[G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004] PIMENTEL vs.

CONGRESS EN BANC Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 22 2004. G. R. No. 163783 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and VicePresident in the May 10, 2004 Elections.) RESOLUTION By the present Petition for Prohibition, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing. Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he relies on legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress. Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised and to put to rest all questions regarding the regularity, validity or constitutionality of the canvassing of votes fro President and Vice-President in the recently concluded national elections, this Court assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to its power and duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution and its original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under Section 5 of the same Article. After a considered and judicious examination of the arguments raised by petitioner as well as those presented in the Comments filed by the Solicitor General and respondent Joint Committee, this Court finds that the petition has absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed. Petitioners claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint Committee and that of the Office of the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of former Senate President Jovito Salonga. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992. On June 16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President.[1] Thereafter, on June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President, respectively.[2] Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on May 27, 1998.[3] The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and Vice-President, respectively.[4] As for petitioner's argument that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the Joint Committee of Congress [a]re [i]nvalid, [i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional [f]ollowing the [a]djournment [s]ine [d]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of Congress [o]f [t]heir [r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004," he cites in support thereof Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time). Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. (Pelayo v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385 [1968], citing Bautista v. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389 [1934] and Aquino v. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29 1968) Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. P.E.T. Case No. 003 January 18, 2008

LOREN B. LEGARDA, protestant, vs. NOLI L. DE CASTRO, protestee. RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: On June 23, 2004, Congress sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) proclaimed1 protestee Noli L. de Castro the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines. The official count of the votes cast for Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 elections showed that the protestee obtained the highest number of votes, garnering 15,100,431 votes as against the 14,218,709 votes garnered by the protestant Loren B. Legarda, who placed second, in a field consisting of four candidates for Vice-President. On July 23, 2004, the protestant filed this protest with this Tribunal praying for the annulment of the protestee's proclamation as the duly elected Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines.2 The protest has two main parts. The First Aspect originally covered "all the erroneous, if not manipulated, and falsified results as reflected in the final canvass documents" for 9,007 precincts in six provinces, one city and five municipalities.3 Protestant avers that the correct results appearing in the election returns were not properly transferred and reflected in the subsequent election documents and ultimately, in the final canvass of documents used as basis for protestee's proclamation. Protestant seeks the recomputation, recanvass and retabulation of the election returns to determine the true result. The Second Aspect required revision of ballots in 124,404 precincts specified in the protest.4

The Tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest and denied the motion of protestee for its outright dismissal. Protestee filed a motion for reconsideration arguing in the main that the Tribunal erred in ruling that the protest alleged a cause of action sufficient to contest protestee's victory in the May 2004 elections.5 On March 31, 2005, the Tribunal ruled that: On the matter of sufficiency of the protest, protestee failed to adduce new substantial arguments to reverse our ruling. We hold that while Pea v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal on requisites of sufficiency of election protest is still good law, it is inapplicable in this case. We dismissed the petition in Pea because it failed to specify the contested precincts. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to protestee's title to his office. In our view, the instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time. Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunal's rule-making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. On a related matter, the protestant in her reiterating motion prays for ocular inspection and inventory-taking of ballot boxes, and appointment of watchers. However, the Tribunal has already ordered the protection and safeguarding of the subject ballot boxes; and it has issued also the appropriate directives to officials concerned. At this point, we find no showing of an imperative need for the relief prayed for, since protective and safeguard measures are already being undertaken by the custodians of the subject ballot boxes. WHEREFORE, protestee's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. Protestant's reiterating motion for ocular inspection and inventory-taking with very urgent prayer for the appointment of watchers is also DENIED for lack of showing as to its actual necessity. Further, the protestant LOREN B. LEGARDA is ORDERED to specify, within ten (10) days from notice, the three (3) provinces best exemplifying the manifest errors alleged in the first part of her protest, and three (3) provinces best exemplifying the frauds and irregularities alleged in the second part of her protest, for the purpose herein elucidated. Lastly, the Tribunal hereby ORDERS the Commission on Elections to SUBMIT, within 30 days hereof, the official project of precincts of the May 2004 Elections. SO ORDERED.6 On April 11, 2005, protestant identified three (3) provinces as pilot areas best exemplifying her grounds for the First Aspect of the protest. She chose the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur with the following number of protested precincts: 1,607, 2,346 and 350, respectively, or a total of 4,303 out of the original 9,007 precincts.7 On June 21, 2005, the Tribunal ascertained8 the number of ballot boxes subject of the protest, to wit: The Tribunal Resolved to NOTE the Letter dated 30 May 2005 filed by Executive Director Pio Jose S. Joson, COMELEC, in compliance with the Letter dated 14 April 2005 of Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, Acting Clerk of the Tribunal, informing the Tribunal that one thousand four hundred fifty-four (1,454) ballot boxes are involved in the precincts of the province of Surigao del Sur which the protestant has identified to the Tribunal as best exemplifying the irregularities in connection with the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections. Accordingly, without prejudice to its recomputation, the number of ballot boxes involved in the precincts of the provinces which the protestant has identified to the Tribunal as best exemplifying the irregularities in connection with the said elections are as follows: Lanao del Sur Lanao del Norte Surigao del Sur Cebu City Pampanga Maguindanao 1,568 2,317 1,454 10,127 5,458 1,755

Total

22,679 ballot boxes involved in the precincts x P500.00 P11,339,500.00

On November 2, 2005 protestant moved to withdraw and abandon almost all pilot precincts in the First Aspect except those in the province of Lanao del Sur.9 On November 22, 2005, the Tribunal granted the said motion withdrawing and abandoning the protest involving the manifest errors in the municipalities of Lanao del Norte and Surigao del Sur.10 Thereafter, proceedings duly ensued concerning both the First and Second Aspects. Former Associate Justice Bernardo P. Pardo as Hearing Commissioner11 heard the presentation of evidence of both parties for the First Aspect. Subpoenas were issued to the witnesses of the protestant, e.g. the President/General Manager of Ernest Printing Corporation12 and then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos.13 On August 28, 2006, a preliminary conference was called by Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo to schedule the presentation of evidence. The latter then ordered as follows: Pursuant to the Resolution of the Tribunal dated 22 August 2006, setting the preliminary conference of the parties with the Hearing Commissioner today, the designated Hearing Commissioner called the preliminary conference in order to consider the order of hearing and presentation of evidence of the parties according to the procedure prescribed in the Resolution of the Tribunal of 1 August 2006, under paragraph B (1 and 2). The following are the appearances: 1) Protestant Loren B. Legarda, in person; 2) Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Atty. Jesus P. Casila, for the protestant; 3) Protestee Noli L. de Castro did not appear; 4) Atty. Armando M. Marcelo and Atty. Carlo Vistan, for the protestee. Atty. Brillantes manifested that the protestant is ready to adduce testimonial and documentary evidence on a date to be scheduled and agreed upon by the parties; they have about seven witnesses to testify on the first aspect as indicated in the Tribunal's Resolution of 1 August 2006. He suggested 6 September 2006 as the initial date of the hearing. Atty. Marcelo stated that he was leaving for abroad on 6 September 2006 for one month and suggested a hearing after his return in October 2006. At any rate, protestee has a pending motion for reconsideration of the Tribunal's Resolution of 22 August 2006 designating a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Hearing Commissioner. They wanted an incumbent Justice of the Supreme Court or an official of the Tribunal who is a member of the Bar to be the designated Hearing Commissioner. The undersigned Hearing Commissioner suggested that the initial hearing be held on 4 September 2006, at 10:00 a.m., when protestee's counsel will still be in town, without prejudice to the resolution of the Tribunal on his motion for reconsideration. The undersigned Hearing Commissioner suggested to protestant's counsel to submit by this afternoon the list of the names of the proposed witnesses and documents to be produced so that the proper process may be issued to them. The undersigned Hearing Commissioner set the initial hearing tentatively on Monday, 4 September 2006, at 10:00 a.m., at the same venue, subject to the Tribunal's ruling on protestee's motion for reconsideration of the person of the Hearing Commissioner, and protestant to submit by this afternoon the list of witnesses and documents to be produced at the hearing. IT IS SO ORDERED.14 Several hearings on the First Aspect were held wherein the protestant adduced evidence and the protestee interposed his continuing objection to such in the form of motions and comments. Months of continuous trial took place until the Hearing Commissioner made his final report of the proceedings for detailed consideration by the Tribunal. On January 31, 2006, while the case was sub judice, the Tribunal ordered both parties to refrain from sensationalizing the case in the media. Its extended resolution on the matter reads as follows: On December 12, 2005, the re-tabulation of election returns (ERs) from the ten (10) protested municipalities of Lanao del Sur commenced. According to the report submitted by the Acting Clerk of the Tribunal, Atty. Maria Luisa D. Villarama, the correction team was able to re-tabulate only the ERs from four (4) of the ten (10) protested municipalities of Lanao del Sur, namely, Balindong, Masiu, Mulondo and Taraka. The ERs of the other six (6) protested municipalities were not found inside

the ballot boxes collected from the House of Representatives, but found were the ERs from municipalities not subject of the protest. Therefore, acting on the aforementioned report of the Acting Clerk, the Tribunal resolves to REQUIRE Hon. Roberto Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives and Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operation, of the House of Representatives, within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from notice, to (a) DELIVER to the Tribunal the election returns and other election documents/paraphernalia used in the May 2004 National/Local elections for the remaining six (6) protested municipalities of Lanao del Sur, namely (1) BacolodKalawi; (2) Ganassi; (3) Kapai; (4) Sultan Gumander; (5) Tamparan; and (6) Wao; (b) EXPLAIN why the election returns and other election documents and paraphernalia which were turned over to the PET Retrieval Team are incomplete when compared to the COMELEC's total number of clustered precincts for Lanao del Sur; and (c) SUBMIT to the Tribunal the complete list of all the election returns, Provincial/District Certificates of Canvass and Statements of Votes and other election documents and paraphernalia used in the May 2004 National and Local Elections for the province of Lanao del Sur which were in its official custody. In the resolution dated December 6, 2005, the Tribunal granted protestant's motion to suspend the remittance of additional cash deposit amounting to P3,882,000 as required in the resolution of November 22, 2005. Protestant also manifested in said motion that she will make the required cash deposit sometime in the year 2006. Thus, the Tribunal resolves to REQUIRE protestant to comply with the resolution of November 22, 2005 requiring her to make additional cash deposit of P3,882,000 within ten (10) days. On another matter, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal notes the following news reports: (1) In an article entitled "Recount shows fraud, says Legarda" appearing in the December 13, 2005 issue of The Manila Times, protestant Legarda said that the election returns from Congress had been tampered after initial retabulation of votes by the Tribunal showed that the lead of protestee De Castro over her has widened. She added that this discovery confirmed her claim of massive poll fraud in favor of protestee in the 2004 election. (2) In an article entitled "Intel feelers offer proof of poll fraud to Loren" published in the December 13, 2005 issue of The Daily Tribune, sources from protestant's legal team said that feelers from the military's intelligence service arm have reached their camp offering videotapes of cheating in the 2004 elections for a price they cannot afford. (3) In another article entitled "Election returns altered inside Congress-Loren" published in the December 15, 2005 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, protestant claimed that the altering of election returns from Lanao del Sur occurred right inside Congress as borne out by the "spurious" returns being retabulated by the Tribunal. She said the crime could have been perpetrated by the operatives of protestee. (4) In a news article entitled "Cebu recount shows Noli, Loren votes tally with NBC" appearing in the January 6, 2006 issue of The Manila Times, Atty. Romulo Macalintal, counsel of protestee, stated that "the initial recount in Lapu-lapu showed that there was no tampering of the ballot boxes in the city," and further noted that the four (4) out of the 40 ballot boxes "contained tampered or spurious ballots, but these are not connected to the protest of Senator Legarda but on local protests." (5) In an article entitled "Noli condemns tampering of ballots" appearing in the January 6, 2006 issue of Manila Standard Today, Atty. Armando Marcelo said that their revisors at the PET discovered that several ballots of Legarda had been substituted with fake and spurious ballots. Atty. Macalintal added that "the substitution of ballots was so clear, that the security markings of the substitute ballots were not reflected or visible or that the ultraviolet markings of the COMELEC seal do not appear or are not present", and that "these ultraviolet markings are readily visible in a genuine ballot once lighted with an ultraviolet light." (6) In an article entitled "No cheating in Cebu, Noli's lawyer insists," published in the January 19, 2006 issue of Philippine Daily Inquirer, Atty. Macalintal said that "the results of the actual count of the ballots for Legarda and De Castro from the cities of Mandaue and Lapu-lapu tallied with the results as reflected in the election returns and tally boards. There was no sign of any tampering of the results of the ballot count as well as the votes reflected on the returns and tally boards." He also said that protestant Legarda is already estopped from questioning the results of the election in these cities since she failed to object to the returns. (7) In an article entitled "GMA-Noli poll win in Cebu affirmed," published in the January 19, 2006 issue of The Philippine Star, it was reported that Atty. Macalintal, in his speech before the Rotary Club of Pasay City, denied protestant's claim that 90 percent of the ballots from two major cities of the province were found to be spurious by the

Tribunal. He added that "if a candidate would allow himself to be cheated by 90 percent, then he or she has no business to be in politics." (8) In an article entitled "Why Noli is unacceptable" appearing in the January 20, 2006 issue of The Daily Tribune, protestant "told the media that the real ballots from Mandaue City and Lapu-lapu City were 'clearly substituted with fakes so that they would correspond with the similarly spurious results reflected in the election returns (ERs).'" Surely, the parties do not harbor the idea that the re-tabulation of election returns and revision of ballots is the end of the election protest. They are merely the first phase of the process and must still pass closer scrutiny by the Tribunal. The great public interest at stake behooves the Tribunal to exercise its power and render judgment free from public pressure and uninterrupted by the parties' penchant for media mileage. Therefore, in view of the foregoing reports where press statements of both parties appeared as an attempt to influence the proceedings, convince the public of their version of facts, and create bias, prejudice and sympathies, the Tribunal resolves to WARN both parties and counsels from making public comments on all matters that are sub judice. Finally, acting on the pleadings filed in this electoral protest case, the Tribunal further Resolves to (a) NOTE the Comment on Protestee's Motion to Allow Revisors to Examine All Ballots dated January 24, 2006, filed by counsel for protestant Legarda, in compliance with the resolution of January 17, 2006, informing the Tribunal that she interposes no objection and opposition to the motion and GRANT the aforesaid motion of the protestee; (b) DIRECT all Head Revisors to ALLOW the parties to examine the ballots within a reasonable time; (c) NOTE the Manifestation dated January 24, 2006, filed by counsel for protestant relative to the Motion to Intervene filed by Intervenor/Movant Amytis D. Batao, informing the Tribunal that she is not waiving the revision of the thirty-five (35) ballot boxes subject of the electoral protest for the mayoralty post of Carmen, Cebu, and proposing that priority be given and extended to the same so that upon completion of the revision by the Tribunal, said ballot boxes can be returned to the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, at the earliest time possible; and (d) DENY the above Motion to Intervene of Intervenor/Movant Amytis D. Batao, with regard to the return of the ballot boxes considering that the Tribunal has priority in their possession and examination." Ynares Santiago, J., no part.15 Revision of ballots was also conducted for the Second Aspect in the Tribunal's premises by the duly designated officials and trained personnel with both parties duly represented. After ten months of continuous work by twenty-four revision teams, under the supervision of Atty. Orlando Cario as the designated Consultant, the revision of the ballots from the pilot province of Cebu was completed. Revision also started for the second pilot province of Pampanga, but was suspended after the Tribunal granted the protestee's Motion for Partial Determination of Election Protest Based on the Results of the Revision of Ballots of the Province of Cebu and the Recanvass of Election Returns from Lanao Del Sur and to Hold in Abeyance Revision of Ballots from Pampanga.16 On May 3, 2007, the protestant was required to deposit P3,914,500 for expenses necessary for the continuation of the revision of ballots.17 But protestant failed to pay on the due date. Thus, protestee moved to dismiss the protest. The Tribunal extended the period for protestant to make the necessary deposit. Even with this extension, she still failed to pay. Thus, in a Resolution dated June 5, 2007, the Tribunal partially granted the protestee's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 3318 of PET rules, and ordered the dismissal of the Second Aspect of the protest as follows: PET Case No. 003 (Loren B. Legarda vs. Noli L. de Castro). - Acting on the protestee's Motion to Dismiss dated May 9, 2007, the Tribunal Resolved to (a) PARTIALLY GRANT the aforesaid motion pursuant to Rule 33 of the 2005 PET Rules; and (b) DISMISS the second aspect of the protest (revision of ballots), for protestant's failure to make the required deposit. The Tribunal further Resolved to DENY the request of Atty. Eric C. Reginaldo in his letter dated May 29, 2007 that he be furnished with a copy of the petition in this case for case study, as he is neither a party nor a counsel of any party in this protest.19 On June 13, 2007, Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo submitted to the Tribunal a Report of the Proceedings of the First Aspect.20

On June 18 2007, protestant filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve First Aspect of the Protest, stating that she formally moved for the immediate resolution of the submitted portion of the First Aspect of the protest.21 Protestee did not interpose any objection to this motion. On July 10, 2007, the Tribunal resolved to note the report of the Hearing Commissioner. In response to the motion filed by the protestant, the Tribunal required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within twenty days from notice, pursuant to Rule 6122 of the PET Rules.23 On August 2, 2007, by counsel protestant submitted her memorandum.24 On August 16, 2007, also by counsel protestee filed his memorandum.25 On October 1, 2007, Hearing Commissioner Bernardo P. Pardo submitted his Final Report of the Proceedings on the First Aspect. After a thorough analysis of the parties' memoranda and the results of the proceedings on the protest, he recommended the dismissal of the First Aspect.26 For her part, protestant filed a memorandum stating that based on the pieces of evidence she presented, both documentary and testimonial, she has shown that electoral fraud or cheating was committed through the so-called dagdag-bawas strategy in the elections for President and Vice-President held last May 14, 2004. Protestant in particular submitted that electoral fraud was perpetuated as follows: 1. That the correct votes of the parties were properly recorded and tabulated in the election returns (ERs), wherein she garnered a higher number of votes over protestee De Castro;27 2. That when the ERs were canvassed at the municipal level, the ER results were "wrongly and erroneously" transposed and transferred to the Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOV-P), such that the protestee was given a higher number of votes;28 3. That the inaccurate results shown in the SOV-P were totaled and transferred to the Municipal Certificate of Canvass (MCOC), with protestee prevailing over protestant;29 4. That the MCOC, with incorrect totals, was transmitted to the Provincial Board of Canvassers, wherein the inaccurate MCOC totals were transposed to the Statement of Votes by Municipalities (SOV-M);30 5. That the numbers reflected in the individual SOV-Ms were totaled, and the sum for the whole province was indicated in the Provincial Certificate of Canvass (PCOC);31 6. That the PCOCs, with the erroneously transposed totals stemming from the incorrect SOV-Ps, were the ones canvassed by Congress, acting as the National Board of Canvassers for the presidential and vice-presidential positions;32 and 7. That Congress, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, merely "noted" and denied protestant's request to view the precinct-source ERs, and proceeded to canvass the "already-manipulated/dagdag-bawas" PCOCs, resulting in the flawed and farcical victory of protestee De Castro.33 Protestant avers that fraud, by means of the anomalous election practices, was sufficiently proven by using her sample-pilot precincts in two municipalities in Lanao del Sur, particularly Balindong and Taraka. She likewise alleges that the "dagdag-bawas" scheme, which was perpetrated through the deliberate and erroneous transposition of results from the authentic ERs to the SOV-Ps, was further aggravated by an alleged cover-up operation to hide the same. According to protestant, the Congress-retrieved copies of the ERs which tally with the SOV-Ps, were fake and spurious; they were intended to cover-up the electoral fraud committed. Protestant submits that the correct voting results are those reflected in the COMELEC and NAMFREL's copies of the ERs, not those in the copies retrieved from Congress. Protestant further claims that while she presented pieces of evidence, both testimonial and documentary, in only two municipalities of Lanao del Sur, i.e., Balindong and Taraka, to prove the electoral fraud perpetrated through the dagdag-bawas strategy, she could have shown that such fraudulent machination was replicated in several other municipalities of Lanao del Sur and other provinces, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Lanao del Sur if she had enough time. Protestee, for his part, argues that the Congress-retrieved ERs are public documents as defined under Section 19 (a),34 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, and thus, they enjoy the presumption of regularity accorded thereto, and they are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. He avers that there is prima facie presumption that the Congress-retrieved copies of the ERs are genuine, authentic and duly executed. Protestee submits that protestant has failed to rebut such presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Protestee adds that a blank or unused ER form duly authenticated by the COMELEC, with the correct and complete set of security features and markings, should have been marked and offered as evidence, to serve as basis for comparison with the various sets of ERs presented to prove the genuiness of the security features and markings in the ER forms. On this score, according to protestee, the protestant's counsel has failed in his task. At any rate, protestee points out that the witnesses presented by protestant, i.e., COMELEC

Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos and Mr. Robert Payongayong of the Ernest Printing Corporation, testified that they were able to discern security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved copies of the ERs. Protestee also claims that when Mr. Payongayong testified about the security features on the Congress' copies, he was shown only a sample set thereof, and was not able to examine all Congress' copies being contested. Protestee thus concludes that the Tribunal cannot rely on the testimonies of the protestant's witnesses debunking the authenticity of the Congress-retrieved copies vis--vis the other sets of ER copies. Protestee further contends that, assuming arguendo that the results reflected in the COMELEC, NAMFREL and MBOC's35 copies of the ERs are re-tabulated, in lieu of the results in the Congress-retrieved copies, or even if all the votes in the 497 precincts included in the pilot areas, as well as in the remaining protested precincts in the First Aspect, are counted in favor of protestant, said votes would be insufficient to overcome the lead of the protestee totaling 881,722 votes. Hence, in view of the failure of the protestant to make out her case for the First Aspect of the protest, the same and ultimately the protest in its entirety, must be dismissed without consideration of the other provinces mentioned. The Hearing Commissioner further recommended, following the precedent set in Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,36 that the protest be dismissed for being moot and academic due to abandonment and withdrawal resulting from protestant's election and assumption of office as senator. He also emphasized that assuming that dagdag-bawas had indeed occurred and that the results in the COMELEC's ER copies indicated in Annex "A" were to be used for re-tabulation, protestant would be entitled to an additional 4,912 votes for the municipality of Taraka and 5,019 votes for Balindong, or a total of 9,931 votes, which is not adequate to surpass protestee's lead of 881,722 votes over protestant. On protestant's charges of electoral fraud allegedly aggravated by a cover-up operation that switched or exchanged the Congress' ER copies with spurious ones, the Hearing Commissioner stressed that the Congress-retrieved ERs are public documents which enjoy the presumption of regularity and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. He concluded that the protestant failed to adequately and convincingly rebut the presumption. The Hearing Commissioner also emphasized that protestant failed to substantiate sufficiently her claim that the Congress-retrieved ERs are spurious and were switched with the authentic copies during an alleged break-in at the storage area of the House of Representatives as no evidence was presented to prove such break-in. Hence, the alleged discrepancies found in NAMFREL, MBOC and COMELEC's copies of the ERs are insufficient to exclude the Congress-retrieved ER copies from the re-tabulation. The Hearing Commissioner also observed that in 11 out of the 51 precincts in Balindong, Lanao del Sur, there are similar entries in the Congress-retrieved ERs and in the COMELEC's copies of the ERs, where protestant garnered a higher number of votes over protestee, while the entries in the respective SOV-Ms are different in that the protestee received more votes, belying protestant's assertion that the Congress-retrieved ERs should all be disregarded since the results therein differ from those in the COMELEC's copies of ERs and that they have been manipulated to favor protestee. Consequently, according to the Hearing Commissioner's report, protestant failed to make out her case. Thus, the Hearing Commissioner recommended that the protestant's Motion to Resolve the First Aspect of the Protest under consideration should be denied, and consequently, the protest itself, be dismissed for lack of legal and factual basis, as the pilot-tested revision of ballots or re-tabulation of the certificates of canvass would not affect the winning margin of the protestee in the final canvass of the returns, in addition to the ground of abandonment or withdrawal by reason of her candidacy for, election and assumption of office as Senator of the Philippines.37 After thorough deliberation and consideration of the issues in this case, this Tribunal finds the abovestated recommendations of its Hearing Commissioner well-taken, and adopts them for its own. Further, we are also in agreement that the protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, which fact we can take judicial notice of,38 has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. The most relevant precedent on this issue is Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos,39 a decision rendered by this Tribunal, which held that: The term of office of the Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, the first three of which coincides with the last three years of the term of the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if she would succeed in proving in the instant protest that she was the true winner in the 1992 elections. In assuming the office of Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn this protest, or at the very least, in the language of Moraleja, abandoned her "determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate." Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot the instant protest. Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential election, thereby enhancing the all-[too] crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national recovery. It must also be stressed that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, an election protest may be summarily dismissed, regardless of the public policy and public interest implications thereof, on the following grounds: (1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance; (2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 14 and 15 hereof;

(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for in these Rules; (4) The cash deposit, or the first P100,000.00 thereof, is not paid within 10 days after the filing of the protest; and (5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the Tribunal are not clearly legible. Other grounds for a motion to dismiss, e.g., those provided in the Rules of Court which apply in a suppletory character, may likewise be pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer. After which, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, hold a preliminary hearing on such grounds. In sum, if an election protest may be dismissed on technical grounds, then it must be, for a decidedly stronger reason, if it has become moot due to its abandonment by the Protestant.40 In the case at bar, protestant's tenure in the Senate coincides with the term of the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010, that is the subject of her protest. In Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, the protestant's tenure in the Senate also coincided with the term of the Presidency she was vying for. Like the protestant in the aforementioned case, the protestant in the case at bar filed her certificate of candidacy for the Senate, campaigned for the office, assumed office after election, and discharged the duties and functions of said office. Thus, we agree concerning the applicability of the Defensor-Santiago case as a precedent in the resolution of the present protest, though they differ in that Defensor-Santiago's case involves the Presidency while Legarda's protest concerns only the Vice-Presidency. On the matter of the alleged spurious ER copies, we agree with the protestee that the protestant had not adequately and convincingly rebutted the presumption that as public documents, the Congress-retrieved ER copies, used for the proclamation of the protestee by the NBC, are authentic and duly executed in the regular course of official business. The evidence adduced by protestee to show that the supposed security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs and the COMELEC/NAMFREL's copies are different, did not categorically establish that the Congress-retrieved ERs are fake and spurious. To overcome the presumption of regularity, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. Absent such convincing evidence, the presumption must be upheld.41 In fact, the records show that even the witnesses presented by the protestant testified that they were able to discern security features and markings in the Congress-retrieved ERs. The records also show that witnesses were not made to examine all Congress-retrieved ERs in making observations relative to security features and markings, but only a sample set thereof was utilized, resulting in grave insufficiency in the evidence presented by protestant. As to the alleged break-in in Congress, which allegedly facilitated the switching of ERs, no conclusive evidence has been given. One of the protestant's own witnesses, Atty. Artemio Adasa, Deputy General for Legislative Operations of the House of Representatives, categorically denied that a break-in and a switching of ERs had occurred in Congress.42 At any rate, as pointed out by protestee, even assuming arguendo that all the votes in the 497 precincts included in the pilot areas for the First Aspect with approximately 99,400 votes are considered in favor of protestant, still the protestant would not be able to overcome the lead of the protestee. The margin in favor of protestee adds up to a total of 881,722 votes, and it would take much more than a hundred thousand votes to overcome this lead. This is what the protestant had set out to do in her protest before the Tribunal, but unfortunately she failed to make out her case.43 In fact, Taraka and Balindong, the only two municipalities on which protestant anchors her arguments for the First Aspect, would only yield an additional 9,931 votes (4,912 votes for Taraka and 5,019 votes for Balindong), a mere fraction of the lead of protestee over protestant. To say that she could have shown that such fraudulent machination was replicated in several other municipalities of Lanao del Sur and other provinces, such as Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Lanao del Sur if she had enough time, is mere conjecture and can not be considered convincing by this Tribunal. It is the protestant herself who admits that she was able to adduce evidence only in Taraka and Balindong, for lack of time. But this Tribunal has been liberal in granting her plea for time extension. To say that the protestant had shown enough evidence to prove that the whole or even half (440,862)44 of the lead of the protestee over the protestant is spurious, would go against the grain of the evidence on hand. One cannot say that half a million votes were illegally obtained based on unclear evidence of cheating in less than ten thousand. The protestant has been afforded ample opportunity to adduce evidence in her behalf for the First Aspect of the protest but the evidence presented is simply insufficient to convince the Tribunal to render invalid all or even half of the 881,722 votes that protestee had over her in the last elections for Vice-President. WHEREFORE, the First Aspect of the protest is hereby DISMISSED for lack of legal and factual basis, as the pilot-tested revision of ballots or re-tabulation of the certificates of canvass would not affect the winning margin of the protestee in the final canvass of the returns, in addition to the ground of abandonment or withdrawal by reason of protestant's candidacy for, election to and assumption of the office of Senator of the Philippines. The Second Aspect, having been already DISMISSED on June 5, 2007, pursuant to Rule 33 of this Tribunal, the entire Protest is now deemed DISMISSED and TERMINATED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010

ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. RESOLUTION

CORONA, C.J.: What is the proper interpretation of the following provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution: "[t]he President shall not be eligible for any reelection?" The novelty and complexity of the constitutional issue involved in this case present a temptation that magistrates, lawyers, legal scholars and law students alike would find hard to resist. However, prudence dictates that this Court exercise judicial restraint where the issue before it has already been mooted by subsequent events. More importantly, the constitutional requirement of the existence of a "case" or an "actual controversy" for the proper exercise of the power of judicial review constrains us to refuse the allure of making a grand pronouncement that, in the end, will amount to nothing but a non-binding opinion. The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on the President from "any reelection." Private respondent was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. However, his petition was denied by the Second Division of public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).1 His motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the COMELEC en banc.2 Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari3 on May 7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such petition would not stay the execution of the judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.4 Besides, petitioner did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, private respondent was able to participate as a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.51avvphi1 Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists.6 There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.7 No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein.8 As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.9 The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it.10 In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.11 An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.12 Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his "reelection" will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose. Accordingly, the petition is denied due course and is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: Confronting us is an undesignated petition1 filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioners averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules),3 specifically: (1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices are designated as "Chairman and Members," respectively; (2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and confidential employees of every member thereof; (3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and (4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court seal. Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional provision does allow the "appointment of additional personnel." Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC4 which peripherally declared that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of quasi-judicial power." On this point, petitioner reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as directed in our Resolution dated April 6, 2010, filed a Comment5 thereon. At the outset, the OSG points out that the petition filed by Atty. Macalintal is unspecified and without statutory basis; "the liberal approach in its preparation x x x is a violation of the well known rules of practice and pleading in this jurisdiction." In all, the OSG crystallizes the following issues for resolution of the Court: I WHETHER x x x PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION. II WHETHER x x x THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 7, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. III WHETHER x x x THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AS MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF SECTION 12, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.6 In his Reply,7 petitioner maintains that: 1. He has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of transcendental importance of the issues raised therein; 2. The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal from the Supreme Court, violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and 3. The PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. We winnow the meanderings of petitioner into the singular issue of whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. But first, we dispose of the procedural issue of whether petitioner has standing to file the present petition. The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry:

1. There must be an actual case or controversy; 2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and 4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.8 On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of.9 The dust has long settled on the test laid down in Baker v. Carr:10 "whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult questions."11 Until and unless such actual or threatened injury is established, the complainant is not clothed with legal personality to raise the constitutional question. Our pronouncements in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo12 illuminate: The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a" citizen" or "taxpayer." xxxx However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings. xxxx By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner has simply alleged a generalized interest in the outcome of this case, and succeeds only in muddling the issues. Paragraph 2 of the petition reads:

2. x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and the issue raised herein is of transcendental importance, it is petitioners humble submission that, as a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he has the legal standing to file this petition. But even if his submission is valid, petitioners standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in the petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13 because judicial inquiry, as mentioned above, requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.14 Such appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunals constitution. Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunals authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Courts power of judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright. Prior to petitioners appearance as counsel for then protestee Macapagal-Arroyo, we had occasion to affirm the grant of original jurisdiction to this Court as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal in the auspicious case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections.15 Thus Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads: "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or VicePresident. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory setup, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution. Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion, was even more categorical: The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez petitions. Petitioners cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides: "The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no "contest" before a winner is proclaimed.16 Similarly, in her separate opinion, Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez declared: G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 invoke the Courts exclusive jurisdiction under the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. I agree with the majority opinion that these petitions should be dismissed outright for prematurity. The Court has no jurisdiction at this point of time to entertain said petitions. The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or quo warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner.17 Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),18 cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the

unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections19 is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal. Despite the foregoing, petitioner is adamant on his contention that the provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. And although he concedes that the Supreme Court may promulgate its rules for this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the constitution of the PET is unconstitutional. However, petitioner avers that it allows the Court to appoint additional personnel for the purpose, notwithstanding the silence of the constitutional provision. Petitioners pastiche arguments are all hurled at the Court, hopeful that at least one might possibly stick. But these arguments fail to elucidate on the scope of the rules the Supreme Court is allowed to promulgate. Apparently, petitioners concept of this adjunct of judicial power is very restrictive. Fortunately, thanks in no part to petitioners opinion, we are guided by well-settled principles of constitutional construction. Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. This Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration20 instructs: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of the Constitution.21 In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or remedied.22 Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect. Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23 It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. We had earlier expounded on this rule of construction in Chiongbian v. De Leon, et al., 24 to wit: [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do not include his restrictive view one which really does not offer a solution. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Before we resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we discuss the framework of judicial power mapped out in the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion, the Supreme Courts constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our countrys highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof. We recall the unprecedented and trailblazing case of Marcos v. Manglapus:25

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial power. Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable. The mirabile dictu of the grant of jurisdiction to this Court, albeit found in the Article on the executive branch of government, and the constitution of the PET, is evident in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission. On the exercise of this Courts judicial power as sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential election contests, and to promulgate its rules for this purpose, we find the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission most instructive: MR. DAVIDE. On line 25, after the words "Vice-President," I propose to add AND MAY PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. This refers to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. This is also to confer on the Supreme Court exclusive authority to enact the necessary rules while acting as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or VicePresident. MR. REGALADO. My personal position is that the rule-making power of the Supreme Court with respect to its internal procedure is already implicit under the Article on the Judiciary; considering, however, that according to the Commissioner, the purpose of this is to indicate the sole power of the Supreme Court without intervention by the legislature in the promulgation of its rules on this particular point, I think I will personally recommend its acceptance to the Committee.26 xxxx MR. NOLLEDO. x x x. With respect to Sections 10 and 11 on page 8, I understand that the Committee has also created an Electoral Tribunal in the Senate and a Commission on Appointments which may cover membership from both Houses. But my question is: It seems to me that the committee report does not indicate which body should promulgate the rules that shall govern the Electoral Tribunal and the Commission on Appointments. Who shall then promulgate the rules of these bodies? MR. DAVIDE. The Electoral Tribunal itself will establish and promulgate its rules because it is a body distinct and independent already from the House, and so with the Commission on Appointments also. It will have the authority to promulgate its own rules.27 On another point of discussion relative to the grant of judicial power, but equally cogent, we listen to former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion: MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers? MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power. MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action. MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are essentially justiciable questions. MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President.28 Echoing the same sentiment and affirming the grant of judicial power to the Supreme Court, Justice Florenz D. Regalado29 and Fr. Joaquin Bernas30 both opined: MR. VILLACORTA. Thank you very much, Madam President.

I am not sure whether Commissioner Suarez has expressed his point. On page 2, the fourth paragraph of Section 4 provides: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. May I seek clarification as to whether or not the matter of determining the outcome of the contests relating to the election returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President is purely a political matter and, therefore, should not be left entirely to the judiciary. Will the above-quoted provision not impinge on the doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the judicial departments of the government? MR. REGALADO. No, I really do not feel that would be a problem. This is a new provision incidentally. It was not in the 1935 Constitution nor in the 1973 Constitution. MR. VILLACORTA. That is right. MR. REGALADO. We feel that it will not be an intrusion into the separation of powers guaranteed to the judiciary because this is strictly an adversarial and judicial proceeding. MR. VILLACORTA. May I know the rationale of the Committee because this supersedes Republic Act 7950 which provides for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal? FR. BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary. Election contests are, by their nature, judicial. Therefore, they are cognizable only by courts. If, for instance, we did not have a constitutional provision on an electoral tribunal for the Senate or an electoral tribunal for the House, normally, as composed, that cannot be given jurisdiction over contests. So, the background of this is really the case of Roxas v. Lopez. The Gentleman will remember that in that election, Lopez was declared winner. He filed a protest before the Supreme Court because there was a republic act which created the Supreme Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The question in this case was whether new powers could be given the Supreme Court by law. In effect, the conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create two Supreme Courts and the answer of the Supreme Court was: "No, this did not involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but precisely we are giving new jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the Constitution. Congress may allocate various jurisdictions." Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest between two presidential candidates or two vice-presidential candidates, no one had jurisdiction over it. So, it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.31 Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole power ought to be without intervention by the legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power connected thereto. To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be denied.32 Consequently, we find it imperative to trace the historical antecedents of the PET. Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation. The precursors of the present Constitution did not contain similar provisions and instead vested upon the legislature all phases of presidential and vice-presidential elections from the canvassing of election returns, to the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president elect, and even the determination, by ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be contested. Unless the legislature enacted a law creating an institution that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential race, a defeated candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast for the office involved or to challenge the ineligibility of the proclaimed candidate. Effectively, presidential and vice-presidential contests were non-justiciable in the then prevailing milieu. The omission in the 1935 Constitution was intentional. It was mainly influenced by the absence of a similar provision in its pattern, the Federal Constitution of the United States. Rather, the creation of such tribunal was left to the determination of the National Assembly. The journal of the 1935 Constitutional Convention is crystal clear on this point: Delegate Saguin. For an information. It seems that this Constitution does not contain any provision with respect to the entity or body which will look into the protests for the positions of the President and Vice-President.

President Recto. Neither does the American constitution contain a provision over the subject. Delegate Saguin. But then, who will decide these protests? President Recto. I suppose that the National Assembly will decide on that.33 To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing an independent PET to try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election of President and Vice-President. The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court were tasked to sit as its Chairman and Members, respectively. Its composition was extended to retired Supreme Court Justices and incumbent Court of Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for ill, absent, or temporarily incapacitated regular members. The eleven-member tribunal was empowered to promulgate rules for the conduct of its proceedings. It was mandated to sit en banc in deciding presidential and vice-presidential contests and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon courts of justice, including the issuance of subpoena, taking of depositions, arrest of witnesses to compel their appearance, production of documents and other evidence, and the power to punish contemptuous acts and bearings. The tribunal was assigned a Clerk, subordinate officers, and employees necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which replaced the bicameral legislature under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a parliamentary government. With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was rendered irrelevant, considering that the President was not directly chosen by the people but elected from among the members of the National Assembly, while the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent. In 1981, several modifications were introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive power was restored to the President who was elected directly by the people. An Executive Committee was formed to assist the President in the performance of his functions and duties. Eventually, the Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was installed anew. These changes prompted the National Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on December 3, 1985, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." This tribunal was composed of nine members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and two Associate Justices designated by him, while the six were divided equally between representatives of the majority and minority parties in the Batasang Pambansa. Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to recommend the prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who in its opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with the canvassing and/or accomplishing of election returns. The independence of the tribunal was highlighted by a provision allocating a specific budget from the national treasury or Special Activities Fund for its operational expenses. It was empowered to appoint its own clerk in accordance with its rules. However, the subordinate officers were strictly employees of the judiciary or other officers of the government who were merely designated to the tribunal. After the historic People Power Revolution that ended the martial law era and installed Corazon Aquino as President, civil liberties were restored and a new constitution was formed. With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional Commission transformed the then statutory PET into a constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional nomenclature: FR. BERNAS. x x x. x x x. So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.34 Clearly, petitioners bete noire of the PET and the exercise of its power are unwarranted. His arguments that: (1) the Chief Justice and Associate Justices are referred to as "Chairman" and "Members," respectively; (2) the PET uses a different seal; (3) the Chairman is authorized to appoint personnel; and (4) additional compensation is allocated to the "Members," in order to bolster his claim of infirmity in the establishment of the PET, are too superficial to merit further attention by the Court. Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc. The following exchange in the 1986 Constitutional Commission should provide enlightenment:

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Let me proceed to line 23, page 2, wherein it is provided, and I quote: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc[,] shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. Are we not giving enormous work to the Supreme Court especially when it is directed to sit en banc as the sole judge of all presidential and vice-presidential election contests? MR. SUMULONG. That question will be referred to Commissioner Concepcion. MR. CONCEPCION. This function was discharged by the Supreme Court twice and the Supreme Court was able to dispose of each case in a period of one year as provided by law. Of course, that was probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not know how the present Supreme Court would react to such circumstances, but there is also the question of who else would hear the election protests. MR. SUAREZ. We are asking this question because between lines 23 to 25, there are no rules provided for the hearings and there is not time limit or duration for the election contest to be decided by the Supreme Court. Also, we will have to consider the historical background that when R.A. 1793, which organized the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, was promulgated on June 21, 1957, at least three famous election contests were presented and two of them ended up in withdrawal by the protestants out of sheer frustration because of the delay in the resolution of the cases. I am referring to the electoral protest that was lodged by former President Carlos P. Garcia against our "kabalen" former President Diosdado Macapagal in 1961 and the vice-presidential election contest filed by the late Senator Gerardo Roxas against Vice-President Fernando Lopez in 1965. MR. CONCEPCION. I cannot answer for what the protestants had in mind. But when that protest of Senator Roxas was withdrawn, the results were already available. Senator Roxas did not want to have a decision adverse to him. The votes were being counted already, and he did not get what he expected so rather than have a decision adverse to his protest, he withdrew the case. xxxx MR. SUAREZ. I see. So the Commission would not have any objection to vesting in the Supreme Court this matter of resolving presidential and vice-presidential contests? MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not have any objection. MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers? MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two parties. This is a judicial power. MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action. MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are essentially justiciable questions. MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President. MR. CONCEPCION. The time consumed or to be consumed in this contest for President is dependent upon they key number of teams of revisors. I have no experience insofar as contests in other offices are concerned. MR. SUAREZ. Although there is a requirement here that the Supreme Court is mandated to sit en banc? MR. CONCEPCION. Yes. MR. SUAREZ. I see. MR. CONCEPCION. The steps involved in this contest are: First, the ballot boxes are opened before teams of three, generally, a representative each of the court, of the protestant and of the "protestee." It is all a questions of how many teams are organized. Of course, that can be expensive, but it would be expensive whatever court one would choose. There were times that the Supreme Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the same time working, would classify the objections, the kind of problems, and the court would only go

over the objected votes on which the parties could not agree. So it is not as awesome as it would appear insofar as the Court is concerned. What is awesome is the cost of the revision of the ballots because each party would have to appoint one representative for every team, and that may take quite a big amount. MR. SUAREZ. If we draw from the Commissioners experience which he is sharing with us, what would be the reasonable period for the election contest to be decided? MR. CONCEPCION. Insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned, the Supreme Court always manages to dispose of the case in one year. MR. SUAREZ. In one year. Thank you for the clarification.35 Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET, to undertake the Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-presidential candidates in accordance with the process outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget allocation of the PET. The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.36 We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the purpose." The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),37 which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.38 Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies, independent of the three departments of government Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary but not separate therefrom. MR. MAAMBONG. x x x. My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction? xxxx MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body? MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President. MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions? MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body. MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid? MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.39

The view taken by Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna40 and Regalado E. Maambong41 is schooled by our holding in Lopez v. Roxas, et al.:42 Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that: "There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal x x x which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-president-elect of the Philippines." has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President-elect of Vice-Presidentelect and to demand a recount of the votes case for the office involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one elected president or vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character. Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which are primary within the jurisdiction of courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court, although it may perform the functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics different from those of the others. Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both trial courts and, appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge said dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court of land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad than those of a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court. By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court. As regards petitioners claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, we point out that the issue in Buac v. COMELEC43 involved the characterization of the enforcement and administration of a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections. However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared, in an obiter, that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power." The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads: SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" 44 is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."45 The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.

The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1 At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively. At the higher levels city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.46 It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission,47 Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution. With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts,48 the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court. If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the same prohibition. We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of Maryland49 proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioners, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power. One final note. Although this Court has no control over contrary people and naysayers, we reiterate a word of caution against the filing of baseless petitions which only clog the Courts docket. The petition in the instant case belongs to that classification. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. NIXON v. FITZGERALD, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) 457 U.S. 731 NIXON v. FITZGERALD CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 79-1738. Argued November 30, 1981 Decided June 24, 1982 During the waning months of the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968, respondent, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testified before a congressional Subcommittee about cost-overruns and unexpected technical difficulties concerning the development of a particular airplane. In January 1970, during the Presidency of petitioner Richard M. Nixon, respondent was dismissed from his job during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in which his job was eliminated. Respondent complained to the Civil Service Commission, alleging that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his congressional testimony. The Commission rejected this claim, but concluded that respondent's dismissal offended applicable regulations because it was motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. Respondent thereafter filed suit for damages in Federal District Court against various Defense

Department officials and White House aides allegedly responsible for his dismissal. An amended complaint later named petitioner as a defendant. After earlier judicial rulings and extensive pretrial discovery, only three defendants were involved: petitioner and two White House aides (petitioners in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, post, p. 800). Denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court held that respondent had stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and the First Amendment, and that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute Presidential immunity. Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed summarily. Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction to determine the immunity question. Pp. 741-744. (a) The case was "in" the Court of Appeals for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1254, which authorizes this Court's review of "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. The Court of Appeals here dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. However, petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals falls within the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , as raising a "serious [457 U.S. 731, 732] and unsettled question" of law. Although the Court of Appeals had previously ruled in another case that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court had never so held. Pp. 741-743. (b) Nor was the controversy mooted by an agreement to liquidate damages entered into between the parties after the petition for certiorari was filed and respondent had entered his opposition. Under the terms of the agreement, petitioner paid respondent $142,000; respondent agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 if this Court ruled that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity; and no further payments would be made if the decision upheld petitioner's immunity claim. The limited agreement left both parties with a considerable financial stake in the resolution of the question presented in this Court. Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 . Pp. 743-744. 2. Petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. Pp. 744-758. (a) Although there is no blanket recognition of absolute immunity for all federal executive officials from liability for civil damages resulting from constitutional violations, certain officials - such as judges and prosecutors - because of the special nature of their responsibilities, require absolute exemption from liability. Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 . Determination of the immunity of particular officials is guided by the Constitution, federal statutes, history, and public policy. Pp. 744-748. (b) The President's absolute immunity is a functionally mandated incident of his unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by the Nation's history. Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. While the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President, a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. The exercise of jurisdiction is not warranted in the case of merely private suits for damages based on a President's official acts. Pp. 748-754. (c) The President's absolute immunity extends to all acts within the "outer perimeter" of his duties of office. Pp. 755-757. (d) A rule of absolute immunity for the President does not leave the Nation without sufficient protection against his misconduct. There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment, as well as the deterrent effects of constant scrutiny by the press and vigilant oversight by Congress. Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include [457 U.S. 731, 733] a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. Pp. 757-758. Reversed and remanded. POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BURGER, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 758. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 764. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 797. Herbert J. Miller, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was R. Stan Mortenson. John E. Nolan, Jr., argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Samuel T. Perkins and Arthur B. Spitzer. * [ Footnote * ] Louis Alan Clark filed a brief for the Government Accountability Project of the Institute for Policy Studies as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Lee for the United States; by Roger J. Marzulla and William H. Mellor III for the Mountain States Legal Foundation; by John C. Armor and H. Richard Mayberry for the National Taxpayers Legal Fund, Inc.; and by Thomas J. Madden for Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff in this lawsuit seeks relief in civil damages from a former President of the United States. The claim rests on actions allegedly taken in the former President's official capacity during his tenure in office. The issue before us is the scope of the immunity possessed by the President of the United States. I In January 1970 the respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force. Fitzgerald's dismissal occurred in the context of a departmental reorganization and reduction in force, in [457 U.S. 731, 734] which his job was eliminated. In announcing the reorganization, the Air Force characterized the action as taken to promote economy and efficiency in the Armed Forces. Respondent's discharge attracted unusual attention in Congress and in the press. Fitzgerald had attained national prominence approximately one year earlier, during the waning months of the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. On November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald appeared before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. To the evident embarrassment of his superiors in the Department of Defense, Fitzgerald testified that cost-overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion. 1 He also revealed that unexpected technical difficulties had arisen during the development of the aircraft. Concerned that Fitzgerald might have suffered retaliation for his congressional testimony, the Subcommittee on Economy in Government convened public hearings on Fitzgerald's dismissal. 2 The press reported those hearings prominently, [457 U.S. 731, 735] as it had the earlier announcement that his job was being eliminated by the Department of Defense. At a news conference on December 8, 1969, President Richard Nixon was queried about Fitzgerald's impending separation from Government service. 3 The President responded by promising to look into the matter. 4 Shortly after the news conference the petitioner asked White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's assignment to another job within the administration. 5 It also appears that the President suggested to Budget Director Robert Mayo that Fitzgerald might be offered a position in the Bureau of the Budget. 6 Fitzgerald's proposed reassignment encountered resistance within the administration. 7 In an internal memorandum of January 20, 1970, White House aide Alexander Butterfield reported to Haldeman that "`Fitzgerald is no doubt a top-notch cost expert, but he must be given very low [457 U.S. 731, 736] marks in loyalty; and after all, loyalty is the name of the game.'" 8 Butterfield therefore recommended that "`[w]e should let him bleed, for a while at least.'" 9 There is no evidence of White House efforts to reemploy Fitzgerald subsequent to the Butterfield memorandum. Absent any offer of alternative federal employment, Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission. In a letter of January 20, 1970, he alleged that his separation represented unlawful retaliation for his truthful testimony before a congressional Committee. 10 The Commission convened a closed hearing on Fitzgerald's allegations on May 4, 1971. Fitzgerald, however, preferred to present his grievances in public. After he had brought suit and won an injunction, Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 152 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 467 F.2d 755 (1972), public hearings commenced on January 26, 1973. The hearings again generated publicity, much of it devoted to the testimony of Air Force Secretary Robert Seamans. Although he denied that Fitzgerald had lost his position in retaliation for congressional testimony, Seamans testified that he had received "some advice" from the White House before [457 U.S. 731, 737] Fitzgerald's job was abolished. 11 But the Secretary declined to be more specific. He responded to several questions by invoking "executive privilege." 12 At a news conference on January 31, 1973, the President was asked about Mr. Seamans' testimony. Mr. Nixon took the opportunity to assume personal responsibility for Fitzgerald's dismissal: "I was totally aware that Mr. Fitzgerald would be fired or discharged or asked to resign. I approved it and Mr. Seamans must have been talking to someone who had discussed the matter with me. No, this was not a case of some person down the line deciding he should go. It was a decision that was submitted to me. I made it and I stick by it." 13 A day later, however, the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement. According to a press spokesman, the President had confused Fitzgerald with another former executive employee. On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had "put before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald." 14 After hearing over 4,000 pages of testimony, the Chief Examiner for the Civil Service Commission issued his decision [457 U.S. 731, 738] in the Fitzgerald case on September 18, 1973. Decision on the Appeal of A. Ernest Fitzgerald, as reprinted in App. 60a. The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations. Id., at 86a-87a. 15 The Examiner based this conclusion on a finding that the departmental reorganization in which Fitzgerald lost his job, though purportedly implemented as an economy measure, was in fact motivated by "reasons purely personal to" respondent. Id., at 86a. As this was an impermissible basis for

a reduction in force, 16 the Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority. 17 [457 U.S. 731, 739] The Examiner, however, explicitly distinguished this narrow conclusion from a suggested finding that Fitzgerald had suffered retaliation for his testimony to Congress. As found by the Commission, "the evidence of record does not support [Fitzgerald's] allegation that his position was abolished and that he was separated . . . in retaliation for his having revealed the C-5A cost overrun in testimony before the Proxmire Committee on November 13, 1968." Id., at 81a. Following the Commission's decision, Fitzgerald filed a suit for damages in the United States District Court. In it he raised essentially the same claims presented to the Civil Service Commission. 18 As defendants he named eight officials of the Defense Department, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, and "one or More" unnamed "White House Aides" styled only as "John Does." The District Court dismissed the action under the District of Columbia's 3-year statute of limitations, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 384 F. Supp. 688 (DC 1974), and the Court of Appeals affirmed as to all but one defendant, White House aide Alexander Butterfield, Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 75, 553 F.2d 220 (1977). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Fitzgerald had no reason to suspect White House involvement in his dismissal at least until 1973. In that year, reasonable grounds for suspicion had arisen, most notably through publication of the internal White House memorandum in which Butterfield had recommended that Fitzgerald at least should be made to "bleed for a while" before being offered another job in the administration. Id., at 80, 84, 553 F.2d, at 225, 229. Holding that concealment of illegal activity [457 U.S. 731, 740] would toll the statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals remanded the action against Butterfield for further proceedings in the District Court. Following the remand and extensive discovery thereafter, Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the District Court on July 5, 1978. It was in this amended complaint - more than eight years after he had complained of his discharge to the Civil Service Commission - that Fitzgerald first named the petitioner Nixon as a party defendant. 19 Also included as defendants were White House aide Bryce Harlow and other officials of the Nixon administration. Additional discovery ensued. By March 1980, only three defendants remained: the petitioner Richard Nixon and White House aides Harlow and Butterfield. Denying a motion for summary judgment, the District Court ruled that the action must proceed to trial. Its order of March 26 held that Fitzgerald had stated triable causes of action under two federal statutes and the First Amendment to the Constitution. 20 The court also [457 U.S. 731, 741] ruled that petitioner was not entitled to claim absolute Presidential immunity. Petitioner took a collateral appeal of the immunity decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed summarily. It apparently did so on the ground that its recent decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, 196 U.S. App. D.C. 285, 606 F.2d 1192 (1979), aff'd in pertinent part by an equally divided Court, 452 U.S. 713 (1981), had rejected this claimed immunity defense. As this Court has not ruled on the scope of immunity available to a President of the United States, we granted certiorari to decide this important issue. 452 U.S. 959 (1981). II Before addressing the merits of this case, we must consider two challenges to our jurisdiction. In his opposition to the petition for certiorari, respondent argued that this Court is without jurisdiction to review the nonfinal order in which the District Court rejected petitioner's claim to absolute immunity. 21 We also must consider an argument that an agreement between the parties has mooted the controversy. A Petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under 28 U.S.C. 1254, a statute that invests us with authority to review "[c]ases in" the courts of appeals. 22 When the petitioner [457 U.S. 731, 742] in this case sought review of an interlocutory order denying his claim to absolute immunity, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing the "jurisdictional" basis for the Court of Appeals' decision, respondent argued that the District Court's order was not an appealable "case" properly "in" the Court of Appeals within the meaning of 1254. We do not agree. Under the "collateral order" doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), a small class of interlocutory orders are immediately appealable to the courts of appeals. As defined by Cohen, this class embraces orders that "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); see Cohen, supra, at 546547. As an additional requirement, Cohen established that a collateral appeal of an interlocutory order must "presen[t] a serious and unsettled question." 337 U.S., at 547 . At least twice before this Court has held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable under the Cohen criteria. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (claim of immunity under the Speech and Debate Clause); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (claim of immunity under Double Jeopardy Clause). In previous cases the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also has treated orders denying absolute immunity as appealable under Cohen. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S. App. D.C. 179, 227-229, 569 F.2d 10, 58-60 (1977) (Wilkey, J., dissenting on the appealability issue); McSurely v. McClellan, 172 U.S. App. D.C. 364, 372, 521 F.2d 1024, 1032 (1975), aff'd in pertinent part en banc, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 101, 107-108, n. 18, 553 F.2d 1277, 1283-1284, n. 18 (1976), cert. dism'd sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U.S. 189 (1978).

In "dismissing" the appeal in this case, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that petitioner's appeal lay [457 U.S. 731, 743] outside the Cohen doctrine because it raised no "serious and unsettled question" of law. This argument was pressed by the respondent, who asked the Court of Appeals to dismiss on the basis of that court's "controlling" decision in Halperin v. Kissinger, supra. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree that petitioner's interlocutory appeal failed to raise a "serious and unsettled" question. Although the Court of Appeals had ruled in Halperin v. Kissinger that the President was not entitled to absolute immunity, this Court never had so held. And a petition for certiorari in Halperin was pending in this Court at the time petitioner's appeal was dismissed. In light of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under the separation of powers, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 691 -692 (1974), we conclude that petitioner did present a "serious and unsettled" and therefore appealable question to the Court of Appeals. It follows that the case was "in" the Court of Appeals under 1254 and properly within our certiorari jurisdiction. 23 B Shortly after petitioner had filed his petition for certiorari in this Court and respondent had entered his opposition, the parties reached an agreement to liquidate damages. 24 Under [457 U.S. 731, 744] its terms the petitioner Nixon paid the respondent Fitzgerald a sum of $142,000. In consideration, Fitzgerald agreed to accept liquidated damages of $28,000 in the event of a ruling by this Court that petitioner was not entitled to absolute immunity. In case of a decision upholding petitioner's immunity claim, no further payments would be made. The limited agreement between the parties left both petitioner and respondent with a considerable financial stake in the resolution of the question presented in this Court. As we recently concluded in a case involving a similar contract: "Given respondents' continued active pursuit of monetary relief, this case remains `definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'" Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 371 (1982), quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 -241 (1937). III A This Court consistently has recognized that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from suits for civil damages. In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), the Court considered the immunity available to the Postmaster General in a suit for damages based upon his official acts. Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English cases at common law, the Court concluded that "[t]he interests of the people" required a grant of absolute immunity to public officers. Id., at 498. In the absence of immunity, the Court reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise [457 U.S. 731, 745] their discretion in a way "injuriously affect[ing] the claims of particular individuals," id., at 499, even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of "public policy and convenience" therefore compelled a judicial recognition of immunity from suits arising from official acts. "In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint." Id., at 498. Decisions subsequent to Spalding have extended the defense of immunity to actions besides those at common law. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Court considered whether the passage of 42 U.S.C. 1983, which made no express provision for immunity for any official, had abrogated the privilege accorded to state legislators at common law. Tenney held that it had not. Examining 1983 in light of the "presuppositions of our political history" and our heritage of legislative freedom, the Court found it incredible "that Congress . . . would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason" without some indication of intent more explicit than the general language of the statute. Id., at 376. Similarly, the decision in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), involving a 1983 suit against a state judge, recognized the continued validity of the absolute immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role. This was a doctrine "`not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions [457 U.S. 731, 746] with independence and without fear of consequences.'" Id., at 554, quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868). See Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The Court in Pierson also held that police officers are entitled to a qualified immunity protecting them from suit when their official acts are performed in "good faith." 386 U.S., at 557 . In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court considered the immunity available to state executive officials in a 1983 suit alleging the violation of constitutional rights. In that case we rejected the officials' claim to absolute immunity under the doctrine of Spalding v. Vilas, finding instead that state executive officials possessed a "good faith" immunity from 1983 suits alleging constitutional violations. Balancing the purposes of 1983 against the imperatives of public policy, the Court held that "in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based." 416 U.S., at 247 .

As construed by subsequent cases, Scheuer established a two-tiered division of immunity defenses in 1983 suits. To most executive officers Scheuer accorded qualified immunity. For them the scope of the defense varied in proportion to the nature of their official functions and the range of decisions that conceivably might be taken in "good faith." This "functional" approach also defined a second tier, however, at which the especially sensitive duties of certain officials - notably judges and prosecutors - required the continued recognition of absolute immunity. See, e. g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (state prosecutors possess absolute immunity with respect to the initiation and pursuit of prosecutions); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (state judge possesses absolute immunity for all judicial acts). This approach was reviewed in detail in Butz v. Economou, [457 U.S. 731, 747] 438 U.S. 478 (1978), when we considered for the first time the kind of immunity possessed by federal executive officials who are sued for constitutional violations. 25 In Butz the Court rejected an argument, based on decisions involving federal officials charged with common-law torts, that all high federal officials have a right to absolute immunity from constitutional damages actions. Concluding that a blanket recognition of absolute immunity would be anomalous in light of the qualified immunity standard applied to state executive officials, id., at 504, we held that federal officials generally have the same qualified immunity possessed by state officials in cases under 1983. In so doing we reaffirmed our holdings that some officials, notably judges and prosecutors, "because of the special nature of their responsibilities," id., at 511, "require a full exemption from liability." Id., at 508. In Butz itself we upheld a claim of absolute immunity for administrative officials engaged in functions analogous to those of judges and prosecutors. Ibid. We also left open the question whether other federal officials could show that "public policy requires an exemption of that scope." Id., at 506. B Our decisions concerning the immunity of government officials from civil damages liability have been guided by the Constitution, federal statutes, and history. Additionally, at least in the absence of explicit constitutional or congressional guidance, our immunity decisions have been informed by the common law. See Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421. This Court necessarily also has weighed concerns of public policy, especially as illuminated [457 U.S. 731, 748] by our history and the structure of our government. See, e. g., Butz v. Economou, supra, at 508; Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S., at 498 . 26 This case now presents the claim that the President of the United States is shielded by absolute immunity from civil damages liability. In the case of the President the inquiries into history and policy, though mandated independently by our cases, tend to converge. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional heritage and structure. Historical inquiry thus merges almost at its inception with the kind of "public policy" analysis appropriately undertaken by a federal court. This inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers. IV Here a former President asserts his immunity from civil damages claims of two kinds. He stands named as a defendant in a direct action under the Constitution and in two statutory actions under federal laws of general applicability. In neither case has Congress taken express legislative action to subject the President to civil liability for his official acts. 27 [457 U.S. 731, 749] Applying the principles of our cases to claims of this kind, we hold that petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. We consider this immunity a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history. Justice Story's analysis remains persuasive: "There are . . . incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to perform them . . . . The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability." 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 1563, pp. 418-419 (1st ed. 1833). A The President occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme. Article II, 1, of the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of [457 U.S. 731, 750] the United States . . . ." This grant of authority establishes the President as the chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch, entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity. These include the enforcement of federal law - it is the President who is charged constitutionally to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"; 28 the conduct of foreign affairs - a realm in which the Court has recognized that "[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret"; 29 and management of the Executive Branch - a task for which "imperative reasons requir[e] an unrestricted power [in the President] to remove the most important of his subordinates in their most important duties." 30

In arguing that the President is entitled only to qualified immunity, the respondent relies on cases in which we have recognized immunity of this scope for governors and cabinet officers. E. g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). We find these cases to be inapposite. The President's unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials. 31 [457 U.S. 731, 751] Because of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government. As is the case with prosecutors and judges - [457 U.S. 731, 752] for whom absolute immunity now is established - a President must concern himself with matters likely to "arouse the most intense feelings." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 554 . Yet, as our decisions have recognized, it is in precisely such cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with" the duties of his office. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979). This concern is compelling where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional system. 32 Nor can the sheer prominence of the President's [457 U.S. 731, 753] office be ignored. In view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages. 33 Cognizance of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve. B Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors counseling judicial deference and restraint. 34 For example, while courts generally have looked to the common law to determine the scope of an official's evidentiary privilege, 35 we have recognized that the Presidential privilege is "rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 708 . It is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction [457 U.S. 731, 754] over the President of the United States. See, e. g., United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191, 196 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 36 But our cases also have established that a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon, supra, at 703-713. When judicial action is needed to serve broad public interests - as when the Court acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, but to maintain their proper balance, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, or to vindicate the public interest in an ongoing criminal prosecution, see United States v. Nixon, supra - the exercise of jurisdiction has been held warranted. In the case of this merely private suit for damages based on a President's official acts, we hold it is not. 37 [457 U.S. 731, 755] C In defining the scope of an official's absolute privilege, this Court has recognized that the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes. Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S., at 508 -517; cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S., at 430 -431. But the Court also has refused to draw functional lines finer than history and reason would support. See, e. g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S., at 498 (privilege extends to all matters "committed by law to [an official's] control or supervision"); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959) (fact "that the action here taken was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable [457 U.S. 731, 756] . . ."); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S., at 363 , and n. 12 (judicial privilege applies even to acts occurring outside "the normal attributes of a judicial proceeding"). In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the "outer perimeter" of his official responsibility. Under the Constitution and laws of the United States the President has discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of areas, many of them highly sensitive. In many cases it would be difficult to determine which of the President's innumerable "functions" encompassed a particular action. In this case, for example, respondent argues that he was dismissed in retaliation for his testimony to Congress - a violation of 5 U.S.C. 7211 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) and 18 U.S.C. 1505. The Air Force, however, has claimed that the underlying reorganization was undertaken to promote efficiency. Assuming that petitioner Nixon ordered the reorganization in which respondent lost his job, an inquiry into the President's motives could not be avoided under the kind of "functional" theory asserted both by respondent and the dissent. Inquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive. Here respondent argues that petitioner Nixon would have acted outside the outer perimeter of his duties by ordering the discharge of an employee who was lawfully entitled to retain his job in the absence of "`such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.'" Brief for Respondent 39, citing 5 U.S.C. 7512(a). Because Congress has granted this legislative protection, respondent argues, no federal official could, within the outer perimeter of his duties of office, cause Fitzgerald to be dismissed without satisfying this standard in prescribed statutory proceedings. This construction would subject the President to trial on virtually every allegation that an action was unlawful, or was taken for a forbidden purpose. Adoption of this construction thus would deprive absolute immunity of its intended effect. [457 U.S. 731, 757] It clearly is within the President's constitutional and statutory authority to prescribe the manner in which the Secretary will conduct the business of the Air Force. See 10 U.S.C. 8012(b). Because this mandate of office must include the authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force, we conclude that petitioner's alleged wrongful acts lay well within the outer perimeter of his authority.

V A rule of absolute immunity for the President will not leave the Nation without sufficient protection against misconduct on the part of the Chief Executive. 38 There remains the constitutional remedy of impeachment. 39 In addition, there are formal and informal checks on Presidential action that do not apply with equal force to other executive officials. The President is subjected to constant scrutiny by the press. Vigilant oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment. 40 Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include a desire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as an element of Presidential influence, and a President's traditional concern for his historical stature. [457 U.S. 731, 758] The existence of alternative remedies and deterrents establishes that absolute immunity will not place the President "above the law." 41 For the President, as for judges and prosecutors, absolute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends. VI For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for action consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Syllabus CLINTON v. JONES certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit No. 95-1853. Argued January 13, 1997 Decided May 27, 1997 Respondent sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 and Arkansas law to recover damages from petitioner, the current President of the United States, alleging, inter alia, that while he was Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances to her, and that her rejection of those advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the time. Petitioner promptly advised the Federal District Court that he would file a motion to dismiss on Presidential immunity grounds, and requested that all other pleadings and motions be deferred until the immunity issue was resolved. After the court granted that request, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and to toll any applicable statutes of limitation during his Presidency. The District Judge denied dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until petitioner's Presidency ended. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity to which petitioner was not constitutionally entitled. The court explained that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an official was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and that the rationale for official immunity is inapposite where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue. The court also rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive Branch would violate separation of powers. Held: 1. This Court need not address two important constitutional issues not encompassed within the questions presented by the certioraripetition: (1) whether a claim comparable to petitioner's assertion of immunity might succeed in a state tribunal, and (2) whether a court may compel the President's attendance at any specific time or place. Pp. 7-9. 2. Deferral of this litigation until petitioner's Presidency ends is not constitutionally required. Pp. 7-28. (a) Petitioner's principal submission--that in all but the most exceptional cases, the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office--cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent. The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from damages actions based on their official acts--i.e., to enable them to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 , 752, and n. 32--provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 . The Court is also unpersuaded by petitioner's historical evidence, which sheds little light on the question at issue, and is largely canceled by conflicting evidence that is itself consistent with both the doctrine of presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald, and rejection of the immunity claim in this case. Pp. 9-15.

(b) The separation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. Even accepting the unique importance of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that that doctrine would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine provides a self executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the three co equal branches of Government at the expense of another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 . But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies, and, whatever the outcome, there is no possibility that the decision here will curtail the scope of the Executive Branch's official powers. The Court rejects petitioner's contention that this case--as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Eighth Circuit's judgment might spawn--may place unacceptable burdens on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. That assertion finds little support either in history, as evidenced by the paucity of suits against sitting Presidents for their private actions, or in therelatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. Of greater significance, it is settled that the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, see e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 , and may direct appropriate process to the President himself, see e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 . It must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct. The reasons for rejecting a categorical rule requiring federal courts to stay private actions during the President's term apply as well to a rule that would, in petitioner's words, require a stay "in all but the most exceptional cases." Pp. 15-24. (c) Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's ruling, the District Court's stay order was not the "functional equivalent" of an unconstitutional grant of temporary immunity. Rather, the District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. See, e.g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 . Moreover, the potential burdens on the President posed by this litigation are appropriate matters for that court to evaluate in its management of the case, and the high respect owed the Presidency is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding. Nevertheless, the District Court's stay decision was an abuse of discretion because it took no account of the importance of respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial, and because it was premature in that there was nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess whether postponement of trial after the completion of discovery would be warranted. Pp. 25-27. (d) The Court is not persuaded of the seriousness of the alleged risks that this decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation and that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance, and has confidence in the ability of federal judges to deal with both concerns. If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with legislation. Pp. 27-28. 72 F. 3d 1354, affirmed. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. U.S. Supreme Court No. 95-1853 WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PETITIONER v. PAULA CORBIN JONES on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit [May 27, 1997] Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. This case raises a constitutional and a prudential question concerning the Office of the President of the United States. Respondent, a private citizen, seeks to recover damages from the current occupant of that office based on actions allegedly taken before his term began. The President submits that in all but the most exceptional cases the Constitution requires federal courts to defer such litigation until his term ends and that, in any event, respect for the office warrants such a stay. Despite the force of the arguments supporting the President's submissions, we conclude that they must be rejected. Petitioner, William Jefferson Clinton, was elected to the Presidency in 1992, and re elected in 1996. His term of office expires on January 20, 2001. In 1991 he was the Governor of the State of Arkansas. Respondent, Paula Corbin Jones, is a resident of California. In 1991 she lived in Arkansas, and was an employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission.

On May 6, 1994, she commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas by filing a complaint naming petitioner and Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police officer, as defendants. The complaint alleges two federal claims, and two state law claims over which the federal court has jurisdiction because of the diverse citizenship of the parties. 1 As the case comes to us, we are required to assume the truth of the detailed--but as yet untested-- factual allegations in the complaint. Those allegations principally describe events that are said to have occurred on the afternoon of May 8, 1991, during an official conference held at the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Governor delivered a speech at the conference; respondent-working as a state employee--staffed the registration desk. She alleges that Ferguson persuaded her to leave her desk and to visit the Governor in a business suite at the hotel, where he made "abhorrent" 2 sexual advances that she vehemently rejected. She further claims that her superiors at work subsequently dealt with her in a hostile and rude manner, and changed her duties to punish her for rejecting those advances. Finally, she alleges that after petitioner was elected President, Ferguson defamed her by making a statement to a reporter that implied she had accepted petitioner's alleged overtures, and that various persons authorized to speak for the President publicly branded her a liar by denying that the incident had occurred. Respondent seeks actual damages of $75,000, and punitive damages of $100,000. Her complaint contains four counts. The first charges that petitioner, acting under color of state law, deprived her of rights protected by the Constitution, in violation of Rev. Stat. 1979, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The second charges that petitioner andFerguson engaged in a conspiracy to violate her federal rights, also actionable under federal law. See Rev. Stat. 1980, 42 U.S.C. 1985. The third is a state common law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, grounded primarily on the incident at the hotel. The fourth count, also based on state law, is for defamation, embracing both the comments allegedly made to the press by Ferguson and the statements of petitioner's agents. Inasmuch as the legal sufficiency of the claims has not yet been challenged, we assume, without deciding, that each of the four counts states a cause of action as a matter of law. With the exception of the last charge, which arguably may involve conduct within the outer perimeter of the President's official responsibilities, it is perfectly clear that the alleged misconduct of petitioner was unrelated to any of his official duties as President of the United States and, indeed, occurred before he was elected to that office. 3 In response to the complaint, petitioner promptly advised the District Court that he intended to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity, and requested the court to defer all other pleadings and motions until after the immunity issue was resolved. 4 Relying on our cases holding that immunity questions should be decided at the earliest possible stage of the litigation, 858 F. Supp. 902, 905 (ED Ark. 1994), our recognition of the " `singular importance of the President's duties,' " id., at 904 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 (1982)), and the fact that the question did not require any analysis of the allegations of the complaint, 858 F. Supp., at 905, the court granted the request. Petitioner thereupon filed a motion "to dismiss . . . without prejudice and to toll any statutes of limitation [that may be applicable] until he is no longer President, at which time the plaintiff may refile the instant suit." Record, Doc. No. 17. Extensive submissions were made to the District Court by the parties and the Department of Justice. 5 The District Judge denied the motion to dismiss on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery in the case could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until the end of petitioner's Presidency. 869 F. Supp. 690 (ED Ark. 1994). Although she recognized that a "thin majority" in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), had held that "the President has absolute immunity from civil damage actions arising out of the execution of official duties of office," she was not convinced that "a President has absolute immunity from civil causes of action arising prior to assuming the office." 6 She was, however, persuaded by some of the reasoning in our opinion in Fitzgerald that deferring the trial if one were required would be appropriate. 7 869 F. Supp., at 699-700. Relying in part on the fact that respondent had failed to bring her complaint until two days beforethe 3 year period of limitations expired, she concluded that the public interest in avoiding litigation that might hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office outweighed any demonstrated need for an immediate trial. Id., at 698-699. Both parties appealed. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, but because it regarded the order postponing the trial until the President leaves office as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity, it reversed that order. 72 F. 3d 1354, 1361, n. 9, 1363 (CA8 1996). Writing for the majority, Judge Bowman explained that "the President, like all other government officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all other members of our society," id., at 1358, that he could find no "case in which any public official ever has been granted any immunity from suit for his unofficial acts," ibid., and that the rationale for official immunity "is inapposite where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue," id., at 1360. The majority specifically rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive Branch through scheduling orders, potential contempt citations, and sanctions would violate separation of powers principles. Judge Bowman suggested that "judicial case management sensitive to the burdens of the presidency and the demands of the President's schedule," would avoid the perceived danger. Id., at 1361. In dissent, Judge Ross submitted that even though the holding in Fitzgerald involved official acts, the logic of the opinion, which "placed primary reliance on the prospect that the President's discharge of his constitutional powers and duties would be impaired if he were subject to suits for damages," applies with equal force to this case. 72 F. 3d, at 1367. In his view, "unless exigent circumstances can be shown," all private actionsfor damages against a sitting President must be stayed until the completion of his term. Ibid. In this case, Judge Ross saw no reason why the stay would prevent respondent from ultimately obtaining an adjudication of her claims. In response to the dissent, Judge Beam wrote a separate concurrence. He suggested that a prolonged delay may well create a significant risk of irreparable harm to respondent because of an unforeseeable loss of evidence or the possible death of a party. Id., at 1363-1364. Moreover, he argued that in civil rights cases brought under 1983 there is a "public interest in an ordinary citizen's timely

vindication of . . . her most fundamental rights against alleged abuse of power by government officials." Id., at 1365. In his view, the dissent's concern about judicial interference with the functioning of the Presidency was "greatly overstated." Ibid. Neither the involvement of prior presidents in litigation, either as parties or as witnesses, nor the character of this "relatively uncomplicated civil litigation," indicated that the threat was serious. Id., at 1365-1366. Finally, he saw "no basis for staying discovery or trial of the claims against Trooper Ferguson." Id., at 1366. 8 The President, represented by private counsel, filed a petition for certiorari. The Solicitor General, representing the United States, supported the petition, arguing that the decision of the Court of Appeals was "fundamentally mistaken" and created "serious risks for the institution of the Presidency." 9 In her brief in opposition to certiorari, respondent argued that this "one of a kind case is singularly inappropriate" for the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction because it did not create any conflict among the Courts of Appeals, it "does not pose any conceivable threat to the functioning of the Executive Branch," and there is no precedent supporting the President's position. 10 While our decision to grant the petition expressed no judgment concerning the merits of the case, it does reflect our appraisal of its importance. The representations made on behalf of the Executive Branch as to the potential impact of the precedent established by the Court of Appeals merit our respectful and deliberate consideration. It is true that we have often stressed the importance of avoiding the premature adjudication of constitutional questions. 11 That doctrine of avoidance, however, is applicable to the entire Federal Judiciary, not just to this Court, cf. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. ___ (1997), and comes into play after the court has acquired jurisdiction of a case. It does not dictatea discretionary denial of every certiorari petition raising a novel constitutional question. It does, however, make it appropriate to identify two important constitutional issues not encompassed within the questions presented by the petition for certiorari that we need not address today. 12 First, because the claim of immunity is asserted in a federal court and relies heavily on the doctrine of separation of powers that restrains each of the three branches of the Federal Government from encroaching on the domain of the other two, see, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976), it is not necessary to consider or decide whether a comparable claim might succeed in a state tribunal. If this case were being heard in a state forum, instead of advancing a separation of powers argument, petitioner would presumably rely on federalism and comity concerns, 13 as well as the interest in protecting federal officials from possible local prejudice that underlies the authority to remove certain cases brought against federal officers from a state to afederal court, see 28 U.S.C. 1442(a); Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 125 -126 (1989). Whether those concerns would present a more compelling case for immunity is a question that is not before us. Second, our decision rejecting the immunity claim and allowing the case to proceed does not require us to confront the question whether a court may compel the attendance of the President at any specific time or place. We assume that the testimony of the President, both for discovery and for use at trial, may be taken at the White House at a time that will accommodate his busy schedule, and that, if a trial is held, there would be no necessity for the President to attend in person, though he could elect to do so. 14 Petitioner's principal submission--that "in all but the most exceptional cases," Brief for Petitioner i, the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office--cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent. Only three sitting Presidents have been defendants in civil litigation involving their actions prior to taking office. Complaints against Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman had been dismissed before they took office; the dismissals were affirmed after their respective inaugurations. 15 Two companion cases arising out of an automobile accident were filed against John F. Kennedyin 1960 during the Presidential campaign. 16 After taking office, he unsuccessfully argued that his status as Commander in Chief gave him a right to a stay under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. 501-525. The motion for a stay was denied by the District Court, and the matter was settled out of court. 17 Thus, none of those cases sheds any light on the constitutional issue before us. The principal rationale for affording certain public servants immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. In cases involving prosecutors, legislators, and judges we have repeatedly explained that the immunity serves the public interest in enabling such officials to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability. 18 We explained in Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193 (1979): "As public servants, the prosecutor and the judge represent the interest of society as a whole. The conduct of their official duties may adversely affect a wide variety of different individuals, each of whom may be a potential source of future controversy. The societal interest in providing such public officials with the maximum ability to deal fearlesslyand impartially with the public at large has long been recognized as an acceptable justification for official immunity. The point of immunity for such officials is to forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated functions in a principled fashion." Id., at 202-204. That rationale provided the principal basis for our holding that a former President of the United States was "entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts," Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 749 . See id., at 752 (citing Ferri v. Ackerman). Our central concern was to avoid rendering the President "unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties." 457 U.S., at 752 , n. 32. 19

This reasoning provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. As we explained in Fitzgerald, "the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes." Id., at 755. Because of the President's broad responsibilities, werecognized in that case an immunity from damages claims arising out of official acts extending to the "outer perimeter of his authority." Id., at 757. But we have never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official capacity. See id., at 759 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (noting that "a President, like Members of Congress, judges, prosecutors, or congressional aides--all having absolute immunity--are not immune for acts outside official duties"); see also id., at 761, n. 4. Moreover, when defining the scope of an immunity for acts clearly taken within an official capacity, we have applied a functional approach. "Frequently our decisions have held that an official's absolute immunity should extend only to acts in performance of particular functions of his office." Id., at 755. Hence, for example, a judge's absolute immunity does not extend to actions performed in a purely administrative capacity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 -230 (1988). As our opinions have made clear, immunities are grounded in "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Id., at 229. Petitioner's effort to construct an immunity from suit for unofficial acts grounded purely in the identity of his office is unsupported by precedent. We are also unpersuaded by the evidence from the historical record to which petitioner has called our attention. He points to a comment by Thomas Jefferson protesting the subpoena duces tecum Chief Justice Marshall directed to him in the Burr trial, 20 a statement in the diaries kept by Senator William Maclay of the first Senate debates, in which then Vice President John Adams and Senator Oliver Ellsworth are recorded as having said that "the President personally [is] not . . . subject to any process whatever," lest it be "put . . . in the power of a common Justice to exercise any Authority over him and Stop the Whole Machine of Government," 21 and to a quotation from Justice Story's Commentaries on the Constitution. 22 None of these sources sheds much light on the question at hand. 23 Respondent, in turn, has called our attention to conflicting historical evidence. Speaking in favor of the Constitution's adoption at the Pennsylvania Convention, James Wilson--who had participated in the Philadelphia Convention at which the document was drafted-explained that, although the President "is placed [on] high," "not a single privilege is annexed to his character; far from being above the laws, he is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen, and in his public character by impeachment." 2 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 480 (2d ed. 1863) (emphasis omitted). This description is consistent with both the doctrine of presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald, and rejection of the immunity claim in this case. With respect to acts taken in his "public character"-that is official acts--the President may be disciplined principally by impeachment, not by private lawsuits for damages. But he is otherwise subject to the laws for his purely private acts. In the end, as applied to the particular question before us, we reach the same conclusion about these historical materials that Justice Jackson described when confronted with an issue concerning the dimensions of the President's power. "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharoah. A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side . . . . They largely canceleach other." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 -635 (1952) (concurring opinion). Petitioner's strongest argument supporting his immunity claim is based on the text and structure of the Constitution. He does not contend that the occupant of the Office of the President is "above the law," in the sense that his conduct is entirely immune from judicial scrutiny. 24 The President argues merely for a postponement of the judicial proceedings that will determine whether he violated any law. His argument is grounded in the character of the office that was created by Article II of the Constitution, and relies on separation of powers principles that have structured our constitutional arrangement since the founding. As a starting premise, petitioner contends that he occupies a unique office with powers and responsibilities so vast and important that the public interest demands that he devote his undivided time and attention to his public duties. He submits that--given the nature of the office--the doctrine of separation of powers places limits on the authority of the Federal Judiciary to interfere with the Executive Branch that would be transgressed by allowing this action to proceed. We have no dispute with the initial premise of the argument. Former presidents, from George Washingtonto George Bush, have consistently endorsed petitioner's characterization of the office. 25 After serving his term, Lyndon Johnson observed: "Of all the 1,886 nights I was President, there were not many when I got to sleep before 1 or 2 a.m., and there were few mornings when I didn't wake up by 6 or 6:30." 26 In 1967, the Twenty fifth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted to ensure continuity in the performance of the powers and duties of the office; 27 one of the sponsors of that Amendment stressed the importance of providing that "at all times" there be a President "who has complete control and will be able to perform" those duties. 28 As Justice Jackson has pointed out, the Presidency concentrates executive authority "in a single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, making him the focus of public hopes and expectations. In drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that almost alone he fills the public eye and ear." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S., at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring). We have, in short, long recognized the "unique position in the constitutional scheme" that this office occupies. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 749 . 29 Thus, while we suspect that even in ourmodern era there remains some truth to Chief Justice Marshall's suggestion that the duties of the Presidency are not entirely "unremitting," United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (CC Va. 1807), we accept the initial premise of the Executive's argument.

It does not follow, however, that separation of powers principles would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine of separation of powers is concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co equal branches of our Government. The Framers "built into the tripartite Federal Government . . . a self executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 122 . 30 Thus, for example, the Congress may not exercise the judicial power to revise final judgments, Plaut v. SpendthriftFarm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), 31 or the executive power to manage an airport, see Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276 (1991) (holding that "[i]f the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it"). 32 See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (Congress may not "invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power"). Similarly, the President may not exercise the legislative power to authorize the seizure of private property for public use. Youngstown, 343 U.S., at 588 . And, the judicial power to decide cases and controversies does not include the provision of purely advisory opinions to the Executive, 33 or permit the federal courts to resolve nonjusticiable questions. 34 Of course the lines between the powers of the three branches are not always neatly defined. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 -381 (1989). 35 But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies. Whatever the outcome of this case, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail the scope of the official powers of the Executive Branch. The litigation of questions that relate entirely to the unofficial conduct of the individual who happens to be the President poses no perceptible risk of misallocation of either judicial power or executive power. Rather than arguing that the decision of the case will produce either an aggrandizement of judicial power or a narrowing of executive power, petitioner contends that--as a by product of an otherwise traditional exercise of judicial power--burdens will be placed on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. We have recognized that "[e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself . . . the separation of powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties." Loving v. United States, 517 U. S. ___, ___ (1996) (slip op., at 8); see also Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). As a factual matter, petitioner contends that this particular case--as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment might spawn--may impose an unacceptable burden on the President's time and energy, and thereby impair the effective performance of his office. Petitioner's predictive judgment finds little support in either history or the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. As we have already noted, in the more than 200 year history of the Republic, only three sitting Presidents have been subjected to suits for their private actions. 36 See supra, at 9-10. If the past is any indicator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency. As for the case at hand, if properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of petitioner's time. Of greater significance, petitioner errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and theExecutive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive's ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions. "[O]ur . . . system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which `would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.' " Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 381 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S., at 121 ). As Madison explained, separation of powers does not mean that the branches "ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other." 37 The fact that a federal court's exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution. Two long settled propositions, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, support that conclusion. First, we have long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such a case is our holding that President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills in order to avert a national catastrophe. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Despite the serious impact of that decision on the ability of the Executive Branch to accomplish its assigned mission, and the substantial time that the President must necessarily have devoted to the matter as a result of judicial involvement, we exercised our Article III jurisdiction todecide whether his official conduct conformed to the law. Our holding was an application of the principle established in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Id., at 177. Second, it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances. Although Thomas Jefferson apparently thought otherwise, Chief Justice Marshall, when presiding in the treason trial of Aaron Burr, ruled that a subpoena duces tecum could be directed to the President. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807). 38 We unequivocally and emphatically endorsed Marshall's position when we held that President Nixon was obligated to comply with a subpoena commanding him to produce certain tape recordings of his conversations with his aides. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). As we explained, "neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances." Id., at 706. 39 Sitting Presidents have responded to court orders to provide testimony and other information with sufficient frequency that such interactions between the Judicial and Executive Branches can scarcely be thought a novelty. President Monroe responded to written interrogatories, see Rotunda, Presidents and Ex Presidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. Ill. L. F. 1, 5-6, President Nixon--as noted above--produced tapes in response to a subpoena duces tecum, see United States v. Nixon, President Ford complied with an order to give a deposition in a criminal trial, United States v. Fromme, 405 F. Supp. 578 (ED Cal. 1975), and President Clinton

has twice given videotaped testimony in criminal proceedings, see United States v. McDougal, 934 F. Supp. 296 (ED Ark. 1996); United States v. Branscum, No., LRP-CR%96-49 (ED Ark., June 7, 1996). Moreover, sitting Presidents have also voluntarily complied with judicial requests for testimony. President Grant gave a lengthy deposition in a criminal case under such circumstances, R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 7.1 (2d ed. 1992), and President Carter similarly gave videotaped testimony for use at a criminal trial, ibid. In sum, "[i]t is settled law that the separation of powers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of the United States." Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 753 -754. If the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it mustfollow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct. The burden on the President's time and energy that is a mere by product of such review surely cannot be considered as onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the occasional invalidation of his official actions. 40 We therefore hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. The reasons for rejecting such a categorical rule apply as well to a rule that would require a stay "in all but the most exceptional cases." Brief for Petitioner i. Indeed, if the Framers of the Constitution had thought it necessary to protect the President from the burdens of private litigation, we think it far more likely that they would have adopted a categorical rule than a rule that required the President to litigate the question whether a specific case belonged in the "exceptional case" subcategory. In all events, the question whether a specific case should receive exceptional treatment is more appropriately the subject of the exercise of judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution. Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the District Court's decision to stay the trial until after petitioner leaves office was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals described the District Court's discretionary decision to stay the trial as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity. 72 F. 3d, at 1361, n. 9. Concluding that petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to such an immunity, the court held that it was error to grant the stay. Ibid. Although we ultimately conclude that the stay should not have been granted, we think the issue is more difficult than the opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests. Strictly speaking the stay was not the functional equivalent of the constitutional immunity that petitioner claimed, because the District Court ordered discovery to proceed. Moreover, a stay of either the trial or discovery might be justified by considerations that do not require the recognition of any constitutional immunity. The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. See, e.g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). As we have explained, "[e]specially in cases of extraordinary public moment, [a plaintiff] may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted." Id., at 256. Although we have rejected the argument that the potential burdens on the President violate separation of powers principles, those burdens are appropriate matters for the District Court to evaluate in its management of the case. The high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive, though not justifying a rule of categorical immunity, is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of discovery. 41 Nevertheless, we are persuaded that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to defer the trial until after the President leaves office. Such a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatever of the respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial. The complaint was filed within the statutory limitations period--albeit near the end of that period--and delaying trial would increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts, or the possible death of a party. The decision to postpone the trial was, furthermore, premature. The proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need. Id., at 255. In this case, at the stage at which the District Court made its ruling, there was no way to assess whether a stay of trial after the completion of discovery would be warranted. Other than the fact that a trial may consume some of the President's time and attention, there is nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess the potential harm that may ensue from scheduling the trial promptly after discovery is concluded. We think the District Courtmay have given undue weight to the concern that a trial might generate unrelated civil actions that could conceivably hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office. If and when that should occur, the court's discretion would permit it to manage those actions in such fashion (including deferral of trial) that interference with the President's duties would not occur. But no such impingement upon the President's conduct of his office was shown here. We add a final comment on two matters that are discussed at length in the briefs: the risk that our decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation, and the danger that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance. We are not persuaded that either of these risks is serious. Most frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little if any personal involvement by the defendant. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12, 56. Moreover, the availability of sanctions provides a significant deterrent to litigation directed at the President in his unofficial capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment. 42 History indicates that the likelihood that a significant number of such cases will be filed is remote. Although scheduling problems may arise, there is no reason to assume that the District Courts will be either unable to accommodate the President's needs or unfaithful to the tradition--especially in matters involving national security--of giving "the utmost deference to

Presidential responsibilities." 43 Several Presidents, including petitioner, have given testimony without jeopardizing the Nation's security. See supra, at 23. In short, we have confidence in the ability of our federal judges to deal with both of these concerns. If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation. As petitioner notes in his brief, Congress has enacted more than one statute providing for the deferral of civil litigation to accommodate important public interests. Brief for Petitioner 34-36. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 362 (litigation against debtor stayed upon filing of bankruptcy petition); Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. 501-525 (provisions governing, inter alia, tolling or stay of civil claims by or against military personnel during course of active duty). If the Constitution embodied the rule that the President advocates, Congress, of course, could not repeal it. But our holding today raises no barrier to a statutory response to these concerns. The Federal District Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Like every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent. ---------------------------------------G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent. PUNO, J.: On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style. First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President. In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1 The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.2 The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner

take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10 The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13 The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15 After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators. On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.20 January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21 On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26 There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there

was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:30 "20 January 2001 STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people. MABUHAY! (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31 "Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. (Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA" A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33 On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit: "A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria MacapagalArroyo to be sworn in as President of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.1wphi1.nt This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party." Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of

respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government.36 On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives.37 The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution."39 On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41 On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46 On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48 Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very poor class.50 After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against him. Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15." On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved: "(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution; (2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and (3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53 The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision. The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are: I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy. II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution. IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity. We shall discuss the issues in seriatim. I Whether or not the cases At bar involve a political question Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter. We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz: "x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate

branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'." In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.60 With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x." Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution. In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate. Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66 Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz: "Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances." The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society."70 In

Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that " it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers." Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark. II Whether or not the petitioner Resigned as President We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides: "Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified. x x x." The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry. As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire. As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes)

(Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time. The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz: "x x x I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name. If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday. The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88 Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation. The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened: "Opposition's deal 7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel. Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads: '1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. 2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the incumbent officials concerned. 3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authority effective immediately. 4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice President).

5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President. Our deal We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads: The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows: '1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. '2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private sector throughout their natural lifetimes. This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal). '3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada. '4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program. During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities. Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof. Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89 The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period. According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90 "xxx 11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background. Agreement. The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines. xxx The rest of the agreement follows: 2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.

'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority Vice President. '4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authorities. '5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President. The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore attached to this agreement. 11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United opposition. And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon. 'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked. Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).' I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?' And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).' Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross. But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and General Reyes. I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected. I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon. The President is too stunned for words: Final meal 12 noon Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines. 12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound. The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered. By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President. 1 p.m. The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal possessions as they can. During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving Malacaang. The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country. I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people. MABUHAY!"' It was curtain time for the petitioner. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense. It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz: "Sir. By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president. (Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada" To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision. After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz: "Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery." A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section 15:

"Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery. The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency."93 The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure. Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution. There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-001756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President. Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned. III Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President. We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella. Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President. An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides: "SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President. Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,

the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office." That is the law. Now, the operative facts: 1. 2. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House; Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.; Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;96

3.

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states: "RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him; WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.; WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines; WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development; WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof; WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various segments of the whole nation; WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution. Adopted, (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. Speaker This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001. (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General"

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states: "RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately; WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines; WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism; WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Adopted, (Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. Speaker This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001. (Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO Secretary General" (4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed the following: "RESOLUTION WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge; WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will; WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives; WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99 On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states: "RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines; WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism; WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines. Adopted, (Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR. President of the Senate This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001. (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO Secretary of the Senate" On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states: "RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated. Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved. Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon written approval of the Senate president. Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution. Adopted, (Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. President of the Senate This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001. (Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO Secretary of the Senate" (5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.' (6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President. (7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.

What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability. The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court. IV Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held: " The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it. Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act." Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105

Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated: "The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure. The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution. In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition: "In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome)." The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed. The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108 "Mr. Suarez. Thank you. The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily? Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit. Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here. Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things. Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President. I think the Commissioner for the clarifications." We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:110 "xxx

Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped? Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts." This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu. We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.114 Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct. There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency. V Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that: "We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other offcourt publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.' We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases, viz: "Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation. xxx The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was xxx a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038. b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive

information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place. c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated. Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied) Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.1wphi1.nt The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior. Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court. VI. Epilogue A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135 To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts,

however offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010

LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a certain JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents. DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and seek to set aside the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00003, a petition commenced under the Amparo Rule. The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments contained, in substance, the following allegations: 1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was released at Dasmarias, Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset. After Lourdes release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at least two occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmarias, Cavite and Baclaran in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets, continued; 2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp. Gomez), then sub-station commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, kept sending text messages to Lourdes daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her questions about Karapatan, an alliance of human rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an investigation even after Lourdes disappearance had been made known to him; 3. A week after Lourdes release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean), was constrained to leave their house because of the presence of men watching them; 4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma), Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain Jonathan, c/o Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Paraaque City, but nothing has happened; and the threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmarias municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations. Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes abduction went into hiding after being visited by government agents in civilian clothes; and 5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission order" which was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF. The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping

qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes. Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired, and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations truth. And by way of general affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses: (1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of the Amparo Rule.4 Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public officials, containing their respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of what they had undertaken or committed to undertake regarding the claimed disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and her daughters: 1. Gen. Esperon attested that, pursuant to a directive of then Secretary of National Defense (SND) Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the Commanding General of the PAF, with information to all concerned units, to conduct an investigation to establish the circumstances behind the disappearance and the reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the involvement of alleged personnel/unit is concerned. The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the Judge Advocate General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a parallel action. Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of the investigation; to continue with the probe on the alleged abduction of Lourdes and to bring those responsible, including military personnel, to the bar of justice when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the investigation process by those mandated to look into the matter;5 2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately ordered upon receiving a copy of the petition is on-going vis--vis Lourdes abduction, and that a background verification with the PNP Personnel Accounting and Information System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma and one Jonathan do not appear in the police personnel records, although the PNP files carry the name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga. Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmarias municipal police station, P/Dir. Gen. Razon disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six armed men in the afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to AK Cottage Industry with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Paraaque City. The person residing in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @ Darius Reyes allegedly working, per the latters house helper, in Camp Aguinaldo. P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico never contacted nor coordinated with the local police or other investigating units of the PNP after her release, although she is in the best position to establish the identity of her abductors and/or provide positive description through composite sketching. Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to assist and protect the petitioners and the key witnesses from threats, harassments and intimidation from whatever source and, at the same time, to assist the Court in the implementation of its orders.61avvphi1 3. P/Supt. Roquero stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes complaint, an investigation and submitting the corresponding report to the PNP Calabarzon, observing that neither Lourdes nor her relatives provided the police with relevant information; 4. P/Insp. Gomez alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to cooperate with the investigating Cavite PNP; and 5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for violation of Articles 267 and 124, or kidnapping and arbitrary detention, respectively, have been filed with, and are under preliminary investigation by the OMB against those believed to be involved in Lourdes kidnapping; that upon receipt of the petition for a writ of amparo, proper coordination was made with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) where the subject criminal and administrative complaints were filed. Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more than a general denial of averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court, they also asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to their failure to secure the current address of the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required, proof of service of the petition on them. The hearing started on November 13, 2007.7 In that setting, petitioners counsel prayed for the issuance of a temporary protection order (TPO) against the answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the petition. At the hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served by the courts process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes, Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.

The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President Arroyo from the petition, petitioners motions for service by publication, and the issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this recital. The bottom line is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case; denied the motion for a TPO for the courts want of authority to issue it in the tenor sought by petitioners; and effectively denied the motion for notice by publication owing to petitioners failure to submit the affidavit required under Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.8 After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, in order that petitioners complaint will not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation. SO ORDERED. In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following wise: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent. Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.9 The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.10 x x x And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners protected rights. This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez, and the OMB. None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has been implicated as being connected to, let alone as being behind, the alleged abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their names were not even mentioned in Lourdes Sinumpaang Salaysay11 of April 2007. The same goes for the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jean12 and Mary Joy.13 As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners. To the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of the military or the police force." The two generals, the CAs holding broadly hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP. As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because they allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against Mary Joy.

While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis--vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict."14 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,15 foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators16 (as opposed to crimes he ordered). The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute17 of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.18 While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,19 there is still no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.20 It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.21 Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),22 the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."23 Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis: It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial killings]. xxxx As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact.24 x x x If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any. Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed part of either the military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police investigation report, however, would tend to show a link, however hazy, between the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction of Lourdes and the address of Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working in Camp Aguinaldo.25 Then, too, there were affidavits and testimonies on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point to military involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but not limited to, her abduction in broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the sounds of planes taking off and landing could be heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that Lourdes was asked about her membership in the Communist Party and of being released when she agreed to become an "asset." Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.

Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano26 and Technical Sergeant John N. Romano,27 officer-in-charge and a staff of the 301st AISS, respectively, none of the alleged abductors of Lourdes belonged to the 301st AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any unit of the Philippine Air Force, per the certification28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air Force Adjutant. And as stated in the challenged CA decision, a verification with the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the PNP yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga, the other alleged abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of the PNP. Petitioners, when given the opportunity to identify Police Officer 1 Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to confirm if he was the same Maj. Darwin Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in Lourdes abduction. Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering respondents documentary evidence, adduced to debunk the formers allegations directly linking Lourdes abductors and tormentors to the military or the police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on cross-examination, expressed the belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent.29 The Court is, of course, aware of what was referred to in Razon30 as the "evidentiary difficulties" presented by the nature of, and encountered by petitioners in, enforced disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this reason that the Court should take care too that no wrong message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind or degree of evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to secure amparo remedies and protection. Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum evidentiary substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of action under the Rule, thus: Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence. xxxx Sec. 18. Judgment.x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (Emphasis added.) Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged;31 it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise.32 Per the CAs evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the three Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a very real sense, the burden of evidence never even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the appellate courts determination of the answering respondents role in the alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her familys security. Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per their separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in issuing directives to the concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough probe of the case and in providing the investigators the necessary support. As of this date, however, the investigations have yet to be concluded with some definite findings and recommendation. As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they have no direct or indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty that would include looking into the cause, manner, and like details of the disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from them; and following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate number XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to the abduction and the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we said in Manalo,33 the right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the government, is breached by the superficial and one-sidedhence, ineffectiveinvestigation by the military or the police of reported cases under their jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary factfinding on petitioners complaint. They could not, however, make any headway, owing to what was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses attitude, "[They] do not trust the government agencies to protect them."34 The difficulty arising from a situation where the party whose complicity in extra-judicial killing or enforced disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same party who investigates it is understandable, though. The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To repeat what the Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case,35 in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. (Emphasis added.)

This brings us to Mary Joys charge of having been harassed by respondent P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we take of this incident, there is nothing concrete to support the charge, save for Mary Joys bare allegations of harassment. We cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt from the appealed CA decision: In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed against her or her mother and sister, Mary Joy replied "None "36 Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners allegations about the OMB failing to act on their complaint against those who allegedly abducted and illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners contention, the OMB has taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled from the affidavit37 of the Deputy Overall Ombudsman and the joint affidavits38 of the designated investigators, all dated November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on the basis of said complaint, commenced criminal39 and administrative40 proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-0602-E and OMB-P-A 07-567-E, respectively, against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The requisite orders for the submission of counter-affidavits and verified position papers had been sent out. The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with the correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. And petitioners motion interposed before the appellate court for notice or service via publication has not been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial judgmentdisposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo without (1) pronouncement as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2) outright dismissal of the same petition as to themhews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving and reviving cases.41 Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review. Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate facts as would link the OMB in any manner to the violation or threat of violation of the petitioners rights to life, liberty, or personal security. The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.42 It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.43 Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the impleaded respondents "to immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners, however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not to say, however, that petitioners allegation on the fact of the abduction incident or harassment is necessarily contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is that the military or police connection has not been adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by showing that they acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct and must, accordingly, be sustained. Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the appealed decision veritably extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs. Consider: the appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take specific measures for the protection of petitioners right or threatened right to liberty or security. The protection came in the form of directives specifically to Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure that the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units, respectively, under them on the complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are being pursued with urgency to bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts complained of; and (2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a regular report on the progress and status of the investigations. The directives obviously go to Gen. Esperon in his capacity as head of the AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of order and security in the country. On the other hand, P/Dir. Gen. Razon is called upon to perform a duty pertaining to the PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory, and arresting institution. As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set in its decision for the completion of the investigation and the reportorial requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razons imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services, respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of the AFP and the PNP. At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper disposition of this case.

First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subject amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out, though, that the filing44 of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo Rule on October 24, 2007. Second, Sec. 2245 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23,46 on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 647 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation. Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises. 48 Towards this end, two things are at once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective. WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and makes a decision: (1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of amparo; (2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and (3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as required by Sec. 1749 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate officials, in particular, to do the following: (a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and this Court; (b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and (c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them. The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP shall submit a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners. This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the investigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP. Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment dated July 31, 2008 of the CA.

SO ORDERED. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, Petitioners, - versus G.R. No. 164978 Present: Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, FLORENCIO B. ABAD, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., Tinga, MICHAEL T. DEFENSOR, JOSEPH H. DURANO, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, RENE C. VILLA, and ARTHUR C. YAP,

Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ. Promulgated: October 13, 2005

Respondents. x-----------------------------------------------------x DECISION CARPIO, J.:

The Case This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap (respondents) as acting secretaries of their respective departments. The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of department secretaries. Antecedent Facts The Senate and the House of Representatives (Congress) commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments[2] to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Appointee Arthur C. Yap Alberto G. Romulo Raul M. Gonzalez Florencio B. Abad Department Agriculture Foreign Affairs Justice Education Date of Appointment 15 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004

Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. Rene C. Villa Joseph H. Durano Michael T. Defensor

National Defense Agrarian Reform Tourism Environment and Natural Resources

23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004 23 August 2004

The appointment papers are uniformly worded as follows: Sir: Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed ACTING SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF (appropriate department) vice (name of person replaced). By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties and functions of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of your Oath of Office. (signed) Gloria Arroyo

Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8 September 2004, Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator Pimentel), Edgardo J. Angara (Senator Angara), Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile), Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada (Senator Ejercito-Estrada), Jinggoy E. Estrada (Senator Estrada), Panfilo M. Lacson (Senator Lacson), Alfredo S. Lim (Senator Lim), Jamby A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal), and Sergio R. Osmea, III (Senator Osmea) (petitioners) filed the present petition as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines. Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments[3] to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity. The appointment papers are uniformly worded as follows: Sir: Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed SECRETARY [AD INTERIM], DEPARTMENT OF (appropriate department). By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties and functions of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of your oath of office. (signed) Gloria Arroyo Issue The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session. The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Preliminary Matters On the Mootness of the Petition The Solicitor General argues that the petition is moot because President Arroyo had extended to respondents ad interim appointments on 23 September 2004 immediately after the recess of Congress.

As a rule, the writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.[4] However, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[5] In the present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the constitutionality of the Presidents appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment. On the Nature of the Power to Appoint The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.[6] Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.[7] The scope of the legislatures interference in the executives power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.[8] However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus: xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature. xxx[9]

On Petitioners Standing The Solicitor General states that the present petition is a quo warranto proceeding because, with the exception of Secretary Ermita, petitioners effectively seek to oust respondents for unlawfully exercising the powers of department secretaries. The Solicitor General further states that petitioners may not claim standing as Senators because no power of the Commission on Appointments has been infringed upon or violated by the President. xxx If at all, the Commission on Appointments as a body (rather than individual members of the Congress) may possess standing in this case.[10] Petitioners, on the other hand, state that the Court can exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over unconstitutional acts of the President.[11] Petitioners further contend that they possess standing because President Arroyos appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity while Congress is in session impairs the powers of Congress. Petitioners cite Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary[12] as basis, thus: To the extent that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Considering the independence of the Commission on Appointments from Congress, it is error for petitioners to claim standing in the present case as members of Congress. President Arroyos issuance of acting appointments while Congress is in session impairs no power of Congress. Among the petitioners, only the following are members of the Commission on Appointments of the 13th Congress: Senator Enrile as Minority Floor Leader, Senator Lacson as Assistant Minority Floor Leader, and Senator Angara, Senator Ejercito-Estrada, and Senator Osmea as members. Thus, on the impairment of the prerogatives of members of the Commission on Appointments, only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada, and Osmea have standing in the present petition. This is in contrast to Senators Pimentel, Estrada, Lim, and Madrigal, who, though vigilant in protecting their perceived prerogatives as members of Congress, possess no standing in the present petition. The Constitutionality of President Arroyos Issuance of Appointments to Respondents as Acting Secretaries

Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed respondents as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary.[13] Petitioners base their argument on Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292),[14] which enumerates the powers and duties of the undersecretary. Paragraph 5 of Section 10 reads: SEC. 10. Powers and Duties of the Undersecretary. - The Undersecretary shall: xxx (5) Temporarily discharge the duties of the Secretary in the latters absence or inability to discharge his duties for any cause or in case of vacancy of the said office, unless otherwise provided by law. Where there are more than one Undersecretary, the Secretary shall allocate the foregoing powers and duties among them. The President shall likewise make the temporary designation of Acting Secretary from among them; and xxx Petitioners further assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained its consent.[15] In sharp contrast, respondents maintain that the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Respondents point to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 16 reads: SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

Respondents also rely on EO 292, which devotes a chapter to the Presidents power of appointment. Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 read: SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws. SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. (1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy[.] (2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is already in the government service in which case he shall receive only such additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds appropriated for the office or agency concerned. (3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners and respondents maintain two diametrically opposed lines of thought. Petitioners assert that the President cannot issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries while Congress is in session because the law does not give the President such power. In contrast, respondents insist that the President can issue such appointments because no law prohibits such appointments. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office.[16] In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office.

Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. Law refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. [17] Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of appointments in an acting capacity is susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed: Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.[18] However, we find no abuse in the present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139554

July 21, 2006

ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA, petitioners, vs. BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x G.R. No. 139565 July 21, 2006

BALTAZAR N. ENDRIGA, MA. PAZ D. LAGDAMEO, PATRICIA C. SISON, IRMA PONCE-ENRILE POTENCIANO, and DOREEN FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. ARMITA B. RUFINO, ZENAIDA R. TANTOCO, LORENZO CALMA, RAFAEL SIMPAO, JR., and FREDDIE GARCIA, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.:

Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) for the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines.1 The CCP is to awaken the consciousness of the Filipino people to their artistic and cultural heritage and encourage them to preserve, promote, enhance, and develop such heritage.2 PD 15 created a Board of Trustees ("Board") to govern the CCP. PD 15 mandates the Board to draw up programs and projects that (1) cultivate and enhance public interest in, and appreciation of, Philippine art; (2) discover and develop talents connected with Philippine cultural pursuits; (3) create opportunities for individual and national self-expression in cultural affairs; and (4) encourage the organization of cultural groups and the staging of cultural exhibitions.3 The Board administers and holds in trust real and personal properties of the CCP for the benefit of the Filipino people.4 The Board invests income derived from its projects and operations in a Cultural Development Fund set up to attain the CCP's objectives.5 The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding involving two sets of CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils down to the constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board. The Case Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In G.R. No. 139554, petitioners Armita B. Rufino ("Rufino"), Zenaida R. Tantoco ("Tantoco"),6 Lorenzo Calma ("Calma"), Rafael Simpao, Jr. ("Simpao"), and Freddie Garcia ("Garcia"), represented by the Solicitor General and collectively referred to as the Rufino group, seek to set aside the Decision7 dated 14 May 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50272 as well as the Resolution dated 3 August 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's decision reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered 1) Declaring petitioners [the Endriga group] to have a clear right to their respective offices to which they were elected by the CCP Board up to the expiration of their 4-year term, 2) Ousting respondents [the Rufino group], except respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco, from their respective offices and excluding them therefrom, and 3) Dismissing the case against respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco. SO ORDERED.8 In G.R. No. 139565, petitioners Baltazar N. Endriga ("Endriga"), Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo ("Lagdameo"), Patricia C. Sison ("Sison"), Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano ("Potenciano"), and Doreen Fernandez ("Fernandez"), collectively referred to as the Endriga group, assail the Resolution dated 3 August 1999 issued by the Court of Appeals in the same case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of the Decision dated 14 May 1999. The Antecedents On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees, who were all appointed by President Marcos, were Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile, Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P. Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino. On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15,9 the CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public corporation free from the "pressure or influence of politics."10 PD 15 increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11. After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili ("Cabili"), and Manuel T. Maosa ("Maosa"). On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees were: 1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar N. Endriga 2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez

3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili 4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Maosa 5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo 6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison 7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties in early January 1999. On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court questioning President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board "shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]." The Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Maosa's term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees, namely, Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, together with Cabili, Father Bernardo P. Perez ("Fr. Perez"), Eduardo De los Angeles ("De los Angeles"), Ma. Cecilia Lazaro ("Lazaro"), and Gloria M. Angara ("Angara"). President Estrada retained Fr. Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara as trustees. Endriga's term was to expire on 26 July 1999, while the terms of Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, and Fernandez were to expire on 6 February 1999. The Endriga group maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term could only be terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board. The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x." The Court referred the Endriga group's petition to the Court of Appeals "for appropriate action" in observance of the hierarchy of courts. On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision under review granting the quo warranto petition. The Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other hand, the appellate court's Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board. In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in rank" than the appointing power. On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga group's motion for immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision. Hence, the instant consolidated petitions. Meanwhile, Angara filed a Petition-in-Intervention before this Court alleging that although she was not named as a respondent in the quo warranto petition, she has an interest in the case as the then incumbent CCP Board Chairperson. Angara adopted the same position and offered the same arguments as the Rufino group. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals held that Section 6(b) of PD 15 providing for the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. Section 6(b) of PD 15 mandates the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the CCP Board. Only when the Board is entirely vacant, which is not the situation in the present case, may the President exercise his power to appoint. The Court of Appeals stated that the legislative history of PD 15 shows a clear intent "to insulate the position of trustee from the pressure or influence of politics by abandoning appointment by the President of the Philippines as the mode of filling"11 vacancies in the

CCP Board. The Court of Appeals held that until Section 6(b) of PD 15 is declared unconstitutional in a proper case, it remains the law. The Court of Appeals also clarified that PD 15 vests on the CCP Chairperson the power to appoint all officers, staff, and personnel of the CCP, subject to confirmation by the Board. The Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for reconsideration for failure to raise new issues except the argument that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 6(b) of PD 15 since the Rufino group raised this issue for the first time in the motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also held, "Nor may the President's constitutional and/or statutory power of supervision and control over government corporations restrict or modify the application of the CCP Charter."12 The Court of Appeals, moreover, denied the Endriga group's motion for immediate execution of judgment on the ground that the reasons submitted to justify execution pending appeal were not persuasive. The Issues In G.R. No. 139554, the Rufino group, through the Solicitor General, contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error: I x x x in holding that it was "not actuated" to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 6(b) of PD 15 inasmuch as the issue was raised for the first time in [Rufino et al.'s] motion for reconsideration; II x x x in not holding that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional considering that: A. x x x [it] is an invalid delegation of the President's appointing power under the Constitution; B. x x x [it] effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and supervision over the CCP; III x x x in declaring the provisions of PD 15 as clear and complete and in failing to apply the executive/administrative construction x x x which has been consistently recognized and accepted since 1972; IV x x x in finding that [Endriga et al.] have a clear legal right to be the incumbent trustees and officers of the CCP considering that: A. Endriga et al. are estopped from instituting the quo warranto action since they recognized and benefited from the administrative construction regarding the filling of vacancies in the CCP Board of Trustees x x x; B. x x x [Endriga et al.'s] terms did not legally commence as [they] were not validly elected under PD 15; C. assuming that [Endriga et al.] were validly elected, they lost their right to retain their offices because their terms as trustees expired on 31 December 1998; D. [Endriga et al.] assumed positions in conflict x x x with their offices in the CCP and were thus not entitled to retain the same; V x x x in not dismissing the quo warranto petition for being moot x x x; VI x x x in holding that [Rufino et al.'s] prayer [that the] disputed offices [be declared] entirely as vacant is bereft of basis and amounts to "an admission of their lack of right to the office they claim."13 In G.R. No. 139565, the Endriga group raises the following issue:

whether a writ of quo warranto involving a public office should be declared a self-executing judgment and deemed immediately executory under Rule 39, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.14 The Court's Ruling The petition in G.R. No. 139554 has merit. The battle for CCP's leadership between the Rufino and Endriga groups dealt a blow to the country's artistic and cultural activities. The highly publicized leadership row over the CCP created discord among management, artists, scholars, employees, and even the public because of the public interest at stake. Subsequently, the assumption to office of a new President in 2001 seemingly restored normalcy to the CCP leadership. After then VicePresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the Presidency on 20 January 2001, the Rufino group tendered their respective resignations on 24-29 January 2001 as trustees of the CCP Board. On 12 July 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed 11 trustees to the CCP Board with the corresponding positions set opposite their names: 1. Baltazar N. Endriga - Chairman 2. Nestor O. Jardin - President 3. Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo - Member 4. Teresita O. Luz - Member 5. Irma P.E. Potenciano - Member 6. Eduardo D. De los Angeles - Member 7. Patricia C. Sison - Member 8. Benjamin H. Cervantes - Member 9. Sonia M. Roco - Member 10. Ruperto S. Nicdao, Jr. - Member 11. Lina F. Litton - Member In its special meeting on 13 July 2001, the CCP Board elected these 11 newly-appointed trustees to the same positions and as trustees of the CCP Board. In the same meeting, the Board also elected the Chairman and President. On 21 December 2001, the Solicitor General submitted to this Court a manifestation stating that the "election of the trustees was made without prejudice to the resolution of the constitutional issues before this Honorable Court in G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, x x x."15 The Issue of Mootness We first consider the Rufino group's contention that the Endriga group's quo warranto suit should have been dismissed for being moot. The Rufino group argued that when the Endriga group's terms subsequently expired, there was no more actual controversy for the Court to decide. For the Court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.16 The case must not be moot or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by courts of justice.17 A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.18 The purpose of the quo warranto petition was to oust the Rufino group from the CCP Board and to declare the Endriga group as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board. It may appear that supervening events have rendered this case moot with the resignation of the Rufino group as well as the expiration of the terms of the Endriga group based on their appointments by then President Ramos. A "new" set of CCP trustees had been appointed by President Macapagal-Arroyo and subsequently elected by the CCP Board. However, there are times when the controversy is of such character that to prevent its recurrence, and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a case. This is one such case.

The issues raised here are no longer just determinative of the respective rights of the contending parties. The issues pertaining to circumstances personal to the Endriga group may have become stale. These issues are (1) whether the Endriga group is estopped from bringing the quo warranto for they themselves were appointed by the incumbent President; (2) whether they were validly elected by the remaining CCP trustees; (3) whether their terms expired on 31 December 1998 as specified in their appointment papers; and (4) whether they are entitled to immediate execution of judgment. However, the constitutional question that gave rise to these issues will continue to spawn the same controversy in the future, unless the threshold constitutional question is resolved the validity of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the CCP Board. While the issues may be set aside in the meantime, they are certain to recur every four years, especially when a new President assumes office, generating the same controversy all over again. Thus, the issues raised here are capable of repetition, yet evading review if compromises are resorted every time the same controversy erupts and the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is not resolved. The Court cannot refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 if only to prevent a repeat of this regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked by internecine politics. Every President who assumes office naturally wants to appoint his or her own trustees to the CCP Board. A frontal clash will thus periodically arise between the President's constitutional power to appoint under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and the CCP trustees' power to elect their fellow trustees under Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15. This Court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brush aside procedural barriers19 and take cognizance of constitutional issues due to their paramount importance. It is the Court's duty to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the Legislature or the Executive would want it interpreted.20 This Court has the final word on what the law means.21 The Court must assure respect for the constitutional limitations embodied in the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 At the heart of the controversy is Section 6(b) of PD 15, as amended, which reads: Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation. xxxx (b) Vacancies in the Board of Trustees due to termination of term, resignation, incapacity, death or other cause as may be provided in the By-laws, shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting following occurrence of such vacancy. The elected trustee shall then hold office for a complete term of four years unless sooner terminated by reason of resignation, incapacity, death or other cause. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the Center. Such officers shall be designated in the Center's Code of By-Laws. Should for any reason the Board be left entirely vacant, the same shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the aforementioned ranking officers of the Center. (Emphasis supplied) Inextricably related to Section 6(b) is Section 6(c) which limits the terms of the trustees, as follows: (c) No person may serve as trustee who is not a resident of the Philippines, of good moral standing in the community and at least 25 years of age: Provided, That there shall always be a majority of the trustees who are citizens of the Philippines. Trustees may not be reelected for more than two (2) consecutive terms. (Emphasis supplied) The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive terms. The Power of Appointment The source of the President's power to appoint, as well as the Legislature's authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized

by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied) The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.22 Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the appointment of this fourth group of officers.23 The President appoints the first group of officers with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall under the third group of officers. The Scope of the Appointment Power of the Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions, or Boards The original text of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as written in Resolution No. 51724 of the Constitutional Commission, is almost a verbatim copy of the one found in the 1935 Constitution. Constitutional Commissioner Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., explains the evolution of this provision and its import, thus: The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16 x x x is a relic from the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, x x x. Under the 1935 Constitution, the provision was: "but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments." As already seen, it meant that, while the general rule was that all presidential appointments needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, Congress could relax this rule by vesting the power to appoint "inferior officers" in "the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments." It also meant that while, generally, appointing authority belongs to the President, Congress could let others share in such authority. And the word "inferior" was understood to mean not petty or unimportant but lower in rank than those to whom appointing authority could be given. Under the 1973 Constitution, according to which the power of the President to appoint was not limited by any other body, the provision read: "However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their respective offices." No mention was made of the President. The premise was that the power to appoint belonged to the President; but the Batasan could diffuse this authority by allowing it to be shared by officers other than the President. The 1987 provision also has the evident intent of allowing Congress to give to officers other than the President the authority to appoint. To that extent therefore reference to the President is pointless. And by using the word "alone," copying the tenor of the 1935 provision, it implies, it is submitted, that the general rule in the 1935 Constitution of requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments had not been changed. Thereby the picture has been blurred. This confused text, however, should be attributed to oversight. Reference to the President must be ignored and the whole sentence must be read merely as authority for Congress to vest appointing power in courts, in heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards after the manner of the 1973 text. Incidentally, the 1987 text, in order to eschew any pejorative connotation, avoids the phrase "inferior officers" and translates it instead into "officers lower in rank," that is, lower in rank than the courts or the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.25 (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly intended that Congress could by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The deliberations26 of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explain this intent beyond any doubt.27 The framers of the 1987 Constitution changed the qualifying word "inferior" to the less disparaging phrase "lower in rank" purely for style. However, the clear intent remained that these inferior or lower in rank officers are the subordinates of the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards who are vested by law with the power to appoint. The express language of the Constitution and the clear intent of its framers point to only one conclusion the officers whom the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower rank than those vested by law with the power to appoint. Congress May Vest the Authority to Appoint Only in the Heads of the Named Offices Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to vest "in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Section 16 provides: The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. (Emphasis supplied) In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers. The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other members of the commission or board. This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.28 The power to appoint conferred directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc29 and on the Constitutional Commissions30 is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations or conditions. The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person.31 The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons. First, a plain reading of the last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution shows that the word "heads" refers to all the offices succeeding that term, namely, the departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. This plain reading is consistent with other related provisions of the Constitution. Second, agencies, like departments, have no collegial governing bodies but have only chief executives or heads of agencies. Thus, the word "heads" applies to agencies. Any other interpretation is untenable. Third, all commissions or boards have chief executives who are their heads. Since the Constitution speaks of "heads" of offices, and all commissions or boards have chief executives or heads, the word "heads" could only refer to the chief executives or heads of the commissions or boards. Fourth, the counterpart provisions of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions uniformly refer to "heads" of offices. The 1935 Constitution limited the grant of the appointment power only to "heads of departments."32 The 1973 Constitution expanded such grant to other officers, namely, "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards x x x."33 If the 1973 Constitution intended to extend the grant to members of commissions or boards, it could have followed the same language used for "members of the Cabinet" so as to state "members of commissions or boards." Alternatively, the 1973 Constitution could have placed the words commissions and boards after the word "courts" so as to state "members of the Cabinet, x x x, courts, commissions and boards." Instead, the 1973 Constitution used "heads of agencies, commissions, and boards." Fifth, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the power to appoint lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of that collegial body. Thus, the 1935 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the heads of departments." Similarly, the 1973 Constitution speaks of "members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies, commissions, and boards."

Also, the 1987 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to appoint "in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This is consistent with Section 5(6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that the "Supreme Court shall x x x [a]ppoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law," making the Supreme Court en banc the appointing power. In sharp contrast, when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the power to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive branch, it vests the power "in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." In addition, the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that in the case of the constitutional commissions, the power to appoint lowerranked officers is vested in the commission as a body. Thus, Section 4, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides, "The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in accordance with law." Sixth, the last clause of the pertinent sentence in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is an enumeration of offices whose heads may be vested by law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. This is clear from the framers' deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, thus: THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Davide is recognized. MR. DAVIDE: On page 8, line 3, change the period (.) after "departments" to a comma (,) and add AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS. This is just to complete the enumeration in the 1935 Constitution from which this additional clause was taken. THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept? xxxx MR. SUMULONG: We accept the amendment. MR. ROMULO: The Committee has accepted the amendment, Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to the addition of the words "AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, OR BOARDS" on line 3, page 8? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.34 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied) As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the enumeration also applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of" refer to "departments," the same words "in the heads of" also refer to the other offices listed in the enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards." The Chairperson of the CCP Board is the Head of CCP The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board. PD 15 and its various amendments constitute the Chairperson of the Board as the head of CCP. Thus, Section 8 of PD 15 provides: Appointment of Personnel. The Chairman, with the confirmation of the Board, shall have the power to appoint all officers, staff and personnel of the Center with such compensation as may be fixed by the Board, who shall be residents of the Philippines. The Center may elect membership in the Government Service Insurance System and if it so elects, its officers and employees who qualify shall have the same rights and privileges as well as obligations as those enjoyed or borne by persons in the government service. Officials and employees of the Center shall be exempt from the coverage of the Civil Service Law and Rules. Section 3 of the Revised Rules and Regulations of the CCP recognizes that the head of the CCP is the Chairman of its Board when it provides: CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD. The Board of Trustees shall elect a Chairman who must be one of its members, and who shall be the presiding officer of the Board of Trustees, with power among others, to appoint, within the compensation fixed by the Board, and subject to confirmation of the Board, remove, discipline all officers and personnel of the Center, and to do such other acts and exercise such other powers as may be determined by the Board of Trustees. The Chairman shall perform his duties and exercise his powers as such until such time as the Board of Trustees, by a majority vote, shall elect another Chairman. The Chairman shall be concurrently President, unless the Board otherwise elects another President. Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP. Under PD 15, the CCP is a public corporation governed by a Board of Trustees. Section 6 of PD 15, as amended, states:

Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) Trustees who shall serve without compensation. The CCP, being governed by a board, is not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 Repugnant to Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only "officers lower in rank" than such "heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards." This excludes a situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to "elect" and not "appoint" their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to fill vacancies in the CCP Board. A statute cannot circumvent the constitutional limitations on the power to appoint by filling vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. Such manner of filling vacancies in a public office has no constitutional basis. Further, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP trustees the independent appointing power of their fellow trustees. The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the President's power to appoint. This inherent conflict has spawned recurring controversies in the appointment of CCP trustees every time a new President assumes office. In the present case, the incumbent President appointed the Endriga group as trustees, while the remaining CCP trustees elected the same Endriga group to the same positions. This has been the modus vivendi in filling vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing the President to appoint and the CCP Board to elect the trustees. In effect, there are two appointing powers over the same set of officers in the Executive branch. Each appointing power insists on exercising its own power, even if the two powers are irreconcilable. The Court must put an end to this recurring anomaly. The President's Power of Control There is another constitutional impediment to the implementation of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15. Under our system of government, all Executive departments, bureaus, and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied) The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.35 This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive branch.36 The 1987 Constitution has established three branches of government the Executive, Legislative and Judicial. In addition, there are the independent constitutional bodies like the Commission on Elections, Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, and the Ombudsman. Then there are the hybrid or quasi-judicial agencies,37 exercising jurisdiction in specialized areas, that are under the Executive branch for administrative supervision purposes, but whose decisions are reviewable by the courts. Lastly, there are the local government units, which under the Constitution enjoy local autonomy38 subject only to limitations Congress may impose by law.39 Local government units are subject to general supervision by the President.40 Every government office, entity, or agency must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or Judicial branches, or must belong to one of the independent constitutional bodies, or must be a quasi-judicial body or local government unit. Otherwise, such government office, entity, or agency has no legal and constitutional basis for its existence. The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency "not placed by law or order creating them under any specific department" falls "under the Office of the President."41 Since the President exercises control over "all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices," the President necessarily exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the Executive branch. In mandating that the President "shall have control of all executive x x x offices," Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one performing executive functions

outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the President's power of control. There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions. The President's power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.42 In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices." There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch.43 Any office in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or constitutional basis. The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive the President of his constitutional power of control over "all the executive x x x offices." If the Legislature can do this with the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches. Of course, the President's power of control does not extend to quasi-judicial bodies whose proceedings and decisions are judicial in nature and subject to judicial review, even as such quasi-judicial bodies may be under the administrative supervision of the President. It also does not extend to local government units, which are merely under the general supervision of the President. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15, which authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the Board, runs afoul with the President's power of control under Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The intent of Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is to insulate the CCP from political influence and pressure, specifically from the President.44 Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 makes the CCP a self-perpetuating entity, virtually outside the control of the President. Such a public office or board cannot legally exist under the 1987 Constitution. Section 3 of PD 15, as amended, states that the CCP "shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."45 This provision does not free the CCP from the President's control, for if it does, then it would be unconstitutional. This provision may give the CCP Board a free hand in initiating and formulating policies and undertaking activities, but ultimately these policies and activities are all subject to the President's power of control. The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President's control over the CCP in the guise of insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By stating that the "President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP. Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 139554. We declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section 6(b) and (c) of Presidential Decree No. 15, as amended, insofar as it authorizes the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines. In view of this ruling in G.R. No. 139554, we find it unnecessary to rule on G.R. No. 139565. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., J.J., concur.

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 139554 (Armita B. Rufino, Zenaida R. Tantoco, Lorenzo Calma, Rafael Simpao, Jr., and Freddie Garcia, petitioners, v. Baltazar N. Endriga, Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo, Patricia C. Sison, Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano, and Doreen Fernandez, respondents) G.R. No. 139565 (Baltazar N. Endriga, Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo, Patricia C. Sison, Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano, and Doreen Fernandez, petitioners, v. Armita B. Rufino, Zenaida R. Tantoco, Lorenzo Calma, Rafael Simpao, Jr., and Freddie Garcia, respondents.)

Promulgated: July 21, 2006 x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DISSENTING OPINION TINGA, J.: The majority's ruling is not as innocuous as it may seem. It is of monumental but disturbing consequence. It upsets the delicate balance ordained by our constitutional system, which reposes on the three equal branches of government different inherent functions augmented by specifically chartered duties. In one fell swoop, it expands executive power in unprecedented fashion while diminishing the inherent plenary power of Congress to make laws as explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. It gives license to the President to disregard the laws enacted by Congress although it is the Chief Executive's sworn constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land, an intolerable notion under the democratic order. With all due respect, I must dissent. The majority has voted to uphold the power of the President to appoint the members of the Board of Trustees (CCP board) of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), a government owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) established by P.D. No. 15 as amended (CCP Charter)1 as a "non-municipal public corporation."2 A brief reference to the key facts is necessary to illustrate the seriousness of the problem. The petitioners in G.R. No. 139565 (Endriga Group) were members of the CCP board who sat in such capacity beginning in 1995. Then President Ramos issued appointment papers to the members of the Endriga Group in 1995, qualifying that their appointment would extend only until 31 December 1998. At the same time, the Endriga Group was likewise elected by the CCP board as members of the board, with Endriga himself elected as President. On 22 December 1998, President Estrada advised Endriga through a letter advising him of seven (7) new appointees (the Rufino Group) to the CCP board replacing the Endriga Group. The Endriga Group resisted these new appointments by filing a quo warranto petition, the resolution of which by the Court of Appeals spawned the present petitions. In main, the Endriga Group posited that they could not have been replaced by President Estrada as they had not yet completed their four-year term of office as provided in the CCP Charter. The Court of Appeals3 agreed with the basic position of the Endriga Group, notwithstanding the proviso made by President Ramos in his appointment papers. The Court of Appeals compelled obeisance instead to Section 6 of the CCP Charter which reads: Sec. 6. Board of Trustees. The governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board of eleven (11) trustees who shall serve without compensation. (a) The trustees appointed by the President of the Philippines pursuant to Executive Order No. 30 dated 25 June 1966, and currently holding office shall be the first trustees to serve on the Board of the new Center and shall be known as Founding Trustees. They shall elect the remaining trustees for a complete [Board]. Elected trustees shall hold office for a period of four (4) years. (b) Vacancies in the Board of Trustees due to termination of term, resignation, incapacity, death or other cause as may be provided in the By-laws, shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting following occurrence of such vacancy. The elected trustee shall then hold office for a complete term of four years unless sooner terminated by reason of resignation, incapacity, death or other cause. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the Center. Such officers shall be designated in the Center's Code of By-Laws. Should for any reason the Board be left entirely vacant, the same shall be filled by the President of the Philippines acting in consultation with the aforementioned ranking officers of the Center.4 The CCP Charter clearly states that the trustees appointed by the President in 1966 shall elect the remaining trustees to complete the board, and such electees shall hold office for a period of four (4) years. Subsequent vacancies in the board shall be filled by the Board of Trustees, through a majority vote, with the new appointee serving for a four (4)-year term. The power to select the members of the Board of Trustees is always vested in the board, no matter the number of persons who are serving therein at a particular time, except when all the positions in the board without exception are vacant. It is only then that the President may exercise the power to appoint the members of the board, subject to the condition that the appointments be made in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. The majority, reversing the Court of Appeals, holds this setup prescribed by Section 6 of the CCP Charter, unconstitutional. Two grounds are offered for this holding. First, Section 16,5 Article VII of the Constitution (Appointments Clause) limits the authority of Congress to vest the power of appointment over lower-ranked officials only to "heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards." In the majority's estimation, the CCP should be considered as a "board" for purposes of the Appointments Clause, and thus, only the chairperson of the CCP could be authorized by law to exercise the right to appoint.6

Second, the presidential power of control over the executive branch, as provided in Section 17,7 Article VII of the Constitution (Executive Control Clause), grants the President control over the CCP. The authority of the CCP board of Trustees to fill vacancies in the Board renders the CCP a "self-perpetuating entity [outside] the control of the President," and is thus unconstitutionally drawn.8 It is not readily apparent from the ponencia whether it maintains that executive control, as contemplated in the Constitution, empowers the President to make all appointments of officers and officials within the executive branch. If that were the position, such view is clearly inconsistent with the Appointments Clause which categorically authorizes Congress to empower officials other than the President to make such appointments, in the case of lower-ranked officials. To sustain the expansive view that "executive control" extends to the power of the President to make all appointments in the executive branch would render the Appointments Clause inutile. It would then be senseless to acknowledge that Congress has the right to authorize the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards to appoint their junior officers, since executive control would indubitably vest that right to the President anyway. It is nonetheless cold comfort that the majority does not expressly frame such a view, and I hope that the ponencia does not lay the groundwork for such a radical notion. Notwithstanding, I prefer to delineate the critical issues in the following manner. The Appointments Clause, being complete in itself, is the sole constitutional provision governing the authority of the President to make appointments to the executive branch, as well as the authority of Congress to provide otherwise in certain instances. The Executive Control Clause does not extend to the presidential power of appointments. Thus, in ruling on whether or not the President or the CCP Board of Trustees has the power to appoint members of the board, it is the Appointments Clause alone that should govern. At the same time, due consideration of the Executive Control Clause is also warranted in the present cases, but for a different purpose. It is clear from the petitions that assailed also are the acts of President Ramos in limiting below four (4) years the term of his appointees to the CCP board, and the subsequent act of President Estrada in appointing new appointees to the board despite the fact that the four(4)-year term of those persons who purportedly vacated their seats had not yet expired. Thus, a second critical issue arises: whether the holder of a statutory term of office in the executive branch may be removed from office by the President on the basis of the power of executive control. The Power of Appointment in Relation to the CCP Board of Trustees Constitutional authority to make appointments within the executive branch is governed solely by the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which is broad enough to cover all possible appointment scenarios. The provision states: SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The first sentence of the Appointments Clause enumerates the officers whom only the President may appoint, subject to the consent of the Commission of Appointments. There is no doubt that no official of the CCP, or any GOCC for that matter, is included in this first category of appointees.9 The second and third sentences must be examined together. The second sentence authorizes the President to appoint all other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, or those whom he may be authorized to appoint by law. This authority must be appreciated with the third sentence, which authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank to the President, the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. Thus, as regards the officials in the executive branch other than those enumerated in the first sentence of the Appointments Clause, or those who do not belong to the first category, the following valid scenarios are authorized: (1) the law may expressly authorize the President to make the appointment; (2) the law may expressly authorize the courts or the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards to appoint those officers lower in rank; (3) the law may remain silent on the power of appointment, thus enabling the President to make the appointment on the basis of the Appointments Clause itself. Implicitly, it can also be argued that other than the case of "other officers lower in rank," Congress may authorize a person or entity other than the President to appoint all such other officers, or provide for a modality through which such appointment may be made. I am aware that this last point may be a source of controversy, yet for reasons I shall explain later, it is not an issue in the particular cases at bar and, hence, need not be settled for now. From the same provision, the majority formulates two premises: that the CCP is considered a "board" or "Board" for purposes of the Appointments Clause,10 and, that only the President or the chairperson of the CCP Board of Trustees, may be authorized by law to appoint officials of the CCP.11 I respectfully disagree with both premises. CCP an Agency under the Appointments Clause

I submit that "boards," as used in the Appointments Clause, does not pertain to the boards of directors of government or public corporations such as the CCP. Such GOCCs are properly considered as agencies which nonetheless fall within the same classification in the Appointments Clause. The term "board" or "Board,"12 as utilized in the administrative bureaucracy, may pertain to different entities performing different functions under different mandates. There are several prominent government agencies which use the nomenclature "Board," such as the Monetary Board (MB), the Housing Land Use and Regulatory Board (HLURB), the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), and the former Energy Regulatory Board, among others. Collegial bodies such as the Boards just mentioned have long formed part of the executive superstructure, along with departments, agencies and commissions. Hence, it came as no surprise that all four (4) entities were lumped together in the Appointments Clause. However, the board of directors or board of trustees of a government corporation should be appreciated in a different context. Unlike the Boards enumerated above, the board of directors/trustees does not constitute a unit that operates by itself as an agency of the government. Instead, such board of directors/trustees, as a general rule, operates as the body that exercises the corporate powers of the government corporations concerned. The Constitution itself authorizes the creation of government-owned or controlled corporations through special charters,13 and the CCP was established as a public corporation through Presidential Decree No. 15, its charter. The majority believes differently, stating that since the CCP is governed by a board, it is not an agency but a Board for purposes of the Appointments Clause. The majority explains this away by merely noting that there is such an entity as the CCP Board of Trustees. The bother of explaining why the CCP is a board, as distinguished from a department, agency or commission is altogether avoided. Instead, it is assumed as self-evident that since there is a CCP Board of Trustees, the CCP is consequently a board. For one, the CCP itself may be considered as an agency since under the Administrative Code, an agency includes a governmentowned or controlled corporation.14 The term "Board," used in a general sense, has been defined as a representative body organized to perform a trust or to execute official or representative functions,15 or a group of persons with managerial, supervisory or investigatory functions.16 There is no doubt that sovereign executive functions can be delegated through duly constituted Boards, such as the HLURB or MTRCB, and it is commonly understood that the Boards in those cases refer to a group of individuals vested with the exercise of governmental functions. However, boards do not normally have independent juridical personality, unlike corporations. Indeed, whatever governmental functions are exercised by the members of the CCP Board of Trustees are not derived from their formation as a board but from its installation by charter as the governing authority of a GOCC. The Board of Trustees is not vested with any sort of independent juridical personality under the CCP charter; such personality is imbued instead in the CCP itself. The Board of Trustees may be the governing authority of the CCP, but it is the CCP itself as the legislative creation that is tasked to perform the mandate of its charter. The latest performances of the prima ballerinas are sponsored and presented not by the panel known as the "CCP Board of Trustees," but by the entity that is the CCP itself. Assuming for the nonce that there is ambiguity in how the term "board" in the Appointments Clause should be construed, the rule is that the correct meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which the term is found or with which it is associated.17 Departments, agencies, commissions orboards (Boards) all pertain to segregate units within the executive branch performing with particular competence unique and specialized functions. Departments, agencies, commissions or boards (Boards) refer to offices of different nomenclatures within the executive department, each performing functions that are independent of each other. Furthermore, that the use of the disjunctive term "or" in the enumeration "departments, agencies, commissions or boards (Boards)" signifies that these four entities, though lumped together, are under constitutional contemplation disassociated or distinct from each other.18 Given the degree of fluidity within administrative practice, it is standard that a particular government office would create subdivided groupings to which functions would be delegated. Considering the paucity of available terms, these groupings could very well be named as "departments," "agencies," "commissions," or "boards" (Boards). Thus, Agency X could have an Accounting Department, a Board of Merit Review, and Employee Health and Welfare Commission. With the majority's reasoning, these three aggrupments would fall within the same constitutional class under the Appointments Clause as Agency X itself. Worse, the appointing power of the head of the Accounting Department would be treated separately and accorded equal constitutional weight as that of the head of Agency X. The example may border on the absurd, but that is the implication of the majority's holding that the CCP Board of Trustees is considered as a "Board" for purposes of the Appointments Clause, even if the CCP itself is properly an agency. The enumeration "departments, agencies, commissions or boards (Boards)," highlighted by the use of the disjunctive word "or" positively implies that the items are treated singly, and not one at the same time.19 The CCP board cannot be disassociated from the CCP itself for the former was constituted as the governing authority of the CCP and not as an independent entity on its own. In short, within the enumeration the CCP is more akin to an "agency" rather than a "Board." Under the Appointments Clause, agencies and Boards are accorded similar treatment and in both cases, Congress may vest the power to appoint officers in the "head" of such agency or Board. In CCP's case, the appointment power may be delegated to the "head" of the CCP. Board of Trustees is the Head of the CCP

Who then is the "head" of the CCP? The majority suggests that it is the Chairperson of the CCP board. I respectfully differ but maintain that it is the CCP board itself that is the "head" of the CCP or acts as such head. The majority's conclusion is predicated on the premise that the CCP should be classified as a board (Board) and not an agency. However, as I pointed out, the CCP as a GOCC should instead be considered as an agency. Indeed, the CCP Board of Trustees cannot exercise any function or power outside the context of its mandate as the governing authority of the CCP. Certainly, the answer to the query as to who or which is the head of the CCP should be discerned primarily from its charter. As earlier stated, Section 6 of the CCP Charter expressly provides that "the governing powers and authority of the corporation shall be vested in, and exercised by, a Board [of] Trustees."20 Even the Rufino Group concedes that the CCP Board of Trustees itself is the "head" of the CCP, owing to the fact that is the governing body of the CCP.21 Section 8 of the CCP Charter provides the Chairperson with a power of appointment which nonetheless is limited, incomplete, and subject to confirmation by the CCP Board. Sec. 8. Appointment of Personnel. The Chairman, with the confirmation of the Board, shall have the power to appoint all officers, staff and personnel of the Center with such compensation as may be fixed by the Board, who shall be residents of the Philippines. xxx22 The Revised Rules and Regulations of the CCP provides the Chairperson with additional powers not found in the charter, particularly the power to remove and discipline all officers and personnel of the CCP. Section 3 of the Revised Rules states: Sec. 3. Chairman of the Board. The Board of Trustees shall elect a Chairman who must be one of its members, and who shall be the presiding officer of the Board of Trustees, with power among others, to appoint, within the compensation fixed by the Board, and subject to confirmation of the Board, remove, discipline all officers and personnel of the Center, and to do such other acts and exercise such other powers as may be determined by the Board of Trustees. The Chairman shall perform his duties and exercise his powers as such until such time as the Board of Trustees, by a majority vote, shall elect another Chairman. The Chairman shall be concurrently President unless the Board otherwise elects another President.23 Even as these Revised Rules and Regulations emanate from the CCP Board itself, the limitations contained therein on the powers to be exercised by the Chairperson highlight, rather than diminish, the stature of the board as the governing power and authority over the CCP. This relationship between the CCP Chairperson and the CCP board is aligned with the theory and practice of corporations. Generally, corporate acts and powers are exercised by the board of directors of stock corporations or the board of trustees of non-stock corporations.24 Such corporate powers may be delegated by charter or by-laws, or even by the board, to particular corporate officers. However, the authority of officers to bind the corporation is usually not considered inherent in their office, but is derived from law, the corporate by-laws, or by delegation from the board, either expressly or impliedly by habit, custom or acquiescence in the general course of business.25 In the case of the CCP, whatever powers are delegated to the CCP Chairperson, even if incidental to the exercise of the corporate powers of the CCP, are still subject to confirmation by the Board of Trustees. The Chairperson cannot by himself/herself enter into contractual relations unless previously authorized by the Board of Trustees. On the other hand, the Board may, without prior authority from any other person or entity, enter into such contractual relations. Even those powers expressly granted to the Chairperson, such as appointment of officers, staff and personnel, are qualified with the phrase, "subject to/with confirmation of the Board." Evidently, the powers of the CCP Chairperson are especially circumscribed while the Board of Trustees is vested with latitude to overturn the discretion of the CCP Chairperson. In short, for all the prestige that comes with chairing the CCP board, the Chairperson has limited powers, and his/her acts are subject to confirmation, if not reversal, by the board. The Chairperson is not the final authority as he/she lacks the final say within the CCP system itself. It is the Board of Trustees that is the duly constituted governing authority of the CCP, the statutory delegate vested with the last word over the acts of the CCP itself. I feel that the majority has succumbed to the temptation in regarding the term "head" as exclusively referring to a singular personality. Such a reading, I respectfully submit, is unduly formalistic. The proper construction of "head" should be functional in approach, focusing on the entity that exercises the actual governing authority rather than searching for a single individual who could be deemed by reason of title as representative of the CCP. For the objective of the Appointments Clause is to allow the power to appoint to be exercised by the final governing authority of a department, agency, commission or board (Board) over its junior officers. It would be patently absurd to insist that the constitutional intent is to authorize the repose of such appointing power instead to an individual officer whose acts are still subject to confirmation by a higher authority within that office. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper freinda est, ut eviatur inconveniens et absurdum.26

Thus, pursuant to the Appointments Clause, Congress may vest on the CCP board, as the head of the CCP, the power to appoint officers of the CCP. The controversy in this case lies though in the appointment of the members of the Board of Trustees themselves, and not the particular officers of the CCP. Thus, the question is this: Can the Board of Trustees be validly empowered by law to appoint its own members, as it is so under the CCP Charter? CCP Board Superior in Rank Over the Individual Trustees As stated earlier, the Rufino Group concedes that it is the CCP board that is the "head" of the CCP.27 At the same time, it argues that the law could not validly give unto the members of the CCP board the authority to appoint their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank, and not lower rank.28 The majority adopts this latter position of the Rufino Group.29 I respectfully submit that the CCP board may validly appoint its own trustees, as provided for in Section 6(b) of the CCP Charter, and under the authority of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. In doing so, I recognize that the Board of Trustees as a body, the head of the CCP, remains superior in rank than any particular member of the board. Certainly, there can be no argument that an individual member of the CCP board is an entity separate from the board itself, and that he, the board member, remains under the governing authority of the CCP board. Generally speaking, the term "inferior officer" connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers.30 A board member by himself/herself cannot speak for or act in behalf of the board as a whole, unless the board authorizes that member to do so. When the Board of Trustees elects to fill a vacancy in the board, it cannot be said that it exercises the power appointment to a co-equal office. As stated before, the Board of Trustees is an entity separate from and superior to any one of its members. Under Section 6(d) of the CCP Charter, "majority of the Trustees holding office shall constitute a quorum to do business." The CCP board is thus able to operate and exercise its corporate powers irrespective of the number of persons sitting on the board at a particular time. In fact, it is possible that at a given time, the entire CCP board would consist of only one member, who until such time the vacancies are filled, wields the powers of the Board of Trustees. This possibility is precisely recognized under Section 6(b) of the CCP Charter, which authorizes the single remaining board member to fill the remaining vacancies in the board. Unusual as it may seem, it precisely aligns with the theories behind corporate personality. The remaining board member is authorized to fill the remaining vacancies for at that moment said member is the Board of Trustees, the governing authority of the CCP. The Court has recognized that collective or collegiate bodies outweigh or outrank the individual members, even if the member is the presiding officer of the body. In GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications,31 the Court upheld a ruling of the Court of Appeals invalidating an order and other issuances signed solely by the Chairman of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The Chairman had maintained that he had the exclusive authority to sign, validate and promulgate all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC. The Court disagreed, holding that the NTC is a collegial body "requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein."32 It was further noted that the NTC Chairman "is not the [NTC]. He alone does not speak for and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of the NTC."33 Even the collegial bodies established under the Constitution exercise their powers collectively, and not through their presiding officer. Thus, it is the Supreme Court, not the Chief Justice, which has the power to appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary.34 The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Commission on Audit (COA) exercise their constitutional powers as a body, and not through their Chairpersons.35 Even if not denominated as such, the CCP board takes on the same attributes as any collegial body, and could be recognized as such in the same way that the Court has recognized the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors as a collegial body. The CCP board makes decisions as a collective body during its regular meetings, presumably after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote.36 Still, the majority's theory that Section 6 of the CCP Charter is unconstitutional is anchored in part on the assumed predicate that it is the only the Chairperson of the CCP board, as "head" of the CCP, who may be empowered by law to appoint the members of the CCP board. If this premise is adopted, it would operate as the rule not only in the CCP, but in all GOCCs. Following the majority, the following kinds of appointment would consequently be unconstitutional: 1) Appointments to the Board of Directors/Trustees of any GOCC by authorities other than the President of the Philippines or the chairperson of the board. The power to appoint members of the Board of Directors/Trustees of GOCCs would exclusively belong to the President or the Chairperson of the Board, notwithstanding any statutory mandate through a charter providing the contrary. 2) Appointments of other officers and officials of GOCCs by authorities other than the President of the Philippines or the chairperson of the board. Even if the Board of Directors or Trustees is duly constituted by charter as the governing authority of the GOCC, the majority would deprive such governing authority any appointing power, as such power could purportedly be vested only in the President or the chairperson of the board.

3) Ex-officio appointments to the boards of GOCCs. The charters of several GOCCs mandate that certain persons sit in the Board of Directors/Trustees by reason of their office, or in an ex-officio capacity. Such ex-officio appointments are not expressly provided for in the Constitution. Following the majority's literalist reading of the Appointments Clause, ex-officio appointments are similarly invalid as they do not derive from the exclusive appointment power of the President or the chairperson of the board. Again, with all due respect, the rationale is predicated on a flawed interpretation of the terms "head" and "board" (Board) as used in Section 16, Article VII, a reading that is alien to the common understanding of corporate personality, as well as actual corporate practice. On the contrary, the procedure outlined in Section 6 of the CCP Charter, vesting in the CCP Board of Trustees the authority to appoint the members of the board, is congruent with constitutional order. It should be stressed anew that the CCP Board itself is the head of the CCP and that any individual member of the board is lower in rank than the board itself. It is de rigueur for directors of a corporation to fill vacancies in their own Board where such power is conferred upon them by statute or charter or by by-law.37 Modern statutes typically provide that vacancies in the Board, regardless of the cause, may be filled up by the Board itself, side by side with an identical power vested in the shareholders.38 Among them is the U.S. Model Corporation Business Act of 1984 which acknowledges that vacancies in the board of directors may be properly filled by the Board itself.39 The CCP precisely has that power conferred to it by statute, the CCP charter that is. Perhaps this question may arise: if the CCP board, as head of the CCP, may be legally authorized to appoint its own members, they being officers lower in rank than the board, who then may appoint the CCP board itself, as distinguished from individual vacancies therein? It should be noted though that it is settled rule that the term "appointment" is in law equivalent to "filling a vacancy."40 A vacancy exists when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.41 Accordingly the appointment power cannot be validly exercised unless there is a vacancy to be filled. In the case of the CCP, its charter provides that the Board of Trustees subsists even if there is only one remaining board member left.42 Hence, the CCP board can only be considered as truly vacant if there is not even one member left sitting on the board. In that case, the CCP Charter authorizes the President to appoint the new CCP board to replace the board that no longer exists,43 by filling the vacancies in the board. Yet pursuant to the CCP Charter, it still is the President that appoints the Board of Trustees when such board is vacant. The statutory impediment to such appointing authority is the recognition of very limited circumstances under which the CCP board may be considered as truly vacant. During deliberations on these petitions, some distress was raised over the prospect that in case only one person remained on the CCP Board of Trustees, that one person is empowered to appoint the other members of the Board. Perhaps the notion may strike as counterintuitive, yet it is perfectly valid under legal consideration considering that this sole remaining member stands as the Board itself, and not just an individual member thereof. This setup adheres to sound theory that a Board of Directors/Trustees retains collective force, no matter the number of persons sitting thereon, so long as the quorum requirements are satisfied. Indeed, the idea of a one-person board of directors is hardly a flight of whimsy under modern corporation law. Consider the U.S. state of Delaware, the state most associated with incorporation. With over half of publicly traded American corporations and over 60% of all Fortune 500 companies incorporated in Delaware[44], it among all the American states, has the greatest public interest in the oversight or regulation of corporations. Yet the Delaware General Corporation Law expressly authorizes a corporation to constitute a board of directors consisting of only one (1) member.[45] The choice, as expressed in the by-laws or the certificate of incorporation, is up to the corporation. When a board of 1 director is so authorized, "the 1 director shall constitute a quorum."46Certainly, there is nothing so forlorn with the statutory prescription of the CCP charter that admits to the possibility of only one trustee acting as the Board. The law of Delaware, the corporate hub of America, sufficiently defeats any supposition that the possibility of a one-person CCP Board of Trustees offends good customs, morals, law or public policy. Our own Corporation Code does not permit one-person Board of Directors for private corporations,47 yet it concedes that corporations created by special laws or charters are governed primarily by the provisions of the charter creating them.48 The determination of the quorum requirement for chartered corporations is exclusively the prerogative of the legislature, which can very well impose a oneperson board of directors or, as in the case of CCP, permit a situation whereby a lone remaining director would be empowered to act as the board. The majority states that this statutory setup of the CCP "makes [it] a self-perpetuating entity." But the CCP is really no different from private corporations whose boards of directors are, under the Corporation Code, permitted to fill vacancies in the Board themselves for as long as the remainder of the board still constitute a quorum.49 Considering the clear legislative intent to accord the CCP with a significant degree of independence, with its chartered guarantee of "autonomy of policy and operation,"50 the notion should give no offense at all. Yet even if there is wisdom or cause in preventing the "self-perpetuation" of the CCP Board, the solution lies in legislative amendment. The majority cannot supplant legislative prerogatives by merely doing away with provisions of law that meet its aversion. Moreover, short of amending the CCP Charter there are enough anti-graft laws, government audit controls and other administrative safeguards to check abuse in office and ensure accountable governance. My own conclusion is that the means prescribed by the CCP Charter in the appointment of the members of the CCP board is in accordance with the Appointments Clause, specifically the provision therein that authorizes Congress to empower the President, the courts and the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards (Boards) to appoint officers of lower rank. The CCP is an agency, not a Board, and its head is its Board of Trustees. The CCP board is superior in rank than any of its particular members, and it may thus be authorized by law to fill vacancies by appointing new members of the board. Should the CCP board be totally vacant,

owing to the fact that no person sits on the board at a given time, then the President is authorized by law to fill the vacant CCP board by appointment. While the members of the Endriga Group were "appointed" by President Ramos, who had no authority to do so, it is also uncontested that the Endriga Group were subsequently elected by the CCP board to sit on the Board. For that reason, not their "appointment" by President Ramos, they could be deemed as having validly assumed their office upon their election to the board in 1995, for the statutory term of four (4) years. Executive Control and Statutory Restrictions Thereon There is an even more disturbing implication to the present ruling which the majority barely touches upon. By ruling against the Endriga Group, and sanctioning their replacement by President Estrada even though their statutory term had yet to expire, the majority in effect has ruled that the President may remove officials whose terms have been fixed by law even prior to the cessation of the terms in office. The legal rationale for this precipitate new rule is not precisely explained. Pointedly though, the majority refers to the power of the President of executive control to bolster its conclusion, characterizing such power as "another constitutional impediment to the implementation of Section 6(b) and (c)" of the CCP Charter. The power of the President to maintain executive control over executive departments, bureaus and offices is constitutionally mandated by the Executive Control Clause.51 Yet as earlier stressed, the power of the President to make appointments is governed by a different provision, the Appointments Clause which is complete by itself. If executive control is extended to bear on the power of the President to make appointments in the executive branch by further expanding it, then the Appointments Clause would be rendered useless. Clearly, the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officials to the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards, (Boards). To insist that such power of appointment so vested in an agency head is nonetheless circumscribed by executive control would render the provision nugatory. Yet, may executive control be utilized to justify the removal of public officers within the executive department notwithstanding statutory restrictions thereon, such as the prescription of a fixed term of office? To declare that it does would be equivalent to saying that executive control authorizes the President to violate the laws passed by Congress. And that is not what the Constitution says. The Executive Control Clause, which enshrines the presidential power of executive control, actually prescribes two (2) functions to the President. Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. While the majority understandably lays emphasis on the first sentence of the Executive Control Clause, the second sentence is of equal importance. It emphasizes the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws enacted by Congress and is obliged to obey and execute these laws. The duty of faithful execution of laws is enshrined not only in the Constitution, but also in the oath of office of the President and Vice-President.52 It is clear that the twin duties prescribed under the Executive Control Clause are of equal value. At very least, they should be construed in harmony, not antagonism, to each other, so that the power of control that the President may exercise over executive departments, bureaus and offices should still stay within the ambit of faithful execution of the Constitution and the laws of the land which the Constitution itself ordains. I submit that the members of the CCP board are shielded by law from arbitrary removal by the President, even if is sought to be justified under the aegis of executive control. The traditional view that "the power of removal of executive officers [is] incident to the power of appointment"53 has since been severely undercut by the U.S. Supreme Court,54 and is of limited application in this jurisdiction in light of the constitutional guarantee to the security of tenure of employees in the civil service.55 The notion that executive control authorizes the President to remove the members of the CCP board at his pleasure contravenes not only the CCP Charter but the Constitution itself, not to mention our civil service laws. CCP Embraced Under the Civil Service Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution states that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters". It appears to have been the deliberate intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in specifying the phrase "with original charters," to exclude from civil service coverage those GOCCs without original charters, meaning those incorporated under the general corporation law.56 Yet undoubtedly, the CCP was created through an original charter, and is hence covered by the civil service by mandate of the Constitution. This point has significant impact on the resolution of this case. It can be advanced that Ang-Angco v. Castillo57 settles the question in favor of the Endriga Group. In that case, President Garcia, through his Executive Secretary, rendered a ruling finding a Collector of Customs guilty of prejudicial conduct and considering him "resigned effective from the date of notice."58 The action was justified by virtue of the President's power of control over all executive

departments, bureaus and offices as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. Ang-Angco countered that the Civil Service Act of 1959, a legislative enactment, vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases against officers and employees in the classified service such as himself; and that his subsequent removal by order of the President violated the Civil Service Act. The Court agreed with Ang-angco, holding that such "law which governs the action to be taken against officers and employees in the classified civil service is binding upon the President."59 The Court explained why the power of executive control could not supersede a statutory enactment such as the Civil Service Act of 1959: Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over all officers and employees in the executive department which is now invoked by respondents as justification to override the specific provisions of the Civil Service Act. This power of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron vs. Reyes, supra, had already occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter" , to distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive department. Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.60 xxx Further, the Court in Ang-Angco chose to avoid the ungainly clash between the constitutional power of executive control and the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure to those in the civil service, thus: [T]he strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and set at naught the beneficient purpose of the whole civil service system implanted in this Jurisdiction which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the classified service in derogation of the provision of our Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII, Constitution). Here, we have two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently in conflict, the power of control by the President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the protection extended to those who are in the civil service of our government embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty to reconcile and harmonize these conflicting provisions in a manner that may be given to both full force and effect and the only logical, practical and rational way is to interpret them in the manner we do it in this decision. As this Court has aptly said in the case of Lacson vs. Romero: ". . . To hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing power subject to removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the whole Civil Service System and structure. The country would then go back to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could if so minded, sweep out of office, civil service employees differing in political color or affiliation from him, and sweep in his political followers and adherents, especially those who have given him help, political or otherwise." (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 754)61 At the same time, the Court considered the difference between the power of control exercised by President Garcia over his direct appointees vis--vis that over employees belonging to the classified service. There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson vs. Romero, supra), but not with regard to those officers and employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section 10 (3), Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority.62 Evidently, Ang-Angco lays the precedent for distinguishing between officials whose tenure are protected under the civil service law, and those who enjoy no such statutory protection. The 1987 Constitution likewise makes it explicit that GOCCs with original charters such as the CCP are embraced under the civil service. Reference is thus necessary to the provisions of the present civil service law, particularly the Administrative Code of 1987. The Administrative Code restates that GOCCs with original charters are within the scope of the civil service.63 It further classifies positions in the civil service into career service and non-career service.64 Generally, personnel of GOCCs are classified as career service, provided that they do not fall under the non-career service. On the other hand, the Administrative Code provides that noncareer service employees under the Administrative Code are characterized by:

The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. Included in the non-career service are: 1. Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff; 2. Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s); 3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff; 4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; 5. Emergency and seasonal personnel.65 Since the members of the CCP board are appointed to a fixed tenure, the four (4)-year period specified by the CCP Charter, they may be properly considered as non-career service. Yet, even if these members fall within non-career service, their right to security of tenure is guaranteed both by the Constitution and by law. Section 2. xxx (3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.66 xxx Sec. 46. Discipline: General Provisions. (a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process.67 What are thus the implications of the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure to non-career service officials of GOCCs with original charter, particularly those whose appointments are for a fixed term? Simply put, these officials cannot be removed from office before the expiration of their term without cause, or for causes other than those specified by either the GOCC's charter, the Administrative Code, or other relevant civil service laws. Otherwise, their removal is unconstitutional. An appointing power cannot arbitrarily remove an officer if the tenure is fixed by law, or if the officer is appointed to hold during the pleasure of some officer or board other than that appointing him.68 In the absence of any provision for summary removal, an individual appointed to a post for a fixed term may be removed prior to the term's expiration only for cause. It is the fixity of the term that destroys the power of removal at pleasure.69 Under the CCP Charter, the term of a trustee may be terminated "due to termination of term, resignation, incapacity, death or other cause as may be provided in the By-laws."70 These are the causes by law which may cause the dismissal of a member of the CCP board. In this case, the right of the Rufino Group to sit on the CCP board is premised on the claim that the members of the Endriga Group vacated their seats before the expiration of the four (4)-year term owing to the conditionalities made by President Ramos to their appointment. I have already pointed out that President Ramos did not have the authority to appoint the Endriga Group, but that they still were validly elected to the Board upon vote by the CCP board. Evidently, the conditionality restricting the Endriga Group to serve for a period less than the statutory term of four (4) years is invalid, whether or not it was attached to a valid appointing authority. Clearly then, the power of the President to remove appointed officials of GOCCs with original charters, grounded as it could be in the power of "executive control" in the Constitution, is circumscribed by another constitutional provision. There is no showing that the Endriga Group was validly removed for legal cause before the expiration of their four (4)-year term. Hence, their removal is unconstitutional, as is the appointment of the Rufino Group to fill seats to the CCP board that had not yet become vacant. CCP Governed by its Statutory Charter Special considerations must likewise be appreciated owing to the fact that the CCP is a GOCC with an original charter. The Constitution authorizes the creation or establishment of GOCCs with original charters.71 Section 6 of the Corporation Code states that "[c]orporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them."72

Obviously, since the CCP Charter mandates a four (4)-year term for the members of the CCP board, such condition is binding as a law governing the CCP. Hence, any measure diminishing a duly elected trustee's right to serve out the four (4)-year term solely on the basis of the President's discretion or pleasure runs contrary to law. This is a simple way to look at the issue, and its starkness does not detract from its inherent validity. Still, a deeper examination into the question supports the same conclusion. There is no question that a GOCC with original charter falls within the executive department, hence generally subject to executive control. At the same time, the fact that its creation is sourced from legislative will should give cause for pause. GOCCs may be created by the State either through the legislative routethe enactment of its original charter, or the executive routeits incorporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The discretion to incorporate unchartered government units falls solely with the executive branch, but the discretion in chartering GOCCs is purely legislative. In theory, a chartered GOCC can come into being even against the will of the Chief Executive, as is done if Congress overrides an executive veto of a bill chartering a particular GOCC. Our laws similarly sustain the theoretical underpinning that a chartered GOCC is a creature of the legislative branch of government, even as it falls within the executive branch. As noted earlier, Section 6 of the Corporation Code states that "[c]orporations created by special laws or charters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating them or applicable to them"73 Thus, it is Congress, and not the executive branch, which determines a chartered GOCC's corporate structure, purposes and functions. This basic point should be beyond controversy. Yet, the majority implies that Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive branch, and from that context, declares that a law authorizing the CCP Board of Trustees to appoint its own members runs afoul with the President's power of control. Evidently, there is a looming clash between the prerogative of the President to exercise control over the executive branch, and the prerogative of Congress to dictate through legislation the metes and bounds of a government corporation with original charter. The scope of the potential controversy could also extend not only to GOCCs with original charters, but also to other public offices created by law. Outside of those offices specifically created by the Constitution itself, the creation and definition of the bureaucracy that constitutes the executive branch of government is an incident of the legislative power to make laws. The power to create public offices is inherently legislative,74 and generally includes the power to modify or abolish it.75 Laws that create public offices or GOCCs are no different from other statutes in that they are all binding on the Chief Executive. Indeed, while Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the law, executive power generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.76 The corresponding task of the Chief Executive is to see that every government office is managed and maintained properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations. Corollary to these powers is the power to promulgate rules and issuances that would ensure a more efficient management of the executive branch, for so long as such issuances are not contrary to law.77 Since the creation of public offices involves an inherently legislative power, it necessarily follows that the particular characteristics of the public office, including eligibility requirements and the nature and length of the term in office, are also for legislative determination. Hence, laws creating public offices generally prescribe the necessary qualifications for appointment to the public office and the length of their terms. The wisdom of such matters is left up to the legislative branch. At the same time, the power of appointment is executive in character, and the choice of whom to appoint is within the discretion of the executive branch of government. This setup aligns with traditional notions of checks and balances the choice whom to appoint resting with the executive branch, but proscribed by the standards enacted by the legislative. Persons to be appointed to a public office should possess the prescribed qualifications as may be mandated by Congress. The same setup governs the removal of officers from public office. The power to remove a public officer is again executive in nature, but also subject to limitations as may be provided by law. Ordinarily, where an office is created by statute, it is wholly within the power of Congress, its legislative power extends to the subject of regulating removals from the office.78 Even the very definition of "executive control" under the Administrative Code concedes that the general definition of control may yield to a different prescription under a specific law governing particular agencies. SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as follows: (1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph.79 The charters of GOCCs are specific laws with specific application to the GOCCs they govern. The Administrative Code itself affirms that "control," as defined by a particular charter, supersedes the general definition under the Code with respect to the GOCC governed by the charter. This concession is recognition of the primacy of legislative enactments in the constitution and definition of public offices within the executive branch of government.

The Authority of Congress to Impose Limitations On the Exercise of Executive Control There is another worrisome implication in the majority's reliance on executive control. It connotes that the legislative branch of government has no power to legislate any form of controls on executive action, thus effectively authorizing the President to ignore the laws of Congress. This significant diminution of the plenary power of the legislature to make laws guts the power of Congress to check and balance the executive branch of government. The duty of the President "to faithfully execute the laws of the land" places the Chief Executive under the rule of law.80 The President cannot refuse to carry out a law for the simple reason that in his/her judgment it will not be beneficial to the people.81 Indeed, the exercise of every aspect of executive power, whether residual, express, or delegated, is governed by one principle beyond compromise that such powers be in accordance with law. Executive control, taken to its furthest extreme that it warrants the unchecked exercise of executive power, can be used to justify the President or his/her subalterns in ignoring the law, or disobeying the law. I submit that as a means of checking executive power, the legislature is empowered to impose reasonable statutory limitations in such exercise, over such areas wherein the legislative jurisdiction to legislate is ceded. As stated earlier, among such areas within the province of Congress is the creation of public offices or GOCCs. Even as such public offices or GOCCs may fall within the control and supervision of the executive branch, Congress has the power, through legislation, to enact whatever restrictions it may deem fit to prescribe for the public good. Indeed, there are appreciable limits to what restrictions Congress may impose on public offices within the Executive Branch. For example, a law prescribing a fixed term for a Cabinet Secretary which may extend beyond the President's term of office is of dubious constitutional value, since Cabinet departments are recognized by law and tradition as extensions of the President, and their heads as alter egos thereof. This concession likewise finds constitutional enshrinement in the fact that the Appointments Clause vests solely in the President the power to appoint members of the cabinet, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. I likewise recognize that in the absence of statutory restrictions, the President should be given wide latitude in the selection and termination of presidential appointees, and discretion to review, reverse or modify the acts of these officials. GOCCs with original charters pose special considerations. The very fact that they were created by legislative enactments denotes the presence of statutory restrictions. At the same time, while remaining agencies of the State, they are in possession of independent juridical personality segregate from that of the Government. Indeed, the very corporate character of GOCCs implies a legislative intent to delegate sovereign functions to an entity that, in legal contemplation, is endowed with a separate character from the Government. The congressional charter of a GOCC should be recognized as legislative expression of some degree of independence from the Government reposed in the GOCC. The charter itself is an assertion of a GOCC's statutory independence from the other offices in the executive branch. The comments of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas on the power of control over GOCCs warrant consideration: It is submitted [that] the Executive's power of control over government-owned corporations, which in legal category are not on the same level as executive departments, bureaus, or offices, is not purely constitutional but largely statutory. The legislature may place them under the control of the Executive where their functions "partake of the nature of government bureaus and offices." Unlike executive departments, bureaus or offices, however, which by constitutional mandate must be under the Executive's control, government-owned corporations may be removed by the legislature from the Executive's control when the nature of their functions is changed.82 Even with respect to other public offices, if Congress deems it necessary to vest such a particular public office with a degree of independence from the executive branch, then the legislative prescription of conditions to the appointment/removal, including the fixing of a term of office, should generally be upheld. Indeed, Congress has the right to create public offices. While falling under the executive branch of government, the legislature may find in its creation such a significant public purpose as to be accorded a degree of independence from the executive department. This may especially hold true for quasi-judicial agencies tasked with determining competing claims lodged by private persons against the executive department. In the United States, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of Congress "in creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them to act in the discharge of their duties independently of executive control and that the authority includes, as an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall continue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the meantime."83 Unlike the "necessary and proper" clause of the U.S. Constitution,84 there is no express characterization in our Constitution as to what laws our legislature should enact. This should not dissuade the Court from recognizing that Congress has the right to enact laws that are for the public good, even if they impair the comfort of private citizens or the officials of government. There are valid legislative purposes for insulating certain agencies of the State from unfettered executive interference. Congress may create agencies under the executive branch tasked with investigatory or fact-finding functions, and accord them a necessary degree of independence by assuring tenure to its members, for example. I submit that such prerogative of Congress is aligned with the principle of checks and balances, under which the legislature is empowered to prescribe standards and impose limitations in the exercise of powers vested or delegated to the President. The ruling in the majority would sadly impair the right of the legislature to impart public offices it creates with safeguards that ensure independence from executive interference should Congress deem that such independence serves a necessary public purpose.

The implications are similarly ruinous to the independent corporate personality of GOCCs as determined and fleshed out by Congress. Their charters are legislative enactments beyond the pale of the President to amend or repeal. In effect, there is a seeming new rule that the President may ignore or countermand statutory limitations contained in the charters of GOCCs. The President may thus abolish chartered GOCCs at whim, appoint persons Congress may have deemed as unqualified to positions in the GOCC, alter the corporate purposes for which the GOCC was established, all in the guise of executive control. Executive control may similarly be justified to alter or deprive statutory rights which may have been vested by Congress to private persons via the corporate charter. The power of Congress to charter government corporations would be rendered worthless an intent hardly justified by the Constitution, which allocated the power to create GOCCs to Congress.85 CCP Charter a Means of Promoting An Autonomous Policy on the Arts Odd as the structure of the CCP may be, its atypical nature was not enacted for the sake of uniqueness, but for laudable public purposes which the Court should acknowledge. The CCP Charter, apart from recognizing the CCP's corporate personality, goes as far as mandating that the CCP "enjoy[s] autonomy of policy and operation."86 While the inherent right of Congress to create public offices in general, and specifically to charter GOCCs sufficiently justifies the constitutionality of Section 6 of the CCP Charter. Still, if it is necessary to inquire into the public purpose for prescribing the unique setup of the CCP, I submit that the mandated autonomy of the CCP is in accord with constitutional principles that should be upheld and promoted. The Constitution provides that "arts and letters shall enjoy the patronage of the State"87 and "[t]he state shall foster the preservation, enrichment, and dynamic evolution of a Filipino national culture based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of free artistic and intellectual expression."88 More crucially, artistic and intellectual expression is encompassed in free expression guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.89 Clearly, art and culture, in constitutional contemplation, is not the product of collectivist thought like the prescribed social realism in Stalin's Soviet Union, but of free individual expression consonant to the democratic ideal. The assurance of policy and operational autonomy on the CCP is aligned with these constitutional purposes. Government-sponsored art is susceptible to executive diktat, especially to countermand unpopular art or to dilute its potency to the point of innocuousness. Indeed, executive control left unhampered could allow the executive branch to impose its own notions of what art and culture should be, and to block the art forms that do not conform to its vision. Given the paramount constitutional protection guaranteed to artistic expression, such executive interference would contravene constitutional rights. Such interference could be enforced by the executive through a Board of Directors whose subservience could be guaranteed by their staying in office solely by pleasure of the President. Even without the autonomy granted to the CCP in its charter, the CCP as a government agency would still be precluded from denigrating any person's right to free expression. But the fact that the legislative charter did put into operation safeguards that promote a climate of artistic independence should be lauded and upheld as within the prerogative of the legislature to enact. There is no higher public purpose in the formulation of laws than to promote constitutional values. I could not improve on the following disquisition of Justice Puno on the important role the CCP has played in our development as a nation: The CCP Complex is the only area in the Philippines that is fully devoted to the growth and propagation of arts and culture. It is the only venue in the country where artists, Filipino and foreign alike, may express their art in its various forms, be it in music, dance, theater, or in the visual arts such as painting, sculpture and installation art or in literature such as prose, poetry and the indigenous oral and written literary forms. The theaters and facilities of the Complex have been utilized for the staging of cultural presentations and for the conduct of lectures and demonstrations by renowned visiting artists. The wide open spaces of the Complex are the only open spaces in Metropolitan Manila that have been used to accommodate huge crowds in cultural, artistic and even religious events. But the fulfillment of CCP's mandate did not start and end in Manila Bay. The CCP, through its Board of Trustees, has reached out to the provinces through programs, scholarships and national competitions for young artists. It has helped young artists hone their craft and develop their creativity and ingenuity. It has also exposed the Filipino artists to foreign art and advanced instruction, and thereby develop world-class artists, earning for the Philippines the respect and admiration of other countries. The CCP has likewise exposed the ordinary Filipino to the national culture. It has enhanced public interest in Philippine art in various forms, in our history, in our indigenous and modern culture, and at the same time, enriched us with the culture of other countries. The CCP has indeed emerged as a dynamic force in the promotion of the country's artistic and cultural heritage and the development of new and modern art forms. Through the years, it has helped raise the Filipino consciousness to our nationhood, and in the process, inculcated love for our country The state recognizes the vital role arts and culture play in national development. Indeed, a nation that would give up its cultural patrimony in exchange for economic and material pursuits cannot but be doomed as a "people without a soul."90 The Cultural Center of the Philippines has helped us capture this "soul."91 Art thrives within an atmosphere of free thought. The CCP Charter, by ensuring political and operational autonomy, ferments expression free from prior restraint or subsequent punishment from the executive department. There is a constitutional purpose to the independence attendant to the unique corporate structure of the CCP. There is constitutional authority for the legislature to charter a government corporation with reasonable safeguards of independence from the executive branch. And there is a constitutional duty for the President to obey and execute the laws enacted by Congress.

Conclusion The ruling of the Court today is boon for those quarters which wish to concede to the presidency as much power as there can be. Sadly, it comes at the expense of the time-honored prerogative of Congress to legislate laws. The power of Congress to enact legislative charters with any sort of restrictions that would be enforced is now severely put in doubt. The power of Congress to fix the terms of the offices it creates is now controvertible. The President has been given the green light to remove at will officials whose terms of offices are set by law, without regard to the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure to these officials. All these wrought simply because for the majority, the CCP Board of Trustees somehow transubstantiated itself into the CCP itself. I have consistently advocated a generous interpretation of presidential authority, owing to my firm belief in the potency of the inherent and residual powers implicit in the highest office of the land.92 Still, the Constitution is allergic to an omnipotent presidency, and thus, the law is the limit. This is a live tiger that the majority has set loose today, one utterly capable of inflicting great pain on the delicate balance that safeguards the separation of powers. DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice G.R. No. 191002 April 20, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191032 JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191057 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191149 JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent. PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLES LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD

OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON; AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.; Intervenors. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191342 ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBP Governor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191420 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents. RESOLUTION BERSAMIN, J.: On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision, holding: WHEREFORE, the Court: 1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature; 2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and 3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council: (a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and (d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED. Motions for Reconsideration Petitioners Jaime N. Soriano (G.R. No. 191032), Amador Z. Tolentino and Roland B. Inting (G.R. No. 191342), and Philippine Bar Association (G.R. No. 191420), as well as intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Davao del Sur (IBP-Davao del Sur, et al.); Christian Robert S. Lim; Peter Irving Corvera; Bagong Alyansang Bayan and others (BAYAN, et al.); Alfonso V. Tan, Jr.; the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP); Marlou B. Ubano; Mitchell John L. Boiser; and Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P. Rosales (Bello, et al.), filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Also filing a motion for reconsideration was Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., whose belated intervention was allowed. We summarize the arguments and submissions of the various motions for reconsideration, in the aforegiven order:

Soriano 1. The Court has not squarely ruled upon or addressed the issue of whether or not the power to designate the Chief Justice belonged to the Supreme Court en banc. 2. The Mendoza petition should have been dismissed, because it sought a mere declaratory judgment and did not involve a justiciable controversy. 3. All Justices of the Court should participate in the next deliberations. The mere fact that the Chief Justice sits as ex officio head of the JBC should not prevail over the more compelling state interest for him to participate as a Member of the Court. Tolentino and Inting 1. A plain reading of Section 15, Article VII does not lead to an interpretation that exempts judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments. 2. In excluding the Judiciary from the ban, the Court has made distinctions and has created exemptions when none exists. 3. The ban on midnight appointments is placed in Article VII, not in Article VIII, because it limits an executive, not a judicial, power. 4. Resort to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is superfluous, and is powerless to vary the terms of the clear prohibition. 5. The Court has given too much credit to the position taken by Justice Regalado. Thereby, the Court has raised the Constitution to the level of a venerated text whose intent can only be divined by its framers as to be outside the realm of understanding by the sovereign people that ratified it. 6. Valenzuela should not be reversed. 7. The petitioners, as taxpayers and lawyers, have the clear legal standing to question the illegal composition of the JBC. Philippine Bar Association 1. The Courts strained interpretation of the Constitution violates the basic principle that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than what is required by the precise facts of the case. 2. Considering that Section 15, Article VII is clear and straightforward, the only duty of the Court is to apply it. The provision expressly and clearly provides a general limitation on the appointing power of the President in prohibiting the appointment of any person to any position in the Government without any qualification and distinction. 3. The Court gravely erred in unilaterally ignoring the constitutional safeguard against midnight appointments. 4. The Constitution has installed two constitutional safeguards:- the prohibition against midnight appointments, and the creation of the JBC. It is not within the authority of the Court to prefer one over the other, for the Courts duty is to apply the safeguards as they are, not as the Court likes them to be. 5. The Court has erred in failing to apply the basic principles of statutory construction in interpreting the Constitution. 6. The Court has erred in relying heavily on the title, chapter or section headings, despite precedents on statutory construction holding that such headings carried very little weight. 7. The Constitution has provided a general rule on midnight appointments, and the only exception is that on temporary appointments to executive positions. 8. The Court has erred in directing the JBC to resume the proceedings for the nomination of the candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno with a view to submitting the list of nominees for Chief Justice to President Arroyo on or before May 17, 2010. The Constitution grants the Court only the power of supervision over the JBC; hence, the Court cannot tell the JBC what to do, how to do it, or when to do it, especially in the absence of a real and justiciable case assailing any specific action or inaction of the JBC. 9. The Court has engaged in rendering an advisory opinion and has indulged in speculations.

10. The constitutional ban on appointments being already in effect, the Courts directing the JBC to comply with the decision constitutes a culpable violation of the Constitution and the commission of an election offense. 11. The Court cannot reverse on the basis of a secondary authority a doctrine unanimously formulated by the Court en banc. 12. The practice has been for the most senior Justice to act as Chief Justice whenever the incumbent is indisposed. Thus, the appointment of the successor Chief Justice is not urgently necessary. 13. The principal purpose for the ban on midnight appointments is to arrest any attempt to prolong the outgoing Presidents powers by means of proxies. The attempt of the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice is undeniably intended to perpetuate her power beyond her term of office. IBP-Davao del Sur, et al. 1. Its language being unambiguous, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applies to appointments to the Judiciary. Hence, no cogent reason exists to warrant the reversal of the Valenzuela pronouncement. 2. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides for presidential appointments to the Constitutional Commissions and the JBC with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Its phrase "other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution" is enough proof that the limitation on the appointing power of the President extends to appointments to the Judiciary. Thus, Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 of Article VII apply to all presidential appointments in the Executive and Judicial Branches of the Government. 3. There is no evidence that the framers of the Constitution abhorred the idea of an Acting Chief Justice in all cases. Lim 1. There is no justiciable controversy that warrants the Courts exercise of judicial review. 2. The election ban under Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Court and to other appointments to the Judiciary. 3. The creation of the JBC does not justify the removal of the safeguard under Section 15 of Article VII against midnight appointments in the Judiciary. Corvera 1. The Courts exclusion of appointments to the Judiciary from the Constitutional ban on midnight appointments is based on an interpretation beyond the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution. 2. The intent of the ban on midnight appointments is to cover appointments in both the Executive and Judicial Departments. The application of the principle of verba legis (ordinary meaning) would have obviated dwelling on the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution. If there is any ambiguity in Section 15, Article VII, the intent behind the provision, which is to prevent political partisanship in all branches of the Government, should have controlled. 3. A plain reading is preferred to a contorted and strained interpretation based on compartmentalization and physical arrangement, especially considering that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole. 4. Resort to the deliberations or to the personal interpretation of the framers of the Constitution should yield to the plain and unequivocal language of the Constitution. 5. There is no sufficient reason for reversing Valenzuela, a ruling that is reasonable and in accord with the Constitution. BAYAN, et al. 1. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. The issues it raised were not yet ripe for adjudication, considering that the office of the Chief Justice was not yet vacant and that the JBC itself has yet to decide whether or not to submit a list of nominees to the President. 2. The collective wisdom of Valenzuela Court is more important and compelling than the opinion of Justice Regalado.

3. In ruling that Section 15, Article VII is in conflict with Section 4(1), Article VIII, the Court has violated the principle of ut magis valeat quam pereat (which mandates that the Constitution should be interpreted as a whole, such that any conflicting provisions are to be harmonized as to fully give effect to all). There is no conflict between the provisions; they complement each other. 4. The form and structure of the Constitutions titles, chapters, sections, and draftsmanship carry little weight in statutory construction. The clear and plain language of Section 15, Article VII precludes interpretation. Tan, Jr. 1. The factual antecedents do not present an actual case or controversy. The clash of legal rights and interests in the present case are merely anticipated. Even if it is anticipated with certainty, no actual vacancy in the position of the Chief Justice has yet occurred. 2. The ruling that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to a vacancy in the Court and the Judiciary runs in conflict with long standing principles and doctrines of statutory construction. The provision admits only one exception, temporary appointments in the Executive Department. Thus, the Court should not distinguish, because the law itself makes no distinction. 3. Valenzuela was erroneously reversed. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary. Hence, giving more weight to the opinion of Justice Regalado to reverse the en banc decision in Valenzuela was unwarranted. 4. Section 15, Article VII is not incompatible with Section 4(1), Article VIII. The 90-day mandate to fill any vacancy lasts until August 15, 2010, or a month and a half after the end of the ban. The next President has roughly the same time of 45 days as the incumbent President (i.e., 44 days) within which to scrutinize and study the qualifications of the next Chief Justice. Thus, the JBC has more than enough opportunity to examine the nominees without haste and political uncertainty.1avvphi1 5. When the constitutional ban is in place, the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII is suspended. 6. There is no basis to direct the JBC to submit the list of nominees on or before May 17, 2010. The directive to the JBC sanctions a culpable violation of the Constitution and constitutes an election offense. 7. There is no pressing necessity for the appointment of a Chief Justice, because the Court sits en banc, even when it acts as the sole judge of all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and Vice-President. Fourteen other Members of the Court can validly comprise the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. WTLOP 1. The Court exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees for Chief Justice to the President on or before May 17, 2010, and to continue its proceedings for the nomination of the candidates, because it granted a relief not prayed for; imposed on the JBC a deadline not provided by law or the Constitution; exercised control instead of mere supervision over the JBC; and lacked sufficient votes to reverse Valenzuela. 2. In interpreting Section 15, Article VII, the Court has ignored the basic principle of statutory construction to the effect that the literal meaning of the law must be applied when it is clear and unambiguous; and that we should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish. 3. There is no urgency to appoint the next Chief Justice, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 already provides that the power and duties of the office devolve on the most senior Associate Justice in case of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice. Ubano 1. The language of Section 15, Article VII, being clear and unequivocal, needs no interpretation 2. The Constitution must be construed in its entirety, not by resort to the organization and arrangement of its provisions. 3. The opinion of Justice Regalado is irrelevant, because Section 15, Article VII and the pertinent records of the Constitutional Commission are clear and unambiguous. 4. The Court has erred in ordering the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President by May 17, 2010 at the latest, because no specific law requires the JBC to submit the list of nominees even before the vacancy has occurred.

Boiser 1. Under Section 15, Article VII, the only exemption from the ban on midnight appointments is the temporary appointment to an executive position. The limitation is in keeping with the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to place a restriction on the power of the outgoing Chief Executive to make appointments. 2. To exempt the appointment of the next Chief Justice from the ban on midnight appointments makes the appointee beholden to the outgoing Chief Executive, and compromises the independence of the Chief Justice by having the outgoing President be continually influential. 3. The Courts reversal of Valenzuela without stating the sufficient reason violates the principle of stare decisis. Bello, et al. 1. Section 15, Article VII does not distinguish as to the type of appointments an outgoing President is prohibited from making within the prescribed period. Plain textual reading and the records of the Constitutional Commission support the view that the ban on midnight appointments extends to judicial appointments. 2. Supervision of the JBC by the Court involves oversight. The subordinate subject to oversight must first act not in accord with prescribed rules before the act can be redone to conform to the prescribed rules. 3. The Court erred in granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, because the petition did not present a justiciable controversy. Pimentel 1. Any constitutional interpretative changes must be reasonable, rational, and conformable to the general intent of the Constitution as a limitation to the powers of Government and as a bastion for the protection of the rights of the people. Thus, in harmonizing seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution, the interpretation should always be one that protects the citizenry from an ever expanding grant of authority to its representatives. 2. The decision expands the constitutional powers of the President in a manner totally repugnant to republican constitutional democracy, and is tantamount to a judicial amendment of the Constitution without proper authority. Comments The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the JBC separately represent in their respective comments, thus: OSG 1. The JBC may be compelled to submit to the President a short list of its nominees for the position of Chief Justice. 2. The incumbent President has the power to appoint the next Chief Justice. 3. Section 15, Article VII does not apply to the Judiciary. 4. The principles of constitutional construction favor the exemption of the Judiciary from the ban on midnight appointments.1awph!1 5. The Court has the duty to consider and resolve all issues raised by the parties as well as other related matters. JBC 1. The consolidated petitions should have been dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not yet decided at the time the petitions were filed whether the incumbent President has the power to appoint the new Chief Justice, and because the JBC, having yet to interview the candidates, has not submitted a short list to the President. 2. The statement in the decision that there is a doubt on whether a JBC short list is necessary for the President to appoint a Chief Justice should be struck down as bereft of constitutional and legal basis. The statement undermines the independence of the JBC.

3. The JBC will abide by the final decision of the Court, but in accord with its constitutional mandate and its implementing rules and regulations. For his part, petitioner Estelito P. Mendoza (A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC) submits his comment even if the OSG and the JBC were the only ones the Court has required to do so. He states that the motions for reconsideration were directed at the administrative matter he initiated and which the Court resolved. His comment asserts: 1. The grounds of the motions for reconsideration were already resolved by the decision and the separate opinion. 2. The administrative matter he brought invoked the Courts power of supervision over the JBC as provided by Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, as distinguished from the Courts adjudicatory power under Section 1, Article VIII. In the former, the requisites for judicial review are not required, which was why Valenzuela was docketed as an administrative matter. Considering that the JBC itself has yet to take a position on when to submit the short list to the proper appointing authority, it has effectively solicited the exercise by the Court of its power of supervision over the JBC. 3. To apply Section 15, Article VII to Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII is to amend the Constitution. 4. The portions of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission quoted in the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales, as well as in some of the motions for reconsideration do not refer to either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but to Section 13, Article VII (on nepotism). Ruling We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010. Nonetheless, the Court opts to dwell on some matters only for the purpose of clarification and emphasis. First: Most of the movants contend that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and accordingly insist that the Court has erred in disobeying or abandoning Valenzuela.1 The contention has no basis. Stare decisis derives its name from the Latin maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere, i.e., to adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things that are settled. It simply means that a principle underlying the decision in one case is deemed of imperative authority, controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same jurisdiction, unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of competent authority. The decisions relied upon as precedents are commonly those of appellate courts, because the decisions of the trial courts may be appealed to higher courts and for that reason are probably not the best evidence of the rules of law laid down. 2 Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.3 In a hierarchical judicial system like ours, the decisions of the higher courts bind the lower courts, but the courts of co-ordinate authority do not bind each other. The one highest court does not bind itself, being invested with the innate authority to rule according to its best lights.4 The Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.5 The adherence to precedents is strict and rigid in a common-law setting like the United Kingdom, where judges make law as binding as an Act of Parliament.6 But ours is not a common-law system; hence, judicial precedents are not always strictly and rigidly followed. A judicial pronouncement in an earlier decision may be followed as a precedent in a subsequent case only when its reasoning and justification are relevant, and the court in the latter case accepts such reasoning and justification to be applicable to the case. The application of the precedent is for the sake of convenience and stability. For the intervenors to insist that Valenzuela ought not to be disobeyed, or abandoned, or reversed, and that its wisdom should guide, if not control, the Court in this case is, therefore, devoid of rationality and foundation. They seem to conveniently forget that the Constitution itself recognizes the innate authority of the Court en banc to modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down in any decision rendered en banc or in division.7 Second: Some intervenors are grossly misleading the public by their insistence that the Constitutional Commission extended to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Section 15, Article VII.

The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Section 15, Article VII or Section 4(1), Article VIII, but only Section 13, Article VII, a provision on nepotism. The records of the Constitutional Commission show that Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had proposed to include judges and justices related to the President within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity among the persons whom the President might not appoint during his or her tenure. In the end, however, Commissioner Davide, Jr. withdrew the proposal to include the Judiciary in Section 13, Article VII "(t)o avoid any further complication,"8 such that the final version of the second paragraph of Section 13, Article VII even completely omits any reference to the Judiciary, to wit: Section 13. xxx The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. Last: The movants take the majority to task for holding that Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. They aver that the Court either ignored or refused to apply many principles of statutory construction. The movants gravely err in their posture, and are themselves apparently contravening their avowed reliance on the principles of statutory construction. For one, the movants, disregarding the absence from Section 15, Article VII of the express extension of the ban on appointments to the Judiciary, insist that the ban applied to the Judiciary under the principle of verba legis. That is self-contradiction at its worst. Another instance is the movants unhesitating willingness to read into Section 4(1) and Section 9, both of Article VIII, the express applicability of the ban under Section 15, Article VII during the period provided therein, despite the silence of said provisions thereon. Yet, construction cannot supply the omission, for doing so would generally constitute an encroachment upon the field of the Constitutional Commission. Rather, Section 4(1) and Section 9 should be left as they are, given that their meaning is clear and explicit, and no words can be interpolated in them.9 Interpolation of words is unnecessary, because the law is more than likely to fail to express the legislative intent with the interpolation. In other words, the addition of new words may alter the thought intended to be conveyed. And, even where the meaning of the law is clear and sensible, either with or without the omitted word or words, interpolation is improper, because the primary source of the legislative intent is in the language of the law itself.10 Thus, the decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. We cannot permit the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to suit the purposes of any quarter. Final Word It has been insinuated as part of the polemics attendant to the controversy we are resolving that because all the Members of the present Court were appointed by the incumbent President, a majority of them are now granting to her the authority to appoint the successor of the retiring Chief Justice. The insinuation is misguided and utterly unfair. The Members of the Court vote on the sole basis of their conscience and the merits of the issues. Any claim to the contrary proceeds from malice and condescension. Neither the outgoing President nor the present Members of the Court had arranged the current situation to happen and to evolve as it has. None of the Members of the Court could have prevented the Members composing the Court when she assumed the Presidency about a decade ago from retiring during her prolonged term and tenure, for their retirements were mandatory. Yet, she is now left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy. ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality. SO ORDERED.

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO MORALES, J.: "Although the Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot legally decide a case on his own because of the Courts nature as a collegial body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by himself, overturn the decision of the Court, whether of a division or the en banc." Associate Justice Renato C. Corona in Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against Justice Puno, 499 Phil. 1, 14 (2005) Primus Inter pares. First among equals. The Latin maxim indicates that a person is the most senior of a group of people sharing the same rank or office. The phrase has been used to describe the status, condition or role of the prime minister in most parliamentary nations, the high-ranking prelate in several religious orders, and the chief justice in many supreme courts around the world. The inclination to focus on the inter pares without due emphasis on the primus/prima has spawned contemporary discourse that revives the original tug-of-war between domination and parity, which impasse the conceived maxim precisely intended to resolve. In the present case, several arguments attempt to depict a mirage of doomsday scenarios arising from the impending vacancy of the primus in the Court as a springboard for their plea to avert a supposed undermining of the independence of the judiciary. In reality, the essential question boils down to the limitation on the appointing power of the President. The ponencia of Justice Bersamin holds that the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno on May 17, 2010 since the prohibition during election periodi[3] does not extend to appointments in the judiciary, thereby reversing In re appointments of Hon. Valenzuela & Hon. Vallarta.ii[4] The ponencia additionally holds that the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit to the President the list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice. I DISSENT. Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving at a constitutional construction The first ratiocination adverts to the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution that was, as the ponencia declares, purposely made by the framers of the Constitution to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of the charters contents. It is unfortunate that the ponencia chiefly relies on the trivialities of draftsmanship style in arriving at a constitutional construction. The petitioner in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretaryiii[5] raised a similar argument, but the Court held: AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of ordering the law which, so it alleges, can be said of the Constitutions distinct treatment of these three areas, as reflected in separate provisions in different parts of the Constitution. It argues that the Constitution did not intend an over-arching concept of agrarian reform to encompass the two other areas, and that how the law is ordered in a certain way should not be undermined by mere executive orders in the guise of administrative efficiency. The Court is not persuaded. The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of social justice is not something implausible or unlikely. Their interlocking nature cuts across labels and works against a rigid pigeonholing of executive tasks among the members of the Presidents official family. Notably, the Constitution inhibited from identifying and compartmentalizing the composition of the Cabinet. In vesting executive power in one person rather than in a plural executive, the evident intention was to invest the power holder with energy. AMIN takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform areas in marked provisions of the Constitution. It is a precept, however, that inferences drawn from title, chapter or section headings are entitled to very little weight. And so must reliance on subheadings, or the lack thereof, to support a strained deduction be given the weight of helium. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt. AMINs thesis unsettles, more than settles the order of things in construing the Constitution. Its interpretation fails to clearly establish that the so-called ordering or arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was consciously adopted to imply a signification in terms of government hierarchy from where a constitutional mandate can per se be derived or asserted. It fails to demonstrate that the ordering or layout was not simply a matter of style in constitutional drafting but one of intention in government structuring. With its inherent ambiguity, the proposed interpretation cannot be made a basis for declaring a law or governmental act unconstitutional. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Concededly, the allocation of three Articles in the Constitution devoted to the respective dynamics of the three Departments was deliberately adopted by the framers to allocate the vast powers of government among the three Departments in recognition of the principle of separation of powers.

The equation, however, does not end there. Such kind of formulation detaches itself from the concomitant system of checks and balances. Section sequencing alone of Sections 14, 15 and 16 of Article VII, as explained in the fourth ratiocination, does not suffice to signify functional structuring. That the power of judicial appointment was lodged in the President is a recognized measure of limitation on the power of the judiciary, which measure, however, is counterbalanced by the election ban due to the need to insulate the judiciary from the political climate of presidential elections. To abandon this interplay of checks and balances on the mere inference that the establishment of the JBC could de-politicize the process of judicial appointments lacks constitutional mooring. The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils of midnight appointments in the judiciary The constitutional prohibition in Section 15 found its roots in the case of Aytona v. Castillo,where among the midnight or last minute appointments voided to abort the abuse of presidential prerogatives or partisan efforts to fill vacant positions were one in the Supreme Court and two in the Court of Appeals. Heeding Aytonas admonition, the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) saw it fit to provide for a comprehensive ban on midnight appointments, finding that the establishment of the JBC is not enough to safeguard or insulate judicial appointments from politicization. The ConCom deliberations reveal: MR. GUINGONA: Madam President. THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA: Would the distinguished proponent accept an amendment to his amendment to limit this prohibition to members of collegiate courts? The judges of the lower courts perhaps would not have the same category or the same standing as the others mentioned here. MR. DAVIDE: Pursuant to the post amendment, we already included here government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries which are not even very sensitive positions. So with more reason that the prohibition should apply to appointments in these bodies. THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?

FR. BERNAS: What is common among these people Ministers, Deputy Ministers, heads of bureaus or offices is that they are under the control of the President. MR. GUINGONA: FR. BERNAS: That is correct. Whereas, the other offices the Commissioner mentioned are independent offices.

MR. DAVIDE: The idea of the proposal is that about the end of the term of the President, he may prolong his rule indirectly by appointing people to these sensitive positions, like the commissions, the Ombudsman, the JUDICIARY, so he could perpetuate himself in power even beyond his term of office; therefore foreclosing the right of his successor to make appointments to these positions. We should realize that the term of the President is six years and under what we had voted on, there is no reelection for him. Yet he can continue to rule the country through appointments made about the end of his term to these sensitive positions. FR. BERNAS: At any rate, there are other checks as far as the appointment of those officers is concerned.

MR. DAVIDE: Only insofar as the Commission on Appointments is concerned for offices which would require consent, and the Judicial Bar Council insofar as the judiciary is concerned. FR. BERNAS: We leave the matter to the body for a vote.iv[8] (capitalization and emphasis supplied)

The clear intent of the framers is thus for the ban on midnight appointments to apply to the judiciary. The succeeding interpellationsv[9] suggest no departure from this intent. For almost half a century, the seeds of Aytona, as nurtured and broadened by the Constitution, have grown into an established doctrine that has weathered legal storms like Valenzuela. The second ratiocination in the ponencia could thus not remove an added constitutional safeguard by pretending to have examined and concluded that the establishment of the JBC had eliminated all encompassing forms of political maneuverings during elections. Otherwise, reading into the Constitution such conclusion so crucial to the scheme of checks and balances, which is neither written nor tackled, undermines the noticeable silence or restraint exercised by the framers themselves from making a definitive analysis. To illustrate, the instance given in the fifth ratiocination that having the new President appoint the next Chief Justice cannot ensure judicial independence because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority bears an inconsistent

stance. It does not admit or recognize that the mechanism of removal by impeachment eliminates the evils of political indebtedness. In any event, that level of reasoning overlooks the risk of compromising judicial independence when the outgoing President faces the Court in the charges that may be subsequently filed against her/him, and when the appointing President is up for re-election in the peculiar situation contemplated by Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. All rules of statutory construction revolt against the interpretation arrived at by the ponencia It is simplistic and unreliable for the ponencia to contend that had the framers intended to extend the ban in Article VII to appointments in the judiciary, they would have easily and surely written so in Article VIII, for it backlashes the question that had the framers intended to exclude judicial appointments in Article VIII from the prohibition in Article VII, they would have easily and surely written so in the excepting proviso in Article VII. Taking into account how the framers painstakingly rummaged through various sections of the Constitution and came up with only one exception with the need to specify the executive department, it insults the collective intelligence and diligence of the ConCom to postulate that it intended to exclude the judiciary but missed out on that one. To hold that the ban on midnight appointments applies only to executive positions, and not to vacancies in the judiciary and independent constitutional bodies, is to make the prohibition practically useless. It bears noting that Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution already allows the President, by way of exception, to make temporary appointments in the Executive Department during the prohibited period. Under this view, there is virtually no restriction on the Presidents power of appointment during the prohibited period. The general rule is clear since the prohibition applies to ALL kinds of midnight appointments. The Constitution made no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. The exception is likewise clear. Expressio unius et exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.vi[10] There is no clear circumstance that would indicate that the enumeration in the exception was not intended to be exclusive. Moreover, the fact that Section 15 was couched in negative language reinforces the exclusivity of the exception. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication.vii[11] (italics in the original; underscoring supplied) The proclivity to innovate legal concepts is enticing. Lest the basic rule be forgotten, it helps to once more recite that when the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation and must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.viii[12] In its third ratiocination, the ponencia faults Valenzuela for not according weight and due consideration to the opinion of Justice Florenz Regalado. It accords high regard to the opinion expressed by Justice Regalado as a former ConCom Member, to the exception of the opinion of all others similarly situated. It bears noting that the Court had spoken in one voice in Valenzuela. The ponencia should not hastily reverse, on the sole basis of Justice Regalados opinion, the Courts unanimous en banc decision penned by Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, and concurred in by, inter alia, Associate Justices who later became Chief Justices Hilario Davide, Jr., Artemio Panganiban and Reynato Puno. The line of reasoning is specious. If that is the case and for accuracys sake, we might as well reconvene all ConCom members and put the matter to a vote among them. Providentially, jurisprudence is replete with guiding principles to ascertain the true meaning of the Constitution when the provisions as written appear unclear and the proceedings as recorded provide little help: While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof.ix [13] (underscoring supplied) The clear import of Section 15 of Article VII is readily apparent. The people may not be of the same caliber as Justice Regalado, but they simply could not read into Section 15 something that is not there. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est.

What complicates the ponencia is its great preoccupation with Section 15 of Article VII, particularly its fixation with sentences or phrases that are neither written nor referred to therein. Verba legis non est recedendum, index animi sermo est. There should be no departure from the words of the statute, for speech is the index of intention. IN FINE, all rules of statutory construction virtually revolt against the interpretation arrived at by the ponencia. The 90-day period to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court is suspended during the ban on midnight appointments Although practically there is no constitutional crisis or conflict involved upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice, the ponencia illustrates the inapplicability of the 90-day mandate to every situation of vacancy in the Supreme Court (i.e., the 19-day vacuum articulated in the sixth ratiocination) if only to buttress its thesis that judicial appointment is an exception to the midnight appointments ban. The contemplated situation, however, supports the idea that the 90-day period is suspended during the effectivity of the ban. I submit that the more important and less complicated question is whether the 90-day period in Section 4(1) of Article VIIIx[14] runs during the period of prohibition in Section 15 of Article VII. In response to that question, the ponencia declares that it is the Presidents imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy [and that t]he failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.xi[15] The ponencia quotes certain records of the ConCom deliberations which, however, only support the view that the number of Justices should not be reduced for any appreciable length of time and it is a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy. Notably, there is no citation of any debate on how the framers reckoned or determined an appreciable length of time of 90 days, in which case a delay of one day could already bring about the evils it purports to avoid and spell a culpable violation of the Constitution. On the contrary, that the addition of one month to the original proposal of 60 days was approved without controversyxii[16] ineluctably shows that the intent was not to strictly impose an inflexible timeframe. Respecting the rationale for suspending the 90-day period, in cases where there is physical or legal impossibility of compliance with the duty to fill the vacancy within the said period, the fulfillment of the obligation is released because the law cannot exact compliance with what is impossible. In the present case, there can only arise a legal impossibility when the JBC list is submitted or the vacancy occurred during the appointments ban and the 90-day period would expire before the end of the appointments ban, in which case the fresh 90-day period should start to run at noon of June 30. This was the factual antecedent respecting the trial court judges involved in Valenzuela. There also arises a legal impossibility when the list is submitted or the vacancy occurred prior to the ban and no appointment was made before the ban starts, rendering the lapse of the 90-day period within the period of the ban, in which case the remaining period should resume to run at noon of June 30. The outgoing President would be released from non-fulfillment of the constitutional obligation, and the duty devolves upon the new President. Considering also that Section 15 of Article VII is an express limitation on the Presidents power of appointment, the running of the 90-day period is deemed suspended during the period of the ban which takes effect only once every six years. This view differs from Valenzuela in that it does not implement Section 15 of Article VII so as to breach Section 4(1) of Article VIII. Instead of disregarding the 90-day period in the observance of the ban on midnight appointments, the more logical reconciliation of the two subject provisions is to consider the ban as having the effect of suspending the duty to make the appointment within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Otherwise stated, since there is a ban, then there is no duty to appoint as the power to appoint does not even exist. Accordingly, the 90-day period is suspended once the ban sets in and begins or continues to run only upon the expiration of the ban. One situation which could result in physical impossibility is the inability of the JBC to constitute a quorum for some reasons beyond their control, as that depicted by Justice Arturo Brion in his Separate Opinion, in which case the 90-day period could lapse without fulfilling the constitutional obligation. Another such circumstance which could frustrate the ponencias depiction of the inflexibility of the period is a no-takers situation where, for some reason, there are no willing qualified nominees to become a Member of the Court.xiii[17] Some might find this possibility remote, but then again, the situation at hand or the absurdityxiv[18] of a 19-day overlapping vacuum may have also been perceived to be rare. The seventh ratiocination is admittedly a non-issue. Suffice it to state that the Constitution is clear that the appointment must come from a list x x x prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council. The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight appointments ban without an appointed Chief Justice The ponencia also holds that the JBC has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit to the President the list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice. It declares that the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy, explaining that the 90-day period in the proviso, Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof, is addressed to the President, not to the JBC.

Such interpretation is absurd as it takes the application and nomination stages in isolation from the whole appointment process. For the ponencia, the filling of the vacancy only involves the President, and the JBC was not considered when the period was increased from 60 days to 90 days. The sense of the Concom is the exact opposite.xv[19] The flaw in the reasoning is made more evident when the vacancy occurs by virtue of death of a member of the Court. In that instance, the JBC could never anticipate the vacancy, and could never submit a list to the President before the 90-day period. Sustaining the view meansxvi[20] that in case the President appoints as Chief Justice a sitting member of the Court, from a JBC list which includes, for instance, incumbent justices and outsiders, the JBC must forthwith submit a list of nominees for the post left vacant by the sitting member-now new Chief Justice. This thus calls for the JBC, in anticipation, to also commence and conclude another nomination process to fill the vacancy, and simultaneously submit a list of nominees for such vacancy, together with the list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice. If the President appoints an outsider like Sandiganbayan Justice Edilberto Sandoval as Chief Justice, however, the JBCs toil and time in the second nomination process are put to waste. It is ironic for the ponencia to state on the one hand that the President would be deprived of ample time to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees, and to show on the other hand that the President has, in recent history, filled the vacancy in the position of Chief Justice in one or two days. It is ironic for the ponencia to recognize that the President may need as much as 90 days of reflection in appointing a member of the Court, and yet abhor the idea of an acting Chief Justice in the interregnum as provided for by law,xvii[21] confirmed by tradition,xviii [22] and settled by jurisprudencexix[23] to be an internal matter. The express allowance of a 90-day period of vacancy rebuts any policy argument on the necessity to avoid a vacuum of even a single day in the position of an appointed Chief Justice. As a member of the Court, I strongly take exception to the ponencias implication that the Court cannot function without a sitting Chief Justice. To begin with, judicial power is vested in one Supreme Courtxx[24] and not in its individual members, much less in the Chief Justice alone. Notably, after Chief Justice Puno retires, the Court will have 14 members left, which is more than sufficient to constitute a quorum. The fundamental principle in the system of laws recognizes that there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings. While most of the Courts work is performed by its three divisions, the Court remains one court single, unitary, complete and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while individual justices may dissent or only partially concur, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice.xxi[25] The Court, as a collegial body, operates on a one member, one vote basis, whether it sits en banc or in divisions. The competence, probity and independence of the Court en banc, or those of the Courts Division to which the Chief Justice belongs, have never depended on whether the member voting as Chief Justice is merely an acting Chief Justice or a duly appointed one. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to hold, for the guidance of the Judicial and Bar Council, that the incumbent President is constitutionally proscribed from appointing the successor of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, G.R. No. 168056 Petitioners, Present: DAVIDE, JR., C.J., PUNO, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and

- versus -

GARCIA, JJ. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondents. x-------------------------x AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, AND SERGIO R. OSMEA III, G.R. No. 168207 Petitioners, - versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, CESAR V. PURISIMA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents. x-------------------------x ASSOCIATION OF PILIPINAS SHELL DEALERS, INC. represented by its President, ROSARIO ANTONIO; PETRON DEALERS' ASSOCIATION represented by its President, RUTH E. BARBIBI; ASSOCIATION OF CALTEX DEALERS' OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its President, MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA; ROSARIO ANTONIO doing business under the name and style of 'ANB NORTH SHELL SERVICE STATION; LOURDES MARTINEZ doing business under the name and style of 'SHELL GATE ' N. DOMINGO; BETHZAIDA TAN doing business under the name and style of 'ADVANCE SHELL STATION; REYNALDO P. MONTOYA doing business under the name and style of 'NEW LAMUAN SHELL SERVICE STATION; EFREN SOTTO doing business under the name and style of 'RED FIELD SHELL SERVICE STATION; DONICA CORPORATION represented by its President, DESI TOMACRUZ; RUTH E. MARBIBI doing business under the name and style of 'R&R PETRON STATION; PETER M. UNGSON doing business under the name and style of 'CLASSIC STAR GASOLINE SERVICE STATION; MARIAN SHEILA A. LEE doing business under the name and style of 'NTE GASOLINE & SERVICE STATION; JULIAN CESAR P. POSADAS doing business under the name and style of 'STARCARGA ENTERPRISES' ; ADORACION MAEBO doing business under the name and style of 'CMA MOTORISTS CENTER; SUSAN M. ENTRATA doing business under the name and style of 'LEONA'S GASOLINE STATION and SERVICE CENTER; CARMELITA BALDONADO doing business under the name and style of 'FIRST CHOICE SERVICE CENTER; MERCEDITAS A. GARCIA doing business under the name and style of 'LORPED SERVICE CENTER; RHEAMAR A. RAMOS doing business under the name and style of 'RJRAM PTT GAS STATION; MA. ISABEL VIOLAGO doing business under the name and style of 'VIOLAGO-PTT SERVICE CENTER; MOTORISTS' HEART CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS' HARVARD CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; MOTORISTS' HERITAGE CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; PHILIPPINE STANDARD OIL CORPORATION represented by its Vice-President for Operations, JOSELITO F. FLORDELIZA; ROMEO MANUEL doing business under the name and style of 'ROMMAN GASOLINE STATION; ANTHONY ALBERT CRUZ III doing business under the name and style of 'TRUE SERVICE STATION', G.R. No. 168461 'Petitioners, - versus CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance and GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondents. x-------------------------x FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, RODOLFO G. PLAZA, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, OSCAR G. MALAPITAN, BENJAMIN C. AGARAO, JR. JUAN EDGARDO M. ANGARA, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, RODOLFO Q. AGBAYANI and TEODORO A. CASIO, G.R. No. 168463 Petitioners, - versus CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,

Respondents.

x-------------------------x BATAAN GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR. Petitioner, - versus HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as the Executive Secretary; HON. MARGARITO TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; HON. JOSE MARIO BUNAG, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and HON. ALEXANDER AREVALO, in his capacity as the OIC Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 168730

Promulgated: Respondents.

September 1, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------------------x DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: The expenses of government, having for their object the interest of all, should be borne by everyone, and the more man enjoys the advantages of society, the more he ought to hold himself honored in contributing to those expenses. -Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727-1781) 'French statesman and economist Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits ' these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337)[1] was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the Court even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe. The petitioners in these cases, however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived constitutional infirmities in its passage. Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments notwithstanding, petitioners failed to justify their call for the invalidity of the law. Hence, R.A. No. 9337 is not unconstitutional. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. House Bill No. 3555[2]was introduced on first reading on January 7, 2005. The House Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill, in substitution of House Bill No. 1468, which Representative (Rep.) Eric D. Singson introduced on August 8, 2004. The President certified the bill on January 7, 2005 for immediate enactment. On January 27, 2005, the House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading. House Bill No. 3705[3]on the other hand, substituted House Bill No. 3105 introduced by Rep. Salacnib F. Baterina, and House Bill No. 3381 introduced by Rep. Jacinto V. Paras. Its 'mother bill is House Bill No. 3555. The House Committee on Ways and Means approved the bill on February 2, 2005. The President also certified it as urgent on February 8, 2005. The House of Representatives approved the bill on second and third reading on February 28, 2005. Meanwhile, the Senate Committee on Ways and Means approved Senate Bill No. 1950[4] on March 7, 2005, 'in substitution of Senate Bill Nos. 1337, 1838 and 1873, taking into consideration House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705. Senator Ralph G. Recto sponsored Senate Bill No. 1337, while Senate Bill Nos. 1838 and 1873 were both sponsored by Sens. Franklin M. Drilon, Juan M. Flavier and Francis N. Pangilinan. The President certified the bill on March 11, 2005, and was approved by the Senate on second and third reading on April 13, 2005. On the same date, April 13, 2005, the Senate agreed to the request of the House of Representatives for a committee conference on the disagreeing provisions of the proposed bills. Before long, the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950, 'after having met and discussed in full free and conference, recommended the approval of its report, which the Senate did on May 10, 2005, and with the House of Representatives agreeing thereto the next day, May 11, 2005.

On May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version was transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005. Thus, came R.A. No. 9337. July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337.[5] When said date came, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining respondents from enforcing and implementing the law. Oral arguments were held on July 14, 2005. Significantly, during the hearing, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, voiced the rationale for its issuance of the temporary restraining order on July 1, 2005, to wit: J. PANGANIBAN : . . . But before I go into the details of your presentation, let me just tell you a little background. You know when the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO at about 5 oclock in the afternoon. But before that, there was a lot of complaints aired on television and on radio. Some people in a gas station were complaining that the gas prices went up by 10%. Some people were complaining that their electric bill will go up by 10%. Other times people riding in domestic air carrier were complaining that the prices that theyll have to pay would have to go up by 10%. While all that was being aired, per your presentation and per our own understanding of the law, that's not true. It's not true that the e-vat law necessarily increased prices by 10% uniformly isnt it? ATTY. BANIQUED : No, Your Honor. J. PANGANIBAN : It is not? ATTY. BANIQUED : It's not, because, Your Honor, there is an Executive Order that granted the Petroleum companies some subsidy . . . interrupted J. PANGANIBAN : That's correct . . . ATTY. BANIQUED : . . . and therefore that was meant to temper the impact . . . interrupted J. PANGANIBAN : . . . mitigating measures . . . ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor. J. PANGANIBAN : As a matter of fact a part of the mitigating measures would be the elimination of the Excise Tax and the import duties. That is why, it is not correct to say that the VAT as to petroleum dealers increased prices by 10%. ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor. J. PANGANIBAN : And therefore, there is no justification for increasing the retail price by 10% to cover the E-Vat tax. If you consider the excise tax and the import duties, the Net Tax would probably be in the neighborhood of 7%? We are not going into exact figures I am just trying to deliver a point that different industries, different products, different services are hit differently. So it's not correct to say that all prices must go up by 10%. ATTY. BANIQUED : Youre right, Your Honor. J. PANGANIBAN : Now. For instance, Domestic Airline companies, Mr. Counsel, are at present imposed a Sales Tax of 3%. When this E-Vat law took effect the Sales Tax was also removed as a mitigating measure. So, therefore, there is no justification to increase the fares by 10% at best 7%, correct? ATTY. BANIQUED : I guess so, Your Honor, yes. J. PANGANIBAN : There are other products that the people were complaining on that first day, were being increased arbitrarily by 10%. And that's one reason among many others this Court had to issue TRO because of the confusion in the implementation. That's why we added as an issue in this case, even if it's tangentially taken up by the pleadings of the parties, the confusion in the implementation of the E-vat. Our people were subjected to the mercy of that confusion of an across the board increase of 10%, which you yourself now admit and I think even the Government will admit is incorrect. In some cases, it should be 3% only, in some cases it should be 6% depending on these mitigating measures and the location and situation of each product, of each service, of each company, isnt it? ATTY. BANIQUED : Yes, Your Honor. J. PANGANIBAN : Alright. So that's one reason why we had to issue a TRO pending the clarification of all these and we wish the government will take time to clarify all these by means of a more detailed implementing rules, in case the law is upheld by this Court. . . .[6] The Court also directed the parties to file their respective Memoranda. G.R. No. 168056

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit: . . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of valueadded tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 '%). Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. G.R. No. 168207 On June 9, 2005, Sen. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al., filed a petition for certiorari likewise assailing the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337. Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase the VAT rate to 12%, on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power, petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate to 12% contingent on any of the two conditions being satisfied violates the due process clause embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people, in that: (1) the 12% increase is ambiguous because it does not state if the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the conditions are no longer satisfied; (2) the rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and (3) the increase in the VAT rate, which is supposed to be an incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should only be based on fiscal adequacy. Petitioners further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the Bicameral Conference Committee is a violation of the 'no-amendment rule upon last reading of a bill laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution. G.R. No. 168461 Thereafter, a petition for prohibition was filed on June 29, 2005, by the Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al., assailing the following provisions of R.A. No. 9337: 1) Section 8, amending Section 110 (A)(2) of the NIRC, requiring that the input tax on depreciable goods shall be amortized over a 60month period, if the acquisition, excluding the VAT components, exceeds One Million Pesos (P1, 000,000.00); 2) Section 8, amending Section 110 (B) of the NIRC, imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax; and 3) Section 12, amending Section 114 (c) of the NIRC, authorizing the Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including GOCCs, to deduct a 5% final withholding tax on gross payments of goods and services, which are subject to 10% VAT under Sections 106 (sale of goods and properties) and 108 (sale of services and use or lease of properties) of the NIRC. Petitioners contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being arbitrary, oppressive, excessive, and confiscatory. Petitioners' argument is premised on the constitutional right of non-deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. According to petitioners, the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. Petitioners also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law. Petitioners further contend that like any other property or property right, the input tax credit may be transferred or disposed of, and that by limiting the same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added. Petitioners also believe that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2) invests in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification. Lastly, petitioners contend that the 70% limit is anything but progressive, violative of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution, and that it is the smaller businesses with higher input tax to output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences thereof for it wipes out whatever meager margins the petitioners make. G.R. No. 168463

Several members of the House of Representatives led by Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero filed this petition for certiorari on June 30, 2005. They question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 on the following grounds: 1) Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution; 2) The Bicameral Conference Committee acted without jurisdiction in deleting the no pass on provisions present in Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3705; and 3) Insertion by the Bicameral Conference Committee of Sections 27, 28, 34, 116, 117, 119, 121, 125,[7] 148, 151, 236, 237 and 288, which were present in Senate Bill No. 1950, violates Article VI, Section 24(1) of the Constitution, which provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives G.R. No. 168730 On the eleventh hour, Governor Enrique T. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 20, 2005, alleging unconstitutionality of the law on the ground that the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, thus violating the principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated for public purposes and expenditures. Petitioner Garcia further claims that allowing these establishments to pass on the tax to the consumers is inequitable, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution. RESPONDENTS' COMMENT The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of respondents. Preliminarily, respondents contend that R.A. No. 9337 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and petitioners failed to cast doubt on its validity. Relying on the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994), respondents argue that the procedural issues raised by petitioners, i.e., legality of the bicameral proceedings, exclusive origination of revenue measures and the power of the Senate concomitant thereto, have already been settled. With regard to the issue of undue delegation of legislative power to the President, respondents contend that the law is complete and leaves no discretion to the President but to increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions provided therein arise. Respondents also refute petitioners' argument that the increase to 12%, as well as the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, the 60-month amortization on the purchase or importation of capital goods exceeding P1,000,000.00, and the 5% final withholding tax by government agencies, is arbitrary, oppressive, and confiscatory, and that it violates the constitutional principle on progressive taxation, among others. Finally, respondents manifest that R.A. No. 9337 is the anchor of the government's fiscal reform agenda. A reform in the value-added system of taxation is the core revenue measure that will tilt the balance towards a sustainable macroeconomic environment necessary for economic growth. ISSUES The Court defined the issues, as follows: PROCEDURAL ISSUE Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: a. Article VI, Section 24, and b. Article VI, Section 26(2) SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution: a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and b. Article VI, Section 28(2) 2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution: a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and b. Article III, Section 1 RULING OF THE COURT

As a prelude, the Court deems it apt to restate the general principles and concepts of value-added tax (VAT), as the confusion and inevitably, litigation, breeds from a fallacious notion of its nature. The VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods or properties and services.[8] Being an indirect tax on expenditure, the seller of goods or services may pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer,[9] with the seller acting merely as a tax collector.[10] The burden of VAT is intended to fall on the immediate buyers and ultimately, the end-consumers. In contrast, a direct tax is a tax for which a taxpayer is directly liable on the transaction or business it engages in, without transferring the burden to someone else.[11] Examples are individual and corporate income taxes, transfer taxes, and residence taxes.[12] In the Philippines, the value-added system of sales taxation has long been in existence, albeit in a different mode. Prior to 1978, the system was a single-stage tax computed under the 'cost deduction method and was payable only by the original sellers. The singlestage system was subsequently modified, and a mixture of the 'cost deduction method and 'tax credit method was used to determine the value-added tax payable.[13] Under the 'tax credit method, an entity can credit against or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports.[14] It was only in 1987, when President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 273, that the VAT system was rationalized by imposing a multi-stage tax rate of 0% or 10% on all sales using the 'tax credit method.[15] E.O. No. 273 was followed by R.A. No. 7716 or the Expanded VAT Law,[16] R.A. No. 8241 or the Improved VAT Law,[17] R.A. No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997,[18] and finally, the presently beleaguered R.A. No. 9337, also referred to by respondents as the VAT Reform Act. The Court will now discuss the issues in logical sequence. PROCEDURAL ISSUE I. Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: a. Article VI, Section 24, and b. Article VI, Section 26(2) A. The Bicameral Conference Committee Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference Committee exceeded its authority by: 1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337; 2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills; 3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the output tax; and 4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds of taxes in addition to the value-added tax. Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee. It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, '[i]f the power did not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and order.[19] Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that 'each House may determine the rules of its proceedings. Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee. Thus, Rule XIV, Sections 88 and 89 of the Rules of House of Representatives provides as follows: Sec. 88. Conference Committee. ' In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendment to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by the conference committees of both chambers. In resolving the differences with the Senate, the House panel shall, as much as possible, adhere to and support the House Bill. If the differences with the Senate are so substantial that they materially impair the House Bill, the panel shall report such fact to the House for the latter's appropriate action. Sec. 89. Conference Committee Reports. ' . . . Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure. ...

The Chairman of the House panel may be interpellated on the Conference Committee Report prior to the voting thereon. The House shall vote on the Conference Committee Report in the same manner and procedure as it votes on a bill on third and final reading. Rule XII, Section 35 of the Rules of the Senate states: Sec. 35. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten (10) days after their composition. The President shall designate the members of the Senate Panel in the conference committee with the approval of the Senate. Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in, or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by a majority of the members of each House panel, voting separately. A comparative presentation of the conflicting House and Senate provisions and a reconciled version thereof with the explanatory statement of the conference committee shall be attached to the report. ... The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement over changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of the most basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of proceedings and to discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the details of how Congress complies with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing legislation? Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress. In the recent case of Farias vs. The Executive Secretary,[20] the Court En Banc, unanimously reiterated and emphasized its adherence to the 'enrolled bill doctrine, thus, declining therein petitioners' plea for the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed in said case was Congress's creation of two sets of bicameral conference committees, the lack of records of said committees' proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of the rules of both houses, and the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill submitted by the bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such irregularities in the passage of the law nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act. Striking down such argument, the Court held thus: Under the 'enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Court's consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.: But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: 'At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.[21] (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting provisions in the House and Senate bills. Akin to the Farias case,[22] the present petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference committee on matters regarding Congress' compliance with its own internal rules. As stated earlier, one of the most basic and inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its proceedings and the discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business' expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the sole concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its conference committee if it believes that said members violated any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of government. Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,[23] the Court already made the pronouncement that '[i]f a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. [24] To

date, Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be very useful for purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action. Nevertheless, just to put minds at ease that no blatant irregularities tainted the proceedings of the bicameral conference committees, the Court deems it necessary to dwell on the issue. The Court observes that there was a necessity for a conference committee because a comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, reveals that there were indeed disagreements. As pointed out in the petitions, said disagreements were as follows: House Bill No. 3555 House Bill No.3705 Senate Bill No. 1950

With regard to 'Stand-By Authority in favor of President Provides for 12% VAT on every sale of goods or properties (amending Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12% VAT on importation of goods (amending Sec. 107 of NIRC); and 12% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties (amending Sec. 108 of NIRC) Provides for 12% VAT in general on sales of goods or properties and reduced rates for sale of certain locally manufactured goods and petroleum products and raw materials to be used in the manufacture thereof (amending Sec. 106 of NIRC); 12% VAT on importation of goods and reduced rates for certain imported products including petroleum products (amending Sec. 107 of NIRC); and 12% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties and a reduced rate for certain services including power generation (amending Sec. 108 of NIRC) Provides for a single rate of 10% VAT on sale of goods or properties (amending Sec. 106 of NIRC), 10% VAT on sale of services including sale of electricity by generation companies, transmission and distribution companies, and use or lease of properties (amending Sec. 108 of NIRC)

With regard to the 'no pass-on provision No similar provision Provides that the VAT imposed on power generation and on the sale of petroleum products shall be absorbed by generation companies or sellers, respectively, and shall not be passed on to consumers Provides that the VAT imposed on sales of electricity by generation companies and services of transmission companies and distribution companies, as well as those of franchise grantees of electric utilities shall not apply to residential end-users. VAT shall be absorbed by generation, transmission, and distribution companies. Provides that the input tax credit for capital goods on which a VAT has been paid shall be equally distributed over 5 years or the depreciable life of such capital goods; the input tax credit for goods and services other than capital goods shall not exceed 90% of the output VAT.

With regard to 70% limit on input tax credit Provides that the input tax credit for capital goods on which a VAT has been paid shall be equally distributed over 5 years or the depreciable life of such capital goods; the input tax credit for goods and services other than capital goods shall not exceed 5% of the total amount of such goods and services; and for persons engaged in retail trading of goods, the allowable input tax credit shall not exceed 11% of the total amount of goods purchased. No similar provision

With regard to amendments to be made to NIRC provisions regarding income and excise taxes No similar provision No similar provision Provided for amendments to several NIRC provisions regarding corporate income, percentage, franchise and excise taxes

The disagreements between the provisions in the House bills and the Senate bill were with regard to (1) what rate of VAT is to be imposed; (2) whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the Senate bill, or both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products should not be passed on to consumers, as proposed in the House bill; (3) in what manner input tax credits should be limited; (4) and whether the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes, percentage, franchise and excise taxes should be amended.

There being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and Senate bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of both houses of Congress to act on the same by settling said differences and/or disagreements. The Bicameral Conference Committee acted on the disagreeing provisions by making the following changes: 1. With regard to the disagreement on the rate of VAT to be imposed, it would appear from the Conference Committee Report that the Bicameral Conference Committee tried to bridge the gap in the difference between the 10% VAT rate proposed by the Senate, and the various rates with 12% as the highest VAT rate proposed by the House, by striking a compromise whereby the present 10% VAT rate would be retained until certain conditions arise, i.e., the value-added tax collection as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5%, or National Government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1%, when the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance shall raise the rate of VAT to 12% effective January 1, 2006. 2. With regard to the disagreement on whether only the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies should not be passed on to consumers or whether both the VAT imposed on electricity generation, transmission and distribution companies and the VAT imposed on sale of petroleum products may be passed on to consumers, the Bicameral Conference Committee chose to settle such disagreement by altogether deleting from its Report any no pass-on provision. 3. With regard to the disagreement on whether input tax credits should be limited or not, the Bicameral Conference Committee decided to adopt the position of the House by putting a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax, although it crafted its own language as to the amount of the limitation on input tax credits and the manner of computing the same by providing thus: (A) Creditable Input Tax. ' . . . ... Provided, The input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds one million Pesos (P1,000,000.00): PROVIDED, however, that if the estimated useful life of the capital good is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such shorter period: . . . (B) Excess Output or Input Tax. ' If at the end of any taxable quarter the output tax exceeds the input tax, the excess shall be paid by the VAT-registered person. If the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters: PROVIDED that the input tax inclusive of input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT any input tax attributable to zerorated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, . . . 4. With regard to the amendments to other provisions of the NIRC on corporate income tax, franchise, percentage and excise taxes, the conference committee decided to include such amendments and basically adopted the provisions found in Senate Bill No. 1950, with some changes as to the rate of the tax to be imposed. Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules, the Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the disagreeing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term settle is synonymous to 'reconcile and 'harmonize.[25] To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions. In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions. The so-called stand-by authority in favor of the President, whereby the rate of 10% VAT wanted by the Senate is retained until such time that certain conditions arise when the 12% VAT wanted by the House shall be imposed, appears to be a compromise to try to bridge the difference in the rate of VAT proposed by the two houses of Congress. Nevertheless, such compromise is still totally within the subject of what rate of VAT should be imposed on taxpayers. The no pass-on provision was deleted altogether. In the transcripts of the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee held on May 10, 2005, Sen. Ralph Recto, Chairman of the Senate Panel, explained the reason for deleting the no pass-on provision in this wise: . . . the thinking was just to keep the VAT law or the VAT bill simple. And we were thinking that no sector should be a beneficiary of legislative grace, neither should any sector be discriminated on. The VAT is an indirect tax. It is a pass on-tax. And let's keep it plain and simple. Let's not confuse the bill and put a no pass-on provision. Two-thirds of the world have a VAT system and in this two-thirds of the globe, I have yet to see a VAT with a no pass-though provision. So, the thinking of the Senate is basically simple, let's keep the VAT simple.[26] (Emphasis supplied)

Rep. Teodoro Locsin further made the manifestation that the no pass-on provision 'never really enjoyed the support of either House.[27] With regard to the amount of input tax to be credited against output tax, the Bicameral Conference Committee came to a compromise on the percentage rate of the limitation or cap on such input tax credit, but again, the change introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee was totally within the intent of both houses' to 'put 'a cap on input tax that may be credited against the output tax. From the inception of the subject revenue bill in the House of Representatives, one of the major objectives was to 'plug a glaring loophole in the tax policy and administration by creating vital restrictions on the claiming of input VAT tax credits . . . and '[b]y introducing limitations on the claiming of tax credit, we are capping a major leakage that has placed our collection efforts at an apparent disadvantage.[28] As to the amendments to NIRC provisions on taxes other than the value-added tax proposed in Senate Bill No. 1950, since said provisions were among those referred to it, the conference committee had to act on the same and it basically adopted the version of the Senate. Thus, all the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were germane to subjects of the provisions' referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado[29] and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,[30] the Court recognized the long-standing legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for compromising differences' between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was held that: . . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an 'amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.[31] (Emphasis supplied) B. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on the 'No-Amendment Rule Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution, states: No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. Petitioners' argument that the practice where a bicameral conference committee is allowed to add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of the 'no amendment rule (Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution), fails to convince the Court to deviate from its ruling in the Tolentino case that: Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee's Report in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek modification of the compromise bill. . . . Art. VI. ' 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.[32] (Emphasis supplied) The Court reiterates here that the no-amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited. C. R.A. No. 9337 Does Not Violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on Exclusive Origination of Revenue Bills Coming to the issue of the validity of the amendments made regarding the NIRC provisions on corporate income taxes and percentage, excise taxes. Petitioners refer to the following provisions, to wit: Section 27 28(A)(1) Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporation Tax on Resident Foreign Corporation

28(B)(1) 34(B)(1) 116 117 119 121 148 151 236 237 288

Inter-corporate Dividends Inter-corporate Dividends Tax on Persons Exempt from VAT Percentage Tax on domestic carriers and keepers of Garage Tax on franchises Tax on banks and Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries Excise Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels Excise Tax on mineral products Registration requirements Issuance of receipts or sales or commercial invoices Disposition of Incremental Revenue

Petitioners claim that the amendments to these provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate from the House. They aver that House Bill No. 3555 proposed amendments only regarding Sections 106, 107, 108, 110 and 114 of the NIRC, while House Bill No. 3705 proposed amendments only to Sections 106, 107,108, 109, 110 and 111 of the NIRC; thus, the other sections of the NIRC which the Senate amended but which amendments were not found in the House bills are not intended to be amended by the House of Representatives. Hence, they argue that since the proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. The argument does not hold water. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution reads: Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. In the present cases, petitioners admit that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for amending provisions of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House? The foregoing question had been squarely answered in the Tolentino case, wherein the Court held, thus: . . . To begin with, it is not the law ' but the revenue bill ' which is required by the Constitution to 'originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. . . . At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute ' and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to 'concur with amendments but also to 'propose amendments. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. ... Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.[33] (Emphasis supplied) Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Senate to the NIRC provisions that had not been touched in the House bills are still in furtherance of the intent of the House in initiating the subject revenue bills. The Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 1468, the very first House bill introduced on the floor, which was later substituted by House Bill No. 3555, stated: One of the challenges faced by the present administration is the urgent and daunting task of solving the country's serious financial problems. To do this, government expenditures must be strictly monitored and controlled and revenues must be significantly increased. This may be easier said than done, but our fiscal authorities are still optimistic the government will be operating on a balanced budget

by the year 2009. In fact, several measures that will result to significant expenditure savings have been identified by the administration. It is supported with a credible package of revenue measures that include measures to improve tax administration and control the leakages in revenues from income taxes and the value-added tax (VAT). (Emphasis supplied) Rep. Eric D. Singson, in his sponsorship speech for House Bill No. 3555, declared that: In the budget message of our President in the year 2005, she reiterated that we all acknowledged that on top of our agenda must be the restoration of the health of our fiscal system. In order to considerably lower the consolidated public sector deficit and eventually achieve a balanced budget by the year 2009, we need to seize windows of opportunities which might seem poignant in the beginning, but in the long run prove effective and beneficial to the overall status of our economy. One such opportunity is a review of existing tax rates, evaluating the relevance given our present conditions.[34] (Emphasis supplied) Notably therefore, the main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring in sizeable revenues for the government to supplement our country's serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house bills were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of national perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways that would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consumers. The sponsorship speech of Sen. Ralph Recto on why the provisions on income tax on corporation were included is worth quoting: All in all, the proposal of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means will raise P64.3 billion in additional revenues annually even while by mitigating prices of power, services and petroleum products. However, not all of this will be wrung out of VAT. In fact, only P48.7 billion amount is from the VAT on twelve goods and services. The rest of the tab ' P10.5 billion- will be picked by corporations. What we therefore prescribe is a burden sharing between corporate Philippines and the consumer. Why should the latter bear all the pain? Why should the fiscal salvation be only on the burden of the consumer? The corporate world's equity is in form of the increase in the corporate income tax from 32 to 35 percent, but up to 2008 only. This will raise P10.5 billion a year. After that, the rate will slide back, not to its old rate of 32 percent, but two notches lower, to 30 percent. Clearly, we are telling those with the capacity to pay, corporations, to bear with this emergency provision that will be in effect for 1,200 days, while we put our fiscal house in order. This fiscal medicine will have an expiry date. For their assistance, a reward of tax reduction awaits them. We intend to keep the length of their sacrifice brief. We would like to assure them that not because there is a light at the end of the tunnel, this government will keep on making the tunnel long. The responsibility will not rest solely on the weary shoulders of the small man. Big business will be there to share the burden.[35] As the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which is to raise revenues for the government. Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes germane to the reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers. Considering that certain goods and services which were subject to percentage tax and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would be burdened more as they would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need to amend these sections to soften the impact of VAT. Again, in his sponsorship speech, Sen. Recto said: However, for power plants that run on oil, we will reduce to zero the present excise tax on bunker fuel, to lessen the effect of a VAT on this product. For electric utilities like Meralco, we will wipe out the franchise tax in exchange for a VAT. And in the case of petroleum, while we will levy the VAT on oil products, so as not to destroy the VAT chain, we will however bring down the excise tax on socially sensitive products such as diesel, bunker, fuel and kerosene. ... What do all these exercises point to? These are not contortions of giving to the left hand what was taken from the right. Rather, these sprang from our concern of softening the impact of VAT, so that the people can cushion the blow of higher prices they will have to pay as a result of VAT.[36]

The other sections amended by the Senate pertained to matters of tax administration which are necessary for the implementation of the changes in the VAT system. To reiterate, the sections introduced by the Senate are germane to the subject matter and purposes of the house bills, which is to supplement our country's fiscal deficit, among others. Thus, the Senate acted within its power to propose those amendments. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES I. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution: a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and b. Article VI, Section 28(2) A. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., Pimentel, Jr., et al., and Escudero, et al. contend in common that Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The assailed provisions read as follows: SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties. ' (A) Rate and Base of Tax. ' There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling price or gross value in money of the goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied. (i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%) or (ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 '%). SEC. 5. Section 107 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: SEC. 107. Value-Added Tax on Importation of Goods. ' (A) In General. ' There shall be levied, assessed and collected on every importation of goods a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) based on the total value used by the Bureau of Customs in determining tariff and customs duties, plus customs duties, excise taxes, if any, and other charges, such tax to be paid by the importer prior to the release of such goods from customs custody: Provided, That where the customs duties are determined on the basis of the quantity or volume of the goods, the value-added tax shall be based on the landed cost plus excise taxes, if any: provided, further, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%) after any of the following conditions has been satisfied. (i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and fourfifth percent (2 4/5%) or (ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 '%). SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: SEC. 108. Value-added Tax on Sale of Services and Use or Lease of Properties ' (A) Rate and Base of Tax. ' There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services: provided, that the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied. (i) value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and fourfifth percent (2 4/5%) or (ii) national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 '%). (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government. They argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services, which cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported. Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the President's power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by the law to bring about either or both the conditions precedent. On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation that the imposition of the 12% rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of Finance, an unelected bureaucrat, contrary to the principle of no taxation without representation. They submit that the Secretary of Finance is not mandated to give a favorable recommendation and he may not even give his recommendation. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are provided in the law on what basis and as to how he will make his recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not. A brief discourse on the principle of non-delegation of powers is instructive. The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters' falling within its' own constitutionally allocated sphere.[37] A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means 'what has been delegated, cannot be delegated.[38] This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.[39] With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that 'the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete law ' complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable ' and to determine the expediency of its enactment.[40] Thus, the rule is that in order that a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature ' that is, one appertaining exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation. Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized limitations or exceptions: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution; (3) Delegation to the people at large; (4) Delegation to local governments; and (5) Delegation to administrative bodies. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;[41] and (b) fixes a standard ' the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable ' to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[42] A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.[43] Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.[44] In People vs. Vera,[45] the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on the concept and extent of delegation of power in this wise:

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. ... The true distinction', says Judge Ranney, 'is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. ... It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community. In Wayman vs. Southard, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the government. Notwithstanding the apparent tendency, however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in this modern industrial age, the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof. Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following language ' speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative agencies: The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is governed. The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate. The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon the happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person or body the power to determine when the specified contingency has arisen. (Emphasis supplied).[46] In Edu vs. Ericta,[47] the Court reiterated: What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislative does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may be the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. 'The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability. (Emphasis supplied).[48] Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority.[49] While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.[50] The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform through its members, or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated problems of modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate information on the part of the legislators, and any reasonable method of securing such information is proper.[51] The Constitution as a continuously operative charter of government does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.[52] In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which reads as follows: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of valueadded tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 '%). The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.[53] 'Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.[54] Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than the legislature itself. The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that the law effectively nullified the President's power of control over the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the position of petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the phrase upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. Neither does the Court find persuasive the submission of petitioners Escudero, et al. that any recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter. When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President, it simply means that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as such, occupies a political position and holds office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, is 'subject to the direction of the President."[55] In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President.He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.[56] The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Congress simply granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact, namely, whether by December 31, 2005, the value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (24/5%) or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%). If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the President effective January 1, 2006. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.[57] Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.[58] As to the argument of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is contrary to the principle of republicanism, the same deserves scant consideration. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.[59] The insinuation by petitioners Pimentel, et al. that the President has ample powers to cause, influence or create the conditions to bring about either or both the conditions precedent does not deserve any merit as this argument is highly speculative. The Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all.The Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. When the Court acts on appearances instead of realities, justice and law will be short-lived. B. The 12% Increase VAT Rate Does Not Impose an Unfair and Unnecessary Additional Tax Burden

Petitioners Pimentel, et al. argue that the 12% increase in the VAT rate imposes an unfair and additional tax burden on the people. Petitioners also argue that the 12% increase, dependent on any of the 2 conditions set forth in the contested provisions, is ambiguous because it does not state if the VAT rate would be returned to the original 10% if the rates are no longer satisfied. Petitioners also argue that such rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year. Under the common provisos of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, if any of the two conditions set forth therein are satisfied, the President shall increase the VAT rate to 12%. The provisions of the law are clear. It does not provide for a return to the 10% rate nor does it empower the President to so revert if, after the rate is increased to 12%, the VAT collection goes below the 24/5 of the GDP of the previous year or that the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year does not exceed 1%. Therefore, no statutory construction or interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or limitations be introduced where none is provided for. Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that only Congress may tread upon.[60] Thus, in the absence of any provision providing for a return to the 10% rate, which in this case the Court finds none, petitioners' argument is, at best, purely speculative. There is no basis for petitioners' fear of a fluctuating VAT rate because the law itself does not provide that the rate should go back to 10% if the conditions provided in Sections 4, 5 and 6 are no longer present. The rule is that where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous, so that there is no occasion for the court's seeking the legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.[61] Petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT rate, which was allegedly an incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should be based on fiscal adequacy. Petitioners obviously overlooked that increase in VAT collection is not the only condition. There is another condition, i.e., the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 '%). Respondents explained the philosophy behind these alternative conditions: 1. VAT/GDP Ratio > 2.8%

The condition set for increasing VAT rate to 12% have economic or fiscal meaning. If VAT/GDP is less than 2.8%, it means that government has weak or no capability of implementing the VAT or that VAT is not effective in the function of the tax collection. 'Therefore, there is no value to increase it to 12% because such action will also be ineffectual. 2. Natl Govt Deficit/GDP >1.5%

The condition set for increasing VAT when deficit/GDP is 1.5% or less means the fiscal condition of government has reached a relatively sound position or is towards the direction of a balanced budget position. Therefore, there is no need to increase the VAT rate since the fiscal house is in a relatively healthy position. Otherwise stated, if the ratio is more than 1.5%, there is indeed a need to increase the VAT rate.[62] That the first condition amounts to an incentive to the President to increase the VAT collection does not render it unconstitutional so long as there is a public purpose for which the law was passed, which in this case, is mainly to raise revenue. In fact, fiscal adequacy dictated the need for a raise in revenue. The principle of fiscal adequacy as a characteristic of a sound tax system was originally stated by Adam Smith in his Canons of Taxation (1776), as: IV. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state.[63] It simply means that sources of revenues must be adequate to meet government expenditures and their variations.[64] The dire need for revenue cannot be ignored. Our country is in a quagmire of financial woe. During the Bicameral Conference Committee hearing, then Finance Secretary Purisima bluntly depicted the country's gloomy state of economic affairs, thus: First, let me explain the position that the Philippines finds itself in right now. We are in a position where 90 percent of our revenue is used for debt service. So, for every peso of revenue that we currently raise, 90 goes to debt service. That's interest plus amortization of our debt. So clearly, this is not a sustainable situation. That's the first fact. The second fact is that our debt to GDP level is way out of line compared to other peer countries that borrow money from that international financial markets. Our debt to GDP is approximately equal to our GDP. Again, that shows you that this is not a sustainable situation. The third thing that Id like to point out is the environment that we are presently operating in is not as benign as what it used to be the past five years.

What do I mean by that? In the past five years, weve been lucky because we were operating in a period of basically global growth and low interest rates. The past few months, we have seen an inching up, in fact, a rapid increase in the interest rates in the leading economies of the world. And, therefore, our ability to borrow at reasonable prices is going to be challenged. In fact, ultimately, the question is our ability to access the financial markets. When the President made her speech in July last year, the environment was not as bad as it is now, at least based on the forecast of most financial institutions. So, we were assuming that raising 80 billion would put us in a position where we can then convince them to improve our ability to borrow at lower rates. But conditions have changed on us because the interest rates have gone up. 'In fact, just within this room, we tried to access the market for a billion dollars because for this year alone, the Philippines will have to borrow 4 billion dollars. Of that amount, we have borrowed 1.5 billion. We issued last January a 25-year bond at 9.7 percent cost. We were trying to access last week and the market was not as favorable and up to now we have not accessed and we might pull back because the conditions are not very good. So given this situation, we at the Department of Finance believe that we really need to front-end our deficit reduction. Because it is deficit that is causing the increase of the debt and we are in what we call a debt spiral. The more debt you have, the more deficit you have because interest and debt service eats and eats more of your revenue. We need to get out of this debt spiral. And the only way, I think, we can get out of this debt spiral is really have a front-end adjustment in our revenue base.[65] The image portrayed is chilling. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue from an inevitable catastrophe. Whether the law is indeed sufficient to answer the state's economic dilemma is not for the Court to judge. In the Farias case, the Court refused to consider the various arguments raised therein that dwelt on the wisdom of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), pronouncing that: . . . policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.[66] In the same vein, the Court in this case will not dawdle on the purpose of Congress or the executive policy, given that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[67] II. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the Constitution: a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and b. Article III, Section 1 A. Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. argue that Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110 (A)(2), 110 (B), and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114 (C) of the NIRC are arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory. Their argument is premised on the constitutional right against deprivation of life, liberty of property without due process of law, as embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. Petitioners also contend that these provisions violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the law. The doctrine is that where the due process and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.[68] Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(B) of the NIRC imposes a limitation on the amount of input tax that may be credited against the output tax. It states, in part: '[P]rovided, that the input tax inclusive of the input VAT carried over from the previous quarter that may be credited in every quarter shall not exceed seventy percent (70%) of the output VAT: Input Tax is defined under Section 110(A) of the NIRC, as amended, as the value-added tax due from or paid by a VAT-registered person on the importation of goods or local purchase of good and services, including lease or use of property, in the course of trade or business, from a VAT-registered person, and Output Tax is the value-added tax due on the sale or lease of taxable goods or properties or services by any person registered or required to register under the law. Petitioners claim that the contested sections impose limitations on the amount of input tax that may be claimed. In effect, a portion of the input tax that has already been paid cannot now be credited against the output tax.

Petitioners' argument is not absolute. It assumes that the input tax exceeds 70% of the output tax, and therefore, the input tax in excess of 70% remains uncredited. However, to the extent that the input tax is less than 70% of the output tax, then 100% of such input tax is still creditable. More importantly, the excess input tax, if any, is retained in a business's books of accounts and remains creditable in the succeeding quarter/s. This is explicitly allowed by Section 110(B), which provides that 'if the input tax exceeds the output tax, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. In addition, Section 112(B) allows a VAT-registered person to apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund for any unused input taxes, to the extent that such input taxes have not been applied against the output taxes. Such unused input tax may be used in payment of his other internal revenue taxes. The non-application of the unutilized input tax in a given quarter is not ad infinitum, as petitioners exaggeratedly contend. Their analysis of the effect of the 70% limitation is incomplete and one-sided. It ends at the net effect that there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a given quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact that such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the subsequent periods as allowed by the carry-over provision of Section 110(B) or that it may later on be refunded through a tax credit certificate under Section 112(B). Therefore, petitioners' argument must be rejected. On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Garcia failed to comprehend the operation of the 70% limitation on the input tax. According to petitioner, the limitation on the creditable input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they collect, which violates the principle that tax collection and revenue should be for public purposes and expenditures As earlier stated, the input tax is the tax paid by a person, passed on to him by the seller, when he buys goods. Output tax meanwhile is the tax due to the person when he sells goods. In computing the VAT payable, three possible scenarios may arise: First, if at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by the seller are equal to the input taxes that he paid and passed on by the suppliers, then no payment is required; Second, when the output taxes exceed the input taxes, the person shall be liable for the excess, which has to be paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);[69] and Third, if the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters. Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions, any excess over the output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other internal revenue taxes, at the taxpayer's option.[70] Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337 however, imposed a 70% limitation on the input tax. Thus, a person can credit his input tax only up to the extent of 70% of the output tax. In layman's term, the value-added taxes that a person/taxpayer paid and passed on to him by a seller can only be credited up to 70% of the value-added taxes that is due to him on a taxable transaction. There is no retention of any tax collection because the person/taxpayer has already previously paid the input tax to a seller, and the seller will subsequently remit such input tax to the BIR. The party directly liable for the payment of the tax is the seller.[71] What only needs to be done is for the person/taxpayer to apply or credit these input taxes, as evidenced by receipts, against his output taxes. Petitioners Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc., et al. also argue that the input tax partakes the nature of a property that may not be confiscated, appropriated, or limited without due process of law. The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process clause. A VAT-registered person's entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which were created by the law of the state, although it may not take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights.[72] Under the previous system of single-stage taxation, taxes paid at every level of distribution are not recoverable from the taxes payable, although it becomes part of the cost, which is deductible from the gross revenue. When Pres. Aquino issued E.O. No. 273 imposing a 10% multi-stage tax on all sales, it was then that the crediting of the input tax paid on purchase or importation of goods and services by VAT-registered persons against the output tax was introduced.[73] This was adopted by the Expanded VAT Law (R.A. No. 7716),[74] and The Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8424).[75] The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege created by law, a privilege that also the law can remove, or in this case, limit. Petitioners also contest as arbitrary, oppressive, excessive and confiscatory, Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 110(A) of the NIRC, which provides: SEC. 110. Tax Credits. ' (A) Creditable Input Tax. ' Provided, That the input tax on goods purchased or imported in a calendar month for use in trade or business for which deduction for depreciation is allowed under this Code, shall be spread evenly over the month of acquisition and the fifty-nine (59) succeeding months if the aggregate acquisition cost for such goods, excluding the VAT component thereof, exceeds One million pesos (P1,000,000.00):

Provided, however, That if the estimated useful life of the capital goods is less than five (5) years, as used for depreciation purposes, then the input VAT shall be spread over such a shorter period: Provided, finally, That in the case of purchase of services, lease or use of properties, the input tax shall be creditable to the purchaser, lessee or license upon payment of the compensation, rental, royalty or fee. The foregoing section imposes a 60-month period within which to amortize the creditable input tax on purchase or importation of capital goods with acquisition cost of P1 Million pesos, exclusive of the VAT component. Such spread out only poses a delay in the crediting of the input tax. Petitioners' argument is without basis because the taxpayer is not permanently deprived of his privilege to credit the input tax. It is worth mentioning that Congress admitted that the spread-out of the creditable input tax in this case amounts to a 4-year interestfree loan to the government.[76] In the same breath, Congress also justified its move by saying that the provision was designed to raise an annual revenue of 22.6 billion.[77] The legislature also dispelled the fear that the provision will fend off foreign investments, saying that foreign investors have other tax incentives provided by law, and citing the case of China, where despite a 17.5% non-creditable VAT, foreign investments were not deterred.[78] Again, for whatever is the purpose of the 60-month amortization, this involves executive economic policy and legislative wisdom in which the Court cannot intervene. With regard to the 5% creditable withholding tax imposed on payments made by the government for taxable transactions, Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, which amended Section 114 of the NIRC, reads: SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. ' (C) Withholding of Value-added Tax. ' The Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each purchase of goods and services which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold a final valueadded tax at the rate of five percent (5%) of the gross payment thereof: Provided, That the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For purposes of this Section, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the withholding agent. The value-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end of the month the withholding was made. Section 114(C) merely provides a method of collection, or as stated by respondents, a more simplified VAT withholding system. The government in this case is constituted as a withholding agent with respect to their payments for goods and services. Prior to its amendment, Section 114(C) provided for different rates of value-added taxes to be withheld -- 3% on gross payments for purchases of goods; 6% on gross payments for services supplied by contractors other than by public works contractors; 8.5% on gross payments for services supplied by public work contractors; or 10% on payment for the lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners. Under the present Section 114(C), these different rates, except for the 10% on lease or property rights payment to nonresidents, were deleted, and a uniform rate of 5% is applied. The Court observes, however, that the law the used the word final. In tax usage, final, as opposed to creditable, means full. Thus, it is provided in Section 114(C): final value-added tax at the rate of five percent (5%). In Revenue Regulations No. 02-98, implementing R.A. No. 8424 (The Tax Reform Act of 1997), the concept of final withholding tax on income was explained, to wit: SECTION 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source (A) Final Withholding Tax. ' Under the final withholding tax system the amount of income tax withheld by the withholding agent is constituted as full and final payment of the income tax due from the payee on the said income. The liability for payment of the tax rests primarily on the payor as a withholding agent. Thus, in case of his failure to withhold the tax or in case of underwithholding, the deficiency tax shall be collected from the payor/withholding agent. ' (B) Creditable Withholding Tax. ' Under the creditable withholding tax system, taxes withheld on certain income payments are intended to equal or at least approximate the tax due of the payee on said income. ' Taxes withheld on income payments covered by the expanded withholding tax (referred to in Sec. 2.57.2 of these regulations) and compensation income (referred to in Sec. 2.78 also of these regulations) are creditable in nature. As applied to value-added tax, this means that taxable transactions with the government are subject to a 5% rate, which constitutes as full payment of the tax payable on the transaction. This represents the net VAT payable of the seller. The other 5% effectively accounts for the standard input VAT (deemed input VAT), in lieu of the actual input VAT directly or attributable to the taxable transaction.[79] The Court need not explore the rationale behind the provision. It is clear that Congress intended to treat differently taxable transactions with the government.[80] This is supported by the fact that under the old provision, the 5% tax withheld by the government remains creditable against the tax liability of the seller or contractor, to wit:

SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax. ' (C) Withholding of Creditable Value-added Tax. ' The Government or any of its political subdivisions, instrumentalities or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall, before making payment on account of each purchase of goods from sellers and services rendered by contractors which are subject to the value-added tax imposed in Sections 106 and 108 of this Code, deduct and withhold the value-added tax due at the rate of three percent (3%) of the gross payment for the purchase of goods and six percent (6%) on gross receipts for services rendered by contractors on every sale or installment payment which shall be creditable against the value-added tax liability of the seller or contractor: Provided, however, That in the case of government public works contractors, the withholding rate shall be eight and one-half percent (8.5%): Provided, further, That the payment for lease or use of properties or property rights to nonresident owners shall be subject to ten percent (10%) withholding tax at the time of payment. For this purpose, the payor or person in control of the payment shall be considered as the withholding agent. The valued-added tax withheld under this Section shall be remitted within ten (10) days following the end of the month the withholding was made. (Emphasis supplied) As amended, the use of the word final and the deletion of the word creditable exhibits Congress's intention to treat transactions with the government differently. Since it has not been shown that the class subject to the 5% final withholding tax has been unreasonably narrowed, there is no reason to invalidate the provision. Petitioners, as petroleum dealers, are not the only ones subjected to the 5% final withholding tax. It applies to all those who deal with the government. Moreover, the actual input tax is not totally lost or uncreditable, as petitioners believe. Revenue Regulations No. 14-2005 or the Consolidated Value-Added Tax Regulations 2005 issued by the BIR, provides that should the actual input tax exceed 5% of gross payments, the excess may form part of the cost. Equally, should the actual input tax be less than 5%, the difference is treated as income.[81] Petitioners also argue that by imposing a limitation on the creditable input tax, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added even if there is no profit or value-added. Petitioners' stance is purely hypothetical, argumentative, and again, one-sided. The Court will not engage in a legal joust where premises are what ifs, arguments, theoretical and facts, uncertain. Any disquisition by the Court on this point will only be, as Shakespeare describes life in Macbeth,[82] full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. What's more, petitioners' contention assumes the proposition that there is no profit or value-added. It need not take an astute businessman to know that it is a matter of exception that a business will sell goods or services without profit or value-added. It cannot be overstressed that a business is created precisely for profit. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that 'no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.[83] The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State's power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.[84] Petitioners point out that the limitation on the creditable input tax if the entity has a high ratio of input tax, or invests in capital equipment, or has several transactions with the government, is not based on real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification. The argument is pedantic, if not outright baseless. The law does not make any classification in the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection. Petitioners' alleged distinctions are based on variables that bear different consequences. While the implementation of the law may yield varying end results depending on one's profit margin and value-added, the Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down and interfere with the affairs of business. The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.[85] Petitioners brought to the Court's attention the introduction of Senate Bill No. 2038 by Sens. S.R. Osmea III and Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. ' Madrigal on June 6, 2005, and House Bill No. 4493 by Rep. Eric D. Singson. The proposed legislation seeks to amend the 70% limitation by increasing the same to 90%. This, according to petitioners, supports their stance that the 70% limitation is arbitrary and confiscatory. On this score, suffice it to say that these are still proposed legislations. Until Congress amends the law, and absent any unequivocal basis for its unconstitutionality, the 70% limitation stays. B. Uniformity and Equitability of Taxation

Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads: The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times.[86] In this case, the tax law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and services. Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the NIRC, provide for a rate of 10% (or 12%) on sale of goods and properties, importation of goods, and sale of services and use or lease of properties. These same sections also provide for a 0% rate on certain sales and transaction. Neither does the law make any distinction as to the type of industry or trade that will bear the 70% limitation on the creditable input tax, 5-year amortization of input tax paid on purchase of capital goods or the 5% final withholding tax by the government. It must be stressed that the rule of uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class.[87] R.A. No. 9337 is also equitable. The law is equipped with a threshold margin. The VAT rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) does not apply to sales of goods or services with gross annual sales or receipts not exceeding P1,500,000.00.[88] Also, basic marine and agricultural food products in their original state are still not subject to the tax,[89] thus ensuring that prices at the grassroots level will remain accessible. As was stated in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan:[90] The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, so that the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public. It is admitted that R.A. No. 9337 puts a premium on businesses with low profit margins, and unduly favors those with high profit margins. Congress was not oblivious to this. Thus, to equalize the weighty burden the law entails, the law, under Section 116, imposed a 3% percentage tax on VAT-exempt persons under Section 109(v), i.e., transactions with gross annual sales and/or receipts not exceeding P1.5 Million. This acts as a equalizer because in effect, bigger businesses that qualify for VAT coverage and VAT-exempt taxpayers stand on equal-footing. Moreover, Congress provided mitigating measures to cushion the impact of the imposition of the tax on those previously exempt. Excise taxes on petroleum products[91] and natural gas[92] were reduced. Percentage tax on domestic carriers was removed.[93] Power producers are now exempt from paying franchise tax.[94] Aside from these, Congress also increased the income tax rates of corporations, in order to distribute the burden of taxation. Domestic, foreign, and non-resident corporations are now subject to a 35% income tax rate, from a previous 32%.[95] Intercorporate dividends of non-resident foreign corporations are still subject to 15% final withholding tax but the tax credit allowed on the corporation's domicile was increased to 20%.[96] The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is not exempt from income taxes anymore.[97] Even the sale by an artist of his works or services performed for the production of such works was not spared. All these were designed to ease, as well as spread out, the burden of taxation, which would otherwise rest largely on the consumers. It cannot therefore be gainsaid that R.A. No. 9337 is equitable. C. Progressivity of Taxation

Lastly, petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but regressive. It is the smaller business with higher input tax-output tax ratio that will suffer the consequences. Progressive taxation is built on the principle of the taxpayer's ability to pay. This principle was also lifted from Adam Smith's Canons of Taxation, and it states: I. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up depending on the resources of the person affected.[98] The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. The disparity lies in the income earned by a person or profit margin marked by a business, such that the higher the income or profit margin, the smaller the portion of the income or profit that is eaten by VAT. A converso, the lower the income or profit margin, the bigger the part that the VAT eats away. At the end of the day, it is really the lower income group or businesses with low-profit margins that is always hardest hit.

Nevertheless, the Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes, like the VAT. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation." The Court stated in the Tolentino case, thus: The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall 'evolve a progressive system of taxation. The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that 'direct taxes are . . . to be preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized. (E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. 1977)) Indeed, the mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which perhaps are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII, '17 (1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, '28 (1) was taken. Sales taxes are also regressive. Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, '3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, '4 amending '103 of the NIRC)[99] CONCLUSION It has been said that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. In this case, it is just an enema, a first-aid measure to resuscitate an economy in distress. The Court is neither blind nor is it turning a deaf ear on the plight of the masses. But it does not have the panacea for the malady that the law seeks to remedy. As in other cases, the Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its yokes. Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that the judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature may not correct, for instance, those involving political questions. . . . Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of remedies for all political or social ills; We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously allocated the powers of government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the three, and a zealous regard of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the others and that, for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the ballot box.[100] The words of the Court in Vera vs. Avelino[101] holds true then, as it still holds true now. All things considered, there is no raison d'tre for the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9337. WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED. There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon finality of herein decision. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192935

December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 193036 REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.:

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. --- Justice Jose P. Laurel1 The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments.2 The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer.3 Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it.4 For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010." The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.7 The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives. The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read: EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1 CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives; WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious violation of this mandate; WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged sector of society; WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions; WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants; WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections "kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds; WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order: SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor. The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent collegial body. SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. In particular, it shall: a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate; b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other papers; c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being investigated by the Commission; d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be; e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be; f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose; g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and their private sector coprincipals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws; h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions and duties; i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate; j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence; k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order.

SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x. SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x. SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x. SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x. SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x. SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law. SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x. SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible. SECTION 12. Office. x x x. SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x. SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31, 2012. SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x. SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x. SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order. SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof. SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately. DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010. (SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III By the President: (SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. Executive Secretary Nature of the Truth Commission As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.8 To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards

in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions. The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and non-judicial factfinding bodies "to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a countrys past."9 They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice. Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.10 "Commissions members are usually empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms."11 Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims. The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer12 puts it: The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: "To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again." The Thrusts of the Petitions Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner: (a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. (b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission." (c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission" with quasijudicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987. (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. (e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates the consistent and general international practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution. (f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty. (g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or even a statute."13

In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments: 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 141616 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,17 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies. 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress. 3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction. 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes. The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.18 From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1; 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; 3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ; 4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and 5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief. Essential requisites for judicial review Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.19 Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue. Legal Standing of the Petitioners The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.20 The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,21

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.22 With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.23 It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo24 explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus: Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted] Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."25 Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,26 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance28 laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco29 are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to

justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society. Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.31 Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed32 since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."34 Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.35 Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.36 Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority. The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized.37 According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.39 It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.40 The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline subordinates,41 his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes42 and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.43 The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,44 where it was held that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the government.45 The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative. To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,46

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied] In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.48 The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.49 The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause: WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the national government. Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says "it was enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the legislative and executive powers are fused, correct? SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution. SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct. SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.50 While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads: Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied). As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the

Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:52 x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances. It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x. Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled: The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied] It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed. On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission."55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding. Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithfulexecution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.56 As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department.57 Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law."58 In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies. The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasijudicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted] Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.60 Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.61 Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation."62 The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them,63 is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.64 At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,65 it was written: This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied]. Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied] The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans primordial duties. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes. Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be

recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility."66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.67 The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68 were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption."69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force."70 Position of respondents According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous administration" as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said administration.71 Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for "the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the following: First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants. Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration. Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede the current administration. Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.73 [Emphases supplied] Concept of the Equal Protection Clause One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination

offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.74 "According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities."77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."78 The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.79 Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80 It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."82 For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.83 "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."84 The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted] Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these are: WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all; SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and

employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor. SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied] In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration" only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."88 The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness."89 The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil it breeds."90 The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the bodys limited time and resources. "The law does not require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).91 Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,92 Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied] It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.94 While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of "substantial distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an "adventure in partisan hostility." In the case of US v. Cyprian,95 it was written: "A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights." To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class."97 The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause."98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its reach."99 It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.100 In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process.101 "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked."102

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."103 To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.104 The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides: SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order. The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration."105 The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,106 that the "PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause." The decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action. A final word The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress. The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments. To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them."107 Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional. It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.108 The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. "The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude."109

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and not of men."110 WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1. SO ORDERED. EN BANC G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004 SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO Petitioners, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, Respondents. G.R. No. 159103. February 3, 2004 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, Petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 159185. February 3, 2004 REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL-HERMIDA, Petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Respondents. G.R. No. 159196. February 3, 2004 AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., Respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: They came in the middle of the night.Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).1 In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation No. 427 reads in full: PROCLAMATION NO. 427 DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic

of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government service and outside the government; WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion; NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion, compelling me to declare a state of rebellion. In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. General Order No. 4 is similarly worded: GENERAL ORDER NO. 4 DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 et seq. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government service and outside the government; WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion; NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress and quell the rebellion. I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435: DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, a state of rebellion was declared; WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003, which was issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, and pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion; WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police have effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist.

In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4. In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.),2 party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.3 They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.4 Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS), Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers.5 Like Sanlakas and PM, they claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion.6 They contend that the declaration is a constitutional anomaly that confuses, confounds and misleads because [o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of private citizens.7 Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law.8 Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.9 In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo), petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion.10 Petitioners do not challenge the power of the President to call out the Armed Forces.11 They argue, however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a superfluity, and is actually an exercise of emergency powers.12 Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.13 In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner Senator assails the subject presidential issuances as an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution.14 In the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion.15 Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.16 In addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the petitioners to bring suit.17 The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of actual controversies.18 Nevertheless, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.19 The case at bar is one such case. Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to break into Malacaang.20 Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases21 precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the Presidents calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 22 this Court recognized that: To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny into the Presidents exercise of martial law powers. Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.The gist of the question of standing is

whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.23 Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that: 2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens. 3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support the same.24 [Emphasis in the original.] Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez: petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion.Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement. At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[]s right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution. However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.25 Even assuming that petitioners are peoples organizations, this status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato: 26 The Constitution provides that the State shall respect the role of independent peoples organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means, that their right to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. (Art. XIII, 15-16) These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.27 That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.28 No such illegal disbursement is alleged. On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.29 Again, no such injury is alleged in this case. Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail. It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of

invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.] The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated power[s].30 From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law.In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.31 However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,32 [t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers. Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: The executive power shall be vested in the President. As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United States. The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S. President executive and commander-in-chief powers have remained in their original simple form since the Philadelphia Constitution of 1776, Article II of which states in part: Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America . . . . .... Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. . . . .... Section 3. he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. [Article II Executive Power] Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of the above-quoted provisions, as juxtaposed against the corresponding action of the U.S. Supreme Court, is instructive. Clad with the prerogatives of the office and endowed with sovereign powers, which are drawn chiefly from the Executive Power and Commander-in-Chief provisions, as well as the presidential oath of office, the President serves as Chief of State or Chief of Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Foreign Relations and Chief of Public Opinion.33 First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State, as the protector of the people, was President Andrew Jackson. Coming to office by virtue of a political revolution, Jackson, as President not only kept faith with the people by

driving the patricians from power. Old Hickory, as he was fondly called, was the first President to champion the indissolubility of the Union by defeating South Carolinas nullification effort.34 The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did not pacify the hotspurs from South Carolina.Its State Legislature ordered an election for a convention, whose members quickly passed an Ordinance of Nullification.The Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts unconstitutional, prohibited South Carolina citizens from obeying them after a certain date in 1833, and threatened secession if the Federal Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The Legislature then implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive laws aimed at any who sought to pay or collect customs duties.35 Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be easy.Technically, the President might send troops into a State only if the Governor called for help to suppress an insurrection, which would not occur in the instance. The President could also send troops to see to it that the laws enacted by Congress were faithfully executed. But these laws were aimed at individual citizens, and provided no enforcement machinery against violation by a State. Jackson prepared to ask Congress for a force bill.36 In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his position. He wrote: . . . when a faction in a State attempts to nullify a constitutional law of Congress, or to destroy the Union, the balance of the people composing this Union have a perfect right to coerce them to obedience. Then in a Proclamation he issued on December 10, 1832, he called upon South Carolinians to realize that there could be no peaceable interference with the execution of the laws, and dared them, disunion by armed force is treason. Are you ready to incur its guilt? 37 The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and tight-rope walkers. Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt resolutions of agreement, and the President announced that the national voice from Maine on the north to Louisiana on the south had declared nullification and accession confined to contempt and infamy.38 No other President entered office faced with problems so formidable, and enfeebled by personal and political handicaps so daunting, as Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln believed the Presidents power broad and that of Congress explicit and restricted, and sought some source of executive power not failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage. He seized upon the Presidents designation by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to the executive power provision and joined them as the war power which authorized him to do many things beyond the competence of Congress.39 Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the Presidents independent power and duty under his oath directly to represent and protect the people. In his Message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln declared that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power in defense of the government forced upon him. He could not but perform the duty or surrender the existence of the Government . . . . This concept began as a transition device, to be validated by Congress when it assembled. In less than twoyears, it grew into an independent power under which he felt authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and restore reoccupied States.40 Lincolns Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 troops. Their first service, according to the proclamation, would be to recapture forts, places and property, taking care to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens.41 Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President Lincolns report to use the war powers without the benefit of Congress. The decision was handed in the celebrated Prize Cases42 which involved suits attacking the Presidents right to legally institute a blockade. Although his Proclamation was subsequently validated by Congress, the claimants contended that under international law, a blockade could be instituted only as a measure of war under the sovereign power of the State. Since under the Constitution only Congress is exclusively empowered to declare war, it is only that body that could impose a blockade and all prizes seized before the legislative declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld Lincolns right to act as he had.43 In the course of time, the U.S. Presidents power to call out armed forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without prior legislative approval, in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized and accepted. The United States introduced the expanded presidential powers in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1902.44 The use of the power was put to judicial test and this Court held that the case raised a political question and said that it is beyond its province to inquire into the exercise of the power.45 Later, the grant of the power was incorporated in the 1935 Constitution.46 Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the presidency to mean that it made him the trustee of all the people. Guided by the maxim that Public office is a public trust, which he practiced during his incumbency, Cleveland sent federal troops to Illinois to quell striking railway workers who defied a court injunction. The injunction banned all picketing and distribution of handbills. For leading the strikes and violating the injunction, Debs, who was the union president, was convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the Supreme Court, the principal issue was by what authority of the Constitution or statute had the President to send troops without the request of the Governor of the State.47

In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al,48 the Supreme Court upheld the contempt conviction. It ruled that it is not the governments province to mix in merely individual present controversies. Still, so it went on, whenever wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the Courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties.49 Thus, Clevelands course had the Courts attest. Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore Roosevelt launched what political scientists dub the stewardship theory. Calling himself the steward of the people, he felt that the executive power was limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its constitutional powers.50 The most far-reaching extension of presidential power T.R. ever undertook to employ was his plan to occupy and operate Pennsylvanias coal mines under his authority as Commander-in-Chief.In the issue, he found means other than force to end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he had made detailed plans to use his power as Commander-in-Chief to wrest the mines from the stubborn operators, so that coal production would begin again.51 Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take over the operation of vital utilities in the public interest was accepted. In the Philippines, this led to the incorporation of Section 6,52 Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which was later carried over with modifications in Section 7,53 Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, and thereafter in Section 18,54 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State. In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was vested with residual power and that this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this distinction to the unitary and highly centralized nature of the Philippine government. She noted that, There is no counterpart of the several states of the American union which have reserved powers under the United States constitution. Elaborating on the constitutional basis for her argument, she wrote: . The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments of the government in this manner: The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines. The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be provided by law. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, a grant of legislative power means a grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government. If this is true of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply to the executive power which is vested in one official the president. He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the executive branch absent from the two other branches of government. The president is not the chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more immediate and direct than the United States president because he is given by express provision of the constitution control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.55 The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of the 1935 Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a general opinion in favor of a strong Executive in the Philippines.56 Since then, reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our most recent Charter has restricted the Presidents powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the Presidents powers as Chief Executive. In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the Presidents power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majoritys ruling rested on the Presidents unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.57[Underscoring supplied. Italics in the original.] Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out,

statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. [Emphasis supplied.] The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity.58 At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.59 Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Courts mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights.60 Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these conditions.62 At any rate, the presidential issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that [i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state of rebellion.64 In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.65 The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the theater of war or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law powers. Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution: Sec. 23. (1) . (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG, Petitioners, vs.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171409 May 3, 2006

NIEZ CACHO-OLIVARES AND TRIBUNE PUBLISHING CO., INC., Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND HONORABLE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171485 May 3, 2006

FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO, JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, MARIO J. AGUJA, SATUR C. OCAMPO, MUJIV S. HATAMAN, JUAN EDGARDO ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL JOSEL J. VILLANUEVA, LIZA L. MAZA, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO B. MAGTUBO, JUSTIN MARC SB. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLEZ, DARLENE ANTONINO-CUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, JOSEL G. VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GILBERT C. REMULLA, FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES REPRESENTED BY AMADO GAT INCIONG, Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., SECRETARY, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETARY, DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF PNP, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171483 May 3, 2006

KILUSANG MAYO UNO, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON ELMER C. LABOG AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOEL MAGLUNSOD, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT, JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, JR., AND ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners, vs. HER EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171400 May 3, 2006

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, Respondents. G.R. No. 171489 May 3, 2006

JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOSVIDAL, FELIMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J.B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), Petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PNP CHIEF, Respondents. x-------------------------------------x G.R. No. 171424 May 3, 2006

LOREN B. LEGARDA, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF; ARTURO LOMIBAO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP); GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP); AND EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.1 Superior strength the use of force cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights of the citizens, specifically their liberty. Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: "In cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts "with a heavy presumption against their constitutional validity."2 These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes license?3 On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus: NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency. She cited the following facts as bases: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President; WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people; On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus: WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004; WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government; WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national media; WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and their faith in the future of this country; WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy; WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State; WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government; WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino people; WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National Emergency; NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country; I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads: WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency; WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary; WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion; NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.4 They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners counsels.

The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation, however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues. On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to "show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms." 5 On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA parade ground. On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.7 Prior to his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the "Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I." On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to "disavow" any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: "All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty." On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos brother, businessmen and midlevel government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his groups plans if President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Armys elite Scout Ranger. Lim said "it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo."8 B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio. Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio "Ka Roger" Rosal declared: "The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to end it."9 On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: "Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field." He claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006. Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.10 By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region. For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary

Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled.Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that "warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media, can already be implemented."11 Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in Makati City.12 According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building.13 A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is "meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow "standards set by the government during the state of national emergency." Director General Lomibao stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the standards are - if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for "balanced reporting" from broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security is threatened.14 Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated 1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions. When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police. Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody. Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite. Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan Muna Representative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the "Batasan 5" decided to stay indefinitely. Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are not being raised in these petitions. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) itis a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017. In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so." In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances. In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 415 of Article II, (b) Sections 1,16 2,17 and 418 of Article III, (c) Section 2319 of Article VI, and (d) Section 1720 of Article XII of the Constitution. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code." And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are "unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for being moot; second,petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.) and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the peoples right to free expression and redress of grievances. On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may be summarized as follows: A. PROCEDURAL: 1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic. 2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing. B. SUBSTANTIVE: 1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017. 2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. a. Facial Challenge b. Constitutional Basis c. As Applied Challenge A. PROCEDURAL First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.

I- Moot and Academic Principle One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation -The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of judicial review.22 But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a "self-starting capacity."23 Courts may exercise such power only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.24 Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief.25 The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic" by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021. Such contention lacks merit. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,26 so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.27 Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case28 or dismiss it on ground of mootness.29 The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative."30 The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;31 second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;32 third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;33 and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.34 All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.35 And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.36 However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justices very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice. II- Legal Standing In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi. Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."37 In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."38 Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer. Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,39 where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:40 "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v. Jordan41 held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied." However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt,42 later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.43 The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public. This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,44 it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,45 Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works47 and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48 However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,49 where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec,50 this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.51 Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under the principle of "transcendental importance." Pertinent are the following cases: (1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,52 where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi; (2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,53 wherein the Court held that "given the transcendental importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review" of the Visiting Forces Agreement; (3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,54 while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that "Balikatan 02-01" involves the exercise of Congress taxing or spending powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,55that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may be relaxed. By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,56 the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization does not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered. In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,57 the Court reiterated the "direct injury" test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional issues. It held that "there must be a showing that the citizen personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act." In Lacson v. Perez,58 the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,59 the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress, thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson. Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions. The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not question their legal standing. In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights. In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,60 Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,61 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,62 Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,63 and Taada v. Tuvera,64 that when the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws. In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.65 We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,66 the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules. It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the "liberality doctrine" on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the application of the "transcendental importance" doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the petitioners in the "PP 1017 cases."1avvphil.net This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,67 may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people68 but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.69 B. SUBSTANTIVE I. Review of Factual Bases Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not "necessary" for President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation. The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker70 and Montenegro v. Castaneda71 to the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,72 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,73 and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.74 The tug-of-war always cuts across the line defining "political questions," particularly those questions "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."75 Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, "under which the President is supreme, x x x only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme."76 In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.77 There, the Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question.78 Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re-examine the latter case, ratiocinating that "in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience, the People, and God."79 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora80 -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.81 It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.82 As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that "judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct," but that "the President did not act arbitrarily." Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.83 In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court further ruled that "it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis" and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then "this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 Doctrines of Several Political Theorists on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency

This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion. John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative "power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes even against it."84 But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that "the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven."85 Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in time of emergency. According to him: The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse... If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the peoples first intention is that the State shall not perish.86 Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or "supreme magistracy" as he termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by "indiscreet use." He was unwilling to rely upon an "appeal to heaven." Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.87 John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: "I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship."88 Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus: Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra constitutional measures; for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it.89 Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints.90 Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.91 Frederick M. Watkins saw "no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions," provided it "serves to protect established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life."92 He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time "imposing limitation upon that power."93 Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a dictatorship: "The period of dictatorship must be relatively shortDictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in characterFinal authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator himself"94 and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be "strict political conservatism." Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.95 "It is a problem of concentrating power in a government where power has consciously been divided to cope with situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and to what end."96 Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: "The emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to determine the existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order."97

Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar, Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of "constitutional dictatorship" as solution to the vexing problems presented by emergency.98 Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the "constitutional dictatorship," thus: 1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order 2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the man or men who will constitute the dictator 3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific provisions for its termination 4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements 5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . . 6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be permanent in character or effect 7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . . 8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional dictatorship. . . 9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . . 10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it was instituted 11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship99 Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would secure to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the effectiveness of congressional investigating committees.100 Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, "the suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation is not based upon sound constitutional theory." To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term "dictator" is used in its normal sense (as applied to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering emergency powers. However used, "constitutional dictatorship" cannot be divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus, they favored instead the "concept of constitutionalism" articulated by Charles H. McIlwain: A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers, and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in the limiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism with "limited" as distinguished from "weak" government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a complete political responsibility of government to the governed.101 In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists - from Locks "theory of prerogative," to Watkins doctrine of "constitutional dictatorship" and, eventually, to McIlwains "principle of constitutionalism" --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.

Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jacksons "balanced power structure."102 Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations. a. "Facial Challenge" Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth." They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to the citizens. A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for. First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.103 A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,104 the US Supreme Court held that "we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment" (freedom of speech). Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,105 it was held: It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct."106 Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is "generally disfavored;"107 The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.108 A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further: The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,109 it was held that: [T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists. Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted. Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."110 It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017. b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017 Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017. The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus: First provision: "by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion" Second provision: "and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;" Third provision: "as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency." First Provision: Calling-out Power The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,111 this Court, through Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,112 the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country. Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations. It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a "state of rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides: SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. President Arroyos declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case of Sanlakas. Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power. The declaration of Martial Law is a "warn[ing] to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law."113 In his "Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice" on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,114 an authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides: A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its command is ultra vires. Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence. Second Provision: "Take Care" Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,115 the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, "execute its laws."116 In the exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,117 including the Philippine National Police118 under the Department of Interior and Local Government.119 Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." \ Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted120 from Former President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate "decrees"? PP 1017 states in part: "to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the following: Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.121 This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws," she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence. Third Provision: Power to Take Over The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states: x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency. The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees x x x" but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads: Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017? The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President, without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the "martial law" thinking of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.122 In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over "the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency." Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers. This is an area that needs delineation. A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise. Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads: SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress. Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other.123 Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.124 Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,125 held: It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . . .;" that "he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed;" and that he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the Presidents military power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater of war" be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nations lawmakers, not for its military authorities. Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the Presidents power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. . ."126 Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term "emergency" under Section 17, Article XII refers to "tsunami," "typhoon," "hurricane"and"similar occurrences." This is a limited view of "emergency." Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or wellbeing beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception.127 Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,128 b) natural disaster,129 and c) national security.130

"Emergency," as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.131 This is evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus: MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees definition of "national emergency" which appears in Section 13, page 5? It reads: When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest. MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters. MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots? MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term "national emergency." MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service.132 xxxxxx MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if "national emergency" refers to military national emergency or could this be economic emergency?" MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations. MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.133 It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. In Araneta v. Dinglasan,134 this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis. "x x x After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively." Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. c. "AS APPLIED CHALLENGE" One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are curtailed and trampled

upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest; and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow. Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate "direct injury." In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the arrest. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the CIDG operatives "raided and ransacked without warrant" their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible "source of destabilization." Again, the basis was PP 1017. And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were "turned away and dispersed" when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20th Anniversary of People Power I. A perusal of the "direct injuries" allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017. Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional? Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused135 and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.136 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.137 PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens constitutional rights. Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.138 This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago. President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are "acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." They are internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations create no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them.139 They are based on and are the product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object.140 For these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence." Unlike the term "lawless violence" which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably associated with "invasion, insurrection or rebellion," the phrase "acts of terrorism" is still an amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism. In fact, this "definitional predicament" or the "absence of an agreed definition of terrorism" confronts not only our country, but the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos: In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the "fight against terrorism" has become one of the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups operating internationally. Lists of states "sponsoring terrorism" and of terrorist organizations are set up and constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined by strategic interests. The basic problem underlying all these military actions or threats of the use of force as the most recent by the United States against Iraq consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism. Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying "One countrys terrorist is another countrys freedom fighter." The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term "terrorism" may further be demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected statesmen. What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense? Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable to bridge the gap between those who associate "terrorism" with any violent act by non-state groups against civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic and/or religious groups within a state is concerned. The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which is a terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims the Kashmiri resistance groups who are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan the earlier Contras in Nicaragua freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp or, most drastically, the Afghani Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way because of opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions. How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in the divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will "fluctuate" accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its territory and will therefore speak of a "liberation struggle," not of "terrorism" when acts of violence by this group are concerned, and vice-versa. The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter dichotomy. A "policy of double standards" on this vital issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable consequence. This "definitional predicament" of an organization consisting of sovereign states and not of peoples, in spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! has become even more serious in the present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.141 The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression on their part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and imposing the corresponding penalty thereon. So far, the word "terrorism" appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled "Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations." The word "terrorism" is mentioned in the following provision: "That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x x." P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define "acts of terrorism." Since there is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts are considered illegal.

We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.) The Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."142 The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.143 In the Brief Account144 submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth,he was treated brusquely by policemen who "held his head and tried to push him" inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang No. 880145 and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh,he was eventually released for insufficiency of evidence. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and x x x. Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective "Oust Gloria Now" and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.146 Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.147 But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble. Section 4 of Article III guarantees: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. "Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required. The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon,148 it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus: Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a conspiracy

against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge. On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent."149 Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated. Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.150 The first time they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a persons right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure. G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily Tribunes offices were searched without warrant;second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices. Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was "meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government." Director General Lomibao further stated that "if they do not follow the standards and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover." National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks to "cooperate" with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage during times when the national security is threatened.151 The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives. Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff152 this Court held that -As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum" newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry. While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.153 Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.154

Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribunes offices and the seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible "for any purpose," thus: JUSTICE CALLEJO: You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when inspected the Tribune for the purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility of these clippings that were taken from the Tribune? SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO: Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your Honor, and these are inadmissible for any purpose.155 xxxxxxxxx SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to get those past issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 oclock in the morning and without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of rebellion or inciting to sedition or what? SOLGEN BENIPAYO: Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is not based on Proclamation 1017. SOLGEN BENIPAYO: It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which says that the police could go and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any other newspaper. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: Is it based on any law? SOLGEN BENIPAYO: As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no. SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO: So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever? SOLGEN BENIPAYO: Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I dont know if it is premature to say this, we do not condone this. If the people who have been injured by this would want to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.156 Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal and cannot be condoned, thus: CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory. SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

I dont know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts committed on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that is their responsibility.157 The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and "should result in no constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter." The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal. In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part of this ponencia. SUMMATION In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5. On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities. It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state.During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty. Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed.158 WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No costs. SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008] AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN"), PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHAN SA KANAYUNAN ("PKSK"), ALLIANCE OF PROGRESSIVE LABOR ("APL"), VICENTE A. FABE, ANGELITO R. MENDOZA, MANUEL P. QUIAMBAO, ROSE BEATRIX CRUZ-ANGELES, CONG. LORENZO R. TANADA III, CONG. MARIO JOYO AGUJA, CONG. LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, CONG. ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, AND CONG. EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, PETITIONERS, VS. THOMAS G. AQUINO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (DTI) AND CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF DELEGATE OF THE PHILIPPINE COORDINATING COMMITTEE (PCC) FOR THE JAPAN-PHILIPPINES ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, EDSEL T. CUSTODIO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) AND CO-CHAIR OF THE PCC FOR THE JPEPA, EDGARDO ABON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE TARIFF COMMISSION AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR COMPETITION POLICY AND EMERGENCY MEASURES OF THE JPEPA, MARGARITA SONGCO, IN HER CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR TRADE IN SERVICES AND COOPERATION OF THE JPEPA, MALOU MONTERO, IN HER CAPACITY AS FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER I, OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS OF THE DFA AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR THE GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS OF THE JPEPA, ERLINDA ARCELLANA, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR TRADE IN GOODS (GENERAL RULES) OF THE JPEPA, RAQUEL ECHAGUE, IN HER CAPACITY AS LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR RULES OF ORIGIN OF THE JPEPA, GALLANT SORIANO, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR CUSTOMS PROCEDURES AND PAPERLESS TRADING OF THE JPEPA, MA. LUISA GIGETTE IMPERIAL, IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR MOVEMENT OF NATURAL PERSONS OF THE JPEPA, PASCUAL DE GUZMAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR INVESTMENT OF THE JPEPA, JESUS MOTOOMULL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR FOR THE BUREAU OF PRODUCT STANDARDS OF THE DTI AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE JPEPA, LOUIE CALVARIO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE JPEPA, ELMER H. DORADO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT POLICY BOARD TECHNICAL SUPPORT OFFICE, THE GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT IS LEADING THE NEGOTIATIONS ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT OF THE JPEPA, RICARDO V. PARAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF STATE COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ) AND LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR DISPUTE AVOIDANCE AND SETTLEMENT OF THE JPEPA, ADONIS SULIT, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LEAD NEGOTIATOR FOR THE GENERAL AND FINAL PROVISIONS OF THE JPEPA, EDUARDO R. ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DFA,* RESPONDENTS. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Taada III and Mario Joyo Aguja filed on January 25, 2005 House Resolution No. 551 calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade agreements then being negotiated by the Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA. The Resolution became the basis of an inquiry subsequently conducted by the House Special Committee on Globalization (the House Committee) into the negotiations of the JPEPA. In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested herein respondent Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino), Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating Committee created under Executive Order No. 213 ("Creation of A Philippine Coordinating Committee to Study the Feasibility of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement")[1] to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did not heed the request, however. Congressman Aguja later requested for the same document, but Usec. Aquino, by letter of November 2, 2005, replied that the Congressman shall be provided with a copy thereof "once the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review of the proposed agreement has been conducted."

In a separate move, the House Committee, through Congressman Herminio G. Teves, requested Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish it with "all documents on the subject including the latest draft of the proposed agreement, the requests and offers etc."[2] Acting on the request, Secretary Ermita, by letter of June 23, 2005, wrote Congressman Teves as follows: In its letter dated 15 June 2005 (copy enclosed), [the] D[epartment of] F[oreign] A[ffairs] explains that the Committee's request to be furnished all documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a work in progress for about three years. A copy of the draft JPEPA will however be forwarded to the Committee as soon as the text thereof is settled and complete. (Emphasis supplied) Congressman Aguja also requested NEDA Director-General Romulo Neri and Tariff Commission Chairman Edgardo Abon, by letter of July 1, 2005, for copies of the latest text of the JPEPA. Chairman Abon replied, however, by letter of July 12, 2005 that the Tariff Commission does not have a copy of the documents being requested, albeit he was certain that Usec. Aquino would provide the Congressman with a copy "once the negotiation is completed." And by letter of July 18, 2005, NEDA Assistant Director-General Margarita R. Songco informed the Congressman that his request addressed to Director-General Neri had been forwarded to Usec. Aquino who would be "in the best position to respond" to the request. In its third hearing conducted on August 31, 2005, the House Committee resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of the JPEPA, but the same was not pursued because by Committee Chairman Congressman Teves' information, then House Speaker Jose de Venecia had requested him to hold in abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.[3] Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by the Philippine government within December 2005, the present petition was filed on December 9, 2005.[4] The agreement was to be later signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following which the President endorsed it to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution. To date, the JPEPA is still being deliberated upon by the Senate. The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and final provisions.[5] While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006,[6] respondents do not dispute that, at the time the petition was filed up to the filing of petitioners' Reply - when the JPEPA was still being negotiated - the initial drafts thereof were kept from public view. Before delving on the substantive grounds relied upon by petitioners in support of the petition, the Court finds it necessary to first resolve some material procedural issues. Standing For a petition for mandamus such as the one at bar to be given due course, it must be instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right.[7] Respondents deny that petitioners have such standing to sue. "[I]n the interest of a speedy and definitive resolution of the substantive issues raised," however, respondents consider it sufficient to cite a portion of the ruling in Pimentel v. Office of Executive Secretary[8] which emphasizes the need for a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" on questions of standing. In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.[9] As the present petition is anchored on the right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence. Mootness Considering, however, that "[t]he principal relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,"[10] public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been largely rendered moot and academic. With the Senate deliberations on the JPEPA still pending, the agreement as it now stands cannot yet be considered as final and binding between the two States. Article 164 of the JPEPA itself provides that the agreement does not take effect immediately upon the signing thereof. For it must still go through the procedures required by the laws of each country for its entry into force, viz: Article 164 Entry into Force This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which the Governments of the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective legal procedures necessary for entry into force of this Agreement have been completed. It shall remain in force unless terminated as provided for in Article 165.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

President Arroyo's endorsement of the JPEPA to the Senate for concurrence is part of the legal procedures which must be met prior to the agreement's entry into force. The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the disclosure of the "full text" thereof. The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.[12] A discussion of the substantive issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers, is thus in order. Grounds relied upon by petitioners Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public concern[13] and contravenes other constitutional provisions on transparency, such as that on the policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.[14] Second, they contend that non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social, political, and economic decisionmaking.[15] Lastly, they proffer that divulging the contents of the JPEPA only after the agreement has been concluded will effectively make the Senate into a mere rubber stamp of the Executive, in violation of the principle of separation of powers. Significantly, the grounds relied upon by petitioners for the disclosure of the latest text of the JPEPA are, except for the last, the same as those cited for the disclosure of the Philippine and Japanese offers. The first two grounds relied upon by petitioners which bear on the merits of respondents' claim of privilege shall be discussed. The last, being purely speculatory given that the Senate is still deliberating on the JPEPA, shall not. The JPEPA is a matter of public concern To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern. Apropos is the teaching of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. `Public concern' like `public interest' is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.[16] (Underscoring supplied) From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public disclosure. Respondents' claim of privilege It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature. The types of information which may be considered privileged have been elucidated in Almonte v. Vasquez,[17] Chavez v. PCGG,[18] Chavez v. Public Estate's Authority,[19] and most recently in Senate v. Ermita[20] where the Court reaffirmed the validity of the doctrine of executive privilege in this jurisdiction and dwelt on its scope. Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.[21] In the present case, the ground for respondents' claim of privilege is set forth in their Comment, viz: x x x The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters of diplomatic character and under negotiation and review. In this case, the privileged character of the diplomatic negotiations has been categorically invoked and clearly explained by respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary. The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege. At the time when the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering the status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence. Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the disclosure of the "rolling texts" which may undergo radical change or portions of which may be totally abandoned. Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the information sought involves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.

Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest."[23] Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in People's Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus[24] wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more precise terms. In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the President's representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.[25] The Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information." The Resolution went on to state, thus: The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although much has been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson: "A complicated negotiation . . . cannot be carried through without many, many private talks and discussion, man to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences with other countries and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances and would not do under other circumstances. . . If these reports . . . should become public . . . who would ever trust American Delegations in another conference? (United States Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284.)." xxxx There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy. As expressed by one writer, "It can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the Censorship, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War declared that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived at." He quickly abandoned his thought. No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is possible. In the moment that negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before it is approved. (The New American Government and Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.[26] that the President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries, viz: "x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613. . . (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original) Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential - since there should be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" - the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that "historic confidentiality"[27] would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations. A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest. Apropos are the following observations of Benjamin S. Duval, Jr.: x x x [T]hose involved in the practice of negotiations appear to be in agreement that publicity leads to "grandstanding," tends to freeze negotiating positions, and inhibits the give-and-take essential to successful negotiation. As Sissela Bok points out, if "negotiators have more to gain from being approved by their own sides than by making a reasoned agreement with competitors or adversaries, then they are inclined to 'play to the gallery . . .'' In fact, the public reaction may leave them little option. It would be a brave, or foolish, Arab leader who expressed publicly a willingness for peace with Israel that did not involve the return of the entire West Bank, or Israeli leader who stated publicly a willingness to remove Israel's existing settlements from Judea and Samaria in return for peace.[28] (Emphasis supplied) Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical ones. Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as

privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. Whether petitioners have established the presence of such a public interest shall be discussed later. For now, the Court shall first pass upon the arguments raised by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus to the present case. Arguments proffered by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus Petitioners argue that PMPF v. Manglapus cannot be applied in toto to the present case, there being substantial factual distinctions between the two. To petitioners, the first and most fundamental distinction lies in the nature of the treaty involved. They stress that PMPF v. Manglapus involved the Military Bases Agreement which necessarily pertained to matters affecting national security; whereas the present case involves an economic treaty that seeks to regulate trade and commerce between the Philippines and Japan, matters which, unlike those covered by the Military Bases Agreement, are not so vital to national security to disallow their disclosure. Petitioners' argument betrays a faulty assumption that information, to be considered privileged, must involve national security. The recognition in Senate v. Ermita[29] that executive privilege has encompassed claims of varying kinds, such that it may even be more accurate to speak of "executive privileges," cautions against such generalization. While there certainly are privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the "informer's privilege," or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.[30] The suspect involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the most high-profile cases, in which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial to law enforcement efforts in general. Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that x x x [a] frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. x x x[31] (Emphasis supplied) In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of national security. It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that "the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing." [32] This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation.[33] Closely related to the "presidential communications" privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co,[34] deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the "obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news," the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. [35] The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications is similar, if not identical. The earlier discussion on PMPF v. Manglapus[36] shows that the privilege for diplomatic negotiations is meant to encourage a frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such negotiations from public view. Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity as "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." And, as with the deliberative process privilege, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations arises, not on account of the content of the information per se, but because the information is part of a process of deliberation which, in pursuit of the public interest, must be presumed confidential. The decision of the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia in Fulbright & Jaworski v. Department of the Treasury[37] enlightens on the close relation between diplomatic negotiations and deliberative process privileges. The plaintiffs in that case sought access to notes taken by a member of the U.S. negotiating team during the U.S.-French tax treaty negotiations. Among the points noted therein were the issues to be discussed, positions which the French and U.S. teams took on some points, the draft language agreed on, and articles which needed to be amended. Upholding the confidentiality of those notes, Judge Green ruled, thus: Negotiations between two countries to draft a treaty represent a true example of a deliberative process. Much give-and-take must occur for the countries to reach an accord. A description of the negotiations at any one point would not provide an onlooker a summary of the discussions which could later be relied on as law. It would not be "working law" as the points discussed and positions

agreed on would be subject to change at any date until the treaty was signed by the President and ratified by the Senate. The policies behind the deliberative process privilege support non-disclosure. Much harm could accrue to the negotiations process if these notes were revealed. Exposure of the pre-agreement positions of the French negotiators might well offend foreign governments and would lead to less candor by the U. S. in recording the events of the negotiations process. As several months pass in between negotiations, this lack of record could hinder readily the U. S. negotiating team. Further disclosure would reveal prematurely adopted policies. If these policies should be changed, public confusion would result easily. Finally, releasing these snapshot views of the negotiations would be comparable to releasing drafts of the treaty, particularly when the notes state the tentative provisions and language agreed on. As drafts of regulations typically are protected by the deliberative process privilege, Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Internal Revenue Service, C.A. No. 80-705 (D.C.Cir., May 21, 1982), drafts of treaties should be accorded the same protection. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Clearly, the privilege accorded to diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged character of the deliberative process. The Court is not unaware that in Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), et al. v. Office of U.S. Trade Representative[38] where the plaintiffs sought information relating to the just-completed negotiation of a United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement - the same district court, this time under Judge Friedman, consciously refrained from applying the doctrine in Fulbright and ordered the disclosure of the information being sought. Since the factual milieu in CIEL seemed to call for the straight application of the doctrine in Fulbright, a discussion of why the district court did not apply the same would help illumine this Court's own reasons for deciding the present case along the lines of Fulbright. In both Fulbright and CIEL, the U.S. government cited a statutory basis for withholding information, namely, Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).[39] In order to qualify for protection under Exemption 5, a document must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be either inter-agency or intra-agency in nature, and (2) it must be both pre-decisional and part of the agency's deliberative or decision-making process.[40] Judge Friedman, in CIEL, himself cognizant of a "superficial similarity of context" between the two cases, based his decision on what he perceived to be a significant distinction: he found the negotiator's notes that were sought in Fulbright to be "clearly internal," whereas the documents being sought in CIEL were those produced by or exchanged with an outside party, i.e. Chile. The documents subject of Fulbright being clearly internal in character, the question of disclosure therein turned not on the threshold requirement of Exemption 5 that the document be inter-agency, but on whether the documents were part of the agency's pre-decisional deliberative process. On this basis, Judge Friedman found that "Judge Green's discussion [in Fulbright] of the harm that could result from disclosure therefore is irrelevant, since the documents at issue [in CIEL] are not inter-agency, and the Court does not reach the question of deliberative process." (Emphasis supplied) In fine, Fulbright was not overturned. The court in CIEL merely found the same to be irrelevant in light of its distinct factual setting. Whether this conclusion was valid - a question on which this Court would not pass - the ruling in Fulbright that "[n]egotiations between two countries to draft a treaty represent a true example of a deliberative process" was left standing, since the CIEL court explicitly stated that it did not reach the question of deliberative process. Going back to the present case, the Court recognizes that the information sought by petitioners includes documents produced and communicated by a party external to the Philippine government, namely, the Japanese representatives in the JPEPA negotiations, and to that extent this case is closer to the factual circumstances of CIEL than those of Fulbright. Nonetheless, for reasons which shall be discussed shortly, this Court echoes the principle articulated in Fulbright that the public policy underlying the deliberative process privilege requires that diplomatic negotiations should also be accorded privileged status, even if the documents subject of the present case cannot be described as purely internal in character. It need not be stressed that in CIEL, the court ordered the disclosure of information based on its finding that the first requirement of FOIA Exemption 5 - that the documents be inter-agency - was not met. In determining whether the government may validly refuse disclosure of the exchanges between the U.S. and Chile, it necessarily had to deal with this requirement, it being laid down by a statute binding on them. In this jurisdiction, however, there is no counterpart of the FOIA, nor is there any statutory requirement similar to FOIA Exemption 5 in particular. Hence, Philippine courts, when assessing a claim of privilege for diplomatic negotiations, are more free to focus directly on the issue of whether the privilege being claimed is indeed supported by public policy, without having to consider - as the CIEL court did - if these negotiations fulfill a formal requirement of being "inter-agency." Important though that requirement may be in the context of domestic negotiations, it need not be accorded the same significance when dealing with international negotiations. There being a public policy supporting a privilege for diplomatic negotiations for the reasons explained above, the Court sees no reason to modify, much less abandon, the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus. A second point petitioners proffer in their attempt to differentiate PMPF v. Manglapus from the present case is the fact that the petitioners therein consisted entirely of members of the mass media, while petitioners in the present case include members of the House of Representatives who invoke their right to information not just as citizens but as members of Congress. Petitioners thus conclude that the present case involves the right of members of Congress to demand information on negotiations of

international trade agreements from the Executive branch, a matter which was not raised in PMPF v. Manglapus. While indeed the petitioners in PMPF v. Manglapus consisted only of members of the mass media, it would be incorrect to claim that the doctrine laid down therein has no bearing on a controversy such as the present, where the demand for information has come from members of Congress, not only from private citizens. The privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and effect simply because the same privilege is now being claimed under different circumstances. The probability of the claim succeeding in the new context might differ, but to say that the privilege, as such, has no validity at all in that context is another matter altogether. The Court's statement in Senate v. Ermita that "presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations [state secrets privilege, informer's privilege, and a generic privilege for internal deliberations], and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations,"[41] implies that a privilege, once recognized, may be invoked under different procedural settings. That this principle holds true particularly with respect to diplomatic negotiations may be inferred from PMPF v. Manglapus itself, where the Court held that it is the President alone who negotiates treaties, and not even the Senate or the House of Representatives, unless asked, may intrude upon that process. Clearly, the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens' demands for information, but also in the context of legislative investigations. Hence, the recognition granted in PMPF v. Manglapus to the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations cannot be considered irrelevant in resolving the present case, the contextual differences between the two cases notwithstanding. As third and last point raised against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus in this case, petitioners proffer that "the socio-political and historical contexts of the two cases are worlds apart." They claim that the constitutional traditions and concepts prevailing at the time PMPF v. Manglapus came about, particularly the school of thought that the requirements of foreign policy and the ideals of transparency were incompatible with each other or the "incompatibility hypothesis," while valid when international relations were still governed by power, politics and wars, are no longer so in this age of international cooperation.[42] Without delving into petitioners' assertions respecting the "incompatibility hypothesis," the Court notes that the ruling in PMPF v. Manglapus is grounded more on the nature of treaty negotiations as such than on a particular socio-political school of thought. If petitioners are suggesting that the nature of treaty negotiations have so changed that "[a]n ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides" no longer "lead[s] to widespread propaganda to block the negotiations," or that parties in treaty negotiations no longer expect their communications to be governed by historic confidentiality, the burden is on them to substantiate the same. This petitioners failed to discharge. Whether the privilege applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process Petitioners admit that "diplomatic negotiations on the JPEPA are entitled to a reasonable amount of confidentiality so as not to jeopardize the diplomatic process." They argue, however, that the same is privileged "only at certain stages of the negotiating process, after which such information must necessarily be revealed to the public."[43] They add that the duty to disclose this information was vested in the government when the negotiations moved from the formulation and exploratory stage to the firming up of definite propositions or official recommendations, citing Chavez v. PCGG[44] and Chavez v. PEA.[45] The following statement in Chavez v. PEA, however, suffices to show that the doctrine in both that case and Chavez v. PCGG with regard to the duty to disclose "definite propositions of the government" does not apply to diplomatic negotiations: We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. x x x[46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government may not be disclosed if they fall under "recognized exceptions." The privilege for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the recognized exceptions, for the footnote to the immediately quoted ruling cites PMPF v. Manglapus itself as an authority. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of privilege It being established that diplomatic negotiations enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure, even against the demands of members of Congress for information, the Court shall now determine whether petitioners have shown the existence of a public interest sufficient to overcome the privilege in this instance. To clarify, there are at least two kinds of public interest that must be taken into account. One is the presumed public interest in favor of keeping the subject information confidential, which is the reason for the privilege in the first place, and the other is the public interest in favor of disclosure, the existence of which must be shown by the party asking for information. [47] The criteria to be employed in determining whether there is a sufficient public interest in favor of disclosure may be gathered from cases such as U.S. v. Nixon,[48] Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,[49] and In re Sealed Case.[50] U.S. v. Nixon, which involved a claim of the presidential communications privilege against the subpoena duces tecum of a district court

in a criminal case, emphasized the need to balance such claim of privilege against the constitutional duty of courts to ensure a fair administration of criminal justice. x x x the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Similarly, Senate Select Committee v. Nixon,[51] which involved a claim of the presidential communications privilege against the subpoena duces tecum of a Senate committee, spoke of the need to balance such claim with the duty of Congress to perform its legislative functions. The staged decisional structure established in Nixon v. Sirica was designed to ensure that the President and those upon whom he directly relies in the performance of his duties could continue to work under a general assurance that their deliberations would remain confidential. So long as the presumption that the public interest favors confidentiality can be defeated only by a strong showing of need by another institution of government- a showing that the responsibilities of that institution cannot responsibly be fulfilled without access to records of the President's deliberations- we believed in Nixon v. Sirica, and continue to believe, that the effective functioning of the presidential office will not be impaired. x x x xxxx The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In re Sealed Case[52] involved a claim of the deliberative process and presidential communications privileges against a subpoena duces tecum of a grand jury. On the claim of deliberative process privilege, the court stated: The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the competing interests," taking into account factors such as "the relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence," "the seriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government," and the "possibility of future timidity by government employees. x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Petitioners have failed to present the strong and "sufficient showing of need" referred to in the immediately cited cases. The arguments they proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this standard. Petitioners go on to assert that the non-involvement of the Filipino people in the JPEPA negotiation process effectively results in the bargaining away of their economic and property rights without their knowledge and participation, in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. They claim, moreover, that it is essential for the people to have access to the initial offers exchanged during the negotiations since only through such disclosure can their constitutional right to effectively participate in decision-making be brought to life in the context of international trade agreements. Whether it can accurately be said that the Filipino people were not involved in the JPEPA negotiations is a question of fact which this Court need not resolve. Suffice it to state that respondents had presented documents purporting to show that public consultations were conducted on the JPEPA. Parenthetically, petitioners consider these "alleged consultations" as "woefully selective and inadequate."[53] AT ALL EVENTS, since it is not disputed that the offers exchanged by the Philippine and Japanese representatives have not been disclosed to the public, the Court shall pass upon the issue of whether access to the documents bearing on them is, as petitioners claim, essential to their right to participate in decision-making. The case for petitioners has, of course, been immensely weakened by the disclosure of the full text of the JPEPA to the public since September 11, 2006, even as it is still being deliberated upon by the Senate and, therefore, not yet binding on the Philippines. Were the Senate to concur with the validity of the JPEPA at this moment, there has already been, in the words of PMPF v. Manglapus, "ample opportunity for discussion before [the treaty] is approved." The text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they will not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making unless the initial offers are also published. It is of public knowledge that various non-government sectors and private citizens have already publicly expressed their views on the JPEPA, their comments not being limited to general observations thereon but on its specific provisions. Numerous articles and statements critical of the JPEPA have been posted on the Internet.[54] Given these developments, there is no basis for petitioners' claim that access to the Philippine and Japanese offers is essential to the exercise of their right to participate in decision-making. Petitioner-members of the House of Representatives additionally anchor their claim to have a right to the subject documents on the basis of Congress' inherent power to regulate commerce, be it domestic or international. They allege that Congress cannot meaningfully exercise the power to regulate international trade agreements such as the JPEPA without being given copies of the initial offers exchanged during the negotiations thereof. In the same vein, they argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress, pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402 of Presidential Decree No. 1464.[55]

The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, and other taxes. Thus it provides: (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of Article VII - the article on the Executive Department - which states: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President, being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary[56]where the Court held: By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is "executive altogether." As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in Pimentel v. Executive Secretary[57] where the Court ruled: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress, and is exercised by the President only by delegation of that body, it has long been recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464[58] may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations. This is not to say, of course, that the President's power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the Senate. Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens, petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a "sufficient showing of need" that the information sought is critical to the performance of the functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation. Respondents' alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege On respondents' invocation of executive privilege, petitioners find the same defective, not having been done seasonably as it was raised only in their Comment to the present petition and not during the House Committee hearings. That respondents invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited. Petitioners' position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been made during the House Committee investigations, failing which respondents are deemed to have waived it. When the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja requested respondents for copies of the documents subject of this case, respondents replied that the negotiations were still on-going and that the draft of the JPEPA would be released once the text thereof is settled and complete. There was no intimation that the requested copies are confidential in nature by reason of public policy. The response may not thus be deemed a claim of privilege by the standards of Senate v. Ermita, which recognizes as claims of privilege only those which are accompanied by precise and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of the information being sought. Respondents' failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof

by the Executive branch. As the immediately preceding paragraph indicates, what respondents received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia's alleged request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance. While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials - out of respect for their office - until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive privilege. The privilege is an exemption to Congress' power of inquiry.[59] So long as Congress itself finds no cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the privilege. In this light, respondents' failure to invoke the privilege during the House Committee investigations did not amount to a waiver thereof. The Court observes, however, that the claim of privilege appearing in respondents' Comment to this petition fails to satisfy in full the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that the claim should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary "by order of the President."[60] Respondents' claim of privilege is being sustained, however, its flaw notwithstanding, because of circumstances peculiar to the case. The assertion of executive privilege by the Executive Secretary, who is one of the respondents herein, without him adding the phrase "by order of the President," shall be considered as partially complying with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita. The requirement that the phrase "by order of the President" should accompany the Executive Secretary's claim of privilege is a new rule laid down for the first time in Senate v. Ermita, which was not yet final and executory at the time respondents filed their Comment to the petition.[61] A strict application of this requirement would thus be unwarranted in this case. Response to the Dissenting Opinion of the Chief Justice We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof. We respond only to the salient arguments of the Dissenting Opinion which have not yet been sufficiently addressed above.

1. After its historical discussion on the allocation of power over international trade agreements in the United States, the dissent
concludes that "it will be turning somersaults with history to contend that the President is the sole organ for external relations" in that jurisdiction. With regard to this opinion, We make only the following observations: There is, at least, a core meaning of the phrase "sole organ of the nation in its external relations" which is not being disputed, namely, that the power to directly negotiate treaties and international agreements is vested by our Constitution only in the Executive. Thus, the dissent states that "Congress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations but does not have the power to negotiate international agreements directly."[62] What is disputed is how this principle applies to the case at bar. The dissent opines that petitioner-members of the House of Representatives, by asking for the subject JPEPA documents, are not seeking to directly participate in the negotiations of the JPEPA, hence, they cannot be prevented from gaining access to these documents. On the other hand, We hold that this is one occasion where the following ruling in Agan v. PIATCO[63] - and in other cases both before and since - should be applied: This Court has long and consistently adhered to the legal maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. To declare the PIATCO contracts valid despite the clear statutory prohibition against a direct government guarantee would not only make a mockery of what the BOT Law seeks to prevent -- which is to expose the government to the risk of incurring a monetary obligation resulting from a contract of loan between the project proponent and its lenders and to which the Government is not a party to -- but would also render the BOT Law useless for what it seeks to achieve -- to make use of the resources of the private sector in the "financing, operation and maintenance of infrastructure and development projects" which are necessary for national growth and development but which the government, unfortunately, could ill-afford to finance at this point in time.[64] Similarly, while herein petitioners-members of the House of Representatives may not have been aiming to participate in the negotiations directly, opening the JPEPA negotiations to their scrutiny - even to the point of giving them access to the offers exchanged between the Japanese and Philippine delegations - would have made a mockery of what the Constitution sought to prevent and rendered it useless for what it sought to achieve when it vested the power of direct negotiation solely with the President. What the U.S. Constitution sought to prevent and aimed to achieve in defining the treaty-making power of the President, which

our Constitution similarly defines, may be gathered from Hamilton's explanation of why the U.S. Constitution excludes the House of Representatives from the treaty-making process: x x x The fluctuating, and taking its future increase into account, the multitudinous composition of that body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character, decision, secrecy and dispatch; are incompatible with a body so variable and so numerous. The very complication of the business by introducing a necessity of the concurrence of so many different bodies, would of itself afford a solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon the house of representatives, and the greater length of time which it would often be necessary to keep them together when convened, to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, would be source of so great inconvenience and expense, as alone ought to condemn the project.[65] These considerations a fortiori apply in this jurisdiction, since the Philippine Constitution, unlike that of the U.S., does not even grant the Senate the power to advise the Executive in the making of treaties, but only vests in that body the power to concur in the validity of the treaty after negotiations have been concluded.[66] Much less, therefore, should it be inferred that the House of Representatives has this power. Since allowing petitioner-members of the House of Representatives access to the subject JPEPA documents would set a precedent for future negotiations, leading to the contravention of the public interests articulated above which the Constitution sought to protect, the subject documents should not be disclosed.

2. The dissent also asserts that respondents can no longer claim the diplomatic secrets privilege over the subject JPEPA
documents now that negotiations have been concluded, since their reasons for nondisclosure cited in the June 23, 2005 letter of Sec. Ermita, and later in their Comment, necessarily apply only for as long as the negotiations were still pending; In their Comment, respondents contend that "the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality." That respondents liken the documents involved in the JPEPA negotiations to judicial deliberations and working drafts of opinions evinces, by itself, that they were claiming confidentiality not only until, but even after, the conclusion of the negotiations. Judicial deliberations do not lose their confidential character once a decision has been promulgated by the courts. The same holds true with respect to working drafts of opinions, which are comparable to intra-agency recommendations. Such intraagency recommendations are privileged even after the position under consideration by the agency has developed into a definite proposition, hence, the rule in this jurisdiction that agencies have the duty to disclose only definite propositions, and not the inter-agency and intra-agency communications during the stage when common assertions are still being formulated.[67]

3. The dissent claims that petitioner-members of the House of Representatives have sufficiently shown their need for the same
documents to overcome the privilege. Again, We disagree. The House Committee that initiated the investigations on the JPEPA did not pursue its earlier intention to subpoena the documents. This strongly undermines the assertion that access to the same documents by the House Committee is critical to the performance of its legislative functions. If the documents were indeed critical, the House Committee should have, at the very least, issued a subpoena duces tecum or, like what the Senate did in Senate v. Ermita, filed the present petition as a legislative body, rather than leaving it to the discretion of individual Congressmen whether to pursue an action or not. Such acts would have served as strong indicia that Congress itself finds the subject information to be critical to its legislative functions. Further, given that respondents have claimed executive privilege, petitioner-members of the House of Representatives should have, at least, shown how its lack of access to the Philippine and Japanese offers would hinder the intelligent crafting of legislation. Mere assertion that the JPEPA covers a subject matter over which Congress has the power to legislate would not suffice. As Senate Select Committee v. Nixon[68] held, the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality turns, not only on the nature and appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the material was sought, but also the degree to which the material was necessary to its fulfillment. This petitioners failed to do. Furthermore, from the time the final text of the JPEPA including its annexes and attachments was published, petitionermembers of the House of Representatives have been free to use it for any legislative purpose they may see fit. Since such publication, petitioners' need, if any, specifically for the Philippine and Japanese offers leading to the final version of the JPEPA, has become even less apparent. In asserting that the balance in this instance tilts in favor of disclosing the JPEPA documents, the dissent contends that the Executive has failed to show how disclosing them after the conclusion of negotiations would impair the performance of its functions. The contention, with due respect, misplaces the onus probandi. While, in keeping with the general presumption of transparency, the burden is initially on the Executive to provide precise and certain reasons for upholding its claim of privilege, once the Executive is able to show that the documents being sought are covered by a recognized privilege, the burden shifts to the party seeking information to overcome the privilege by a strong showing of need.

When it was thus established that the JPEPA documents are covered by the privilege for diplomatic negotiations pursuant to PMPF v. Manglapus, the presumption arose that their disclosure would impair the performance of executive functions. It was then incumbent on petitioner- requesting parties to show that they have a strong need for the information sufficient to overcome the privilege. They have not, however.

4. Respecting the failure of the Executive Secretary to explicitly state that he is claiming the privilege "by order of the President,"
the same may not be strictly applied to the privilege claim subject of this case. When the Court in Senate v. Ermita limited the power of invoking the privilege to the President alone, it was laying down a new rule for which there is no counterpart even in the United States from which the concept of executive privilege was adopted. As held in the 2004 case of Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice,[69] citing In re Sealed Case,[70] "the issue of whether a President must personally invoke the [presidential communications] privilege remains an open question." U.S. v. Reynolds,[71] on the other hand, held that "[t]here must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer." The rule was thus laid down by this Court, not in adherence to any established precedent, but with the aim of preventing the abuse of the privilege in light of its highly exceptional nature. The Court's recognition that the Executive Secretary also bears the power to invoke the privilege, provided he does so "by order of the President," is meant to avoid laying down too rigid a rule, the Court being aware that it was laying down a new restriction on executive privilege. It is with the same spirit that the Court should not be overly strict with applying the same rule in this peculiar instance, where the claim of executive privilege occurred before the judgment in Senate v. Ermita became final.

5. To show that PMPF v. Manglapus may not be applied in the present case, the dissent implies that the Court therein erred in
citing US v. Curtiss Wright[72] and the book entitled The New American Government and Its Work[73] since these authorities, so the dissent claims, may not be used to calibrate the importance of the right to information in the Philippine setting. The dissent argues that since Curtiss-Wright referred to a conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government, the factual setting thereof was different from that of PMPF v. Manglapus which involved a collision between governmental power over the conduct of foreign affairs and the citizen's right to information. That the Court could freely cite Curtiss-Wright - a case that upholds the secrecy of diplomatic negotiations against congressional demands for information - in the course of laying down a ruling on the public right to information only serves to underscore the principle mentioned earlier that the privileged character accorded to diplomatic negotiations does not ipso facto lose all force and effect simply because the same privilege is now being claimed under different circumstances. PMPF v. Manglapus indeed involved a demand for information from private citizens and not an executive-legislative conflict, but so did Chavez v. PEA[74] which held that "the [public's] right to information . . . does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers." What counts as privileged information in an executive-legislative conflict is thus also recognized as such in cases involving the public's right to information. Chavez v. PCGG[75] also involved the public's right to information, yet the Court recognized as a valid limitation to that right the same privileged information based on separation of powers - closed-door Cabinet meetings, executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. These cases show that the Court has always regarded claims of privilege, whether in the context of an executive-legislative conflict or a citizen's demand for information, as closely intertwined, such that the principles applicable to one are also applicable to the other. The reason is obvious. If the validity of claims of privilege were to be assessed by entirely different criteria in each context, this may give rise to the absurd result where Congress would be denied access to a particular information because of a claim of executive privilege, but the general public would have access to the same information, the claim of privilege notwithstanding. Absurdity would be the ultimate result if, for instance, the Court adopts the "clear and present danger" test for the assessment of claims of privilege against citizens' demands for information. If executive information, when demanded by a citizen, is privileged only when there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent, it would be very difficult for the Executive to establish the validity of its claim in each instance. In contrast, if the demand comes from Congress, the Executive merely has to show that the information is covered by a recognized privilege in order to shift the burden on Congress to present a strong showing of need. This would lead to a situation where it would be more difficult for Congress to access executive information than it would be for private citizens. We maintain then that when the Executive has already shown that an information is covered by executive privilege, the party demanding the information must present a "strong showing of need," whether that party is Congress or a private citizen. The rule that the same "showing of need" test applies in both these contexts, however, should not be construed as a denial of the importance of analyzing the context in which an executive privilege controversy may happen to be placed. Rather, it affirms it, for it means that the specific need being shown by the party seeking information in every particular instance is highly significant in determining whether to uphold a claim of privilege. This "need" is, precisely, part of the context in light of which every claim of privilege should be assessed.

Since, as demonstrated above, there are common principles that should be applied to executive privilege controversies across different contexts, the Court in PMPF v. Manglapus did not err when it cited the Curtiss-Wright case. The claim that the book cited in PMPF v. Manglapus entitled The New American Government and Its Work could not have taken into account the expanded statutory right to information in the FOIA assumes that the observations in that book in support of the confidentiality of treaty negotiations would be different had it been written after the FOIA. Such assumption is, with due respect, at best, speculative. As to the claim in the dissent that "[i]t is more doubtful if the same book be used to calibrate the importance of the right of access to information in the Philippine setting considering its elevation as a constitutional right," we submit that the elevation of such right as a constitutional right did not set it free from the legitimate restrictions of executive privilege which is itself constitutionally-based.[76] Hence, the comments in that book which were cited in PMPF v. Manglapus remain valid doctrine.

6. The dissent further asserts that the Court has never used "need" as a test to uphold or allow inroads into rights guaranteed
under the Constitution. With due respect, we assert otherwise. The Court has done so before, albeit without using the term "need." In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a "sufficient showing of need" only means, in substance, that they should show a public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of privilege. [77] Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving fundamental rights. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,[78] which was cited in the dissent, applied just such a test. Given that the dissent has clarified that it does not seek to apply the "clear and present danger" test to the present controversy, but the balancing test, there seems to be no substantial dispute between the position laid down in this ponencia and that reflected in the dissent as to what test to apply. It would appear that the only disagreement is on the results of applying that test in this instance. The dissent, nonetheless, maintains that "it suffices that information is of public concern for it to be covered by the right, regardless of the public's need for the information," and that the same would hold true even "if they simply want to know it because it interests them." As has been stated earlier, however, there is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement. However, when the Executive has - as in this case - invoked the privilege, and it has been established that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is a matter of public concern. Moreover, in view of the earlier discussions, we must bear in mind that, by disclosing the documents of the JPEPA negotiations, the Philippine government runs the grave risk of betraying the trust reposed in it by the Japanese representatives, indeed, by the Japanese government itself. How would the Philippine government then explain itself when that happens? Surely, it cannot bear to say that it just had to release the information because certain persons simply wanted to know it "because it interests them." Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to information, a specific "showing of need" for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.[79]

7. The dissent maintains that "[t]he treaty has thus entered the ultimate stage where the people can exercise their right to
participate in the discussion whether the Senate should concur in its ratification or not." (Emphasis supplied) It adds that this right "will be diluted unless the people can have access to the subject JPEPA documents". What, to the dissent, is a dilution of the right to participate in decision-making is, to Us, simply a recognition of the qualified nature of the public's right to information. It is beyond dispute that the right to information is not absolute and that the doctrine of executive privilege is a recognized limitation on that right. Moreover, contrary to the submission that the right to participate in decision-making would be diluted, We reiterate that our people have been exercising their right to participate in the discussion on the issue of the JPEPA, and they have been able to articulate their different opinions without need of access to the JPEPA negotiation documents. Thus, we hold that the balance in this case tilts in favor of executive privilege.

8. Against our ruling that the principles applied in U.S. v. Nixon, the Senate Select Committee case, and In re Sealed Case, are
similarly applicable to the present controversy, the dissent cites the caveat in the Nixon case that the U.S. Court was there addressing only the President's assertion of privilege in the context of a criminal trial, not a civil litigation nor a congressional demand for information. What this caveat means, however, is only that courts must be careful not to hastily apply the ruling therein to other contexts. It does not, however, absolutely mean that the principles applied in that case may never be applied in such contexts. Hence, U.S. courts have cited U.S. v. Nixon in support of their rulings on claims of executive privilege in contexts other than a criminal trial, as in the case of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services[80] - which involved former President Nixon's invocation of executive privilege to challenge the constitutionality of the "Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act"[81] - and the above-mentioned In re Sealed Case which involved a claim of privilege against a subpoena duces tecum issued in a grand jury investigation. Indeed, in applying to the present case the principles found in U.S. v. Nixon and in the other cases already mentioned, We are merely affirming what the Chief Justice stated in his Dissenting Opinion in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability[82] - a case involving an executive-legislative conflict over executive privilege. That dissenting opinion stated that, while Nixon was not concerned with the balance between the President's generalized interest in confidentiality and congressional demands for information, "[n]onetheless the [U.S.] Court laid down principles and procedures that can serve as torch lights to illumine us on the scope and use of Presidential communication privilege in the case at bar."[83] While the Court was divided in Neri, this opinion of the Chief Justice was not among the points of disagreement, and We similarly hold now that the Nixon case is a useful guide in the proper resolution of the present controversy, notwithstanding the difference in context. Verily, while the Court should guard against the abuse of executive privilege, it should also give full recognition to the validity of the privilege whenever it is claimed within the proper bounds of executive power, as in this case. Otherwise, the Court would undermine its own credibility, for it would be perceived as no longer aiming to strike a balance, but seeking merely to water down executive privilege to the point of irrelevance. Conclusion To recapitulate, petitioners' demand to be furnished with a copy of the full text of the JPEPA has become moot and academic, it having been made accessible to the public since September 11, 2006. As for their demand for copies of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the JPEPA negotiations, the same must be denied, respondents' claim of executive privilege being valid. Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on September 13, 1988, been recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by petitioners against the application of the ruling therein to the present case have not persuaded the Court. Moreover, petitioners - both private citizens and members of the House of Representatives - have failed to present a "sufficient showing of need" to overcome the claim of privilege in this case. That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents' Comment to the present petition, and not during the hearings of the House Special Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, since it cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the Executive branch. For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as departing from the ruling in Senate v. Ermita that executive privilege should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary "by order of the President." WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162230

April 28, 2010

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PEA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA, ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PEA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. In their capacity and as members of the "Malaya Lolas Organization", Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions, exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful world services the debt.1 There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter. Factual Antecedents This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.ten.lihpwal Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering.2 Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Issues Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. Petitioners arguments Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system established by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against humanity,3 sexual slavery,4 and torture.5 They allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine governments acceptance of the "apologies" made by Japan as well as funds from the Asian Womens Fund (AWF) were contrary to international law. Respondents Arguments Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.6 Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace7 provides:

Article 14. Claims and Property a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the present time meet its other obligations. b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation. In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan8 have been satisfactory, and that Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women through the atonement money paid by the Asian Womens Fund.1avvphi1 Historical Background The comfort women system was the tragic legacy of the Rape of Nanking. In December 1937, Japanese military forces captured the city of Nanking in China and began a "barbaric campaign of terror" known as the Rape of Nanking, which included the rapes and murders of an estimated 20,000 to 80,000 Chinese women, including young girls, pregnant mothers, and elderly women.9 Document1zzF24331552898 In reaction to international outcry over the incident, the Japanese government sought ways to end international condemnation10 by establishing the "comfort women" system. Under this system, the military could simultaneously appease soldiers' sexual appetites and contain soldiers' activities within a regulated environment.11 Comfort stations would also prevent the spread of venereal disease among soldiers and discourage soldiers from raping inhabitants of occupied territories.12 Daily life as a comfort woman was "unmitigated misery."13 The military forced victims into barracks-style stations divided into tiny cubicles where they were forced to live, sleep, and have sex with as many 30 soldiers per day.14 The 30 minutes allotted for sexual relations with each soldier were 30-minute increments of unimaginable horror for the women.15 Disease was rampant.16 Military doctors regularly examined the women, but these checks were carried out to prevent the spread of venereal diseases; little notice was taken of the frequent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even broken bones inflicted on the women by soldiers. Document1zzF48331552898 Fewer than 30% of the women survived the war.17 Their agony continued in having to suffer with the residual physical, psychological, and emotional scars from their former lives. Some returned home and were ostracized by their families. Some committed suicide. Others, out of shame, never returned home.18 Efforts to Secure Reparation The most prominent attempts to compel the Japanese government to accept legal responsibility and pay compensatory damages for the comfort women system were through a series of lawsuits, discussion at the United Nations (UN), resolutions by various nations, and the Womens International Criminal Tribunal. The Japanese government, in turn, responded through a series of public apologies and the creation of the AWF.19 Lawsuits In December 1991, Kim Hak-Sun and two other survivors filed the first lawsuit in Japan by former comfort women against the Japanese government. The Tokyo District Court however dismissed their case.20 Other suits followed,21 but the Japanese government has, thus far, successfully caused the dismissal of every case.22 Undoubtedly frustrated by the failure of litigation before Japanese courts, victims of the comfort women system brought their claims before the United States (US). On September 18, 2000, 15 comfort women filed a class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia23 "seeking money damages for [allegedly] having been subjected to sexual slavery and torture before and during World War II," in violation of "both positive and customary international law." The case was filed pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"),24 which allowed the plaintiffs to sue the Japanese government in a US federal district court.25 On October 4, 2001, the district court dismissed the lawsuit due to lack of jurisdiction over Japan, stating that "[t]here is no question that this court is not the appropriate forum in which plaintiffs may seek to reopen x x x discussions nearly half a century later x x x [E]ven if Japan did not enjoy sovereign immunity, plaintiffs' claims are non-justiciable and must be dismissed." The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.26 On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted the womens petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and remanded the case.27 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior decision, noting that "much as we may feel for the plight of the appellants, the courts of the US simply are not authorized to hear their case."28 The women again brought their case to the US Supreme Court which denied their petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2006.

Efforts at the United Nations In 1992, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (KCWS), submitted a petition to the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), asking for assistance in investigating crimes committed by Japan against Korean women and seeking reparations for former comfort women.29 The UNHRC placed the issue on its agenda and appointed Radhika Coomaraswamy as the issue's special investigator. In 1996, Coomaraswamy issued a Report reaffirming Japan's responsibility in forcing Korean women to act as sex slaves for the imperial army, and made the following recommendations: A. At the national level 137. The Government of Japan should: (a) Acknowledge that the system of comfort stations set up by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War was a violation of its obligations under international law and accept legal responsibility for that violation; (b) Pay compensation to individual victims of Japanese military sexual slavery according to principles outlined by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A special administrative tribunal for this purpose should be set up with a limited time-frame since many of the victims are of a very advanced age; (c) Make a full disclosure of documents and materials in its possession with regard to comfort stations and other related activities of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War; (d) Make a public apology in writing to individual women who have come forward and can be substantiated as women victims of Japanese military sexual slavery; (e) Raise awareness of these issues by amending educational curricula to reflect historical realities; (f) Identify and punish, as far as possible, perpetrators involved in the recruitment and institutionalization of comfort stations during the Second World War. Gay J. McDougal, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, also presented a report to the Sub-Committee on June 22, 1998 entitled Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict. The report included an appendix entitled An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the Government of Japan for 'Comfort Women Stations' established during the Second World War,30 which contained the following findings: 68. The present report concludes that the Japanese Government remains liable for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their totality to crimes against humanity. The Japanese Governments arguments to the contrary, including arguments that seek to attack the underlying humanitarian law prohibition of enslavement and rape, remain as unpersuasive today as they were when they were first raised before the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal more than 50 years ago. In addition, the Japanese Governments argument that Japan has already settled all claims from the Second World War through peace treaties and reparations agreements following the war remains equally unpersuasive. This is due, in large part, to the failure until very recently of the Japanese Government to admit the extent of the Japanese militarys direct involvement in the establishment and maintenance of these rape centres. The Japanese Governments silence on this point during the period in which peace and reparations agreements between Japan and other Asian Governments were being negotiated following the end of the war must, as a matter of law and justice, preclude Japan from relying today on these peace treaties to extinguish liability in these cases. 69. The failure to settle these claims more than half a century after the cessation of hostilities is a testament to the degree to which the lives of women continue to be undervalued. Sadly, this failure to address crimes of a sexual nature committed on a massive scale during the Second World War has added to the level of impunity with which similar crimes are committed today. The Government of Japan has taken some steps to apologize and atone for the rape and enslavement of over 200,000 women and girls who were brutalized in "comfort stations" during the Second World War. However, anything less than full and unqualified acceptance by the Government of Japan of legal liability and the consequences that flow from such liability is wholly inadequate. It must now fall to the Government of Japan to take the necessary final steps to provide adequate redress. The UN, since then, has not taken any official action directing Japan to provide the reparations sought. Women's International War Crimes Tribunal

The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT) was a "people's tribunal" established by a number of Asian women and human rights organizations, supported by an international coalition of non-governmental organizations.31 First proposed in 1998, the WIWCT convened in Tokyo in 2000 in order to "adjudicate Japan's military sexual violence, in particular the enslavement of comfort women, to bring those responsible for it to justice, and to end the ongoing cycle of impunity for wartime sexual violence against women." After examining the evidence for more than a year, the "tribunal" issued its verdict on December 4, 2001, finding the former Emperor Hirohito and the State of Japan guilty of crimes against humanity for the rape and sexual slavery of women.32 It bears stressing, however, that although the tribunal included prosecutors, witnesses, and judges, its judgment was not legally binding since the tribunal itself was organized by private citizens. Action by Individual Governments On January 31, 2007, US Representative Michael Honda of California, along with six co-sponsor representatives, introduced House Resolution 121 which called for Japanese action in light of the ongoing struggle for closure by former comfort women. The Resolution was formally passed on July 30, 2007,33 and made four distinct demands: [I]t is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan (1) should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as "comfort women", during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II; (2) would help to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity and status of prior statements if the Prime Minister of Japan were to make such an apology as a public statement in his official capacity; (3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual enslavement and trafficking of the "comfort women" for the Japanese Imperial Army never occurred; and (4) should educate current and future generations about this horrible crime while following the recommendations of the international community with respect to the "comfort women."34 In December 2007, the European Parliament, the governing body of the European Union, drafted a resolution similar to House Resolution 121.35 Entitled, "Justice for Comfort Women," the resolution demanded: (1) a formal acknowledgment of responsibility by the Japanese government; (2) a removal of the legal obstacles preventing compensation; and (3) unabridged education of the past. The resolution also stressed the urgency with which Japan should act on these issues, stating: "the right of individuals to claim reparations against the government should be expressly recognized in national law, and cases for reparations for the survivors of sexual slavery, as a crime under international law, should be prioritized, taking into account the age of the survivors." The Canadian and Dutch parliaments have each followed suit in drafting resolutions against Japan. Canada's resolution demands the Japanese government to issue a formal apology, to admit that its Imperial Military coerced or forced hundreds of thousands of women into sexual slavery, and to restore references in Japanese textbooks to its war crimes.36 The Dutch parliament's resolution calls for the Japanese government to uphold the 1993 declaration of remorse made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdoms Parliament also produced a report in November, 2008 entitled, "Global Security: Japan and Korea" which concluded that Japan should acknowledge the pain caused by the issue of comfort women in order to ensure cooperation between Japan and Korea. Statements of Remorse made by representatives of the Japanese government Various officials of the Government of Japan have issued the following public statements concerning the comfort system: a) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in 1993: The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime "comfort women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study. As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere. As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.

Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment. We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history. As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto. b) Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayamas Statement in 1994 On the issue of wartime "comfort women", which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to take this opportunity once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and apologies" c) Letters from the Prime Minister of Japan to Individual Comfort Women The issue of comfort women, with the involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of a large number of women. As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who endured immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations. d) The Diet (Japanese Parliament) passed resolutions in 1995 and 2005 Solemnly reflecting upon the many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression that occurred in modern world history, and recognizing that Japan carried out such acts in the past and inflicted suffering on the people of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House hereby express deep remorse. (Resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on June 9, 1995) e) Various Public Statements by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe I have talked about this matter in the Diet sessions last year, and recently as well, and to the press. I have been consistent. I will stand by the Kono Statement. This is our consistent position. Further, we have been apologizing sincerely to those who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable psychological wounds as comfort women. Former Prime Ministers, including Prime Ministers Koizumi and Hashimoto, have issued letters to the comfort women. I would like to be clear that I carry the same feeling. This has not changed even slightly. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at an Interview by NHK, March 11, 2007). I am apologizing here and now. I am apologizing as the Prime Minister and it is as stated in the statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at the Budget Committee, the House of Councilors, the Diet of Japan, March 26, 2007). I am deeply sympathetic to the former comfort women who suffered hardships, and I have expressed my apologies for the extremely agonizing circumstances into which they were placed. (Excerpt from Telephone Conference by Prime Minister Abe to President George W. Bush, April 3, 2007). I have to express sympathy from the bottom of my heart to those people who were taken as wartime comfort women. As a human being, I would like to express my sympathies, and also as prime minister of Japan I need to apologize to them. My administration has been saying all along that we continue to stand by the Kono Statement. We feel responsible for having forced these women to go through that hardship and pain as comfort women under the circumstances at the time. (Excerpt from an interview article "A Conversation with Shinzo Abe" by the Washington Post, April 22, 2007). x x x both personally and as Prime Minister of Japan, my heart goes out in sympathy to all those who suffered extreme hardships as comfort women; and I expressed my apologies for the fact that they were forced to endure such extreme and harsh conditions. Human rights are violated in many parts of the world during the 20th Century; therefore we must work to make the 21st Century a wonderful century in which no human rights are violated. And the Government of Japan and I wish to make significant contributions to that end.

(Excerpt from Prime Minister Abe's remarks at the Joint Press Availability after the summit meeting at Camp David between Prime Minister Abe and President Bush, April 27, 2007). The Asian Women's Fund Established by the Japanese government in 1995, the AWF represented the government's concrete attempt to address its moral responsibility by offering monetary compensation to victims of the comfort women system.37 The purpose of the AWF was to show atonement of the Japanese people through expressions of apology and remorse to the former wartime comfort women, to restore their honor, and to demonstrate Japans strong respect for women.38 The AWF announced three programs for former comfort women who applied for assistance: (1) an atonement fund paying 2 million (approximately $20,000) to each woman; (2) medical and welfare support programs, paying 2.5-3 million ($25,000-$30,000) for each woman; and (3) a letter of apology from the Japanese Prime Minister to each woman. Funding for the program came from the Japanese government and private donations from the Japanese people. As of March 2006, the AWF provided 700 million (approximately $7 million) for these programs in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; 380 million (approximately $3.8 million) in Indonesia; and 242 million (approximately $2.4 million) in the Netherlands. On January 15, 1997, the AWF and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Our Ruling Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. The petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. Baker v. Carr39 remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court explained that: x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. In Taada v. Cuenco,40 we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions.41 One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."42 The US Supreme Court has further cautioned that decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.43 To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.44 However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari. In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,45 the US Supreme Court held that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations."

It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps serious embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. x x x This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v. Executive Secretary46 and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary;47 its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief) Justice Punos dissent in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion:48 x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Philippine government was without authority to negotiate the Treaty of Peace with Japan. And it is equally true that, since time immemorial, when negotiating peace accords and settling international claims: x x x [g]overnments have dealt with x x x private claims as their own, treating them as national assets, and as counters, `chips', in international bargaining. Settlement agreements have lumped, or linked, claims deriving from private debts with others that were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions in regard to one category of claims might be set off against concessions in the other, or against larger political considerations unrelated to debts.49 Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. In Ware v. Hylton,50 a case brought by a British subject to recover a debt confiscated by the Commonwealth of Virginia during the war, Justice Chase wrote: I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or brought into contest again. All violences, injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution of, or compensation for, British property confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the United States, could only be provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these subjects, in the treaty, they could not be agitated after the treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects in courts of justice. (Emphasis supplied). This practice of settling claims by means of a peace treaty is certainly nothing new. For instance, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,51 the US Supreme Court held: Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the government of another country are "sources of friction" between the two sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225, 62 S.Ct. 552, 563, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the government of another "are established international practice reflecting traditional international theory." L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. x x x Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum payments or the establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also undisputed that the "United States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a whole." Henkin, supra, at 262-263. Accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 213 (1965) (President "may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state x x x [even] without the consent of the [injured] national"). It is clear that the practice of settling claims continues today. Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan not necessarily for the complete atonement of the suffering caused by Japanese aggression during the war, not for the payment of adequate reparations, but for security purposes. The

treaty sought to prevent the spread of communism in Japan, which occupied a strategic position in the Far East. Thus, the Peace Treaty compromised individual claims in the collective interest of the free world. This was also the finding in a similar case involving American victims of Japanese slave labor during the war.52 In a consolidated case in the Northern District of California,53 the court dismissed the lawsuits filed, relying on the 1951 peace treaty with Japan,54 because of the following policy considerations: The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a fundamental goal of the agreement was to settle the reparations issue once and for all. As the statement of the chief United States negotiator, John Foster Dulles, makes clear, it was well understood that leaving open the possibility of future claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace: Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking. The present peace is no exception. On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering. On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. x x x The policy of the United States that Japanese liability for reparations should be sharply limited was informed by the experience of six years of United States-led occupation of Japan. During the occupation the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the region, General Douglas MacArthur, confiscated Japanese assets in conjunction with the task of managing the economic affairs of the vanquished nation and with a view to reparations payments. It soon became clear that Japan's financial condition would render any aggressive reparations plan an exercise in futility. Meanwhile, the importance of a stable, democratic Japan as a bulwark to communism in the region increased. At the end of 1948, MacArthur expressed the view that "[t]he use of reparations as a weapon to retard the reconstruction of a viable economy in Japan should be combated with all possible means" and "recommended that the reparations issue be settled finally and without delay." That this policy was embodied in the treaty is clear not only from the negotiations history but also from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommending approval of the treaty by the Senate. The committee noted, for example: Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In short, [it] would be contrary to the basic purposes and policy of x x x the United States x x x. We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners claims. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf.55 Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights. Nowhere is this position more clearly reflected than in the dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case: By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. The question, therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant.56 Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be influenced by political considerations other than the legal merits of the particular claim.57 As clearly stated by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction: The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The municipal

legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding sanctions.1awwphi1 However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.58 (Emphasis supplied) The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this traditional view. They (i) state that "the right of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State,"59 (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the State;60 and (iii) stress that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so."61 It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured.62 However, at present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad.63 Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment.641avvphi1 We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law.65 However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations from the state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states reluctance to directly prosecute claims against another state, recent developments support the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in suits against perpetrators of international crimes.66 Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes.67 Of course a customary duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity."68 Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction: x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.http://www.search.com/reference/Erga_omnes - _note-0#_note-0 Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character. The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice.69 The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.70 Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,71 but peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.72 The recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).73 Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,74 the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms.

After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that "there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens."75 In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."76 Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78 Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend the unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of the Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, the petitioners appear to be without a remedy to challenge those that have offended them before appropriate fora. Needless to say, our government should take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of their fundamental human rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 176278 June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations, Respondents. RESOLUTION CARPIO, J.: At issue is the power of Congress to limit the Presidents prerogative to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments confirmation of nominees.1 However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness,2 we dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be. Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65.3 Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA officials and employees. In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioners standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither petitioners citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davides appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question. On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23s mandated retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide. The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness. First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We have granted access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution.5 Three factors are relevant in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioners allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more direct and specific interest to bring the suit." Career

ambassadors forced to leave the service at the mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than petitioners generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.1avvphi1 The same conclusion holds true for petitioners invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers contributions to the states coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFAs total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent Davides nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary,8 negating petitioners claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds."9 Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct. Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED. TENET et al. v. DOE et ux. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 03-1395.Argued January 11, 2005--Decided March 2, 2005 Respondent husband and wife filed suit against the United States and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), asserting estoppel and due process claims for the CIA's alleged failure to provide them with financial assistance it had promised in return for their espionage services during the Cold War. The District Court denied the Government's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, finding that respondents' claims were not barred by the rule of Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105, prohibiting suits against the Government based on covert espionage agreements. Affirming in relevant part, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Totten posed no bar to reviewing some of respondents' claims and thus the case could proceed to trial, subject to the Government's asserting the evidentiary state secrets privilege and the District Court's resolving that issue. Held: Respondents' suit is barred by the Totten rule. In Totten, this Court concluded with no difficulty that the President had the authority to bind the United States to contracts with secret agents, observed that the very essence of such a contract was that it was secret and had to remain so, and found that allowing a former spy to bring suit to enforce such a contract would be entirely incompatible with the contract's nature. The Ninth Circuit was quite wrong in holding that Totten does not require dismissal of respondents' claims. It reasoned that Totten developed merely a contract rule, prohibiting breach-of-contract claims seeking to enforce an espionage agreement's terms but not barring due process or estoppel claims. However, Totten was not so limited. It precludes judicial review in cases such as respondents' where success depends on the existence of their secret espionage relationship with the Government. Id., at 107. The Ninth Circuit also claimed that Totten had been recast simply as an early expression of the evidentiary "state secrets" privilege, rather than a categorical bar to respondents' claims, relying mainly on United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, in which widows of civilians killed in a military plane crash sought privileged military information in their wrongful death action against the Government. While the Reynolds Court looked to Totten in invoking the "well established" state secrets privilege, it in no way signaled a retreat from Totten's broader holding that lawsuits premised on alleged espionage agreements are altogether forbidden. The Court later credited Totten's more sweeping holding in Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw./Peace Ed. Project, 454 U. S. 139, 146147, thus confirming its continued validity. Reynolds therefore cannot plausibly be read to have replaced Totten's categorical bar in the distinct class of cases that depend upon clandestine spy relationships. Nor does Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, which addressed constitutional claims made by acknowledged (though covert) CIA employees, support respondents' claim. Only in the case of an alleged former spy is Totten's core concern implicated: preventing the existence of the plaintiff's relationship with the Government from being revealed. The state secrets privilege and the use of in camera judicial proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection the Court found necessary in enunciating the Totten rule. The possibility that a suit may proceed and an espionage relationship may be revealed is unacceptable. Forcing the Government to litigate these claims would also make it vulnerable to "graymail," i.e., individual lawsuits brought to induce the CIA to settle a case out of fear that litigation would reveal classified information that might undermine covert operations. And requiring the Government to invoke the privilege on a case-by-case basis risks the perception that it is either confirming or denying relationships with individual plaintiffs. Pp. 5-10. 329 F. 3d 1135, reversed. Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion.

B/GEN. (RET.) FRANCISCO V. GUDANI AND LT. COL. ALEXANDER F. BALUTAN Petitioners,

G.R. No. 170165 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO,

- versus -

QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

LT./GEN. GENEROSO S. SENGA AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, COL. GILBERTO JOSE C. ROA AS THE PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATING OFFICER, THE PROVOST MARSHALL GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL, Respondents.

CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated: August 15, 2006 x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION TINGA, J.: A most dangerous general proposition is foisted on the Court that soldiers who defy orders of their superior officers are exempt from the strictures of military law and discipline if such defiance is predicated on an act otherwise valid under civilian law. Obedience and deference to the military chain of command and the President as commander-in-chief are the cornerstones of a professional military in the firm cusp of civilian control. These values of obedience and deference expected of military officers are content-neutral, beyond the sway of the officers own sense of what is prudent or rash, or more elementally, of right or wrong. A self-righteous military invites itself as the scoundrels activist solution to the ills of participatory democracy. Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyoxxii[1] enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners violation of the aforementioned directive. The Court is cognizant that petitioners, in their defense, invoke weighty constitutional principles that center on fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Although these concerns will not be addressed to the satisfaction of petitioners, the Court recognizes these values as of paramount importance to our civil society, even if not determinative of the resolution of this petition. Had the relevant issue before us been the right of the Senate to compel the testimony of petitioners, the constitutional questions raised by them would have come to fore. Such a scenario could have very well been presented to the Court in such manner, without the petitioners having had to violate a direct order from their commanding officer. Instead, the Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct order of the AFP Chief of Staff. The solicited writs of certiorari and prohibition do not avail; the petition must be denied. I. The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners, Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine Marines. At the time of the subject incidents, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City, the former as the PMA Assistant Superintendent, and the latter as the Assistant Commandant of Cadets.xxiii[2]

On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The

hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of Joint Task Force Ranao by the AFP Southern Command. Joint Task Force Ranao was tasked with the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.xxiv[3] ` Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga) were among the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 September 2005 hearing. On 23 September 2005, Gen. Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to a previous commitment in Brunei, but he nonetheless directed other officers from the AFP who were invited to attend the hearing.xxv[4] On 26 September 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to the Superintendent of the PMA Gen. Cristolito P. Baloing (Gen. Baloing). It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga.xxvi[5] Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing on 28 September 2005, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing.xxvii[6] Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent. On 27 September 2005, Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement of the hearing scheduled for the following day, since the AFP Chief of Staff was himself unable to attend said hearing, and that some of the invited officers also could not attend as they were attending to other urgent operational matters. By this time, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had already departed Baguio for Manila to attend the hearing. Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows: PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.xxviii[7]

The following day, Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the respondents before this Court, has offered additional information surrounding the testimony of Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan. The OSG manifests that the couriers of the AFP Command Center had attempted to deliver the radio message to Gen. Gudanis residence in a subdivision in Paraaque City late in the night of 27 September 2005, but they were not permitted entry by the subdivision guards. The next day, 28 September 2005, shortly before the start of the hearing, a copy of Gen. Sengas letter to Sen. Biazon sent earlier that day was handed at the Senate by Commodore Amable B. Tolentino of the AFP Office for Legislative Affairs to Gen. Gudani, who replied that he already had a copy. Further, Gen. Senga called Commodore Tolentino on the latters cell phone and asked to talk to Gen. Gudani, but Gen. Gudani refused. In response, Gen. Senga instructed Commodore Tolentino to inform Gen. Gudani that it was an order, yet Gen. Gudani still refused to take Gen. Sengas call.xxix [8] A few hours after Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had appeared before the Senate Committee in spite of the fact that a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to such an appearance; that such directive was in keeping with the time[-]honored principle of the Chain of Command; and that the two officers disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General Court Martial proceedings x x x Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.xxx[9] On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.xxxi[10] This Court subsequently ruled on the constitutionality of the said executive order in Senate v. Ermita.xxxii[11] The relevance of E.O. 464 and Senate to the present petition shall be discussed forthwith. In the meantime, on 30 September 2005, petitioners were directed by General Senga, through Col. Henry A. Galarpe of the AFP Provost Marshal General, to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation. During their appearance before Col. Galarpe, both petitioners invoked their right to remain silent.xxxiii[12] The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily retired from military service, having reached the age of 56.xxxiv[13] In an Investigation Report dated 6 October 2005, the OPMG recommended that petitioners be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Article of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to the good order and military discipline.xxxv[14] As recommended, the case was referred to a Pre-Trial Investigation Officer (PTIO) preparatory to trial by the General Court Martial (GCM).xxxvi[15] Consequently, on 24 October 2005, petitioners were separately served with Orders respectively addressed to them and signed by respondent Col. Gilbert Jose C. Roa, the Pre-Trial Investigating Officer of the PTIO. The Orders directed

petitioners to appear in person before Col. Roa at the Pre-Trial Investigation of the Charges for violation of Articles 65xxxvii[16] and 97xxxviii[17] of Commonwealth Act No. 408,xxxix[18] and to submit their counter-affidavits and affidavits of witnesses at the Office of the Judge Advocate General.xl[19] The Orders were accompanied by respective charge sheets against petitioners, accusing them of violating Articles of War 65 and 97. It was from these premises that the present petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, particularly seeking that (1) the order of President Arroyo coursed through Gen. Senga preventing petitioners from testifying before Congress without her prior approval be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges stated in the charge sheets against petitioners be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga, Col. Galarpe, Col. Roa, and their successors-in-interest or persons acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding against petitioners, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate on 28 September 2005.xli[20] Petitioners characterize the directive from President Arroyo requiring her prior approval before any AFP personnel appear before Congress as a gag order, which violates the principle of separation of powers in government as it interferes with the investigation of the Senate Committee conducted in aid of legislation. They also equate the gag order with culpable violation of the Constitution, particularly in relation to the publics constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of public concern. Plaintively, petitioners claim that the Filipino people have every right to hear the [petitioners] testimonies, and even if the gag order were unconstitutional, it still was tantamount to the crime of obstruction of justice. Petitioners further argue that there was no law prohibiting them from testifying before the Senate, and in fact, they were appearing in obeisance to the authority of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Finally, it is stressed in the petition that Gen. Gudani was no longer subject to military jurisdiction on account of his compulsory retirement on 4 October 2005. It is pointed out that Article 2, Title I of the Articles of War defines persons subject to military law as all officers and soldiers in the active service of the AFP. II. We first proceed to define the proper litigable issues. Notably, the guilt or innocence of petitioners in violating Articles 65 and 97 of the Articles of War is not an issue before this Court, especially considering that per records, petitioners have not yet been subjected to court martial proceedings. Owing to the absence of such proceedings, the correct inquiry should be limited to whether respondents could properly initiate such proceedings preparatory to a formal court-martial, such as the aforementioned preliminary investigation, on the basis of petitioners acts surrounding their testimony before the Senate on 28 September 2005. Yet this Court, consistent with the principle that it is not a trier of facts at first instance,xlii[21] is averse to making any authoritative findings of fact, for that function is first for the court-martial court to fulfill. Thus, we limit ourselves to those facts that are not controverted before the Court, having been commonly alleged by petitioners and the OSG (for respondents). Petitioners were called by the Senate Committee to testify in its 28 September 2005 hearing. Petitioners attended such hearing and testified before the Committee, despite the fact that the day before, there was an order from Gen. Senga (which in turn was sourced per instruction from President Arroyo) prohibiting them from testifying without the prior approval of the President. Petitioners do not precisely admit before this Court that they had learned of such order prior to their testimony, although the OSG asserts that at the very least, Gen. Gudani already knew of such order before he testified.xliii[22] Yet while this fact may be ultimately material in the court-martial proceedings, it is not determinative of this petition, which as stated earlier, does not proffer as an issue whether petitioners are guilty of violating the Articles of War. What the Court has to consider though is whether the violation of the aforementioned order of Gen. Senga, which emanated from the President, could lead to any investigation for court-martial of petitioners. It has to be acknowledged as a general principlexliv[23] that AFP personnel of whatever rank are liable under military law for violating a direct order of an officer superior in rank. Whether petitioners did violate such an order is not for the Court to decide, but it will be necessary to assume, for the purposes of this petition, that petitioners did so. III. Preliminarily, we must discuss the effect of E.O. 464 and the Courts ruling in Senate on the present petition. Notably, it is not alleged that petitioners were in any way called to task for violating E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for violating the direct order of Gen. Senga not to appear before the Senate Committee, an order that stands independent of the executive order. Distinctions are called for, since Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 listed generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege, as among those public officials required in Section 3 of E.O. 464 to secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. The Court in Senate declared both Section 2(b) and Section 3 void,xlv[24] and the impression may have been left following Senate that it settled as doctrine, that the President is prohibited from requiring military personnel from attending congressional hearings without having first secured prior presidential consent. That impression is wrong. Senate turned on the nature of executive privilege, a presidential prerogative which is encumbered by significant limitations. Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration.xlvi[25] However, the ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

During the deliberations in Senate, the Court was very well aware of the pendency of this petition as well as the issues raised herein. The decision in Senate was rendered with the comfort that the nullification of portions of E.O. 464 would bear no impact on the present petition since petitioners herein were not called to task for violating the executive order. Moreover, the Court was then cognizant that Senate and this case would ultimately hinge on disparate legal issues. Relevantly, Senate purposely did not touch upon or rule on the faculty of the President, under the aegis of the commander-in-chief powersxlvii[26] to require military officials from securing prior consent before appearing before Congress. The pertinent factors in considering that question are markedly outside of those which did become relevant in adjudicating the issues raised in Senate. It is in this petition that those factors come into play. At this point, we wish to dispose of another peripheral issue before we strike at the heart of the matter. General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court-martial, considering his retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to military law as, among others, all officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP], and points out that he is no longer in the active service. This point was settled against Gen. Gudanis position in Abadilla v. Ramos,xlviii[27] where the Court declared that an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Thus, the Court held: The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.xlix[28] Citing Colonel Winthrops treatise on Military Law, the Court further stated: We have gone through the treatise of Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against the contention of the petitioners, viz 3. Offenders in general Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been held, and is now settled law, in regard to military offenders in general, that if the military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to the date of the termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by court-martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle has mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that the offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is complete, proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him as by arrest or the service of charges, the military jurisdiction will fully attach and once attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the end of the term of the enlistment of the accused x x x l[29] Thus, military jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily retired on 4 October 2005. We see no reason to unsettle the Abadilla doctrine. The OSG also points out that under Section 28 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as amended, [a]n officer or enlisted man carried in the retired list [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines] shall be subject to the Articles of War x x xli[30] To this citation, petitioners do not offer any response, and in fact have excluded the matter of Gen. Gudanis retirement as an issue in their subsequent memorandum. IV. We now turn to the central issues. Petitioners wish to see annulled the gag order that required them to secure presidential consent prior to their appearance before the Senate, claiming that it violates the constitutional right to information and transparency in matters of public concern; or if not, is tantamount at least to the criminal acts of obstruction of justice and grave coercion. However, the proper perspective from which to consider this issue entails the examination of the basis and authority of the President to issue such an order in the first place to members of the AFP and the determination of whether such an order is subject to any limitations. The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government. The Constitution reposes final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions being clearly civil in nature.lii[31] Civilian supremacy over the military also countermands the notion that the military may bypass civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as conducting warrantless searches and seizures.liii[32] Pursuant to the maintenance of civilian supremacy over the military, the Constitution has allocated specific roles to the legislative and executive branches of government in relation to military affairs. Military appropriations, as with all other appropriations, are determined by Congress, as is the power to declare the existence of a state of war.liv[33] Congress is also empowered to revoke a proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.lv[34] The approval of the Commission on Appointments is also required before the President can promote military officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain.lvi[35] Otherwise, on the particulars of civilian dominance and administration over the military, the Constitution is silent, except for the commander-in-chief clause which is fertile in meaning and

implication as to whatever inherent martial authority the President may possess.lvii[36] The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines x x xlviii[37] Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law. Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villalix[38] is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under house arrest by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest, that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his period of detention. The Court unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting: [T]he Court is of the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on petitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.lx[39] Any good soldier, or indeed any ROTC cadet, can attest to the fact that the military way of life circumscribes several of the cherished freedoms of civilian life. It is part and parcel of the military package. Those who cannot abide by these limitations normally do not pursue a military career and instead find satisfaction in other fields; and in fact many of those discharged from the service are inspired in their later careers precisely by their rebellion against the regimentation of military life. Inability or unwillingness to cope with military discipline is not a stain on character, for the military mode is a highly idiosyncratic path which persons are not generally conscripted into, but volunteer themselves to be part of. But for those who do make the choice to be a soldier, significant concessions to personal freedoms are expected. After all, if need be, the men and women of the armed forces may be commanded upon to die for country, even against their personal inclinations. It may be so that military culture is a remnant of a less democratic era, yet it has been fully integrated into the democratic system of governance. The constitutional role of the armed forces is as protector of the people and of the State.lxi[40] Towards this end, the military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life.lxii[41] The laws and traditions governing that discipline have a long history; but they are founded on unique military exigencies as powerful now as in the past.lxiii[42] In the end, it must be borne in mind that the armed forces has a distinct subculture with unique needs, a specialized society separate from civilian society. lxiv[43] In the elegant prose of the eminent British military historian, John Keegan: [Warriors who fight wars have] values and skills [which] are not those of politicians and diplomats. They are those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but does not belong to it. Both worlds change over time, and the warrior world adopts in step to the civilian. It follows it, however, at a distance. The distance can never be closed, for the culture of the warrior can never be that of civilization itself.lxv[44] Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain of command. Willful disobedience of a superior officer is punishable by court-martial under Article 65 of the Articles of War.lxvi[45] An individual soldier is not free to ignore the lawful orders or duties assigned by his immediate superiors. For there would be an end of all discipline if the seaman and marines on board a ship of war [or soldiers deployed in the field], on a distant service, were permitted to act upon their own opinion of their rights [or their opinion of the Presidents intent], and to throw off the authority of the commander whenever they supposed it to be unlawfully exercised.lxvii[46] Further traditional restrictions on members of the armed forces are those imposed on free speech and mobility. Kapunan is ample precedent in justifying that a soldier may be restrained by a superior officer from speaking out on certain matters. As a general rule, the discretion of a military officer to restrain the speech of a soldier under his/her command will be accorded deference, with minimal regard if at all to the reason for such restraint. It is integral to military discipline that the soldiers speech be with the consent and approval of the military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to restrain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier desires to speak freely on political matters. The Constitution requires that [t]he armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics, and that [n]o member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.lxviii[47] Certainly, no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will eliminate a soldiers ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vital that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. This fundamental principle averts the country from going the way of banana republics. Parenthetically, it must be said that the Court is well aware that our countrys recent past is marked by regime changes wherein active military dissent from the chain of command formed a key, though not exclusive, element. The Court is not blind to

history, yet it is a judge not of history but of the Constitution. The Constitution, and indeed our modern democratic order, frown in no uncertain terms on a politicized military, informed as they are on the trauma of absolute martial rule. Our history might imply that a political military is part of the natural order, but this view cannot be affirmed by the legal order. The evolutionary path of our young democracy necessitates a reorientation from this view, reliant as our socio-political culture has become on it. At the same time, evolution mandates a similar demand that our system of governance be more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the citizenry, so as to avoid an environment vulnerable to a military apparatus able at will to exert an undue influence in our polity. Of possibly less gravitas, but of equal importance, is the principle that mobility of travel is another necessary restriction on members of the military. A soldier cannot leave his/her post without the consent of the commanding officer. The reasons are selfevident. The commanding officer has to be aware at all times of the location of the troops under command, so as to be able to appropriately respond to any exigencies. For the same reason, commanding officers have to be able to restrict the movement or travel of their soldiers, if in their judgment, their presence at place of call of duty is necessary. At times, this may lead to unsentimental, painful consequences, such as a soldier being denied permission to witness the birth of his first-born, or to attend the funeral of a parent. Yet again, military life calls for considerable personal sacrifices during the period of conscription, wherein the higher duty is not to self but to country. Indeed, the military practice is to require a soldier to obtain permission from the commanding officer before he/she may leave his destination. A soldier who goes from the properly appointed place of duty or absents from his/her command, guard, quarters, station, or camp without proper leave is subject to punishment by court-martial.lxix[48] It is even clear from the record that petitioners had actually requested for travel authority from the PMA in Baguio City to Manila, to attend the Senate Hearing.lxx[49] Even petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing. It is clear that the basic position of petitioners impinges on these fundamental principles we have discussed. They seek to be exempted from military justice for having traveled to the Senate to testify before the Senate Committee against the express orders of Gen. Senga, the AFP Chief of Staff. If petitioners position is affirmed, a considerable exception would be carved from the unimpeachable right of military officers to restrict the speech and movement of their juniors. The ruinous consequences to the chain of command and military discipline simply cannot warrant the Courts imprimatur on petitioners position. V. Still, it would be highly myopic on our part to resolve the issue solely on generalities surrounding military discipline. After all, petitioners seek to impress on us that their acts are justified as they were responding to an invitation from the Philippine Senate, a component of the legislative branch of government. At the same time, the order for them not to testify ultimately came from the President, the head of the executive branch of government and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.lxxi [50] Explication of these principles is in order. As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions,lxxii[51] yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.lxxiii[52] At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation.lxxiv[53]

Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government. As evidenced by Arnault v. Nazarenolxxv[54] and Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,lxxvi[55] among others, the Court has not shirked from reviewing the exercise by Congress of its power of legislative inquiry.lxxvii[56] Arnault recognized that the legislative power of inquiry and the process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.lxxviii[57] On the other hand, Bengzon acknowledged that the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited, and its exercise is circumscribed by Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.lxxix[58] From these premises, the Court enjoined the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring the petitioners in Bengzon from testifying and producing evidence before the committee, holding that the inquiry in question did not involve any intended legislation. Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus: As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called McCarthy era, however, the right of Congress to conduct inquirites in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanctionlxxx[59]. In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. The Court did not rule that the power to conduct legislative inquiry ipso facto superseded the claim of executive privilege, acknowledging instead that the viability of executive privilege stood on a case to case basis. Should neither branch yield to the other branchs assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non-attendance in legislative inquiries. Following these principles, it is clear that if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance. Such judicial action should be directed at the heads of the executive branch or the armed forces, the persons who wield authority and control over the actions of the officers concerned. The legislative purpose of such testimony, as well as any defenses against the same whether grounded on executive privilege, national security or similar concerns would be accorded due judicial evaluation. All the constitutional considerations pertinent to either branch of government may be raised, assessed, and ultimately weighed against each other. And once

the courts speak with finality, both branches of government have no option but to comply with the decision of the courts, whether the effect of the decision is to their liking or disfavor. Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.lxxxi[60] This is the fair and workable solution implicit in the constitutional allocation of powers among the three branches of government. The judicial filter helps assure that the particularities of each case would ultimately govern, rather than any overarching principle unduly inclined towards one branch of government at the expense of the other. The procedure may not move as expeditiously as some may desire, yet it ensures thorough deliberation of all relevant and cognizable issues before one branch is compelled to yield to the other. Moreover, judicial review does not preclude the legislative and executive branches from negotiating a mutually acceptable solution to the impasse. After all, the two branches, exercising as they do functions and responsibilities that are political in nature, are free to smooth over the thorns in their relationship with a salve of their own choosing. And if emphasis be needed, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts. Petitioners have presented several issues relating to the tenability or wisdom of the Presidents order on them and other military officers not to testify before Congress without the Presidents consent. Yet these issues ultimately detract from the main point that they testified before the Senate despite an order from their commanding officer and their commander-in-chief for them not to do so,lxxxii[61] in contravention of the traditions of military discipline which we affirm today. The issues raised by petitioners could have very well been raised and properly adjudicated if the proper procedure was observed. Petitioners could have been appropriately allowed to testify before the Senate without having to countermand their Commander-in-chief and superior officer under the setup we have prescribed. We consider the other issues raised by petitioners unnecessary to the resolution of this petition. Petitioners may have been of the honest belief that they were defying a direct order of their Commander-in-Chief and Commanding General in obeisance to a paramount idea formed within their consciences, which could not be lightly ignored. Still, the Court, in turn, is guided by the superlative principle that is the Constitution, the embodiment of the national conscience. The Constitution simply does not permit the infraction which petitioners have allegedly committed, and moreover, provides for an orderly manner by which the same result could have been achieved without offending constitutional principles. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino and their minor children Renato Redentor, Anna Marika Lissa, Nina Elissa, and Anna Karmina, Freedom From Debt Coalition, and Filomeno Sta. Ana III, Petitioners , G.R. No. 106064 Present: DAVIDE, JR., CJ., PUNO, PANGANIBAN, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, and GARCIA, JJ.

- versus -

Hon. Jose B. Cuisia, in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank, Hon. Ramon del Rosario, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, Hon. Emmanuel V. Pelaez, in his capacity as Philippine Debt Negotiating Chairman, and the NATIONAL TREASURER, Respondents.

Promulgated: October 13, 2005

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION Tinga, J.: The quagmire that is the foreign debt problem has especially confounded developing nations around the world for decades. It has defied easy solutions acceptable both to debtor countries and their creditors. It has also emerged as cause celebre for various political movements and grassroots activists and the wellspring of much scholarly thought and debate. The present petition illustrates some of the ideological and functional differences between experts on how to achieve debt relief. However, this being a court of law, not an academic forum or a convention on development economics, our resolution has to hinge on the presented legal issues which center on the appreciation of the constitutional provision that empowers the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. The ultimate choice is between a restrictive reading of the constitutional provision and an alimentative application thereof consistent with time-honored principles on executive power and the alter ego doctrine. This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts which were entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing Program for 1992 (Financing Program or Program). It seeks to enjoin respondents from executing additional debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto. It also urges the Court to issue an order compelling the Secretary of Justice to institute criminal and administrative cases against respondents for acts which circumvent or negate the provisions Art. XII of the Constitution.[1] Parties and Facts The petition was filed on 17 July 1992 by petitioners spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino and their minor children, Renato Redentor, Anna Marika Lissa, Nina Elissa, and Anna Karmina, Filomeno Sta. Ana III, and the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock, non-profit, non-government organization that advocates a pro-people and just Philippine debt policy.[2] Named respondents were the then Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Secretary of Finance, the National Treasurer, and the Philippine Debt Negotiation Chairman Emmanuel V. Pelaez.[3] All respondents were members of the Philippine panel tasked to negotiate with the countrys foreign creditors pursuant to the Financing Program.

The operative facts are sparse and there is little need to elaborate on them. The Financing Program was the culmination of efforts that began during the term of former President Corazon Aquino to manage the countrys external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented debt strategy involving cooperation and negotiation with foreign creditors.[4] Pursuant to this strategy, the Aquino government entered into three restructuring agreements with representatives of foreign creditor governments during the period of 1986 to 1991.[5] During the same period, three similarly-oriented restructuring agreements were executed with commercial bank creditors.[6] On 28 February 1992, the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team, chaired by respondent Pelaez, negotiated an agreement with the countrys Bank Advisory Committee, representing all foreign commercial bank creditors, on the Financing Program which respondents characterized as a multi-option financing package.[7] The Program was scheduled to be executed on 24 July 1992 by respondents in behalf of the Republic. Nonetheless, petitioners alleged that even prior to the execution of the Program respondents had already implemented its buyback component when on 15 May 1992, the Philippines bought back P1.26 billion of external debts pursuant to the Program.[8] The petition sought to enjoin the ratification of the Program, but the Court did not issue any injunctive relief. Hence, it came to pass that the Program was signed in London as scheduled. The petition still has to be resolved though as petitioners seek the annulment of any and all acts done by respondents, their subordinates and any other public officer pursuant to the agreement and program in question.[9] Even after the signing of the Program, respondents themselves acknowledged that the remaining principal objective of the petition is to set aside respondents actions.[10] Petitioners characterize the Financing Program as a package offered to the countrys foreign creditors consisting of two debt-relief options.[11] The first option was a cash buyback of portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount.[12] The second option allowed creditors to convert existing Philippine debt instruments into any of three kinds of bonds/securities: (1) new money bonds with a fiveyear grace period and 17 years final maturity, the purchase of which would allow the creditors to convert their eligible debt papers into bearer bonds with the same terms; (2) interest-reduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years; and (3) principal-collateralized interestreduction bonds with a maturity of 25 years.[13] On the other hand, according to respondents the Financing Program would cover about U.S. $5.3 billion of foreign commercial debts and it was expected to deal comprehensively with the commercial bank debt problem of the country and pave the way for the countrys access to capital markets.[14] They add that the Program carried three basic options from which foreign bank lenders could choose, namely: to lend money, to exchange existing restructured Philippine debts with an interest reduction bond; or to exchange the same Philippine debts with a principal collateralized interest reduction bond.[15] Issues for Resolution Petitioners raise several issues before this Court.

First, they object to the debt-relief contracts entered into pursuant to the Financing Program as beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20, Article VII of the Constitution.[16] The provision states that the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic. It is claimed that the buyback and securitization/bond conversion schemes are neither loans nor guarantees, and hence beyond the power of the President to execute. Second, according to petitioners even assuming that the contracts under the Financing Program are constitutionally permissible, yet it is only the President who may exercise the power to enter into these contracts and such power may not be delegated to respondents. Third, petitioners argue that the Financing Program violates several constitutional policies and that contracts executed or to be executed pursuant thereto were or will be done by respondents with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that the Financing Program was made available for debts that were either fraudulently contracted or void. In this regard, petitioners rely on a 1992 Commission on Audit (COA) report which identified several behest loans as either contracted or guaranteed fraudulently during the Marcos regime.[17] They posit that since these and other similar debts, such as the ones pertaining to the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant,[18] were eligible for buyback or conversion under the Program, the resultant relief agreements pertaining thereto would be void for being waivers of the Republics right to repudiate the void or fraudulently contracted loans. For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by petitioners. They also question the standing of petitioners to institute the present petition and the justiciability of the issues presented. The Court shall tackle the procedural questions ahead of the substantive issues. The Courts Rulings Standing of Petitioners The individual petitioners are suing as citizens of the Philippines; those among them who are of age are suing in their additional capacity as taxpayers.[19] It is not indicated in what capacity the Freedom from Debt Coalition is suing. Respondents point out that petitioners have no standing to file the present suit since the rule allowing taxpayers to assail executive or legislative acts has been applied only to cases where the constitutionality of a statute is involved. At the same time, however, they urge this Court to exercise its wide discretion and waive petitioners lack of standing. They invoke the transcendental importance of resolving the validity of the questioned debt-relief contracts and others of similar import. The recent trend on locus standi has veered towards a liberal treatment in taxpayers suits. In Tatad v. Garcia Jr.,[20] this Court reiterated that the prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national government or government owned and controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of law.[21] A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.[22] Moreover, a ruling on the issues of this case will not only determine the validity or invalidity of the subject pre-termination and bondconversion of foreign debts but also create a precedent for other debts or debt-related contracts executed or to be executed in behalf of the President of the Philippines by the Secretary of Finance. Considering the reported Philippine debt of P3.80 trillion as of November 2004, the foreign public borrowing component of which reached P1.81 trillion in November, equivalent to 47.6% of total government borrowings,[23] the importance of the issues raised and the magnitude of the public interest involved are indubitable. Thus, the Courts cognizance of this petition is also based on the consideration that the determination of the issues presented will have a bearing on the state of the countrys economy, its international financial ratings, and perhaps even the Filipinos way of life. Seen in this light, the transcendental importance of the issues herein presented cannot be doubted. Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance.[24] We thus hold that by the very nature of the power wielded by the President, the effect of using this power on the economy, and the well-being in general of the Filipino nation, the Court must set aside the procedural barrier of standing and rule on the justiciable issues presented by the parties. Ripeness/Actual Case Dimension Even as respondents concede the transcendental importance of the issues at bar, in their Rejoinder they ask this Court to dismiss the Petition. Allegedly, petitioners arguments are mere attempts at abstraction.[25] Respondents are correct to some degree. Several issues, as shall be discussed in due course, are not ripe for adjudication. The allegation that respondents waived the Philippines right to repudiate void and fraudulently contracted loans by executing the debtrelief agreements is, on many levels, not justiciable.

In the first place, records do not show whether the so-called behest loansor other allegedly void or fraudulently contracted loans for that matterwere subject of the debt-relief contracts entered into under the Financing Program. Moreover, asserting a right to repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans begs the question of whether indeed particular loans are void or fraudulently contracted. Fraudulently contracted loans are voidable and, as such, valid and enforceable until annulled by the courts. On the other hand, void contracts that have already been fulfilled must be declared void in view of the maxim that no one is allowed to take the law in his own hands.[26] Petitioners theory depends on a prior annulment or declaration of nullity of the preexisting loans, which thus far have not been submitted to this Court. Additionally, void contracts are unratifiable by their very nature; they are null and void ab initio. Consequently, from the viewpoint of civil law, what petitioners present as the Republics right to repudiate is yet a contingent right, one which cannot be allowed as an anticipatory basis for annulling the debt-relief contracts. Petitioners contention that the debt-relief agreements are tantamount to waivers of the Republics right to repudiate so-called behest loans is without legal foundation. It may not be amiss to recognize that there are many advocates of the position that the Republic should renege on obligations that are considered as illegitimate. However, should the executive branch unilaterally, and possibly even without prior court determination of the validity or invalidity of these contracts, repudiate or otherwise declare to the international community its resolve not to recognize a certain set of illegitimate loans, adverse repercussions[27] would come into play. Dr. Felipe Medalla, former Director General of the National Economic Development Authority, has warned, thus: One way to reduce debt service is to repudiate debts, totally or selectively. Taken to its limit, however, such a strategy would put the Philippines at such odds with too many enemies. Foreign commercial banks by themselves and without the cooperation of creditor governments, especially the United States, may not be in a position to inflict much damage, but concerted sanctions from commercial banks, multilateral financial institutions and creditor governments would affect not only our sources of credit but also our access to markets for our exports and the level of development assistance. . . . [T]he country might face concerted sanctions even if debts were repudiated only selectively. The point that must be stressed is that repudiation is not an attractive alternative if net payments to creditors in the short and mediumrun can be reduced through an agreement (as opposed to a unilaterally set ceiling on debt service payments) which provides for both rescheduling of principal and capitalization of interest, or its equivalent in new loans, which would make it easier for the country to pay interest.[28] Sovereign default is not new to the Philippine setting. In October 1983, the Philippines declared a moratorium on principal payments on its external debts that eventually lasted four years,[29] that virtually closed the countrys access to new foreign money[30] and drove investors to leave the Philippine market, resulting in some devastating consequences.[31] It would appear then that this beguilingly attractive and dangerously simplistic solution deserves the utmost circumspect cogitation before it is resorted to. In any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with the courts but with the executive. Thus, the Program was conceptualized as an offshoot of the decision made by then

President Aquino that the Philippines should recognize its sovereign debts[32] despite the controversy that engulfed many debts incurred during the Marcos era. It is a scheme whereby the Philippines restructured its debts following a negotiated approach instead of a default approach to manage the bleak Philippine debt situation. As a final point, petitioners have no real basis to fret over a possible waiver of the right to repudiate void contracts. Even assuming that spurious loans had become the subject of debt-relief contracts, respondents unequivocally assert that the Republic did not waive any right to repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans, it having incorporated a no-waiver clause in the agreements.[33] Substantive Issues It is helpful to put the matter in perspective before moving on to the merits. The Financing Program extinguished portions of the countrys pre-existing loans through either debt buyback or bond-conversion. The buyback approach essentially pre-terminated portions of public debts while the bond-conversion scheme extinguished public debts through the obtention of a new loan by virtue of a sovereign bond issuance, the proceeds of which in turn were used for terminating the original loan. First Issue: The Scope of Section 20, Article VII For their first constitutional argument, petitioners submit that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in the Constitution and are consequently prohibited. Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution provides, viz: The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law. On Bond-conversion Loans are transactions wherein the owner of a property allows another party to use the property and where customarily, the latter promises to return the property after a specified period with payment for its use, called interest.[34] On the other hand, bonds are interest-bearing or discounted government or corporate securities that obligate the issuer to pay the bondholder a specified sum of money, usually at specific intervals, and to repay the principal amount of the loan at maturity.[35] The word bond means contract, agreement, or guarantee. All of these terms are applicable to the securities known as bonds. An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to the issuer, and the bond represents the issuers contractual promise to pay interest and repay principal according to specific terms. A short-term bond is often called a note.[36] The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic act. The only restriction that the Constitution provides, aside from the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to limitations provided by law. In this regard, we note that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 245 as amended by Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 142, s. 1973, entitled An Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrow to Meet Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign loans to be contracted in the form of, inter alia, bonds. Thus: Sec. 1. In order to meet public expenditures authorized by law or to provide for the purchase, redemption, or refunding of any obligations, either direct or guaranteed of the Philippine Government, the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of the President of the Philippines, after consultation with the Monetary Board, is authorized to borrow from time to time on the credit of the Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government." Such evidences of indebtedness may be of the following types: .... c. Treasury bonds, notes, securities or other evidences of indebtedness having maturities of one year or more but not exceeding twenty-five years from the date of issue. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the foregoing provisions, sovereign bonds may be issued not only to supplement government expenditures but also to provide for the purchase,[37] redemption,[38] or refunding[39] of any obligation, either direct or guaranteed, of the Philippine Government. Petitioners, however, point out that a supposed difference between contracting a loan and issuing bonds is that the former creates a definite creditor-debtor relationship between the parties while the latter does not.[40] They explain that a contract of loan enables the debtor to restructure or novate the loan, which benefit is lost upon the conversion of the debts to bearer bonds such that the Philippines surrenders the novatable character of a loan contract for the irrevocable and unpostponable demandability of a bearer bond.[41] Allegedly, the Constitution prohibits the President from issuing bonds which are far more onerous than loans.[42] This line of thinking is flawed to say the least. The negotiable character of the subject bonds is not mutually exclusive with the Republics freedom to negotiate with bondholders for the revision of the terms of the debt. Moreover, the securities market provides some flexibilityif the Philippines wants to pay in advance, it can buy out its bonds in the market; if interest rates go down but the Philippines does not have money to retire the bonds, it can replace the old bonds with new ones; if it defaults on the bonds, the bondholders shall organize and bring about a re-negotiation or settlement.[43] In fact, several countries have restructured their sovereign bonds in view either of inability and/or unwillingness to pay the indebtedness.[44] Petitioners have not presented a plausible reason that would preclude the Philippines from acting in a similar fashion, should it so opt. This theory may even be dismissed in a perfunctory manner since petitioners are merely expecting that the Philippines would opt to restructure the bonds but with the negotiable character of the bonds, would be prevented from so doing. This is a contingency which petitioners do not assert as having come to pass or even imminent. Consummated acts of the executive cannot be struck down by this Court merely on the basis of petitioners anticipatory cavils. On the Buyback Scheme In their Comment, petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with Congress and was deliberately withheld by the Constitution from the President.[45] It is true that in the balance of power between the three branches of government, it is Congress that manages the countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending powers. However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic appropriations provision for debt servicing[46] by virtue of which the President is empowered to execute debt payments without the need for further appropriations. Regarding these legislative enactments, this Court has held, viz: Congress deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law. Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor already exists under RA Nos. 4860 and 245, as amended, and PD 1967. Precisely in the light of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies the implementation or execution of the legislative wisdom.[47] Specific legal authority for the buyback of loans is established under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 240, viz: Sec. 2. The Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out of any moneys in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, or from any sinking funds provided for the purpose by law, any interest falling due, or accruing, on any portion of the public debt authorized by law. He shall also cause to be paid out of any such money, or from any such sinking funds the principal amount of any obligations which have matured, or which have been called for redemption or for which redemption has been demanded in accordance with terms prescribed by him prior to date of issue: Provided, however, That he may, if he so chooses and if the holder is willing, exchange any such obligation with any other direct or guaranteed obligation or obligations of the Philippine Government of equivalent value. In the case of interest-bearing obligations, he shall pay not less than their face value; in the case of obligations issued at a discount he shall pay the face value at maturity; or, if redeemed prior to maturity, such portion of the face value as is prescribed by the terms and conditions under which such obligations were originally issued. (Emphasis supplied.) The afore-quoted provisions of law specifically allow the President to pre-terminate debts without further action from Congress.

Petitioners claim that the buyback scheme is neither a guarantee nor a loan since its underlying intent is to extinguish debts that are not yet due and demandable.[48] Thus, they suggest that contracts entered pursuant to the buyback scheme are unconstitutional for not being among those contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its

terms.[49] The President is not empowered to borrow money from foreign banks and governments on the credit of the Republic only to be left bereft of authority to implement the payment despite appropriations therefor. Even petitioners concede that [t]he Constitution, as a rule, does not enumeratelet alone enumerate allthe acts which the President (or any other public officer) may not do,[50] and [t]he fact that the Constitution does not explicitly bar the President from exercising a power does not mean that he or she does not have that power.[51] It is inescapable from the standpoint of reason and necessity that the authority to contract foreign loans and guarantees without restrictions on payment or manner thereof coupled with the availability of the corresponding appropriations, must include the power to effect payments or to make payments unavailing by either restructuring the loans or even refusing to make any payment altogether. More fundamentally, when taken in the context of sovereign debts, a buyback is simply the purchase by the sovereign issuer of its own debts at a discount. Clearly then, the objection to the validity of the buyback scheme is without basis. Second Issue: Delegation of Power Petitioners stress that unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They submit that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country. Petitioners position is negated both by explicit constitutional[52] and legal[53] imprimaturs, as well as the doctrine of qualified political agency. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals.[54] If, as petitioners would have it, the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency, later adopted in Villena v. Secretary of the Interior[55] from American jurisprudence, viz: With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority" (Myers vs. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep., 21 at 30; 272 U. S., 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160).[56] As it was, the backdrop consisted of a major policy determination made by then President Aquino that sovereign debts have to be respected and the concomitant reality that the Philippines did not have enough funds to pay the debts. Inevitably, it fell upon the Secretary of Finance, as the alter ego of the President regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of the Government,[57] to formulate a scheme for the implementation of the policy publicly expressed by the President herself. Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).[58]

These distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the established functions of governance. Another important qualification must be made. The Secretary of Finance or any designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latters prior consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. In the matter of contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, the repudiation by the President of the very acts performed in this regard by the alter ego will definitely have binding effect. Had petitioners herein succeeded in demonstrating that the President actually withheld approval and/or repudiated the Financing Program, there could be a cause of action to nullify the acts of respondents. Notably though, petitioners do not assert that respondents pursued the Program without prior authorization of the President or that the terms of the contract were agreed upon without the Presidents authorization. Congruent with the avowed preference of then President Aquino to honor and restructure existing foreign debts, the lack of showing that she countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to conclude that said acts carried presidential approval. With constitutional parameters already established, we may also note, as a source of suppletory guidance, the provisions of R.A. No. 245. The afore-quoted Section 1 thereof empowers the Secretary of Finance with the approval of the President and after consultation[59] of the Monetary Board, to borrow from time to time on the credit of the Republic of the Philippines such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue therefor evidences of indebtedness of the Philippine Government. Ineluctably then, while the President wields the borrowing power it is the Secretary of Finance who normally carries out its thrusts. In our recent rulings in Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. The Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp.,[60] this Court had occasion to examine the authority granted by Congress to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Secretary to impose safeguard measures pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act. In doing so, the Court was impelled to construe Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which allowed Congress, by law, to authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.[61] While the Court refused to uphold the broad construction of the grant of power as preferred by the DTI Secretary, it nonetheless tacitly acknowledged that Congress could designate the DTI Secretary, in his capacity as alter ego of the President, to exercise the authority vested on the chief executive under Section 28(2), Article VI.[62] At the same time, the Court emphasized that since Section 28(2), Article VI authorized Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the authority of the President to impose tariffs and imposts, the DTI Secretary was necessarily subjected to the same restrictions that Congress could impose on the President in the exercise of this taxing power. Similarly, in the instant case, the Constitution allocates to the President the exercise of the foreign borrowing power subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. Following Southern Cross, but in line with the limitations as defined in Villena, the presidential prerogative may be exercised by the Presidents alter ego, who in this case is the Secretary of Finance. It bears emphasis that apart from the Constitution, there is also a relevant statute, R.A. No. 245, that establishes the parameters by which the alter ego may act in behalf of the President with respect to the borrowing power. This law expressly provides that the Secretary of Finance may enter into foreign borrowing contracts. This law neither amends nor goes contrary to the Constitution but merely implements the subject provision in a manner consistent with the structure of the Executive Department and the alter ego doctine. In this regard, respondents have declared that they have followed the restrictions provided under R.A. No. 245,[63] which include the requisite presidential authorization and which, in the absence of proof and even allegation to the contrary, should be regarded in a fashion congruent with the presumption of regularity bestowed on acts done by public officials. Moreover, in praying that the acts of the respondents, especially that of the Secretary of Finance, be nullified as being in violation of a restrictive constitutional interpretation, petitioners in effect would have this Court declare R.A. No. 245 unconstitutional. We will not strike down a law or provisions thereof without so much as a direct attack thereon when simple and logical statutory construction would suffice. Petitioners also submit that the unrestricted character of the Financing Program violates the framers intent behind Section 20, Article VII to restrict the power of the President. This intent, petitioners note, is embodied in the proviso in Sec. 20, Art. VII, which states that said power is subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. However, as previously discussed, the debt-relief contracts are governed by the terms of R.A. No. 245, as amended by P.D. No. 142 s. 1973, and therefore were not developed in an unrestricted setting. Third Issue: Grave Abuse of Discretion and Violation of Constitutional Policies

We treat the remaining issues jointly, for in view of the foregoing determination, the general allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents would arise from the purported violation of various state policies as expressed in the Constitution. Petitioners allege that the Financing Program violates the constitutional state policies to promote a social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty,[64] foster social justice in all phases of national development,[65] and develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos;[66] thus, the contracts executed or to be executed pursuant thereto were or would be tainted by a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents cite the following in support of the propriety of their acts:[67] (1) a Department of Finance study showing that as a result of the implementation of voluntary debt reductions schemes, the countrys debt stock was reduced by U.S. $4.4 billion as of December 1991;[68] (2) revelations made by independent individuals made in a hearing before the Senate Committee on Economic Affairs indicating that the assailed agreements would bring about substantial benefits to the country;[69] and (3) the Joint LegislativeExecutive Foreign Debt Councils endorsement of the approval of the financing package containing the debt-relief agreements and issuance of a Motion to Urge the Philippine Debt Negotiating Panel to continue with the negotiation on the aforesaid package.[70] Even with these justifications, respondents aver that their acts are within the arena of political questions which, based on the doctrine of separation of powers,[71] the judiciary must leave without interference lest the courts substitute their judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or law is for the latter alone to decide.[72] On the other hand, in furtherance of their argument on respondents violation of constitutional policies, petitioners cite an article of Jude Esguerra, The 1992 Buyback and Securitization Agreement with Philippine Commercial Bank Creditors,[73] in illustrating a bestcase scenario in entering the subject debt-relief agreements. The computation results in a yield of $218.99 million, rather than the $2,041.00 million claimed by the debt negotiators.[74] On the other hand, the worst-case scenario allegedly is that a net amount of $1.638 million will flow out of the country as a result of the debt package.[75] Assuming the accuracy of the foregoing for the nonce, despite the watered-down parameters of petitioners computations, we can make no conclusion other than that respondents efforts were geared towards debt-relief with marked positive results and towards achieving the constitutional policies which petitioners so hastily declare as having been violated by respondents. We recognize that as with other schemes dependent on volatile market and economic structures, the contracts entered into by respondents may possibly have a net outflow and therefore negative result. However, even petitioners call this latter event the worst-case scenario. Plans are seldom foolproof. To ask the Court to strike down debt-relief contracts, which, according to independent third party evaluations using historically-suggested rates would result in substantial debt-relief,[76] based merely on the possibility of petitioners worst-case scenario projection, hardly seems reasonable. Moreover, the policies set by the Constitution as litanized by petitioners are not a panacea that can annul every governmental act sought to be struck down. The gist of petitioners arguments on violation of constitutional policies and grave abuse of discretion boils down to their allegation that the debt-relief agreements entered into by respondents do not deliver the kind of debt-relief that petitioners would want. Petitioners cite the aforementioned article in stating that that the agreement achieves little that cannot be gained through less complicated means like postponing (rescheduling) principal payments,[77] thus: [T]he price of success in putting together this debt-relief package (indicates) the possibility that a simple rescheduling agreement may well turn out to be less expensive than this comprehensive debt-relief package. This means that in the next six years the humble and simple rescheduling process may well be the lesser evil because there is that distinct possibility that less money will flow out of the country as a result. Note must be taken that from these citations, petitioners submit that there is possibly a better way to go about debt rescheduling and, on that basis, insist that the acts of respondents must be struck down. These are rather tenuous grounds to condemn the subject agreements as violative of constitutional principles. Conclusion The raison d etre of the Financing Program is to manage debts incurred by the Philippines in a manner that will lessen the burden on the Filipino taxpayersthus the term debt-relief agreements. The measures objected to by petitioners were not aimed at incurring more debts but at terminating pre-existing debts and were backed by the know-how of the countrys economic managers as affirmed by third party empirical analysis. That the means employed to achieve the goal of debt-relief do not sit well with petitioners is beyond the power of this Court to remedy. The exercise of the power of judicial review is merely to checknot supplantthe Executive, or to simply ascertain whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction but not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.[78] In cases where the main purpose is to nullify governmental acts whether as unconstitutional or done with grave abuse of discretion, there is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the assailed acts. The heavy onus is in on petitioners to overcome the presumption of regularity. We find that petitioners have not sufficiently established any basis for the Court to declare the acts of respondents as unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.: The salient facts are well established. The instant controversy originated from an application for land use conversion filed on December 11, 1993 before the DAR by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development Association (BAIDA) and petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation concerning its 144-hectare land in San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon. In an Orderlxxxiii[1] dated November 14, 1994, DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao denied the application for conversation of the land from agricultural to agro-industrial use and ordered its distribution to qualified landless farmers. BAIDA and NQSR Management and Development Corporation filed a motion for reconsiderationlxxxiv[2] dated January 9, 1995, which was, however, denied in an Orderlxxxv[3] dated June 7, 1995. Thereafter, Bukidnon Governor Carlos O. Fortich sent a letterlxxxvi[4] to President Fidel V. Ramos requesting him to suspend the Garilao Order and to confirm the ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao converting the subject land from agricultural to industrial/institutional land. Acting on the letter, then Executive Secretary Torres reversed the Garilao Order and upheld the power of local government units to convert portions of their agricultural lands into industrial areas.lxxxvii[5] Respondent DAR Secretary Garilao filed a motion for reconsideration. Admittedly tardy, which was denied by then Executive Secretary Torres on the ground that his March 29, 1996 decision had already become final and executory in view of the lapse of the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration was filed during the pendency of which President Ramos constituted the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. On November 7, 1997, Deputy Executive Secretary Corona issued the herein-assailed "winwin" resolution which, pursuant to the recommendations of the task force, substantially modified the Torres decision by awarding one hundred (100) hectares of the Sumilao property to the qualified farmer beneficiaries and allocating only forty four (44) hectares for the establishment of an industrial and commercial zone. In our decision promulgated in Baguio City on April 24, 1998, we annulled the "win-win" resolution on the ground that public respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying an already final and executory decision of then Executive Secretary Ruben T. Torres. It is undisputed that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) failed to comply with the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration.lxxxviii[6] It received the Torres decision on April 10, 1996 but transmitted its motion for reconsideration to the DAR Records Management Division for mailing to the Office of the President only on May 23, 1996.lxxxix[7] The Office of the President received the motion on July 14, 1997. Forthwith, we applied the rule on finality of administrative determinations and upheld the policy of setting an end to litigation as an indispensable aspect of orderly administration of justice. In their motions for reconsideration, respondents and intervenors protest the technical basis of out decision. I vote to grant their motions for reconsideration and remand the case to the Court of Appeals. First. It is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.xc [8] Procedure, however, is only a means to an end,xci[9] and they may be suspended when they subvert the interests of justice. It is self-evident that the prerogative to suspend procedural rules or to grant an exception in a particular case lies in the authority that promulgated the rules.xcii[10] Rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts are promulgated by this Court.xciii[11] On the other hand, it is the President as administrative head who is vested by the Administrative Code of 1987 to promulgate rules relating to governmental operations, including administrative procedure. These rules take the form of administrative orders.xciv[12] This power is necessary for the President to discharge his constitutional duty faithfully executing our laws.xcv[13] Under exceptional circumstances, this Court has suspended its rules to prevent miscarriage of justice. In the same breath, we should hold that the President has the power to suspend the effectivity of administrative rules of procedure when they hamper, defeat or in any way undermine the effective enforcement of the laws of the land. Indeed, we already recognize that Congress can suspend its own rules if doing so will enable it to facilitate its task of lawmaking. The three great branches of our government are co-equal and within their own sphere they have the same responsibility to promote the good of our people. There is no reason to withhold the power to suspend rules from the President and grant it alone to the two other branches of government. A closer scrutiny of the records in the instant case reveals that the fifteen-day rule for filing a motion for reconsideration under Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 was suspended by the President when he constituted, on October 15, 1997 or some six (6) months after the promulgation of the Torres decision, the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force to conduct a comprehensive review of the proper land use of the 144-hectare Sumilao property. At that time, then Executive Secretary Torres had already denied the first motion for reconsideration of the DAR on the ground that his March 29, 1997 decision had already become final and executory. This notwithstanding, the President treated the case as still open and stated in his memorandum that the findings of the Presidential FactFinding Task Force " will be inputs to the resolution of the case now pending at the Office of the President regarding the said land" (emphasis ours).14 The President took cognizance of the special circumstances surrounding the tardy filing by the DAR of its motion for reconsideration. The DAR lawyers assigned to the Sumilao case received the Torres decision only after the lapse of the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal. The copy of the decision intended for them was passed from one office to another, e.g., the Records Section of the DAR, the Office of the DAR Secretary, the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, before it finally reached the DAR Litigation Office. It does not appear to be just that DAR will be made to lose a significant case because of bureaucratic lapses. Viewed

in this context, we should rule that the President suspended the effectivity of Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and that his exercise of discretion in this regard cannot be assailed as whimsical. I also respectfully submit this act of the President also finds full sanction under the corollary principles of presidential power of control and qualified political agency. "This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa to mean 'the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.' It is said to be at the very 'heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.' Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the 'Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.' As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate of them to his Cabinet members. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, 'all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person o[r] the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.' x x x Thus, and in short, 'the President's power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.'"15 By suspending the fifteen-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration and re-opening the Torres decision, the President clearly exercised his control power over an alter-ego within the framework of a constitutional and presidential system of governance. The President's suspension of the fifteen-day rule for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be characterized as arbitrary. The Sumilao problem raises fundamental issues which conflict between land reform and the industrialization of the countryside, the power of control by the President over his alter egos vis--vis the power of local government to convert agricultural land to industrial land. The resolution of these has far reaching implications on the success of our land reform program. Indeed, their successful resolution can bring peace or rebellion in our countryside. The President should not be frustrated by an administrative procedural rule that he himself promulgated, from formulating a creative, legal solution to the Sumilao problem. There is no denying the liberal interpretation equally accorded to both administrative and judicial rules in order to promote their object to the extent that technically be not a bar to the vindication of a legitimate grievance. We have trumpeted the truism that when technicality ceases to be an aid to justice, the courts are justified in excepting from its operation a particular case.16 We ought not to deny the same power to the Chief Executive who heads a co-equal branch of government. Second. The petitioners are estopped from assailing the authority of the Office of the President to re-open the Sumilao case and resolve it based on the report of the Presidential Fact-Finding Task Force. Undeniably, petitioners participated in the processes conducted by the task force. Their participation in the administrative proceedings without raising any objection thereto, bars them from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against them.17 Petitioners Carlos O Fortich and Rey B. Baula, Bukidnon Governor and Sumilao Mayor, respectively, were named members of the task force.18 The president ordered the task force to confer with the representatives of, among others, the landowners, namely, petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation.19 In a letter dated October 20, 1997 addressed to the President, the counsel for NQSR Management and Development Corporation expressed its reluctance "to comment on the merits and demerits of the [motion for intervention and motion to admit additional evidence filed by the farmer beneficiaries] out of respect of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals where these cases are presently pending".20 NQSR Management and Development Corporation, however, did not question the authority of the President to constitute the task force despite its express adherence to the declaration by then Executive Secretary Torres as to the finality of his March 29, 1997 decision. It was confident that its interests would be promoted and protected by Bukidnon Governor Fortich who himself filed the appeal from the order of DAR Secretary Garilao21 and Sumilao Mayor Baula who certified as correct Resolution No. 24 approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao on March 4, 1993 converting the 144-hectare property from agricultural to industrial/institutional land.22 But when the "win-win" resolution was issued by the Office of the President on November 7, 1997, allowing the conversion into industrial land of only forty four (44) hectares of the 114-hectare Sumilao property and ordering the distribution of the rest to qualified farmer beneficiaries, petitioners were flabbergasted. Mr. Norberto Quisumbing, Jr. could hardly hide his disdain over that resolution in his letter to the provincial agrarian officer protesting as absurd and arbitrary the valuation of the 100 hectares at P5.1 million pesos. That resolution was allegedly an "unprecedented turn-around which is most difficult for the discerning public to appreciate".23 The "win-win" resolution being adverse to petitioners, they now assail the authority of the President to modify the Torres decision. Under the above-mentioned circumstances, however, the principle of estoppel applies to effectively bar petitioners from raising the issue of jurisdiction.24 While lack of jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before it will estop him from assailing its lack of jurisdiction.25 This Court has always frowned upon the

undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.26 Third. Considering the special circumstances of the case as detailed above, it would better serve the ends of justice to obtain a definitive resolution of the issues raised in the instant petition and remand the same to the Court of Appeals where jurisdiction over this appeal lies. Noteworthy, is the pendency in the Court of Appeals of two or more cases involving the Sumilao property: (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, entitled, "N.Q.S.R. Management & Development Corporation and Bukidnoon Agro-Industrial Association, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Ernesto Garilao, Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform; Rogelio E. Tamin, DAR Regional Director, Region X; Nicanor Peralta, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, Region X; Dolores Apostol, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, Sumilao, Bukidnon, Respondents";27 and (2) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, entitled. "Rodolfo Buclasan, et al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Leonardo N. Demecillo, as Judge of RTC, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch IX and NQSR Management and Development Corporation, Respondents".28 The remand of the instant petition to the Court of Appeals would enable said court to consolidate the same with the two other cases pending there which undoubtedly contemplate of the same factual milieu and raise invariably the same issues as in this petition, leaving no room for further confusion that will surely be wrought by the rendition of conflicting decisions affecting a single controversy. For the above reasons, I vote to grant the motions for reconsideration filed by the respondents and the intervenors who should be allowed to intervene pursuant to sec. 1, Rule 19 and to remand the instant petition to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings.

G.R. No. 183591

October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents. x--------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 183752 October 14, 2008

CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A. FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents. x--------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008

THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process; and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary. respondents. x--------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS, Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte, namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO

M. MEJORADA II, HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO, HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J. CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON. RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser of Peace Process, respondents. x--------------------------------------------x G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners, vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents. x--------------------------------------------x FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioners-in-intervention, x--------------------------------------------x THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioners-inintervention. x--------------------------------------------x THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention. x-------------------------------------------x RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF, petitioner-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens and residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention. x--------------------------------------------x MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively. I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.1 The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.2 Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.4 The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.5 Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.

Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6 In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOAAD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962. Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain7 and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.10 This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the City of Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void. By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15 Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as respondent. The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD. On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition,20 docketed as G.R. No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman Mohagher Iqbal. Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-inIntervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of Isabela21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat, Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention. By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions, while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies. Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the MOAAD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners. The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues: 1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and (ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft; 2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication; 3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5; 4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;] If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy; 5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law; b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA; c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;] If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; 6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and 7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.24 The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on time. III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA. The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF. Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP and MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel Ramos. The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)25 and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26 and several international law instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others. The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ulmua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty device." During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-ulIslam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway, while the

second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective.27 This way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the international community of nations. As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-governmental organizations, the classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.28 It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the Philippines being the land of compact and peace agreement - that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles declared in the [MOA-AD]."29 The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body. The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and Governance. A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.30 Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally understood even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.33 The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-state in the modern sense.34 The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates. As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.35 The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians. In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described collectively by the plural "First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term. The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37 B. TERRITORY The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.38

More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39 Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOAAD.40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41 The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal waters," defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area;42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the internal waters is not similarly described as "joint." The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures.45 There is no similar provision on the sharing of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE. C. RESOURCES The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.46 The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47 With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial jurisdiction." This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the operation of such resources.48 The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE.49 The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50 The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51 D. GOVERNANCE The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.52 The "associative" relationship between the Central Government and the BJE

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact. The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision. The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact. As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating panels.53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008. Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY. IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES A. RIPENESS The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.56 An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination.58 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture,60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of.62 The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning that The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied with. x x x xxxx In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all, is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied) The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD: TERRITORY

xxxx 2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations: xxxx d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD. xxxx GOVERNANCE xxxx 7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to nonderogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.64 (Underscoring supplied) The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade. Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court held: x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. xxxx By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.66 In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face.68 That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,69 decided in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996, because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences.70 The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.74 The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001.75 The said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order."76

The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution. Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later. As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77 B. LOCUS STANDI For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."78 Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.79 When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.80 When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.81 For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.83 In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.84 An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members,85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing.86 As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs.87 Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties. In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised, highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights. In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed aside technical rules of procedure.91 In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No. 183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory. Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt. In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The

fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them standing. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance" clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions. With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an intervenor. With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand. Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices to clothe them with standing. B. MOOTNESS Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA."92 In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace Panel.93 In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved;96 (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;97 and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.98 Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.99 The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v. Romulo100 and Manalo v. Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding. Petitions not mooted Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points," especially given its nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching Constitutional implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE. In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary

for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOAAD,102 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding. Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the country's territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity. Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole." The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between two parties-the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy. The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement 2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspect in May 2002. Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001. Need to formulate principles-guidelines Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain. Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104 in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They contend that the Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked. The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893 (City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had done in a number of landmark cases.106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon, will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August 7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD. V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:

1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD? 2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws? ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.107 As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually accorded constitutional status. The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right.109 In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x111 In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation112 so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.113 The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern114 faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws,117 the civil service eligibility of a public employee,118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials,119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth,120 and the identity of party-list nominees,121 among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled: x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."122 (Emphasis and italics in the original) Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.124 The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.125 The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such policy.126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the people.127 Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose: MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after Congress shall have provided it. MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128 The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening. MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement? MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law" MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable safeguards on the sole ground national interest? MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the conduct of public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which is inconsistent with this policy.129 (Emphasis supplied) Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.131 Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government provide feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing operational mechanisms. MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a feedback, both ways. xxxx MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence? I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also network of private business o[r] community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another OMA in the making.132 (Emphasis supplied)

The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation. One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace process."135 Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."136 Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process."137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives."138 In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President.139 Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners' right to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward token provisos that border on classic lip service.140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP makes its official recommendations or before the government proffers its definite propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue. AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad cautelam. Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions"142 is welltaken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy: Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.143 (Italics and underscoring supplied) In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and

unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies.147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,148 which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs. Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section. Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.149 ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the present Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents, nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and the Central Government. 4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD. Keitner and Reisman state that [a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel

documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security Council and by their admission to UN membership. According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either government. In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these territories for military purposes. It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based on an underlying status of independence.152 In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states.153 Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X: SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied) As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE. The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows: SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization; (2) Creation of sources of revenues; (3) Ancestral domain and natural resources; (4) Personal, family, and property relations; (5) Regional urban and rural planning development; (6) Economic, social, and tourism development; (7) Educational policies; (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied) Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs: In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter

into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity. Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157 Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states: 1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows: "As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region who are: (a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the national community; and (b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions." Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region." Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof: SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures: xxxx b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs; c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned; d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents: 1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions; 2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages; 4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs; 5) Survey plans and sketch maps; 6) Anthropological data; 7) Genealogical surveys; 8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds; 9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and 10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community. e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein; f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP; g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available; h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below. xxxx To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only the Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land." Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent whose deportation order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159 applied the aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals. International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had occasion to acknowledge that "the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond convention' and is considered a general principle of international law."

Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights161 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of selfdetermination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development." The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive: "(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination 126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people. (Emphasis added) 127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people's right to selfdetermination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states. x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less definitely but asserted by a number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent positions therein. The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee stated the rule as follows: x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the interests of the international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact, been chased from the

capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted" sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own populations. Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest.164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal peoples of Canada. As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international law,165 but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination. In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to wit: Article 3 Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Article 4 Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. Article 5 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to "internal self-determination."166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder: Article 8 1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. 2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for: (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities; (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources; (c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; (d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration; (e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them. Article 21

1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. 2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities. Article 26 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. Article 30 1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned. 2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities. Article 32 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources. 2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact. Article 37 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. 2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements. Article 38 States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary international law - a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the different States. There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the

forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows: 1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary. It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but which is reproduced below for convenience: 7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively. Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution. Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing. Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid, as discussed below. The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups." These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations. It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF, was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic, and political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states: SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following: a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied) The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O. No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak. Hence, they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot, however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional amendments. The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked whether the President herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a). The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the extent of the President's power to conduct peace negotiations. That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus: "In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the President's . . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commanderin-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.169 As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit: x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peacebuilding mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies. The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition. Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy will operate.170 In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed that the typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions.171 In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions172 is the framers' intention to implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by then Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.

MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions. I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in fact, diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new? MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite steps have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a good first step, but there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the fuller standard of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state policy.173(Emphasis supplied) The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao, then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973 Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim National Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side. Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus Justice Teehankee opined: "Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power is expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative and referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative. These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any further involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v. COMELEC:177 "The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group

thus admits that their people's' initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of people's voice' or sovereign will' in the present initiative." It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office,178 only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation. One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which - for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President.179 The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested. Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil law as a future and uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact." Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that, By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior agreements" from which there could be no derogation. What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these "consensus points" and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework. Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as unconstitutional. A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive. As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was then the Organic Act of the ARMM. The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law." Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the part of the Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding agreement under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in international law, however. The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition, representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to surmise

that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion. The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom Accord Amnesty180 (the Lom Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone is enlightening. The Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN. On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government, another agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996. Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began. In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not in international law. Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction. "37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with some degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their representatives and representatives of international organizations, means the agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. xxxx 40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement. 41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of statehood and is to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lom Agreement were moral guarantors of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended, presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including certain international crimes. 42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The Lom Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the Lom Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that the international community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the same status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States. The Lom Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x" (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law. In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France,181 also known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French officials including its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case.182 Those statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance from other States for it to become effective. Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international community in issuing its public statements, viz: 43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made. 44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for. xxxx 51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences must be considered within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances attending their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests, gave an undertaking to the international community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances. The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v. Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a statement made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso. Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal implications. It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject thereof, to wit: 40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in which the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States were not the only ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral declarations had conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method: a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law. Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would not be detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States. In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the participating statesrepresentatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other countries. That the Philippine panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under international law. The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is known as Jus Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision. SUMMARY The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda. One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and hereby GRANTED. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. SO ORDERED.

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