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West European Politics

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Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe
Christian Joppke

To cite this Article Joppke, Christian(2007) 'Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western

Europe', West European Politics, 30: 1, 1 22 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01402380601019613 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380601019613

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West European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1 22, January 2007

Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe
CHRISTIAN JOPPKE
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This article argues that, instead of diverging in terms of national models, Western European states policies on immigrant integration are increasingly converging. One convergent trend is examined in detail, obligatory civic integration courses and tests for newcomers. While a comparison of the Netherlands, France and Germany reveals considerable national variation in implementing civic integration, this variation tends to be incompatible with traditional national model assumptions. Moreover, more noteworthy than variation is the shared feature of civic integration that liberal goals are pursued with illiberal means, making it an instance of repressive liberalism.

Some 40 years after the onset of the great post-World War II migrations, there is a widespread sense across Europe that the state policies that were set up to accommodate these migrations were insucient or even harmful. Even in states that were long believed to adhere to articulate and coherent national models of immigrant integration, such as the multicultural Netherlands or assimilationist France, this sense of failure is strong. In the Netherlands, a 2004 parliamentary inquiry into government policy towards ethnic minorities between 1970 and 2000 came to the devastating conclusion that, if some migrants in the Netherlands succeeded, then it was in spite of rather than thanks to government policy.1 In France, a similar review of the French postwar immigration experience by the Cour des Comptes noted that state attention had always been xated on rening instruments of immigration control, while integration policy remained badly dened in its objectives and principles, incoherent, contradictory and insucient (Cour des Comptes 2004: 9f). I argue in this paper that a key feature of the policy solutions that have been oered in response to the integration crisis is the weakening of national distinctiveness, and a convergence with respect to the general direction and

Correspondence Address: cjoppke@aup.fr ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/01402380601019613

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content of integration policy. The notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did. Gary Freeman rightly noted that the notion of national models of incorporation . . . lend[s] too much dignity to the patchwork of institutions, laws, and practices that constitute incorporation frameworks in the West (Freeman 2003: 3). Much of the scholarly literature nevertheless continues to distinguish, within a liberal-democratic spectrum, between the poles of dierencefriendly multiculturalism and universalistic assimilationism, and to negatively demarcate from both, as beyond the liberal-democratic pale, the segregationism prevailing in some guestworker-receiving countries (the most recent, and sophisticated, version is Koopmans et al. 2005: ch. 2). A review of recent policy trends in three countries that are commonly taken as representative of these approaches, the Netherlands, France and Germany, respectively, will attest to the implausibility of such classication. In France, it has become de rigueur to reject any presumption of cultural assimilation since the early 1990s. The most recent report by the Haut Conseil de lIntegration (HCI), chaired by philosopher Blandine Kriegel, invokes the RawlsHabermasian distinction between political and ethical integration to beef up this stance: [D]ans les republiques democratiques, ` lEtat na pas vocation a imposer des valeurs car il laisse aux citoyens la liberte de les choisir (In a Republican democracy, the state is not imposing values on its citizens; instead, the citizens are free to choose their own values) (Haut Conseil 2003: 84). Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy illustrates this stance: Lintegration, cest: Je taccueille dans le creuset republicain comme tu es. Lassimilation, cest: Je te fais dispara tre. (Integration means: I welcome you to the Republican crucible just as you are. Assimilation means: I make you disappear.)2 This is the general creed of liberal democracy, from Canada to France. At the same time, the supposedly dierence-friendly, multicultural Netherlands is currently urging migrants to accept Dutch norms and values in the context of a policy of civic integration that is only an inch (but still an inch!) away from the cultural assimilation that had once been attributed to the French. And the pariah among migrant-receiving states in the West, segregationist Germany, has recently liberalised its nationality law in a big way, thus including its huge migrant population in the citizenry, and it has adopted (or is about to adopt) the same civic integration and anti-discrimination policies and laws that are currently taking hold in the rest of Europe. In the rst part of this article, I lay out the broad contours of policy convergence in Europe, with the help of the Council of the European Unions recent agreement on common basic principles of immigrant integration policy. In the main section, one convergent policy is examined in more detail: obligatory civic integration courses and tests for newcomers, which are compared in the Netherlands, France and Germany. In a concluding discussion, civic integration is interpreted as an instance of repressive liberalism, which is gaining strength under contemporary globalisation.

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Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe Policy Convergence in the European Union

Because they were agreed upon by the justice and home ministers of the member states of the European Union, and thus reect national policy preferences, the November 2004 European Council agreement on common basic principles of immigrant integration policy oers a unique window on the general direction and content of integration policies across Europe (Council of the European Union 2004). A general feature of these policies, which is no novelty, is to be broadly if imperfectly inclusive (Freeman 2003: 3). As Freeman points out, this is counter-intuitive if one considers that many of Europes migrants arrived uninvited, and that national electorates are generally hostile to large-scale immigration, especially of non-European provenance. This inclusiveness is due to the postwar human rights discourse and related international and national legal regimes, which extended rights from national citizens to all persons irrespective of citizenship (Soysal 1994). It is thus not specically European but germane to all Western liberal democracies. Inclusiveness is usually formulated in the metaphor of two-way integration. Accordingly, the rst of the EUs common basic principles of immigrant integration policy reads: Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the Member States (Council of the European Union 2004: 19). This means that not just migrants but also the receiving society has to change, the latter being mandated to create the opportunities for the immigrants full economic, social, cultural, and political participation (p. 19). This stance has become a platitude, but one should not therefore forget its extreme improbability. Ever since the transition from nomadic to settled life in the Neolithic Revolution, the maxim that settled populations had put forward to newcomers was that they should adapt to their ways when in Rome do as the Romans do. The idea that something as complex and extensive as the receiving society, a society after all and not just people, should change in response to the arrival of by nature numerically inferior migrants is unheard of. That a settled society would change as a result of migration is of course inevitable, but elevating this into an ethical maxim, a should, is an unprecedented stance to take. The second of the EUs common basic principles oers insight into what is expected on the part of migrants: Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union. What are these values? The joint stock of all liberal democracies: the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law (p. 19). All these are political values, not substantive ethical values. Europe is becoming like America in that, much as Rawls political liberalism has formulated it, the integration of society can only occur in terms of a procedural consensus on what is right, not in terms of a substantive consensus on what is good. Political liberalisms application in the migration domain is a common

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preference of integration over assimilation assimilation had meant imposing the substantive culture of the majority society (comprehensive doctrine, in Rawls terms) on newcomers, while the precise meaning of integration is to abstain from this. Accordingly, the EUs common basic principles include [f]ull respect for the immigrants and their descendants own language and culture (p. 20). With respect to migrants own language and culture, the crucial question is whether their expression is left to the free play of society, or whether the state becomes involved in their protection and maintenance. Interestingly, only Spain, under a socialist government bent on setting a progressive counterpoint to its conservative predecessor, wanted to commit the other EU states to a multicultural stance on this question, obliging them to proactively further and protect migrant languages and cultures.3 This attempt was rebutted. The compromise formula, full respect, does not go beyond the classic liberal stance on matters of culture and way of life, leaving them to the discretion of individuals, and not considering them the business of the state. Moreover, when the EU document reiterated that the freedom to practise ones religion and culture was guaranteed by constitutional law, emphasis was put on the strings attached to it respect for the equality of women, the rights and interests of children, and the freedom to practise or not to practise a particular religion (p. 23). This reservation reects the most recent diculties with Muslim integration in Europe, as a result of which the pendulum has swung from cultural maintenance to enforcement of liberal core values. The reduced emphasis on cultural recognition in the EU document, while at one level consistent with the precepts of liberalism, points to an important reorientation of European states immigrant integration policies. Previous programmatic statements by European states were much louder in arming the integrity of migrant cultures and ways of life, and some states most notably Sweden and the Netherlands went even further in protecting and supporting them. Instead, the third of the EUs common basic principles reads: Employment is a key part of the integration process (p. 20). Responding to an alarming degree of unemployment and welfare dependency among immigrants and their ospring in Europe, which is in sharp contrast to the United States or Canada, where migrant ethnic minorities are generally in work, socioeconomic integration has become the key focus of European states immigrant integration policies. This reorientation is framed by a new, post-national model philosophy of migrants selfsuciency and autonomy, to be found in the Netherlands and France alike, according to which paradoxically the primary task of the state is to make migrants independent of the state. An inevitable result of the new focus on socioeconomic integration is to shift the burden of adjustment heavily towards the individual migrant, particularly in the rst phases of entering the new society. Accordingly, the fourth principle in the EU statement on immigrant integration policy

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Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe

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says: Basic knowledge of the host societys language, history, and institutions is indispensable to integration. This refers to the new policy of civic integration, which the Netherlands pioneered in the late 1990s, and which has since been adopted, among other European states, by Finland, Denmark, Austria, Germany and France. This policy obliges newcomers to enrol in civic and language courses immediately after entry (in the Netherlands lately even before entry), and non-compliance tends to be sanctioned in terms of nancial penalties or denial of permanent legal residence permits. The novelty of civic integration policy is its obligatory character, which has notably increased over time, and this notional integration policy has even transmuted into a tool of migration control, helping states to restrict especially the entry of unskilled and non-adaptable family migrants. However, a liberal counterpoint to increasingly illiberal civic integration policies is the parallel emphasis on anti-discrimination laws and policies, which forced by direct EU mandate are now taking hold across Europe. Accordingly, the last of the EUs integration principles that will be mentioned here is: Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for better integration (p. 21).4 Equality of treatment, irrespective of ones ethnic origin or any other ascriptive marker, is certainly the stock-in-trade of all liberal societies, and guaranteed by their constitutions. Yet to enforce this by explicit antidiscrimination laws, which lowers the hurdle of claims-making for the victims of discrimination and above all expands the reach of the nondiscrimination principle from the public to the private sector, is a novelty. Though enabled by a unique window of opportunity at EU level (see Geddes and Guiraudon 2004), the proliferation of anti-discrimination laws and policies reects Europes structural transformation into a multiethnic society, as well as a general willingness to tackle the specic inequalities that go along with it.

Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants The Netherlands A key new development in European immigrant integration policies, civic integration for newcomers, was pioneered in the Netherlands, and therefore has to be rst understood within the specic Dutch context. Since the early 1980s, the Netherlands had pursued Europes most prominent and proudly exhibited multiculturalism policy, which envisaged emancipation for designated ethnic minorities, but within their own state-supported ethnic infrastructures, including ethnic schools, ethnic hospitals and ethnic media. Alas, one of Europes biggest socioeconomic integration failures happened in the shadow of multiculturalism. The gures are daunting

C. Joppke

(see Koopmans 2003, 2005). Whereas in the majority of EU countries the unemployment rate for non-EU migrants is about twice that of natives, the Dutch non-EU migrant unemployment rate, despite considerable uctuation, has been at a minimum three times above that of natives in the past seven years, in 1999 being 5.4 times more. In 1999, only one-third (33.7 per cent) of non-EU foreigners were gainfully employed in the Netherlands, with the remainder either not on the labour market at all (like many Muslim women) or dependent on social benets. In fact, migration into the Netherlands, as into many other countries of continental Europe, which since the late 1970s has been mostly through asylum and family reunication, is often a direct march into welfare state dependency. In 1998, 47 per cent of all those on welfare in the Netherlands were immigrants; among nonWestern foreigners, 20 per cent depended on welfare, which is ten times greater than the welfare dependency of native Dutch. In other sectors the picture is no better. Again in 1998, high school drop-out rates were 2.5 times higher for immigrant than for native Dutch children (19 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively), despite twice as much state funding for ethnic minority than for normal children, and the drop-out rates were especially bad for the two Dutch ethnic Sorgenkinder: Moroccans (39 per cent drop-out rate) and Turks (35 per cent). Thirdly, residential segregation is extremely high in the Netherlands. Whereas the Berlin-Kreuzberg city quarter, with a high ethnic density by German standards, is only one-third inhabited by foreigners, in Amsterdam and Rotterdams ethnic quarters the foreign resident rate is above two-thirds, and these two biggest Dutch cities are expected to become predominantly foreign-populated within the next few decades. The situation in Dutch prisons is topping this bleak picture. Whereas most European prisons tend to be overpopulated by foreigners (in contrast to the US or Canada), this is especially so in the Netherlands: 32 per cent of the Dutch prison population was foreigners in 1997. If one considers the share of foreign citizens in the population, this makes for an overrepresentation by 6.3 times, the highest in Europe. While the jury is out on the causes of the Dutch integration failure, the important thing is that the political elites responded by scaling back ocial multiculturalism and turning towards civic integration. Its goal is migrants participation in mainstream institutions (which later came to be labelled shared citizenship) and autonomy, to be achieved through Dutch language acquisition and labour-market integration (see the overview by one of the intellectual engineers of the civic integration approach, Entzinger 2003). Its basis is the 1998 Newcomer Integration Law (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers, henceforth referred to as WIN). WIN obliges most non-EU newcomers5 to participate in a 12-month integration course, which consists of 600 hours of Dutch language instruction, civic education, and preparation for the labour market. When WIN was introduced in 1998, the coercive side was still subordinate to the service aspect. There were nancial penalties attached to

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Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe

non-compliance, but they were relatively minor and hardly ever enforced by the responsible local governments. Moreover, this was a state-paid service with incontrovertibly positive intentions, to get migrants into work, help them learn Dutch, and thus make them functioning members of Dutch society. For the liberal mastermind behind WIN, Han Entzinger, the mandatory nature of civic integration was no more than a trick to maximise its reach (e.g. traditional women of Muslim origin, Entzinger 2004: 7) and to guarantee that the state would in turn have the obligation to ensure that enough courses of good quality are available (ibid.). However, the rightist turn of the political climate after the killing of iconic populist Pim Fortuyn in 2002 pushed the coercive dimension of civic integration unambiguously to the fore. A May 2003 cabinet agreement by a centre-right government brought into power in the wake of Fortuyns death announced a restrictive revision of the civic integration law, one that would ensure that newcomers be aware of Dutch values and keep to the countrys norms. The rhetoric of respect for diversity, which had still dominated in the original version of civic integration, was evidently replaced by instilling dominant Dutch values and norms (Entzinger 2004: 9). Reinforcing this shift of emphasis, the responsibility for integration shifted from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Justice, which made integration primarily a law-and-order aair (ibid.). A revised civic integration law, which was approved by parliament in July 2006, shows a number of draconian features that clearly distinguish it from its milder predecessor. Overall, the Dutch state has engaged in a paradoxical double move of withdrawal from and increased presence in the integration process. On the side of state withdrawal, the philosophy of autonomy and self-suciency (zelfredzaamheid) underlying civic integration is now extended to its actual provision, in that migrants are required to pay for the integration courses in full. In addition, the provision of integration courses has been farmed out to private organisations, and state involvement in the whole aair is now reduced to the holding of standardised tests at the very end. The Dutch state thus does not care whether the courses are actually attended; only the result counts. It thus has quite literally become true that everyone is responsible for his own integration, as an ocial in the Justice Ministry characterised the philosophy of civic integration (Musso-van der Velde 2005). However, in a counterpoint to the privatisation of integration, coercive state involvement has massively increased. While a controversial extension of the integration test to some 800,000 established and naturalised immigrants was dropped from the revised integration law at the last minute,6 a crucial innovation on the coercive side has been to tie the granting of permanent residence permits to the successful passing of an integration test. This creates a linkage between the previously separate domains of migration control and immigrant integration. It also constitutes an entirely new view on immigrant integration. So far the prevailing view

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had been that a secure legal status enhances integration; now the lack of integration is taken as grounds for the refusal of admission and residence. Accordingly, the entire integration domain is potentially subordinated to the exigencies of migration control (see Groenendijk 2004; also de Heer 2004). The most drastic expression of this development is the new policy of integration from abroad, which entered into force in March 2006. Applicants for family reunication are now required to take an integration test at a Dutch embassy abroad as a precondition for being granted even a temporary residence permit. Integration from abroad is no Dutch invention. It was rst introduced in the context of the German Aussiedler policy, which is a preferential immigration scheme for ethnic Germans, at the moment that the ethnic credentials of ethnic German migrants had become questionable. However, the crucial dierence is that the German government has supported German language acquisition abroad with massive funding of schools and language courses, while no Dutch education programmes abroad exist. Integration from abroad thus boils down to no integration whatsoever, making the integration test a perfect tool of preventing unwanted immigration. Overall, what began as an immigrant integration policy has thus turned into its opposite, a no-immigration policy. What has caused this evolution? As suggested earlier, the Dutch domestic imbroglio after the killing of Fortuyn, rapidly followed by that of lm-maker Theo Van Gogh, certainly accounts for the peculiar harshness of Dutch-style civic integration. However, the connecting of the previously separate agendas of integration and migration control is clearly a European-wide trend (see Carrera 2006). European states are everywhere crafting sharply dualistic immigration policies, in which for highly skilled immigrants a red carpet of relaxed entry and residence requirements is laid out (see the overview by Shachar 2006), while low-skilled family migrants are meant to be fended o by toughened age thresholds together with cohabitation and pre-entry integration requirements. Civic integration is really targeting these low-skilled family migrants whose numbers are to be reduced while those of high-skilled immigrants are to be increased. For more than three decades Europe had not had signicant programmes for labour migration, so that still today the large majority of newcomers are asylum and family migrants, many of whom are low- or unskilled, have very little if any schooling and no host-society language competence. The harshest new measure, Dutch-style integration from abroad, explicitly targets only family migrants, so that this measure is really an indirect way of preventing family migration among people with low skills (Entzinger 2004: 23). But that is not all. Most of the family migrants targeted by the Dutch policy are Muslims of Turkish and Moroccan origins. As elsewhere in Europe, Turkish and Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands have a high propensity for endogamy.7 In eect, this means that even second- and thirdgeneration migrants look for a marriage partner in their parents country of

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origin. A recent Dutch report on imported marriages claims that 70 per cent of Turkish youngsters marry a partner from their parents home country, while in the case of Moroccan youngsters 60 per cent of females and 50 per cent of males do so.8 The ospring of such unions grow up in ethnically closed families, thus reinforcing and perpetuating the ethnic seclusion that characterises the Turkish and Moroccan communities in the Netherlands. Endogenous marriage migration perpetuates the problem of ill-adapted ethnics, preventing especially the Dutch-born ospring of intraethnic unions from melting into the host society. That is the precise problem that the civic integration policy had originally set out to resolve, providing a continuity with its latest, heavily restriction-minded incarnation.
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France The Dutch civic integration policy has quickly become a model for Europe (Michalowski 2004a), and variants of it are now practised in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, Portugal and Spain (see the overviews in Michalowski 2004a,b; ICMPD 2005; Carrera 2006). If initially one could distinguish between countries in which civic integration was more right than obligation, this is increasingly less so, as the obligatory and coercive thrust of civic integration is moving to the fore almost everywhere. A good example for this is France, which has moved from initial voluntarism toward the obligatory and coercive pole, though stopping short of the Dutch extreme. While the inuence of the Dutch example is explicit and incontrovertible (see HCI 2001: 478), the principle of civic integration, in which newcomers are asked to adopt a shared standard of language and values, certainly resonates closely with the traditional philosophy of republican assimilation (see Favell 1998). It is therefore all the more astonishing, and epitomising the previous inaction of the state in matters of immigrant integration, that the earliest incarnation of French civic integration appeared only in the late 1990s: the plates-formes daccueil (introduction platforms), voluntary half-day instruction for certain categories of newcomers (originally only family migrants), which were introduced by the socialist Jospin government in 1998. In July 2003, the Gaullist Raarin government launched the more ambitious Contrats daccueil et de lintegration (CAI) programme, which has evidently taken its cue from the Dutch example (see HCI 2001: 478). It consists of one day of civics instruction, followed (when deemed necessary) by 500 hours of French language instruction. Interestingly, only about onethird of the 150,000 expected newcomers in 2006 (rst expected year of full operation of the new policy) are targeted for enrolment in a French language course.9 The francophone background of the majority of newcomers to France evidently is an asset that positively distinguishes the French from the Dutch or German civic integration challenges, where

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language acquisition is a much more pressing concern. While this might lead to a lesser emphasis on the earlier (as against the later) phase(s) of immigrant integration, there has also been a countervailing consideration. As the Cour des Comptes (2004: 125) outlined, with an eye on the French distaste for ethnic-origin classication, accueil (reception) constitutes the only moment in the integration process where the targeted public can be easily designated without creating a legitimacy problem for public action. Overall, there is a remarkable explicitness on the part of the French state that CAI and the reform of accueil constitutes one of two pillars of a comprehensive re-founding of the French politics of integration, the other pillar being the struggle against discrimination, the rst targeting the beginning, the latter the end of the integration process (see HCI 2003). Compared with the Dutch case, the coercive side of French civic integration was slower in moving to the fore. While in the rst year of CAIs existence about 90 per cent of eligible newcomers signed an integration contract, only 65 per cent of those who were prescribed a French language course followed up on this.10 This has provided impetus for making CAI obligatory. The track for this was in principle set in the rst Loi Sarkozy of November 2003, which drastically restricted access to legal permanent residence, and which made the receipt of a ten-year residence card dependent on lintegration republicaine, dened in the law as connaissance de la langue francaise et des principes qui regissent la Republique francaise (quoted in Lochak 2004: 2). Most importantly, family migrants (spouses and minor children), who previously had direct access to a ten-year residence card (or at least the same residence status as the sponsor), now would receive only a temporary card for one year, and only after two years could they apply for the all-important ten-year card, subject to the integration republicaine proviso. As in the Netherlands, the intention behind making civil integration obligatory is to ght ethnic endogamy, referred to by Sarkozy as communautarisme parfaitement clanique (in Lochak 2004: 4). As Sarkozy further outlined the rationale: Ce que nous voulons, cest obliger celui qui fait venir, dans le cadre du regroupement familial, une personne, laquelle est generalement sa femme, a lui permettre dapprendre le francais et de sinserer dans notre societe (ibid.). Attacked by Lochak as perversion de la logique et de lequite, this amounts to a double illiberalism in pursuit of a liberal goal: not just directly obliging a person to become autonomous, which is the usual rationale of civic integration, but employing patriarchy and third-party pressure (of husbands) to oblige another person (his wife) to be free. While the rst Loi Sarkozy did not specify how integration francaise was to be formally determined, the next logical step was to determine such integration in terms of the integration contract (CAI), and to make the latter obligatory for a ten-year residence card. This move promptly occurred in a new immigration law passed under Sarkozys second spell as interior minister, in spring 2006. The

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comprehensive law of immigration and integration, whose grand purpose is to fashion the face of France for the next 30 years,11 epitomises the general logic of Europes current transformation of immigration and integration policy. In Sarkozys terms, the new law is to bring about a fundamental change from unwanted (subie) to chosen immigration. This implies an opening for high-skilled migrants, and a parallel closing for presumably low-skilled family and asylum migrants. With respect to the rst, the second Loi Sarkozy creates a new three-year (and renewable) resident card Competences et talents for migrants who are likely to foster economic development and to strengthen the standing (rayonnement) of France, while the entry and post-graduation stay conditions for foreign students are facilitated. However, the new chosen immigration is not to occur in addition to but in lieu of existing ows, of which in 2004 a staggering 73 per cent consisted of family migration.12 Here, in addition to adjusting to the exigencies of economic globalisation, the second, countervailing vector shaping Europes wholesale immigration revirement comes into play: to appease anti-immigrant publics. Sarkozy formulated it in terms of carrying back one by one the voters of Le Pens National Front into the Republican family.13 Ironically, national family values are meant to be reinforced by a wholesale attack on existing rights of family reunication, which for the rst time targets French citizens also. This is because out of the 102,662 family migrants in 2004 only 25 per cent joined a non-citizen, while the vast majority joined a French citizen. In socio-demographic terms, family reunication is now mostly between French-born second-generation ethnics, who are French citizens, and a person from their country of origin, the absolute number of such marriages having more than tripled between 1997 and 2004, from 15,000 to 50,000.14 France has now joined the group of those countries, like the Netherlands and Britain, which limit the family rights of citizens for the sake of more eective migration control. Accordingly, non-French spouses of French citizens will need to wait three (instead of two) years before being able to apply for a ten-year resident card, and they will have to prove that they entered on a long-term visa issued by a consulate or embassy abroad (which is to stop the current practice of entering visa-free and applying for resident status later); furthermore, the minimum cohabitation time for naturalisation has been increased from two to four years. Most importantly, the foreign spouses of French citizens also, like all new entrants, will have to full the general integration requirements as set out by the new law. According to this third pillar of the new law, the CAI has been transformed from a nice contract into an ardent obligation.15 That means that all new entrants above 16 years are obliged to enter into an integration contract, and having passed its requirements, including a French language test, is now obligatory for the renewal of residence permits, including obtaining the all-important ten-year card that establishes permanent residence rights.

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The socialist opposition vehemently objected to the non-equilibrated character of this forced contract (contrat leonin).16 In fact, rendering the integration contract obligatory constituted a defeat of domesticating civic integration in terms of framing it as a continuation of French Republicanism. Instead, France was now exposed as simply toeing the increasingly coercive European line on this issue. Before this development, the notion of contract, which was rather casually deployed for the civic integration schemes in the Netherlands and other European countries, was viewed rather more philosophically in France. For the president of the Haut Conseil dIntegration, Blandine Kriegel, the integration contract was inscribed in the French tradition of the contrat social.17 Thus approximated to the foundation of the French Republic, the integration contract could not be forced upon the migrant; otherwise it would not be a contract. A contract creates obligations but logically it cannot itself be an obligation. Accordingly, the Haut Conseils (2001) initial proposal for an integration contract, which would marquer la volonte de limmigre de sinserer dans la societe daccueil (p. 60), strongly insisted that it had to be voluntary. If HCI chief Blandine Kriegel had once celebrated the integration contract as a continuation of the French model, untainted by any foreign inuences,18 this national model refashioning of civic integration was wiped o the table by the de facto annihilation of the contractual element in it. Germany While there was some denial of the non-domestic roots of the contrats dintegration in France, reference to the Dutch model lent even more legitimacy to the introduction of similar Integrationskurse (integration courses) in Germany. Faithful to its post-nationalism, Germany, in a move opposite to France, tended to repress the indigenous sources of the new approach in its Aussiedler policy. Since the 1990s Germany had oered language courses to would-be ethnic migrants in Eastern Europe and Russia, which prepared them for a status test that had to be passed before they were entitled to immigrate to Germany, and after arrival there was additional state-funded language instruction and civic orientation for a period of six months. The new Integrationskurse, whose focus is likewise on language acquisition, simply extend to non-EU, non-ethnic migrants a programme that had been in place already for ethnic Germans. The true novelty of the Integrationskurse is that ethnic and non-ethnic migrants are now enrolled in the same programme of 600 hours of German language instruction and 30 hours of civics instruction. This has also been the last stab against the old notion that ethnic migration was not immigration but a homecoming of co-ethnics, to be processed in a separate legal regime (for the latter, see Joppke 2005: ch. 4). However, the inuence of the Aussiedler paradigm shows in the reluctance to follow the obligatory and coercive tilt of the Dutch model. Since the idea

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of Integrationskurse was rst introduced in the so-called Sussmuth Commission of 2001 (which prepared the ground for the 2004 German immigration law), the right to participate was stressed, though it was never in doubt that attendance of an integration course was also to be obligatory. The Sussmuth Commission (2001: 260) wanted to eat the cake and have it too: [T]he courses should be obligatory; however, penalties in the case of non-attendance . . . cannot be implemented and are not practicable. How can there be an obligation without penalties? The same twisted logic is visible in the few clauses of the 2004 Immigration Law (Zuwanderungsgesetz) that deal with the promotion of integration and lay out the design of the integration courses. Article 43 creates an entitlement to participate for non-EU newcomers. Article 43a, in turn, creates an obligation to participate for those who are entitled according to the preceding clause but who cannot conduct a simple oral conversation in German language (this obligation extends to settled migrants who are dependent on welfare). According to this bizarre construct, newcomers are at the same time entitled and obliged to enrol in an integration course. If there was debate surrounding the new policy, it focused on the question of sanctions (positive or negative?) and who is to pay (the migrant or the state, and if the latter, the federal state, the Land or the commune?). The dividing line on both questions was the usual one, the conservative camp (CDU/CSU) pushing for a hard line of negative sanctions and user pays, and the majority in the ruling SPD and the Greens, in line with the recommendations of the Sussmuth Commission (2001: 2605), opting for positive incentives and wanting the federal state and the Lander to pay. In the end, a compromise was reached on both questions. The bulk of the costs are carried by the federal state, while migrants are required to pay only a modest fee, one euro per course hour (however, in the case of economic hardship this requirement may be waived). An element of positive sanctions remains, in that in the case of successful participation in an integration course the residence requirement for as-of-right naturalisation is lowered from eight to seven years. There is a larger catalogue of negative sanctions. With respect to nancial penalties, there is a (modest) cutting of social benets in the case of non-attendance. With respect to the denial of residence permits, an elastic formula was inserted in the 2004 Immigration Law (Article 8.3) that non-compliance can lead to the non-renewal of a temporary or the denial of a permanent residence permit, provided that these permits are discretionary. This is a can with considerable strings attached (especially existing family and other social ties in the Federal Republic have to be considered), so that it is not likely to cut much ice.19 Most importantly, family migrants are not at all aected by this sanction, because their entitlement to a residence permit is not discretionary, but grounded in constitutional law. Considering that, much as in the Netherlands or France, the majority of newcomers to Germany are arriving as family migrants, the rough edges of the civic integration

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policy do not apply to them (see Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2005a: 208). However, the German integration debate is rapidly evolving, with a coercive turn looming large on the horizon. In May 2006, after intense debates on so-called honour killings in the Turkish immigrant milieu and shocking separatism and ethnic violence in a Berlin public school, the German interior ministers agreed on making the attendance of civic integration courses and the passing of standard language tests a prerequisite for naturalisation. It appears logical to apply to citizenship what is already required for ordinary residence, and this German innovation is likely to spread to other civic integration countries too. However, if applied to citizenship, civic integration reverses a previous trend toward liberalisation across continental Europe, which was incidentally crowned by Germanys great citizenship reform of 1999. Moreover, learning from the Dutch, which had previously been the diction of the multicultural left, is now paraded with unrestrained Schadenfreude by a conservative interior minister, Wolfgang Schauble (CDU); among the new proposals currently circulating in his ministry is Dutch-style integration from abroad for family migrants.20 Civic Integration as Repressive Liberalism Despite obvious national variation in the scope and level of restrictiveness of civic integration policies across Europe, a focus on obligation (and reverse de-emphasis on rights) is a shared feature of all of them. Desmond King (1999: 18) argued that a balance between rights and duties is inherent in liberal contractualism, and that at times this balance could shift decidedly towards duties. Civic integration is an instance, next to eugenics and workfare policies, of illiberal social policy in a liberal state. Kings important insight is that such policies are not born of sources extrinsic to liberalism, such as nationalism or racism, but are inherent in liberalism itself. For instance, liberalisms core tenets of freedom and equality presuppose that members of the polity possess the necessary reasoning powers or ability to . . . plan for their future (ibid.: 8). This creates illiberal temptations with respect to those who do not meet these criteria. By the same token, it would be misleading to interpret civic integration toward immigrants as a rebirth of nationalism or racism. These policies are carefully observing the dividing line between integration, which leaves the ethical orientation of the migrant intact, and assimilation, which does not. As the French Haut Conseil dIntegration (2003: 106) put it: lintegration civique doit respecter lidentite de chacun et se demarquer de lassimilation; it is limited to enseigner aux nouveaux arrivants . . . la loi commune, autrement dit la Constitution (p. 85). Whereas the Netherlands have recently become more aggressive in imposing Dutch norms and values (Musso-van der Velde 2005: 2), the only provocative part in this campaign,

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when disseminated in the form of an instructional video for integration abroad, were pictures of kissing men, rock concerts, and women with naked breasts and they were promptly censored for Islamic viewers.21 In the Manual for Germany, which is distributed to newcomers by the German commissioner for foreigner aairs, one can read, under the rubric Art and Culture. that Cafes serve espresso, cappuccino and cafe au lait, that [p]otatoes are served as a side dish along with French baguettes and Turkish at bread, and that German popular music is heavily inuenced by American music (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung 2005b: 28). The diction of these statements is cognitive rather than normative, with no expectation that newcomers share such preferences; in addition, every attempt is evidently made to dilute distinct German traits in such art and culture. This is not to underrate the exclusionary, even discriminatory possibilities inherent in civic integration, which may be depicted in terms of the liberal state as one for liberal people only. If the Dutch governments information DVD for integration abroad originally included pictures of nude women, this would be meaningless information if not specically targeting Muslim audiences for whom such footage is known to be an aront.22 An even more obvious example of discrimination-minded civic integration is the so-called Gesprachsleitfaden (Interview Guideline) for examining citizenship applicants, which was introduced by the German Land government of BadenWurttemberg in early 2006. Targeting only citizenship applicants from 57 Muslim states, this Gesprachsleitfaden consists of 30 questions that should help determine whether an applicants formal acceptance of liberaldemocratic values, which is required by German nationality law, corresponds to his or her real convictions.23 All questions are formulated in terms of a binary opposition between liberal democracy and a certain idea of Islam, as prescribing or condoning arranged marriage, patriarchy, homophobia, veiling and terrorism (e.g. question 23: You heard about the assaults on 11 September 2001 in New York and on 11 March 2004 in Madrid. Were the protagonists in your eyes terrorists or freedom ghters? Elaborate on your statement).24 While one may see insult in the transparency of such questions (and correspondingly low intelligence imputed to citizenship candidates), their discriminatory edge consists of interpreting . . . the liberal-democratic order primarily in opposition to the presumed values of a specic group, as a legal evaluation of the Gesprachsleitfaden for the city of Heidelberg put it (Wolfrum and Roeben 2006). In other words, such liberalism is nothing but a device for excluding a specic group, Muslims. Overall, Western European immigrant integration is shaped by two opposite, perhaps contradictory types of liberalism. On the one side, there is Rawlsian liberalism, with its emphasis on equality, individual rights and neutrality; this is the liberalism that has moved states from assimilation to integration, and that requires states to assure a modicum of equality for all members of society, nding expression in upgraded alien rights

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(Joppke 2001), liberalised citizenship laws (Hansen and Weil 2001), and anti-discrimination laws and policies (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004), all of which have proliferated across Europe in the past two decades or so. However, civic integration policies for newcomers reveal the parallel existence of a liberalism of power and disciplining, which has found much attention in a recent Foucault-inspired literature on governmentality and neoliberalism (for representative statements, see Dean 1999 and Rose 1999). In the optic of this Foucauldian liberalism, the contemporary state, hollowed out by economic globalisation, is coercing individuals, as well as the communities of which they are a part, to release their self-producing and -regulating capacities, as an alternative to redistribution and public welfare that scally diminished states can no longer deliver. Civic integration is the equivalent on the part of immigrants to the workfare policies that the general population is subjected to in the context of shrinking welfare states (for the latter, see Handler 2004), seeking to make people both self-sucient and autonomous by illiberal means. Because immigrants are at the intersection of dierent nation-state societies, one is inclined to interpret repressive policies toward them in nationalist or racist terms. However, this has the smell of yesteryear liberal constitutionalism rules out these possibilities. Instead, the repressive impulse, at least at the level of state policy, now stems from liberalism itself this is the distinct contribution of the Foucault-inspired reading of liberalism. Already John Stuart Mill had limited liberalism to human beings in the maturity of their faculties, thus excluding all those who could not meet these requirements; and those not meeting these requirements could be induced to acquire them through by denition illiberal means. Accordingly, for barbarians despotism was a legitimated mode of government, provided its purpose was these hapless fellows improvement (in Dean 1999: 133). Contemporary civic integration or workfare policies are of the same kind, because illiberal means are put to the service of liberal goals. A dierence, however, exists with respect to the context of repressive liberalism then and now, which is no longer an autarchic nation-state (the context of empire, as in Mills example of the good despot, did not much change this), but a global competition state. This endows the notion of integration with a heavy dose of economic instrumentalism. In an intriguing analysis of changing public school curricula in Britain, Canada and the US, Katharyne Mitchell (2003) found that the vision of good citizenship to be inculcated by public education is no longer centred on the national if multicultural self but on the strategic cosmopolitan, who can function in any national setting. The perceived need to master global competition is indeed one reason why old group narratives of multiculturalism, perhaps nationalisms historical rearguard (in this sense, Favell 1998), are giving way to a new focus on the individual and her autonomy and self-suciency.

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Symptomatic in this respect is the centrality of employment in Europes contemporary immigrant integration policies. As the European Commission observed in its rst Annual Report on Migration and Integration, access to employment has become the most important political priority within national integration policies (European Commission 2004: 5). On one level, this priority is as old as the hills, consonant with Brechts belly-centred ethic of Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral (Eating rst, morality second). However, on a more subtle level this also displays a novel sense of integration in the post-national state, as social inclusion, which is itself subordinate to the exigencies of globalisation. In the European Union, for instance, the combat against social exclusion is not free-standing but tied to the global competition goal, formulated within the so-called Lisbon strategy, of making the Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. From this perspective, even anti-discrimination laws and policies, as envisioned by the EU Race Directive, do not so much aim at equality as allow a full utilisation of societys resources in the global competition. As Eichenhofer (2005: 2) put it, these people (women, handicapped, aged, and ethnic minorities) are to be fully included in society and labour market of the member states, not least in order to reduce the costs for social protection or welfare. Overall, social inclusion becomes narrowly tied to the labour market rather than the nation-state at large, motivated by the image of society as a machinery of performance (Haahr 2004: 225). In its economic instrumentalism, integration as social inclusion is a world apart from classic nation-building as cultural homogenisation. However, there is still a perfectionist dimension to it, and one with paternalist, obligation-imposing possibilities, in the sense that being in work is not just a means for an income, but is seen as of intrinsic importance to an individuals well-being, and thus to be pursued, or imposed, for its own sake. The main purpose of social inclusion is social cohesion, that is, order, not justice. This distinguishes social inclusion, as a Foucauldian liberalism, from the Rawlsian liberalism of equal opportunities, which had been the lode star of the classic welfare state: Whereas the aim of equality of opportunity seeks to put people in a position in which they are able to participate in the economy and other aspects of social life, the aim of social inclusion also seems to include an element that sometimes requires people to become included. There are no rights without responsibilities. (Collins 2003: 24f) Social inclusion is not about equality: Social inclusion does not seek the same . . . outcomes for citizens. It concentrates its attention . . . on the absolute disadvantage of particular groups in society (ibid.: 22). It is thus obvious that social inclusion, like the entire project of integrating immigrants, is still a statist project, perhaps to rescue the

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nation-state in an age of post-nationalism (Favell 2005). The labour-market focus of social inclusion ts in with this, because autonomous (non-statedependent) individuals increase the competitiveness of states as axiomatically assumed survival units in the global context. Interestingly, while the state elites devising such policies are increasingly part of cross-border spanning professional networks and aliations (see Slaughter 1997), the opposite thrust of civic integration policies is to lock the low-skilled immigrant more rmly into established state borders. Consonant with Alan Milwards (1992) original European rescue of the nation-state scenario, even EC migration policies are serving member states purpose of locking in the immigrants: Article 15.3 of the Long-Term Residents Directive of November 2003 allows member states to apply their integration measures to long-term residents from another EU state, if only with respect to attend[ing] language courses. Cumulative integration requirements, which of course do not exist for EU citizens, erect a signicant hurdle on free movement for Europes settled immigrant populations, and this within a measure whose declared purpose had been to remove such hurdles. However, a Foucauldian perspective of repressive liberalism should not be pushed too far. Rather than springing from generic features of a neoliberal state that is seen as achendeckend engaged in a coercive privatisation of social reproduction, civic integration policies are not all of one piece. Instead, the dierent contours of these policies in dierent states reect other than statist variables the leftright balance of the political forces or the demographic prole of migrants, among other possibilities. The Netherlands, pressured by a uniquely strong right-wing populist movement, went further than other European states in expanding the repressive dimension of civic integration, whereas in other states, such as Germany, the obligatory thrust of this policy has (so far) remained more subdued, the policy (still) bearing more resemblance to remedial settlement aids for newcomers. Moreover, only in the Netherlands has the policy became truly privatised, as neoliberalism would have it, in making migrants fully responsible and paying for their integration. In France, by contrast, there was no question that in the re-founding of integration policy the state had to be rendered its traditional place in guaranteeing national unity.25 The supercial contractual element in civic integration even allowed the policy to be associated with a rejuvenation of French republicanism, creating a space for opposing the (nevertheless triumphant) obligatory and repressive trend of the policy. Moreover, if one asks why long-established newcomer reception policies in classic immigrant nations, like Canada and Australia, have remained optional and voluntary, while the newly established European policies in this area are overall marked by a repressive tone, an alleged logic of the neoliberal state cannot be an answer to this. Instead, a plausible explanation must centre on the dierent ways of selecting newcomers in the transoceanic immigrant nations and in Europe. Canada and Australia

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select predominantly highly skilled, resourceful, and language-competent immigrants, which removes the point of coercive integration. The majority of migrants to Europe, by contrast, are not selected at all, but they enter on the basis of rights through family reunication and asylum. Because a majority of these migrants are unskilled and (with the exception of France) not procient in the language of the receiving societies, and often directly become dependent on welfare, they pose serious adjustment problems. In sum, the obligatory and repressive dimension of civic integration in Europe cannot be decoupled from the non-selected quality of most of its immigrants. The comparison of civic integration policies in the Netherlands, France and Germany revealed signicant variation in their respective national interpretations and implementations. Does this not conrm the persistence of national models of integration, and thus refute the central claim of this paper? Unsurprisingly, the answer must be no. Most of the observed variation runs counter to what the national models (or rather, accumulated stereotypes about a respective country and its policy) would predict. The multicultural Netherlands adopted the most repressive variant of civic integration. Republican France, where the degree of articulation of its philosophy of integration is still unmatched, now submits to Rawlsian political liberalism (HCI 2003) that shuns cultural assimilation, while its pragmatic stress on the principle of becoming rapidly autonomous betrays an acceptance of the otherwise despised tenets of neoliberalism (HCI 2001: 49). And segregationist Germany has adopted the (hitherto) least control-minded, most Canadian variant of civic integration; even the nastier possibilities that seem to be brewing there would only bring Germany more rmly in line with its European neighbours, most notably the Netherlands. Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge helpful suggestions by two reviewers for this journal.

Notes
1. The 2,500 page report, chaired by Liberal Party MP Stef Blok, was published in January 2004, under the title Building Bridges. See Migration News Sheet, February 2004, p. 25. 2. Interview with Nicolas Sarkozy, LExpress, 19 January 2004. 3. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 November 2004. 4. Other common basic principles of integration policy not further discussed here are: education, inter-cultural dialogue, political participation (especially at local level), the mainstreaming of integration policies in other policy portfolios, and the development of better indicators and evaluation mechanisms. 5. EU migrants are exempted through European Community law (because it would constitute discrimination on the basis of nationality), and the citizens of most developed OECD

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countries (such as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan) are exempted through bilateral treaties. However, this removal occurred only because an opinion by the Council of State, the highest judicial body in the Netherlands, on the controversial extension of the integration test to so-called oudkomers was still pending; should the Court approve of this, the matter will inevitably be back on the legislative agenda (Migration News Sheet, August 2006, p. 26). In 2003, 8090 per cent of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese immigrants arrived in the Netherlands on the family ticket (Migration News Sheet, October 2005, p. 24). Migration News Sheet, July 2005, p. 26. Le Figaro, 19 May 2004. Le Figaro, 27 September 2004. Nicolas Sarkozy, quoted in Le Figaro, 3 May 2006. Immigration familiale: les faits, Le Monde, 5 January 2006. Nicolas Sarkozy, quoted in La Croix, 4 May 2006. Interview with Nicolas Sarkozy, Le Monde, 28 April 2006. These are the words of Thiery Mariani (UMP), when presenting the second Sarkozy bill in parliament. Quoted in Leducation civique et linguistique adoptee, Liberation, 5 May 2006. LAssemblee rend obligatoire le contrat daccueil et dintegration, Agence France Presse, 4 May 2006. Interview with Blandine Kriegel, Le Figaro, 11 December 2004. Ibid. See the critical review, Die Integrations-Industrie, Die Welt, 7 July 2004. Interview with German Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schauble (CDU), Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 12 March 2006, p. 4. Ol ins Feuer, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 July 2005, p. 3. Even in its censored version, only the pictures, not the words, were changed. Quoted from a press declaration by the interior ministry of Baden-Wurttemberg, Spiegel Online 3 January 2006 (Sonderbefragung fur Muslime, by Christine Xuan Muller and Anna Reimann). The Gespra chsleitfaden is reprinted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 January 2006, p. 3. From the statement by Social Aairs Minister Francois Fillon, Assemblee nationale, 155th session, 10 February 2004.

6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

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16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

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