisoner or with any person
on behalf of any prisoner; or

(c) assaults, threatens or insults any member of the

prison staff, who is senior to him when such
senior member is on duty, or as a result of
anything done by such senior member in the
course of his duty,

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 shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine of
nineteen thousand five hundred dollars or to
imprisonment for three months

While section 53(1) creates offences for introducing prohibited

articles into any prison; for supplying such articles to prisoners;
for placing or concealing them for prisoners or for conveying
them out of the prison, the penalty for which is $26,000 or 3
months in prison, section 53(3) provides:

Any prison or police officer who is convicted under

this section shall, in addition to any other
punishments, be liable to forfeit his office and any
arrears of salary due to him and also to any pension
to which he may be entitled.

The Commission has seen the need to advert attention to

such criminal offences not merely because misconduct of
members of the prison staff is criminally punishable but also
because of their particular relevance to the testimony of a
former inmate of the Georgetown Prison. That inmate informed
the Commission of specially prepared meals being supplied by
prison officers to prisoners at a price; of financial transactions
between prisoners and prison officers; and of articles being
thrown over the prison walls and their subsequent upliftment
and concealment in the prison. The involvement of prison
officers in such illegal activities does not attract only internal
disciplinary sanctions but criminal sanctions by the courts since
they affect internal discipline and can seriously prejudice the
public welfare and safety. Prison staff should be made aware of
the fact that sections 11 and 53 criminalise such activities and
render the perpetrators answerable to the criminal courts.

Courts
The Commission is quite satisfied that the law has
adequately addressed the issue of civilian oversight of the
administration of the prisoners. In fact, the law provides for
civilian participation in the administration of the prisons.
However, the Commission is concerned that sections 46 and 47
of the Act which provide for a Board of Visiting Justices and for
judicial oversight of the administration of the prisons seem to
have been overlooked to the detriment of the policy of the

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legislation. Parliamentary creativity and wisdom should not be
stultified by executive or judicial omission. Parliament must be
presumed to have intended that judicial officers on whose orders
persons are incarcerated should play some role in overseeing the
prison system.

Recommendations
With regard to the Prison Service’s “relationship with, and
responsibility to, civilian authority” the Commission recommends
that:

(159) The Chancellor of the Judiciary should be asked to alert

the Magistrates and Judges as to their responsibility for
oversight of the prison system and encourage them to
make prison visits since such visits would enable them to
make informed decisions on sentencing.

(160) The Minister should establish a Board of Visiting Justices

for each prison in compliance with section 46 of the Act.

(161) The Visiting Committee should ensure the satisfaction of

the prisoner’s dietary requirements and report to the
Director of Prisons if necessary; hear complaints from
prisoners and report to the Minister if necessary; and
bring to the attention of the Director administrative
matters requiring his attention.

(162) The Chief Medical Officer in furtherance of his statutory

duties should ensure that a government medical officer
is assigned to each prison and that he makes daily visits
thereto.

(163) Officers-in-Charge should discharge their responsibility

for ensuring that sick prisoners are not left without
medical attention.

(164) Staff of the Georgetown prison and other prisons should

especially be apprised of their liabilities for involvement
with prisoners in financial transactions, food smuggling

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and other racketeering and should be duly sanctioned for
misconduct, in these respects.

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 Conclusion

In brief, the Commission has come to the following conclusions:

(1) National and international developments have impacted on

the operations of the Disciplined Forces but commensurate
changes in legislation, organisation and administration in all such
areas have not been made. Given their current resources,
composition and capability, the Forces seemed unable and/or
unwilling/reluctant to confront with equanimous resoluteness,
the recent spate of social disorder and internal disturbance.
Public safety and national security have suffered as a
consequence. A ‘National Security Sector Reform Programme’,
which methodically addresses these deficiencies of the Forces to
enable them to cope with these evolutionary challenges should
be considered for implementation.

(2) Clear guidelines should be given to determine how

responsibility for the performance of the Forces ought to be
shared between the Ministers of the Government with executive
responsibility for their respective agency and civilian authorities
on the one hand, and the professional officers of the Forces on
the other. As part of their responsibility, Ministers should: have
prepared by their technical Officers, long-term strategic plans for
each of the Forces; reconfigure their Ministries in such a way
that would allow for the monitoring of these Plans on a periodic
basis, and where necessary, to review them. In addition, the
establishment of a Parliamentary Committee on Public Safety
would provide appropriate constitutional oversight of these
processes.

(3) No evidence of deliberate discrimination in selection of

personnel for the Forces was found. It was felt, however, that
no conscious initiative was taken to improve on the
unimaginative, dated and worn procedures, and potential
recruits from certain geographic areas or of certain ethnic groups
were disadvantaged or inadvertently ignored. Recruitment,

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retention and promotion, and all other matters affecting
personnel, should be entirely re-examined. The evidence
reveals that existing procedures, based on traditional population
centres and the lack of a wide multi-ethnic recruitment and
promotion panels are unlikely to produce results which are
satisfactory to the majority of the population. Greater ethnic
balance is both desirable and achievable with the adoption of
new approaches.

(4) The four Forces have separate and distinct roles to play in
public safety and national security. Although there may be a
measure of co-operation and collaboration, the operational
efficiency of each Force is more dependent on their specialisation
than on collaboration. The failure of the GPF, GDF and GFS to
maintain adequate reserve forces has created the illusion of
manpower shortages. The absence of reserves could prompt
premature requests for assistance from other Forces when,
indeed, reserves could be mobilized in cases of emergency. The
best means of ensuring a higher level of operational efficiency
and effectiveness, however, is by the establishment, equipping
and staffing of training schools in all the Forces, but particularly
for the GPS and GFS. In addition, special attention must be paid
to the professional and managerial education, training and
development of senior officers.

(5) The Commission found no evidence that the Ministerial

system for financial and public accountability was deficient or in
need of reform. In broad terms, the Forces have been found to
be functioning within the limits of their present resources,
capacity and traditional focus. Blame for failures in public safety
and national security is to be shared with the Executive not
merely because the Forces may have lacked the capacity to
respond effectively but also because executive direction and
governmental organisation may not have been sufficiently firm,
compelling and retributive.

(6) An open-door policy on the operations of the GPF and

GDF in particular, together with a community oriented strategy,
is needed to transform the image of the Forces if the general

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population is to feel that these agencies are indeed maintained in
the service of the country as a whole.

(7) Recommendations for reform, however, relevant to current

social conditions must be reviewed periodically if they are to
remain relevant to functional effectiveness and efficiency. The
work of the Commission should therefore not be seen as final but
merely a part, if not the start, of a continuing process of
adaptation and change to improve the performance of the
Disciplined Forces in the discharge of their responsibilities. The
practice of conducting periodic national security reviews with the
aim and objective of examining changes in the security
environment on the one hand, and recommending improvements
in the Disciplined Forces on the other, should be considered.

(8) The Commission was given no assistance by way of

testimony to examine the structure and capability of the subject
Ministries to draft and monitor the execution of long-term
strategic plans in relation to the development and functions of
the Forces. However, it is the Commission’s view that such
Ministries may need to be re-configured to enable them to
discharge such a responsibility.

Signed:

…………………………… ….…….…………………………
Ian Neville Chang S C David Arthur Granger MSS
Chairman Member

………………………… …………………………………..
Charles Rishiram Ramson S C Mohabir Anil Nandlall LL.B
Member Member

………………………….
Harold Alexander Lutchman Ph.D
Member

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