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“Worldwide Worry”
“Worldwide Worry” headlined The Boston Globe on Tuesday, October 7, 2008.
Above the fold stories included “Ominous signs of pullback by businesses,” and
“Markets tumble amid doubts on US stability.” The heat producing this meltdown had
been turning up for a year or more. A large number of homeowners had to default on
their mortgages; the major investment bank Bear Sterns built a house of cards to make
money hand over fist, went belly up and was sold off; housing prices fell and the supply
of credit dried up; the financial-services firm Lehman Brothers set the record for largest
bankruptcy in US history; the banks in the entire country of Iceland melted away; and the
largest automobile manufacturers in the US began to dissolve.
Seemingly humble, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank said, “[W]e’re
not smart enough as people. We just cannot see events that far in advance.” The “not
smart enough” people were the mathematical economists on staff at the Federal Reserve
Board. He implied that if the brilliant people hired by the government – product of the
most prestigious business schools in the country – could not predict this calamity, then
nobody could. What this leaves out is that several other people did foresee the possibility
of the collapse based not just on readily available numerical data, but on a fundamental
theoretical criticism of academic mathematical finance.
1920’s and 30’s these wonderful but expensive things included automobiles. To compete
with the Ford Motor Company “Layaway Plan” – basically an organized way to save up
for a car – the idea of “Automobile Loan” was conceived, born and raised by the General
Motors Assurance Corporation. In other words, General Motors – along with department
stores – helped create “modern consumer capitalism.” After World War II the consumer
credit business blossomed big-time and GMAC expanded into home mortgages. Banks
gamble on their borrowers and big banks gamble big.
underlying patterns that relate measurements. All measurements come down to counting.
For example, time is measured by counting clock ticks, and money is measured by
counting dollars. Of course, there are an unlimited number of quantities that can or might
be counted. A mathematical scientist seeks the simplest patterns relating measurements to
one another. That is science because a proposed pattern can be refuted by more
measurements, and mathematical because studying patterns involving numbers –
reasoning and calculating – is best expressed using mathematical machinery. For
example, one of the best tricks in mathematics is to invent new kinds of numbers to
expand the possibilities for reasoning and calculating. So, although counting cannot ever
yield, say, the square-root-of-two, it is mysteriously useful to be able to reason about and
calculate with measurements if square roots are allowed in reasoning and calculation.
Making measurements is an engineering problem. Originating ideas about what
patterns to seek requires intuition – and luck. The trick is to use the mathematical
machinery to build a streamlined imaginary universe – often called a “model” – intended
to mimic measurements in our messy real universe. The ideas come from recognizing
analogies, making guesses, tinkering with the machinery, seeing the numbers it generates,
comparing these numbers with measurements, and then guessing and tinkering some
more. This activity is so much fun – and intellectually rewarding – that some people get
deeply obsessed with it. We call them mathematicians and mathematical scientists.
The super-star mental gymnasts of mathematics have contributed for thousands of
years and from diverse cultures. Their understanding and inventiveness undergirds all of
engineering, including electronics and computers, and increasingly all of science,
including biology and medicine. The on-line Mathematics Genealogy Project presents a
searchable “family tree” of mathematicians in which a “parent” is a supervisor – or
among the supervisors – of the doctoral work of the “child.” For each individual the chart
provides the year that the doctorate was granted together with the number of “children”
and the total number of “descendants.”
For example, Henri Poincaré achieved his doctorate in 1879, had 3 students, and
they were his only descendants. Succinctly, (1879, 3/3). As a youth Poincaré was already
called a “monster of mathematics” and went on to create entire fields of research, and
among other prodigious achievements to anticipate key ideas leading to the relativity
theory of Albert Einstein. In particular, Poincaré supervised the work of Louis Bachelier
(1900, 0/0), who is universally acknowledged as the originator of mathematical finance.
Subsequently, two of the students of Jacques Hadamard (1892, 6/1695) – Paul Lévy
(1911, 4/377) and Szolem Mandelbrojt (1923, 10/928) – indirectly impinged on
mathematical finance through Benoit Mandelbrot (1952, 8/12), who was a student of
Lévy and a nephew of Mandelbrojt.
ping-pong impact. The Bachelier intuition is that large price changes are extremely
unlikely, that price changes continuously.
The explosive history of the Bachelier financial universe is shot through with the
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science (briefly denoted by N and followed by the
date of award). Around 1958, Bachelier’s largely ignored work was brought to the
attention of Paul Samuelson (N, 1970) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(Norbert Wiener’s home base) by Leonard J. Savage, a student of economics under the
supervision of Harry J. Markowitz (N,1990), who initiated “modern portfolio theory,”
1955-1956. William F. Sharpe (N, 1990), who also studied under the supervision of
Markowitz, shared in the development of the “capital asset pricing model,” 1961-1966.
Eugene F. Fama studied mathematical economics as a doctoral student of Benoit
Mandelbrot, and originated the “efficient markets hypothesis,” 1964. Development of the
“Black-Scholes option valuation formula,” 1973 was shared, among others, between
Myron S. Scholes (N, 1997) who worked with Fama, and Robert C. Merton (N,1997),
whose graduate work was supervised by Samuelson.
The Bachelier financial universe is a Platonic realm of perfectly rational denizens
who all have the same information about the financial objects – for example, “stocks” –
on which they place bets. It is assumed, therefore, that the price of an object “reflects” the
universally known information – this is the “efficient markets hypothesis.” These entities
all wish to get the “greatest bang for the buck,” limited only by their tolerance for loss.
Fear of loss is represented by a number called “risk” and is a statistical quantity –
“variance” – calculated using a formula that assumes price changes conform to the
“normal probability distribution.” Denizens can borrow as much money as they want at a
guaranteed interest rate, so they can even borrow money for placing bets.
They can also loan as much money as they wish at a guaranteed interest rate – by
buying “bonds.” They can form sets of bets – “portfolios” – that combine stocks and
bonds and all sorts of other financial objects. They guesstimate the expected value and
the risk of the objects in the set, and calculate the combined expectation and risk of the
whole set. By clever adjustment –“diversification” – of the quantities of objects in the set
they minimize the risk for a given expectation – this is called “modern portfolio theory.”
Given a guesstimate of the risk of the entire set of all possible financial objects – the
“market risk” – they can also calculate the expectation of a financial object being
considered for addition to the set – this is the “capital asset pricing model.”
When someone has a great idea you can bet that others will try to do even better.
In fact, that might even be the definition of “great idea.” In any case, human beings have
invented many unique financial objects – with dependencies of the prices of some upon
the prices of others. Those whose prices do not depend on the prices of others include
basic objects such as bonds and stocks. Those whose prices do depend on others are
called “derivatives,” such as an “option” whose price depends on the interest rates of
bonds and the prices of stocks. In the Bachelier financial universe there is a calculation
for the price of an option – “Black-Scholes option valuation formula” – that, again,
assumes the normal probability distribution for stock price proportional changes.
Companies use derivatives to reduce risk. Change in interest rates, currency exchange
rates, supplies of raw materials, and chance of default on loans are some of the sources
of corporate risk. Speculators use derivatives for hedging their bets.
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dozens of periodicals, and honorary doctorates from institutions all over the world.
Among the prizes listed are the Wolf Prize in Physics 1993: “by recognizing the
widespread occurrence of fractals and developing mathematical tools for describing
them, he has changed our view of nature”; and the Japan Prize 2003: “for the creation of
universal concepts in complex systems - Chaos and Fractals.”
Mandelbrot’s Hypothesis applied to price change is that – like most everything
else in the real world – price change is discontinuous. This flatly contradicts the
fundamental assumption of Bachelier finance – the one taught in business schools and
trundled on Wall Streets worldwide – and the reaction of the mathematical finance
community has been … largely dismissive. Until lately.
If there is to be a Mandelbrot Financial Universe, it will extend the Bachelier
Financial Universe as the Milky Way extends the Solar System. Mandelbrot has
generalized the “mild” variability studied in Bachelier finance by providing mathematical
machinery for simulating, reasoning and calculating about “wild” variability – abnormal
probability distributions.
said, “Funeral by funeral, science makes progress.” Perhaps the next generation of
finance students will boldly realize that mathematics is the ultimate tinker-toy of
metaphor.