Rule 30 Trial

Laluan vs. Malpaya The petitioners and the respondents point to what they believe is the sole question for resolution; whether or not the reception by the clerk of court of the petitioners' evidence, in the absence of the respondents and their counsel, constitutes a prejudicial error that vitiated the proceedings. The petitioners argue that a trial court has authority to designate its clerk of court to receive the evidence of the party present when the other party fails to appear. In receiving evidence, the petitioners continue, the clerk of court merely performs a ministerial task. The ministerial nature of such a task allows the clerk of court to dispense with the procedural steps 5 prescribed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the court a quo arrogated unto itself the power, otherwise denied it, to designate its clerk of court to receive the petitioners' evidence. No provision of the Rules of Court, according to them, empowers a trial court to authorize its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant; only when the clerk of court becomes a commissioner, by appointment pursuant to Rule 33, has he the authority to so receive the evidence of a party litigant, and even in such a situation Rule 33 requires the clerk of court to observe the procedural steps therein prescribed. The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties properly relate to the reference by a court of any or all of the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or report thereon. These provisions explicitly spell out the rules governing the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties before, during, and after the reference proceedings. Compliance with these rules of conduct becomes imperative only when the court formally orders a reference of the case to a commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no application to the case at bar where the court a quo merely directed the clerk of court to take down the testimony of the witnesses 6 presented and to mark the documentary evidence 7 proffered on a date previously set for hearing. No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial task the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present. This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to the admission of the documentary

evidence proffered. 8 More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported. 9 But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant result thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the court based on the evidence presented in such limited proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved party, then there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court.

Yu vs. Mapayo We find for plaintiff-appellant. Since the answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded, plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special defenses. Section 2 of Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly supports appellant: Sec. 2. Judicial admissions. Admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake. While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge, We can not refrain from observing that the trial judge's despotic and outrageous insistence that plaintiff should present proof in support of allegations that were not denied but admitted by the adverse party was totally unwarranted, and was made worse by the trial judge's continual interrupting of the explanations of counsel, in violation of the rules of Judicial Ethics. Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the dismissal of the case was manifestly untenable and contrary to law.

Lee vs. Ranillo On the last issue, the petitioners question the delegation of the reception of the evidence ex-parte in the lower court to its legal researcher invoking our ruling in Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425).<re||an1w> They argue that such practice does not have any basis in law. Their argument is not meritorious. In the case of The National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals (121 SCRA 777, 781), we categorically stated that:

The contention that the Trial Court cannot delegate the reception of evidence to its Clerk of Court, citing the case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (supra) is not well taken. Suffice it to say, for purposes of this suit, that the Id case referred to reception of evidence by a Clerk of Court after declaration of defendant's default. No default is involved herein. As held in the case of Laluan v. Manalo (65 SCRA 494 [1975l), no provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a Court from authorizing its Clerk of Court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. More important, however, is the fact that the trial court reconsidered its earlier order and allowed the petitioners to present their evidence. For almost three years, from July 20, 1978 to May 22, 1981, the petitioners participated in the protracted trials which followed.

Continental Bank vs. Tiangco Also erroneous and unmeritorious is respondents' contention that the judgment in question is void and unenforceable because it was based on evidence which was heard by the deputy clerk of court as commissioner. That judgment is valid and enforceable because it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and it was not impaired by extrinsic fraud nor by lack of due process. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the judgment debtors. They acquiesced in the validity of the judgment when they made partial payments to satisfy it. The defendants or private respondents did not question in the lower court its delegation to the deputy clerk of court of the duty to receive plaintiff's evidence. 'There is no showing that they were prejudiced by such a procedure, that the commissioner committed any mistake or abuse of discretion, or that the proceedings were vitiated by collusion and collateral fraud. It is too late at this hour for them to question the reception of plantiff's evidence by the deputy clerk of court acting as commissioner. (See CCC Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, L-25920, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 264; 2 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970, Ed., pp. 159-160 citing Apurillo vs. Garciano L-23683, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1054: Province of Pangasinan and Soriano vs. Palisoc, 116 Phil. 609, 614. Cf. Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, L-40098, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 425, 453-4.)

Rule 32 Wassmer vs. Velez

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

Rule 33 Demurrer to evidence

Radiowealth vs. Del rosario When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the evidence proffered by the plaintiff. Inasmuch as defendants in the present case admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note both in their Answer and during the pretrial, the appellate court should have rendered judgment on the bases of that Note and on the other pieces of evidence adduced during the trial. Consequences of a Reversal, on Appeal, of a Demurrer to Evidence Petitioner contends that if a demurrer to evidence is reversed on appeal, the defendant should be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence, and the appellate court should render judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. A remand to the trial court "for further proceedings" would be an outright defiance of Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court. On the other hand, respondents argue that the petitioner was not necessarily entitled to its claim, simply on the ground that they lost their right to present evidence in support of their defense when the Demurrer to Evidence was reversed on appeal. They stress that the CA merely found them indebted to petitioner, but was silent on when their obligation became due and demandable.

The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the consequence on appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed. As amended, the pertinent provision of Rule 33 reads as follows: SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.[14] Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana[15] pronounced: The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiffs evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendants evidence so that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiffs case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence. (Underscoring supplied) In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence.[16] The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render

judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.[17] In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants. Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate court correctly ruled that the documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed and appreciated xxx, and that the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary exhibits xxx enumerated in the appealed order,[18] we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record to decide the collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of the facts on record.

Choa vs. Choa

A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain the issue."26 The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict.27 In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.28 We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage. The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the

process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.

Nepomuceno vs. Comelec WON COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO AN ACT IN EXCESS OF OR WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO RESOLVE PETITIONERS' DEMURER TO EVIDENCE BY WAY OF A JUDGMENT WHEREIN IT SHOULD STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH THE IS RESOLUTION IS BASED. Petitioners are obviously misled by the title of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, "Judgment on Demurer to Evidence." Said Rule, consisting of only one section, allows the defendant to move for dismissal of the case after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, and provides for the effects of the dismissal or non-dismissal, as the case may be, on the right of the defendant to present his cause. Otherwise stated, it authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part as the relief sought. The demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny. It is thus apparent that the requirement of Section 1 of Rule 36 would only apply if the demurrer is granted, for in this event, there would in fact be an adjudication on the merits of the case, leaving nothing more to be done, except perhaps to interpose an appeal. However, a denial of the demurrer is not a final judgment, but merely interlocutory in character as it does not finally dispose of the case, the defendant having yet the right to present his evidence, as provided for under Section 1 of Rule 35.

Uy vs. Chua Although respondents pleading was captioned a Demurrer to Evidence, it was more appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata. Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced in full below: SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall

have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.

Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.[28] The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus: A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.[29]

The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence is whether petitioner has been able to show that she is entitled to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTCBranch 24 to make such a determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter. It did not take into consideration any of the evidence presented by petitioner. RTC-Branch 24 dismissed Special Proceedings No. 12562CEB on the sole basis of res judicata, given the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having dismissed Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res judicata rather than an adjudication on the merits of respondents demurrer to evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent should still be allowed to present evidence before RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.

Rule 34 Judgment on the Pleadings

Wood tech vs. Equitable bank We note now that (1) the RTC knew that the Answer asserted special and affirmative defenses; (2) the Court of Appeals recognized that certain issues were raised, but they were not genuine issues of fact; (3) petitioners insisted that they raised genuine issues; and (4) respondent argued that petitioners defenses did not tender genuine issues. However, whether or not the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for summary judgment.14 In a case for judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at all. The essential question in such a case is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings.15 This is the distinction between a proper case of summary judgment, compared to a proper case for judgment on the pleadings. We have explained this vital distinction in Narra Integrated Corporation v. Court of Appeals,16 thus, The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case a of a summary judgment, issues apparently existi.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answerbut the issues thus arising from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions. . . . (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.) Indeed, petitioners Answer apparently tendered issues. While it admitted that WTC obtained the loan, that Cordova and Young signed the promissory note and that they bound themselves as sureties for the loan, it also alleged special and affirmative defenses that the obligation had not matured and that the promissory note and surety agreement were contracts of adhesion. Applying the requisites of a judgment on the pleadings vis--vis a summary judgment, the judgment rendered by the RTC was not a judgment on the pleadings, but a summary judgment. Although the Answer apparently raised issues, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals after considering the parties pleadings, petitioners admissions and the documents attached to the Complaint, found that the issues are not factual ones requiring trial, nor were they genuine issues.1vvphi1.nt

Summary judgment17 is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial.18 In a summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify a summary judgment?19 A "genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not constitute a genuine issue for trial.20 We note that this is a case for a sum of money, and petitioners have admitted that they obtained the loan. They also admitted the due execution of the loan documents and their receipt of the final demand letter made by the respondent. These documents were all attached to the Complaint. Petitioners merely claimed that the obligation has not matured. Notably, based on the promissory note, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found this defense not a factual issue for trial, the loan being payable on demand. We are bound by this factual finding. This Court is not a trier of facts. When respondent made its demand, in our view, the obligation matured. We agree with both the trial and the appellate courts that this matter proferred as a defense could be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the stipulations in the promissory note which was already before the trial court. A full-blown trial to determine the date of maturity of the loan is not necessary. Also, the act of leaving blank the maturity date of the loan did not necessarily mean that the parties agreed to fix it later. If this was the intention of the parties, they should have so indicated in the promissory note.l^vvphi1.net They did not show such intention.l^vvphi1.net Petitioners likewise insist that their defense tendered a genuine issue when they claimed that the loan documents constituted a contract of adhesion. Significantly, both the trial and appellate courts have already passed upon this contention and properly ruled that it was not a factual issue for trial. We agree with their ruling that there is no need of trial to resolve this particular line of defense. All that is needed is a careful perusal of the loan documents. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to show any ambiguity in the loan documents. The rule is that, should there be ambiguities in a contract of adhesion, such ambiguities are to be construed against the party that prepared it. However, if the stipulations are clear and leave no doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations must be held controlling.