FOI-R--1255--SE June 2004 ISSN 1650-1942

User report

Stephan Sjberg

The evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the past, adapted for the future

Defence Analysis SE-172 90 Stockholm

SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY Defence Analysis SE-172 90 Stockholm

FOI-R--1255--SE June 2004 ISSN 1650-1942

User report

Stephan Sjberg

The evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the past, adapted for the future

Issuing organization FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency Defence Analysis SE-172 90 Stockholm

Report number, ISRN FOI-R--1255--SE Research area code

Report type User report

1. Defence and Security Policy Month year Project no. June 2004 Customers code 1. Policy Support to the Government Sub area code 11 Policy Support to the Government (Defence) A1111

Author/s (editor/s) Stephan Sjberg

Project manager Magnus Norell / Karin Strberg Approved by Maria Hedvall Sponsoring agency Ministry of Defence Scientifically and technically responsible Ltcol Hans Alm / Dr Leo Bartonek

Report title The evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the past, adapted for the future Abstract (not more than 200 words) The focus on Special Forces is increasing today; notably after the Afghanistan intervention. The use of these units has changed character after the end of the Cold War according to the changing environment. This research study describes the evolution of the French Special Forces, from being split and de-centralised between several units/organisations within the armed forces to becoming a centralised, joint tool of strategic importance. The first part of the study is focused on experiences drawn from the first Gulf war and the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command: COS. The concept of employment, the organisation and also the thoughts behind the COS is also described. The second part of the study focuses on how COS-units have been used and adapted for new threats; threats often found in the grey-zone between the military and police activity, and also threats in foreign low intensity conflicts.

Keywords Special Forces, France, low intensity conflicts, international operations Further bibliographic information Language English

ISSN 1650-1942

Pages 55 p. Price acc. to pricelist

Utgivare Totalfrsvarets Forskningsinstitut - FOI Frsvarsanalys 172 90 Stockholm

Rapportnummer, ISRN Klassificering FOI-R--1255--SE Anvndarrapport Forskningsomrde 1. Frsvar- och skerhetspolitik Mnad, r Projektnummer Juni 2004 Verksamhetsgren 1. Forskning fr regeringens behov Delomrde 11 Frsvarsforskning fr regeringens behov A1111

Frfattare/redaktr Stephan Sjberg

Projektledare Magnus Norell / Karin Strberg Godknd av Maria Hedvall Uppdragsgivare/kundbeteckning Frsvarsdepartementet Tekniskt och/eller vetenskapligt ansvarig vlt Hans Alm / Dr Leo Bartonek

Rapportens titel (i versttning) Utvecklingen av de franska specialfrbanden: Erfarenheter frn frr anpassade fr framtiden Sammanfattning (hgst 200 ord) Fokus p specialfrband har kat i vr nrtid; srskilt efter interventionen i Afghanistan. Nyttjandet av dessa frband har ndrat karaktr efter slutet av Kalla Kriget i takt med den frndrade vrldsordningen. Denna rapport beskriver utvecklingen av de franska specialfrbanden, frn att ha varit decentraliserade och splittrade mellan olika frband och niver inom Frsvarsmakten till att bli en centraliserad, frsvarsmaktsgemensam resurs med strategisk betydelse. Den frsta delen av rapporten fokuserar p erfarenheter dragna frn det frsta Gulfkriget och skapandet av den frsvarsmaktsgemensamma specialfrbandsledningen COS. Koncept, organisation och ven tankar bakom skapandet beskrivs. Den andra delen av rapporten beskriver hur COS-frband har nyttjats och hur de har anpassats mot nya hotbilder; hotbilder som ofta har en karaktr av att ligga i grnslandet mellan vad som r traditionellt militrt och traditionellt polisirt. Anpassningen mot hotbilder i lgintensiva konflikter beskrivs ocks.

FOI1004 Utgva 11 2002.02 www.signon.se Sign On AB

Nyckelord Specialfrband, Frankrike, lgintensiva konflikter, internationella operationer vriga bibliografiska uppgifter Sprk Engelska

ISSN 1650-1942 Distribution enligt missiv

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The evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the past, adapted for the future

Research study by Capt. Stephan Sjberg, Swedish Defence Forces Under the direction of Dr. Magnus Norell, director of the Centre for the study of Low Intensity Conflicts and Terrorism (CLIENT) Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)
Abstract: The focus on Special Forces is increasing today; notably after the Afghanistan intervention. The use of these units has changed character after the end of the Cold War according to the changing environment. This research study describes the evolution of the French Special Forces, from being split and de-centralised between several units/organisations within the armed forces to becoming a centralised, joint tool of strategic importance. The first part of the study is focused on experiences drawn from the first Gulf war and the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command: COS. The concept of employment, the organisation and also the thoughts behind the COS is also described. The second part of the study focuses on how COS-units have been used and adapted for new threats; threats often found in the grey-zone between the military and police activity, and also threats in foreign low intensity conflicts.

Stockholm 2004

In memory of General Jean Pons.

Among those who have helped me I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Jean-Pierre Marichy and the late General Jean Pons. Without their help and support this study would not have been possible to realise.

Introduktion
Stephan Sjbergs rapport, The Evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the past adapted for the future, utgr en del i en strre studie som behandlar militra specialfrband och deras nyttjande. Den frsta delen behandlar svenska SSG (Srskilda Skyddsgruppen) och utkom i december 2001 (Norell, Magnus och Strberg, Karin). Studien, Special Forces in International Operations Challenge for the Future, var den frsta delen av detta arbete. Ett arbete om brittiska specialfrband har ocks presenterats. I en snar framtid kommer ven ett arbete rrande specialfrband i Sveriges direkta nromrde att presenteras. Tanken med den vergripande studien r att beskriva dessa styrkors organisatoriska utveckling och ven beskriva deras potential och/eller nuvarande roll i aspekten terroristbekmpning. Sjbergs uppsats fyller en viktig uppgift d den p ett bra stt belyser en hittills tmligen oknd del av en europeisk stormakts militra frband. Frankrike har p olika stt, bde historiskt och fr nrvarande, utsatts fr direkta terroristhot bde inom och utanfr egen grns, och anvndandet av just specialfrband som ett av flera verktyg att anvndas bde i kontraoch antiterroristoperationer r omdiskuterat. Sjbergs uppsats berr ven denna politiska bakomliggande diskussion. Nutidens och sannolikt ven framtidens operationsomrden med tillhrande hotbilder har och kommer med stor sannolikhet att karaktriseras av icke-statliga aktrer som agerar utanfr ramarna fr internationell rtt och utan respekt fr krigets lagar. Frankrike, som en nation med stor erfarenhet av interventioner i denna milj utgr ett logiskt val fr en jmfrande studie mellan Sverige och andra nationer. Vad avser specialfrbandsutveckling har svenska och franska specialfrband dessutom nyligen nyttjats tillsammans i denna milj. Vikten av att belysa just franska specialfrband har ocks sin grund i att Frankrike stndigt tydligt visar en mycket hg ambitionsniv avseende EUs kris- och konflikthanteringsfrmga. Drigenom r det sannolikt att Frankrike ven i framtiden kommer att utgra en viktig samarbetspartner fr Sverige. I tjnsten April 2004 Magnus Norell Direktor, CLIENT FOI

The evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the past, adapted for the future
Introduction

I : The Joint Special Operations Command (COS) : Response to a need in the Post-Cold War era

1.1 Role of the Special Forces according to the new formula of the strategic functions..p. 7 1.1.1 The White Paper and the Defence Program Plan ..............p. 7 1.1.2 The strategic functions...p. 9

1.2 Concept of employment..p. 15 1.2.1 Master claims for Special Operations and Special Forces.p. 16 1.2.2 Reflection of a national interest.....p. 17 1.2.3 Disposability..p. 18 1.2.4 Autonomy..p. 18 1.2.5 Discretion...p. 19 1.2.6 The strategy of segmentation.p. 19

1.3 Grouping and today characteristics of the COS and the Special Forces.p. 21 1.3.1 The COS: A joint command for special operations.......p. 21 1.3.2 The First circle...p. 24 1.3.3 The outer circles.p. 29

II : A flexible use in international operations

2.1 The time before the Gulf - Lack of a co-ordinated tool..p. 32 2.1.1 The historical origins of the SF..p. 32

2.2 Experiences from the Gulf and the creation of the COS........p. 34 2.2.1 A painful lesson for France....p. 34 2.2.2 The creation of the COS....p. 35 2.2.3 A unique solution...p. 38

2.3 Somalia : A new experience on a well known theatre....p. 40 2.3.1 The first large scale operationp. 40 2.3.2 Lessons learned from Somalia...p. 42

2.4 Moving into the future with an appropriated tool...p. 44 2.4.1 Afghanistanp. 44 2.4.2 Changing conditions..p. 45 2.4.3 The Ivory Coast..p. 46 2.4.4 An increasing use of SF in the grey zone?.....p. 47

General conclusion

Bibliography

Front page: Special Forces taking control of the cargo-ship Winner in the Mediterranean Sea.

The evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the past adapted for the future

Introduction The main purpose of this research study is to present the development of the French Special Forces (SF), their characteristics and how they are used in operations. Priority will be given to organisational choices, concept of employment and a description of what today is defined as Special Forces. A part of this approach is also described in a previous project by this author.1 The study of these units in one or another specific operation is limited as we find it more important to describe the thoughts behind the creation, training and employment of this strategic, military function. To understand these thoughts a brief historical recapitulation is needed. This is a survey of existing information concerning the subject. Information used in this study is mainly connected in some way or another to the French institutions. Articles from different magazines have also been used. Even if these does not have the same credibility as other sources they give us an idea of events and conditions. Conclusions are drawn out of this survey, answering to the question: How are French Special Forces used and how have they been developed? The study is limited to what is defined as SF of open and covert activity2. Only military SF are described; meaning SF from the army, the navy and the air force. The approach chosen in this study is the role of the French SF as actors with strategic impact. Therefore, the project will not take into account questions such as specific equipmentproblematique, detailed descriptions of training phases and other similar areas. It will however explain the consequence for a specific strategic concept. In some cases, these local matters have an important impact on the strategic level and in these cases these factors will be described. Worth mentioning is also the difficulty of distinguishing the tactical level from the strategic level. Per definition, SF are only used as a strategic tool, as there is no level of tactic
Research study from FOI-course by Stephan Sjberg, "Maktdelning och samordning i Frankrike: En omjlig kombination i kampen mot terrorism?", Stockholm, (2001), p. 21. 2 According to the definition given by Gray, (1996), pp. 144 - 149.
1

use for them. Each operation has an impact of strategic importance, but problems on a unit level may always be the final factor for success or failure. Fast-growing technical development will also culminate with the concerns of the following levels (tactical - operative - strategic) which will be briefly described. Even though these technical systems are of vital importance for the realisation of the operations, they are seen as systems developed due to the choice of strategic concept. The character of these elite Special Forces is, and has in history always been, marked by a high level of discretion. This is the primary reason that books and articles that are written about them often are based on the writer's own hypotheses and conclusions and they are seldom of high credibility. This constraint of reliable information has been obvious during the research. Even with the secrecy concerns of the SF, some official documents have been published with acceptance and co-operation of the armed forces. These documents combined with interviews with personnel connected to the subject3 are the main sources of information. Being that it is of a discrete nature (without being secret) some references in some parts of the study have preferred to be anonymous. None of the persons interviewed will be cited. References can therefore not indicate the actual source in a direct way. This concerns the paper in general. The French SF-units can be traced long back in history and the lack of reliable information is probably the only constraint of accurately dictating its early history. In this study, we have chosen to present the SF in the post-Cold War era and notably their development during this era. This was chosen because of the changing needs for these units after the bi-polar era; and the actuality of these needs and adapting of today. These needs and future operational applications are of great importance for the development of the Swedish SF. This study is presented by Captain Stephan Sjberg of the Swedish Armed Forces who has been studying International Relations and International Security at the Institute for Political Studies (FR: IEP, Institut d'Etudes Politiques) in Toulouse, France. He holds a French Masters in International Relations and International Security (FR: DEA, Diplme d'Etudes Approfondies). The project is a part of an initiative taken by the Swedish Ministry of Defence. Sjberg is also working for FOI/CLIENT.

The first part will give an approach of the Special Forces with regard to their strategic functions in the French defence policy. What importance and impact does these units have according to these functions? Is the activity of the Special Forces adaptable to these strategic functions? As the project concerns the post-Cold War era the continuation of the first part will be the experiences France has drawn in this era of new interests connected with new threats. The concept of employment is described and connected to missions conducted in the past and also the characteristics of the Joint Special Operations Command (FR: COS, Commandement des Operations Spciales) today. The second part will bring attention to how France has been using its Special Forces in operations: international as well as national operations. The creation of the COS will be of major importance in this part, but a focus will also be on the past - the time before the creation of the COS. The final chapter describes recent operations in Afghanistan and the Ivory Coast, as they might give a hint to how the units can be used in the future and what might be the future constraints and solutions for them.

See Bibliography: Interviews, p. 48.

Part I : The Joint Special Operations Command (COS) : Response to a need in the postCold War era

1.1 Role of the Special Forces according to the new formula of the strategic functions The first chapter will briefly describe how the French political environment is shaping the defence policy. Furthermore, the definition, and in some aspects also the evolution of, the French strategic concept will be highlighted. Finally, the role for the SF according to this strategic concept will be presented and illustrated with examples from the past. 1.1.1 The White Paper and the Defence Program Plan The creation of the White Paper concerning the defence in 1994 (FR: Livre Blanc sur la dfense) became the official step towards the new world order for France.4 It is meant to describe the evolution of the international arena to which the French defence politics has to face for a 15 - 20 year period. For the first time in history there was no direct military threat indicated towards France. The White Paper was presented in a time when the cohabitation ruled, which means that the President of the Republic and the Government did not share the same political colour (in 1994 the President of the Republic was Francois Mitterand from the Socialist Party and his Prime Minister was Edouard Balladur from the right wing). 5 The analysis may in some aspects be considered affected by this split situation in the executive power. The geo-strategic analyses ended up in five different scenarios6 for possible conflicttypes where France could find itself engaged in: S1 - S5. The scenarios did not point out specific regions even though conclusions were made out of these scenarios. Briefly, these scenarios covered the whole spectrum of the interests for France: vital - strategic - power interests. It describes also conflicts in regions that might threaten France's interests. The scenarios covered a wide spectrum: from an intervention into a conflict that threatens the treaties of co-operation France has signed with some specific states,7 to the most extreme which describes a symmetric threat to western Europe. A scenario for an intervention in the

4 5

Smouts, (2001), pp. 213 - 222. Martin, (2000), p. 472. 6 SIRPA, "Concept d'emploi des forces", (1998), p. 61. 7 Dumoulin, (1997), pp. 113 - 123.

name of peace and international right was also described, and has been the most common scenario in the post-Cold War era. The White Paper describes the needs for the armed forces in comparison to these scenarios. Some needs are stressed as more important and these needs also have a major impact on the strategic result. These are, among others, a high capacity of logistics, joint armed forces that might vary depending on the task and finally the role of the Special Forces is stressed. The strategic role and importance of the Special Forces are well determined in the description of different possible characteristics of conflicts in which France might find itself engaged. Even though the White Paper from 1994 describes a world that was transforming from the bi-polar era to a new world-order with a multi-polar structure under the American hegemony, it did not trigger any major immediate change concerning the French armed forces. The armed forces were still supposed to be based upon a combination of conscripts and professional units. 8 This combination had some years earlier showed to be ineffective for France in the Gulf War, but was still the organisational choice.9 The strategic functions were not indicated directly in the way they are defined today,10 but the changing character of the formulation of the use of the conventional forces might have been a brief introduction to what came after. Interventions with France's allies, identifications of new threats and the importance of conflict prevention became more important. Three vital capacities were indicated in the White Paper: intelligence capacity, command and control systems and strategic mobility. The Defence Program Plan 1997 - 2002 (FR: LdP 97-02, Loi de Programmation 1997 - 2002) was the first application of the analysis described in the White Paper of 1994. The decision for this plan was taken during a period where the President of the Republic, Jacques Chirac, and his Prime Minister, Alain Jupp, shared the same political colour. The Defence Program Plan 97 - 02 is the first in a series of three (1997 - 2002, 03 - 08, 09 - 15) concerning the development of the French armed forces towards a future goal: The French armed forces in 2015 (FR: Modle 2015). The Defence Program's Plan is not an obligation for the executive
"Loi de programmation militaire 1995 - 2000", Assemble Nationale, (1994). This Program plan never became reality; when Jacques Chirac won the presidential elections he immediately changed the context into what became the Program plan 1997 - 2002. 9 Pascallon, (1997), p. 342. 10 The three components from the Program plan from 1960 described "strategic nuclear forces", "operational territorial defence forces" and "manoeuvre and intervention forces" (Pascallon, (1997), pp. 294 - 310).
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power and it might vary and be changed over time. The Defence Program Plan 97 - 02 was mainly known for the professionalisation of all the armed forces (the decision of abandoning the obligatory military service was taken in 1996) and the re-orientation and re-organisation of the armed forces. It also included new definitions of the Strategic Functions. The use of and the role of the Special Forces will here be compared to the new concept of these strategic functions. 1.1.2 The strategic functions A brief description of the strategic functions indicated is necessary though. These functions are to be seen according to the different national interests of France. The definition of these interests (vital-strategic-power)11 will decide the conditions for the strategic functions. The importance of each function might vary over time, but generally they are to be seen as complementary to each other. Separate occasions / evolutions might raise the importance of one of them. Deterrence (FR: Dissuasion) might simply be translated into fear; the fear of attacking or threatening the vital interests of France. The nuclear possession remains the main key to guarantee the independence and security of the French nation towards all forms of aggressions. The autonomous character of this passive nuclear possession, based on the strategy of a "warning strike"12, where the pre-strategic nuclear missiles were supposed to serve as the final warning (FR: ultime avertisement) before using strategic weapons towards an aggressor, gave France the possibility to protect its vital interests and in worst case, to maintain the nation's survival. The end of the Cold War changed also the doctrinal view of the Deterrence.13 Today, with a minor threat to the national territory, the pre-strategic nuclear weapons have been dismantled and only strategic striking capacity remains; operated by sea- and air-vectors. Services operating the nuclear possession nowadays are the navy and the air force. Prevention (FR: Prevention) means the possibility to foresee conflictual evolution; not only threatening the national interests but also in a global manner. These interests might have a vital character (a threat to Europe and to France) or a more peripheral character (a threat to a state with which France have defence accords) or even a humanitarian character (violence of the human rights or international law). The fast changing and unstable world order of today
11 12

SIRPA, "Concept d'emploi des forces", (1997), p. 11. France will not be the actor that will strike offensively; she will use the nuclear capacity as a final warning if attacked or vital threatened.

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has reinforced the need for reliable intelligence to obtain this task. To be able to maintain this capacity of "foreseeing the future" a global presence in possible conflictual areas of interest might look as the only acceptable answer. For budget reasons, moral aspects of presence in ancient colonial regions, acceptance from international organisations among other factors, this global presence is reduced and the so-called pre-stationed troops are more and more important. Even though information might be exchanged between states / organisations, the credibility of the information gathered by domestic entities cannot be replaced. Arms-control, defence cooperation, alert systems are some other main components needed to obtain the prevention capacity. Protection (FR: Protection) concerns mainly the protection of the national territory and its citizens. The presence of French citizens on foreign soil might though expand the area of this strategic function. Even though the threat to the French territory has been reduced by the end of the bi-polar era, the armed forces still play a significant role (for example: air defence (after the 11th of September), maritime territorial surveillance and operational ground units). The importance of the Gendarmes has though been clearly prioritised, and in the Defence Program Plan 97 - 02, the Gendarmes is the only service who finds itself not just "not-reduced", but also expanded.14 Trans-national threats, terrorism in all forms and disorder are some of the actual main factors connected to the Protection. Last but not least of these strategic functions is the Projection (FR: Projection). The projection covers all interventions realised outside of the French territory. The changing character of the conditions of interventions raises the demand for modularity, flexibility and alertness. Not activated permanently, this strategic function has its specificity in its adapted use and realisation. One major grouping of the Projection is the division into the Force Projection and the Power Projection (FR: Projection de Forces and Projection de Puissance). Force Projection means the employment of troops into an actual terrain for a longer period, with commanding-, logistic-, combat-resources. Power Projection is the use of a superior technological system /-s and / or the use of Special Forces " alors que la projection de puissance repose essentiellement sur l'emploi d'un armement de supriorit approprie et sur l'action de forces spciales". These two groupings are differentiated but together they may be combined in time.

13

Tertrais, Bruno, "Une tape vers le Modle 2015: Une doctrine adapte au contexte stratgique", article in Armes d'Aujourd'hui N 263, (2001), pp. 63 - 66. 14 "La Loi de programmation 1997-2002", Assemble nationale, Paris.

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So, what is the role of the Special Forces according to these four strategic functions? The classical, former SF missions as sabotage and intelligence gathering behind enemy lines have been modified in the new era with new, vast threat-descriptions within these new functions. If the presence of, or the possible presence of SF in a conflict has the effect of deterrence or not, will not be examined here. Of course, knowing that you are facing a potential adversary always effects the moral of the troops. The role of the SF in this function is rather of a protective character. Installations, manoeuvres and tests connected to the nuclear possession are of major importance, which was shown during the nuclear tests in the French Polynesia in 1995. It might be supposed that the SF were protecting vital deterrence sites. The world could follow via the media, two interventions by the Commando Hubert clashing with Greenpeace-activists illegally entering French territorial waters surrounding the nuclear test sites.15 These nuclear tests were of vital importance for the deterrence-capacity of France, and the employment of the marine commandos underlined this importance. The permanent alert defence system operating in these sites are also "examined" by SF in ordinary exercises where the SF simply simulates an adversary. The role of its own SF acting as the enemy's best units often result in scenarios more than realistic, and each weak point in the defence link will be exposed. Another aspect of the use of the SF according to the deterrence is when they are engaged as military advisors in foreign states / conflicts. These military advisors may also serve as units of intelligence gathering and units for conflict prevention. This might be done open or covert. To obtain the effect of deterrence, it would be announced in some way. The vital interests of France are not limited to the French territory and the employment of the SF into a conflictual region might serve as a clear political standpoint from France. Even if they did not possess the role of military advisors, the intervention in the Comore Islands by France and the COS in 1995 may serve as an example of a clear political standpoint taken by France. After the illegal coup d'Etat in the Comore Islands by Bob Denard and his mercenaries, France employed units from 1.RPIMa, Commando Jaubert, Commando Hubert and the reconnaissance units from the 13.RDP. During the operation the gendarme intervention unit GIGN was also engaged.16

15 16

Micheletti, (1999), p. 19. Ibid, pp. 19 - 20.

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Prevention, with a central pole of intelligence gathering, has become a more and more important strategic function for the SF. Analyses today are not only of military factors, but also of non-military factors (economic, social, cultural, political). The intelligence gathered is still in prior human intelligence (Hum Int). Even though the need for highly developed technology has been vital for a long period of time, the technological gathering-equipment can not replace a human being in all situations and is to be seen as a complement rather than a competitor. To be present in the area is vital in conflict prevention. Pre-positioned forces, sovereignty forces, forces concerned by bilateral co-operation and security forces spread over mainly the African continent17 and also in the Pacific Ocean and South-America, is of vital importance for maintaining, supporting, protecting but also to "hide" the SF. Arms-proliferation is another important task concerned by the prevention. Armsproliferation is often operated by trans-national, organised criminal actors and requires knowledge of non-military characteristic and close co-operations among the Special Forces. The presence of military components as the SF in an early stage of the conflict will also help the commanders to prepare the conventional intervention of troops. A permanently up-todate knowledge is made possible because of the SF. This permanent intelligence gathering puts France in a situation where it does not have to rely on intelligence gathered by someone else (which was the situation in the Gulf).18 This means autonomy in decision-making. This is important not only for decisions of military characteristics, but might also be important for humanitarian refugee situations that occur in a conflict area. The evaluations made by the SF will serve as an important tool for making decisions whether to move refugees to a safe place or let them stay and protect them on the spot. SF evaluations will also help decision-makers to indicate urgent needs of medical support in case of epidemics, clear logistic roads for food and fresh water and in other non-military areas. The Protection of the national territory and its citizens is today of large interest when discussing the fighting of terrorism. The role of the military in this strategic function has lost the importance it once had during the Cold War. This "grey-zone" of differentiation between police and military activity has been even more "grey" since the 11th of September. The missions of the armed forces are defined within the four strategic functions, and the actual definition of these has not expressed a will of deployment of the armed forces on French
17 18

Dossier in Armes d'Aujourd'hui, No 259, (2001), pp. 40 - 41. Cecile, (1998), pp. 36 - 38.

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territory or towards French citizens, except in case of situations as natural catastrophes (FR: Projection intrieure). A future change of definition might, if found necessary, change the concept of these strategic functions. Terrorist-threats on French soil is a task for the police, and notably the Secret Service (FR: DST, Direction de Surveillance du Territoire) or for the direct action units from the Gendarmes (FR: GIGN, Groupement d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale). But, as we have already described, such elements as international terrorists act independently of national borders. Networks are often indicated, spreading from conflict areas by diasporas to the French territory. Once these actors are spotted in conflict areas, they might constitute an object for SF in that area. Combatants, and always operating under French flag, the SF mostly acts as intelligence gatherers during such operations, but the capture of war criminals in the Balkans might be an example of direct action. The incident in the early summer of 2002 might serve as an example of territorial surveillance where SF might be used. 19 The cargo-ship "Winner" had been identified as carrying cocaine a long time before crossing the French territorial waters, and contact with the boat was taken immediately by the French authorities. The "Winner" refused to obey French orders and tried to hit the French marine frigate. Fire was opened and units from the Commando Jaubert could finally take control of the cargo-ship. Even though this was not an operation commanded by the COS, and not following the concept of employment for the SF, it was realised by units from the First Circle. 20 The operation was an inter-ministerial, international operation between different French ministries and between France, the US, Spain and Greece. The alert-plan Vigipirate21 created in 1978 and reinforced on occasions of intensity (such as the Gulf War in 1991, the terrorist-attacks caused by the internal Algerian tensions in 199495, the World Championships in football in 1998) is a police-operation with some military reinforcements. 22 The task is surveillance of vital infrastructure such as railway-stations, airports, subways etc. It may be discussed if the COS may have an important role in the Vigipirate-plan, but according to our sources this is not the case. Evacuation of citizens is probably one of the "most known" (known to the ordinary French citizen) specific type of operation by SF. France, as a country with a substantial number of citizens located abroad have to maintain a certain level of alertness to violent
19

Article in Le Monde, 6 June 2002,"Un navire arraisonn par la marine francaise au terme d'une enqute internationale sur un trafic de cocane", by Pascal Ceaux. 20 These notions will be presented later on in this part of the project. 21 Terre Magazine No 68, (1995), pp. 36 - 37. 22 "Contre vents et Mares, l'action des forces armes : dc 1999 - jan 2000", (2000), pp. 25 - 26.

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escalation in conflictual areas where its citizens might be endangered. Several operations have already been performed according to this threat to its own citizens.23 Last, but not least, the Projection. The Force Projection has become the key-element for the French armed forces and most other western-countries when engaged on the international arena of co-operation in the post-Cold War era. The lack of capacity for Force Projection became one of the major reasons why the French decision-makers voted for the installation of an all-professional army in February 1996. Even though SF have not had a central role in post-Cold War interventions until the intervention in Afghanistan, it is clear that they have served with vital functions both before, during and after conflicts for a long time. A classic point of view is that the SF serve as "gate-openers", but their capacity is not limited to this entering phase of the conflict. A clear example of this is the apprehension of war criminals in the Balkans, which is performed by the SF rather after the conflict than before or during. Force-protection by intelligence gathering, neutralisation of threats (such as the shutting down of the mercury-factory in Zvecan, Mitrovica, in august 2000 during Operation Vulcain, where the factory threatened the health of the civil population, including the KFOR-troops) serves as an example of tasks given to the SF in different conflict-phases.24 The Power Projection is a function where the SF might have a more central role. Even though sophisticated, highly developed technological systems are used for the direct action, it is supposed that Hum Int realised by SF have a key role in the preparation. Also guidance by the SF during the strike might be of key-importance for success. If the SF are chosen for the strike / direct action, the roles are changed. To be able to intervene covertly, safely and quickly, the use of highly developed technical systems are once again of vital importance; but now in a different way. The interaction between man and machine in military activity is perhaps most significant in the Power Projection. The role of the SF in this function is here at close distance to operations manned by non-conventional / clandestine units. This strategic approach to the French SF helps us to see them as actors of importance of national interests. Further on in this study, examples will be given about how SF have been used in foreign operations. The use of the SF on a strategic level is also appropriated,

23 24

Dumoulin, (1997), pp. 113 - 125. Dossier in Armes d'Aujourd'hui No 265, (2001), p. 10.

15

according to their utility; small, flexible and light components with a large impact / result. Evolutions after the Cold War have required a high degree of flexibility among the armed instrument of the western armed forces. This flexibility among the SF has maybe been of even higher adaptive capacity than ordinary conventional forces. Being units of permanent utility and effectiveness, the French SF have not been given the time to restructure its organisation in calm. The permanent use of them demands effectiveness as well as flexibility and preparation. This demands a high level of local effectiveness and also an understanding and courage about how to use them by national political decision-makers. Summary The White Paper from 1994 and the Defence Program Plan 19972002 were probably the most important official documents in France during the period after the Gulf war until today. The White Paper described a world changing were France for the first time did not identify any direct threat to the national survival. The Defence Program Plan 1997-2002 became the official declaration of how France had chosen to face the stated new world order. The new scenarios covered a wide spectra and France would soon have to face the most of them. The strategic functions were in some aspects redefined, as was the role for the SF according to these strategic functions. For example, today SF hold central roles in the areas of Deterrence, Projection and Prevention. The area of Protection still remains of less importance for the SF. A further description of the concept for the SF will further explain why their roles have been developed in one specific direction. 1.2 Concept of Employment Now will follow a brief description of the French concept for SF. Focus will be on thoughts and ideas leading to choices of structures, organisations and capacity specifications. This chapter is introduced by a theoretic description of how to use the SF. The short introduction is then followed by an outline of factors of importance for France.

16

1.2.1 Master claims for Special Operations and Special Forces The utility of Special Operations (SO) is described by Colin S Gray25 as strategic, operative or tactical.26 SF activity covers this whole spectrum. Gray implies that its not necessary for the SF to be involved in these tasks, but according to our researches only SF are here taken into consideration. Gray predicts that further down the line, the SF will always, even if used tactically, have a strategic impact. Out of his grouping in tactical-, operative- and strategicutility, Gray points out main characteristics for SF.27 Among these characteristics, some of the factors are pointed out as master claims: economy of force and expansion of choice. These two master claims are covering reasons of success for some past SF-operations. The economy of force is simply described as the excellent level of results achieved with a limited number of personnel and equipment. This choice of quality rather than quantity is also a good example of why conventional troops and soldiers cannot be used in place of the SF. The Power Projection is based on this principle of surgical intervention. France is thus able to obtain gains of vital importance with a limited risk-taking in men's life and political scandal. This concept will probably be even more successful in the RMA-era28 and in a society were the "zero-dead"- doctrine29 has gained success even if not officially declared. Expansion of choice is the second master claim. It might be seen on a purely military level, where the use of SF is an alternative to using conventional troops. This can also be on a political level as an alternative to political solutions such as traditional diplomacy, economic sanctions, and political standpoints. The possibility of using its SF-units demands, as described earlier, a very high level of effectiveness and also a know-how among the political decision-makers to use them for the right type of missions. This tool of coercion is, if used, to be seen as complementary to possibilities already mentioned. The possibility of striking towards sites / objects of all levels (tactic- operative - strategic) gives the political decisionmakers an even higher level of the choice expansion. The apprehensions of war criminals (such as the chase for Dragan Gagovic in Bosnia in 1999 who was neutralised during the attempted escape)30 are clear and good examples of how SF might be used instead of negotiating for the extraction of a certain person or group of persons. The hostage release performed by the Gendarme SF, called GIGN (FR: Groupement
25 26

Gray, (1996), p. 263. Ibid, p. 163. 27 Ibid, p. 164. 28 RMA: Revolution in Military Affair. David, (2000), pp. 199 - 215. 29 Ibid, pp. 257 - 264.

17

d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale) at the Marseille airport in 1997 is another good example of this expansion of choice. France was not blocked and limited by soft instruments, such as negotiations. A message was sent to other terrorists all over the world after the successful rescue. France had the political will and courage of using all their tools for avoiding the victory of terrorist elements. This form of deterrence might have had the same result after the chase of Radovan Milovic in Bosnia in 1991 (even though the sender this time was the international community: the International Criminal Court, ICC). The political standpoint of France was clear though. Other claims for strategic utility mentioned by Gray is Innovation, Morale, Showcasing of competence, Reassurance, Humiliation of the enemy, Control of escalation and Shaping of future.31 1.2.2 Reflection of the national interest The definition of the SF and how to use them is not the same between different states. Each state has its own interests, traditions and cultures to pay attention to. The British definition is different to the French system, though the activity of the British SF might include operations on the own territory (i.e the siege of the Iranian embassy in London 1982).32 It might also include clandestine operations such as for the French DGSE. The Spanish concept also differs and they do not have the joint-structure as in France. The level of autonomy for the Spanish SF is highly reduced though they do not possess their own projection capacity (tactical helicopters, strategic airlifts). 33 The Austrian concept is highly specialised in combat in mountainous terrain and might be compared to French units of human intelligence from the 27. Alpine Brigade rather than with units from the SF-circles.34 All of these examples take us to the main question: -What is the purpose of the SF? Each concept has to be able to answer this question, and the answer will be highly influenced by the states history and its culture. The French concept of SF is characterised by some clear lines of identification. This helps us to understand the solution chosen by France, and also to understand its limitations.
30 31

Micheletti, (1999), p. 22. Ibid, pp. 169 - 180. 32 www.specialoperations/Foreign/United_Kingdom 33 www.specialoperations/Foreign/Spain 34 www.specialoperations/Foreign/Austria

18

1.2.3 Disposability Disposability is of vital importance and has a different meaning for the SF than for the conventional forces. Being, more or less, on constant alert, the SF do not take part in the services alert-systems. For example, the army SF does not take part in the Gupard-alertsystem of rotation in 4-cycle periods, like the conventional forces. The irregular characters of the delay between and during operations and the specificity of the mission make all future planning difficult. This demands professional soldiers with high flexibility, lightweight and small-sized groups highly motivated for the task. The decision of professionalisation in 1996 did not change anything directly for the SF, though previously in 1996 they only recruited professional personnel. This meant indirectly a limitation in recruiting, since the masses of young men did not do their military service and got in contact with the military structures. The possibility of foreseeing the needs is of another character than for the regular forces. The rapidity in employment and the light equipment permits the COS to present a proposition of operational solution within half a day and to employ a team into the theatre in just over 24 hours. This permanent capacity of short notice combat readiness is however not possible without all capacities available all the time. This takes us to the next characteristic: 1.2.4 Autonomy Autonomy for the SF means having what you need for yourself permanently. This means having a joint modular capacity, with specialised competence covering all three elements of intervention. This very much concerns their own capacity of projection by aerial, maritime or land-vectors; both tactic and strategic. These capacities need to be selected and trained according to the tasks, and will also need to know their action colleagues from the direct action teams. Without the autonomy, someone always has to "raise a hand" and demand for a strategic lift, a tactical transport helicopter etc. The COS commands the SF on operations and is not dependent on the CPCO 35 that normally is commanding all military operations. Close relation is permanent and a liaison cell (FR: DL, Dtachement de Liaison) from the COS is stationed at the CPCO. The commanding

35

CPCO, Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Oprations; Planning and commanding staff. CPCO is composed of parts from the former joint planning staff EMIA, (Etat Major Inter Armes) and the joint commanding staff COIA, (Centre Oprationel Interarmes). (Armes D'aujourd'hui No 274, (2002), pp. 12 - 17).

19

staff of the COS consists of about 60 personnel, mainly located at the Taverny air base outside Paris. The COS is depending directly on the Chief of Defence Staff (FR: CEMA, Chef d'Etat Major des Armes). One important consequence of the autonomy is the fact that confidence-building is made possible by a close personal relation between the soldier sent into the hostile area of operation and the pilot that is sent to pick him up after an accomplished mission. This confidence is not possible to create if the pilot and the commando do not share the same objective or have not had a prior relationship. 1.2.5 Discretion Autonomy permits the units to act under discretion. The discretion means safety for the personnel being employed, maintaining the surprise effect in the operation and the protection of your own capacity. Being able to perform discretely with limited risk of forewarning, this concerns the safety of each member of the SF teams. This might be obtained by a detailed simulated PC-model of the object. Before the intervention the personnel can memorise the terrain, learn about the closing-mechanisms for windows, draw conclusions from the materiel in walls etc. on a safe distance, far away from the area of intervention without the risk of loosing the surprise effect. Having all components necessary at their disposal, under the same command, with training suited and adapted for similar types of missions is the only realistic solution. Often, focus is laid on the action units of the COS, but all parts working within the domain has a key-role where all parts are necessary for success. The leakage of information caused by pure pride of being chosen for these operations is limited if the personnel used is trained for the tasks and is constantly connected to the SF units. The training and specialisation for the projection units of the COS give the aircrews an understanding for the discretion that differs from normal aircrew members understanding. 1.2.6 The strategy of segmentation Covering all of these particular factors is the strategy of segmentation (FR: la stratgie de crneau). The light character of the SF permits them to change direction and adapt to a new concept within a completely different way than regular forces. A comparison may be done with the acquisition of the air craft carrier Charles de Gaulle of the French navy. This choice

20

of concept must be based on analyses covering a period of up to 30 years.36 The impact of this heavy acquisition will be discernible for the navy, indirectly or directly, for a long period ahead. The same phenomena may be observed within the air force and their acquisition of the Rafale fighter aircraft, and in some aspects also within the army and the main battle tank Le Clerc. The concept of the French SF is far from that static. The innovative strategy of segmentation of the COS does not mean analysing the future for a period as long as 30 years. The capacity of being adapted for today's needs demands the COS to be on constant evolution for being able to adapt to a new situation within months rather than years. The terrorist strikes at the 11th of September 2001 can give us an idea of such radical, fast changes that may demand a rapid change of direction. This constant evolution may also mean that areas of activity that are performed by SF today, not necessarily have to be so tomorrow. An example is the civilo-military activity; sometimes described as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), PsyOps, CIMIC etc. During the early 90s, the COS developed this capacity of civil competence for militarypolitical purposes within the Section for Influence (FR: la Section d'Influence).37 The concept briefly implied a network of civil competence covered both by reservists and also by personnel engaged occasionally. This network of competence would be used for precise employment in all phases of a crisis (before-during-after), even though mainly before and after the conflict. At this period, the way of seeing the impact of civil competence in a military operation was proportionately new and the concept in France was mainly developed within the COS. The changing character of the role of the civilian expertise in international operations in the mid- and late nineties resulted in an important growth of interest for the civilo-military co-operation. In the late nineties it had grown to a point where it concerned all the armed forces rather than only the COS and the SF. This brought about the creation of the Center for Civilo-Military Activity (FR: BACM, Bureau d'Action Civilo-Militaire) in Lyon, under the Army command (FR: CFT, Commandement des Forces Terrestres; former CFAT, Commandement des Forces d'Action Terrestres). This does not mean that the domain of activity is completely cut off from the French SF and the COS. Today the civilo-military activity is focused on what is called the Initial Expertise in the Theatre (FR: EIT, Expertise Initiale du Theatre). The concept of the EIT is

36 37

Dussage, (1998), pp. 47 - 55. Micheletti, (1999), pp. 28 - 30.

21

more restrictive than the American concept of the MOOTW and PsyOps. The EIT is focused on the initial evaluation of the political, economical and social situation in the conflict area with the purpose to prepare the following employment of the conventional troops. All actors within the EIT-concept belong to the COS. This given example also shows the will of keeping the SF-area restricted. It cannot, and will not be permitted to grow to a size where the strategy of segmentation will be lost. This has to be permanently balanced to the need of being autonomous in employment. The concept of employment is living and changing and is far from being fixed to static tasks. The activity of the French SF mainly has a strategic impact, even if it may be discussed if they are able to act at all levels (tactic-operative-strategic). Their activity may be clearly identified within the strategic functions of the armed forces. Summary After a short description of the SF we move on to how the French SF characteristics are defined. The lines of identifications are called Disposability, Autonomy and Discretion and are all gathered within the Strategy of segmentation. The lines of identification gives the SF the structure and the capability to change immediately in order to face new threats and challenges in any direction. Without anyone of them, the Strategy of segmentation is lost. The frame and these lines of identification is alltogether reflecting the national interest of France and what France wants to obtain with their SF. Being aware of this national interest and its particular form we will now describe the structure and the organisation of the French SF. 1.3 Grouping and today characteristic of the COS and the Special Forces This chapter describes the organisation and the structure of the French SF. The focus will be on units from the First circle, but units from the outer circles will also be described. Even if they do not belong to the same command structure, units from the Intelligence Brigade will also briefly be described. 1.3.1 The COS: A joint command for special operations The definition of the activity of the COS is as follows: "To plan, co-ordinate and conduct operations by special forces units specially organised and equipped to achieve military or para-military objectives as defined by CEMA (Chief of Defence Staff): to conduct and

22

rationalise training; to identify concepts of operations; to acquire new capabilities; to standardise procedures and equipment between units to ensure full interoperability".38 The missions of the Special Forces are clearly defined: "Undertake wide-ranging, targeted and controlled actions, limited in both time and space, against the enemy's centres of gravity." The commanding components of the COS consists of a commanding general officer and a joint staff consisting of representatives from the army (39 %), navy (25%), air force (25 %) and from other functions (11 %) (the figures indicates the actual situation). The commander of the COS officially has control of planning, preparing and conducting special operations. He is also responsible for joint or combined training and exchanges whilst giving direct advise to the Chief of Defence Staff or other services.39 It is necessary to describe the characteristics and relations between the COS and the different SF-units. This differs notably from the American and in some aspects the British organisational solution. The COS does not gather the different units whilst in France: it is mainly a commanding staff while on active operation. When in France, the different SF-units belong to their army-naval or air force command. The responsibility of co-ordinating training, exchanges and doctrinal approaches is however a task for the COS. The French SF-units are grouped in action / combat units and support / projection units. The support / projection units are mainly grouped within the army and the air force. Each one of the three services possesses action / combat units. A first striking impression of the French SF is the plurality of different units. The centralisation of units is supposed to be a subject for the future. A common differentiation and grouping of the SF is the definition of "the Circles". The nature of SF / SO-activity today is changed to what it was during the bi-polar era. Today, expertise might be needed from anywhere (reservists, civilian's as well as from army / navy / air force units) for specific purposes. The French concept seems to be well prepared to this differentiation of needs. The concept of the circles is based on the idea that the first circle concerns units / competence primarily used for SO / SF-activity. The second circle concerns units that might be, and are in

38 39

Official document presenting the COS; annex in Armes d'Aujourd'hui, No 265, (2001). Ibid.

23

some aspects, prepared and trained for these activities. The third circle is less often used than the second and the first and so on. In some books and articles, two circles are mentioned, in some other three circles. No matter the number; the principle of concept is clear: capacities are well defined within the first circle and most of the SO are performed by these units. The complexity of the SO demands expertise that is not permanently attached to the inner circles. One major constraint in the outer circles is the lack of personal relations. The inner circles consist of personnel knowing each other (not only between the combat / action-groups from the 1.RPIMa, but notably between these combat / action-groups and a projection-team). These close personal relations are of vital importance once engaged into an operation, notably when extracting from an accomplished mission. The following part gives a brief presentation of the units within these circles. Priority is given to the first circle. The missions of today's activities for the SF are defined into two general groups: Operations and Environment. Operations involve 1) Special Reconnaissance: infiltration, collecting and reporting intelligence 2) Direct Action: seizing, neutralising, destroying targets, arrest, extract and participate in counter-terrorism 3) Military Assistance: participating in activity for maintaining the safety of French citizens abroad Environment involves 1) Theatre analyses 2) Liaison with different theatre actors 3) VIP-escorts and protection 4) Military assistance 5) Civil affairs 6) Psychological operations (Psy Ops): EIT

24

1.3.2 The First circle The First circle is the central component of the COS. Both action / combat units and support / projection units from the army, navy and air force are attached to it. COS

Navy

Army

Air Force

ALFUSCO Naval Special Warfare Command

BFST Army Special Forces Command

Special Forces Air Command

Marine Commandos x5

1.RPIMa

CPA 10

13.RDP DAOS Helos Fig. The First Circle. Army contribution

DOS Helos DOS C-160 C-130

The army regiment of the 1st Airborne Marine Infantry Regiment (FR: 1.RPIMa, Rgiment Parachutiste d'Infanterie de Marine) is located in Bayonne in the south of France and has the largest number of personnel within the first circle: some 1 000 men. All of the above mentioned are professional volunteers. The regiment consists of one commanding and logistics company, one communication-company, one training company and the main operational components of the 1.RPIMa : the three Airborne Special Reconnaissance and Offensive Action-companies (FR: RAPAS, Recherche Aro Porte et d'Action Spcialise). Each of these companies have one specific specialisation: traditional commando action behind enemy lines, combat in urban terrain, fire support etc. Each company is divided into RAPASgroups of ten men each. These are the operational units of the 1.RPIMa and they are mainly projected in air-ground environments. Officially their specific capabilities are within the

25

domains of long range infiltration and reporting (Special Reconnaissance), commando raiding, extraction, sniping, participation in inland CSAR (Direct Action), VIP-escort and cooperation (Military Assistance). From July 2002, the army 13. Dragoon Airborne Regiment (FR: 13.RDP, Rgiment de Dragons Parachutistes) belongs to the new brigade SF-structure within the French army (FR: BFST, Brigade des Forces Spciales Terre). This co-ordination permits a better use of the direct action and the intelligence gathering for the COS. It also facilitates the adoption of common concepts and gives the commander of the COS a wider range of utility, which in return reinforces notably its capacity of intelligence gathering. The 13.RDP, located in Dieuze, consist of about 900 men who are divided into three intelligence companies, one training company, one company for specialised training, one communication company and one logistic company.40 After the end of the Cold War, major changes were implemented. Acquisition of modern communication equipment, regrouping of patrols brought on by the creation of a third operational company (from 2 x 20 to 3 x 15), exchanges with foreign similar units and the expansion of tasks which made the 13.RDP adaptive for the post-Cold War period.41 The task of the 13.RDP is primarily intelligence gathering and this regiment served for the 1st Army Corps during the Cold War. From the time of the creation of the COS in 1992 and the Military Intelligence Agency (FR: DRM, Direction de Renseignement Militaire) in 1993, the 13.RDP belonged to the Intelligence Brigade (FR: BR, Brigade de Renseignement: former BRGE, Brigade de Renseignement et de la Guerre Electronique) to whom they delivered Hum Int. The BRGE was created, as the COS, after the lessons learned from the Gulf-war in 199342 and changed name recently to the BR. The BR main components are now the 54th Communication Regt (FR: 54.RT, Rgiment de Transmission), the 44th Communication Regt (FR: 44.RT), the 61st Artillery Regt (fr: 61.RA, Rgiment de l'Artillerie), the Information Gathering Group (FR: GRI, Groupement de Recueil de l'Information) and the 2nd Hussar Regt (FR: 2.RH, Rgiment des Husards).43 The army support / projection unit of the first circle is the Light Army Cavalry Detachment (FR: DAOS, Dtachement d'ALAT des Operations Spciales. ALAT, Aviation Lgre dans l'Arme de Terre). Even though the DAOS is attached to the army, it is responsible for tactical heliborne projections of all first circle units. This might be on a direct intervention on ground (repelling, fast-roping) or by sea. The DAOS also has limited capacity
40 41

Micheletti, (2001), pp. 18 - 31. Revue "Renseignement et oprations spciales" No 7, (2001), pp. 126 - 127. 42 Pascallon, (1997), p. 294. 43 Micheletti, (2001), p. 80.

26

to give fire support to action / combat. Out of these two main tasks (tactical projection and fire support) the DAOS is divided in two escadrilles: Manoeuvre: with tactical transport helicopters (mainly Puma, Cougar). In the near future the new helicopter Cougar Mark II+ will be introduced. Reconnaissance and fire support: with combat helicopters (mainly Gazelle armed with Hot / Mistral-missiles or automatic gun 20 mm) and in the future also the Tigre combathelicopter. In total the DAOS consists of about 22 helicopters. The 1.RPIMa, 13.RDP and the DAOS are organised together in the BFST (earlier mentioned) located in Pau in the south of France. Navy contribution The naval SF units are the Marine Commandos (fr: Commandos de Marine). These are divided into five units (fr: commandos. The term commando can mean both unit and soldier): Hubert, Jaubert, Trepel, De Penfentenyo and De Montfort. The total number of all these commandos (soldier) is about 400 men. Each commando (unit) is composed of about 80 men, divided into four sections with 20 elements each. The marine commandos each have some specific capabilities: shore line-targeting, underwater infiltration (Special Reconnaissance), nautical raids at sea, ship boarding, extraction, participation in CSAR at sea (Direct Action), VIP-escort and co-operation (Military Advising). Within the marine commandos, each one has its own area of speciality: Commando Hubert: under-water special warfare Commando Jaubert and Trepel: sea-assault missions and evacuation / extraction of personnel in amphibious areas Commando De Pententenyo: special reconnaissance in maritime infrastructure and installations Commando De Montfort: long range neutralisation and special support (sabotage, light missiles, and guidance of artillery and CAS) All of these commandos, except for Hubert, are located in Lorient. Commando Hubert is situated in Saint Mandrier.

27

The reform of the marine commandos (Commando 2001) 44 has stressed on the importance of these specializations. The former system of training did not permit such a specialisation and the modularity of ultra-specialised detachments was not possible in the same way. This modularity permits the selection of specialised commandos (and their area of competence) to be put together for one specific mission. (Even on a totally different level, these principles of modularity can be identified in the new army-structure for forceprojection)45. The commandos are all attached to the Command of the Marine Fusiliers and Marine Commandos (FR: COFUSCO, Commandement des Fusiliers Marins et Commandos-Marine). The COFUSCO is to be seen as an inter-mediate between the marine commandos and COS. The Tactical Projection Cell (FR: CTP, Cellule Tactique de Projection) has been installed to serve as interface between the COS and the five commandos, whilst the units might be projected into an operation. This CTP does not command any operations. The COS commands all SF-operations. Worth mentioning is the elite-pole within the marine commandos specialised in maritime counter-terrorist warfare: the Combat Group in Closed Areas (FR: GCMC, Groupe de Combat en Mileu Clos). This group, like the B-section of the Commando Hubert is trained for naval assault missions; for example the releasing of vessels taken in control by terrorists. One major difference between the Army and Navy SF is that the marine commandos do not take orders exclusively from the COS. The marine commandos will also perform a large number of missions for the Navy staff.46 These missions might be public services as maritime traffic controlling, rescuing by sea-incidents, patrolling and controlling of territorial waters. Air Force contribution The French Air Force contribution to the first circle is divided in the same way as the army: one action / combat unit and one support / projection unit. The action / combat unit is the 10th Airborne Air Force Commando (FR: CPA 10, Commando Parachutiste de l'Air 10). Stationed in Orlans, this unit consists of 200 personnel and is though the smallest action / combat unit within the first circle. Three areas of specialisation (intelligence gathering, logistics and specialised training) is the main character for the three cells of action. Like the marine commandos, the CPA 10 belongs to the
44 45

Revue No 9 "Renseignement et oprations spciales", (2001), pp. 131 - 136. "Arme de terre XXI sicle : 2002", SIRPA Terre, (2002), p. 6. 46 Micheletti, (1999), p. 58: Translated: "Since the creation of the COS--between 18 and 20 % of the Marine Commando- operations has been in the command of the COS, except for in 1997 when the figure was 61 %".

28

Command for the Air Force Commandos Fusiliers (FR: CFCA, Commandement des Fusiliers Commandos de l'Air) who are depending on the Air Force Command. The missions performed are not only for the COS: it might also be for the benefit of the Air Force Command. Missions for the CPA 10 might be to laser-guide assault missions, lumination and identification of specific targets (Special Reconnaissance), neutralise, control, protect and operate air port facilities, extraction, participation in CSAR (Direct Action) and co-operation (Military Assistance). One important task is to facilitate activity for following units in the depth of an operational terrain such as to mark and operate soft landing stripes or hostile / foreign air fields to permit transports to land in the beginning phase of an intervention. These tasks demand a high level of technical expertise. The areas of specialisation and the principle of modularity are not as clear as among the marine commandos. One unit of these is specialised in infiltration by the third dimension. The support / projection unit is the Special Operations Division Helicopter or Transport (FR: DOS H / DOS T, Division des Operations Spciales Helicoptere / Transport). Both the DOS / H and the DOS / T belong to the Air Force Projection Command (FR: CFAP, Commandement des Forces Ariennes de Projection), but the air crews are dedicated to the COS. The DOS / H main component is the Special Helicopter Escadrille (FR: ESH / 67, Escadrille Spciale Hlicoptre 67), located in Cazaux. This unit was reorganised in the year of 2000 and is nowadays considered as a fully functional unit. The unit only consists of 16 men. Because of differences in use and different organisational belongings, the DOS / H does not use the same helicopters as the DAOS. They mainly use different forms of Pumahelicopters. The DOS / T is divided into one unit with the C-160 Transall and one unit with the C-130 Hercules (DOS C-160 and DOS C-130). The first is located in Toulouse and the latter is located in Orlans. The two types of aircraft are officially used in a complementary way, but the question is raised why using two different types of aircraft. One of them is more capable of transporting large quantities, transport units / helicopters / equipment's for greater distances.47 In the future the A400 M Airbus will be the main aircraft for the DOS / T. If this will be the only

47

Paecht, (1994), p. 74.

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remaining aircraft within the DOS / T, logistic optimisation and effective disposability will be obtained in another way than today. Capacities such as landing and lifting from very short runways will expand the utility. The DOS might be reinforced if necessary from the CFAP. 1.3.3 The outer circles The first circle can be, if necessary, reinforced with units from what is called the second circle. These units are not attached as directly to the COS as the units from the first circle. Their main commander is in general not the COS; rather some of the tactical or operative commanding staffs belonging to the army-, navy- or air force staffs. For different reasons they are sometimes called upon for missions within the domain of the COS. The 11th Airborne Brigade (FR: 11.BP, Brigade Parachutiste; former 11th Airborne Division (FR: 11.DP)) with its headquarters in Toulouse, may support the COS with the commando-groups from the airborne regiments. These Groups of Airborne Commandos (FR: GCP, Groupement de Commandos Parachutistes, former CRAP, Commando de Renseignement et d'Action de Profondeur) are normally stationed at their home regiment in the southern parts of France. Regiments that have these GCP are: First Airborne Light Infantry Regt (FR: 1.RCP, Rgiment de Chasseurs Parachutistes) Second Foreign Legion Airborne Regt (FR: 2.REP, Rgiment Etranger Parachutistes) Third Marine Infantry Airborne Regt (FR: 3.RPIMA, Rgiment Parachutiste d'Infanterie de Marine) 8th Marine Infantry Airborne Regt (FR: 8.RPIMa, Rgiment Parachutiste d'Infanterie de Marine) First Hussar Airborne Regt (FR: 1.RHP, Rgiment Husards de Parachutistes) 35th Airborne Artillery Regt (FR: 35.RAP, Rgiment d'Artillerie Parachutistes) 17th Airborne Engineer Regt (FR: 17.RGP, Rgiment de Genie Parachutistes)

Each regiment normally has about 20 commandos divided into two troops with two squads each. In total the 11.BP consists of about 160 commandos. These units are mostly used for tactical tasks within combined missions. Worth mentioning are the fire support observer squads from the 35.RAP and the combat mine-clearing capacity of the 17.RGP. The 17.RGP can also support the COS with combat engineer swimmers.

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The commando units from the Mountain Infantry Brigade (FR: 27.BIM, Brigade d'Infanterie de Montagne), labelled the Units for Human Intelligence Gathering (FR: URH, Unit de Recherche Humaine), does not have the same status as their colleagues from the 11.BP. Discussions are held regarding the formation of Groups of Mountain Commandos (FR: GCM, Groupement de Commandos de Montagnes) in the same way as the GCP. No decisions are yet taken, and changing the organisation, training routine, equipment is probably necessary. Winnings are the capacity of having units specialised in pure mountain warfare within the circles. The Gendarmes from the Group for Security and Intervention (FR: GSIGN, Groupement de Scurit et d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale) have liaison officers within the COS and might also use some of the Gendarme Intervention Groups (FR: GIGN, Groupement d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale) or the Gendarme Airborne Intervention Group (FR: EPIGN, Escadron Parachutiste d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale) for a COSoperation. In total, the COS and the first circle consists of about 3 000 personnel. They possess roughly 25 helicopters, 4 tactical transport air crafts, 10 combat evacuation rapid boats plus equipment added specially for each operation. The COS today has mainly the autonomous capacity of intelligence gathering concerning sites or objects for intervention. Strategic intelligence is still the domain for the DRM and a close co-operation between the COS and the DRM is permanent. Impact of modern technology is crucial and before an intervention a team might be sent for detailed information gathering concerning the site. For example, before the capture of a war criminal in the Balkans on the 11-12 July 2002, a complete 3D-model was created of the house where the suspected was supposed to be arrested. This 3D-model contained details regarding the construction of the doors, window-locks, wall-material etc. This permits a detailed preparation on safe distance without risking the discretion and surprise-element of the operation. Even though this is a product of high developed technology, only units of Hum Int belong to the COS; a capacity that has been reinforced by the integration of the 13.RDP into the COS. The basic training for a commando from the first circle is about 1,5 years. Then the specialised training may begin. Each unit has its own capacity for training and formation, though some joint training centers does some of the training. For example at the Airborne

31

school in Pau (FR: ETAP, Ecole des Troupes Aroportes) or at the different National Commando Training Centers (FR: CNEC, Centre National d'Entranement de Commando). Regular participation in manoeuvres, both national (such as exercise EXCOM 2002 with the participation of the CPA 10)48 and international (such as exercise Strong Resolve, February 2002, where the commander of the COS occupied the role of commander of the CJSOTF (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force)). This is an important part in the creation of an operational capacity between the French SF and their allied colleagues. During exercise EXCOM 2002 the CPA 10 were trained together with units from the Gendarmerie, the national police and civilian rescue functions in a terrorist attack-scenario on French soil. This might serve as an example of a new way of using the French SF. Summary The structure and organisation of the SF can be defined within the concept of the circles. The First circle consists of the units directly connected to the COS. The army, the navy and the air force all have units within the First circle. These units can be devided into units for direct action and units for projection. The army and the air force have both types of units whilst the navy only have units for direct action. However, there are units which can be used for COS operations without being permanently connected to the COS. These units all fall under the outer circles and may participate with specific competences or expertise. Worth mentioning is the change of status for the 13.RDP. From being a unit from the outer circles it was given a changed status in the summer of 2002 and could fully integrate into the First circle.

48

Armes d'Aujourd'hui No 271, (2002), pp. 18 - 20.

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Part II: A flexible use in international operations

2.1 The time before the Gulf war - lack of a co-ordinated tool The period ahead of the Gulf war was characterised by a decentralised and inconsistent way of using the SF. The following chapter will give some examples of an initial willingness to coordinate and federate these special and elite units even before the official decision was taken. 2.1.1 The historical origins of the SF The birth of what today is called Special Forces is difficult to tie to a specific date. During the First World War French units acted in a way that may be translated into SF-activity of today. The Maquis operated in a manner that is directly connected to the SF-concept of today. Serving for the Interior French Forces (fr: FFI, Forces Franaises de l'Intrieur) they were supported and supplied by the Americans and played an important role in the preparations of the invasion of Normandy; Operation Overlord, in June 1944 and also during the invasion of southern France; Operation Dragoon, in August 1944.49 The Nettoyeurs des tranches (trenchcleaners) were used for neutralising resistance pockets behind own lines. In Indochina the French SF were employed against targets at great distances with strategic importance. The Second World War saw the creation of the first "official" SF. The British SAS-teams served as a model for the French Marine Commandos and the commandos of the French SASteams (today 1.RPIMa). These units still carry their heritage from their British colleagues. Experimentation and development of the SF before the Gulf-war was performed mainly within the army and the navy. The horizontal co-ordination and co-operation was almost nonexistent and each service did his work on his own. The area for SF-activity was not as clear and well defined as today and units even outside the SF-circles today were in some aspects considered as "special". In the middle of the 1970s, the activity within the 11.DP could serve as an example of a beginning co-ordination. Each regiment within the division disposed of its own commando-group (about 20 personnel), and they each had its own specification depending on if they belonged to an artillery, engineer or infantry-regiment; but still with some common basic-structure.

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In 1978 these groups were officially named CRAP (fr: CRAP, Commando de Renseignement et d'Action de Profondeur) and were now grouped within the 11.DP. In the mid 1980s, these CRAP-units were gathered under a common cell of the 11.DP. This CRAPfederation only concerned the army. It is important to stress that these units do not belong to what is today defined as SF-units, but they may serve as units from the outer circles under the command of the COS, and with this point of view their co-ordination may serve as an example of an early will of federating these units of "special" character. Meanwhile, the 1.RPIMa developed what is to be called direct action-units in a grey-zone between covert and clandestine activity. In the mid 80s the regiment was organised into three operational companies, each designed to be engaged as a Unit for Army Corps Intelligence (fr: URCA, Unit de Recherche de Corps d'Arme). Their missions concerning strikes towards the enemy's nuclear- or strategic staff-functions and can be compared to the role of the Russian Spetsnaz-units at the poque.50 The 1.RPIMa also belonged to the 11. Airborne Division (fr: 11.DP, Division Parachutiste) and were also one of the components of the Rapid Reaction Force (fr: FAR, Force d'Action Rapide).51 Even the 13.RDP were operating in the same greyzone. The 13.RDP at this time, with their geo-strategic position in Dieuze, close to the eastern border, had a natural roll within the intelligence gathering at mainly operative level for the 1st Army Corps. Not officially defined, the 1.RPIMa was more or less dedicated for activity on the African continent, and the 13.RDP for activity towards the eastern frontier. This was a time of internal friction and concurrence rather than a time of federation and co-operation. Within the army this was most clear between the 13.RDP and the 1.RPIMa but also between the different CRAP-teams in some ways. The lack of doctrinal concept resulted in a grey-zone where missions and operations were poorly co-ordinated and where initiatives were taken on different levels. In the same way for the navy at the same time, the forces considered "special" were gathered into a battalion of Fusiliers de marine. The exception was Commando Hubert that already at this time had a specific status related to their SF-status of today. These groupings within the different services might be seen as a first step towards the joint structure, even if the concept was far from being as clear as it is today. The co-ordination did not concern all services and the trigger for revolutionary changes had not yet been pulled.

49 50

Article in Special Warfare No 2, Vol 15, (2002), pp. 2 - 13. Cecile, (1998), pp. 179 - 180. 51 Micheletti, (1999), p. 37.

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Summary Apart from focusing on some of the decissions and standpoints leading to the creation of the COS we also identified some traces of early willingness to federate and improve the use of the SF even before the official decissions were taken. In general, there havent been any new units created. Instead, they have been given a new and a more clear status. 2.2 Experiences from the Gulf and the creation of the COS Experiences from the Gulf did not result in any immediate, radical changes for the French defence forces. However, some changes, directly connected to the Gulf war and the evolution of COS, follows similar patterns as other joint functions created in this era. A focus will here be given to the process of creating the COS. 2.2.1 A painful lesson for France After the Iraqi intervention into Kuwait, the crisis in the Gulf became a reality in 1990 and France found herself outnumbered in participation in the multi-national, American-led military operation by their British allies. The Gulf-war became a clear receipt that France did not possess the intervention-capacity officially declared.52 The British had at this moment a smaller armed force, but engaged nearly four times as many troops as France. Concerning SF, some units from the 13.RDP were put to the disposition of the French commander General Michel Roquejeoffre in the defensive, initial phase of the intervention, called the Dessert Shield. They were mainly given the mission to recognise towards the Iraqi border. The 13.RDP found themselves in a situation they were not used to: instead of being behind enemy lines, they were now in front of enemy lines. This sort of short-range reconnaissance patrols were the only French contribution concerning SF. The military commander sent demands back to Paris for sending down CRAP-units and units from the 1.RPIMa for direct action and intelligence gathering. Because of internal reasons within the French staff, decision was not taken in time. The employment was delayed and when, finally, the demanded units were sent to the Gulf, only ten to twelve days rested until the offensive phase of the operation, named the Desert Storm. The purpose was
52

During this period, France had declared they possessed the rapid reaction unit FAR (fr: Force d'Action Rapide), consisting of about 45 000 men, organised into five divisions. What became the constraint in the Gulfintervention was the fact that the main part of these 45 000 men were conscripts and could not be engaged into a conflict outside France without political actions that would have taken too long time.

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originally to use these CRAP / 1.RPIMa-units in the same way as the Anglo-Saxons used their SAS / SF-teams. The late arrival of the units made preparation / infiltration / realisation of missions impossible. The units were finally used during the attack rather than before; during the preparation phase. Some concrete missions of SF-character was the saviour of two air-crew teams shot down in combat who were rescued by French CSAR-teams. Evolutions after the Gulf-war, stressed that France, even if these CRAP / 1.RPIMa-units had been sent on time, due to the lack of doctrinal approach of SF did not really possess the same capacity as their Anglo-Saxon allies. Constraints in co-ordination, co-operation had been clear. Lack in language-skills, organisational structure, joint-functions, disposability of personnel were some of the factors exposed in general for the French armed forces and these lacks were not in any ways typical only for the SF. 2.2.2 The creation of the COS In November 1991 the mission was given to General Maurice Le Page to propose of how to federate and improve the use of the Special Forces within the French armed forces. This was a period where the new Chief of Defence Staff had taken place and had started to put his mark on how the evolution should take direction to face up against future needs. The Admiral Jacques Lanxade entered in position and he immediately took the co-ordination between the different services seriously. The goal was to obtain an operational structure where the tools were used in a better and more efficient way. Worth mentioning is that during the same period some other vital functions were created in the same joint atmosphere. Operative functions such as the Joint Command Staff (fr: COIA, Centre Operationnel Inter-Armes), the Joint Planning Staff (fr: EMIA, Etat-Major InterArmes) changed completely the way of how to command and control operations. The interaction between the COIA and the EMIA was clear though the COIA was commanding and the EMIA was planning the operations. Recently a commanding and planning staff, CPCO (fr: CPCO, Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Oprations), has replaced the COIA and parts of the EMIA.53

53

Article in Armes d'Aujourd'hui, No 274, "Changement d're: Un nouvel outil pour un commandement des oprations plus efficace", (2002), pp. 12 - 16.

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The Military Intelligence Agency (fr: DRM, Direction du Renseignement Militaire) was also created and their task became intelligence gathering on all levels, even though intelligence on strategic level is the DRM main task. In the same manner, the COS became the first and only joint organ for the French Special Forces. The blockage of a "split-doctrine" (intervention-doctrine for participation in operations abroad at the same time as a doctrine for facing the Warsaw-pact) even after the end of the Cold War, had as a consequence that the radical changes in this era had to wait until 1996 to become reality and reform the whole of the armed forces. The Defence Program Plan 1997 - 2002 (fr: LdP 97-02, Loi de Programmation 97-02) was the first application entirely in this formula, though the period before was characterised as a certain memory of the bi-polar era. The task given to General Le Page was to study and to make a proposition of how to federate in a better way the French SF. The question was raised: Where to start ? First of all, a clear definition of what was to be called X and Y was found necessary. During that period, the field of Special Operations / Special Forces was a grey-zone of units with covert, open and clandestine activity. The goal of this work of definition was not to exclude someone from the activity, it was rather to create an atmosphere where co-operation was easier and better prepared. The field was open. The study concerned all possible units; the use of gendarme units, army, naval, air-force-units and in some aspect the DGSE-units. This study of definitions ended up in some general conclusions: The COS (even though named differently in the beginning of the study) was to be a joint function with the representation of all different services. A close co-operation was not to be excluded between the services; on the contrary these new concepts of definition were to facilitate the activity between the different units of SF / SO. The activity of these units was not to concern clandestine activity. This became the activity of the DGSE; and the DGSE only. The status of the COS-connected-units was to be pure military, though they were to obtain the combatant-status. Second was to find a separation and distinction of how to treat and gather intelligence. The question was posed: Shall this new concept of a joint-staff for the SF depend on a certain

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bureau occupied with intelligence gathering? Or shall it gather intelligence itself? The solution became, briefly, that the DRM continued to be responsible for the general intelligence gathering with one army regiment (13.RDP) attached to the Intelligence Brigade (FR: BRGE, Brigade de Renseignement et de la Guerre Electronique). A certain level of autonomy in intelligence gathering was found necessary for the COS; notably tactical information concerning preparations for operations / direct actions. A clear will of co-ordinating as much as possible was indicated in the presentation of the final proposition presented by Gen Le Page. Training, equipment and concept of employment were some domains of co-ordination and also the control of the SF. This was to obtain a real tool of excellence for France, a system where the will and orders penetrated all levels of commanding; from the political level to the team on soil. By controlling, directly commanding was made possible in a more efficient way.54 The proposition fulfilled these demands.
Intelligence Offensive operations

Clandestine Overseas Non Clandestine DRM

DGSE

COS

National territory

GSIGN

DGSE

DRM

GSIGN

COS

Fig. The different roles. Even though the creation of the COS (and also the COIA, the EMIA and the DRM) was realised in the shadow of the Gulf-war and with its experiences, there are signs of earlier need for the co-ordinating of the SF-activity. The hostage-situation in New Caledonia in 1988 where a Kanak-liberation-group took a number of civil citizens' hostage raised some questions

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of how to use and federate units better. The intervention in New Caledonia concerned the GIGN from the Gendarmes and SF from the other services as well (Marine Commandos from the Navy for example). We have identified concrete examples from operations, such as in Tchad, where military commanders found themselves in the situation of being informed from Paris of what was going on in their own Area of Responsibility. Teams from the 13.RDP, who depended directly on the DRM, performed intelligence gathering. Information sent back to the military commander on the terrain was, in some cases, sent back from Paris. The chain of command was radically changed with the new formula. The new proposition changed the relation between these kind of units (here the teams from the 13.RDP) and the local military commander who permitted a more federate use of units in the same area of operation. Even though all military operations, except for the SF-operations, are commanded by the CPCO, the SF-cell at the CPCO informs the commanding staff about activities of the COS. The creation of the COS also resulted in something that did not exist before. The doctrinal application of how to employ the SF (FR: Emploi des forces spciales) was now created in the same atmosphere as the work of definitions, where the tasks given did not change from time to time, from operation to operation. This creation of a description, based on doctrinal conclusions, of how to employ SF became something completely new for the SF. Many problems during the period before the Gulf-war were often related to the complete lack of doctrinal application. 2.2.3 A unique solution The French solution implemented a unique concept. The Americans had, during their federation of the SF created, more or less, a new service. 55 This solution demands a completely different way of handling administrational questions; notably when the units are not engaged in operations. Personnel career, social problems, logistics are only some examples of how heavy this model of organisation might be. In the French solution, the COS

54 55

C3I, Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence. Revue "Renseignement et oprations spciales" No 9, (2001), pp. 131 - 136.

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does not take the responsibility for such administrational matters. The COS is only occupied with SF / SO-activity, and for the rest the different units depend of their services. Staffs on service level have been created (within the army (FR: BFST, Brigade des Forces Spciales Terre: former CFST, Commandement des Forces Spciales Terre), the navy (FR: COFUSCO, Commandement des Fusiliers Commando) and the air force (FR: CFCA, Commandement des Fusiliers Commandos de l'Air)) which serves as inter-mediate between COS and the units. In this way SF-units may be conducted by their own services while not used by the COS. Notably the navy is often used by the navy staff for naval missions (border controlling, surveillance, rescue-missions). During these naval operations, the marine commandos are officially serving under another status than as SF-units. One question is; Does this new concept create friction between the services and the COS? For example between the navy staff and the COS? Who has the priority of using the Marine Commandos? In theory, the answer to the first question is YES. One can suppose a permanent tug of war between the services and this joint function but we have not identified any concrete examples during this study. On the contrary, the average opinion among our sources is that the disposition of the commandos is working fluently and that friction between the services and the COS is rare. The COS was officially created in 1992 and the original concept remains intact today. Some major adjustments were realised in 2002: the creation of the brigade-structure within the army in the summer of 2002 and the attachment of the 13.RDP to the COS. Local unit level changes have been remedied, such as the project Commando 2000 among the marine commandos. These changes did not effect the concept of employment of the SF. Summary The Gulf War became the signal France needed to start acting, in terms of restructuring their SF capability, if they wanted to participate on the same international arena as their anglosaxons colleagues. The lack of personnel disposable for a rapid intervention was the main reason why France only could participate in a minor way in the Gulf War. Concerning the SF, the war in the desert became a modest experience. Being sent to late, and not given proper

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tasks were some of the reasons why France could not return home to La Mtropole with genuine experiences from the multinational operation. The creation of the COS started in 1991 and the General Le Page presented a new and unique concept for how to federate the SF more efficient. Clear definitions and clear tasks were given. The new COS would hereafter seek to coordinate the units that were to be combatants, in that they were to co-operate and complement each other rather than compete with each other. The COS would furthermore be a joint staff with participation from all military services. One major difference in the French concept compared to the anglo-saxon concepts was that the COS only commanded the SF while they were employed in operations. Back in France they belonged to their regular service staffs. It is most likely that this concept creates friction between the different services and the COS staff. Short after the creation of the COS, units from the new joint special forces command were employed for the first time in a large scale operation. 2.3 Somalia - A new experience on a well known theatre Somalia gave useful experiences to the French decission makers as well as to the military commanders. For the SF units it became the first large scale operation where they were engaged together with their colleagues from other services, commanded by the same staff: the COS. This chapter gives an overview of the case of Somalia and the environment for the COS and the SF. 2.3.1 The first large scale operation The UN resolution 794, adopted by the Security Council meant the possibility to create an international task force intervention in Somalia named Operation Restore Hope. This could possibly require the use of force to maintain security for humanitarian aid in Somalia.56 Created in June 1992 the COS only had to wait until December the same year for their first large-scale operation. In December 7, 1992, the French government decided to participate in the multinational UN-operation in Somalia. 57 Immediately groups from 1.RPIMa, CRAPunits from 11.DP (nowadays the GCP / 11.BP) and the Marine Commandos were put on alert.
56 57

Petit, (2000), pp. 52 - 53. Micheletti, (1993), pp. 4 - 11.

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They only had to wait until December 12 to be engaged in Somalia, passing by Djibouti. As of today, Djibouti is strategically France's most important military presence on the African continent. The presence of these pre-positioned forces became a key-element for the French intervention into Somalia. By this date, some legionnaire-units had already been employed (2.REP were employed on the December 9). Even though the COS-units were not the first ones to enter the theatre (even the US Marine Corps had landed in Mogadishu) one main question was immediately raised: Will the UN humanitarian operation be attacked during their intervention or will the local warlords act in a peaceful manner? The first task given to the units of the COS was strategic intelligence gathering and not offensive actions such as taking control over strategic sites or neutralising objects. 58 On December 14, COS-units landed in Djibouti and the next day they were engaged into Somalia. The unit had the village of Baidoa as the main target. On the morning of the 16th the village of Baidoa was in the control of the operation Task Force Hope. On the same day humanitarian elements could intervene into the area. Parallel to the COS-units, two squads from the 13.RDP were sent to Somalia by the Military Intelligence Agency (fr: DRM, Direction de Renseignement Militaire). Their task was mainly intelligence gathering concerning local armed fractions and infrastructure in the region. Even though not engaged for the same tasks, the COS-units and the DRM-units immediately co-operated in the Area of Operation. One example is when information was gathered by COS-units concerning an RPG-7-armed element and handed over to the 13.RDP. This further on led to the exploration of an ammo-hide through complementary co-operation rather than friction in a competitive way. On December 24 the French contingent continued its advance towards the town of Hoddur, 150 km north of Baidoa. The following day the COS installed their tactical commanding post in Hoddur. The armed militias had chosen to leave the village without armed aggression just as in Baidoa. Next to the COS commanding post, the DRM also installed their tactical commanding post. From the village of Hoddur, the SF-units could now be engaged in long range reconnaissance patrols, employed by helicopters from the 5th Combat-Helicopter Regiment (fr: 5.RHC, Rgiment d'Hlicoptre de Combat). The main target was surveillance of the border to Ethiopia located just some 100 km from Hoddur. On December 31, COS-elements spotted a group of armed elements traversing the border into Somalia. After some show of force by the Gazelle-helicopter guns, the armed elements

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were taken in control and escorted back to their main base. These in fact turned out to be soldiers from the Ethiopian army, looking for some adventure. Once installed in Hoddur, the work of mine clearing became more important. Intelligence gathered by the COS- and DRM-teams gave important help to the mine clearing teams from the French Foreign Legion (fr: 6.REG, Rgiment Etranger de Gnie). Without mine clearing in strategic sites and infrastructure the humanitarian aid would have become increasingly difficult to perform. On January 12, the main French contingent arrived in Somalia. The major parts of the COS were now lifted out of the area and sent back to France or to the next conflict waiting: the Balkans. 2.3.2 Lessons learned from Somalia Useful lessons were learned from the Somalia operation Oryx. Experiences important for the future were obtained and the operation Oryx gave France some examples of how the COS could be used in future operations: The rapid employment showed clearly that the COS had to be on permanent alert. This required professional soldiers that could be immediately engaged in a conflict area outside the French territory. The use of conscripted soldiers did not permit this kind of availability.59 Unit-level co-operation with units similar to the COS were vital, both national and international. The French strategic pre-positioned forces in Djibouti had played a key role in the rapid employment. Without these bases of permanent support, a tactical airlift into the zone of operation would have been far more complicated with the lack of strategic mobility that was a fact for France and most of the Europeans at the time. France would have depended on some friendly neighbour-states for landing before intervening on Somalian soil. Opposing forces in the conflict were far from the conventional armed forces threat the Cold War prescribed. The clan-structure of Somalia did not follow the same social structure as western nation-states. Most of the actors were armed local bandits, depending on the commander or warlord that could pay the best salary. In other words, these opponents were
58 59

Baudouin, (1993), pp. 4 - 13. During this period, conscript soldiers could in theory be engaged into conflicts outside France, if the decision was taken in the Parliament. This was though a procedure that demanded long time and would any way end up in a lack of availability. The 1.RPIMa also had some volunteer conscripts, called AVAE who had volunteered for being employed outside the French territory.

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often not difficult to fight, but difficult to identify. The lack of border control (territorial integrity) permitted trans-national actors to intervene on the scene without difficulties. Even though France had military presence in the area (mainly in Djibouti), the main task in the early hours of the operation was the creation of an actual map of existing actors and their expected behaviour. This gave France a hint of the importance of having permanently up-to-date information of all possible conflict areas. The importance of knowing languages were also underlined: both English for allied communication and the different local languages and dialects of the region. The importance of close co-operation with non-military actors also became clear. Though the intervention in Somalia was a humanitarian intervention, the humanitarian organisations were the most important final actors. The media also showed its more and more important role in the conflict. Scenes captured by journalists of US-Marines landing on the beaches of Mogadishu were sent world-wide and gave the world a close distance to what happened in Somalia. The lack of infrastructure and technical resources in Somalia underlined the importance of autonomy capacity with high-tech communication and observing equipment. The importance of combined joint interventions also became clear, though this was a central lesson learned from the Gulf. The principle of modularity (putting together units depending of the tasks and missions given) also showed its importance. The Somalia intervention mainly involved units from the army and the navy, but elements from the air force played a significant role notably during the transport phases. The Somalia experience also showed that quality; not quantity is a key signature for the SF for the future. The SF posses a speciality in different domains in a way that makes them difficult or impossible to replace. The Somalia operation Oryx became the first large-scale experience for the French Special Forces employed by the COS in the post-Cold War era. The operation had the typical characteristics of this period and was far from being the last escalating low-intensity conflict of this kind.

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2.4 Moving into the future with an appropriated tool This last chapter will pay attention to some recent operations and how SF is currently used. Furthermore, the use of SF in the grey zone, between what is traditionally police and military operations, will also be described. 2.4.1 Afghanistan The Afghanistan intervention meant for France, as for most of the Western states, an intervention in a new direction. This was in a region where language and cultural knowledge was limited. Even though the French forces were pre-positioned in Djibouti, the intervention could not be supported in the same way from a pre-positioned force-camp as in earlier interventions in Africa (Somalia, Rwanda, Congo). 60 After the visit by Massoud, the commander of the Northern Alliance, France sent units from the armed wing of the DGSE to Afghanistan for clandestine operations and military advising. 61 The French minister of defence, Mr Alain Richard, officially declared this on October 8, 2001.62 This was before the terrorist strikes on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center on September 11 and the early presence in the area gave the following intervention important information. The French participation in the American led operation in Afghanistan, named Operation Enduring Freedom, has been modest. Worth mentioning is though the surrounding presence in Kirghizstan, Tadjikistan and the Indian Ocean, where the major parts of the French contribution was based.63 Only a smaller amount (about 500 troops) was stationed in Kaboul under the ISAF-command (International Security Assistance Force). The SF were engaged in the early phases of the intervention for a period of about three months. Units from all three services were engaged and they served according to the chosen SF-concept. Their main task was, briefly, offensive action services and force protection. Elements from the Air Force commandos were also stationed at the international air base in Douchanb, Tadjikistan. In Manas, Kirghistan they were responsible for the security of the installations connected to the air base in close co-ordination with their allied colleagues. 64 The American choice to intervene under American concept, not NATO-concept, limited the autonomy for
60 61

Article in Janes Defence Weekly, 31 of October 2001, "France begins Afghan operations", by JAC Lewis. Article in Le Monde, 10 of October 2001, "Des agents de renseignement francais auprs de l'Alliance du Nord", by Jacques Isnard, p. 7. 62 Ibid. 63 Dossier in Armes d'Aujourd'hui No 269, (2002), pp. 27 - 51.

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participating states. A concrete example was that the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force, CJSOTF, which is to be "combined" by definition, did only consist of Americans. The early withdrawal of the French SF was motivated by the change in character of the operations that became more like commando-missions for units from the second circle according to the French concept. 2.4.2 Changing conditions The Afghanistan experience also showed a certain lack of equipment: notably helicopters for tactical transports. 65 Human constraints, such as lack of cultural knowledge and language skills have also been clearly identified during the operations. These needs underlined the importance of maintaining the civilian-military co-operation. The newly installed Office for Civil-Military Actions (FR: BACM, Bureau d'Actions Civil-Militaire) in Lyon will certainly find its role in co-operation with the SF in future operations. The defence minister Mme Alliot Marie has recently officially expressed the need for changes. She announced this in a clear way during the beginning of her mandate-period.66 Some decisions have been taken concerning these demands, and the French government allocated approximately 460 million Euro by the end of the year of 2001 to the COS.67 The decision supported by the Chief of Defence Staff General Jean-Pierre Kelche, concerns the recruiting of between 700 and 900 troops to join the 3 000 men currently enrolled in the COS. Gen Kelche called for the creation of a new SF-regiment with the specialisation of reconnaissance and target-identification behind enemy lines. He also pointed out the direct need for about 12 tactical helicopters (Eurocopter Cougar Mark 2 Plus), which will arrive probably in 2004. This helicopter has the capacity of aerial refuelling, air defence and has a self-efficient distance of operation of about 1000 km. The Tigre combat-helicopter will also be attached to the COS for Close Air Support (CAS). SF operations have during most previous operations been implemented mostly by small groups and at a limited time. This classical way of using and seeing on the SF as a trans-level tool of surgical, time-limited interventions will maybe have to be changed in the near future.
64 65

Ibid, p. 42. Interview with the French Chief of Defence Staff General Jean-Pierre Kelche, Armes d'Aujourd'hui, No 265, (2001), pp. 10 - 12. 66 Article in Le Monde, "Michle Alliot-Marie annonce une modernisation de l'arsenal nuclaire francais", 14 July 2002, p. 6.

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Notably the intervention in Afghanistan has showed that the future use of the SF might be of a larger number of men for a longer period of time. Today operations normally do not engage more than 100 personnel and the intervention normally do not last for a long period. Compared to conventional forces, the SF does not forcefully stay a fixed time on the field / in the theatre of operation. After accomplishing a mission the teams are pulled out and returned to France. Operations in the future may demand longer periods employed and also with forces up to 400 personnel68. This radical change may not change the character of the major parts of all operations, but as Frances ambition is to participate with SF in international operations with its allies, they must as well inspire confidence in doing it and being able to do so if necessary. Balkan is still a theatre of great importance to the French armed forces and the presence of the SF is of a non-permanent character. This summer's capture of a war criminal is an example of actual missions realised by the SF. The raise of effectiveness connected to the creation of a brigade-structure of the SF (FR: BFST, Brigade des Forces Spciales Terre) indicates a will to realise changes concerning the employment of the SF and to underline their importance. The creation of a fourth army, besides the army, the navy and the air force, is rejected firmly by Gen Kelche.69 If the Hum Int-units (FR: URH, Unit de Recherche Humaine) from the 27.Alpine Brigade (FR: 27.BIM, Brigade d'Infanterie de Montagne) will be connected to their colleagues as a GCM, the centralisation of competence will be of importance for future interventions; notably into arctic and mountainous areas. Today the 13.RDP regularly have exchange manoeuvres with Sweden (the K4 ranger-regiment in Arvidsjaur, located in the north of Sweden). 2.4.3 The Ivory Coast The violent evolution in the Ivory Coast in September 2002, caused by the confrontation between rebels from the northern parts of the state and government troops supporting the president Gbagbo, did not have to wait long for a French reaction. From the 1st of October France reinforced their military presence in the Ivory Coast by sending a tactical commanding staff to be able to command the military operation and also reinforcements from the pre67 68

Homepage of the Janes Defence Weekly, 5 December, 2001. Interview with the French Chief of Defence Staff General Jean-Pierre Kelche, Armes d'Aujourd'hui, No 265, (2001), p. 11. 69 Ibid, pp. 34 - 51.

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positioned forces in Gabon due to the conflictual evolution.70 The pre-positioned forces in the Ivory-Coast (FR: 43.BIMa, Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marine) and Gabon (6.BIMa and a permanent COS-detachment) 71 gave France vital up-to-date information of the situation concerning social activity, infrastructure and political evolution. This permitted a fast reaction and also a rapid employment for France. Officially France did not take an active part in the violence between the rebels and the troops of the president Gbagbo, but a support for Mr Gbagbo was expressed. The operation, called Operation Licorne, was initially a co-operation between France and the United States, and the citizens evacuated were mainly French and American. In total about 3000 personnel were evacuated from Korhogo, Ferkessedougou and Bouak, which was in the control by the rebels.72 It may be supposed that the pre-positioned COS-detachment from Gabon took a central part in the preparations in the Operation Licorne. Missions possible may have been supporting with EIT-expertise and special reconnaissance missions or direct participation in the evacuation of the foreign citizens. Once again the pre-positioned forces have played a central role for the security of foreign citizens in regions of violence. 2.4.4 An increasing use of SF in the grey zone? The G8 summit meeting in Evian in June 2003 showed a variety of how to use military units for security operations rather than for defence operations. Air defence systems (Crotale NG) were stationed around the Royal Hotel were the meetings were held. Fighter air crafts from both the French and the Swiss air forces were engaged. These are some examples of protection against attacks from third dimension. The French army contributed with units from mainly three regiments: 5 Combat Helicopter Regt (FR: 5.RHC, Rgiment dHlicoptres de Combat), 27 Mountain Ranger Regt (FR: 27.BCA, Bataillon de Chasseurs Alpins) and the 11 Marine Artillery Regt (FR: 11.RAMa, Rgiment dArtillerie de Marine). The helicopters transported personell between Geneva and Evian. They also observed the valleys of the mountainous region. Infantry units patrolled the region by foot or by vehicle. In case of threat of explosives, experts from the 3 and 31 Engineer Regt (FR: RG, Rgiment de Genie) were on alert. For intelligence gathering, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

70

Article in L'Express international, No 2676, "La France dans le bourbier Ivoirien", 17 - 23 October 2002, pp. 20 - 21. 71 Armes d'Aujourd'hui No 259, (2001), pp. 40 - 41. 72 www.defense.gouv.fr

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(UAV) Hunter were used with a capacity of surveillance day / night, from a hight of 13 000 feet. The SF were also present in Evian. Together with their colleagues from the Gendarmes (GIGN and EPIGN) and the police (RAID), military SF were used as snipers acting from helicopters. Some materiels, such as speed-boats from the marine commando Hubert, were also used by the GIGN at the lake of Leman. Even on the national day of the 14 July (2003), Paris was surveyed from above by SF sniper-teams acting from helicopters. To be noted is the strict control for engagement that concerned these teams. Fire could have been opened only after a direct order from the Prime Minister.

General conclusions

The evolution of the French Special Forces might be described in different ways and explained with different approaches. During our researches we have been able to identify some different phases of evolution; an evolution concerning federating of what is already existing and adapting it to actual needs. Even before the end of the Cold War we have been able to identify a will of co-ordinating the actions of these elite units of special activity. This co-ordination was most clear within the army where tactical commandos within the 11.DP, called CRAP, were grouped and coordinated close to the 11.DP-staff and finally transformed into GCP. This co-ordination of CRAP / GCP-teams were separated from the development of the SF-activity within the 1.RPIMa and the 13.RDP, who had a covert / clandestine role. Even in the navy, similar evolutions have been observed among the Marine Commandos. The end of the Cold War did not immediately trigger any radical changes for the French SF. The total acceptance of the end of the bi-polar era, with fundamental organisational changes, had to wait until mid 90s. The Defence Program Plan 1997-2002 with the professionalisation and the re-organisation of the armed forces became the kick-off. The Gulf war became the trigger for radical changes for some functions within the French armed forces; and also for the SF. It is considered as the most important phase of the

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evolution. The lack of a doctrinal application of how to use what already existed raised the demand for an organisational solution to be well adapted to the new era. The grouping of the SF-units under the Joint Special Operations Command, the COS, became the concrete result of this phase of evolution. The joint structure followed the logic of the era. What the creation of the COS actually did, or permitted, was a more efficient way of using the units for special activity and gave a clear definition to what was to be called Special Forces. Their status as being units of open or covert operations, serving as combatants and not being engaged into clandestine operations were once and for all defined. However, it may be expected that these units, belonging to the COS, should be able to act in other environments, with another status. Changing hats between the COS and units of clandestine charactere can therefore not be excluded. The creation of the COS did not trigger the creation of new units, even though a certain expansion of the activity was related to the newly created joint command. The choice of ranging the COS directly under the Chief of Defence Staff also showed the importance of this tool and the importance of controlling and commanding the tool. The next phase of evolution is connected to the Afghanistan-intervention. Even though the importance of the SF had been observed before this intervention by personnel directly attached to the matter, the Afghanistan-arena became the theatre of the SF: "SF became the solution". This was not an average opinion among the French armed forces in 1991 / 92, during the Gulf-war. Prior to the Afghanistan-experience, the COS mainly kept its original structure and size, but it has after the summer of 2002 been clearly enlarged and given a higher capacity of intelligence gathering. The Afghanistan-intervention also showed an example of how future operations might demand the presence of SF in larger numbers and for a longer period than before. This new geographic, conflictual region has also shown that most participating western states have a lack of culture, language and social knowledge in the area and other regional actors, like Russia, play an important role. Due to these needs of changing, the French Chief of Defence Staff has decided to create a new regiment dedicated to the COS with the specialisation according to some of these support demands. The regiment will probably be created within the years to come. The time between the decision and the implementation can be long. Also direct needs of new equipment's, such as helicopters for tactical transports, has been identified. New Cougar Mark II+ will in the near future be given to the projection units of the

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COS. The combat helicopter Tigre will also be used in the future for close air-support. The acquisition of the strategic aircraft A400M to the COS will expand the possibility of employing the SF further. The light character of the SF is though still in priority; this for being able to constantly adapt the capacity according to the concept of employment within the strategy of segmentation. Finally the 13.RDP have been attached to the COS and France is now entering the unstable era after the 11th of September 2001 with a federated, efficient and more autonomous SFcapacity. The new capacity of the French SF permit the COS to take a more varied responsibility, both within the direct action and also within the human intelligence gathering. Their importance and central role for tomorrow's armed forces is made even clearer than before thanks to the creation of the brigade-structure of the Army Special Forces Brigade. Their operational experiences has made them more than well prepared for interventions into future conflicts. The rise of importance for the French Special Forces may be symbolised by the presence of the 1.RPIMa at the military parade in Paris on the French national day of the 14 of July.73 Participating in inter-ministerial manoeuvres towards terrorist threats may serve as a signal that a change in using the SF is approaching. Training at unit level is also in some ways prepared for this kind of threat. Connected to the future evolution of the French Special Forces is also the evolution of the Gendarmes and the gendarme elite-units (GIGN, EPIGN). The future for the Gendarmes and their para-military colleagues in Europe (notably in Italy and Spain) will probably be a question with great influence from the European Union. A re-definition of the tasks and missions of these units will probably affect both the police forces and also the military forces. If there will be an expanded way of using the COS for more varied missions in the grey zone between pure police tasks and pure military tasks, there is no doubt about the capacity and competence for doing it for the units within the First circle. Their quality and disposability have been well recognised several times. The decision though has to be political, and express a political will of using this tool of excellence in a different way than today. Except for juridical differences in employment, our conclusion is though that training, concept of employment and equipment do not have to be re-oriented in a fundamental way and examples
73

Article in Le Monde, "Un dfil du 14 juillet sous le signe du 11 septembre", 15 august 2002.

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given in this research has shown the flexibility of how to adapt the French Special Forces to actual conditions. Areas of interest for further research In terms of the evolution of the Swedish SF, an interesting aspect for the future might be to further evaluate the trend within the French SF to operate more frequently in the grey zone. New definitions of threats, such as international terrorism, will probably demand a re-think for most western countries. Furtheron, concepts for protection of the territory, the citizens and the national interests will probably take new dimensions in the new world order of trans-national actors. Even if tasks and definitions will stay separated between units and agencies, a closer co-operation and exchange of experiences will most likely be needed. The concept of employment surrounding the COS has given France a tool for strategic use. The disposability has been examined several times, but still, is it the ultimate choice? From a Swedish point of view, it would be interesting to follow whether the French doctrinal choice will remain the same as today or if it will change and be more adapted to the NATO-concept for SF. Useful lessons-learned might be drawn from such a follow-up for Swedish doctrinal choices. According to their anglo-saxon colleagues the French concept is in some aspects unique and differences in efficiency and disposability are interesting to evaluate. Future multinational operations may indicate further differences. The status of the SF are under of continuous state of change. It is therefor interesting to follow how the French definitions and capacity specifications will change for the COS. Will more units be connected to the glorious First circle? If so; what capacities will be demanded? Will a future expansion mean the pure creation of new regiments or just a change in status for already existing units? These questions may give valuable answers on how to organise and define Swedish units. France, among other nations, will probably be a more and more frequent partner for the Swedish armed forces in international operations abroad. The summer of 2003 meant the beginning of a new era of how to use and employ the Swedish SF. Together

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with their French colleagues they were sent to the hostile environment in eastern Congo in what became to be one of the first military operations run by the European Union. The result was a success. It was not only a success for France and Sweden, on a pure national basis, but also for the European Union who for a long time have developed its capacity for conflict and crisis management. Evalutations has been done within the military itself, which is good in many senses. However, in order to increase the credibility of research and in order to enhance the understanding for these phenomena among Swedish decisionmakers, further reports like this one needs to be written. Conclusions have to be drawn from ongoing operations in order to convince decisionmakers about the capability of SF and in order to create trustworthiness in the future use of Swedish SF.

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-Direction de l'Administration Generale (1992), Arrete portant cration du commandement des oprations spciales, Joxe Pierre, 24 June 1992 -Hugeux, Vincent (2002), La France dans le bourbier ivorien, L'Express international No 2676, 17 - 23 October 2002, pp. 21 - 21 -Isnard, Jacques (2001), Des agents de renseignement francais auprs de l'Alliance du Nord, Le Monde, 10 October 2001, p. 7 -Isnard, Jacques (2002), Michle Alliot-Marie annonce une modernisation de l'arsenal nuclaire francais, Le Monde, 14 - 15 July 2002, p. 6 -Ceaux, Pascal (2002), Un navire arraisonn par la marine francaise au terme d'une enqute internatinale sur un trafic de cocane, Le Monde, 15 June 2002 -La France a dploy de nouveaux moyens de renseignement, Le Monde, 21 October 2002 -Lewis, J A C (2001), French Special Forces Get Extra Funding, Jane's Defence Weekly, December 5, 2001 -Lewis, J A C (2001), France Begins Afghan Operations, Jane's Defence Weekly, October 31, 2001 - Micheletti, Eric (1993), Operation Rendre l'Espoir en Somalie, RAIDS N 81, pp. 4 - 11. Research projects -Robert, David (2002), Les forces spciales franaises et les nouveaux types de conflits, Research-project at the Toulouse Institute for Political Studies, Toulouse, France. -Sauvage, Andr; Nougues, Thierry and Chevrier, Stphane (2001), Armes et scurit intrieure: perception des acteurs institutionnels civils et militaires, Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Dfense, Rennes, France.