Defamation

Establishment, Defence, and Reform

Themes & Opinions

It is widely recognized that English libel law is claimant friendly. Despite this, the central
tension between freedom of speech and the right to reputation permeates almost all
aspects of defamation. The law must take account of both of these competing interests
and ensure that neither is favoured more than the other and that both are accommodated
where the circumstances demand it. Also to be considered are the major issues of
promoting responsible journalism, the apparent problem of libel tourism, corporate
actions, and the chilling effect on publication.

From the perspective of protecting reputation, the threat comes from the prospect of an
uninhibited media.
• The media are in the interest of selling stories, some of which may be false and/or
cause a harmful impact to natural and legal persons.

From the perspective of upholding freedom of speech, the law should not erect barriers
such that serious journalism and opinions cannot be freely expressed and discussed
without fear of costly and complex litigation.
• Many claimants are rich and powerful. The media will often be unwilling to
publish stories which risk battles against such individuals and corporations.
• Defamation laws act as an important but controversial restriction on media
freedom. The operation of the law raises numerous obstacles for journalists in
performing their jobs and necessitates caution and restraint when writing.
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform
BARONESS HALE in Jameel
“We need much more serious journalism in this country and our defamation laws should
encourage it rather than discourage it”.

LORD DEVLIN in Lewis pointed out that journalists can, if skillful, avoid the wrath of
the law by successfully negotiating its minefield. This is not an acceptable position for
journalists to be in.

LORD HOFFMAN balanced libel laws are necessary “to deter the media from riding
roughshod over the rights of other citizens”

ROBERTSON AND NICOL

• “Truth and fiction remain as difficult to disentangle in the courtroom as in the
newsroom”
• Argue that before Jameel, the Reynolds defence was ‘a snare and an illusion’; a
snare because there were too many ‘hurdles’ to overcome; an illusion because the
defence was usually rejected by trial judges who had been brought up to believe
that qualified privilege was only available when there was a moral or legal duty to
publish. There is a point here: in its first seven years of availability, the defence
succeeded only twice.
• “There is nothing objectionable in principle that a person’s reputation should be
protected from falsehoods; problems arise because the practices and procedures of
libel law can also work to prevent the exposure of wrongdoing.”
• “Cases that come to trial are merely the tip of an iceberg that deepfreezes large
chunks of interesting news and comment.”
• “The lack of legal aid for libel defendants amounts to a serious failure in the
practical protection of free speech”.

AFIA
• “With press standards getting even lower, a certain degree of chill is derisible”.
(But is this restriction ever desirable!?).
o This is a dangerous conceptual error. The chilling effect should not be
equated with improving responsibility and standards of journalism other
than in very rare cases. The restrictive side of the chill is completely
negated. That is, serious investigative and other journalism is prevented
from publication due to an indirect restriction of freedom of expression.
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform
1. Establishment

a. What is defamation?

In principle, a claimant should be able to bring an action for allegations that infringe their
right to reputation. The ordinary reader test is not the same as the Clapham omnibus test.
The reader of an article concerning allegations of misconduct by a financier must be
considered in the context of the ordinary reader – an international businessman. The
courts have sculpted a test for when words are defamatory:

• Sim v Stretch
LORD ATKIN adopted the test of “would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the
estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?” Following this, it is not
defamatory to suggest that a person behaved with propriety (e.g. reporting a crime) even
if some may think less highly of him as a result.

• Byrne v Dean
The CofA upheld this principle in the case where a member of a golf club reported his
club for keeping illegal games machines on the premises which tended to lower his
reputation for other members but not members of society generally.

• Lewis v Daily Telegraph

LORD REID argued that the ‘ordinary person’ is a range but the court should consider
that an ordinary person would not jump to conclusions and would take a more measured
approach when reading the allegedly defamatory material.

• Hayward v Thompson
LORD DENNING MR took a more claimant-friendly approach than in Lewis. He argued
that the test ought to be what an ordinary person might consider on first reading.

• Charleston v News Group (Neighbours)

LORD NICHOLLS outlined that the law adopts a single standard for determining if
material is defamatory – that is, the ordinary meaning of the words. He did, however, that
this was a ‘crude yardstick’.

The context of the words is clearly of utmost importance and the mixture of fact and
opinion in the circumstances of the publication will have an effect on the decision of
whether or not the material was defamatory. So when the heads of celebrities are
superimposed on pornographic pictures, the otherwise offending content way has its
‘sting’ removed by a caption below or in the context of the article.
• Berkoff v Burchill
NEILL LJ in majority argued that the words – ‘hideously ugly’ - considered in context
may have a defamatory meaning for the actor.
MILLETT LJ in minority argued that the jury should draw the line between mockery and
defamation where it is in question and that this was a merely a cheap joke.
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform
The different outlooks of two learned judges on the same facts illustrate the uncertainty in
outcome of libel actions. The simple ordinary reader test has been overlain by giving trial
judges the ability to strike out meanings that they consider the words not reasonably
capable of bearing. The definition of what is libelous is not absolutely clear. This has
implications for the media in an area of law where certainty of protection from legal
action is of vital importance.

b. Who can sue in defamation?

Any legal person can sue.

• This includes natural and legal persons (ECHR protects this).
o This includes corporations. There is considerable debate over whether
companies should have identical rights and freedoms as people. Many
argue that libel actions should not be allowed because defamatory
allegations do not impact a company in the same way as a person.
o The McLibel scandal has led to calls to prevent corporations from bringing
libel actions due to the inequality of arms.
o In Australia, only companies of less than ten employees may bring libel
actions.
o HARTMANN, an American commentator maintains that legal personhood
should be restricted because corporations are have a disproportionate
effect on democracy by virtue of their free speech and donation rights.
o AFIA insists that there is a vital public interest in allowing corporations to
protect their reputation – primarily economic (e.g. employee morale).
o Citizen’s United 2010, US Supreme Court
The court decided to remove restrictions on legal personhood – thus
expanding its concept and allowing further corporate and union donations
through their newly extended free speech rights.

• Any British (or EU) citizen who has been libeled here.

• Any person who has a reputation in or established in the jurisdiction. This is the
forum non conveniens rule that to some extent reduces libel tourism.
o In Berezovsky LORD HOFFMAN warned against the English courts
acting as ‘globo-cop’ for libel cases in the digital age.
o The perceived problem of libel tourism
o The Roman Polanski saga;
o The Duke of Brunswick rule – that every copy of a publication is a new
tort is applied which has led to frivolous claims and international
condemnation of the practice.

• Since the Defamation Act 1996 an action may be brought immediately after the
cause of action and must be brought within one year.
o The Act also allows equitable claims to be brought out with the time
period.
o The Duke of Brunswick rule applies.
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform
o Prevents claims where the defendant was actually unaffected.

• Derbyshire C.C. v Times Newspapers

A democratically elected, indeed any, governmental body should be open to
uninhibited criticism and prevented from bringing libel actions.

• The dead cannot sue.

It is perhaps more important to consider who will sue. This is by and large restricted to
wealthy individuals, corporations, and individuals with union or other financial backing.
This is an influence in the ‘defamation game’ journalists are playing when they choose
their subject matter.

c. Who can be sued?

Anyone involved in the publication of a defamatory allegation may be sued. This

includes the source, author, editor, publisher, printer, transporter, distributer and retailer.

• This has been exploited by some claimants. Some may wish to focus on the
retailer who will usually be willing to remove the offending material whilst others
will focus on maximizing damages and therefore sue the wealthiest party.
• To protect unwitting parties from having to pay costs and damages, ‘innocent
dissemination’ is available as a defence un the Defamation Act 1996.
o List defined negatively: defence available to everyone who is not an
‘editor, author or publisher’.
o Despite the availability of a defence, liability is still a potential.
• The law balances the tensions here to protect circulation and thus free speech.

d. Identification requirements

Critically, the claimant must show that the defamatory allegations were made against
him.
• Where the claimant is unnamed, as in Morgan v Odhams, the questions ‘would
the ordinary person understand the allegations to refer to the claimant?’ The
claimant needs to show that some readers would understand the allegations in this
way.
• Intention is immaterial to identification. Hutton v Jones: even if the writer did not
intend to libel a particular person, intention is inferred from action and is not
relevant to an assessment of whether material is defamatory to the plaintiff.
o This means that writers and broadcasters must ensure specificity of subject
matter.
o Newstead highlighted how this rule cannot operate extremely harshly.
o From this rule, negligence is not required for liability. This is unfair on the
media because, even after extensive steps, liability may not be avoided.
Jameel developed a fault standard.
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform
• Knupffer: groups cannot sue to protect collective reputation e.g. ‘lawyers are
greedy’.
o Aiken exception. Where the circumstances in conjunction with the words
can be reasonably inferred to applying to the plaintiff there may be an
action.

3. Defences

a. The burden of proof

Under the current law there is a presumption that defamatory allegations made by the
defendant are false. This creates a situation in which the burden of proof is placed on the
claimant who must then raise justification, fair comment, or privilege defences. This
presumption has various implications but generally makes it more difficult for the
defendant to win. In turn, this has a chilling effect on freedom of speech.

The claimant must prove that the words that he complains of:
• Have a defamatory meaning (assumption is that they do*), refer to him and that D
was responsible for publication.
o Once these have been established, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendant.
The defendant must then convince the jury:
• That the words were true, the comment was honest or that the publication was
privileged or otherwise in the public interest.
o The standard of proof is ‘on the balance of probabilities’ and not ‘beyond
reasonable doubt’.

For realization of the aims of Article.10 and the protection of free speech the burden
could be reversed. This would be a simple but far-reaching reform. In every other civil
action the claimant must prove their case to be awarded damages.

*ROBERTSON & NICOL argue that this assumption is absurd.

b. The rule against prior restraint

Where the defendant intends to rely on the defence of public interest, the court will not
prevent publication of defamatory statements.

c. Justification: Truth as a Defence

Truth is a complete defence to a defamatory statement of fact. The whole publication

need not be entirely true, but the ‘sting’ of the publication must be ‘substantially’ true.
• s.5 Defamation Act 1952 sets out that justification will not fail if every charge
cannot be proven to be true. Even where baseless charges injure, accurate
criticisms may amount to partial justification.
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform
o So, calling a man a drunk-driver and a terrorist will not be defamatory if
the man is in fact a terrorist but will be defamatory if he is a drunk driver.
o The fact of a criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of its correctness.
• Repetition: the existence of a defamatory rumour is not a justification.

• Problems
o Although truth is a defence, proving this in court may prove impossible
due to available and admissible evidence e.g. dead witnesses.
o The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the allegations. This
undoubtedly allows for frivolous claims.
o The defence may not succeed despite the actual truth as a result of
evidential problems. This makes the cost of defence and justification even
more crippling for the defendant. The increased risk of failure increases
damages and costs.
o Most importantly, this all causes a chilling effect where true statements are
not published and, if they are, soon become apologies rather than
defences.
• Do the problems matter?
o The defendant may rely upon facts that emerge after publication to prove
truth.
o The claimant must make all documents that are in dispute available the
defendant. Indeed, an ‘order for discovery’ will often stop a claimant in
his tracks.
o A claimant will often buckle under cross-examination.

d. Fair comment: Honest belief as a Defence

Expressions of honestly held opinion based in fact on any matter of public interest, no
matter how unfair or exaggerated but not actuated in malice, may be protected. The
question for the court is ‘could the views be honestly held on the facts available at the
time?’
• The defence relates only to statements of opinion and not of fact.
o ROBERTSON & NICOL describe this as “the most important and the
most difficult distinction in the entire law of libel”.
• A defamatory statement of fact must be justified whereas a defamatory statement
of opinion needs only to be made honestly.
o There is clearly a difficulty in distinguishing facts and opinions where
they are jumbled together. The context is assessed and the ordinary reader
rule applied, but this is by no means hard-and-fast nor is it certain.
§ Does this uncertainty inhibit free comment and make journalists
vulnerable?
§ Telnikoff: letters to the editor of a newspaper were not protected.
Reynolds would now be available here but surely the defence of
fair comment is too narrow.
• The opinion must be based upon a factual basis which should be clearly stated.
o Not applicable for dishonestly held statements of fact.
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform
• Satire and Mere Abuse allowed under fair comment.

e. Absolute Privilege

For certain people in certain circumstances, their defamatory publication will not be
actionable for public policy reasons. It is immaterial whether the publication was made in
malice. If absolute privilege did not exist, persons with a public duty to speak out (such
as MPs) may be threatened by vexatious libel actions.
Ø In Parliament.
Ø In open court.
Ø For reports on court proceedings (s.14 DA 96).
Ø For reports on international conferences.
Ø Discussions on matters of State from armed service
officers, senior civil servants etc.

f. Qualified Privilege and Public Interest

Publications made out of a moral or legal duty (e.g. references) or in the public interest
(e.g. reporting) will be protected, provided they are not actuated in malice (legal-
dishonesty and reckless disregard towards the truth or actual- spite or desire for personal
profit).

It was not until Jameel that the archaic language of ‘privilege’ was shed to allow ‘public
interest’. Public interest came from qualified privilege because it was the only avenue
offered by the common law in the absence of legislative reform. Why the change?
• New judges
• Academic criticism
• US non-enforcement in part due to lack of public interest defence
• Article 10 ECHR under Human Rights Act 1998
o Libel is a restriction that has to be justified.

• Reynolds was intended to be a qualified privilege defence for high quality

investigative journalism in the circumstances where justification was made
impossible. However, it did not usher the era that the media had hope for. Lord
Nicol’s ten indicia to be used to determine ‘responsible journalism’ were
interpreted as ten hurdles by trial judges.
1. Gravity (of allegation)
2. Public Interest
3. Sources (independent/other motive etc)
4. Verification (steps taken to verify)
5. Status (is there an ongoing investigation?)
6. Urgency (e.g. food scare – NOT printing deadline)
7. Comment (of accused subject)
8. Gist (publish the subject’s side)
9. Tone (sensational/neutral)
10. Circumstance
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform

• Jameel reinvigorated the Reynolds defence and recasts the criteria. ROBERTSON
& NICOL describe the case as the most important making freedom of expression
a constitutional right closer to that enjoyed in the US. It was intended to promote
investigate journalism and not tabloid journalism. Gaddafi allows for the use of
Jameel where sources must be kept confidential but the need to convince the jury
of an anonymous source can prove difficult.
• It explicitly allowed public interest as a defence and indeed the defence now
hinges on this rather than responsible journalism. There was concern that exactly
the type of investigative journalism that Reynolds was created to protect was
being carried out by the WSJ but it was not adequately protected. The court must
proceed in this way:
1. Public interest of material
§ As a whole. The judge has no power to add a moral/legal duty to
publish.
2. Inclusion of the defamatory statement
§ Justifiable if it makes a real contribution to the public interest
element.
3. Responsible journalism
§ Were the steps taken to investigate and publish fair?
LORD NICHOLLS in Bonnick v Morris
“Responsible journalism is the point at which a fair balance is held
between freedom of expression on matters of public concern and
the reputation of individuals”.
§ The Reynolds list is still relevant but not decisive; the lack of one
of the factors does not necessarily deprive a defendant of the
public interest defence.

g. Other Defences
i. Consent

People can –and often do- consent to be defamed, often for large sums of money. This is
a complete defence. Defamation is strict liability and so, unlike in the US, contributory
negligence is not available.

ii. Offer of Amends

The Defamation Act 1996 allows for this remedy by correction and/or compensation as
agreed. If the claimant refuses a proposed offer, D may run this statutory defence
(provided it is the only defence run). To rebut the defence, the claimant must prove
malice in publication.

iii. Post-publication responsibility – Not available

This concerns the prompt acknowledgment of mistake and/or apology by the defendant.
This factor is not included in the Reynolds list. It is more in line with ECtHR
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform
jurisprudence that views reputation over a period of time rather than the artificial English
‘moment of publication’ test.

The introduction of this as a defence or merely the support of such practices by the courts
would be in the interest of all parties. It would reduce litigation, enhance freedom of
speech and protect the reputation of claimants without the need for trial. Greater regard
for post-publication responsibility would prevent belligerent claimants from ignoring the
actions of defendants post-publication.

iv. Right of Reply

Adam v Ward: publishing a reply to an attack in an newspaper exempts the publisher.

4. Reforms

a. Current problems

Defamation is the only area of tort in which negligence is not the basis of liability. It is
questionable why this should be permitted and whether it is just. It shows a great
disparity between the protection of free speech and reputation. Negligence would be an
acceptable form of liability but would require public figures to put with stories they know
to be false yet cannot immediately refute.

Courts muse ensure that other remedies (such as correction) are available for victims of
false statements protected by Jameel (for which the recovery of damages is barred).

The costs of litigation are far too high for both sides.
• An average fortnight-long trial can easily cost each side well in excess of £1
million, in addition to damages and fee recovery if unsuccessful.
• This deters all but wealthy claimants from bringing actions.
o The alternative – the PCC – is not sufficient.
• Costs mean that free speech becomes too expensive.
• CFAs have not proved a sensible way forward:
o ‘No win, no fee’ and success fees encourage belligerent lawyers.
o Added costs on media organizations to protect their freedoms.
o CFAs have been exploited by the rich to double costs for the defendant.
For example, Campbell won £3500 damages but racked up £280,000 in
costs which was doubled by a success fee.
• Fee and damages structures mean that the outcome of cases often has more to do
with cost-risk analysis than legal justice. The law should not amount to a game
that effectively involves elaborate bluffing and gambling to the detriment of truth
and justice.

ROBERTSON AND NICOL argue that the best way forward is to abolish CFAs and
instead award legal aid for deserving cases.
 Defamation
Establishment, Defence, and Reform

b. Lord Lester’s Bill: the new Defamation Act

The Act would:

• Abolish the Duke of Brunswick rule of individual publication.
• Abolish the defendant’s burden of proof. Instead, the claimant will have to prove
‘substantial harm’ in line with the rest of civil law.
o BUTTERWORTH has highlighted the significance of this and praises the
direction of the Act generally (not surprising for a Guardian journalist).
She does, however, criticize the lack of the need for corporations to prove
substantial financial loss.
o AFIA (a Schillings defence lawyer…) is critical of the need to prove
substantial harm, arguing that it will create new ‘satellite layers of
litigation’ and lower journalistic standards.
§ Insists that the current law is not onerous on the defendant.
• Abolish the presumption of a jury. Instead the presumption will be against jury
trials.
o BUTTERWORTH critical of this.
• Introduce statutory defences including a public interest defence which would
allow the false or inaccurate reporting on a matter of PI if the journalist had taken
reasonable steps at verifying it.
o AFIA defends the flexibility available in Reynolds although fails to
appreciate that the statute be interpreted relatively widely as well.
o Allows for greater certainty for journalists and enhances FOE.
§ AFIA, in contrast, insists that a new Act would usher in
uncertainty for all parties, unsure of the operation of the new law.
• Make libel tourism more difficult
o AFIA argues this isn’t a problem
AFIA
o Neither freedom of expression or reputation has a ‘presumptive pre-
eminence’ in English law nor is there any reason to move towards one.
(Although it must be said that reputation is disproportionately favoured by
the mechanisms of the law).
o Maintains that the new Act is a “dangerous threat” to the ability of the
public to defend their reputations from unwarranted attacks and that “it is
vital that the public are able to correct false information published by the
media”.
o Argues the Act is threatening to sweep away decades of carefully
constructed case law (which even the law lords in Jameel insisted was too
rigid for reform thus forcing through public interest with qualified
privilege).
o Warns that the “public would undoubtedly suffer” from the implications of
the Act.
o No need for the Act; the current law is fine and all the recent changes have
been in favour of the media.
Defamation  
Meaning  of  Defamatory  
- No  exhaustive  definition  coming  from  the  case  law.  
Ø Arguably  the  function  of  the  Judiciary  is  to  enunciate  principles.  Much  that  they  say  
is  illustrative  not  definitive.  
- Working  description:  A  statement  which  injures  the  reputation  of  another  by  exposing  
him  to  hatred,  contempt  or  ridicule  which  tends  to  lower  him  in  the  esteem  of  right  
thinking  members  of  society.  
- Strict  Liability  in  a  sense:  Cassidy  v  DM:  “Liability  does  not  depend  on  the  intention  of  
the  defamer,  but  the  fact  of  defamation”  
- It  appears  a  matter  of  construction  to  be  construed  objectively  with  reference  to  ‘right  
thinking  members  of  society’  
- Test  of  Defamation  is  that  of  right  thinking  people  generally.  

CASE:  Byrne  v  Deane:  Gambling  machines  (illegal)  removed  by  police.  Poem  left  on  notice  
board  of  pub  insinuating  it  was  B’s  fault.  
HELD:  ‘A  good  and  worthy  subject  of  the  king’  would  not  regard  written  about  as  being  law  
abiding  to  be  defamatory.  It  was  the  general  opinion  of  people,  not  just  the  specific  group  of  
the  patrons  of  the  pub.  

CASE:  Berkoff  v  Burchill  (1996):  Berkoff  described  as  ‘hideously  ugly’  in  a  review.  
HELD:  These  words  could  be  defamatory  and  it  was  up  to  the  courts  to  decide.  
-­‐  This  judgment  places  excessive  limitations  on  desired  ability  to  poke  fun  at  one  another.  
-­‐  The  continuing  role  of  this  case  must  be  questioned  due  to  1)  The  diminishing  role  of  juries  
and  2)  The  great  importance  ECHR  gives  to  free  speech.  

CASE:  Norman  v  Future:  Distinguishes  Berkoff  by  differentiating  between  ‘mere  insults’  and  
words  used  deliberately  to  ‘mock  and  ridicule’  the  claimant.  

Libel/Slander  
- Libel  =  a  statement  in  a  ‘permanent  form’  and  visible.  
- Slander  =  temporary  and  audible.  
- Filmed  and  Recorded  material?  

CASE:  Youssopoff  v  MGM:  Russian  princess  sues  after  film  insinuated  Rasputin  had  seduced  
her.  
HELD:  Suggests  a  visual  element  must  exist  for  libel.  

S1  Defamation  Act  1952:  Broadcasting,  radio,  T.V  and  theatre  all  =  permanent  form.  

- The  faulks  committee  recommended  removing  the  distinction,  reasoning  the  law  would  
be  no  worse  off  in  their  absence.  
- Libel  =  A  tort  and  a  crime  and  is  actionable  ‘per  se’  
- Slander  =  Just  tort  and  needs  proof  of  ‘special  damage’   William 19/5/10 11:18
Comment [1]: I.e.  Once  established,  the  
Defamation:  Elements  of  liability   damages  will  be  presumed  
William 19/5/10 11:20
Allegation  must  be  defamatory   Comment [2]: A  material  loss  capable  of  
estimation  in  money.  Although  some  may  be  
- ‘mere  abuse’  in  a  fit  of  temper  –  Not  defamatory.  Not  intended  to  injure  C.   awarded  ‘per  se’  if  obvious  financial  loss  or  
intrinsically  outrageous.  
- Doubtful  that  written  words  will  ever  be  dismissed  as  ‘mere  abuse’.  
- Words  may  be  innocuous,  but  can  paint  a  ‘general  picture’  

CASE:  Liberace  v  DM:  Phrases  such  as  ‘fruit  flavoured’  were  capable  of  being  construed  in  a  
normal  sense  as  meaning  he  was  gay.  
HELD:  Jury  agreed  these  were  defamatory  statements.  

- Search  for  the  meaning  that  words  would  convey  to  the  ordinary  man,  ultimately  what  
the  jurors  think.  

CASE:  Charleston  v  NGN:  Defamatory  pics  could  not  be  viewed  isolation  of  the  article  as  a  
whole.  When  they  were  viewed  in  context  it  was  clear  that  the  article  was  not  defamatory.  
-­‐  Is  this  a  licence  to  print  sensational  reporting  which  is  subtly  corrected  in  the  text?  

Innuendo  

CASE:  Tolley  v  Fry:  Amateur  golfer  on  poster  with  caddy  comparing  his  ability  to  D’s  
chocolate.  
HELD:  Successful  claim  that  there  was  an  innuendo  that  he  had  consented  to  advertisement  
and  prostituted  his  reputation  as  an  amateur  golfer.  

CASE:  Cassidy  v  DM:  DM  publish  pic  of  C  and  Mrs  X,  saying  they  are  soon  to  be  wed,  
unknowing  of  the  fact  he  was  already  married  and  soon  to  be  separated.  
HELD:  Immaterial  that  D  does  not  know  of  facts  turning  an  innocent  statement  into  a  
defamatory  one.  Mrs  C  brings  a  successful  action  that  there  is  innuendo  that,  as  they  
published  he  was  unmarried,  that  she  was  his  mistress.  

- ‘Falso  Innuendo’  –  An  elaboration  or  embroidering  of  the  words  used  without  proof  of  
extraneous  facts.  

Lewis  v  Daily  Telegraph:  DT  publishes  that  L  was  having  his  affairs  looked  into  by  Scotland  
yard.  L  claims  the  words  could  be  understood  as  meaning  he  was  guilty  of  fraud.  
HELD:  (HL):  The  defamatory  meaning  would  only  be  apparent  to  readers  with  special  and  
additional  knowledge  of  the  question.  Being  investigated  for  fraud  was  not  the  same  of  
being  guilty  of  fraud.  The  ordinary  man  would  not  infer  guilt  from  this  statement.  

Defamatory  statement  must  refer  to  the  claimant  

- If  a  statement  does  not  refer  to  a  C,  but  a  subsequent  one  sheds  light  on  the  first  then  it  
may  be  taken  into  account.  
- Identification  depends  on  whether  a  reasonable  person  would  realise  the  words  
referred  to  C.  
Ø The  ‘ordinary  man’  –  Takes  into  account  loose  thinking  and  a  tendency  to  skim  read.  

CASE:  Morgan  v  Odhams:  Article  about  a  ‘kidnapping’  of  witness  described  C’s  house  in  
being  in  Finchley.  He  argues  that  friends  would  impute  his  involvement  from  that.  
HELD  (CA):  Claim  dismissed.  It  was  not  a  specific  pointer  to  C  and  unlikely  that  a  reasonable  
man  would  read  it  that  carefully.  ‘An  ordinary  man  was  not  expected  to  analyse  an  article  
like  a  fellow  of  all  souls’  
HELD  (HL):  Overturns:  The  ordinary  sensible  man  with  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  
would  see  it  was  C  and  therefore  the  decision  should  be  left  to  the  jury.  There  is  not  a  
requirement  for  a  specific  pointer.  

Unintentional  Defamation  
CASE:  Newstead  v  London  Express:  Article  talks  about  37  y/o  Harold  Newstead  from  
Camberwell  convicted  of  burglary.  Someone  of  the  same  age  from  Camberwell  of  a  similar  
age  sued  for  defamation.  
HELD:  The  words  were  capable  of  being  understood  to  refer  to  him,  therefore  damages  
awarded.  

CASE:  Hulton  v  Jones:  Made  up  story  featuring  fictional  character  ‘Artemus  Jones’.  Real  life  
AJ  wasn’t  like  character,  but  did  write  occasional  articles  for  the  publication.  Successful  claim  
for  libel.  

Defamation  of  a  class  

CASE:  Knuffer  v  London  Express:  D  published  article  referring  to  Young  Russian  Party,  having  
a  British  division  consisting  of  24  members.  Claim  brought  by  one  of  the  members.  
HELD:  Rejected.  HL  hold  statement  must  a)  be  capable  of  referring  to  C  b)  was  in  fact  
understood  to  refer  to  him  (the  size  of  a  class  can  alter  this).  

Legal  Persons?  

South  Hetton  Coal  v  NE  News:  A  trading  &  company  can  sure  for  defamation  affecting  its  
buisness/trading  reputation.  But:  
1)  No  right  to  sue  for  statements  directed  at  specific  employees.  
2)  Damages  should  only  be  modest  (Jameel)  

Non-­‐trading  Entities?  Councils  etc:  

CASE:  Derby  CC  v  Times  (1993):  Held  to  allow  such  actions  would  serve  to  hinder  citizens  
criticisms.  
-­‐  It  is  contrary  to  the  public  interest  to  allow  such  claims  as  it  would  fetter  freedom  of  
speech.  A  signal  that  the  courts  are  stepping  toward  facilitation  of  free  speech?  

Publication  
- Communicating  just  to  a  C  alone  is  insufficient,  3rd  parties  must  also  be  concerned.  One  
other  person  will  suffice  to  bring  action  

3rd  Parties?  

- An  original  publisher  is  not  liable  for  damage  from  republication  done  by  the  voluntary  
act  of  a  3rd  party  over  whom  he  has  no  control.  

CASE:  McManus  v  Beckham:  V.B  is  quoted  in  papers  as  saying  the  photos  in  C’s  shop  were  
fakes.  
HELD:  Test  is  would  a  reasonable  person  in  D’s  shoes  realise  their  slander  is  likely  to  be  
repeated/reported.  

- Every  fresh  publication  gives  a  fresh  cause  of  action  against  each  publisher  (same  on  the  
internet).  
Ø Mechanical  Distributors  are  also  liable.  

CASE:  Vizelly  v  Mudie:  Library  held  liable  for  allowing  widthdrawal  of  books  they  knew  
contained  libellous  material.  Can  be  defended  by  no  knowledge  /  negligence  in  distribution.  

Defamation  Act:  Gives  a  defence  to  distributors  who  can  show  reasonable  care  and  that  they  
did  not  know.  
CASE:  Godfrey  v  Demon:  ISP’s  can  be  liable  for  publication  of  defamatory  material  stored  on  
their  servers.  Defences  were  not  available  as  the  relevant  statements  had  been  brought  to  
their  attention  and  took  2  weeks  to  remove.  

Defences  
Unintentional  Defamation  

- As  shown  not  a  defence  that  D  was  unaware  what  he  was  saying  was  defamatory.  
- The  combination  of  Hulton  and  Morgan  adding  a  ‘terror  to  authorship’?  
Ø Leads  to  reform  
- S4  Defamation  Act:  D  can  make  ‘offer  to  amends’  for  innocent  defamation.  
Ø If  this  is  accepted  it  is  the  end  of  dispute  and  subsequent  litigation.  
Ø If  rejected,  it  can  provide  a  defence  in  subsequent  litigation.  
- S  2-­‐4  Defamation  Act  1996:  Adds  that  the  offer  must  be  supplemented  by  a  monetary  
comp  and  has  no  time  limit.  

Consent  

Chapman  v  Lord  Ellesmere:  Obvious:  

Justification  

- Once  C  proves  defamation  it  is  assumed  that  statements  made  are  untrue.  
Ø Burden  is  on  D  to  show  they  are  true.  
- There  is  no  duty  not  to  publish  injurous  statements  which  are  true.  
- Therefore  a  successful  claimant,  while  getting  damages,  never  in  truth  clears  his  name,  it  
just  means  D  couldn’t  prove  it  to  be  true.  
Ø Inhibitory  of  free  speech  which  is  true  but  unprovable.  
- Several  defamatory  allegations  with  a  ‘common  sting’?  

CASE:  Kashoggi  v  IPC:  Article  lists  lovers  of  K  over  the  years  and  suggests  she  is  of  
considerable  sexual  enthusiasm.  She  objected  to  one  name  in  particular.  
HELD:  If  D  can  prove  the  ‘common  sting’  of  the  allegations  as  a  whole  are  true,  but  not  the  
particular  facts  of  a  single  incident,  justification  is  a  valid  defence.  The  ‘common  sting’  that  
she  was  promiscuous  was  justified.  

- ‘Spent  Convictions’  –  Those  where  enough  time  has  passed  so  that  they  should  be  
treated  as  if  it  didn’t  happen  for  rehabilitation  etc.  
Ø Is  there  the  defence  of  justification  for  mentioning  these  as  long  as  it’s  without  
malice?  

CASE:  Loughans  v  Odams:  Referred  to  as  an  ‘Aquitted  Muderer’.  Justified  as  it  was  provable  
on  the  civil  standard  but  not  criminal.  

Fair  Comment  

- Judge  must  decide  whether  it  is  in  the  ‘public  interest’  and  the  jury  to  decide  whether  it  
is  fact  or  opinion  (&  if  the  latter,  whether  the  opinion  is  honest  and  fair)  
- Malice  defeats  this  defence.  

Public  Interest:  

CASE:  London  Artists  v  Littler:  Public  was  legitimately  interested.  4  actors  give  in  notice  at  
the  same  time,  article  by  the  manager  alleged  this  was  a  plot  to  bring  him  down.  
HELD:  Damages  awarded.  ‘Fair  Comment’  supposes  correct  basic  facts  from  which  
comments  are  based.  The  facts  were  not  present  in  this  case  so  the  defence  was  not  
available.  

- If  it  is  a  matter  in  public  interest,  everyone  is  allowed  to  make  fair  comment.  
Ø It  is  in  the  ‘public  interest’  if  it  effects  people  at  little  or  large  so  that  they  may  be  
legitimately  interested  in  it.  

True:  

- Comment  must  be  on  true  facts  or  privilege  

CASE:  Kemsley  v  Foot:  Article  ‘lower  than  kemsley’  published.  

HELD:  ‘Fair  Comment’  as  they  facts  of  the  conduct  of  Kemsley  were  the  facts  upon  which  the  
comment  was  made.  

Fairness:  

- Comment  must  be  one  that  an  honest  minded  person  could  make  on  the  facts.  
- Telnikoff:  Fairness  is  to  be  judged  objectively.  If  proved,  it  is  presumed  to  be  honestly  
held  unless  C  can  prove  malice.  

Malice:  

CASE:  Branson  v  Bower:  Must  show  D  did  not  genuinely  believe  the  opinion  he  expressed.  
Requirement  of  improper  motive  removed.  

Privilege  

- Freedom  of  speech  is  sometimes  so  important  that  sometimes  complete  immunity  is  
given  even  if  untrue/malicious.  
- 3  categories  of  privilege  –  Parliamentary,  judicial  and  Executive.  
- Parliamentary:  Bill  of  rights  Art  9:  No  defamation  proceedings  can  arise  out  of  what  is  
said  in  parliament.  Can  be  waived  
- Judicial:  Any  statements  made  by  a  judge,  jury,  advocates  etc  in  any  judicial  proceedings.  
- Executive:  Statements  made  by  an  organ  of  the  state  in  the  course  of  duty.  

Qualified  Privilege  

- Different  from  absolute  as  it  is  the  communication  that  contains  the  statement  which  is  
privileged,  not  the  occasion  on  which  it  was  made.  
- Exists  for  the  common  convenience  and  welfare  of  society.  
- To  succeed  it  has  to  be  a  legal,  moral  or  social  duty  to  make  the  statement  and  there  has  
to  be  an  interest  in  receiving  it.      
a) Matters  of  Public  Interest  
a. Idea  that  advantages  of  such  publicity  outweigh  the  possible  injury  to  C’s  
reputation.  
b. Includes  fair  and  accurate  reports  of  P  /  Judicial  proceedings  
i. Cannot  be  extended  or  abstracted.  
b) Matters  of  interest  to  publisher  
a. Such  self  defence  against  written/verbal  attacks  from  another  source.  
b. They  cannot  be  malicious,  and  cannot  go  further  than  defending  to  
attacking.  
c) Matters  of  interest  to  others  
a. Character  references  etc.  
 b. A  legal/moral/social  duty  to  inform?  
d) Common  Interest  
a. Where  the  parties  have  an  interest  in  a  statement  about  the  claimant.  
b. I.e.  An  employer  &  employees  have  an  interest  in  why  someone  may  have  
been  dismissed.  
e) Journalistic  Privilege:  Reynolds  Breakthrough  
- Until  Reynolds,  privilege  was  of  little  use  to  the  media  as  publication  was  made  to  world  
at  large,  not  a  specific  person.  A  type  of  privilege  that  discarded  the  ‘reciprocal  
duty’/interest  test  needed  to  be  established  to  aid  the  press.  

CASE:  Reynolds  v  Times  Newspapers:  Mr  R  resigned  as  PM  of  Ireland  amid  a  political  crisis.  
The  reasons  why  were  of  public  significance.  Times  publishes  2  articles,  one  in  world  section  
on  mainland  UK  and  one  in  Ireland  concerning  the  fail  of  govt.  R  takes  an  exception  the  
claims  he  misled  parliament.  Key  issues:  The  meaning  of  the  article,  the  defence  of  qualified  
privilege  at  common  law,  malice  and  damages.  
HELD  (CA):  Bingham  creates  a  third  limb  of  the  reciprocal  interest/duty  test  called  the  
‘circumstantial  test’  –  It  is  the  nature,  status  and  source  of  the  material  and  circumstances  of  
publication  such  that  publication  should  be  in  the  public  interest?  They  rejected  that  this  
was  satisfied,  but  set  the  ball  rolling  for  freedom  of  expression  onto  the  HL.  
HELD  (HL):  Starting  point  is  freedom  of  expression  to  disseminate  and  receive  information  of  
a  political  matter.  It  is  the  regulation  upon  it  which  requires  justification,  not  the  other  way  
round.  Nicholls  rejects  Bingham’s  test,  and  instead  creates  a  10  step  list  of  factors  relevant  in  
determining  when  test  is  satisfied.  
-­‐  Thus  QP  is  decided  on  a  case  by  case  basis  taking  these  factors  into  account.  

- Didn’t  mark  out  a  ‘political  information’  category  which  always  attracts  qp  nor  said  that  
freedom  of  expression  should  always  prevail.  Some  commentators  have  been  
disappointed  by  this.  
- The  10  step  list  was  seen  to  create  too  many  hurdles  making  availability  of  QP  
unpredictable  and  therefore  having  a  chilling  effect  on  free  expression.  
Ø But  these  burdens  mean  that  the  press  must  satisfy  a  reasonable  standard  and  
responsible  journalism  is  encouraged.  
- The  10  stage  test  is  corrected  in…  

CASE:  Jameel  v  Wall  St  Journal:  WSJ  reported  that  accounts  of  J  were  being  monitored  for  
links  to  terrorism.  Verification  and  attempts  to  get  J’s  response  not  v.extensive  before  
publication.  
HELD:  Lords  revisit  the  Reynolds  test.  Lords  stress  that  they  are  not  ‘tests’  or  ‘hurdles’  but  
simply  a  list  of  10  exhaustive  matters  which  should  be  taken  into  account.  The  more  serious  
the  allegation,  the  more  important  it  is  that  it  should  make  a  real  contribution  to  the  public  
interest.  It  was  necessary  to  include  names  in  this  case.  
-­‐  Hoffman:  This  defence  is  a  different  jurisprudential  creature  from  traditional  privilege  from  
which  it  sprang,  hence  should  be  given  the  name  the  ‘Reynolds  Public  Interest  defence’.  
Disputed  material  must  present  a  public  interest,  then  the  enquiry  should  move  on  to  
whether  the  steps  taken  to  get  the  information  were  fair.  
-­‐  It  is  now  well  established  that  anyone  can  exercise  their  rights  to  free  speech  without  
having  the  traditional  form  of  ‘duty  to  impart  information’.  
-­‐  RPI  defence  is  available  to  anyone  publishing  material  of  public  interest  subject  to  req’s  of  
responsible  publication.  
-­‐  Main  impact  of  this  case  is  that  rather  than  painting  the  Reynolds  test  as  ‘blanket  
statement  of  hurdles’  they  were  seen  as  an  example.  This  frees  journalism  from  the  ‘chilling  
effects  of  libel  law’.  
Jameel’s  3  part  test:  

1) Court  must  ask  is  it  in  pub  interest?  Must  look  at  article  as  a  whole,  not  just  the  
statement.  Jameel  was  a  serious  contribution  to  public  interest  (post  9/11).  
a. Hale:  Cannot  be  ‘vapid  tittle  tattle’,  must  be  ‘in  the  public  interest,  not  just  
interesting  to  the  public’.  
2) Was  the  inclusion  of  the  defamatory  content  justifiable?  For  J  the  names  of  the  
businessmen  being  in  the  article  was  justifiable.  Allows  ‘editorial  judgment’  on  this.  
a. Here  Jameel  does  what  Reynolds  intended  to  do  –  Gives  much  more  
freedom  to  press  in  their  reporting  of  stories.  
b. There  is  a  ‘margin  of  appreciation’  to  the  media  in  presenting  a  particular  
story.  
c. Elevates  the  right  to  freedom  of  speech.  
3) Court  then  analyses  whether  the  publication  was  ‘responsible  and  fair’  
a. Did  they  take  the  care  that  a  ‘reasonable  publisher’  would?  
b. Galloway  Case:  It’s  important  to  verify  the  story  and  give  C  a  chance  to  
comment.  
- It’s  the  application  of  the  Reynolds  factors,  but  in  a  more  flexible  way.  
Ø WSJ  had  verified  and  looking  to  him  for  comment  was  troublesome  due  to  nature  of  
secret  gov’t  information  involved.  
Ø HL  had  said  CA  had  denied  Reynolds  on  a  very  narrow  ground  and  had  undermined  
it’s  liberalising  intention.  WSJ  had  clearly  satisfied  ‘reasonable  journalism’.  
Ø Defamation  should  ENCOURAGE  SERIOUS  JOURNALISM.