S U M M A R Y R E P O R T

A N I P I E C A W O R K S H O P
London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008

Climate Change and Energy

to 2020 and onwards

Introduction
O ver the coming decades, energy
demand will grow significantly,
requiring large investments in energy and
strong improvement in energy efficiency,
all while managing risks associated with
greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation and
changes in climate and associated
adaptation. Policies that aim at significant
reductions in GHG emissions by 2020
would imply drastic changes in the supply
and use of energy—with different changes
in different regions—and raise critical
questions for industry.
This IPIECA-organized workshop brought
together experts from academia, business,
governments, and international and non-
governmental organizations to consider
the outlook for GHG emissions and
climate over the coming decades, and
policies being developed and
implemented over this time frame, and to
explore strategies and best practice for
managing risks.
The workshop and this publication are
part of an ongoing effort by IPIECA and
its members to raise understanding and
provide constructive input on key climate
change issues. The workshop presentations
are available for download from the
IPIECA website (www.ipieca.org) along
with all the publications in the IPIECA
climate change workshop series (see back
cover for list of titles).
ii
Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards
Executive Summary
E fforts to reconcile society’s growing demand for
energy while promoting efforts to mitigate the
risks relating to climate change pose a
fundamental challenge. Large investments are
needed to maintain energy supply and satisfy
energy demand in a world of strong economic
growth (punctuated by recessions) and with vastly
differing circumstances and priorities. Limiting
GHG emissions while satisfying energy demand
entails even larger investments over decades. Over
the next decade, actions aimed at managing the
risks of climate change are focused on a wide
range of policies to reduce GHG emissions, with
an emerging focus on adapting to climate change.
These actions will result in an experience base for
managing climate change risks, and will form a
basis for investment decisions that need to be
made to satisfy energy demand.
The reduction of energy demand has the largest
potential for the near-term reduction of carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions associated with energy
use. Demand reduction can result from more
efficient use of energy, choices to use energy for
different purposes, or simply doing without energy
services—commonly considered an undesirable
outcome. Energy end use and buildings present
significant technical potential for improvements;
however, there are numerous barriers to be
overcome to make these improvements a reality.
Industry has been able to continuously improve its
efficiency through energy management systems
that identify opportunities for economic
improvements, and avoid barriers to their
implementation. Cogeneration offers further
improvements in system efficiency, but can
sometimes face barriers when supplying electricity
beyond the plant gates. Improvements in efficiency
are essential to continue the decreasing trend in
energy intensity, and acceleration of improvements
would be needed if this trend is to be steeper.
Over the next few decades, climate variability
and change is expected to proceed irrespective
IPIECA Workshop, London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008
of efforts to mitigate GHG emissions. Adaptation
strategies that reduce vulnerability to a host of
risks, including those from climate change, may
hold particular promise. Adaptation includes any
action, public or private, planned or spontane-
ous, in anticipation and in response, to reduce
the negative impacts of climate change and
make the most of the positive impacts.
Adaptation actions are best taken by those who
actually manage climate-sensitive resources and
operations. Given the deep uncertainty about
many of the specific impacts of climate change,
improving the robustness and flexibility of
infrastructure and increasing our ability to adapt
(‘adaptive capacity’) may be an appropriate
strategy. Governments do have roles in
improving adaptive capacity; however, the
effectiveness of government actions may be
limited because, in many cases, the government
is not the resource manager. Further, adaptation
will require the contributions of the private sector
in any long-term planning context in both
resources and infrastructure.
Policies that aim at significant reductions in GHG
emissions by 2020 would imply drastic changes
in the supply and use of energy. The effects of
such policies hinge on their impacts on the
decisions that are continually being made—
ranging from the preferences of individuals to the
investments of firms. Ultimately, reducing GHG
emissions from energy supply will involve
thousands of multi-billion dollar investment
decisions; given the large risk of such investment,
these decisions are not being made at this time. A
wide range of imminent policies—differing from
region to region—seek to reduce GHG emissions
while also avoiding competitive distortions and
distributional effects.
Near-term actions alone cannot address the long-
term, global challenges and risks of climate
change. Addressing them effectively requires
actions and policy frameworks that:
● promote the more rapid dissemination and use of
efficient, existing commercial technology in both
developed and developing countries;
● encourage the development and widespread
global use of innovative, currently non-
commercial technologies; and
● enhance the ability of all countries to acquire and
utilize advanced technologies.
Analyses of stabilization pathways rely on carbon
capture and storage (CCS), bioenergy and nuclear
power to make major contributions to mitigation, in
addition to improvements in energy efficiency.
While each of these currently faces opposition to
large-scale deployment, removing any one of these
options leads to a marked increase (e.g. doubling)
of the overall cost of mitigation in model studies.
Analyses of stabilization also rely on global
participation to accomplish mitigation; without
global participation, the cost of mitigation is higher
and can be infeasible for low stabilization levels.
Keeping technology options open, generating
new technology options, and maintaining a
pathway to global participation are each
important in moving from short-term policies to
long-term objectives.
There are significant gaps between the realities of
energy demand and supply, and society’s
expectations of deep reductions in GHG emissions.
Targets such as stabilization at 450 ppm or
reductions in GHG emissions of 50 per cent by
2050 would entail a revolution in energy supply
and use. Such a revolution has not been
demonstrated in the historic context, and it is not
apparent in current statistics of energy research
and development (R&D) nor trends in energy use
and society’s expectations. The public generally
believes that deep reductions in emissions can be
achieved at low cost using technologies in use
today—this is inconsistent with economic analyses.
A much broader dialogue by society, and by
business, is needed if society is to manage climate
risk in an effective, efficient and equitable way.
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 Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards

Energy and emissions outlook

Efforts to reconcile society’s growing demand for energy while promoting efforts to
mitigate the risk of climate change pose a fundamental challenge.

World energy demand is predicted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) to grow
by more than 50 per cent in the next 25 years, with coal use rising more than any
other form of primary energy in absolute terms. In this projection, oil supply and
demand remain tight in the next decade, with a projected gap opening up in supply
and demand of 12.5 million barrels per day by 2015. And China and India are
likely to account for more than 40 per cent of that increased demand, and more than
60 per cent of the increase in carbon dioxide emissions to 2030. The likely scale of
technology deployment needed to manage or reduce these emissions is massive.

In the IEA’s Baseline scenario1 energy outlook, global CO2 emissions will increase
from 27 Gt CO2 in 2005 to 42 Gt CO2 by 2030. In contrast, in the IEA’s BLUE Map
scenario, emissions fall to 23 Gt CO2 by 2030. The IEA estimates its BLUE Map
scenario is on a path towards CO2 stabilization at 450 ppm (parts per million) CO2
and would lower the risk that the global temperature increase would exceed a 2˚ C
rise. In order to satisfy energy demand whilst limiting GHG emissions under this
scenario, massive amounts of low-carbon generation capacity would need to be
added every year through to 2030 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Average annual power generation capacity additions in the 450 ppm stabilization case,
2013–2030 (Note: these additions are the annual totals that have to be added each year) 2

coal CCS 22 x CCS* coal-fired plants (800 MW) * Carbon capture

and storage
†
Combined heat
gas CCS 20 x CCS* gas-fired plants (500 MW) and power

nuclear 30 x nuclear reactors (1000 MW)

hydropower 2 x ‘Three Gorges’ dams

biomass and waste 400 x CHP† plants (40 MW)

wind 17 000 x turbines (3 MW)

other renewables

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
additional power generation capacity (GW)

1 Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, IEA 2 World Energy Outlook 2007, IEA

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IPIECA Workshop, London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008

Targets such as stabilization at 450 ppm or reductions in GHG emissions of 50 per

cent by 2050 would entail a revolution in energy supply and use. Additional
investment in energy supply and infrastructure in this case is estimated to total 45
trillion dollars from now to 20501. Reducing GHG emissions from energy supply will
need to involve thousands of multi-billion dollar investment decisions; given the large
risk to such investments, decisions are not being made at this time. Such a revolution
is not apparent in statistics of energy research and development. Whilst there is a
strong need to encourage innovation and technology development, energy R&D
spending has dropped as a percentage of total R&D spend. Against this background,
energy R&D by governments has steadily declined over the past three decades to a
current (2006) low of 3 per cent of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) total government R&D spending (see Figure 2).

These issues are further compounded by the need to supply electricity to the 1.6
billion people still lacking access. There are surrounding issues of additional
complexity, such as technology transfer to the developing world and the associated
issues of institutional capacity, infrastructure, governance, and intellectual property
rights which will all affect the environment for energy investments3.

Figure 2: Public energy research and development funding in OECD countries 4

14 12
efficiency
fossil fuels CCS
12 10
energy R&D (percent of total R&D)

renewables
funding (billion dollars, 2006)

10 nuclear
8 hydrogen
8 storage technologies
6 other
6 share of energy R&D
4 in total R&D
4

2
2

0 0
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006

3 Increasing the pace of technology innovation and application, IPIECA 2007 4 World Energy Outlook 2007, IEA

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 Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards

Improving energy efficiency

The promise of energy efficiency

Energy efficiency holds great promise for reducing energy demand and associated
CO2 emissions cost-effectively. Scenarios based on estimates of cost (see Figure 3)
exhibit a potential for a 30 per cent reduction in energy use over the next 20 years—
with residential and commercial reductions focused on electricity and transport, and
power reductions focused on primary energy use. Power generation appears to
provide the best candidate for de-carbonization.

Figure 3: Estimates of marginal emission reduction costs for the global energy system, 2050 5

1000
transport alternative fuels
technology
800
pessimism
marginal cost (US$/t CO2)

600
industry fuel switching
and CCS 500

400 BLUE Map

technology
200 optimism
200

end-use efficiency power sector 100

ACT Map
50
0

-200
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
2050 CO2 emissions reduction (Gt CO2/year)

Barriers to energy efficiency

Energy efficiency improvements are being, and have been, made given the economic
justification for saving energy. However, not all improvements in energy efficiency are
cost effective. As shown in Figure 4, options that would fall into the left half of the chart
would not be economic whereas those that fall in the right half would be economic.
There is limited agreement among studies on the cost of such options, especially if one
is considering decades into the future. Energy efficiency savings—even those that are
economic—often do not get implemented, for varying reasons. Barriers to
implementation include market failures such as: externalities (unpriced costs/benefits);

5 Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, IEA

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IPIECA Workshop, London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008

information asymmetry—agency problems (landlord/tenant split incentive); and

appliance uses of electricity—often compounded by lack of awareness of environmental
impacts of actions. Additionally, market barriers include: low priority of energy issues;
and incomplete markets for energy efficiency (lack of rival energy options for a product).

Figure 4: The interrelationship between economic and energy efficiencies 6

decreased energy use

inefficient energy efficiency

energy saving improvement increased
economic
efficiency

waste economically efficient

energy intensification

Buildings
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report notes that buildings, and associated energy use,
offer one of the biggest economically efficient mitigation potentials. There are many un-
costed, or difficult to quantify, co-benefits of building energy efficiency as a form of
GHG mitigation which may even be higher than the value of the energy savings
themselves. These include: reduced morbidity/mortality; improved health and social
welfare; new business opportunities and jobs (retrofitting); and improved energy security.
The role of standards in energy efficiency is vital for assets with 50-year+ lifetimes—
retrofitting buildings is possible, and to a high degree, but is much more expensive.

6 Jim Sweeney’s presentation (see page 16) 7 Saving Energy in the Oil and Gas Industry, IPIECA 2007

Energy management systems

Energy management systems can help to save
energy by improving the efficiency of operations
along the supply chain and eliminating unnecessary
waste. This is primarily achieved through optimizing
the operation of existing facilities using best
practice, identifying economic investment
opportunities to increase efficiencies, and
implementing strong management systems to drive
through continuous improvement. Energy
management systems are a proven approach to
accelerating the pace of efficiency improvement
and are increasingly applied in industry 7.
 Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards

Industry
Industrial energy use is shifting to the developing economies. The potential for energy
savings in industries varies greatly across countries. Under the IEA BLUE Map
scenario8, which looks at a 50 per cent reduction in emissions by 2050, industry
accounts for 19 per cent of the 48 Gt CO2 emissions reduction above the
improvements already assumed in the IEA’s Baseline case. By 2050 industry would
need a 21 per cent absolute reduction in emissions—which means a 60 per cent
reduction in intensity. The use of oil is reduced greater than any other fossil fuel or
primary energy. For the refining sector, out to 2050 this implies a reduction in supply,
and also product switching from naptha/petroleum towards kerosene and diesel.

Cogeneration
Cogeneration, the simultaneous production and
capture of electricity and thermal heat or steam
(also known as combined heat and power, CHP),
has the potential to improve operating efficiencies
significantly. This method of production can be
twice as efficient as traditional methods of
producing steam and power separately, since it
recovers energy otherwise discharged into the
atmosphere or lost during the process of
condensing steam back to water at traditional
power plants. However, an exact match between heat is transported long distances, requiring heavily
the heat and electricity needs rarely exists, and insulated pipes at significant cost. Barriers to
cogeneration is at its most efficient when the heat cogeneration include the large up-front capital costs
can be used on site or very close to it. Thermal of the system and relatively low fuel costs providing
efficiency is reduced, and costs increased, when the insufficient incentive to improve efficiencies 9.

8 Energy Technology Perspectives 2008, IEA 9 The Oil and Gas Industry and Climate Change, IPIECA 2007

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IPIECA Workshop, London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008

Transport
Conventional wisdom states that transport is unlikely to provide as large a share of
carbon reductions as other sectors, given expectations of the high demand for
personal and material mobility, and the high cost of technical options10. According to
the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), a carbon price that cuts emissions
from power generation in half by 2030 would have little impact on transport (EIA
2006). Many policies have been developed to curb emissions, including fuel
economy standards, renewable fuels mandates, and research into alternative fuels
such as hydrogen or plug-in vehicles. Whilst powertrains have become more energy
efficient, these improvements have been outpaced by consumer demand for power
and weight rather than fuel efficiency. A number of areas have the potential to
improve results: greater use of price signals; increased efficiency of markets
(information), and transport systems (e.g. air traffic); more attention to neglected
modes of transport (heavy trucks, aircrafts, rail); and more aggressive research and
development.

The purchasing of a new vehicle is a key decision in terms of efficiency. Although

efficient vehicles offer payback to consumers, there is much uncertainty, including a
lack of trust of the labels/information, uncertainty over the length of ownership of the
car, the price of oil, and the amount of driving to be done. Further, uncertain benefits
in the future are not valued high enough by consumers to drive demand for high
efficiency vehicles. Policies such as ‘feebates’—with a fee on inefficient vehicles, and
a rebate on efficient models—may better influence consumer demand where other
forms of standards have had limited impact.

10 Transport and climate change, IPIECA 2005

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 Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards

Impacts and Adaptation

Uncertainty and adaptation

Over the next few decades, climate variability and change is expected to proceed
irrespective of efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions; for example, while
changes in emissions of CO2 in the future will have a long-term effect on the
accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere, over one or two decades the difference in
atmospheric CO2 concentration for different emission scenarios is modelled to be small
relative to its difference from pre-anthropogenic concentration. GHGs are expected to
drive an increase in global average temperature and associated—but more
uncertain—local changes in climate which will also be affected by climate variability
and other anthropogenic factors. Decadal predictions of future climate such as
depicted in Figure 5 are an emerging research area; the skill of such predictions and
how such predictions will be used to adapt to climate change is yet to be resolved.
Given the limited skill of local predictions of climate change, improving the robustness
and flexibility of infrastructure, and our ‘adaptive capacity’ may be the most
appropriate strategy for adaptation in many cases.

Figure 5: Global mean surface temperature anomaly (5-year means), 2007–2037 11

1.5
Observations
Human effects + natural variability
Human effects only
1.0

0.5

0.0 Confidence (%)

10 50 90
Mt Pinatubo
-0.5
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040

Vulnerable regions
Water, food and housing pose serious risks from climate change to social welfare,
and therefore form priorities in adaptation policy. Geographic regions which highlight
these vulnerabilities are likely to exhibit the first large-scale human impacts of climate
change—for example densely populated mega-deltas, especially in Asia, and Africa,
along with small islands, and the Arctic.

11 Richard Betts’ presentation (see page 16)

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IPIECA Workshop, London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008

Adaptation policy
Adaptation includes any action, public or private, planned or spontaneous, in
anticipation and in response, to reduce the negative impacts of climate change and
make the most of the positive impacts. Adaptation actions are best taken by those
who actually manage climate-sensitive resources and operations. Given the deep
uncertainty in many of the specific impacts of climate change, improving the
robustness and flexibility of infrastructure, and increasing our ability to adapt
(‘adaptive capacity’) may be an appropriate strategy. Governments do have roles in
improving adaptive capacity; however, effectiveness of government actions may be
limited because, in many cases, the government is not the resource manager.
Moreover, in some instances government regulations can hinder adaptive actions.

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 Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards

Imminent policies
and implications

To be on a path to stabilization at a low GHG concentration level, like the case

illustrated in Figure 1, policies would need to drive significant and drastic changes to
consumption and production of energy. These policies would require all technology
options to remain open in order to minimize the cost of mitigation. However, public
perception of the appropriate technologies for the job differs from the expert
assessments of the most economic options for mitigation (e.g. compare Figure 6 to
Figure 1).

Figure 6: US public survey on preferred energy technology options12

solar energy definitely use

probably use
energy efficient cars not sure
probably not use
wind energy definitely not use

carbon sequestration

bioenergy/biomass

nuclear energy

carbon capture
and storage

0 25 50 75 100
public preference (%)

Regional policies
In the European Union (EU), a proliferation of climate policies of various types are
progressing. Targets for 20 per cent of all energy to come from renewables, and for a
20 per cent reduction in primary energy use compared to ‘business a usual’, along
with goals on biofuels and vehicle efficiency have all been proposed. However, there
are complex interactions among these policies that will affect carbon prices and
implementation choices. And with overlaying policies, it becomes increasingly difficult
to estimate and attribute the cost of each policy and its effectiveness, decreasing the
transparency of which policies may be cost-effective.

12 Henry Jacoby’s presentation (see page 16)

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IPIECA Workshop, London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008

In the United States, policies are emerging on state, regional and national fronts,
including a broad patchwork of cap and trade, fuel and efficiency standards, and
renewables portfolios. Unfortunately, the public has large misconceptions concerning
potential costs of such policies and is predisposed toward renewable and efficiency
standards, and much less favourable towards nuclear and CCS technologies (Figure 6).

Competition and carbon leakage

There are concerns surrounding the spill-over effect of climate policies, especially the
negative impacts on trade competitiveness and so-called carbon leakage. Increased
costs in carbon-intensive industries can lead to business focusing investment at
locations with lower imposed costs, which in turn also results in the emissions
moving—usually to a less regulated or unregulated region. Various academic
economic analyses of competitive impacts of policies predict results which are either
relatively minor or manageable with border adjustments or other measures—even for
sectors such as cement, and oil and gas. These predictions, which are among those
being considered to set policy on issues such as auctioning, however, are contrary to
actual commercial experience where investments are already seen as leaving climate
policy-affected regions.

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 Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards

Setting the stage for the long term

Improving innovation and the pace of technology

The timely deployment of existing technologies and innovation to develop new
technologies is essential to meet the world’s growing energy demand over the coming
decades. Even with the enormous rewards of technological progress, the pace of
major technological change has historically been limited. For technology change to
be rapid enough to enable effective management of climate change risk, a pace of
change may be required that is a multiple of past experience. Actions to make such a
pace an option are critical13.

Ultimately, effective policies are needed to encourage and enable options such as
CCS if such technologies are to be a reality. If such options are not available, then
the cost of emissions reduction would multiply or the extent of emission reduction
would be reduced. To contribute to achieving policy goals of drastic reductions in
emissions, CCS would need to move beyond the development and demonstration
phase, to be commercialized by, for example, 2020. For that to happen, a series of
demonstration plants has been proposed along with policies to address the financial
gap for CCS demonstration plants and, ultimately, commercial plants14,15.

Polices are also being developed surrounding biofuels to gain perceived economic,
environmental and social benefits. Mandates have been enacted in the EU, Brazil,
and the USA. However, there are major complications in controlling the sustainability
of biofuels, recognizing the interaction between biofuel production and land, water,
labour and food resources16.

The costs of transition

The transition to a low-carbon economy will occur at both a political and technological
level. In scenario analyses, the stabilization of atmospheric concentrations is driven by
a price on greenhouse gas emissions—either implicitly or explicitly. However, the price
of carbon depends on the timing and extent of international participation. For
example: under a 450 ppm scenario, if China imposed a price on emissions
beginning today, along with the rest of the world, the price would be five times greater
than under a 550 ppm scenario. However, if China and other non-Annex I economies
delayed imposing a price on emissions until 2020, then the price in the year 2020
rises to eight times that of the 550ppm ‘ideal’ scenario (see Figure 7). Further, the

13 Increasing the pace of technology innovation and application, IPIECA 2007

14 Toward a clean, clever and competitive energy future, IEA report to G8, 2007
15 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit Leaders Declaration, 2008
16 Biofuels, sustainability and the petroleum industry, IPIECA 2009

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IPIECA Workshop, London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008

Figure 7: Year 2020 USA carbon prices for different international regimes—450 and 550 ppm17

450 ppm 550 ppm

60 60
Impossible with N/A ideal—global
index 550 ppm 2020 price = 1.0

post-2050 53 price now

non-Annex 1
50 accession 50 parallel regimes,
2020 accession
40 40 parallel regimes,
2035 accession
30 30 parallel regimes,
2050 accession
20 20

10 8 10
5
1.0 1.2 1.4 2.1
0 0

price of carbon also depends on the relative weighting and inclusion of various sectors
of the economy. For example, costs are halved if terrestrial (land-based) carbon is
valued under a 450 ppm CO2 scenario. If only electric power generators incur a
carbon price, the cost of reducing a tonne of carbon rises by a factor of 5.

International agreement
Under international negotiations, a new agreement is hoped for by December 2009.
However, major sticking points exist between developed and developing countries.
Developed countries see the absolute need for emerging economies such as China
and India to begin emission reduction in earnest if any target of significance is to be
achieved. Conversely, developing countries still wish to see historically responsible
developed nations take the first and substantial steps towards decarbonizing their
economies. Key issues surrounding clean technology transfer and funding for
adaptation and mitigation measures in developing countries have also yet to be
resolved. A likely agreement on reducing deforestation and land degradation could
make a real difference to global emissions.

17 Jae Edmonds’ presentation (see page 16)

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 Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards

The road ahead

Targets such as stabilization at 450 ppm or reductions in global GHG emissions of

50 per cent by 2050 would entail a revolution in energy supply and use. Such a
revolution is neither apparent in statistics of energy research and development (see
Figure 2), trends in energy use, or society’s expectations of what it would entail (see
Figure 6). However, the public believes that deep reductions in emissions can be
achieved at low cost using technologies in use today—this is inconsistent with
economic analyses. There is a significant gap between the realities of energy supply
and demand, and society’s expectations of deep reductions in GHG emissions.

A much broader dialog by society, and by business, is needed if society is to manage

climate risk in an effective, efficient and equitable way. Topics for focus include:
● enhancing public understanding and discussion of the scale and means of energy
supply and use;
● including consideration of how climate change links to investment in energy
technology from development to diffusion;
● engaging those responsible for resource management in strategies for climate
change adaptation; and
● a broad discussion of emission reduction policies to reduce the risks posed by
climate change.

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 IPIECA Workshop, London, United Kingdom, 1–2 October 2008

Workshop programme

Welcome
• Richard Sykes (Executive Secretary, IPIECA)

Workshop Scene Set

• Haroon Kheshgi (ExxonMobil)

Session 1: Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Outlooks and Scenarios

• Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Outlooks and Scenarios Dolf Gielen (IEA), presenting on behalf of Fatih Birol (IEA)

Session 2: Improving Energy Efficiency

• The Potential of Energy Efficiency Jim Sweeney (Stanford University)
• Energy Efficiency in Buildings Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Central European University)
• Greenhouse Gases and Efficiency in Industry Dolf Gielen (IEA)
• Road Transport and Efficiency David Greene (Oak Ridge National Lab)

Session 3: Impacts and Adaptation

• Climate Forecasting Richard Betts (Hadley Centre, UK Met Office)
• Adaptation Priorities and Climate Change Impacts Martin Parry (University of East Anglia)
• Adaptation Priorities and Socioeconomic Considerations Richard Tol (Economic and Social Research Institute)
• Assessing Climate Risks Robert Muir-Wood (Risk Management Solutions)

Session 4: Imminent Policies and Implications

• EU Policies and Positions Felix Matthes (Oko Institute for applied ecology)
• US Climate Policies in the Near Term Henry Jacoby (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
• Competitiveness and Carbon Leakage Karsten Neuhoff (Cambridge University)
• Implications for Energy Supply and Infrastructure Gordon MacKerron (SPRU)

Session 5: Setting the Stage for the Long Term

• Transition Scenarios Jae Edmonds (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)
• International Policy Framework Nick Campbell (Arkema)
• CCS Assessment and Initiatives Heleen de Coninck (Energy Research Centre)
• Biofuels Jan-Maarten Teuben (Shell, Chair IPIECA Biofuels Task Force)

Session 6: Effective Policies for Meeting the Climate-Energy Challenge

• Panel Discussion Henry Jacoby (MIT); Nick Campbell (Arkema/International Chamber of Commerce);
Steven Fries (Shell)

Photographs reproduced courtesy of the following: cover (except globe and background image) and pages 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 11 and 14 (top, lower left, lower right): ©iStockphoto.com;
cover (centre left) and page 15: ©Photodisc Inc.; cover (background image) and pages 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12 and 14 (lower middle): ©Shutterstock.com; page 13: IPIECA

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 Climate Change and Energy to 2020 and onwards

The IPIECA Workshop—

speakers’ presentations

T his brochure, the Workshop programme and all speakers’ presentations are available
in PDF format and can be downloaded from the Climate Change publications section
of the IPIECA website at: www.ipieca.org.
Adobe Acrobat Reader™ is required to view the files, and is available as a free
download from the Adobe website at:
www.adobe.co.uk/products/acrobat/readstep2.html

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IPIECA
The International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) was founded in 1974 following the
establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). IPIECA provides one of the industry’s principal
channels of communication with the United Nations.
IPIECA is the single global association representing both the upstream and downstream oil and gas industry on key
global environmental and social issues. IPIECA’s programme takes full account of international developments in these issues,
serving as a forum for discussion and cooperation involving industry and international organizations.
IPIECA’s aims are to develop and promote scientifically-sound, cost-effective, practical, socially and economically
acceptable solutions to global environmental and social issues pertaining to the oil and gas industry. IPIECA is not a
lobbying organization, but provides a forum for encouraging continuous improvement of industry performance.

Climate Change Working Group

The CCWG was established in 1988. Its efforts focus on three strands of work—greenhouse gas emissions best practice,
greenhouse gas metrics, and science and policy including the two major intergovernmental processes: scientific assessments
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); and negotiations under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The Climate Change Working Group aims to provide members with reliable and timely information, issues analysis,
technical guidance, education and involvement in international processes dealing with global climate change.

Climate Change publications

• The Oil and Gas Industry and Climate Change (2007)
• Saving Energy in the Oil and Gas Industry (2007)

Best Practice Guidelines

• Oil and Natural Gas Industry Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Reduction Projects (2007)
• Oil and Natural Gas Industry Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Reduction Projects: Carbon Capture and Geological Storage
Emission Reduction Project Family (2007)
• Petroleum Industry Guidelines for Reporting Greenhouse Gas Emissions (2003)

Guide Series
• The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol: A Guide to the Climate
Change Negotiations (2008)
• Climate Change—a Glossary of Terms (4th Edition) (2007)
• A Guide to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (4th edition) (2006)

Workshop Report Series

• Natural Gas as a Climate Change Solution: Breaking Down the Barriers to Methane’s Expanding Role (2007)
• Increasing the Pace of Technology Innovation and Application: Enabling Climate Change Solutions (2007)
• Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimation and Inventories: Addressing Uncertainty and Accuracy (2007)
• International Policy Approaches to Address the Climate Change Challenge (2006)
• Transportation and Climate Change: Workshop Summary (2005)
• Carbon Dioxide Capture and Geological Storage Workshop Summary (2003)
• A Practical Approach to Identifying Emission Reductions Opportunities, Workshop Summary (2003)
• Energy Development and Climate Change: Considerations in Asia and Latin America (2002)
• Development and Climate Change: Issues and Approaches in Asia (2002)
• Long-Term Carbon and Energy Management—Issues and Approaches (2001)
• Opportunities, Issues and Barriers to the Practical Application of the Kyoto Mechanisms (2000)
• Technology Assessment in Climate Change Mitigation: A Workshop Summary (1999)

International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association

5th Floor, 209–215 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NL
Tel: +44 (0)20 7633 2388 Fax: +44 (0)20 7633 2389
E-mail: info@ipieca.org Internet: www.ipieca.org