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June 29, 2011 Honorable Richard M. Berman United States District Judge United States District Court (SDNY) Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 21B New York, NY 10007 Re: United States v. District Council of New York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, et al; (Index No. 90 Civ. 5722) (RMB) Dear Judge Berman: This letter is in response to the May 26, 2011 United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, (UBCJA) International Union and the New York City District Council of Carpenters (NYCDCC) and Latham and Watkins proposed Restructuring Plan for the NYCDCC, while its Local Union autonomy has been suspended under a temporary Trusteeship imposed under the LMRDA. Per the Court Conference of June 28, 2011, we are submitting this to you as we requested and as you have approved. It is our purpose and intent to clearly identify specific instances of violations of Federal Laws relative to the contract (CBA) and within the Restructuring Plan which do not eliminate the fraud or corruption, or serve to restore the democratic function & purposes of the Consent Decree and the NLRA. As your honor is aware, the Attorneys representing United Brotherhood of Carpenters rank & file member legal interests in this matter, the United States Attorneys Office and the Independent Review Officer, both have an enormous task ahead of them in deciphering the entire 21-year history of this RICO action. Together and with the input of rank & file Union Carpenters through RO Walshs Advisory Committee, they must strike and sever any and all illegal Contract language, UBCJA Constitution & NYCDCC By-Law illegal language; and Pension, Annuity, Health & Welfare and Apprentice Trust Fund language known to violate the NLRA and LMRDA. The savings and severability clause language, which add nothing, have allowed the illegal language to remain, and ever more illegal language to be added to the contracts over the duration of the Consent Decree and particularly within the past 16-years during the tenure of the UBCs International General President. The items addressed above further require vetting for conformance to ERISA, EBSA, SEC regulations and Internal Revenue Code laws and statutes. This is a serious undertaking, which cannot be rushed or forced through, in a mere 30-day timeframe as the UBCJA International are attempting at this juncture of these proceedings, or, within the 10-days requested at the Court conference on June 28th.

The UBCJA & NYCDCC RESTRUCTURING PLAN dated May 26, 2011, in that it has been put forth as fully complying with the Consent Decree, without proper vetting, review and implementation of the veto pen, is being rushed through by the UBCJA attorneys, who know full well that it does not comply with the Consent Decree or the laws cited. Their acceleration of the Restructuring Plan should be viewed with skeptical eyes, as it evinces their desire to see what they can get away with before this honorable Court. We ask that you review this letter, the issues presented within in and the cases cited before approving any portion of their request. Sincerely,

John Musumeci William T. Doherty Cc: file

Where citation to case-law is lengthy, bolded or underlined it is for member benefit (context).

UBCJA INTERNATIONAL RESTRUCTURING & BY-LAW PLAN dated May 26, 2011 With regard to the Latham & Watkins letter, at page-1, paragraph 2: Sentence one, right out of the gate the UBCJA International and their counsel of record which the rank & file members pay for directly, start with a 40-page Lexis-Nexis report from the University of California, Boalt Hall Journal of Criminal Law. Said report is a firm reminder of past and present crimes. Judge Conboy states: Although these efforts have successfully broken the cycle of murders, beatings, disappearances, and violence that plagued the District Council before the imposition of the Consent Decree, they have not yet been able to stamp out corruption, racketeering and Benefit Fund abuses. The members & your honor should note the emphasis on murder as the first reminder of what can and does occur; and, that there is an intent here, duly imparted to the UBC rank & file members conscious mind which stands contrary to the fraudulent claims of apathy made by the IRO. With regard to the Latham & Watkins letter, at page-1, paragraph 3; Judge Conboy stated: More recently, while these anti-corruption efforts have been ongoing, the District Council and the UBC have also been fighting to preserve the economic viability of the Carpenters franchise in New York. Not only has the Union been challenged by the national economic crisis (a third of the active membership is out of work and many of the remainder are working only sporadically), but it is also under attack by both non-union labor (including undocumented workers) and rival unions. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=295&invol=495 With regard to the Latham & Watkins letter, at page-2, paragraph 2, sentence 2: Judge Conboy stated: The economic downturn has greatly reduced the number of construction projects, with the New York City market decreasing 22% between 2006 and 2009. With fewer construction projects, the total number of hours worked by Union carpenters decreased from 17.2 million to 14.4 million. This statement regarding the Total Man-Hours reported to the Benefit Funds is in direct contravention to the Second Report of the IRO, dated_____ which declared the Political Contribution Assessment of 5-cents an hour to be $1,155,132 for FY 2007, $1,055,129 for FY 2008 and $882,045 for FY 2009. Predicated on the Nickel an Hour Political Department assessment for the years 07-09, Total ManHours (M/H) are as follows, FY-2007 23,102,640 M/H, FY 2008 21,102,580 M/H and FY 2009 17,640,900 M/H. Fiscal year 2007 recorded 23.1 Million man-hours verses the 17.2 Million man-hours reported to the Court by Latham & Watkins, equating to a 5.9 Million man-hour, or 34.30% differential. Fiscal year 2009 recorded 17.6 Million man-hours verses the 14.2 Million man-hours reported to the Court by Latham & Watkins, equating to a 3.4 Million man-hour, or 23.94% differential.

Here alone, for the two Fiscal Year noted above, Latham & Watkins, LLP has reported to the Court 9.3 Million man-hours less than what was actually recorded to bolster the UBCJAs position for a National & NYCDCC Economic Crisis; and, accordingly since the figures are suspect, they should be granted no weight by this Court. The differing figures are being used by the UBCJA International to justify their bogus claim of a National Economic Crisis so critical to the NYCDCC that they would request that this Court approve a 100% Full Mobility requirement for the entire Territorial Jurisdiction of the New York City District Council of Carpenters and the creation of an Interior Systems Local Union, that it warrants suspension of the NLRA & LMRDA laws and that the UBCJA International be allowed to subsume a role guaranteed only the Congress of the Unites States of America, that being - the authority of the Legislative Branch of government to author/write, vote, enact and amend Federal Law. Moreover, Latham & Watkins and the UBCJA International Union have intentionally skewed these figures to present false and misleading data to the Court and this so called National Economic Crisis is being furthered by the Building Trades and Employers Association (BTEA) via a bogus 26-point plan and Subway Campaign, replete with advertising to falsely persuade the Public, the Politicians and the Courts that NYCDCC Union Carpenters wage and benefit packages are too high and unsustainable. FY 2010 man-hour data is not yet published. However, predicated on the recorded and paid ManHours using the 15,294 active member figure from 10/31/10 and an average Hourly wage for rounding purposes of $43.00 per M/H for the Carpenter Journeyman package (as a base estimate) and utilizing the FY 2009 M/H Total of 17,640,900 total M/H's:  On average the rank & file journeyman Carpenter would gross 1,153 M/H x $43 = $49,579.00 per year.  At an average of 35% with-holding < $17,353>, net take home pay = $32,226 before the rank & file worker files a short or long form itemized tax return. That translates to $619.73 per week net pay, hardly enough to live in NYC.....BTEA wants to reduce this by 20-25%and honestly believes that people living in or around NYCDCC, or the 5-Boroughs are making it in New York. It seems appropriate, in light of the proposed Restructuring Plan & Bylaw changes that prior to any change, that more detailed analysis is required. The Trustees & Fiduciaries should be required to produce a report detailing numbers for each local union (Total, Average, Mean) and be required to show a demographic breakdown by age, the ratio of apprentices to journeyman employed, the ratio of woman employed and of minorities as data avails itself. The reports should also depict the man-hour relation to the dollar volume and type of work produced in any given year, and further be broken down by specific American Institute of Architect (AIA) & Construction Standards Institute (CSI) General Conditions & all Division of Work - shown in detail by Specification Section from reports garnered by & from GC's & Subcontractors.

Moreover, given the amounts of monies spent on Labor-Management Relations, this should come in the form of a mandate by a formal order of the Court. If the current leadership does not have this information available to them at the snap of a finger, (through the IT dept. & the funds) they cannot begin to address any long term problems, let alone the immediate ones. If the NYCDCC employees do not comprehend why these facts, data & numbers are required - they should be summarily vetoed and replaced with competent executives with a comprehensive knowledge of the Construction Industry.

 The fact of the matter is, approving the requested By-Law changes and granting the UBCJA the legislative power of Congress, in abolishing the NLRA & LMRDA laws will lead to one thing Wage & Benefit Packages for Interior Systems Local Unions in which the Journeyman Carpenters shall be expected to work for 60% of the wages of the full Journeyman Package by the illegal creation of Helper Categories as is now being done in the Pacific Northwest Regional Council of Carpenters. Moreover, the UBCJA has implemented a National Skills Form with facially unlawful language, known to them, their counsel of record PNWRCC counsel to violate the NLRA, LMRDA and many Supreme Court precedent and landmark decisions. Movants shall address this in a separate exhibit attached hereto. With regard to the Latham & Watkins letter, at page-2, paragraph 2, sentence 1: Latham & Watkins, LLP stated: In 2010, the District Council commissioned outside consultants from FMI Corporation (confidential report, which they have sat on since last August to insure there would be insufficient time to challenge it, the sources, etc) to prepare a study of the market for Union Carpentry. That study was attached as Exhibit B, and it states that the District Council is at precarious crossroads. The economic downturn has greatly reduced the number of Construction Projects, with the New York City marker decreasing 22% between 2006 and 2009. With fewer construction projects, the total number of hours worked by Union Carpenters decreased from 17.2 million to 14.4 million.. re: Latham & Watkins at 2. Movants have investigated this firm and forcefully object to the acceptance of the FMI Corp. Report as having any basis in fact. It is a completely biased report, from an agency known to be a Union Buster within the Construction Industry. FMI Corporation core experience dates to perhaps 2007 with the Architectural & Engineering (A/E) markets. The core business has matured past "accounting" for small bit players in the non-union Associated Builders & Contractors (ABC) construction sector - to teaching & training and conducting seminars. In short, most seminars are in essence an excuse for a weekend field trip to a Luxury Resort in which just enough, the bare minimum of business is conducted as it is so called, to qualify the Corporate Fieldtrips to far away destinations as a write-off with the IRS - nothing more, nothing less.

There isn't a large Engineering News Record (ENR) Construction Firm or moderately sized Regional GC or Subcontractor who would consider an ounce of advice from this firm. The sophisticated Regional players Doug McCarron speaks of are the large Multi-Billion dollar top Engineering News Record (ENR) firms and they will generally avoid hiring such a firm, particularly given their relative inexperience in the larger scheme of the industry as a whole. ($30M Gross). FMI, Inc's core business is in the Right to Work for Less States of North Carolina, Florida, and Arizona & in Seoul, Korea. They train people and business how to avoid the laws, their corporate resume dates to 2007. FMI, Inc has never built or managed a project of any size, nor could they. Accordingly, no credible or reputable firm would take any advice from them. They host Weekend & Work-Week getaway Seminars on meaningless topics, which by design are an excuse for the Corporate get away so you can get a round of Golf in at a high end resort, hit the slopes, go jet-skiing etc. and conduct just enough so called business to qualify the trip as a Tax Write-Off/Business expense for the attending Corporations & Firms, barely passing IRS rules. Certain seminars are primarily geared towards avoiding & end-running the law. Topics such as "How to get a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity from Indian Tribes" give you a really good idea of their mindset toward business and the rule of law. FMI Corporation has not produced one legitimate Labor Report which can be verified by the Court, the United States Attorneys office or the IROs office, nor have they produced one legitimate Federal Tax Return for an ENR top 10 GC or top 10 Subcontractor depicting Gross Profit Margins of 24% (Union) to 37% Non-Union) or the Net Profit Margins. The Construction Industry averages 10-12% overhead and profit (OH & P) during the best of times; and, that is qualified to an exceptionally well run firm - one with the requisite experience, bonding & credit capacity, equipment, tools and know how sustained through a competent Subcontractor, Material Supplier, Vendor and a competent well trained Workforce. Typical large Public Works contracts and Private contracts, regardless of contract form, inclusive of PSA-PLA Agreements are capped at 5% OH & P. Change order work, when warranted is a different animal altogether. Were Gross Profit Margins sustainable at 24% to 37%, w/o getting into net profit margins - the fact is the NYCDCC and every Trade involved with BTEA, BCTC & Contractor Associations would have 100% Full Employment, record employment in fact. There isn't an ounce of Credibility or discernable fact presented within the entire Report. When a management consulting firm with such a limited role within the Multi-Billion dollar Union Construction Industry, one with a history of Union Busting,

cites as a reliable source, the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), and its corporate history is such as described in its own literature and dates to 2007, little credence can be given to the entire report. The fact of the matter is the UBCJA International and the named Labor-Management participants (pages 76 of the Restructuring Plan) directed this firm to write it exactly as it was "scripted", as a means to sell their doom & gloom prophecy to the Court. It is an insult to people's intelligence & depicts the lengths the UBCJA International will go to defraud the rank & file of their due process rights and the ability to retain their Local autonomy and control of Local Union and NYCDCC matters, as they see fit, and as the law provides. Any doubt that BTEA, BCTC & Contractor Associations are not heavily involved in these matters can be put to rest. This is a collusive and fraudulent effort to defraud the rank & file and the Court. References: http://www.fminet.com/fmi-speeches, http://www.fminet.com/media/pdf/FMI_History.pdf http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm
http://www.nwcarpenters.org PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS Movants note the following excerpts from the PNWRCCs newly executed Contract, post dissolution & mergers, wherein the specific goal and aim of the UBCJA International is to grant the Contractor Associations an illegal kickback in wages & benefits, for the newly formed Interior Systems Locals. SENIOR DRYWALL UTILITY WORKER (formerly a Journeyman Union Carpenter) $21.40/hr, reduced 40% from Journeyman Rate is: $35.66 and set at $39.23 per hour for Foreman. Effective: 6-1-10 to 5-31-12 (Illegal re-classification of a Journeyman Carpenter, to that of a helper, for 40% of the former wages and benefit rate). y y y y y Mandatory Annual Training, or no Wage Increase per CBA OT, M-SAT Double Time After 12, instead of after 10 Private Jobs $500k or Less = 85% of Journeyman Wage Package Eliminate Zone Pay = Full Mobility Eliminate Travel Time, Regardless of Distance to Project

y y y

When put up on Company Camps...."Camp or Board Lodging" Paid @ $3.00 /Day. Weekend Travel Home...they will pay for Toll or Ferry with documented receipt(s) NW WALL & CEILING - UTILITY WORKER Wage Scale (not an apprentice) 1st 6-months, $17.83/hr - 2nd 6-months $19.61/hr

Movants note: UBCJA Constitution, dated November 11, 2010, page Standing Decisions of the General Executive Board, September 17, 1887 Grading wages is demoralizing to Union principles and to the welfare of the Trade and no Local Union should adopt the system of grading wages. The Proposed NYCDCC Restructuring Plan, with its requisite demand for an Interior systems Local, to be awarded to the corrupt Wall & Ceiling Contractor Association will expressly violate the UBCJA Constitution by the forced impartation of graded wages at 40% below Journeyman Wage & Benefit scale; and, shall thus serve as a form of a kickback to the Contractor Association in direct & flagrant contravention to the requirement that the Consent Decree eliminate any & all forms or racketeering activity and corruption. This is one such instance, wherein the UBCJA and their counsel attempt to play the Court for fools via the to be determined (TBD) language within the 5-26-11 restructuring plan. MANDATORY SKILLS FORMS & ONE YEAR "IRREVOCABLE ASSIGNMENT" of:

I________________(print name) assign to the __________________(fill in Council) from my earnings, a sum equal to the Unions Membership Dues. Assessments, and Initiation Fee (the Union will notify my Employer of the current amount). I authorize & direct my Employer to deduct such sum and to remit the Money to the Union Monthly. This Assignment is irrevocable for One (1) Year from this date or until Termination of the Labor Agreement, whichever occurs first. This Assignment shall be renewed Automatically, for successive 12-month periods, unless the Union and my Employer receive my written Notice of Termination of this Assignment not more than twenty (20) days and not less than ten (10) days prior to renewal of the Assignment. This Authorization is effective regardless of my status as a Member, Non-Member, or "Financial

Core" payer and applies regardless of any Future Resignation of Membership on my part. I hereby authorize the UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA to act as my collective bargaining agent in dealing with my employer in regards to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. All previous authorizations made by me are revoked. Name:_______________________________________Date:_______________________________

On March 1, 2011, the attorneys representing the NYCDCC, DeCarlo, Connor & Shanley, via letter, sought an opinion from the Court to allow interested parties, e.g. parties to the collective bargaining agreement in question, the Consent Decree, and other interested parties, the opportunity to make submissions to the Court regarding their position on this issue, and have the Court issue a ruling that would clarify the matter. The reference was made to the Final Order and Judgment of Contempt and Remedy (Order) Document #961, dated May 26, 2009 with respect to the 67% - 33% Request System for Hiring Workers and Employees from the NYCDCC Out of Work List (OWL). On April 1, 2011, via letter, DeCarlo, Connor & Shanley stated The District Council wishes to explore with the Association of Wall-Ceiling and Carpenter Industries of New York, Inc. (Association) a resolution of the issue that is acceptable to all parties and in accordance with the Order. Thus, the District Council does not wish to burden the Court at this time with this issue. Brian F. Quinn subsequently withdrew the request prior to the April 6th Conferencing session. On May 26, 2011, 10-days after pro-se Movants filed the motion for relief, the UBCJA International and the NYCDCC published a 138-page Restructuring Plan, wherein their new position to avoid compliance with the Court Order dated May 26, 2009 regarding the 67% - 33% mandate for hiring from the OWL would be replaced by the UBCJA & the Wall & Ceiling Association simply eliminating the 50-50 Rule and the 67%-33% May 26, 2009 Court Order altogether. This position does not make law. Moreover, said position is an express violation of the Consent Decree and the Court Order and is a Unilateral Change to both the Collective Bargaining Agreement and the Consent Decree, as per NLRB v. Katz, 369 US 736 (1962); and, as such is a prima-facie violation of NLRA Sec. 8(a)(5). The UBC statements regarding establishment of a Labor-Management Corporation are patently false, as one already exists, and members are already taxed and assessed for these services.

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Moreover, their commentary that and Wall & Ceiling and other employers willingness to participate may well hinge on the elimination of the so-called 50-50 rule (Latham & Watkins letter at pg. 5) have no basis in fact or law. It is what they stated in their March 16, 2011 letter, nothing more than a position. Painting it as a critical issue with the notation that UBC General President Douglas McCarron will seek a meeting with Review Officer Dennis Walsh and Assistant United States Attorney Benjamin Torrance within the next ten days to do so, lends no more credence to their position. Ref: UBC at 5, Latham & Watkins 5-26-11 letter.  Movants request the Court issue an Order to Show cause, per standard Court Motion Practice and force the UBCJA International and the NYCDCC and their attorneys to bring the issues they wish to discuss directly to the Court. Movants further request a permanent Injunction restraining the UBCJA International & the NYCDCC from any further attempts to back-door their desire to re-write the Consent Decree terms and conditions to suit their own agenda, and that of what has proved to be a corrupt Contractor association via informal Conferencing procedures and relaxed Court Rules. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which decision issued February 20, 2007 made it amply clear at 9, pg. 7 The Consent Decree is clear and unambiguous. King, 65 F. 3d. at 1058. The Consent Decree addresses CBAs in two places: Paragraph 4(f)(1)(b) and Job Referral Rule 5(B). However, neither empowers the Union to circumvent the Consent Decree through a CBA. At 14, pg 8, the Court of Appeals stated Rule 5(B) does not permit the Union to make unlimited changes to the Job Referral Rules in a CBA. This is particularly true when Job Referral Rule 5(B) is read in conjunction with Consent Decree Paragraph 11, which again, provide that [t}o the extent that this Consent Decree conflicts with any current or future rights, privileges or rules applicable to the District Council or its membership, the District Councilhereby waives compliance with any such right, privilege or rule an agrees that it and its membership will act in accordance with this Consent Decree. At 21, pg. 8, the Court of Appeals stated Paragraph 11 further requires the Union to make the Job Referral Rules part of the District Council By-Laws.  Movants note that the UBCJA International, the District Council and its attorneys of record have failed to abide by this specific requirement and include the Job Referral Rules part of the

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District Council By-Laws as ordered by the Court. Ref: Exhibit C, pg. 94-125 of Latham & Watkins May 26, 2011 138-page Restructuring Plan Status Update.  Movants respectfully request the Court issue a contempt Order and direct the UBCJA, the District Council, its agents and attorneys of record and the Wall & Ceiling Contractor Associations from making any such changes, and/or issuing any Unilateral Contract changes to the CBAs; and again respectfully request that the contract be extended for one-year, to preserve and maintain the status-quo until such a time as the Local Union Elections, the District Council Elections are held, all statutory election challenges, if any are heard and resolved per DOL/OLMS requirements of law and the Local Union and District Council limited suspension of their autonomy is restored as required by law.  Movants note that the 18-month statutory period has expired, and has a limited extension which we ask be rescinded by Order of this Court. Movants request that intervening supervision be placed under the control of the United States Attorneys office, the Independent Review Officer and the District Councils new Director of Operations.

NORTHEAST REGIONAL COUNCIL SKILL FORM INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT WAIVER PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY! Mark ! below. I am a: [ ] Journeyman carpenter [ ] Apprentice carpenter Year_______________ Name_______________________________________________________ Date___________________ UBC ID#_____________________ UBC Local #____________ Date of Birth______________________ Address_____________________________________________________________________________ City_______________________ State______ Zip__________ Email_____________________________ Phone #___________________________ YOU MUST BE AVAILABLE TO ANSWER THIS PHONE NUMBER BETWEEN 2 P.M. AND 6 P.M. Ethnicity (Optional): [ ] Asian [ ] Hispanic or Latino [ ] White [ ] Black or African American [ ] Other YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE TO ACCEPT WORK IN THE FOLLOWING: (Mark with an ! below.)

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[ ] Metal Framing [ ] Concrete Carpet Flooring Transit Level [ ] Drywall [ ] Bridges/Highway Sheet Goods Total Station [ ] Drywall Finishing [ ] Heavy Highway Vinyl Tile Nuclear Facilities [ ] Ceilings [ ] Wood Framing Wood Flooring (Nail,Glue) Foreman [ ] Trim & Millwork [ ] Scaffolding Wood Flooring (Sand & Finish) Drug-Tested Jobs [ ] Solid Surface [ ] Will work with Heights Synthetic Turf Installation Lather [ ] Cabinetry [ ] Siding/Roofing Computer Floor [ ] Store Front [ ] Piledriving [ ] Doors & Hardware [ ] Welding [ ] Fixtures-Furniture [ ] Concrete [ ] Bridges/Highway [ ] Heavy Highway [ ] Wood Framing [ ] Scaffolding [ ] Will work with Heights [ ] Siding/Roofing [ ] Piledriving [ ] Welding [ ] Doors & Hardware [ ] Fixtures-Furniture [ ] Carpet Flooring [ ] Sheet Goods [ ] Vinyl Tile [ ] Wood Flooring (Nail,Glue) [ ] Wood Flooring (Sand & Finish) [ ] Synthetic Turf Installation [ ] Computer Floor [ ] Transit Level [ ] Total Station [ ] Nuclear Facilities [ ] Foreman [ ] Drug-Tested Jobs [ ] Lather PLEASE MARK WHICH COUNTIESWITHIN YOUR LOCAL IN WHICH YOU PREFER TO WORK. Members of Specialty Locals 252, 251, 178, and 39 may mark any county in any state. (Mark with an X below) New Jersey Commercial Locals Local 255 [ ] Atlantic Local 254 [ ] Hunterdon Local 253 [ ] Bergen [ ] Burlington [ ] Mercer [ ] Essex

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[ ] Camden [ ] Middlesex [ ] Hudson [ ] Cape May [ ] Morris [ ] Passaic [ ] [ ] Cumberland [ ] Somerset New York Commercial Locals Local 291 Local 290 Local 279 Local 277 [ ] Albany [ ] Nassau [ ] Columbia [ ] Broome [ ] Clinton [ ] Suffolk [ ] Dutchess [ ] Cayuga [ ] Essex [ ] Orange [ ] Chemung [ ] Franklin [ ] Putnam [ ] Chenango Local 276 [ ] Allegany [ ] Cattaraugus [ ] Chautauqua [ ] Erie [ ] Somerset [ ] Sussex [ ] Union [ ] Warren [ ] Gloucester [ ] Monmouth [ ] Ocean [ ] Salem [ ] Fulton [ ] Rockland [ ] Cortland [ ] Greene [ ] Sullivan [ ] Delaware [ ] Hamilton [ ] Ulster [ ] Herkimer [ ] Montgomery [ ] Westchester [ ] Jefferson [ ] Rensselaer [ ] Lewis [ ] Saratoga [ ] Madison [ ] Schenectady [ ] Oneida [ ] Schoharie [ ] Onondaga [ ] Warren [ ] Oswego [ ] Washington [ ] Otsego hl [ ] Livingston [ ] Monroe [ ] Niagara [ ] Ontario [ ] Orleans [ ] Wayne [ ] Wyoming g [ ] Schuyler [ ] Seneca [ ] St. Lawrenc [ ] Steuben [ ] Tioga [ ] Tompkins [ ] Yates

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YOU ARE TRAINED / CERTIFIED IN THE FOLLOWING: (Mark with an ! below.) [ ] Boom Truck Cert [ ] Cleanroom Class [ ] Asbestos Abatement [ ] ROV Operator [ ] Door Hardware [ ] Firestop Class [ ] Forklift Industrial [ ] Certified Locksmith [ ] Foreman A Class [ ] Forklift Rough Terrain [ ] Solid Surface Installer Class [ ] Powder Actuated Tool [ ] Rigging [ ] First Aid / CPR Cert [ ] Lead Renovator [ ] Hand Signaler Rigging [ ] PALM (Built-Rite) [ ] Fall Protection [ ] Scaffold Erector [ ] HAZMAT [ ] Certified Steward [ ] Scaffold User [ ] OSHA 10 [ ] TWIC Card [ ] Certified Welder [ ] OSHA 30 [ ] STP Cert [ ] Light Gauge Weld [ ] MSDS [ ] WABO Cert [ ] Rebar Stick Weld [ ] Hazardous Waste 40 Hour [ ] Blueprint Reading [ ] Rebar Wire Weld [ ] FORBO [ ] Laser Level [ ] Stick Cert Weld [ ] INSTALL Carpet [ ] Green Awareness [ ] TIG Cert Weld [ ] INSTALL Resilient [ ] Ceiling Certification [ ] Wire Cert Weld [ ] INSTALL Wood 1 [ ] Confined Space [ ] Insulated Concrete Forms [ ] INSTALL Wood 2 [ ] Nuclear Plant Access COMMENTS: _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________ I ____________________________________(Print Name), assign to the Northeast Regional Council of Carpenters, from my earnings, a sum equal to the Unions check-off assessment and initiation fee (the Council will notify my Employer of the current amount). I authorize and direct my Employer to deduct such sum and remit the money to the Union monthly. This assignment is irrevocable for one (1) year from this date or until the termination of the Labor Agreement, whichever occurs first. This assignment shall be renewed automatically, for successive12 month periods, unless the Union and my employer receive my written notice of termination of this assignment not more than twenty (20) days and not less than ten (10) days prior to renewal of the assignment. This authorization is effective regardless of my status as a member, nonmember, or financial core payer and applies regardless of any future resignation of membership on my part. I hereby authorize the NORTHEAST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS to act as my collective bargaining agent in dealing with my employer in regard to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. All previous authorizations made by me are revoked.

Signature_______________________________________________Date______________________

SKILL(S) FORM Prima-facie example of Illegal Individual Contract by the UBCJA Intl. In Steele v. Louisville N.R. Co. 323 US 192 (1944), the supreme Court noted at:

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Section 2, Second, requiring carriers to bargain with the representative so chosen, operates to exclude any other from representing a craft. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, supra, 300 U.S. 545 , 57 S. Ct. 598. The minority members of a craft are thus deprived by the statute of the right, which they would otherwise possess, to choose a representative of their own, and its members cannot bargain individually on behalf of themselves as to matters which are properly the subject of collective bargaining. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 , 64 S.Ct. 582, and see under the like provisions of the National Labor Relations Act J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332 , 64 S.Ct. 576, and Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 678 , 64 S.Ct. 830. The labor organization chosen to be the representative of the craft or class of employees is thus chosen to represent all of its members, regardless of their union affiliations or want of them. As we have pointed out with respect to the like provision of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq., in J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, 321 U.S. 338 , 64 S.Ct. 580, 'The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group. Its benefits and advantages are open to every employee of the repre- [323 U.S. 192, 201] sented unit ....' The purpose of providing for a representative is to secure those benefits for those who are represented and not to deprive them or any of them of the benefits of collective bargaining for the advantage of the representative or those members of the craft who selected it..  MOVANTS NOTE THE NLRA & RLA are intertwined in statutory text. The representative which thus discriminates may be enjoined from so doing, and its members may be enjoined from taking the benefit of such discriminatory action. No more is the Railroad bound by or entitled to take the benefit of a contract which the bargaining representative [323 U.S. 192, 204] is prohibited by the statute from making. In both cases the right asserted, which is derived from the duty imposed by the statute on the bargaining representative, is a federal right implied from the statute and the policy which it has adopted. It is the federal statute which condemns as unlawful the Brotherhood's conduct. 'The extent and nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are nevertheless to be derived from it and the federal policy which it has adopted.' Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200 , 201 S., 60 S.Ct. 480, 485; Board of Commissioners of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 , 60 S.Ct. 285; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 , 177 S., 63 S.Ct. 172, 173, 174; cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 , 63 S.Ct. 573. So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the power of representation conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft. While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization the right to determine eligibility to its membership, it does require the union, in collective bargaining and in making contracts with the carrier, to represent non- union or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.

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Wherever necessary to that end, the union is required to consider requests of non-union members of the craft and expressions of their views with respect to collective bargaining with the employer and to give to them notice of and opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action. Since the right asserted by petitioner 'is ... claimed ... under the Constitution' and a 'statute of the United States', the decision of the Alabama court adverse to that contention is reviewable here under 237(b) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.A. 344(b), unless the Railway Labor Act itself has excluded petitioner's claims from judicial consideration. The ques- [323 U.S. 192, 205] tion here presented is not one of a jurisdictional dispute, determinable under the administrative scheme set up by the Act, cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 , 64 S.Ct. 95; General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 320 U.S. 323 , 64 S.Ct. 146; General Committee v. Southern Pacific Co., 320 U.S. 338 , 64 S.Ct. 142; Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. United Transport Service Employees, 320 U.S. 715 , 64 S.Ct. 260; Id., 320 U.S. 816 , 64 S.Ct. 435, or restricted by the Act to voluntary settlement by recourse to the traditional implements of mediation, conciliation and arbitration. General Committee v. Missouri- Kansas-Texas R. Co., supra, 320 U.S. 332, 337 , 64 S.Ct. 150, 153. IN J.I. CASE, 321 US 332 (1944) The petitioner, J. I. Case Company, at its Rock Island, Illinois, plant, from 1937 offered each employee an individual contract of employment. The contracts were uniform and for a term of one year While the individual contracts executed August 1, 1941 were in effect, a C.I.O. union petitioned the Board for certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of the production and maintenance employees. On December 17, 1941 a hearing was held, at which the Company urged the individual contracts as a bar to representation proceedings. The Board, however, directed an election, which was won by the union. The union was thereupon certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in question in respect to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. [321 U.S. 332, 334] The union then asked the Company to bargain. It refused, declaring that it could not deal with the union in any manner affecting rights and obligations under the individual contracts while they remained in effect. . The Board held that the Company had refused to bargain collectively, in violation of 8(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 158(5); and that the contracts had been utilized, by means of the circulars, to impede employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 157, with the result that the Company had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of 8(1) of the Act. It ordered the Company to cease and desist from giving effect to the contracts, from extending them or entering into new ones, from refusing to bargain and from interfering with the employees; and it required the Company to give notice accordingly and to bargain upon request... Individual contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to collective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee

17

from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to forestall bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement. 'The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices.' National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 364 , 60 S.Ct. 569, 577. Wherever private contracts conflict with its functions, they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility. [321 U.S. 332, 338] It is equally clear since the collective trade agreement is to serve the purpose contemplated by the Act, the individual contract cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit to which the employee otherwise would be entitled under the trade agreement. The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group. Its benefits and advantages are open to every employee of the represented unit, whatever the type or terms of his pre-existing contract of employment. It also is urged that such individual contracts may embody matters that are not necessarily included within the statutory scope of collective bargaining, such as stock purchase, group insurance, hospitalization, or medical attention. We know of nothing to prevent the employee's, because he is an employee, making any contract provided it is not inconsistent with a collective agreement or does not amount to or result from or is not part of an unfair labor practice. But in so doing the employer may not incidentally exact or obtain any diminution of his own obligation or any increase of those of employees in the matters covered by collective agreement. Hence we find that the contentions of the Company that the individual contracts precluded a choice of representatives and warranted refusal to bargain during their duration were properly over-ruled. It follows that representation to the employees by circular letter that they had such legal effect was improper and could properly be prohibited by the Board. [321 U.S. 332, 340] One minor matter remains for consideration. The literal terms of the Board's order require the Company to 'cease and desist from (a) giving effect to the individual contracts of employment or any modification, continuation, extension or renewal thereof, or entering into any similar form of contract with its employees for any period subsequent to the date of this decision,' and to give written notice to each to that effect and that 'such contract will not in any manner be enforced or attempted to be enforced' and that 'such discontinuance of the contract is without prejudice to the assertion of any legal rights the employee may have acquired under such contract.' These provisions, it has been argued, go beyond the Board's power, leave employees free to bring but the Company powerless to defend actions on the contract, and prohibit making future contracts even when not obnoxious to the law or to any collective agreement. The Board, of course, has no power to adjudicate the validity or effect of such contracts except as to their effect on matters within its jurisdiction. National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra. The Board, however, would construe the order more narrowly than its terms suggest. It says, 'The provision in question, as we have seen, is based upon the finding that the contracts were utilized as a means of interfering with rights guaranteed by the Act and constituted an

18

obstacle to collective bargaining. Read in the context of this finding, the requirement of the cease and desist provisions enjoins petitioner only from continuing to derive benefits from the contracts heretofore utilized to forestall collective bargaining and deter self-organization, and from entering into new contracts either for the purpose of again thus utilizing them or under circumstances in which similar infringement of the collective bargaining process would be a probable consequence. The paragraph does not prevent petitioner from contracting with individual employees under circumstances which negative any [321 U.S. 332, 341] intent to interfere with the employees' right under the Act. ... Thus construed, the challenged requirement is but a reasonable safeguard ....' We agree, but the literal language of the order may well be read in quite different meaning, especially when separated from findings and standing alone in the Court's enforcement order. It then becomes the language of the Court, and the Court would not be bound to look upon the Board's construction as its own. Questions of construction had better be ironed out before enforcement orders issue than upon contempt proceedings. A party is entitled to a definition as exact as the circumstances permit of the acts which he can perform only on pain of contempt of court. Nor should he be ordered to desist from more on the theory that he may violate the literal language and then defend by resort to the Board's construction of it. Courts' orders are not to be trifled with, nor should they invite litigation as to their meaning. It will occur often enough when every reasonable effort is made to avoid it. Where, as here, the literal language of the order goes beyond what the Board admits was intended, correction should be made. Paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a) of the decree of the court below are hereby modified, by adding the words in italics, to read as follows: '1. Cease and desist from: (a) Giving effect to the individual contracts of employment or any modification, continuation, extension, or renewal thereof to forestall collective bargaining or deter self-organization, or entering into any similar form of contract with its employees for any period subsequent to the date of this Decree for such purpose or with such effect. '2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Give separate written notice to each of its employees who signed an individual contract of employment or any modification, continuation, extension, or renewal [321 U.S. 332, 342] thereof, or any similar form of contract for any period subsequent to the date of this Decree, that such contract will not in any manner be enforced or attempted to be enforced to forestall collective bargaining or deter self-organization, that the employee is not required or expected by virtue of such contract to deal with respondent individually in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and that such discontinuance of the contract is without prejudice to the assertion of any legal rights the employee may have acquired under such contract or to any defenses there-to by the employer.' As so modified the decree is AFFIRMED. _________________________________________________________________________________

19

UNITED BROTHERHOOD of CARPENTERS & JOINERS of AMERICA, INTERNATIONAL SKILL FORM: Movants note that the SKILL FORM presented in PNWRCC and the newly established Northeast Regional Council of Carpenters (NRCC) encompassing the former Empire Regional Council of Carpenters (ESRCC) for upstate New York and the former New Jersey Regional Council of Carpenters has been intentionally with-held from this Court via non-inclusion in the Proposed NYCDCC Restructuring Plan so as to fraudulently induce the Court to accept the motives and actions of the UBCJA International as pure. Nothing could be further from the truth. The UBCJA International, acting under the temporary suspension of Local Union and NYCDCC autonomy, seeks to impart said Skill Form after the fact, and to issue the order as a fait-accompli and unilateral contract change which, of course is an act of bad faith, fraud and artifice which by design are to enforce an Individual Contract and execute a waiver of the CBA by individual workers and employees who would otherwise sign such a document under the directed threat of being terminated from their employment. As such, and as the United States Supreme Court noted in Virginia Power & Electric Co. 319 U.S. 533 (1939) under a separate issue, but under the same legal theory it is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can be fairly said to effectuate policies of the act. The UBCJA International Union in seeking an illegal waiver, in an individual contract via fraud, coercion and direct and indirect threats and fear of economic reprisal has established a prima-facie violation of employee Rights. Given under 17 & 18 of the 1:90-cv-5722 Consent Decree, that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and resolve any and all matters under its terms and conditions; and, further noting the Supreme Courts admonishment in J.I. Case, wherein they stated: The Board, of course, has no power to adjudicate the validity or effect of such contracts except as to their effect on matters within its jurisdiction. National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra.  Movants request that this Court take up this matter sua-sponte upon the facts presented. Movants further note, that the UBCJA, International has expressly violated 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158. The NYCDCC, BTEA & the Wall & Ceiling Contractors Association are engaged in Contract Negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement; and, said actions are a prima-facie violation of NLRA Section 8(a)(5) and a derivative violation of section 8(a)(1), as both parties are actively colluding to defraud the rank & file and the Court. Movants also note that Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972) We held in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 , that a union did not violate 8 (b) (1) by fining members who went to work during a lawful strike authorized by the membership and by suing to collect the fines. The Court reviewed at length in that opinion the legislative history of 7 and 8 (b) (1), and concluded by a close majority vote that the disciplinary measures taken by the union against its members on those facts were within the ambit of the union's control over its internal

20

affairs. But the sanctions allowed were against those who "enjoyed full union membership." Id., at 196. Yet when a member lawfully resigns from the union, its power over him ends. We noted in Scofield v. NLRB, [409 U.S. 213, 216] 394 U.S. 423, 429 , that if a union rule "invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating 8 (b) (1)." On the facts, we held that Scofield, where fines were imposed on members by the union, fell within the ambit of Allis-Chalmers. But we drew the line between permissible and impermissible union action against members as follows: ". . . 8 (b) (1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id., at 430. Under 7 of the Act the employees have "the right to refrain from any or all" concerted activities relating to collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right to join a union and participate in those concerted activities. We have here no problem of construing a union's constitution or bylaws defining or limiting the circumstances under which a member may resign from the union. 4 We have, therefore, only to apply the law which normally is reflected in our free institutions - the right of the individual to join or to resign from associations, as he sees fit "subject of course to any financial obligations due and owing" the group with which he was associated. Communications Workers v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 835, 838. [409 U.S. 213, 217] The Scofield case indicates that the power of the union over the member is certainly no greater than the union-member contract. Where a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafter engages in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct. That is to say, when there is a lawful dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control over the former member than it has over the man in the street. The Court of Appeals gave weight to the fact that the resigning employees had participated in the vote to strike. We give that factor little weight. The first two members resigned from the Union from one to two months after the strike had begun. The others did so from seven to 12 months after its commencement. And the strike was still in progress 18 months after its inception. Events occurring after the calling of a strike may have unsettling effects, leading a member who voted to strike to change his mind. The likely duration of the strike may increase the specter of hardship to his family; the ease with which the employer replaces the strikers may make the strike seem less provident. We do not now decide to what extent the contractual relationship between union and member may curtail the freedom to resign. But where, as here, there are no restraints on the resignation of members, 5 we conclude that the vitality of 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the [409 U.S. 213, 218] actions he endorsed in May and that his 7 rights are not lost by a union's plea for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission to its regime. Reversed.

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Machinists 412 U.S. 84 (1973) The Company filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board alleging that the Union had violated 8 (b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) [412 U.S. 84, 87] (1) (A). 5 The General Counsel issued a complaint, and the Board held that the Union violated 8 (b) (1) (A), by fining those employees who had resigned from the Union before returning to work during the strike, and by fining those who had resigned after returning to work to the extent that such fines were based on post-resignation work. The Union contends, however, that a result different from Textile Workers is warranted in this case because, [412 U.S. 84, 89] even though its constitution does not expressly restrict the right to resign during a strike, it does impose on members an obligation to refrain from strikebreaking. The Union asserts that this provision has been consistently interpreted to bind a member, notwithstanding his resignation, to abstain from strikebreaking for the duration of an existing strike. It urges that this provision may be enforced as a matter of contract law against one whose membership has ceased, because it was an obligation he undertook while a member. The provision in the Union's constitution which proscribes strikebreaking by its terms purports only to define "misconduct of a member." Nothing in the record indicates that Union members were informed, prior to the bringing of the charges that were the basis of this action, that the provision was interpreted as imposing any obligation on a resignee. 9 Thus, in order to sustain the Union's position, we would first have to find, contrary to the determination of the Board and of the Court of Appeals, that the Union constitution by implication extended its sanctions to nonmembers, and then further conclude that such sanctions were consistent with the Act. But we are no more disposed to find an implied post-resignation commitment from the strikebreaking proscription in the Union's constitution here than we were to find it from the employees' participation in the strike vote and ratification of penalties in Textile [412 U.S. 84, 90] Workers. 10 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner Union is Affirmed. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America Constitution, dated November 1, 2010 at Article 47, page 61, states: Resignation of Members: A. Section 47. A member can withdraw or sever connection with the United Brotherhood by submitting a clear and unequivocal resignation in writing to the Local Union. A member who resigns can only be readmitted as a new member.  Movants note the language in the Skill Form precludes such resignation, makes no mention of the UBC Constitution and operates as an irrevocable waiver and assignment of any & all employee rights, violates landmark Supreme Court decisions, and is fraudulent on its face. In Scofield, 394 U.S. 429 (1969) the Supreme Court holds a Union Rule invalid if it impairs a policy Congress has embedded into the Labor Laws. In Communication Workers of America v. Beck 487 U.S. 735 (1988) established the notification requirement & agency fee payers & Section 7 rights.

22

In Magnavox, 415 U.S. 322 (1974)The Supreme Court stated: The Board's position, as noted, has not always been consistent. But its present ruling is, we think, quite consistent with 7 rights of employees. It is the Board's function to strike a balance among "conflicting legitimate interests" which will "effectuate national labor policy," including those who support versus those who oppose the union. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 .  Movants note the Skill Form for PNWRCC & NRCC strike no such balance, and is unlawful on its face. Further, we note that as soon as the Court turns it back, the UBCJA will bring this in the back door and use the exact same language to defraud the rank & file, The United States Attorney and this honorable Court.

In Mastro, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (United Brotherhood of Carpenters)

The Supreme Court stated: Apart from the issues raised by petitioners' affirmative defenses, the proceedings reflect a flagrant example of interference by the employers with the expressly protected right of their employees to select their own bargaining representative. The findings disclose vigorous efforts by the employers to influence and even to coerce their employees to abandon the Carpenters as their bargaining representatives and to substitute Local 318. Accordingly, unless petitioners sustain at least one of their affirmative defenses, they must suffer the consequences of their unfair labor practices violating 8 (a) (1), (2) or (3) of the Act, as amended. In the absence of some contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, petitioners' unfair labor practices provide adequate ground for the orderly strike that occurred here. Under those circumstances, the striking employees do not lose their status and are entitled to reinstatement with back pay, even if replacements for them have been made. 9 Failure of the Board to enjoin petitioners' illegal conduct or failure of the Board to sustain the right to strike against that conduct would seriously undermine the primary objectives of the Labor Act. [350 U.S. 270, 279] See Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 673 . While we assume that the employees, by explicit contractual provision, could have waived their right to strike against such unfair labor practices and that Congress, by explicit statutory provision, could have deprived strikers, under the circumstances of this case, of their status as employees, the questions before us are whether or not such a waiver was made by the Carpenters in their 1949-1950 contract and whether or not such a deprivation of status was enacted by Congress in 8 (d) of the Act, as amended in 1947. I. Does the collective-bargaining contract waive the employees' right to strike against the unfair labor practices committed by their employers? The answer turns upon the proper interpretation of the particular contract before us. Like other contracts, it must be read as a whole and in the light of the law relating to it when made. ". . . we have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to preserve

23

the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other." Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 806 . This contract was made in the light of that declared policy. A similar dual purpose is emphasized as follows in 1 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they [350 U.S. 270, 280] have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. 151. See also, the declaration of policy in 1 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 141 (b). The two policies are complementary. They depend for their foundation upon assurance of "full freedom of association." Only after that is assured can the parties turn to effective negotiation as a means of maintaining "the normal flow of commerce and . . . the full production of articles and commodities . . . ." 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 141 (b). On the premise of fair representation, collective-bargaining contracts frequently have included certain waivers of the employees' right to strike and of the employers' right to lockout to enforce their respective economic demands during the term of those contracts. Provided the selection of the bargaining representative remains free, such waivers contribute to the normal flow of commerce and to the maintenance of regular production schedules. Individuals violating such clauses appropriately lose their status as employees. 10 [350 U.S. 270, 281] The waiver in the contract before us, upon which petitioners rely, is as follows: "5. The Union agrees that during the term of this agreement, there shall be no interference of any kind with the operations of the Employers, or any interruptions or slackening of production of work by any of its members. The Union further agrees to refrain from engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement." That clause expresses concern for the continued operation of the plant and has a natural application to strikes and work stoppages involving the subject matter of the contract. Conceding that the words "in any strike or work stoppage during the [one-year] term of this agreement," if read in complete isolation, may include all strikes and work stoppages of every nature, yet the trial examiner, the Board and the Court of Appeals agree that those words do not have that scope when read in their context and in the light of the law under which the contract was made. This unanimity of interpretation is entitled to much weight. 11

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Petitioners argue that the words "any strike" leave no room for interpretation and necessarily include all strikes, even those against unlawful practices destructive of the foundation on which collective bargaining must rest. We disagree. We believe that the contract, taken as a whole, deals solely with the economic relationship between the employers and their employees. 12 It is a typical collectivebargaining [350 U.S. 270, 282] contract dealing with terms of employment and the normal operations of the plant. It is for one year and assumes the existence of a lawfully designated bargaining representative. Its strike and lockout clauses are natural adjuncts of an operating policy aimed at avoiding interruptions of production prompted by efforts to change existing economic relationships. The main function of arbitration under the contract is to provide a mechanism for avoiding similar stoppages due to [350 U.S. 270, 283] disputes over the meaning and application of the various contractual provisions. To adopt petitioners' all-inclusive interpretation of the clause is quite a different matter. That interpretation would eliminate, for the whole year, the employees' right to strike, even if petitioners, by coercion, ousted the employees' lawful bargaining representative and, by threats of discharge, caused the employees to sign membership cards in a new union. Whatever may be said of the legality of such a waiver when explicitly stated, there is no adequate basis for implying its existence without a more compelling expression of it than appears in 5 of this contract. There has been no court decision called to our attention which has held that the employees' right to strike against unfair labor practices has been waived by language such as that which is before us. On the other hand, prior to such contract, such language had been held by the Board to apply appropriately to economic strikes with consequent loss of employee status. 13 It is suggested that 13 of the Act, as amended, precludes reliance by the Board upon the Act for support of its interpretation of the strike-waiver clause. That section provides that "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right." 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. 163. On the basis of the above language, petitioners claim that because the contract-waiver clause prohibits all strikes of every nature, nothing in the Act may be construed to affect the "limitations or qualifications" which the contract thus places on that right. Such a claim assumes the point at issue. The Board relies upon the context of the [350 U.S. 270, 284] contract and upon the language of the clause itself, rather than upon the statute, to define the kind of strike that is waived. As a matter of fact, the initial provision in 13 that nothing in the Act "shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike" adds emphasis to the Board's insistence upon preserving the employees' right to strike to protect their freedom of concerted action. Inasmuch as strikes against unfair labor practices are not anywhere specifically excepted from lawful strikes, 13 adds emphasis to the congressional recognition of their propriety. 14

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For the reasons stated above and those given by the Board and the court below, we conclude that the contract did not waive the employees' right to strike solely against the unfair labor practices of their employers. II. Does 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, deprive individuals of their status as employees if, within the waiting period prescribed by 8 (d) (4), they engage in a strike solely against unfair labor practices of their employers? Here again the background is the dual purpose of the Act (1) to protect the right of employees to be free to take concerted action as provided in 7 and 8 (a), 15 and (2) to substitute collective bargaining for economic warfare in securing satisfactory wages, hours of work and employment conditions. Section 8 (d) 16 seeks to bring about the termination and modification of collective-bargaining agreements without interrupting the flow of commerce or the production of goods, while 7 and 8 (a) seek to insure freedom of concerted action by employees at all times. [350 U.S. 270, 285] The language in 8 (d) especially relied upon by petitioners is as follows: "Any employee who engages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act, as amended . . . ." 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. 158 (d). Petitioners contend that the above words must be so read that employees who engage in any strike, regardless of its purpose, within the 60-day waiting period, thereby lose their status as employees. That interpretation would deprive Ciccone and his fellow strikers of their rights to reinstatement and would require the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 17 If the above words are read in complete isolation from their context in the Act, such an interpretation is possible. However, "In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 8 How. 113, 122. See also, Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 622-623; Duparquet Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216 , and United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 542 -543. Reading the clause in conjunction with the rest of 8, the Board points out that "the sixty-day period" referred to is the period mentioned in paragraph (4) of 8 (d). That paragraph requires the party giving notice of a desire to "terminate or modify" such a contract, as part of its obligation to bargain under 8 (a) (5) or 8 (b) (3), to continue "in full force and effect, without resorting to [350 U.S. 270, 286] strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later." Section 8 (d) thus seeks, during this natural renegotiation period, to relieve the parties from the economic pressure of a strike or lockout in relation to the subjects of negotiation. The final clause of 8 (d) also warns employees that, if they join a proscribed strike, they shall there by lose their status as employees and, consequently, their right to reinstatement. The Board reasons that the words which provide the key to a proper interpretation of 8 (d) with respect to this problem are "termination or modification." Since the Board expressly found that the instant strike was not to terminate or modify the contract, 18 but was designed instead to protest the

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unfair labor practices of petitioners, the loss-of-status provision of 8 (d) is not applicable. We sustain that interpretation. Petitioners' construction would produce incongruous results. It concedes that prior to the 60-day negotiating period, employees have a right to strike against unfair labor practices designed to oust the employees' bargaining representative, yet petitioners' interpretation of 8 (d) means that if the employees give the 60-day notice of their desire to modify the contract, they are penalized for exercising that right to strike. This would deprive them of their most effective weapon at a time when their need for it is obvious. Although the employees' request to modify the contract would demonstrate their need for the services of their freely chosen representative, petitioners' interpretation would have the incongruous effect of cutting off the employees' freedom to strike against unfair labor practices aimed at that representative. This would relegate the employees to filing charges under a procedure too slow [350 U.S. 270, 287] to be effective. The result would unduly favor the employers and handicap the employees during negotiation periods contrary to the purpose of the Act. There also is inherent inequity in any interpretation that penalizes one party to a contract for conduct induced solely by the unlawful conduct of the other, thus giving advantage to the wrongdoer. 19 Petitioners contend that, unless the loss-of-status clause is applicable to unfair labor practice strikes, as well as to economic strikes, it adds nothing to the existing law relating to loss of status. Assuming that to be so, the clause is justifiable as a clarification of the law and as a warning to employees against engaging in economic strikes during the statutory waiting period. Moreover, in the face of the affirmative emphasis that is placed by the Act upon freedom of concerted action and freedom of choice of representatives, any limitation on the employees' right to strike against violations of 7 and 8 (a), protecting those freedoms, must be more explicit and clear than it is here in order to restrict them at the very time they may be most needed. There is sufficient ambiguity here to permit consideration of relevant legislative history. While such history provides no conclusive answer, it is consistent with the view taken by the Board and by the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits. 20 Senator Ball, who was a manager for the 1947 amendments in the Senate and one of the conferees on the bill, stated that 8 (d) made mandatory what was already [350 U.S. 270, 288] good practice and was aimed at preventing such interruptions of production as the "quickie strikes" occasionally used to gain economic advantages. "The provision in the National Labor Relations Act defining collective bargaining, and providing that where a contract between a union and an employer is in existence, fulfilling the obligation on both sides to protect [bargain] collectively means giving at least 60 days' notice of the termination of the contract, or of the desire for any change in it, is another provision aimed primarily at protecting the public, as well as the employee, who have been the victims of `quickie' strikes. I do not think that is taking away any rights of labor . . . it is simply saying that they should all follow the sound, fair, and sane procedure which a majority of the good ones now follow." 93 Cong. Rec. 5014. One minority report suggested a fear that 8 (d) would be applicable to unfair practice strikes. The

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suggestion, however, was not even made the subject of comment by the majority reports or in the debates. 21 An unsuccessful minority cannot put words into the mouths of the majority and thus, indirectly, amend a bill. 22 The record shows that the supporters of the bill were aware of the established practice which distinguished between the effect on employees of engaging in economic strikes and that of engaging in unfair practice strikes. 23 [350 U.S. 270, 289] If Congress had wanted to modify that practice, it could readily have done so by specific provision. Congress cannot fairly be held to have made such an intrusion on employees' rights, as petitioners claim, without some more explicit expression of its purpose to do so than appears here. 24 Finally, petitioners seek support for their interpretation of 8 (d) from the fact that its last clause makes a cross-reference to 8, 9 and 10 of the Act. Such reference does not expand the scope of 8 (d). It merely makes it clear that if 8 (d) is violated by the employees to whom it applies, then they lose their status as employees for the purposes of 8, 9 and 10. 25 As neither the collective-bargaining contract nor 8 (d) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, stands in the way, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. _________________________________________________________________________________ Skill Form cont. Given the lengths to which the UBCJA International Union will go, under their limited authority to suspend the Local Unions & NYCDCC autonomy under the Trusteeship imposed per the LMRDA, it bares of necessity to include the entire case cited below, as related to the Skill Form, whether it be enacted under the terms and conditions of the still operative Collective Bargaining Agreement, or whether through fraud, artifice & collusion with Wall & Ceiling and BTEA, the UBCJA has intentionally with-held same from the proposed New York City District Council of Carpenters Restructuring Plan which incorporates exactions through the illegal portions of Proposed By-Law changes, which by operation and law remain the Local Union members to draft, consider, debate, freely exchange ideas and finally hold a vote upon; and remain outside of the International Carpenters Union authority in the first instance.

U.S. Supreme Court PATTERN MAKERS v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) 473 U.S. 95 PATTERN MAKERS' LEAGUE OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO, ET AL. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ET AL.

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CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 83-1894. Argued February 27, 1985 Reargued April 22, 1985 Decided June 27, 1985 Petitioner national labor union's constitution provides that resignations from the union are not permitted during a strike. The union fined 10 members who, in violation of this provision, resigned during a strike by petitioner local unions and returned to work. Respondent employer representative thereafter filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (Board), claiming that such levying of fines constituted an unfair labor practice under 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their 7 rights. The Board agreed, and the Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order. Held: In related cases this Court has invariably yielded to Board decisions on whether fines imposed by a union "restrained or coerced" employees. Moreover, the Board has consistently construed 8(b)(1)(A) as prohibiting the fining of employees who have resigned from a union contrary to a restriction in the union constitution. Therefore, the Board's decision in this case is entitled to this Court's deference. Pp. 100-116. (a) The Board was justified in concluding that by restricting the right of employees to resign, the provision in question impaired the congressional policy of voluntary unionism implicit in 8(a)(3) of the Act. Pp. 104-107. (b) The proviso to 8(b)(1)(A), which states that nothing in 8(b) (1)(A) shall "impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein," was intended to protect union rules involving admission and expulsion and not to allow unions to make rules restricting the right to resign. Accordingly, the Board properly concluded that the provision in question is not a "rule with respect to the retention of membership." Pp. 108-110. (c) The legislative history does not support petitioners' contention that Congress did not intend to protect the right of union members to resign. Pp. 110-112. [473 U.S. 95, 96] (d) Nor is there any merit to petitioners' argument that because the common law does not prohibit restrictions on resignation, the provision in question does not violate 8(b)(1)(A). Pp. 112-114. 724 F.2d 57, affirmed. POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 116.

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BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 117. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 133. Laurence Gold reargued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Marsha S. Berzon, Michael Rubin, George Kaufmann, and David M. Silberman. Deputy Solicitor General Fried reargued the cause for respondent National Labor Relations Board. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Edward J. Fahy filed a brief for respondent Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association. * [ Footnote * ] Paul Alan Levy and Alan B. Morrison filed a brief for Teamsters for a Democratic Union as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Carl L. Taylor, Glenn Summers, and Stephan A. Bokat; for the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation by Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.; and for Safeway Stores, Inc., et al. by Warren M. Davison and Wesley J. Fastiff. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. The Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO (League), a labor union, provides in its constitution that resignations are not permitted during a strike or when a strike is imminent. The League fined 10 of its members who, in violation of this provision, resigned during a strike and returned to work. The National Labor Relations Board held that these fines were imposed in violation of 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A). We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in order to decide whether 8(b)(1)(A) reasonably may be construed by the [473 U.S. 95, 97] Board as prohibiting a union from fining members who have tendered resignations invalid under the union constitution. I The League is a national union composed of local associations (locals). In May 1976, its constitution was amended to provide that "[n]o resignation or withdrawal from an Association, or from the League, shall be accepted during a strike or lockout, or at a time when a strike or lockout appears imminent." This amendment, known as League Law 13, became effective in October 1976, after being ratified by the League's locals. On May 5, 1977, when a collective-bargaining agreement expired, two locals began an economic strike against several manufacturing companies in Rockford, Illinois, and Beloit, Wisconsin. Forty-three of the two locals' members participated. In early September 1977, after the locals formally rejected a contract offer, a striking union member submitted a letter of resignation to the Beloit Association. 1 He returned to work the following day. During the next three months, 10 more union members resigned from the Rockford and Beloit locals and returned to work. On December 19, 1977, the strike ended when the parties signed a new collective-bargaining agreement. The locals notified 10 employees who had resigned that their resignations had been rejected as violative of League Law 13. 2 The locals further informed the [473 U.S. 95, 98] employees that, as union members, they were subject to sanctions for returning to work. Each was fined approximately

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the equivalent of his earnings during the strike. The Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers' Association (Association) had represented the employers throughout the collective-bargaining process. It filed charges with the Board against the League and its two locals, the petitioners. Relying on 8(b)(1)(A), the Association claimed that levying fines against employees who had resigned was an unfair labor practice. 3 Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge found that petitioners had violated 8(b)(1)(A) by fining employees for returning to work after tendering resignations. Pattern Makers' League of North America, 265 N. L. R. B. 1332, 1339 (1982) (decision of G. Wacknov, ALJ). The Board agreed that 8(b)(1)(A) prohibited the union from imposing sanctions on the 10 employees. 4 Pattern Makers' [473 U.S. 95, 99] League of North America, supra. In holding that League Law 13 did not justify the imposition of fines on the members who attempted to resign, the Board relied on its earlier decision in Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N. L. R. B. 984 (1982), enf. denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (CA9 1984). 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's order. 724 F.2d 57 (1983). The Court of Appeals stated that by restricting the union members' freedom to resign, League Law 13 "frustrate[d] the overriding policy of labor law that employees be free to choose whether to engage in concerted activities." Id., at 60. Noting that the "mutual reliance" theory was given little weight in NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972), the court rejected petitioners' argument that their members, by participating in the strike vote, had "waived their Section 7 right to abandon the strike." 724 F.2d, at 60-61. Finally, the Court of Appeals reasoned that under Scofield [473 U.S. 95, 100] v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), labor organizations may impose disciplinary fines against members only if they are "free to leave the union and escape the rule[s]." 724 F.2d, at 61. We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari, 469 U.S. 814 (1984), to resolve the conflict between the Courts of Appeals over the validity of restrictions on union members' right to resign. 6 The Board has held that such restrictions are invalid and do not justify imposing sanctions on employees who have attempted to resign from the union. Because of the Board's "special competence" in the field of labor relations, its interpretation of the Act is accorded substantial deference. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975). The question for decision today is thus narrowed to whether the Board's construction of 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable. See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 (1984). We believe that 8(b)(1)(A) properly may be construed as prohibiting the fining of employees who have tendered resignations ineffective under a restriction in the union constitution. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals enforcing the Board's order. II A Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 157, grants employees the right to "refrain from any or all [concerted] . . . activities . . . ." 7 This general right is implemented by [473 U.S. 95, 101] 8(b)(1)(A). The latter section provides that a union commits an unfair labor practice if it "restrain[s] or coerce[s] employees in the exercise" of their 7 rights. 8 When employee members of a union refuse to support a strike (whether or not a rule prohibits returning to work during a strike), they are refraining from "concerted

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activity." Therefore, imposing fines on these employees for returning to work "restrain[s]" the exercise of their 7 rights. Indeed, if the terms "refrain" and "restrain or coerce" are interpreted literally, fining employees to enforce compliance with any union rule or policy would violate the Act. Despite this language from the Act, the Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), held that 8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit labor organizations from fining current members. In NLRB v. Textile Workers, supra, and Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973) (per curiam), the Court found as a corollary that unions may not fine former members who have resigned lawfully. Neither Textile Workers, supra, nor Machinists, supra, however, involved a provision like League Law 13, restricting the members' right to resign. We decide today whether a union is precluded from fining employees who have attempted to resign when resignations are prohibited by the union's constitution. 9 [473 U.S. 95, 102] B The Court's reasoning in Allis-Chalmers, supra, supports the Board's conclusion that petitioners in this case violated 8(b)(1)(A). In Allis-Chalmers, the Court held that imposing court-enforceable fines against current union members does not "restrain or coerce" the workers in the exercise of their 7 rights. 10 In so concluding, the Court relied on the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act. It noted that the sponsor of 8(b)(1)(A) never intended for that provision "`to interfere with the internal affairs or organization of unions,'" 388 U.S., at 187 , quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 4272 (1947) (statement of Sen. Ball), and that other proponents of the measure likewise disclaimed an intent to interfere with unions' "internal affairs." 388 U.S., at 187 -190. From the legislative history, the Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to prohibit unions from fining present members, as this was an internal matter. The Court has emphasized that the crux of Allis-Chalmers' holding was the distinction between "internal and external enforcement of union rules . . . ." Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S., at 428 . See also NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 73 (1973). The congressional purpose to preserve unions' control over their own "internal affairs" does not suggest an intent to authorize restrictions on the right to resign. Traditionally, union members were free to resign and escape union discipline. 11 [473 U.S. 95, 103] In 1947, union constitutional provisions restricting the right to resign were uncommon, if not unknown. 12 Therefore, allowing unions to "extend an employee's membership obligation through restrictions on resignation" would "expan[d] the definition of internal action" beyond the contours envisioned by the Taft-Hartley Congress. International Assn. of Machinists, Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.), 270 N. L. R. B. No. 209, p. 11 (1984). 13 C Language and reasoning from other opinions of this Court confirm that the Board's construction of 8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable. [473 U.S. 95, 104] In Scofield v. NLRB, supra, the Court upheld a union rule setting a ceiling on the daily wages that members working on an incentive basis could earn. The union members' freedom to resign was critical to the Court's decision that the union rule did not "restrain or coerce" the employees within the meaning of 8(b)(1)(A). It stated that the rule was

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"reasonably enforced against union members who [were] free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id., at 430. The Court deemed it important that if members were unable to take full advantage of their contractual right to earn additional pay, it was because they had "chosen to become and remain union members." Id., at 435 (emphasis added). The decision in NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972), also supports the Board's view that 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from punishing members not free to resign. There, 31 employees resigned their union membership and resumed working during a strike. We held that fining these former members "restrained or coerced" them, within the meaning of 8(b)(1)(A). In reaching this conclusion, we said that "the vitality of 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November from the actions he endorsed in May." Id., at 217-218. Restrictions on the right to resign curtail the freedom that the Textile Workers Court deemed so important. See also Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973). III Section 8(b)(1)(A) allows unions to enforce only those rules that "impai[r] no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws . . . ." Scofield, supra, at 430. The Board has found union restrictions on the right to resign to be inconsistent with the policy of voluntary unionism implicit in 8(a)(3). 14 [473 U.S. 95, 105] See International Assn. of Machinists, Inc., Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.), supra; Machinists Local 1327 (Dalmo Victor II), 263 N. L. R. B., at 992 (Chairman Van de Water and Member Hunter, concurring). We believe that the inconsistency between union restrictions on the right to resign and the policy of voluntary unionism supports the Board's conclusion that League Law 13 is invalid. Closed shop agreements, legalized by the Wagner Act in 1935, 15 became quite common in the early 1940's. Under these agreements, employers could hire and retain in their employ only union members in good standing. R. Gorman, [473 U.S. 95, 106] Labor Law, ch. 28, 1, p. 639 (1976). Full union membership was thus compulsory in a closed shop; in order to keep their jobs, employees were required to attend union meetings, support union leaders, and otherwise adhere to union rules. Because of mounting objections to the closed shop, in 1947 - after hearings and full consideration - Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act. Section 8(a)(3) of that Act effectively eliminated compulsory union membership by outlawing the closed shop. The union security agreements permitted by 8(a)(3) require employees to pay dues, but an employee cannot be discharged for failing to abide by union rules or policies with which he disagrees. 16 Full union membership thus no longer can be a requirement of employment. If a new employee refuses formally to join a union and subject himself to its discipline, he cannot be fired. Moreover, no employee can be discharged if he initially joins a union, and subsequently resigns. We think it noteworthy that 8(a)(3) protects the employment rights of the dissatisfied member, as well as those of the worker who never assumed full union membership. By allowing employees to resign from a union at any time, 8(a)(3) protects the employee whose views come to diverge from those of his union.

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 Movants note that the UBCJA International, their counsel of record and former Judge Conboy should be well versed in the labor laws, the Supreme Court cases cited thus far, and yet they have no intention of complying or abiding by them thus warranting sanctions and fines and a permanent order from this Court restraining the implementation of the Skills Form in the NYCDCC in any manner of form. The language stated for PNWRCC, NRCC & planned for the NYCDCC does not allow a member to resign and would continue collecting the deductions over the members objection and legal right to refuse them. League Law 13 curtails this freedom to resign from full union membership. Nevertheless, petitioners contend [473 U.S. 95, 107] that League Law 13 does not contravene the policy of voluntary unionism imbedded in the Act. They assert that this provision does not interfere with workers' employment rights because offending members are not discharged, but only fined. We find this argument unpersuasive, for a union has not left a "worker's employment rights inviolate when it exacts [his entire] paycheck in satisfaction of a fine imposed for working." Wellington, Union Fines and Workers' Rights, 85 Yale L. J. 1022, 1023 (1976). Congress in 1947 sought to eliminate completely any requirement that the employee maintain full union membership. 17 Therefore, the Board was justified in concluding that by restricting the right of employees to resign, League Law 13 impairs the policy of voluntary unionism. IV We now consider specifically three arguments advanced by petitioners: (i) union rules restricting the right to resign are protected by the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A); (ii) the legislative history of the Act shows that Congress did not intend to protect the right of union members to resign; and (iii) labor unions should be allowed to restrict the right to resign because other voluntary associations are permitted to do so. 18 [473 U.S. 95, 108] A Petitioners first argue that the proviso to 8(b)(1)(A) expressly allows unions to place restrictions on the right to resign. The proviso states that nothing in 8(b)(1)(A) shall "impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A). Petitioners contend that because League Law 13 places restrictions on the right to withdraw from the union, it is a "rul[e] with respect to the . . . retention of membership," within the meaning of the proviso. 19 Neither the Board nor this Court has ever interpreted the proviso as allowing unions to make rules restricting the right [473 U.S. 95, 109] to resign. 20 Rather, the Court has assumed that "rules with respect to the . . . retention of membership" are those that provide for the expulsion of employees from the union. 21 The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act is consistent with this interpretation. Senator Holland, the proviso's sponsor, stated that 8(b)(1)(A) should not outlaw union rules "which ha[ve] to do with the admission or the expulsion of members." 93 Cong. Rec. 4271 (1947) (emphasis added). Senator Taft accepted the proviso, for he likewise believed that a union should be free to "refuse [a] man admission to the union, or expel him from the union." Id., at 4272 (emphasis added).

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Furthermore, the legislative history of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. 401 et seq., confirms that the proviso was intended to protect union rules involving admission and expulsion. 22 [473 U.S. 95, 110] Accordingly, we find no basis for refusing to defer to the Board's conclusion that League Law 13 is not a "rule with respect to the retention of membership," within the meaning of the proviso. B The petitioners next argue that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that Congress made a considered decision not to protect union members' right to resign. Section 8(c) of the House bill contained a detailed "bill of rights" for labor union members. H. R. 3020, 8(c), 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22-26 (1947). Included was a provision making it an unfair labor practice to "deny to any [union] member the right to resign from the organization at any time." H. R. 3020, supra, 8(c)(4), at 23. The Senate bill, on the other hand, did not set forth specific employee rights, but stated more generally that it was an unfair labor practice to "restrain or coerce" employees in the exercise of their 7 rights. H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 8(b)(1)(A), p. 81 (1947) (as passed by Senate). The TaftHartley Act contains the Senate bill's general language rather than the more specific House prohibitions. See 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A). The petitioners contend that the omission of the House provision shows that Congress expressly decided not to protect the "right to resign." The legislative history does not support this contention. The "right to resign" apparently was included in the original House bill to protect workers unable to resign because of "closed shop" agreements. Union constitutions limiting the right to resign were uncommon in 1947, see n. 12, supra; closed shop agreements, however, often impeded union resignations. The House Report, H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), confirms that closed shop agreements provided the impetus for the inclusion of a right to resign in [473 U.S. 95, 111] the House bill. The Report simply states that even under the proposed legislation, employees could be required to pay dues pursuant to union security agreements. Id., at 32. Because the closed shop was outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act, see 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3), it is not surprising that Congress thought it unnecessary explicitly to preserve the right to resign. Even if 8(c)(4) of the House bill, H. R. 3020, supra, was directed at restrictive union rules, its omission from the Taft-Hartley Act does not convince us that the Board's construction of 8(b)(1)(A) is unreasonable. The House Conference Report, upon which petitioners primarily rely, does state that the specific prohibitions of 8(c) were "omitted . . . as unfair labor practices," H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 46 (1947). But this language does not suggest that all employee rights arguably protected by the House bill were to be left unprotected. Cf. id., at 43 ("[T]he primary strike for recognition . . . was not prohibited"). Apparently, the Report was intended merely to inform House Members that the detailed prohibitions of 8(c) were not separately included in the conference bill as "unfair labor practices." We are reluctant to reach a contrary conclusion, and thereby overturn the Board's decision, on the basis of this summary statement in the House Conference Report. Congress must have been aware that the broad language of 8(b)(1)(A) would reach some of the same union conduct proscribed by the detailed "bill of rights." 23 [473 U.S. 95, 112]

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Petitioners concede that "absent the legislative history," the Board's construction of 8(b)(1)(A) would be entitled to deference. Tr. of Second Oral Arg. 15 (Apr. 1985). They argue, however, that "in this instance the legislative materials are too clearly opposed to what the Board did to permit the result the Board reached." Id., at 17. We do not agree. The ambiguous legislative history upon which petitioners rely falls far short of showing that the Board's interpretation of the Act is unreasonable. 24 C In Textile Workers, 409 U.S. at 216, and Machinists, 412 U.S., at 88 (per curiam), the Court stated that when a union constitution does not purport to restrict the right to resign, the "law which normally is reflected in our free institutions" is applicable. Relying on this quoted language, petitioners [473 U.S. 95, 113] argue that League Law 13 is valid. They assert that because the common law does not prohibit restrictions on resignation, 25 such provisions are not violative of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. We find no merit in this argument. Textile Workers, supra, and Machinists, supra, held only that in the absence of restrictions on the right to resign, members are free to leave the union at any time. Although the Court noted that its decisions were consistent with the common-law rule, it did not state that the validity of restrictions on the right to resign should be determined with reference to common law.  The Court's decision in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), demonstrates that many union rules, although valid under the common law of associations, run afoul of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 26 There the union expelled [473 U.S. 95, 114] a member who failed to comply with a rule requiring the "exhaust[ion of] all remedies and appeals within the Union . . . before . . . resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the Union." Id., at 421. Under the common law, associations may require their members to exhaust all internal remedies. See, e. g., Medical Soc. of Mobile Cty. v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321 (1944). Nevertheless, the Marine Workers Court held that "considerations of public policy" mandated a holding that the union rule requiring exhaustion violated 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A). 391 U.S., at 424 ; see also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S., at 430 (union rule is invalid under 8(b)(1)(A) if it "impairs [a] policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws").  The Skills Form impairs the policies Congress has imbedded in the Labor Laws and it is an illegal exaction of the rank & file members hard-earned Journeyman status, gained from years of training and experience working in the field so that the UBCJA and the crooked and mob connected Wall & Ceiling Contractor Association can enact a wage and benefit cut of 40% by creating this artificial need of re-training and re-certifying every journeyman Carpenter in the invented minutia of specialty crafts. This revocation of Journeyman Status is an express violation of NLRA Section 8(b)(1)(a); thus Movants request the Court issue a Permanent Injunction prohibiting it enactment, now or in the future per section 2 & 18 of the Consent Decree.  Movants note that the UBCJA has bought the silence of the NLRB with regard to this matter and that they refuse to act upon it.

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The Board reasonably has concluded that League Law 13 "restrains or coerces" employees, see 8(b)(1)(A), and is inconsistent with the congressional policy of voluntary unionism. Therefore, whatever may have been the common law, the Board's interpretation of the Act merits our deference. V The Board has the primary responsibility for applying "`the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.'" Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979), quoting NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963), in turn citing NLRB v. Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 362 -363 (1958). Where the Board's construction of the Act is reasonable, it should not be rejected "merely because the courts might prefer another view of the statute." Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 497. In this case, two factors suggest that we should be particularly reluctant to hold that the Board's interpretation of the Act is impermissible. [473 U.S. 95, 115] First, in related cases this Court invariably has yielded to Board decisions on whether fines imposed by a union "restrain or coerce" employees. 27 Second, the Board consistently has construed 8(b)(1)(A) as prohibiting the imposition of fines on employees who have tendered resignations invalid under a union constitution. 28 Therefore, we conclude that the Board's decision here is entitled to our deference. VI The Board found that by fining employees who had tendered resignations, the petitioners violated 8(b)(1)(A) of the [473 U.S. 95, 116] Act, even though League Law 13 purported to render the resignations ineffective. We defer to the Board's interpretation of the Act and so affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals enforcing the Board's order. It is so ordered.

_________________________________________________________________________________ SKILL FORM CONT: In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986), Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court stated Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject [475 US 211, 224] matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935).

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NYCDCC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 7-1-06 to 6-30-11

With regard to Section 3 in the NYCDCC CBA, Applicants who have successfully completed the full Apprenticeship Program shall be presumed to have the necessary skill and experience, which by operation of the express language, simply stated, means that they are a qualified & competent UBC Journeyman Carpenter. The phrase other applicants refers to all others who are not members of the UBC and is a waiver/concession made by the UBCJA to the Employer, with the employer left to determine if said applicant(s) possess the necessary skill and experience  Movants note the Skills Form proposal by the UBCJA, but fraudulently with-held from the Court in the Restructuring Plan dated 5-26-11 as presented by their counsel of record, Latham & Watkins, LLP, seeks to revoke the seniority status of 20,000 Journeyman and return them to the status and wage rates of an Apprentice Carpenter, with wage reductions of 40% lower than the standard Journeyman Wage & Benefit package guaranteed by the current contract. It is both an illegal waiver and revocation of Journeyman status, and it evinces a fait-accompli without bargaining to impasse and is an illegal Arms length deal made between a corrupt International Union (the UBCJA) and their counterparts in this crime and exaction of contractual property rights; the Building Trades Employer Association and the Wall & Ceiling Contractor Association, all of whom are direct participants in this invidious scheme to defraud the rank & file worker and employee, but also this honorable Court.  Movants note further note, the illegal scheme involves removing 8,000 + members from the protection of the Consent Decree which also violate 2 & 18 therein.

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Article III - Jurisdiction

The NYCDCCs Jurisdiction requirement, Article III, Section 3 above requires compliance to the Unions Constitution & By-Laws, as a condition of employment, and is thus facially unlawful, per: Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the unions constitution and bylaws). The NYCDCCs Union Security clause requires members to maintain a maintenance of membership provision, which also require as a condition of employment compliance to the UBCJAs facially unlawful By-Laws Section 4A, 4B & 4C which grant all executive, legislative and judicial power, all plenary power unto the Council, which negate all Local Union Autonomy, wherein all positions shall cease to exist, where said power is without limitation; and wherein said Council Delegate Body (CDB) is subjugated to the control of an all powerful-dictatorial EST who himself is subjugated to the all powerful dictatorial UBCJA General President via non-binding vote on all matters, said Constitution and By-laws of the UBCJA via the Unions Article III, Section 3 Jurisdiction claims and its Article V Union Security claims are also facially unlawful.  The UBCJA has intentionally with-held its illegal Skill(s) Form, which effects a Union Rule requiring compliance to an illegal Individual Contract and illegal Internal Rule to be listed in the first instance, and to maintain their position on the OWL; and, to be considered eligible to collect State or Federal Unemployment Assistance and is an exaction of control of inter-state & intra-state commerce are also facially unlawful, per: Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) (finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list). As the NLRB Board stated in Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz: While unions are free to enforce properly adopted rules against their members, Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, including the right to refrain from joining a union. See Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423, 430(1969) (unions are free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforce[d] sic, against union members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule).

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Thus, employees must be free to resign their union membership and escape the rule. The rule here, however, requires employees to comply with the Unions constitution and bylaws as a condition of employment. Such a requirement violates the Act.  Movants note: Both the legislative history, the NLRA & LMRDA, pari materia and the Supreme Court precedents cited above (pg. 6-39 herein) provide a basis of fact and law certain that the Skill Forms and Independent Contractual waiver and assignment, the illegal revocation of Journeyman status be declared facially unlawful by this Court. The subject matter contained therein, regardless of how express, the UBCJA International Union and their counsel of record attempt to paint it it cannot pass muster or survive.

The UBCJA via chicanery, obfuscation, direct threat of economic reprisal, fear, intimidation and coercion have attempted an exaction/theft of Property rights to which the only remedy is an order from this honorable Court, holding them in contempt and directing them to cease and desist from implementing this now or in the future per the express terms and conditions of the Consent Decree which specifically prohibit this form and manner of racketeering activity. There is no need to mince words here, as the UBCJA International has engaged in formal Hobbs Act extortion of member Property rights, guaranteed by law the chief architect of the illegal rule being the UBCJA International, by order of its General President.

NLRA SECTION 14(b) MOBILITY OF WORKFORCE RIGHT TO WORK & NON-RIGHT TO WORK STATES FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Movants note: The above captioned excerpt is from page 123 of 138 of the Latham & Watkins 5-26-11 NYCDCC Restructuring Plan, page 28 of the proposed By-Law changes, which are being railroaded through the

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Court, with little if any time to debate, discuss or remove illegal contract provisions and/or strike same with the veto pen of the United States Attorney and/or the Independent Review Officer; their acquiescence notwithstanding the fact remains that the negligence of the USAO and/or the IROs office in agreeing to the illegal changes presents a cause of action to have them removed from this case and replaced with legal counsel who recognize the obvious illegalities and who comprehend long standing Supreme Court precedent and landmark decisions as applied to Labor Law and will enforce their provisions and admonitions upon the UBCJA, instead of looking the other way; and who will stand up and represent the rank & file, as their attorneys as the Consent Decree requires by its very issuance in the first instance. Moreover, the State Bar of New York should be so notified. Given the import of these structural changes which are being imposed under the limited suspension of the Local Union and NYCDCCs autonomy, a right secured and protected by the NLRA & LMRDA , the Movants note the pendency of the timing of presentment of this issue given the upcoming Local Union Elections, statutory 120-hold and waiting period for challenges thereto, the pending IRO Draft Election procedures in August 2011 and the review which shall be required prior to implementation and publication of said Election Rules, and the scheduling of Nominations and holding of District Council Elections per those same Rules in December of 2011 as thus proposed.  Accordingly, given these basic issues yet resolved, and the material and factual issues being presented, Movants note that the submission of the untimely, but carefully orchestrated timing of the Restructuring Plan by the UBCJA International and Latham & Watkins, LLP warrant a suspension of Contract negotiations and a Contract Extension of one year be granted, as per the May 16, 2011 Motion for Relief. Movants further not that the UBCJA International is operating a Trusteeship in which the Local Unions and District Councils autonomy have been suspended in limited fashion and maintained far longer than required. The main purpose of maintaining and extending the Trusteeship is to implement and execute their Restructuring Plan in utter disregard of and in spite and with contempt of the specific terms & conditions of the Consent Decree and to do so in bad faith, without bargaining to impasse as required by Federal Law. The UBCJA is attempting to do so as a fait accompli and without the direct and required participation of duly elected Local Union and District Council officers duly chosen in Secret Ballot Elections by the rank & file workers as required by the preamble to the NLRA and the Policy of the United States and as further guaranteed by NLRA Section 7. The timing of this submission was well calculated to coincide with the alleged Negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement and to interrupt the Local Union three (3) year Election cycle, in an obvious attempt to bury the members and the Court so deep, that neither the Court or the US Attorneys Office and Independent Review Officer would be able to capture the essence of the UBCJAS scheme to defraud the members and this honorable Court. Movants expressly note the timing and the direct intention of the UBCJA International is a patent attempt designed expressly to achieve illegitimate ends, which is a direct & flagrant violation of the LMRDA standards for imposing a Trusteeship in the first instance. Movants further note that the US Attorney & IROs office does not have the requisite knowledge of the Construction Industry to discern when such a patent attempt to deceive it is being perpetrated. Moreover, the UBCJA International and its officers are barred by Supreme Court precedent in Lechmere Justice Thomas at II A stated: By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers.

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The workers and employees have not yet elected their representatives (individual, as defined in Sec 2.of the Act) for the required Officer positions within the New York City District Council Locals and/or the New York City District Council of Carpenters. Douglas McCarron, Frank Spencer and John Ballantyne are highly compensated managerial and supervisory International Union employees. They are outside of the mandated coverage of the NLRA. As per Justice Thomass ruling in Lechmere they are the Union. Accordingly, the Contract requires an extension for the one year minimum requested as a means to restore the status-quo; and, until the Local Union & District Council autonomy is restored AND Local Union & District Council Elections are held.  Movants request the Court to issue a Declaratory Judgment ending the Trusteeship and Supervision by the UBCJA International; and, an order from the Court allowing the US Attorneys Office, the IRO and his appointed Director of Operations Matt Walker to take charge of the daily operations of the NYCDCC in the intervening period between this order & the Election & seating of all Officers at each Local Union and the District Council and not begin new contract negotiations to commence until the remaining issues per the May 16, 2011 Motion for Relief have been adjudicated. VIOLATION of the CONSENT DECREE & CONTRACT: NLRA Section 158 (d) Obligation to bargain collectively For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising there-under, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification (1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification; (2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications; (3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and (4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the

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expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later: The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2) to (4) of this subsection shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 159 (a) of this title, and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in this subsection, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsection (g) of this section, shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 158, 159, and 160 of this title, but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer. Whenever the collective bargaining involves employees of a health care institution, the provisions of this subsection shall be modified as follows: (A) The notice of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be ninety days; the notice of paragraph (3) of this subsection shall be sixty days; and the contract period of paragraph (4) of this subsection shall be ninety days. (B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification or recognition, at least thirty days notice of the existence of a dispute shall be given by the labor organization to the agencies set forth in paragraph (3) of this subsection. (C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under either clause (A) or (B) of this sentence, the Service shall promptly communicate with the parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to bring them to agreement. The parties shall participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be undertaken by the Service for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute.  Movants note, the UBCJA has already prepared but has not submitted within the proposed Restructuring Plan, a new Certification for each & every new Local they wish to charter as a means to avoid a mandatory 9(a) Representation Election VIA Secret Ballot as the NLRA and Board precedent require to determine if the majority of Union Carpenters wish to retain the UBCJA as their chosen representative. We shall discuss the appropriate areas elsewhere within this material being presented & provide the violations and citations required. _________________________________________________________________________________ This is an NLRB Brief, DC Circuit Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2011 Nos. 10-1300, 10-1301, 10-1353, 10-1355 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY

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Petitioner/Cross-Respondent v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent/CrossPetitioner and UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION Intervenor ON PETITIONS FOR REVIEW AND CROSS-APPLICATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD _______________________
ROBERT J. ENGLEHART Supervisor Attorney MACKENZIE FILLOW Attorney National Labor Relations Board 1099 14th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20570 (202) 273-2978 (202) 273-3823 LAFE E. SOLOMON Acting General Counsel CELESTE J. MATTINA Acting Deputy General Counsel JOHN H. FERGUSON Associate General Counsel LINDA DREEBEN Deputy Associate General Counsel National Labor

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress made a conscious decision to delegate to the Board the primary responsibility of marking out the scope of the statutory language and of the statutory duty to bargain.72 For this reason, [i]f the Board adopts a rule that is rational and consistent with the Act . . .then the rule is entitled to deference from the courts.73 And courts must give the greatest latitude to the Board when its decision reflects its difficult and delicate responsibility of reconciling conflicting interests of labor and management.74 The case for judicial deference is particularly appropriate here because of the ______________________________
72 Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979). 73 Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 200 (1991). 74 Litton, 501 U.S. at 201-02 (citing NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1975)).

- 18 Boards expertise in determining whether an employer has satisfied its bargaining obligations.75 This Courts review of the Boards factual conclusions is highly deferential.76 Under Section 10(e) of the Act, the Boards factual findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.77 ARGUMENT I. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE BOARDS FINDING THAT DUPONT VIOLATED SECTION 8(a)(5) AND (1) OF THE ACT BY CHANGING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT WITHOUT BARGAINING WITH THE UNION

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A. Well-Settled Precedent Requires an Employer To Bargain Over a Change in a Term or Condition of Employment Under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, an employer commits an unfair labor practice by refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] employees.78 Section 8(d) defines collective bargaining as the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
75 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944) ([T]he Board [is] the expert in this field.) 76 Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 77 29 U.S.C. 160(e). 78 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5).

- 19 other terms and conditions of employment.79 These categories, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, are referred to as mandatory subjects of bargaining. There can be no doubt that health insurance and similar benefits are mandatory subjects of bargaining.80 Pursuant to this statutory bargaining obligation, the Board has long held that when parties are engaged in negotiations [for a collective-bargaining agreement], an employers obligation to refrain from unilateral changes extends beyond the mere duty to give notice and an opportunity to bargain; it encompasses a duty to refrain from implementation at all, unless and until an overall impasse has been reached on bargaining for the agreement as a whole.81 Stated another way, during negotiations for a collective-bargaining agreement, an employer must maintain the
79 29 U.S.C. 158(d). 80 Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 159 (1971) (noting that mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include pension and insurance benefits for active employees); Scepter, Inc. v. NLRB, 448 F.3d 388, 389-90 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (enforcing Board order requiring bargaining over health benefits); NLRB v. Carilli, 648 F.2d 1206, 1217 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981) (It is undisputed that the medical and dental plans provided under the labor-management health trust fund are mandatory subjects of bargaining.). 81 Bottom Line Enter., 302 NLRB 272, 274 (1991).

- 20 status quo with regard to all mandatory bargaining subjects absent overall impasse in negotiations.82 This rule is rooted in longstanding Supreme Court precedent and is fundamental to the Acts purpose of fostering stable labor relations through the collective-bargaining process. In its 1962 decision NLRB v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that an employer violates the duty to bargain by unilaterally changing a term and condition of employment under negotiation, regardless of its motivation for doing so.83 The Court reasoned that such a change constitutes a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy.84 Accordingly, the Court held that the employers unilateral grant of discretionary merit wage increases was tantamount to an outright refusal to negotiate on that subject and therefore a violation of Section 8(a)(5).85 Consistent with Katz, the Court has since recognized that the prohibition against unilateral changes is

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82 Visiting Nurse Servs. of W. Massachusetts, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1999) ([U]nless the employer has bargained to impasse on the agreement as a whole, there is a violation of 8(a)(1) and (5) if the employer makes unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining.). 83 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). 84 Id. at 747. 85 Id.

- 21 grounded in the reality that it is difficult to bargain if, during negotiations, an employer is free to alter the very terms and conditions that are the subject of those negotiations.86 The proscription against unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment applies with full force where, as here, an existing agreement has expired and negotiations on a new one have yet to be completed.87 When the contract expires, terms and conditions continue in effect by operation of the NLRA. They are no longer agreed-upon terms; they are terms imposed by law, at least so far as there is no unilateral right to change them.88 This is required in order to protect the statutory right to bargain.89  This Court has noted the serious damage inflicted by an employers implementation of unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment: A unilateral change not only violates the plain requirement that the parties bargain over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions, but also injures the process of collective bargaining itself. Such unilateral action minimizes the influence of organized bargaining. It interferes with the right of self organization by emphasizing to the employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent.90
86 Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991). 87 Id. at 198. 88 Id. at 206. 89 Id. 90 NLRB v. McClatchy Newspapers, 964 F.2d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting May Dept Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 385 (1945)).

- 22 For this reason, a violation of Section 8(a)(5) also derivatively violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: unilateral changes tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activity.91 As the Supreme Court observed in NLRB v. Katz, unilateral changes plainly frustrate[]the statutory objective of establishing working conditions through bargaining.92 B. The Board Reasonably Concluded that DuPonts Unilateral Changes Violated the Act Applying these well-settled principles to the undisputed facts compels the conclusion that DuPont violated Section 8(a)(5) by unilaterally changing the benefits available to its unit employees at the two facilities. After its previous contracts had expired and while it was negotiating for successor contracts at the Louisville and Edge Moor facilities, DuPont made dramatic and wide-ranging changes to the BeneFlex Plan, as explained on pages 9-10, above. All of these changes were made without bargaining with the Union. Indeed, despite repeated requests to bargain over these issues, DuPont flatly refused.93 As the cases above make clear,94 these changes involve terms and

46 91 Exxon Chem. Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.3d 1160, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ([A]n employer who violates section 8(a)(5) also, derivatively, violates section 8(a)(1).). 92 Katz, 369 U.S. at 744. 93 JA 15, 24, 33l JA 163 62, JA 165 66, JA 644 59. 94 See supra text accompanying note 80.

 Movants note that the UBCJA & the NYCDCC chief negotiators Douglas J. McCarron, Frank Spencer & John Ballantyne, their counsel of record and the respective Contractor Associations have not, will not and refuse to negotiate in good faith, or bargain to impasse. Said parties have colluded in unison in violation of members rights to fraudulently induce the US Attorney, the IRO & this honorable Court to accept their after the fact implementation of the Skill(s) Form as a fait-accompli. Said Unilateral change, whether declared or undeclared, wherein the New York City DCC is under a Trusteeship whereby the Local Union(s) and the District Councils autonomy is temporarily suspended - Movants respectfully request that this Court declare the Trusteeship ended and place the entity under the direct control of the United States Attorney, the Independent Review Officer and the Councils newly hired Director of Operations Matt Walker (NJ State Police), until both the Local Union Elections are held, the District Council Elections are held and decided and issue an Order directing all contract negotiations to be suspended and that the Contract be extended as is provided under its terms & conditions without change, as a means to preserve the status-quo; therein allowing duly and democratically elected Local Union & District Council representatives to resume negotiations for a new contract (CBA) commencing within the 60-day notification requirements prior to the expiration of the requested extension, closing May 31, 2012.  Movants note that the Obligation to Bargain through representatives of their own choosing under the preamble & section 7 of the Act cannot be had where the Local Union autonomy has been temporarily suspended under a Trusteeship imposed by the International UBCJA. There is also a Constitutional issue at bar here, preventing the NLRB from adjudicating this claim on the Constitutional issues previously brought before the Court, which have yet been decided. The Local Union Elections have just been held and the largest such Local Union, Local 157 (10,400) members Officers are not yet seated, nor has the statutory 120-day hold passed as required by the DOL & OLMS. Further, the New York City District Council is in utter disarray, has no standing EST, President, Vice President or any elected officials as they have all been charged, convicted and most sentenced to prison. The condition precedent to holding the Elections in the first instance is qualified by the preamble & section 7 of the Act, to their own choosing, with specific reference to the WORKER per the Preamble & Policy of these United States and to the EMPLOYEE per 7 of the Act. Douglas J. McCarron, Frank Spencer and John Ballantyne are not the chosen representatives of the workers & employees of the NYCDCC, for the purposes of negotiating wages, hours and working conditions of employment. The arms length self dealing, the unilateral changes, the illegal and intentional with-holding of critical information in collusion with the BTEA, Wall & Ceiling and the UBCJA, all of whom have corrupt and invidious aims and all of whom are seated at the same side of the Negotiating Table are the very predicates of racketeering which the Consent Decree was allegedly

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designed to prevent. The last Restructuring Plan was put forth by the very same UBCJA President and his Executive Board and it directly led to the 2009 FBI indictments, convictions and sentencing of NYCDCC officials. This current plan offers no more; and if left undisturbed shall lead to a ten-fold increase in the corruption, fraud and embezzlement of funds that just occurred. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), Justice Thomas at II A stated Section 7 of the NLRA provides in relevant part that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. 157. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, in turn, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in [502 U.S. 527, 532] [ 7]." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers. McCarron, Spencer and Ballantyne are the union as pertaining to the Lechmere doctrine. Moreover, they are highly compensated managerial and supervisory Executives, and are thus outside the bounds of the worker and employee qualification of the Preamble & Policy of the United States. Accordingly, while there are no currently chosen representatives of the employees as noted in Lechmere, and the Election of newly qualified representatives for the Local Unions has just occured; and the District Council Elections have yet to be held to seat an Executive-Secretary Treasurer, President & Vice President as said Officers, Douglas McCarron & Frank Spencer cannot bind the District Council and Local Unions to a new Contract until said Officers are duly elected, seated and the 120-day statutory hold has occurred for Election challenges and appeals. MOBILITY OR FULL MOBILITY {LEBOVITZ DOCTRINE} AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE: In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) at Chief Justice Hughes stated: First. Two preliminary points are stressed by the government with respect to the appropriate approach to the important questions presented. We are told that the provision of the statute authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed are always to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority. Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. 8 The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the [295 U.S. 495, 529] imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary. Such assertions of extra-constitutional authority were anticipated and precluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment- 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' Douglas J. McCarron proffered a false dogma of extra-ordinary circumstances created by the sophisticated regional Contractors working intra-state and inter-state, therein requiring the Mobility of the Contractor workforce. This policy was presented in 1997 under the Consent decree and was

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implemented nationally in 1999. Predecessor actions to this new policy were reflected in the UBCJA Internationals prior lawsuits wherein they convinced the 6th Circuit that Union By-Laws created the right to vote for Business Representatives, therein, that right could be taken away by another by-law rules change, per, 992 F.2d. 1418 (1993) UBCJA Dresden Local No. 267 v. UBCJA International and Sigurd Lucassen (923746) at 42.  As a matter of law, the 6th Circuit erred in stating looking at the actual mechanics of the loss of the right to elect a business representative, the district court reasoned it was the adoption of the Council by-laws, not the reorganization that eliminated the Locals right to elect a business representative. Indeed, it was the Capital District Council by-laws that created the right in the first place. In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), Justice Thomas at II A stated Section 7 of the NLRA provides in relevant part that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. 157. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, in turn, makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in [502 U.S. 527, 532] [ 7]." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers. The District Courts reasons are not in accordance with the text of the NLRA or its Legislative history. No other Circuit Court has made such a similar ruling, nor could they as it is factually and legally incorrect, and can therefore not stand. The Sixth Circuits decision in Dresden Local 267 issued on April 27, 1993, some 15-months after the Lechmere decision issued on January 27, 1992. The UBCJA International under Sigurd Lucassen and subsequently under Douglas J. McCarron has perpetuated this myth, this fallacy of so called law since the decision issued on April 27, 1993. Given the very plain meaning of the Act and noting Justice Thomass ruling in Lechmere By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee organizers. the right to vote being part & parcel to the core predicate of the Act, the very premise of the NLRA; and that the right to vote is held sacrosanct to the employee, or the worker as defined in the NLRA Preamble and the Policy of the United States, NLRA Sec. 1, and as upheld in Lechmere, the 6th Circuit Court clearly erred in stating that the mechanical right of the loss of the right to elect a business representativewas the adoption of the Council By-Laws. The Council By-Laws did not create the right to vote, the United States Congress did so. As a general matter of law, Union members via a coerced or forced vote cannot alter, change or amend what Congress and the Executive branch of government pass into law, via amending internal union bylaws on demand of the International Union representing them. Were that true, then we would have anarchy, which is what we have in the UBCJA right now, an unfettered and out of control Dictatorship run amuck.  The UBC International, as a labor organization cannot force their hidden agenda or position to refuse members the right to vote in Union matters which have as their predicate Federal law. Furthermore, the UBCJA International cannot force this upon a subordinate Regional or District Council or Local Union under the auspice of a simple internal rules change when said rules change violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, and the

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UBCJA International usurps the authority of the Legislative branch of government to initiate, pass, amend or alter Federal Laws.

In Payne v. Tennesse, 501 US 808, regarding stare decisis, at page 501 U. S. 828, the Supreme Court stated: Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 309 U. S. 119 (1940). This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases "correction through legislative action is practically impossible." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra at 285 U. S. 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are involved, see Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 382 U. S. 116 (1965); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363 (1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra at 285 U. S. 405-411 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U. S. 472 (1924); @ 53 U. S. 458 (1852); the opposite is true in cases, such as the present one, involving procedural and evidentiary rules. A three-judge District Court was convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281, providing for such a tribunal whenever the enforcement of a state statute is sought to be enjoined "upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute." That court dismissed on the merits in both its single-judge and three-judge capacities, and appeals were taken respectively to the Court of Appeals and (under 28 U.S.C. 1253) to this Court. Held: The three-judge court requirement applies to injunction suits depending directly upon a substantive provision of the Constitution, and does not apply to Supremacy Clause cases involving only federal-state statutory conflicts. Pp. 382 U. S. 114-129. (a) Appellants' Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment claims are too insubstantial to support three-judge court jurisdiction. Pp. 382 U. S. 114-115. (b) A claim that a state statute is preempted by or in conflict with a federal provision though grounded in the Supremacy Clause primarily involves the comparison of two statutes, rather than the interpretation of the Constitution; therefore, as established in Ex parte Buder, 271 U. S. 461; Ex parte Bransford, 310 U. S. 354, and Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, Supremacy Clause cases are not within the purview of 2281. Pp. 382 U. S. 120-122. (c) The holding in Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U. S. 153, that a three-judge court is required if the constitutional issue is "immediately" apparent, but not if substantial statutory Page 382 U. S. 112construction is required, is unworkable, and that decision is, pro tanto, overruled. Pp. 382 U. S. 124-129. 230 F.Supp. 398, appeal dismissed. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. _________________________________________________________________________________

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Thus, by application, when UBCJA Local Unions are stripped of essential and core NLRA Section 7 rights, their Local autonomy, UBC Union members must point out this simple fact to the Court the Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act, the Act (NLRA) which created the right to vote for rank & file workers and employees in the Unions as noted within the Preamble and Policy of the United States, and in Section 7 rights. Upon enactment of the NLRA in 1935, any and all trade union constitutions and by-laws not in accordance with the law were effectively mooted. The UBCJA put Mobility into effect in 1999, throughout all 50-states. The mobility rules were not challenged at any point in time until the Lebovitz case. It was through the NLRB Board that the UBCJA sought to have the illegal mobility provision cemented into an NLRB board precedent, effectively and operatively granting license to the UBCJA to violate the Act. MOBILITY & THE UNION SECURITY CLAUSE Application: above points of law are tie directly to the MOBILITY issue in the 12-31-09 slip Opinion #354-122 Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz. At p 13, the Board stated: 5. Is the union-security clause facially unlawful? Finally, the union-security clause in article V is facially unlawful. The union-security clause explicitly requires compliance with the Unions constitution and bylaws, a requirement which violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the unions constitution and bylaws); Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) (finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list). While unions are free to enforce properly adopted rules against their members, Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, including the right to refrain from joining a union. See Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423, 430(1969) (unions are free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforce[d] sic, against union members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule). Thus, employees must be free to resign their union membership and escape the rule. The rule here, however, requires employees to comply with the Unions constitution and bylaws as a condition of employment. Such a requirement violates the Act. At p 2, the Board Decision & Order stated: ORDER - The National Labor Relations Board orders that the A. The Respondent, New England Regional Council of Carpenters, Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall  1) Cease and desist from (a) Maintaining in its collective-bargaining agreements a union-security clause requiring employees to comply with the

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Respondents constitution and bylaws as a condition of employment.  (b) Maintaining in its collective-bargaining agreements a mobility clause restricting employers to hiring carpenters who are members in good standing of any local affiliate of the New England Regional Council of Carpenters. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

The UBCJA has applied this case nationally, to the remaining 36-Regional & District Councils in the 50-States. In defiance of the decision an order of the NLRB Board, the New England Regional Council of Carpenters (NERCC), its Officers, Agents and Business Representatives and its corporate counsel of record, Souris & Krakow, LLC, Boston, MA failed to notify all signatory NERCC General Contractors & Subcontractors of the Board decision & order, failed to post it in the 27-Local Union Hiring Halls as directed by the Board, failed to notify any rank & file worker or employee (as defined under NLRA Preamble & Section 7 of the Act). Moreover, NERCC & its attorney, refused to change or modify any of the 27-Local Union Hiring facially unlawful rules requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list, in violation of Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000), nor was this decision & order discussed at any Local Union Meeting. NERCC maintains several websites and never at any time posted an article regarding the case, or the NLRB link to the case, nor did they at anytime produce a mailing to notify members who may not have access to computers and/or the internet, nor did they forward a letter or postcard on the subject. Each of the 27 Local Unions affiliated with NERCC also maintain a Face-book Page, and none posted the required Notice as directed by the Board.  The fact is, the UBCJA International created the case and guided it from inception, carefully monitoring all aspects of it. This case was put forth, via fraud & artifice to achieve the opposite end, that end being turning Non-Right to Work States into Right to Work States. They were intent upon subsuming the role of Congress by this back-door, underhanded means to usurp Congressional authority and by default and with the cooperation of the NLRB, and amend the NLRA while no one was watching. A careful construction of the UBCJA International Constitution, all its subordinate Regional & District Council By-laws, including the newly proposed NYCDCC Restructuring Plan dated May 26, 2011 clearly show that it subsumes the role of all 3-branches of government via the complete domination and control as evinced within Section 4(A), 4(B), 4(C) and Section 5(B) language forming a Centralized Government in the former; and, and by negating the very purpose of the new form of Democratic Engagement by the Non-Binding Vote language in the latter. While it may appear to the untrained eye that the UBC International and NERCC and counsel were defending a legitimate contract term, one which did not violate the NLRA; ultimately they received the decision they were after all along. By having the Board participate in the declaration that

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enforcing the mobility provision of the Contracts, it was a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A), it would by implication allow the UBCJA Signatory General Contractors & Subcontractors roam free with a mobile National workforce as they would do in one of the 22 - Right to Work State. That the NLRB General Counsel did not catch on is evinced in its 12-31-09 decision and order adopting the ALJs decision, pg 13, statingWhile unions are free to enforce properly adopted rules against their members, Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, including the right to refrain from joining a union. See Scofield v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 423, 430(1969) (unions are free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforce[d] sic, against union members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule). The above portion of this decision has two additional ramifications: 1) Impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws the impairment here is Federal Pre-emption and applicability and States Rights under NLRA Sec. 14(b), allowing States to opt out & enact their own Laws regarding the mobility of workers and employees in Right to Work States, and; the Congressional role, left to Congress, to legislate as provided in the Federal Constitution. 2) The current & future ramifications of UBC International counsel authored Skills Forms, were designed and legally constructed to disenfranchise rank & file workers and employees to fraudulently induce, and coerce said members into signing a waiver of their rights, albeit, a waiver and assignment that the average rank & file member would not comprehend given the long history of legal precedent and landmark Supreme Court decisions behind such legal wording. And, this decision is a constructive notice to the UBCJA & NERCC, wherein the Court in Scofield states: and is reasonably enforce[d], sic, against union members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule. The UBCJA International, its counsel of record and NERCC Officers, Agents and Representatives and its counsel of record, know full well the laws and Supreme Court cases surrounding the language in the Skill Forms is unlawful yet they persist in playing the men and the Court for fools. NERCC, Boston & Eastern MA CBA excerpt 9-1-09 TO 8-31-12 CONTRACT (CBA): UNION SECURITY JURISDICTION MOBILITY ARTICLE 3 - Union Security Section 1. The Employer agrees that all employees covered by this agreement shall, as a condition of employment, become and remain members of the Union in good standing. No worker shall be refused admittance and the right to maintain membership in the Union provided he qualifies and complies with the Constitution and By-Laws of the Union.

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 Movants note: Both NERCC executives and their counsel Souris & Krakow, LLP lied to the NLRB Board and failed to strike the illegal contract provisions from the existing CBA and this new CBA (contract) after the Board declared the UBC Constitution & Bylaws facially unlawful without qualification. The language above is a prima-facie showing that the NERCC did not remove the illegal Contract provisions as directed by the Boards Decision & Order. Section 2. All workers employed by the Employer for a period of seven (7) days continuously or accumulatively within the unit covered by this Agreement shall, as a condition of employment, the full and uniform admission fees in effect in the Union. All workers accepted into membership shall thereafter maintain their membership in good standing in the Union as a condition of employment. Section 3. In the event that a worker fails to tender the admission fee or that a member of the Union fails to maintain his or her membership in accordance with the provisions of this Article, the Union shall notify the Employer in writing, and such notice shall constitute a request to the Employer to terminate said individual within forty-eight (48) hours for failure to maintain continuous good standing in the Union in accordance with its rules above referred to in this paragraph, and the Employer shall terminate such worker at the end of such period. Failure to terminate will subject the Employer to damages for lost wages and benefits for each hour worked by the non-member after receipt of notification in writing. Boston and Eastern Area of Massachusetts Carpenters CBA 9/1/09-8/31/12 The NERCC & its counsel of record, Souris & Krakow, LLP, again lied here wherein the language regarding good standing was left intact and not removed per the Boards Decision & Order. ARTICLE 4 Jurisdictional Area (excerpted areas as sample, not all areas included) The terms of this Agreement shall apply to the work of carpentry within the territory of: BOSTON Locals 33, 40, 67, 218 Boston, Belmont, Brookline, Cambridge, Chelsea, Dedham, Everett, Malden, Medford, Milton, Revere, Somerville, Winthrop, and the islands in Boston Harbor. ASHLAND Local 475 Hudson, Clinton, Framingham, Marlboro, Westboro, Northboro, also the localities known as Ashland, Berlin, Bolton, Gleasondale, Holliston, Hopkinton, Maynard, Saxonville, Sherborn, Southboro, and Stow. BROCKTON Local 624 Abington, Avon, Barnstable County, Bridgewater, Brockton, Carver, East Bridgewater, Easton, Halifax, Hanson, Holbrook, Kingston, North Easton, Plymouth, Plympton, Randolph, South Easton, Stoughton, West Bridgewater, and Whitman. Boston and Eastern Area of Massachusetts Carpenters CBA 9/1/09-8/31/12 14 ESSEX/MIDDLESEX Local 26 Arlington, Beverly, Burlington, Danvers, Essex, Gloucester, Hamilton, Ipswich, Lexington, Lynn, Lynnfield, Manchester, Marblehead, Melrose, Middleton, Nahant, North Reading, Peabody, Reading, Rockport, Salem, Saugus, Stoneham, Swampscott, Topsfield, Wakefield, Wenham, Wilmington, Winchester, Woburn, and the islands of Salem Sound to Plum Island Sound. ARTICLE 5 - Mobility of Manpower Employers shall be restricted in their employment of Carpenters to those carpenters who

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normally work in the geographic jurisdiction area of the local union where the project is located. Movants note for the record, that the language in sentence 1 above, while appearing to conform to the Boards Decision & Order is immediately negated by the remaining language in sentence 2 through the close of this Article within the Contract. The UBCJA, the NERCC & their counsel flat out refuse to comply with decisions & orders from any Court, whether at the Federal Agency level within the Inferior Branch of the Executive Department, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); or, on orders emanating from this Court with regard to the 17-year Civil RICO Consent Decree. The UBCJA International disdains any & all authority other than its own, as does the Wall & Ceiling Contractor Association to whom the UBC is currently colluding and conspiring with to commit ever more fraud upon the rank & file worker & employee; and, upon this honorable Court. We know we are dealing with criminals, albeit, ones in finely tailored suits, but does the Court know it? _________________________________________________________________________________ NERCC CBA - ARTICLE V, - CONT-. Notwithstanding any language to the contrary in any area collective bargaining agreement for work in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont, the Employer shall have the right to employ any carpenter who Boston and Eastern Area of Massachusetts Carpenters CBA 9/1/09-8/31/12 16 [who] normally works within any of the six New England states pursuant to the following conditions: The carpenter employee has worked a minimum of three (3) weeks for the employer in the previous five (5) months. If the Employer fails to notify a local union prior to commencing work on a project in that locals geographical jurisdiction, the Employer shall lose the mobility of manpower privileges for the duration of the project for the first violation and for 12 months on all projects for the second and subsequent violations, and the Employer shall be restricted in its employment of carpenters to those carpenters who normally work in the geographical area of the local union where the project is located. This penalty may be appealed to the E.S.T. of NERCC. When a company whose main office is located outside the New England Regional Councils jurisdiction performs any work covered by this agreement, it shall be permitted to bring in two (2) key traveling employees from its home area. All additional carpenter employees shall be requested from the local union where the work is being performed. This provision shall not apply to contractors having a regular office within the jurisdiction of the New England Regional Council of Carpenters. No employee shall be required to work in a geographical jurisdiction outside of the geographical jurisdiction of his home local. Employers shall not retaliate or discriminate against an employee who refuses to work outside of the geographical jurisdiction of his home local. If there is no available work, other than work outside the geographical jurisdiction of the employees home local or at a lesser pay rate than the employees home local, the Employer shall lay-off that employee so that he is eligible to receive Unemployment benefits.{END OF ARTICLE V.} _______________________________________________________________________________  As the Court can readily discern, the NERCC, its Officers, Agents and Directors, willfully & wantonly ignored the express direction of the Board and refused to extract the Illegal Contract Language from the Contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

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______________________________________________________________________________ MEMO

TO: FROM: DATE:

Mark Erlich and NERCC Executive Board Christopher N. Souris September 17, 2010

You have asked for comments on two matters. The first is what if anything the Council needs to do in light of the August 27, 2010 Decision and Order by the NLRB in the case filed by Kevin Lebovitz. Procedurally, the NLRB issued its August 27 decision in response to the ruling by the United States Supreme Court earlier this year that a large number of decisions that had been issued when the NLRB had only two members were invalid. The NLRB had issued its initial decision in the Lebovitz case last year when it had only two members. The Supreme Courts ruling effectively invalidated that decision on purely technical grounds. The Board, now with a full complement of members, issued the August 27 Decision & Order in the case, essentially reaching the same outcome. As to what needs to be done, it is important to clarify what appears to be general confusion about just what the NLRB decided and did not decide in the case. The NLRB did not rule or even remotely suggest that the mobility clauses are unlawful, as many seem to think. In fact, the NLRB in the case actually ruled in favor of a traveling member from Local 24 who was complaining that Local 43 tried to prevent him from working on a project in its area and in order to save the position for a local carpenter. The NLRBs decision is limited to a very narrow and very technical part of the mobility clause that has no meaningful effect on how the clause actually works. Moreover, this case was filed years ago. We have argued strenuously at every stage of the case that the clause as written was lawful. Nevertheless, since then, the mobility clauses in all of the collective bargaining agreements throughout the Council have been revised to eliminate the particular part of the clause the NLRB thinks is inconsistent with labor laws. Eliminating that part of the clause from the contract essentially had no effect on how the mobility clause operates in actual practice. As a result, there is nothing to do now in response to the August 27, 2010 NLRB decision. The current clauses in all the Councils agreements already have been changed and are in full compliance with the NLRA, even under the NLRBs view of the case.

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Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz 12-31-09 The UBCJA International, NERCC and their corporate counsel colluded together to orchestrate and engineer the Mobility Clause and the Skill Form as an exaction, or extortion of rank & file member property rights, long upheld by past Board decisions & orders and Supreme Court decisions. NERCC & their counsel did not want the rank & file member to be aware of the fact that enforcement of the Mobility Clause is illegal under the NLRA Section 7, nor did they want the fact known that the Unions Constitution & By-Laws were declared to be facially unlawful. Souris & Krakow, LLCs 13-page Reply Brief to Answer to Exceptions http://www.nlrb.gov/case/34CB-003047 is demonstrative of the chicanery employed by the UBC International, NERCC and the attorneys to deceive the Board of the true purpose for Mobility, which is to end run the NLRA & LMRDA in collusion with the Contractor Associations. Further proof of their fraudulent concealment and collusion is evinced by their collective-collusive failure to defraud the rank & file and strike the illegal contractual provision from the Collective Bargaining Agreements as directed by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The violations of the attorneys alone warrant at minimum, fines, suspension or disbarment from the practice of law. Mobility Clause as it applied to the then current Contract (CBA) & the September 1, 2009 through August 31, 2012 Contract / Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) NERCC and its attorneys refused to amend the current contract as directed by the Boards decision and order, dated December 31, 2009 and first made available in electronic form the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for the contract period of September 1, 2009 through August 31, 2012 on March 5, 2010 via e-mail to one individual demanding it be made available. Said contract remained un-executed (unsigned) by any NERCC representative and/or Contractor Association representatives. Printed copies were finally made available with signatures in mid May, 2010. The NERCC Executive Secretary Treasurer had maintained the Contract (CBA) for the period described above was signed and executed on August 8, 2009 and also specifically maintained that NERCCs attorneys had made the appropriate changes required by the NLRB Board D & O in the slip opinion # 354-122, dated December 31, 2009. This is a clear misstatement of fact a clear deception of the truth, as the matter had yet to be heard or decided by the NLRB Board on August 8, 2009, therefore, neither Souris & Krakow, LLP or the NERCC Executive Board or EST would be able to change the NERCC Contracts & execute them with the language purporting to make the changes per the 12-31-09 NLRB slip opinion in Lebovitz and put same into a contract dated September 1, 2009. This is an utter fabrication of the facts and the truth. Examination of the NERCC Contract which issued in electronic form for the first time on March 5, 2010, and which remained unexecuted, were not printed or made available at any Union Hiring Hall before May 2010 clearly & unequivocally show that NERCC & its counsel of record are fabricating the story after the fact to fit within the pattern of lies told.

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Further, examination of the contract details clearly show that both the Union Security Clause and the Mobility Clause were not changed to comply with the Board D & O, either on or after the 12-31-09 slip opinion issued, on or after the NERCC CBA Contracts were finally executed and printed in March & May of 2010; and, either on or after the August 26, 2010 Board decision issued and was first published electronically on the NLRB website on August 27, 2010. http://www.nlrb.gov At no time was the language in the Collective Bargaining Agreements modified to conform with the Boards D & O post New Process Steel or post the 8-26-10 final D & O, nor did NERCC, its Executive Board, EST, or any of the 27-individual Local Union Hiring Halls post the NRLBs decision and order as directed, not for one day let alone the statutory minimum period noted within all standard Board decisions. The fact remains that NERCC, has steadfastly refused to comply with any order by the National Labor Relations Board relative to this matter, that NERCC & its Counsel failed to modify the language in the prior Contract which expired on August 31, 2009, nor did they at any time modify the current Contracts to comply with the Boards orders in this case. Region 1 of the NLRB based at the Tip ONeil Federal Building in Boston, Mass. never at any time enforced the Boards D & O.  The Union Security clause language, wherein the condition precedent to employment is the rank & file members compliance to the UBCs Constitution and its By-Laws remains intact, unaltered and exactly as it was prior to any decision and order issuing in the entire progeny of the Lebovitz case. Therein, the NERCC counsel has perjured himself in this matter, within the case history, the briefs and specifically within this back-dated memo allegedly written on September 17, 2010. Moreover, the specific language in the 12-31-09 slip opinion issued by the NLRB Board and the subsequent post New Process Steel re-tried slip opinion issuing August 26, 2010 preserved the specific language, unqualified to this simple fact the UBC Constitution and its By-Laws are facially unlawful; so much so, it need be emphasized again: 12-31-09 slip opinion Carp. Local 43..and Kevin Lebovitz 5. Is the union-security clause facially unlawful? Finally, the union-security clause in article V is facially unlawful. The union-security clause explicitly requires compliance with the Unions constitution and bylaws, a requirement which violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the unions constitution and bylaws); Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) (finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list).

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While unions are free to enforce properly adopted rules against their members, Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, including the right to refrain from joining a union. See Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423, 430(1969) (unions are free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforce[d] sic, against union members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule). Thus, employees must be free to resign their union membership and escape the rule. The rule here, however, requires employees to comply with the Unions constitution and bylaws as a condition of employment. Such a requirement violates the Act. At p 2, the Board Decision & Order stated: ORDER - The National Labor Relations Board orders that the A. The Respondent, New England Regional Council of Carpenters, Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Maintaining in its collective-bargaining agreements a union-security clause requiring employees to comply with the Respondents constitution and bylaws as a condition of employment. (b) Maintaining in its collective-bargaining agreements a mobility clause restricting employers to hiring carpenters who are members in good standing of any local affiliate of the New England Regional Council of Carpenters. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

NERCC, Boston & Eastern MA CBA excerpt 9-1-09 TO 8-31-12 CONTRACT (CBA): UNION SECURITY JURISDICTION MOBILITY ARTICLE 3 - Union Security Section 1. The Employer agrees that all employees covered by this agreement shall, as a condition of employment, become and remain members of the Union in good standing. No worker shall be refused admittance and the right to maintain membership in the Union provided he qualifies and complies with the Constitution and By-Laws of the Union. ARTICLE 5 - Mobility of Manpower Employers shall be restricted in their employment of Carpenters to those carpenters who normally work in the geographic jurisdiction area of the local union where the project is located. Notwithstanding any language to the contrary in any area collective bargaining agreement for work in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont, the Employer shall have the right to employ any carpenter who Boston and Eastern Area of Massachusetts Carpenters

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CBA 9/1/09-8/31/12 16 [who] normally works within any of the six New England states pursuant to the following conditions: The carpenter employee has worked a minimum of three (3) weeks for the employer in the previous five (5) months. If the Employer fails to notify a local union prior to commencing work on a project in that locals geographical jurisdiction, the Employer shall lose the mobility of manpower privileges for the duration of the project for the first violation and for 12 months on all projects for the second and subsequent violations, and the Employer shall be restricted in its employment of carpenters to those carpenters who normally work in the geographical area of the local union where the project is located. This penalty may be appealed to the E.S.T. of NERCC. Movants note the NERCC Counsel of Record, Souris & Krakow, LLP and the NERCC EST have directly perjured themselves to the NLRB Board and directly to the UBCJA members as demonstrated above via the illegal language in Article III Union Security and Article V Mobility. The fact is, the UBCJA International, NERCC and its counsel of record, will lie directly to the Board, its members and the Court in all matters regarding the Mobility issue, whether it be in New England Regional Council of Carpenters (6-New England States) or the New York City District Council of Carpenters (NYCDCC); or, any other area of the United States. This is the standard modus operandi of this criminal organization. Not only do the Council employees lie as a matter of record directly to all its members, they rather do it unabashedly before the NLRBs Regional Offices, Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) and before the NLRB general counsel and Board itself and they are not in the least bit shy about doing the same thing in a state Court or a Federal Court to suit their continued agenda of defrauding rank & file Union Carpenters of their legal rights under the NLRA and LMRDA. To the UBCJA, its counsel Latham & Watkins, NERCC and its counsel Souris & Krakow, this is simply business, do what you have to do, lie when necessary and perjure themselves at will to get what they want from the men unfettered Dictatorial Control.of the NLRB Board, its attorneys, the Courts, and most importantly, direct access to control all of the Benefit Funds and monies to achieve illegitimate ends, all of it done in collusion with known criminal elements and done boldly under a 21-year Federal Civil RICO case and 17-year Civil RICO Consent Decree. To the rank & file members, this issue concerns an intangible property right which is considered a source of wealth.  Once members comply with the proviso to section 8(a) (3) of the Act, the right to exclude all others becomes operative. The NLRB Board and the UBCJA International are both attempting to go outside the limited rule-making processes of the Act, via the grant of limited instances of legislative rule-making authority. The UBCJA and the NLRB Board, when acting under a very limited Constitutional grant are constrained in the application of powers when either or both subsume the roles of all three Federal Branches of government, the Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch and the Judicial Branch.

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In A.L.A. Schechter, the Supreme Court stated The United States Supreme Court does not recognize a centralized form of Government such as this, and as they have noted, the Federal Constitution does not provide for it. The UBCJA International and its 36-District Councils throughout the United States of America have consumed all three branches of government and have effectively declared a formal Dictatorship within the entire UBCJA; and in so doing, both have effectively and constructively amended the NLRA. The alterations and back-door amendments they seek are violations of rank & file members Federal Due Process and Constitutional rights. That the NLRB & the UBCJA International have obliterated the NLRA to this extent via the rulings in Chao & Lebovitz, serve to put the UBC Union Carpenters on notice that they have effectively declared the National Labor Relations Act moot, void of purpose and law and entirely negated. As a matter of law, this cannot stand. It is up to this Court to restrain the illegal behavior and to issue a permanent Injunction to prevent further abuses of the law. The Constitutional questions previously posed before the Court are a bar at law for any member to seek redress at the NLRB, as they have proven themselves incapable of applying the laws and precedent to their decisions, and instead attempt to legislate matters from the bench, which is specifically prohibited within the judiciary as a matter known to all. When the NLRB and its General Counsel proffer such decisions, it is up the Federal Courts and the United States Supreme Court to take up such matters and reverse the decisions so issued. _________________________________________________________________________________ NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (NLRA) SECTION 14(b) APPLICABILITY TO THE NERCC/UBCJAS MOBILITY CLAUSE 14(b) [Agreements requiring union membership in violation of State law] Nothing in this Act [subchapter] shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law. Currently, there are 28 - NonRight to Work States & 22 - Right to Work States. NLRA Section 14(b) operates in two ways: In all Non-RTW States (Union), Federal Pre-emption is applicable to the entire Act. In RTW States (Non-Union), Federal Pre-emption is waived under the Tenth Amendment, and the NLRB Board & General Counsel are free to apply the Mobility Provision to said Non-Union States, as State law(s) are controlling in the Right to Work (RTW) States.  In Non-RTW States (Union States), the 12-31-09 slip Opinion issued in Lebovitz has no application. The reason is fairly obvious, once people understand the base NLRA 9(a) & (8f) Representation issues as applicable to the Construction Industry. Once a bargaining representative has been chosen and subsequently certified by the NLRB; and, after the Contractor, Firm, Organization complies with the proviso to Sec. 8(a)(3) regarding the

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collection of Dues & Initiation Fees and the requisite 30-Day hold for Sec. 9(a) and 7-Day hold for Sec. 8(f), and after Workers or Employees are properly advised of their Beck Rights, to refrain from any & all activities under NLRA Sec. 7 application of the Lebovitz Ruling is out. The CBA is a contract. Within said contracts for particular Locals, District & Regional Councils of the UBC are well Defined Geographical Jurisdictional areas, comprised of cities, towns, counties or combinations thereof as the case may be in a particular Non-RTW (Union) state. The Defined Geographical Jurisdiction of a UBCJA Contract (CBA) is intangible property. In [Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 US 164 (1979), the United States Supreme Court noted.one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property the right to exclude others. In a RTW State wherein Federal Pre-Emption operates as a waiver under the Tenth Amendment, Workers & Employees are free to be employed, or work anywhere they so choose, without exception, thus the UBCJA signatory General Contractors or Subcontractors conducting their Union operations in any of the 22-Right to Work States, where a Union Security Clause is of no force or effect, in such States, the Mobility Clause would fall under the respective State Law.  In a Non-Right to Work State such as New York and the remaining 27-non RTW States, and as here applicable to NYCDCC Union Carpenters & all other Trade Unions operating Exclusive or Non-Exclusive Hiring Halls (re: Employer Chooses, Worker or Employee Solicits or Union Hiring Hall(s) select candidates for employment), the intangible property right of exclusion, to the defined geographical jurisdiction becomes effective, or operative.  After all other factors are properly weighed and compliance is had, the Locals are thus free to enforce the right of exclusion limiting this to the defined geographical jurisdiction, to the benefit of their properly indentured workers and employees; and, are free to employ their members first, all members to the exclusion of all others. The exclusion principle includes, Non-Union Workers, UBC Union Travelers whether interstate or intra-state, 1099 Independent Contractors, Cash Workers and Illegal Aliens/ Undocumented Workers & any others working off the books. The NLRB Board, the UBCJA or their 36-subordinate Regional or District Councils cannot usurp the Congressional Authority to legislate. The UBC Constitution & Bylaws have been ruled facially unlawful as per slip opinion No. 354-122 Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz dated 12-31-09. The union-security clause explicitly requires compliance with the Unions constitution and bylaws, a requirement which violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security

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clause unlawfully required compliance with the unions constitution and bylaws) Even when illegal provisions within both documents are properly severed and they are then deemed to be in compliance with all mandates and requirements of law the UBC Constitution & By-Laws do not supersede or usurp Congressional authority legislate. UBC Attorneys for NERCC claim that the Mobility provision of the Contract (CBA) is an exception to the general rule, and this is where it runs afoul of the Law and where it must fail as a matter of law. This is also a clear example of the UBC International and its Regional/District Councils shopping NLRB Board Regions for favorable decisions gained in one Region and unilaterally applying the decision and order to all 50-States.  The NLRB Board and its General Counsel and Regional Director have failed to enforce the specific requirements of their original or amended Decision & Order (D & O) or to correct and strike the illegal languages from the NERCC 6-State Contracts (CBAs). Their participation in this case, as a means to backdoor a legislative amendment to the NLRA, in collusion with the UBCJA warrants an investigation into the Inferior Agency of the Executive Branchthe NLRB & its Region 1 Office by the United States Department of Justice or Office of the Inspector General. The Board Agents and the General Counsel are sworn to uphold the law, not circumvent it for political reasons. Their actions are grossly negligent and warrant at a minimum fines and suspensions form the practice of law. Douglas J. McCarron, Frank Spencer and John Ballantyne have suspended all NYCDCC Locals autonomy as a fraudulent means to change the By-Laws, exercise a veto power, and to put forth a Restructuring Plan which incorporates 100% Full Mobility throughout the NYC District Council of Carpenters and one which incorporates the entire State of New York; and which merges and consolidates Local Union rank & file workers/employees. {Restructuring Plan dated 5-26-11 at pg. 131 at 2. and at By-Laws Section 38, pg. 123 of 138, or pg. 28 of bylaws as a separate document}  Under the law(s), this is fraudulent inducement, as the UBC International, with malice & fore-thought has intentionally deceived the US Attorney, the Independent Review Officer and the Court by with-holding these facts from them. Coupled together with the current 67% - 33% Rule, favoring Contractor Association workers and employees, wherein Contractors can increase the 67% ratio with other added rules under the Consent Decree, the Mobility provision fairly said eats away an additional 30% in the Contractor Association and Contractor favor and effectively grants exclusive control and license to them of the Union Hiring Halls and the Out of Work List (OOWL). Not only does this disenfranchise workers and employees who rely upon the OOWL & Hiring Hall Rules under the Consent Decree, it is openly discriminatory and provides the Contractor Associations a monopoly control over all hiring and violates the terms and conditions of the Consent Decree.

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In NLRB Mountain Pacific, page 894, the portions not over-ruled, the Board noted: "The Respondents do not, nor could they, argue that this contract does not make employment conditional upon union approval, for a more complete and outright surrender of the normal management hiring prerogative to a union could hardly be phrased in contract language. The fact that the Agreement limits the unions exclusive control to a 48-hour period after a request for employees is immaterial, for if unqualified exclusive delegation of hiring to a Union is unlawful, the vice is not cured by a reversion back to the employer of the hiring privilege after the union is unable to enjoy the power conferred upon it."2

Mobility & Primary Job Situs: PRIMARY JOB SITUS PER THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, NLRA Sec. 14(b) U.S. Supreme Court Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976) Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp. No. 74-1254 , Argued March 29, 1976 Decided June 14, 1976 426 U.S. 407 Syllabus Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act permits union- or agency shop agreements between employers and unions, but 14(b) authorizes States to exempt themselves from 8(a)(3) and to enact "right-to-work" laws prohibiting union or agency shops. About two years after petitioner unions and respondent employer had entered into an agency shop agreement covering seamen employed on respondent's oil tankers, respondent brought suit claiming that the agreement was invalid and unenforceable because it violated Texas' right-to-work laws. Since, inter alia, all final decisions for hiring the seamen are made in Texas, the majority of the then employed seamen reside in Texas, and respondent's personnel records are maintained and payroll checks are written there, the District Court held that Texas had an "intimate concern" with the agreement, notwithstanding that the seamen spend the vast majority of their working hours away from Texas on the high seas, and that therefore Texas' right-to-work laws were applicable under 14(b) and rendered the agreement void and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stressing that Texas was the place of hiring. Held: 1. lt is the employees' predominant job situs, rather than a generalized weighing of factors or the place of hiring, that triggers operation of 14(b), and, under 14(b), right-to-work laws cannot void agreements permitted by 8(a)(3) when the situs at which all the employees covered by the agreement perform most of their work is located outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 412-419. (a) Insofar as 8(a)(3) deals with union and agency shop agreements, it focuses both in effect and purpose on post-hiring conditions, conditions that have a major impact on the job situs. Pp. 426 U. S. 414-416. Page 426 U. S. 408

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(b) Similarly, 14(b)'s primary concern is with state regulation of the post-hiring employer employee-union relationship, the center of which is the job situs, i.e., the place where the work that is the very raison d'etre of the relationship is performed; and because of this close relationship between 14(b) and job situs, 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job situs is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418. (c) Under the job situs test, as opposed to a "place of hiring" test, the possibility of patently anomalous extraterritorial applications of any given State's right-to-work laws will be minimized, and parties entering a collective bargaining agreement will easily be able to determine in virtually all situations whether a union or agency shop provision is valid. Pp. 426 U. S. 418-419. 2. Under the job situs test, Texas' right-to-work laws cannot govern the validity of the agency shop agreement in question, because most of the employees' work is done on the high seas, outside the territorial bounds of Texas. It is immaterial that Texas may have more contacts than any other State with the employment relationship involved, since there is no reason to conclude under 14(b) that, in every employment situation, some State's law with respect to union security agreements must apply, and it is fully consistent with national labor policy to conclude, if the predominant job situs is outside the boundary of any State, that no State has a sufficient interest in the employment relationship, and that, hence, no State's right-to-work laws can apply. Pp. 426 U. S. 420-421. 504 F.2d 272, reversed. MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a concurring statement, post, p. 426 U. S. 421. BURGER, C.J., concurred in the judgment. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 426 U. S. 421. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 426 U. S. 422. Page 426 U. S. 409 A) UBCJA INTERNATIONAL - RESTRUCTURING PLAN dated May 26, 2011 The Consolidation and re-chartering of new Local Unions will illegally shift some 8,000 rank & file workers/employee Union Carpenters from the specific protections accorded under the Consent Decree, and take then permanently & forever outside of its control and protection. Accordingly, the RO must reject and veto the proposed Restructuring Plan. The entire predicate behind it is to evade the Consent Decrees terms & conditions and the Court must recognize and see it for what it is a plan of evasion and deception. The fact that it is being done so boldly is ample proof of the UBCs contempt of its own members, and more importantly, contempt for this honorable Court. The same methods of fraudulent inducement apply in the same manner and form to the 100% Mobility Rule. This rule/exception to the rule is proffered as being required to accommodate the

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sophisticated Contractors all of whom work in multiple UBC intra-state Jurisdictions throughout New York and inter-State Jurisdictions. While these so called sophisticated Contractors are working in Non-Union States, running doublebreasted non-union entities and/or alter-ego corporations, State Law for Right to Work States prevails as it applies to the 100% mobility rule issued in NLRB No. 354-122, Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz, slip opinion dated 12-31-09 as per the NLRA Section 14(b) deferral granted to the States so choosing enact Right to Work legislation.  In the State of New York and specifically within the NYCDCC any & all form of the Mobility Exception must fail as a matter of Federal Law, the Federal Constitution and the separation of powers doctrine embedded therein AS MOVANTS so noted within our June 1, 2011 response to the UBCJA Internationals counsel of record Latham & Watkins, LLP. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America and the National Labor Relations Board stepped far outside their area of authority allowed under the Federal Constitution, noted as follows: In NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 US 418 (1968), Justice Douglas noted - There cannot be any justification to make the public processes wait until the union member exhausts internal procedures plainly inadequate to deal with all phases of the complex problem concerning employer, union, and employee member. If the member becomes exhausted, instead of the remedies, the issues of public policy are never reached and an airing of the grievance never had. The Court of Appeals recognized that this might be the consequence and said that resort to an intra-union remedy if it imposed unreasonable delay or hardship upon the complainant. 379 F2d. at 707. Congressman Griffin at 13 [T]he proviso was not intended to limit in any way the right of a union member under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, to file unfair labor practice charges against a union, or the right of the NLRB to entertain such charges, even though a 4-month period may not have elapsed. Notwithstanding this fact lies the mandate of the Consent Decree that under 17 Retention of Jurisdiction and Application to the Court. This Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to supervise implementation of this Consent Decree and shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide any and all issues arising under the Consent Decree, and any and all disputes growing out of the issuance, interpretation or application of this Consent Decree. At 18, Future Actions. Except as specified in paragraph 15, nothing herein shall preclude the Government, or any of its department or agencies, from taking any appropriate action in regard to any of the defendant signatories hereto in reliance on any federal laws.  Thus, per 17 & 18 and per the Supreme Court ruling in NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), there is a bar to member remedies which precludes action through the NLRB. Given said preclusion and the fact that the NLRB is a quasi-judicial Federal Agency, with limited quasi-legislative rule-making authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),

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with final rule-making per Federal Register procedures; and, the fact that the specific issues of fact & law are predicated upon the Federal Constitution, the Board and its General Counsel are barred from ruling upon the issues presented, thus, the Constitutional issues are properly before this Court as jurisdiction & venue are proper. The UBCs Section 38 Mobility provision and the application of Section 4(A), 4(B) & 4(C) of the proposed Restructuring Plan & By-Laws wherein all executive, legislative, judicial and plenary powers are vested in an all consuming dictatorial EST indicate the UBCJAs willful & wanton violation of the NLRA, LMRDA and their intentional and fraudulent deception to the Court, which by design are intended to frustrate and exhaust the member. Accordingly as per NLRB v. Marine workers instead of the remedies, the issues of public policy are never reached and an airing of the grievance never had. Moreover, since the UBCJA International has the same very limited legislative role, specifically qualified to rulemaking under the same grant afforded to the NLRB, that of an Inferior Department of the Executive Branch, when one or both cross the line by subsuming the powers of all three branches, Movants note the following:

 The separation of powers can be violated in two basic ways. One involves the aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976).Another occurs when a law, despite no inter-branch aggrandizement. disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches by preventing one of the branches from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions Nixon v. Admr. of Gen. Servs. 433 US 425 (1977). The Department of Labor and the National Labor Relations Board, its General Counsel, Officers, Regional Directors and employees are an Inferior Branch of the Executive Branch of Government as established by the United States Constitution. The NLRB Board and all of its constituent employees of the Federal Government Executive Branch quasi-judicial agency who has limited powers of Rulemaking authority under the Administrative Procedures Act and which, when properly followed, its Board & General Counsel and constituent employees are mandated to follow specific requirements to enact rule changes through the Federal Register. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) As Chief Justice Hughes amply stated at 8 The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the [295 U.S. 495, 529] imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is necessary.  The above statement by Chief Justice Hughes applies to the NLRB, its General Counsel, Officers, Attorneys and agents and to Douglas J. McCarron & the UBCJA International. That they and/or the UBC International General President, the NYCDCC, the Building Trades

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Employers Association (BTEA), the Building Construction Trades Council (BCTC) or any other Contractor Associations claim a Local, Regional or National crisis or extra-ordinary circumstances exist; and/or that new or emerging sophisticated Regional Contractors corporate business plans require, or a grave national crisis exists within the Construction Industry that require an exception are flat out wrong. Moreover, the NLRB cannot legislate from the Bench as was done in Lebovitz.

 The UBC International shopped this test case throughout the NLRB Regions as a means to end run Congresss legislative authority. The UBCJAs limited legislative roles ascribe to the same restraints imposed upon each of the 3-branches of government under our Federal Constitution. The NLRB Board issued the decision & order, failed to enforce it and has allowed the UBC International to apply this policy for 100% Mobility to the full complement of 50-States. Its application and enforcement can only be effected in Right to Work States and no other. Under 28 USC, Sec. 2403 & USC Sec 517, the Attorney General of the 28 NonRight to Work States need to be notified and joined. Movants request an Order from this Court directing the USAO to provide the notifications required by law to the effected 28 states. The NLRB is a political animal and can and often is driven by political agendas predicated upon which party appoints whom to serve and for reasons peculiar to their political views. When the Board steps outside of its legal authority, in limited rule-making changes; and when it transcends that line and crosses over into the line of the Congressional authority to legislate that decision and order must be over-turned. The United States District Court (SDNY) need not look long or far to make such a decision. The NLRB and its Board and General Counsel often get it wrong. In UBC Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz, 354-122 slip opinion issuing December 31, 2010, the Board clearly erred. Upon issuance of the Supreme Court decision in New Process Steel, 6-17-10 , the Board via application from a UBC member to have the case added to the their docket for exceptions and re-issuance, the NLRB altered the decision & order and neither the original decision or the amended version comply with the law as stated above. D) AUGUST 26, 2010 355 NLRB 132 MOBILITY (modifications to, insertions to 12-31-09 skip opinion) United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 43 and New England Regional Council of Carpenters (McDowell Building & Foundation, Inc.) and Kevin Lebovitz. Case 34CB3047 August 26, 2010 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS SCHAUMBER AND BECKER On December 31, 2009, the two sitting members of the Board issued a Decision and Order in this proceeding, which is reported at 354 NLRB No. 122.1 Thereafter, Respondent Carpenters Local 43

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filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and the General Counsel filed a cross-application for enforcement. On June 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635, holding that under Section 3(b) of the Act, in order to exercise the delegated authority of the Board, a delegee group of at least three members must be maintained. Thereafter, the Board issued an order setting aside the above-referenced decision and order, and retained this case on its docket for further action as appropriate. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.2 The Board has considered the judges decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judges rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order to the extent and for the reasons stated in the decision reported at 354 NLRB No. 122, which has been set aside and which is incorporated herein by reference, except as modified below. 1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the powers of the National Labor Relations Board in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kirsanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Thereafter, pursuant to this delegation, the two sitting members issued decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases. 2 Consistent with the Boards general practice in cases remanded from the courts of appeals, and for reasons of administrative economy, the panel includes the members who participated in the original decision. Furthermore, under the Boards standard procedures applicable to all cases assigned to a panel, the Board Members not assigned to the panel had the opportunity to participate in the adjudication of this case at any time up to the issuance of this decision. At slip opinion page 1, substitute the following for the first three sentences of the fourth full paragraph, ending with Council local: The judge found that the Respondents maintenance of the mobility clause violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. We agree with the judges conclusion. The mobility clause operates as an exception to geographic restrictions on signatory employers hiring previously contained in separate agreements between the locals in the New England Council and the multiemployer association of which employer McDowell Building & Foundation, Inc. was a member. As explained by the Unions, While this provision replaced the terms of the old local hiring requirement, it did not eliminate them. Thus, in the event an employers employees do not satisfy the mobility rule . . . , the default rule remains a local hiring requirement. Brief at 5. In other words, in order for an employee from outside the locals geographic jurisdiction to be hired, the employee must satisfy the two prongs of the mobility clause: (1) the employee must have worked for the employer for a minimum of 3 weeks in the previous 5 months and (2) the employee must be a member in good standing of any local affiliate of the New England Regional Council of Carpenters. It is the second prong that is at issue here. On its face, the second prong of the clause appears to be an unlawful requirement that employees be members of a local union prior to hiring. Even if the requirement is construed to reduce the obligations of membership to its financial core, the clause appears to require membership in good

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standing prior to or at the time of hiring rather than 7 days thereafter as permitted by the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) as modified by Section 8(f). The Unions argue that the clause should be further construed to require only financial core membership after the 7th day of employment and that all employees who satisfy the first prong of the requirement will, necessarily, satisfy the second because the mobility exception to the local hiring restriction applies only to those who have worked for 3 weeks for the employer. By definition, such 3 week employees will have been subject to the seven day security clause. Brief at 12. But this is not the case for several reasons. First, an employee who was employed by signatory employer for a minimum of 3 weeks in the previous 5 months might not have been a member in good standing and might not have satisfied his or her financial obligations to the Unions. Most obviously, such an employee might have left employment when the union-security clause was enforced against him or her. Second, the proviso to Section 8(a)(3) combined with Section 8(f) permit a requirement that employees become members within 7 days of hire. Even as construed by the Unions, the mobility clause requires membership during a period prior to hire. Third, if the second prong of the mobility clause is construed as suggested by the Unions, it is superfluous because its requirement is necessarily satisfied by the first prong,3 and also because it is redundant of the union-security provision. The proposed construction is thus not a reasonable one. Also on page one, insert the following at the end of the fourth full paragraph, before footnote four: The Unions argue that Lebovitz was in compliance with the second prong of the mobility clause and thus, even assuming the Unions invoked the clause and thereby caused him to leave employment, the Unions 3 The Unions expressly argue that the second prong is superfluous:The only real operative requirement for satisfaction of the mobility clause, then, is the 3 weeks of employment requirement. Br. at 13 The reference to members in the current clause in essence is superfluous. Br. at 13. invoked only the lawful prong of the clause. But our precedent does not permit such detailed splicing of an unlawful clause. See Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112, 112 fn. 3 (2004), enfd. 414 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1170 (2006).

Dated, Washington, D.C. August 26, 2010 ______________________________________ Wilma B. Liebman, Chairman ______________________________________ Peter C. Schaumber, Member ______________________________________ Craig Becker, Member (SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

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 Movants note the Boards decision is fatally flawed and wraps itself in the cloak of good standing in the union; and, an exception to geographic restrictions on signatory employers hiring and it patently ignores the separation of powers doctrine of the Federal Constitution. _________________________________________________________________________________ In United States of America v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.1969) the Second Circuit at 19 stated The Hobbs Act 'speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence.' Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). The concept of property under the Hobbs Act, as devolved from its legislative history and numerous decisions, is not limited to physical or tangible property or things (United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947, 85 S.Ct. 440, 13 L.Ed.2d 544 (1964); United States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1958)), but includes, in a broad sense, any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth (Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915, 75 S.Ct. 604, 99 L.Ed. 1249 (1955), reh. denied, 349 U.S. 969, 75 S.Ct. 879, 99 L.Ed. 1290 (1955)) and does not depend upon a direct benefit being conferred on the person who obtains the property (United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 76 S.Ct. 522, 100 L.Ed. 494 (1956)). At 21 The phraseology of the Act makes it clear that the interference or attempted interference with interstate commerce 'in any way or degree' is prohibited. Stated differently, extortion or threats of violence need affect interstate commerce only in a minimal degree to constitute a violation. The broad and extensive reach of the commerce clause under the Hobbs Act has been upheld in a variety of circumstances. United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310, 89 S.Ct. 1164, 22 L.Ed.2d 297 (1969); Battaglia v. United States, 383 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 907, 88 S.Ct. 817, 19 L.Ed.2d 874 (1968); Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1954); United States v. Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426, 428 (S.D.N.Y.1956).

 Here, the UBC International and NERCC in 354-122, Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz, Inter-state & Intra-state Commerce is involved as the contractual provision being challenged is the 6-State New England Regional Council of Carpenters (NERCC) collective bargaining agreement, the contract clearly controls the movement of the labor commodity, the worker and employee defined under the preamble & Section 7 of the NLRA; and attempted interference, if not actual interference, was clearly established by the circumvention of Congressional authority to legislate and should warrant a similar finding that the conduct of the UBCJA International constitute extortion or attempted extortion which affected interstate commerce - within the proscription of the Hobbs Act, per United States v. Provenzano, supra; United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1958), reversed on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960).

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The United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America (UBCJA) International union, its General President Douglas J. McCarron and their counsel of record, Latham and Watkins, LLP have put the Lebovitz decision and the Mobility issue square on the table, via their incorporation of the National Restructuring Plan into the May 26, 2011 NYCDCC Restructuring Plan, Exhibit D, Page 131, which stated: Re: UBCJA (undated) 8-page Memorandum by Phil Newkirk, Chief of Staff, page 131-138 at 5, The proposed LU [Local Union] restructuring for the for the above referenced LUS [Local Unions] is based on the premise that, while Local Unions play an integral role in the structure of the UBC, there exists an unnecessary number of LUs that are holdovers from a previous construction era. During that earlier era, LUs were structured in a way that was consistent with the provincial attitudes of the members residing in many ethnic neighborhoods throughout New York City. Additionally, in that era construction was largely localized and contractors rarely traveled outside of the boroughs they resided in, with many contractors not traveling beyond a limited number of neighborhoods within the borough. However, in todays construction market, Union contractors are increasingly mobile, chasing work across borough, city and state borders. They employ Union Carpenters who may be members of a LU within a given borough, but are quite possibly residents of an entirely different borough or city. Given the mobility of todays industry and workforce, it is not necessary to have numerous Carpenter LUs [Local Unions] scattered throughout New York City. That simply results in unnecessary duplication of administrative resources and costs, resources that could be better directed towards organizing and work growth. Movants note that the holdovers from a previous construction era and the provincial attitudes of members residing in many ethnic neighborhoods of New York City lines are just that. There isnt any factual basis for these lies, but they must tell a story to avoid the obvious that being, following the law. NYC is the largest and most racially diverse cities in the nation, and Newkirks statements appear racist and discriminatory, as neither have anything to do with the Mobility issue with the exception of creating a diversion to the Court to cloud the real issue, the UBCS patent attempt to end run labor laws and avoid motion practice on same. The fact is, the UBCJA Signatory General Contractors & Subcontractors have always worked across city, borough, county & state borders and have done so since the advent of the automobile, and prior to that as well. The UBCJA signatories noted above, although all are contractually bound to work Union, bound to pay the contracted wage and benefit rates, abide by Davis-Bacon regulations, prevailing wage laws, certified payroll requirements etc., said signatories also like to run afoul of the Union Contract and devise double breasted and alter-ego corporation so they can avoid paying the prevailing Union Contract Wage and Benefit scale; and, to substitute it with that of the Non-Union Associated Building and Contractor wage rates. To get around this, and to end run the labor laws in Union States, large cities such as New York and to afford themselves with the opportunity to skirt and avoid NRLA Sec. 14(b), the UBCJA devised

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the Mobility Scheme as the primary vehicle to bring in out of state travelers and pay them their lower wage rates when said workers came from an adjoining Union State and Regional or District Council; and to pay the Non-Union wage scale whenever they can get away with it. The real predicate behind the Mobility Scheme is furthered by the introduction of the non-union worker, the 1099 independent contractor category and predominately of the illegal alien & undocumented work force, all of whom work for cash without any benefits. As NYCDCC and this Court well know, the Mobility clause in Union Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) is the primary magnet leading directly to the fraud in the first instance. The fraud costs honest UBC Local Union members their jobs and robs them of their livelihood, property and ability to build and sustain wealth and costs taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars throughout the State of New York. UBCJA Local Unions are sized proportionally to the dollar volume of work which a given Local Union in a defined Geographical Jurisdiction produces on a historical basis. Local union members who live, work, shop, own homes and who pay property taxes are effectively locked out of work when they are replaced with these travelers. When Local Union workers are not on the Projects in their jurisdictional areas, and where the predominant body of the work force is made up of a core group of travelers and illegal aliens/undocumented workers & employees, working for cash and without benefits, who are without any vested interest in the area where the project is located, and when no one is watching the fraud & corruption only accelerates. The signatory Contractors encourage it, as was demonstrated within all of the testimony relevant to the August 5, 2009 indictments (Forde, Greaney & others) The last line of defense, is the District Council assigned Certified Shop Steward, yet, as has just been proven, when he or she is the lone wolf on the job, the same Contractors who are defrauding the Benefit Funds and who fail to pay Workers Compensation, Unemployment Insurance, State & Federal Taxes, Social Security & Medicare/Medicaid etc, defraud the Local Union rank & file member, unduly increase the amount of time said members spend on the so called Out of Work List (OWL) an further induce Unemployment Insurance fraud by forcing the State & Federal Government to pay claims to Local Union members who would otherwise be working, paying all of the aforementioned taxes and insurance and who would therein not be a drain on these critical systems. Mobility is a power grab, which by design enriches and lines the pockets of corrupt Union & Contractor Association employers who maintain their mob connections. The UBCJA does not have clean hands in these matters, as it is their direct policies and violations of the laws which directly caused the fraud. When you eliminate the Local Unions and consolidate them to the point of creating mega-locals, the specific intent is to increase the power for those at the top and to create a vacuum of eyes, ears and voices at the bottom; and negate and eviscerate the NLRA & LMRDA which the United States Congress via legislation created.

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The primary aim herein is to silence those who oppose the UBCJA International taking on the role of Congress and effectively vetoing the NLRA in its entirety and, by coercion, fraud and intimidation, under the threat & fear of economic reprisal (banishment to the OWL).  The UBCJA Internationals Mobility scheme serves as an effective veto over the legislative branch or Congressional authority to author, write, pass or amend laws. The UBCJA cannot usurp what is clearly Congresss, nor can it substitute its scheme under the false claim of an economic emergency or crisis, nor can the NLRB. The commentary regarding putting the resources into Organizing is pure fiction. The Organizing Department is a make work program for UBCJA appointed yes men, who are appointed pro-tem to avoid Union Elections required under the NLRA & LMRDA; and who are clearly overpaid and who have proven time & again that their enormous wage and benefit packages, serve no other than themselves, and produced no tangible results which the UBCJA or NYCDCC could hang their hat on in a Court of law. The money that is expended goes to buying blow up rats, making signs, meaningless banner campaigns, leafleting & picketing activities and building signs for politicians every election cycle. Toss in a few hats and T-Shirts and thats pretty much it. The irony is in the fact that the Council will expend members monies chasing down small wage claims for the non-union, 1099 & illegal alien workers. It amounts to a dog & pony show to feign compliance with the law and to cover their tails and they just make sure to focus on a project where they were not involved in any shakedowns or kickback schemes. The end of this myth fails here with 25k men and a 16-Million man-hours per year in the current economy (hours are going up, not down), were the UBCJA to sign every Non-Union Contractor and an additional 25k non-union men tomorrow, the base market would still have the same total manhours, yet the NYCDCC would now have 50k men to employ. The latest figures rounded, depict an approximate yearly average of 1,153 man-hours per man, per year. With 50k members and the same 16-Million man-hours of work from the Union side and were the Non-Union element to add 5Million man-hours to that total, as an approximation of their capacity in the New York market, the average man-hour total would go down, not up. Longtime rank & file union carpenters know full well that the Organizing Department produces no quantifiable or tangible results. They act only as a respite for appointed pro-tem yes man who the UBCJA International will ensure become delegates and who will be beholden to the McCarron slate as a paid at will Council employee, as their job depends on that vote. The proposed Restructuring Plan, sec. 20, pg. 16 COUNCIL DELEGATE BODY (CDB) (B) Review, approve or reject in advance, all CBA following a recommendation from the Executive Committee. If a CBA is rejected, the Delegate Body shall promptly inform the Executive Committee in writing of any provisions that cause, or will cause as indicated by a non-binding vote, in whole or in part the rejection.

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The above language, the non-binding vote on the CBA utterly negates the entire purpose of Empowering Delegates in a new form of Democratic Engagement as was stated in Court during the Bilello Motion & conferencing session. The UBCJA rhetoric emanating from Latham & Watkins, Douglas J. McCarron and the District Councils counsel regarding the February 8, 2011 conference on the Bilello Motion, the so called introduction of a new form of democratic engagement argued by Kenneth Conboy that day was an utter fabrication designed to fool the Court as evinced within the May 26, 2011 Restructuring Plans well hidden language contained within the By-Laws. NATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: The UBCJA urges that the national crisis in 1999 demanded a broad and intensive co-operative effort by the Contractor Associations, and that this necessary co-operation was carried out by the adoption and implementation of Mobility Rules on a National level. But the statutory plan is not simply one for voluntary effort. It does not seek merely to endow voluntary trade or industrial associations or groups with privileges or immunities. It involves the UBCJAs coercive exercise and the exaction of Congressional valid lawmaking and legislative power passed off as a simple internal rules change governed by the UBC Constitution and its subordinate Regional & District Council By-Laws. The UBC International and its subordinate Regional & District Councils seek to abolish the Congressional power to legislate, substitute their internal union by-laws and constitution for that of the United States and the Congress. The UBCJA International & Regional/District Councils are exercising a veto power over the 22-Right to Work States inherent sovereignty to control & legislate their own Employment laws and in the instance of the 28-Non Right to Work States, they seek to pre-empt Federal laws by application of a Right to Work State law and apply those laws to all 50-States nationwide. The UBC International simply does not have such powers, nor can they violate the property right of the Local union jurisdiction and source of wealth for its members, the workers & employees which the act protects. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the United States Supreme Court at second wrote: Second. The Question of the Delegation of Legislative Power. - We recently had occasion to review the pertinent decisions and the general principles which govern the determination of this question. Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 , 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed . 446. The Constitution provides that 'All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.' Article 1, 1. And the Congress is authorized 'To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' its general powers. Article 1, 8, par. 18. The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. We have repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting [295 U.S. 495, 530] legislation to complex conditions involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot deal directly. We pointed out in the Panama Refining Company Case that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to

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perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to apply. But we said that the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained. Id., 293 U.S. 388 , page 421, 55 S.Ct. 241.

The Supreme Court further noted at 15: But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress. Such was the hope of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiner of America, International Union (UBCJA) and its subordinate New England Regional Council of Carpenters (NERCC) in bringing Carpenter Local 43and Lebovitz case before the NLRB. The UBCJA, via an illegal internal ByLaw and UBCJA Constitution fraudulently imposed upon its rank & file members, usurped Congressional authority in the delegation of legislative power to itself over and above Federal laws controlling worker & employee rights. The UBCJA & NERCC counsel fraudulently induced the Regional Director of the NLRB, the ALJ & the Board to go along with its fraudulent scheme to defraud workers & employees of their Federal Rights; and to have them issue a Ruling from an Inferior Agency (the NLRB) of the Executive Branch of the United States Government establishing their illegal usurpation of the Congressional authority to legislate upon itself, the UBCJA & NERCC. At___A.L.A. Schechter the Supreme Court went on to state: That administrative agency, in dealing with particular cases, is required to act upon notice and hearing, and its orders must be supported by findings of fact which in turn are sustained by evidence. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, 227 U.S. 88 , 33 S.Ct. 185; State of Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194 , 51 S.Ct. 119; United States [295 U.S. 495, 540] v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 293 U.S. 454 , 55 S.Ct. 268. ________________________________________________________________________________ Movants note, the NLRB & its regional offices, attorneys and the Boards General Counsel never once looked into the laws surrounding NLRA Sec. 14(b), nor did they abide the Supreme Court precedent case-law, which by right, they should know. The reason for this is simple the NLRB being the political animal that it often is will readily ignore the law as it suits them, in order to pursue their political interests. Two such political interests they are currently pursuing are inexorably tied together. The first involves their dissatisfaction with the Congress to pass the Employee Free Choice Act

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(EFCA) into law, and the second matter at hand is their political preference for illegal aliens/undocumented workers who violate the sovereignty of the United States of America. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Employee_Free_Choice_Act http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21887_20110112.pdf  Movants note that the NLRB General Counsel and its Board are currently issuing decisions against employers, on a proposed law which has not yet passed the House & the Senate and having been signed by the President and undergone any vetting relative to vetos or the potential need for an over-ride should that be the case; is sufficient on its face, without further showing to put this honorable Court on notice that the NLRB readily and willfully end runs the Legislative Branch of Government and seeks to impose its limited quasi-legislative role, as does the UBCJA International, via rules making provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and public hearing notification and publishing requirements within the Federal Register to impose back-door legislative changes, alterations and amendments of Federal Laws, strictly reserved to the Congress. In so doing, as the Supreme Court has pointed out in ample case-law, including Hoffman Plastics, when they exceed their limited authority and/ or when the Board issues precedent case-law decisions on a law not even in effect or operative, they have clearly & unequivocally over-stepped their bounds or their competence to administer and the only remedy is an order enjoining them from future similar action. To move about freely and to be employed, the illegal alien/undocumented worker requires mobility. The Board awarded back-pay & interest to an illegal alien and that issue reached the Supreme Court in Hoffman Plastics, 535 US 137, and was summarily rejected.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 001595 HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC., PETITIONER v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT [March 27, 2002] Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) awarded backpay to an undocumented alien who has never been legally authorized to work in the United States. We hold that such relief is foreclosed by federal immigration policy, as expressed by Congress in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).

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Petitioner Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. (petitioner or Hoffman), custom-formulates chemical compounds for businesses that manufacture pharmaceutical, construction, and household products. In May 1988, petitioner hired Jose Castro to operate various blending machines that mix and cook the particular formulas per customer order. Before being hired for this position, Castro presented documents that appeared to verify his authorization to work in the United States. In December 1988, the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, and Plastic Workers of America, AFLCIO, began a unionorganizing campaign at petitioners production plant. Castro and several other employees supported the organizing campaign and distributed authorization cards to co-workers. In January 1989, Hoffman laid off Castro and other employees engaged in these organizing activities. Three years later, in January 1992, respondent Board found that Hoffman unlawfully selected four employees, including Castro, for layoff in order to rid itself of known union supporters in violation of 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).1 306 N. L. R. B. 100. To remedy this violation, the Board ordered that Hoffman (1) cease and desist from further violations of the NLRA, (2) post a detailed notice to its employees regarding the remedial order, and (3) offer reinstatement and backpay to the four affected employees. Id., at 107108. Hoffman entered into a stipulation with the Boards General Counsel and agreed to abide by the Boards order. In June 1993, the parties proceeded to a compliance hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to determine the amount of backpay owed to each discriminatee. On the final day of the hearing, Castro testified that he was born in Mexico and that he had never been legally admitted to, or authorized to work in, the United States. 314 N. L. R. B. 683, 685 (1994). He admitted gaining employment with Hoffman only after tendering a birth certificate belonging to a friend who was born in Texas. Ibid. He also admitted that he used this birth certificate to fraudulently obtain a California drivers license and a Social Security card, and to fraudulently obtain employment following his layoff by Hoffman. Ibid. Neither Castro nor the Boards General Counsel offered any evidence that Castro had applied or intended to apply for legal authorization to work in the United States. Ibid. Based on this testimony, the ALJ found the Board precluded from awarding Castro backpay or reinstatement as such relief would be contrary to Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984), and in conflict with IRCA, which makes it unlawful for employers knowingly to hire undocumented workers or for employees to use fraudulent documents to establish employment eligibility. 314 N. L. R. B., at 685686. In September 1998, four years after the ALJs decision, and seven years after Castro was fired, the Board reversed with respect to backpay. 326 N. L. R. B. 1060. Citing its earlier decision in A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N. L. R. B. 408 (1995), the Board determined that the most effective way to accommodate and further the immigration policies embodied in [IRCA] is to provide the protections and remedies of the [NLRA] to undocumented workers in the same manner as to other employees. 326 N. L. R. B., at 1060. The Board thus found that Castro was entitled to $66,951 of backpay, plus interest. Id., at 1062. It calculated this backpay award from the date of Castros termination to the date Hoffman first learned of Castros undocumented status, a period of 31/2 years. Id., at 1061. A dissenting Board member would have affirmed the ALJ and denied Castro all backpay. Id., at 1062 (opinion of Hurtgen). Hoffman filed a petition for review of the Boards order in the Court of Appeals. A panel of the Court of Appeals denied the petition for review. 208 F.3d 229 (CADC 2000). After rehearing the case en banc, the court again denied the petition for review and enforced the Boards order. 237 F.3d 639 (2001). We granted certiorari, 533 U.S. 976 (2001), and now reverse.2

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This case exemplifies the principle that the Boards discretion to select and fashion remedies for violations of the NLRA, though generally broad, see, e.g., NLRB v. Seven&nbhyph;Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344, 346347 (1953), is not unlimited, see, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257258 (1939); Southern S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 4647 (1942); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 532534 (1984); Sure&nbhyph;Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, at 902904. Since the Boards inception, we have consistently set aside awards of reinstatement or backpay to employees found guilty of serious illegal conduct in connection with their employment. In Fansteel, the Board awarded reinstatement with backpay to employees who engaged in a sit down strike that led to confrontation with local law enforcement officials. We set aside the award, saying: We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct,to invest those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employers property, which they would not have enjoyed had they remained at work. 306 U.S., at 255. Though we found that the employer had committed serious violations of the NLRA, the Board had no discretion to remedy those violations by awarding reinstatement with backpay to employees who themselves had committed serious criminal acts. Two years later, in Southern S. S. Co., supra, the Board awarded reinstatement with backpay to five employees whose strike on shipboard had amounted to a mutiny in violation of federal law. We set aside the award, saying: It is sufficient for this case to observe that the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important [c]ongressional objectives. 316 U.S., at 47. Although the Board had argued that the employees conduct did not in fact violate the federal mutiny statute, we rejected this view, finding the Boards interpretation of a statute so far removed from its expertise entitled no deference from this Court. Id., at 4046. Since Southern S. S. Co., we have accordingly never deferred to the Boards remedial preferences where such preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies unrelated to the NLRA. Thus, we have precluded the Board from enforcing orders found in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code, see Bildisco, supra, at 527534, 529, n. 9 (While the Boards interpretation of the NLRA should be given some deference, the proposition that the Boards interpretation of statutes outside its expertise is likewise to be deferred to is novel), rejected claims that federal antitrust policy should defer to the NLRA, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, 421 U.S. 616, 626 (1975), and precluded the Board from selecting remedies pursuant to its own interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Act, Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 108110 (1958). Our decision in Sure-Tan followed this line of cases and set aside an award closely analogous to the award challenged here. There we confronted for the first time a potential conflict between the NLRA and federal immigration policy, as then expressed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. Two companies had unlawfully reported alien-employees to the INS in retaliation for union activity. Rather than face INS sanction, the employees voluntarily departed to Mexico. The Board investigated and found the companies acted in violation of 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA. The Boards ensuing order directed the companies to reinstate the affected workers and pay them six months backpay.

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We affirmed the Boards determination that the NLRA applied to undocumented workers, reasoning that the immigration laws as presently written expressed only a peripheral concern with the employment of illegal aliens. 467 U.S., at 892 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 360 (1976)). For whatever reason, Congress had not made it a separate criminal offense for employers to hire an illegal alien, or for an illegal alien to accept employment after entering this country illegally. Sure-Tan, supra, at 892893. Therefore, we found no reason to conclude that application of the NLRA to employment practices affecting such aliens would necessarily conflict with the terms of the INA. 467 U.S., at 893. With respect to the Boards selection of remedies, however, we found its authority limited by federal immigration policy. See id., at 903 (In devising remedies for unfair labor practices, the Board is obliged to take into account another equally important Congressional objective ) (quoting Southern S. S. Co., supra, at 47)). For example, the Board was prohibited from effectively rewarding a violation of the immigration laws by reinstating workers not authorized to reenter the United States. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S., at 903. Thus, to avoid a potential conflict with the INA, the Boards reinstatement order had to be conditioned upon proof of the employees legal reentry. Ibid. Similarly, with respect to backpay, we stated: [T]he employees must be deemed unavailable for work (and the accrual of backpay therefore tolled) during any period when they were not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States. Ibid. In light of the practical workings of the immigration laws, such remedial limitations were appropriate even if they led to [t]he probable unavailability of the [NLRAs] more effective remedies. Id., at 904. The Board cites our decision in ABF Freight System, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317 (1994), as authority for awarding backpay to employees who violate federal laws. In ABF Freight, we held that an employees false testimony at a compliance proceeding did not require the Board to deny reinstatement with backpay. The question presented was a narrow one, id., at 322, limited to whether the Board was obliged to adopt a rigid rule that employees who testify falsely under oath automatically forfeit NLRA remedies, id., at 325. There are significant differences between that case and this. First, we expressly did not address whether the Board could award backpay to an employee who engaged in serious misconduct unrelated to internal Board proceedings, id., at 322, n. 7, such as threatening to kill a supervisor, ibid. (citing Precision Window Mfg. v. NLRB, 963 F.2d 1105, 1110 (CA8 1992)), or stealing from an employer, 510 U.S., at 322, n. 7 (citing NLRB v. Commonwealth Foods, Inc., 506 F.2d 1065, 1068 (CA4 1974)). Second, the challenged order did not implicate federal statutes or policies administered by other federal agencies, a most delicate area in which the Board must be particularly careful in its choice of remedy. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 172 (1962). Third, the employee misconduct at issue, though serious, was not at all analogous to misconduct that renders an underlying employment relationship illegal under explicit provisions of federal law. See, e.g., 237 F.3d, at 657, n. 2 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (The perjury statute provides for criminal sanctions; it does not forbid a present or potential perjurer from obtaining a job) (distinguishing ABF Freight)). For these reasons, we believe the present case is controlled by the Southern S. S. Co. line of cases, rather than by ABF Freight. It is against this decisional background that we turn to the question presented here. The parties and the lower courts focus much of their attention on Sure-Tan, particularly its express limitation of backpay to aliens lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States. 467 U.S., at 903. All agree that as a matter of plain language, this limitation forecloses the award of backpay to Castro. Castro was never lawfully entitled to be present or employed in the United States, and thus, under the plain language of Sure-Tan, he has no right to claim backpay. The Board takes the view, however, that read in context, this limitation applies only to aliens who left the United States and thus

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cannot claim backpay without lawful reentry. Brief for Respondent 1724. The Court of Appeals agreed with this view. 237 F.3d, at 642646. Another Court of Appeals, however, agrees with Hoffman, and concludes that Sure-Tan simply meant what it said, i.e., that any alien who is not lawfully entitled to be present and employed in the United States cannot claim backpay. See Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115 11181121 (CA7 1992); Brief for Petitioner 720. We need not resolve this controversy. For whether isolated sentences from Sure-Tan definitively control, or count merely as persuasive dicta in support of petitioner, we think the question presented here better analyzed through a wider lens, focused as it must be on a legal landscape now significantly changed. The Southern S. S. Co. line of cases established that where the Boards chosen remedy trenches upon a federal statute or policy outside the Boards competence to administer, the Boards remedy may be required to yield. Whether or not this was the situation at the time of SureTan, it is precisely the situation today. In 1986, two years after Sure-Tan, Congress enacted IRCA, a comprehensive scheme prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens in the United States. 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 3360, 8 U.S.C. 1324a. As we have previously noted, IRCA forcefully made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to [t]he policy of immigration law. INS v. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194, and n. 8 (1991). It did so by establishing an extensive employment verification system, 1324a(a)(1), designed to deny employment to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present in the United States, or (b) are not lawfully authorized to work in the United States, 1324a(h)(3).3 This verification system is critical to the IRCA regime. To enforce it, IRCA mandates that employers verify the identity and eligibility of all new hires by examining specified documents before they begin work. 1324a(b). If an alien applicant is unable to present the required documentation, the unauthorized alien cannot be hired. 1324a(a)(1). Similarly, if an employer unknowingly hires an unauthorized alien, or if the alien becomes unauthorized while employed, the employer is compelled to discharge the worker upon discovery of the workers undocumented status. 1324a(a)(2). Employers who violate IRCA are punished by civil fines, 1324a(e)(4)(A), and may be subject to criminal prosecution, 1324a(f)(1). IRCA also makes it a crime for an unauthorized alien to subvert the employer verification system by tendering fraudulent documents. 1324c(a). It thus prohibits aliens from using or attempting to use any forged, counterfeit, altered, or falsely made document or any document lawfully issued to or with respect to a person other than the possessor for purposes of obtaining employment in the United States. 1324c(a)(1)(3). Aliens who use or attempt to use such documents are subject to fines and criminal prosecution. 18 U.S.C. 1546(b). There is no dispute that Castros use of false documents to obtain employment with Hoffman violated these provisions. Under the IRCA regime, it is impossible for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United States without some party directly contravening explicit congressional policies. Either the undocumented alien tenders fraudulent identification, which subverts the cornerstone of IRCAs enforcement mechanism, or the employer knowingly hires the undocumented alien in direct contradiction of its IRCA obligations. The Board asks that we overlook this fact and allow it to award backpay to an illegal alien for years of work not performed, for wages that could not lawfully have been earned, and for a job obtained in the first instance by a criminal fraud. We find, however, that awarding backpay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies the Board has no authority to enforce or administer. Therefore, as we have consistently held in like circumstances, the award lies beyond the bounds of the Boards remedial discretion.

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The Board contends that awarding limited backpay to Castro reasonably accommodates IRCA, because, in the Boards view, such an award is not inconsistent with IRCA. Brief for Respondent 2942. The Board argues that because the backpay period was closed as of the date Hoffman learned of Castros illegal status, Hoffman could have employed Castro during the backpay period without violating IRCA. Id., at 37. The Board further argues that while IRCA criminalized the misuse of documents, it did not make violators ineligible for back pay awards or other compensation flowing from employment secured by the misuse of such documents. Id., at 38. This latter statement, of course, proves little: The mutiny statute in Southern S. S. Co., and the INA in SureTan, were likewise understandably silent with respect to such things as backpay awards under the NLRA. What matters here, and what sinks both of the Boards claims, is that Congress has expressly made it criminally punishable for an alien to obtain employment with false documents. There is no reason to think that Congress nonetheless intended to permit backpay where but for an employers unfair labor practices, an alien-employee would have remained in the United States illegally, and continued to work illegally, all the while successfully evading apprehension by immigration authorities.4 Far from accommodating IRCA, the Boards position, recognizing employer misconduct but discounting the misconduct of illegal alien employees, subverts it. Indeed, awarding backpay in a case like this not only trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future violations. The Board admits that had the INS detained Castro, or had Castro obeyed the law and departed to Mexico, Castro would have lost his right to backpay. See Brief for Respondent 78 (citing A.P.R.A. Fuel Buyers Group, Inc., 320 N. L. R. B., at 416). Cf. INS v. National Center for Immigrants Rights, Inc., 502 U.S., at 196, n. 11 ([U]ndocumented aliens taken into custody are not entitled to work) (construing 8 CFR 103.6(a) (1991)). Castro thus qualifies for the Boards award only by remaining inside the United States illegally. See, e.g., A.P.R.A. Fuel Buyers Group, 134 F.3d, at 62, n. 4 (Considering that NLRB proceedings can span a whole decade, this is no small inducement to prolong illegal presence in the country) (Jacobs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Similarly, Castro cannot mitigate damages, a duty our cases require, see Sure-Tan, 467 U.S., at 901 (citing Seven-Up Bottling, 344 U.S., at 346; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 (1941)), without triggering new IRCA violations, either by tendering false documents to employers or by finding employers willing to ignore IRCA and hire illegal workers. The Board here has failed to even consider this tension. See 326 N. L. R. B., at 1063, n. 10 (finding that Castro adequately mitigated damages through interim work with no mention of ALJ findings that Castro secured interim work with false documents).5 We therefore conclude that allowing the Board to award backpay to illegal aliens would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration policy, as expressed in IRCA. It would encourage the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the immigration laws, and encourage future violations. However broad the Boards discretion to fashion remedies when dealing only with the NLRA, it is not so unbounded as to authorize this sort of an award. Lack of authority to award backpay does not mean that the employer gets off scot-free. The Board here has already imposed other significant sanctions against Hoffmansanctions Hoffman does not challenge. See supra, at 2. These include orders that Hoffman cease and desist its violations of the NLRA, and that it conspicuously post a notice to employees setting forth their rights under the NLRA and detailing its prior unfair practices. 306 N. L. R. B., at 100101. Hoffman will be subject to contempt proceedings should it fail to comply with these orders. NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107, 112113 (1955) (Congress gave the Board civil contempt power to enforce compliance with the Boards orders). We have deemed such traditional remedies sufficient to effectuate national labor

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policy regardless of whether the spur and catalyst of backpay accompanies them. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S., at 904. See also id., at 904, n. 13 (This threat of contempt sanctions provides a significant deterrent against future violations of the [NLRA]). As we concluded in Sure-Tan, in light of the practical workings of the immigration laws, any perceived deficienc[y] in the NLRAs existing remedial arsenal, must be addressed by congressional action, not the courts. Id., at 904. In light of IRCA, this statement is even truer today.6 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. ________________________________________________________________________________ POST HOFFMAN PLASTICS: Post Hoffman, the 2nd Circuit has admonished and remanded a case back to the NLRB, in http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1556065.html, for abuse of discretion amongst other particulars, dated February 18, 2011. _______________________________________________________________________________ NYCDCC business representatives, agents, organizers, stewards and corrupt Contractor Association Employers, require the services of the illegal alien to defraud the Benefit Funds, to pay cash to workers and to avoid payments to the Benefit Funds; and, to line their own pockets. Because the NLRB thinks it knows better than the Congress what legislation is or may be required, they as a political animal have taken a direct course towards enacting a back-door rules change, issued from the Board, via & through the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) & Federal Register and via the decision issuing in Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz, No. 354-122, dated 12-31-09 and 355 NLRB 132 dated 8-26-10. This was a collusive effort with the UBCJA & NERCC to set up a test case for them to try & hear and rule upon; and, by default issue the Decision & Order which forever altered and changed NLRA Sec. 14(b), an amendment of Law, the NLRA which only the Congress is authorized to perform. The NLRB Board, its General Counsel, the UBCJA & NERCC and its counsel all failed to take into account any evidence. They did not meet the base standards of evidentiary review. The NLRB did not in fact apply nor use the APA or the Federal Register in applying this amendment to the NLRA Sec. 14(b); rather, they simply let the UBCJA & NERCC run out the back door with decision & order in hand and effect the policy to a National Carpenters Union in each of the 50-states. This also speaks to the President of the United States and his limited powers under the Executive Branch of government. The Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Board is an Inferior Executive Branch Agency. They do not sit within the Legislative Branch of government, and when they exceed their bounds, they must be turned back, as must the UBCJAs International General President Douglas J. McCarron. Douglas J. McCarron, as the General President of an International Carpenters Union, the UBCJA; and given that he is not in the Executive Branch of the United States Government, he cannot as a matter of law or right, claim to himself more power than allowed the President of the United States under the proposition that the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBCJA), International Constitution and By-Laws, or that of its constituent Regional or District Councils

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supersede, usurp or rise above the authority of the President of the United States, under the falseclaim that it be a mere internal union matter. The same legal premise applies directly to the NERCC Executive-Secretary Treasurer (EST). The NERCC counsel and ESTs in the instant case and apply to the NYCDCC while under the limited Trusteeship and supervision of the UBC International. As a matter of law, and as the UBCJA has applied this exaction of Congressional right to legislate to their internal Mobility Rule which is in force in each of the 50-States with the lone exception being the NYCDCC, this too must fail. Hence, Movants note that the Supreme Court in Schechter at 15 asked and answered the question that is now before you relative to Mobility; and to it, we can add nothing other than repeating it again and applying the same Question to the UBCJA & NERCC in the Lebovitz matter. Sup. Ct. at 15. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) But would it be seriously contended that Congress could delegate its legislative authority to trade or industrial associations or groups so as to empower them to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries? Could trade or industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? And could an effort of that sort be made valid by such a preface of generalities as to permissible aims as we find in section 1 of title 1? The answer is obvious. Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress At Third. The Question of the Application of the Provisions of the Live Poultry Code to Intrastate Transactions.-Although the validity of the codes (apart from the question of delegation) rests upon the commerce clause of the Constitution, section 3(a) of the act (15 USCA 703(a) is not in terms limited to interstate and foreign commerce. From the generality of its terms, and from the argument of the government at the bar, it would appear that section 3(a) was designed to authorize codes without that limitation. But under section 3(f) of the act (15 USCA 73(f) penalties are confined to violations of a code provision 'in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce.' This aspect of the case presents the question whether the particular provisions of the Live Poultry Code, which the defendants were convicted for violating and for having conspired to violate, were within the regulating power of Congress. These provisions relate to the hours and wages of those employed by defendants in their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn and to the sales there made to retail dealers and butchers. Were these transactions 'in' interstate commerce? Much is made of the fact that almost all the poultry coming to New York is sent there from other states. But the code provisions, as here applied, do not concern the transportation of the poultry from other states to New York, or the transactions of the commission men or others to whom it is consigned, or the sales made by such consignees to defendants. When defendants had made their purchases, whether at the West Washington Market in New York City or at the railroad [295 U.S. 495, 543] terminals serving the city, or elsewhere, the poultry was trucked to their slaughterhouses in Brooklyn for local disposition. The interstate transactions in relation to that poultry then ended. Defendants held the poultry at their slaughterhouse markets for slaughter and local sale to retail dealers and butchers who in turn sold directly to consumers. Neither the slaughtering nor the sales by defendants were transactions in interstate commerce. Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 632 , 633 S., 5 S.Ct. 1091; Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 245 , 39 S.Ct. 268; Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 78 ,

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79 S., 45 S.Ct. 403; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U.S. 257, 267 , 48 S.Ct. 107. The undisputed facts thus afford no warrant for the argument that the poultry handled by defendants at their slaughterhouse markets was in a 'current' or 'flow' of interstate commerce, and was thus subject to congressional regulation. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) At Third.The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities into a state does not mean that the flow continues after the property has arrived and has become commingled with the mass of property within the state and is there held solely for local disposition and use.  The commodity at issue here, in terms of the UBCJA International & Regional/District Council Mobility Rule is labor. The commodity subject to the exploitation by Organized Crime and the UBCJA & NYCDCC Contractor Associations is the employment of illegal aliens/undocumented workers, which is the primary mean by which the NYCDCC Benefit Funds are defrauded. The inter-state and intra-state activity involves the transportation of Travelers from within and outside of the UBCJA member rank & file, the importation and use of 1099 workers, illegal aliens and cash workers long exploited by the LCN and mob and put in force and effect to disrupt the flow of commerce such that Federal Income Taxes, Social Security, Medicare-Medicaid taxes go unpaid, as do State, County and Local income taxes, Workers Compensation and Unemployment Insurance programs. Moreover, a large aspect is with regard to the defrauding of lawful Pension, Annuity and Health & Welfare payments to NYCDCC Benefit Funds. Thus, where the flow of the Labor Commodity may have ceased or stopped once in the State of New York and the interstate transaction in relation to the labor commodity may have ended, serves as no bar, for that is where the corruption, exploitation, LCN and mob related corruption and extortion begin thus the clear legal distinction between the commodity at bar in Schechter (food for human consumption), verses the human component of the labor commodity subject to the aforementioned crimes which have led to the 21-year Civil Consent Decree. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, taxes this labor commodity via the imposition of a per-capita tax, whether said labor commodity is in inter-state or intra-state commerce and whether it is moving between the two or in-situs and at its final destination. Illegal aliens & undocumented workers are an exploitable labor commodity due to the direct threat of deportation (via ICE) on the one hand; by the government and/or expulsion by the union or the employer (under the threat to call ICE) on the other. The effect to workers & employees (the labor commodity) in both right to work states under state sovereignty, or non-right to work states operating under federal pre-emption doctrines is telling. In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 , 260 S., 43 S.Ct. 83, the Supreme Court noted: The action of the state as a regulation of interstate commerce does not depend upon the degree of interference; it is illegal in any degree.

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 Movants contend the same applies no less to the UBCJA. Whether coal as in the instant case, or labor in the present one, both are commodities and the UBCJA Internationals actions relating to their attempt to regulate interstate commerce, in the instance of taxing moving or nonmoving humans, taxed as a labor commodity similarly does not depend on the degree of interference; whereas, it is illegal in any degree. Similar to Heisler, the tax is a tribute paid to the UBC International for an activity to which it is not competent to administer inter-state commerce, and should thus be declared facially unlawful. The failure to pay Federal Income Taxes, Social Security, and Medicare & Medicaid certainly are matter affecting interstate commerce. The failure to pay Local, County & State Income Taxes and Workers Compensation and Unemployment Insurance are matters affecting intra-state commerce. Violation of Sur-Tan, IRCA of 1986 by Employer & Contractor Associations are additional matters affecting inter-state commerce, as is the exploitation of the worker and employee and the failure to pay prevailing wages per the NYCDCC Collective Bargaining Agreements. Movants also note the continued Benefit Fund fraud, in that it violates Federal laws within the domain of ERISA, EBSA, PBGC and that it impacts the return on investments and may in turn violate SEC regulations, and that the appropriate Federal Taxes are not paid, also violate the Internal Revenue Code and all such violations readily impact and obstruct interstate commerce. Retirees depend upon their Pensions, which in turn depend upon the return on investments (ROI), noting that investments returns are generated both inter-state and intra-state; therein effecting interstate commerce when said Benefit Funds are being robbed of the necessary dollars and funding levels required to keep them stable & solvent and from encroaching or being in endangered or critical status as defined by E.R.I.S.A.  Movants note in U.S. Supreme Court, Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976) Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp. No. 74-1254 , Argued March 29, 1976 Decided June 14, 1976 426 U.S. 407, the Supreme Court ruled that :(b) Similarly, 14(b)'s primary concern is with state regulation of the post-hiring employer employee-union relationship, the center of which is the job situs, i.e., the place where the work that is the very raison d'etre of the relationship is performed; and because of this close relationship between 14(b) and job situs, 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal job situs is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418. The Mobility Rule as implemented on a National basis by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America International Union and as imposed upon it subordinate 36-Regional & District Councils is the chief component behind the present fraud in and about NYCDCC, and throughout the remainder of the United States. The UBCJA Mobility Rule, enacted in all 50-States clearly effects inter-state and intra-state commerce by encouraging rather than eliminating illegal immigration, violating IRCA Regulation and therein inducing the Building Trades Employers Association (BTEA), the Contractor Associations, Unions Officers, Business Agents & Representatives and certain Union Stewards to participate in the schemes to employ this labor commodity to reduce their costs and thus achieve an Unfair Business Practice and advantage over legitimate Union Contractors, Material Suppliers and Vendors. The impact to the State & Federal Treasuries, the losses to Workers Compensation & Unemployment Insurance programs and the drastic effects to their treasuries is in the range of $100 - $200 billion

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dollars of losses annually.  The loss of the property right via mobility rules enacted by the UBCJA and the hiring and employment of illegal aliens are the primary magnet which has led to these direct losses and is the source of the continued fraud, manipulation, malfeasance and longstanding LCN involvement which necessitated the RICO charges in the first instance in 1990.  It is also a deprivation of the member rights to secure work through his/her own Local Union, for projects in their Local Unions Defined Geographical Jurisdiction, above and before all others. The United States Supreme Court made this point amply clear , stating: because of this close relationship between 14(b) and job situs, 14(b) does not allow enforcement of right-to-work laws with regard to an employment relationship whose principal jobsitus is outside of a State having such laws. Pp. 426 U. S. 416-418. Carpenters Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz No. 354-122, is one such individual case warranting the Constitutional questions presented by Movants, as noted within the June 1, 2011 letter to the Court. In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Justice Hughes noted: Interstate commerce is brought in only upon the charge that violations of these provisions-as to hours and wages of employees and local sales-'affected' interstate commerce. In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate transactions upon the ground that they 'affect' interstate commerce, there is a necessary and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects. The precise line can be drawn only as individual cases arise, but the distinction is clear in principle. Direct effects are illustrated by the railroad cases we have cited, as, e.g., the effect of failure to use prescribed safety appliances on railroads which are the highways of both interstate and intrastate commerce, injury to an employee engaged in interstate transportation by the negligence of an employee engaged in an intrastate movement, the fixing of rates for intrastate transportation which unjustly discriminate against interstate commerce. But where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the domain of state power. [Movants Note the Mobility issue at bar here is one of Federal Pre-emption, as New York is not bound by Right to Work State laws which the UBC seeks to impose via fraud & artifice upon the Court. New York is a Non-Right to Work State, and as Movants previously noted, once the proviso to Section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA is adhered to, the intangible property right of exclusion is then enacted an operative.] If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people, and the authority of the state over its domestic concerns would exist only by sufferance of the federal government. Indeed, on such a theory, even the development of the state's commercial facilities would be subject to federal control. As we said in Simpson v. Shepard (Minnesota Rate Case), 230 U.S. 352, 410 , 33 S. Ct. 729, 745, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18: 'In the intimacy of commercial relations, much that is done in the superintendence of local matters may have an indirect bearing upon interstate commerce. The development of local resources and the extension of local facilities may have a very important effect upon communities less favored, and to an appreciable degree [295 U.S. 495, 547] alter the course of trade. The freedom of local trade may stimulate interstate commerce, while restrictive measures within the police power of the state, enacted exclusively with respect to internal business, as distinguished from interstate traffic, may in their reflex or indirect influence diminish the latter and reduce the volume of articles transported into or out of the state.' See, also, Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 , 9 S.Ct. 6; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 , 260 S., 43 S.Ct. 83.

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The distinction between direct and indirect effects has been clearly recognized in the application of the Anti-Trust Act. Where a combination or conspiracy is formed, with the intent to restrain interstate commerce or to monopolize any part of it, the violation of the statute is clear. Coronado Coal Company v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 , 45 S.Ct. 551. But, where that intent is absent, and the objectives are limited to intrastate activities, the fact that there may be an indirect effect upon interstate commerce does not subject the parties to the federal statute, notwithstanding its broad provisions. This principle has frequently been applied in litigation growing out of labor disputes. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Company, 259 U.S. 344, 410 , 411 S., 42 S. Ct. 570, 27 A.L.R. 762; United Leather Workers' International Union v. Herkert, 265 U.S. 457 , 464-467, 44 S.Ct. 623, 33 A.L.R. 566; Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 82 , 45 S.Ct. 403; Levering & Garrigues v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 , 108 S., 53 S.Ct. 549, 551.  The UBCJA & NERCC in the Lebovitz case forced through the NLRB, is a clear case of the UBCJAs intent to conspire with a worker, a signatory contractor, its subordinate Regional Council and its attorneys of Record, Souris & Krakow, LLC to put up a factually fraudulent test case before the National Labor Relations Board and to fraudulently induce its attorneys to accept the idea that the UBCJA General President and his subordinate Regional Councils Executive Secretary-Treasurers proposition that they be allowed to re-write State & Federal law(s) and be allowed to enact the laws they deem to be wise and beneficent for the rehabilitation and expansion of their trade or industries because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises? Movants think not. And, this Court should so rule. B) CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT: In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) at Chief Justice Hughes stated, at Third: While these decisions related to the application of the Federal statute, and not to its constitutional validity, the distinction between direct and indirect effects of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce must be recognized as a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitutional system. Otherwise, as we have said, there would be virtually no limit to the federal power, and for all practical purposes we should have a completely centralized government. We must consider the provisions here in question in the light of this distinction. NYCDCC RESTRUCTURING PLAN BY-LAWS dated May 26, 2011 Douglas J. McCarron and the UBCJA International Union now proffer a Restructuring Plan for the New York City District Council of Carpenters, dated May 26, 2011 in which their Final Draft ByLaws changes propose a permanent change and a shift to a Centralized Government for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC), via Sections 4(A), (4B) & 4(C), THUS MOVANTS note the following: To Review Officer Dennis Walsh: Re: Proposed NYCDCC Bylaws / Reference: Section 4 (A), (B) & (C) We, the undersigned, OPPOSE these bylaws and urge you to REJECT and VETO this document and to protect our guarantee rights under the law.

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Upon examination of proposed Bylaws Section 4(A) (B) &; (C), 4 (A) states: the central governing body language which grants all Executive & Legislative Powers to the Council, coupled with the last paragraphs language whereupon upon approval of these Bylaws, all Local Union Employment positions shall cease to exist, said language effectively eliminates and eviscerates the Local Autonomy which the Wagner Act granted to Workers via the Preamble to the NLRA, and to Employees in NLRA Section 7 as an unfettered & guaranteed right toward collective bargaining. Accordingly, as a matter of law it is Facially Unlawful. The UBC International and its General President and Officers have a duty under both Federal laws and the Consent Decree, NLRB Board precedent & Supreme Court precedent to preserve the statusquo until and upon the restoration of the Locals & Council to its rightful owners. The rightful owners of the Locals and Council are the men & woman who go to work each & every day, who generate the revenues which not only support Local activities, but in fact support all District Council and UBC International wages & benefits and their requisite perks (vehicles, gas cards, insurance, maintenance, credit cards, airfare, hotel charges, meals, accounting, auditing and legal affairs), including their Legal Billings and attorneys on retainer. The Civil Consent Decree has as its core elements the restoration of Democratic Rights and the elimination of Fraud & Corruption. Section 4(A) of the Proposed Bylaws for NYCDCC clearly ignores this express mandate of the Court; and essentially sends a message to the rank & file that the UBC International, in executing this language will readily, willfully & wantonly put forth bylaw changes which they believe they can get away with because the membership is perhaps too stupid to realize what is going on here. We can assure you, that is not the case and we will not allow it, nor should you as the Review Officer. Further examination reveals the following: Section 4 (B) states: The full plenary power and authority of the District Council is hereby vested, without limitation, in the Delegates to the Council that shall collectively form the Council Delegate Body. The Plenary Power, as defined by Blacks Law Dict., 8th Ed. Adj. 1. Full; complete; entire. Unfortunately, this definition rather simplifies what UBC Locals and their constituent members are being told they must give up. Accordingly further examination reveals: (without limitation invites more fraud & corruption). BLACKS LAW DICT. 8th Ed. POWER: , pg 1,207 1. the ability to act or not act, esp. a persons capacity for acting in such a manner as to control someone else's responses 2. Dominance; Control; or Influence over another, control over ones subordinates 3. The legal right or authorization to act or not act; a persons or Organizations ability to alter, by an act of will, the rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations either of that person or another. Section 4 (C) states: These Bylaws and any other rules, resolutions and directives adopted by the Council shall govern and be binding on each Local Union affiliated with the Council.

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The Plenary Powers as written are a direct violations of NLRA Section 8(a)(2). The UBC International and the NYC District Council as a matter of law cannot be allowed to Dominate, Control or Influence over subordinate rights of Local Unions, Worker or Employee Guaranteed Rights, nor can either party alter, by an act of will, the legal rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations either of that person or another when such alterations of Law are specifically reserved for the United States Congress. Only Congress can amend existing laws or author new ones the UBC International & NYCDCC cannot. Under the current Organizational schemes of Douglas J. McCarron, through the UBC Constitution and Regional or District Council Bylaws, he grants unto himself and the Councils all powers of Executive, Legislative & Judicial functions period. All one has to do, is sit down with a pen & ruler and a few high-lighters & note the appropriate language within the body of documents noted; and it is clear that by carrying all such powers, the UBC International & the District Councils are effectively running a Dictatorship and McCarron is the declared King. All the while, the so called Department of Labor stands by & does nothing in utter silence. Given their power to act, this is as disturbing as the UBC Internationals actions and it sheds light on the collusive effort of the two to destroy members rights which they are required to preserve by law. The behaviors of both parties are at a minimum, grossly negligent and border on the criminal. No other Union in the Nation, whether Public or Private has been allowed to destroy Rank & File rights in this manner and to do it by taking away the guaranteed Right to Vote, to Organize, to Legislate their own affairs at the Local Union level.only the UBC gets away with these actions. Our members want an answer as to why this goes unchecked, and to why the abuses are allowed to continue. Were the UBC & District Councils intent on restoring Democratic Rights & Eliminating the Fraud & Corruption this Consent Decree would long ago have ended and would not be approaching two-decades in duration. The administration of the Local Labor Organization is the rank & files by right and as a matter of law. Restoration of Democracy requires the Court and yourself to check the abuses of the UBC International and the NYC District Council when unearthed; and, to stand up fight these changes in Federal Court before Judge Berman and protect rank & file members Right to take on the Legislative role at the Local Union Level as the Congress & the NLRA intended; and, to Vote and Elect their own Officers and to run their own affairs at the Local and the Council level. The NYCDCC Bylaws as proposed eviscerate and negate those guaranteed rights and subsequent to approval without modification would require the Court to issue an order declaring the Council the Local (see "Motion for Relief" filed May, 16, 2011 and "Submission in Support of Bilello Motion" by Bill Lebo dated April 3, 2011) and ordering all Council Officers to stand for direct Election via secret ballot of the members in good standing per rules which you are to establish as the Election Supervisor under the Consent Decree. Sincerely, All interested-impacted UBC Carpenters

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To this, Movants add the following: (via fax to R.O. 6-9-11 @ 11:50 PM) BYLAWS: Section 20, pg 16 Following recommendation by the Executive Committee, the Council Delegate Body shall have the exclusive power and authority to ratify & execute Collective Bargaining Agreements for an on behalf of its affiliated Local Unions, except to the extent that the International Union exercises its jurisdiction or authority. This is precluded by the Garlock Doctrine at the NLRB, as the International and/or NYCDCC cannot exercise a veto power over Local Union autonomy. Moreover, it is negated in full by the language at 8, page 4 and more fully by Section 5, page 3 which states: POWERS & DUTIES OF THE DELEGATE BODY (A) The Council Delegate Body shall have the exclusive authority to consider, vote upon and finally make decisions on all matters affecting the Council, as provided for in the By-Laws (B) Review, approve or reject in advance, all CBA following a recommendation from the Executive Committee. If a CBA is rejected, the Delegate Body shall promptly inform the Executive Committee in writing of any provisions that cause, or will cause as indicated by a non-binding vote, in whole or in part the rejection The power to ratify the contract by vote is granted and then summarily taken away via a nonbinding vote, rendering it and the transparency & restoration of Democracy meaningless. At page 8, item (I) The EST power to appoint & remove all Trustees, is unchecked and goes without saying further, given the 21-year history that it is too much power unchecked. No specifics were provided on how or when the Council Delegate Body shall vote on this matter. Last Sentence All Trust Fund agreements shall be amended to reflect the appointment & removal process. Again, this leaves too much power to the EST & sets the Council up for another out of control Dictator who does as he or she pleases, ala Forde & Greaney.  It also leads to the Constitutional & legal question of whether the CBA language governs the Trust Funds, or the Trust Fund language govern the CBAs under ERISA, EBSA & SEC and the Internal Revenue Code. We believe the former is controlling and said language should be changed to clearly & distinctly reflect the four agencies cited, in concert with the NLRA & LMRDA, as these laws created the vehicle by which all such UBCJA Pension, Annuity & Health and Welfare Funds came to be in the first instance and the same holds for the Apprenticeship Fund and all other associated funds within the CBAs. The By-Laws should reflect these [b]ase facts. Executive Committee, page 10 Sec. 12 (A) Shall be a sub-committee of the Delegate Body. The prior language identified above relative to the Binding & Non-Binding Vote language all needs to be changed to reflect the specific requirements of the Preamble to the NLRA and to NLRA section 7. This language, granting to the Council Delegate Body the right to a non-binding vote on all

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matters concerning the CBAs (the contracts) provides the vehicle by which a small click, subject to corruption and the influence of corrupt Trustees, who are again appointed by the stand alone commands of one man, the EST effectively negates the entire predicate behind the establishment of this newly empowered CDB, and again makes a mockery of justice by granting the powers to a select few. The entire purpose of the CDB was to install a check on the Dictatorial Rule & Powers of the ESTin all instances, the new by-laws fail to comply with tenets of the Consent Decree Restoration of Democracy & Elimination of Corruption. These sections will do nothing to stop it and shall only serve to encourage more of the same. SECTION 34 Lawsuits against the Council, UBCJA Exhaustion both violate the LMRDA & Supreme Court precedents. SECTION 35 Amendments eliminates all NLRA Sec. 7 rights & violates Garlock Doctrine. SECTION 36 Severability the entire document should be scrubbed clean by the US Attorneys office, via line item veto. It has had 17-years to do so, and catch all exclusionary phrase serves as no excuse for not doing this vital scrub-purging. SECTION 37 SAME COMMENTS AS 35 SECTION 38 HIRING HALL & REFERRAL..employment mobility& 50-50 elimination as proposed by UBCJA International violate the Consent Decree and bring to light the Closed Shop preferential hiring agreement, given the 67-33% ratio now in place. Mobility shall increase this to near 100%; and by so doing, the reversion of control back to the Employers control violates known NLRB Board precedent decisions & orders. Re: Mountain Pacific, page 893 _________________________________________________________________________________

EMPLOYER & UNION INTERFERENCE & DOMINANCE:

Illegal VETO POWER over labor organizations In 167 NLRB No. 58, 9-15-67 the Board found That save for Trusteeship, the general tenor of these powers is that of limited, procedurally safeguarded, restraint on local bargaining activity. The general president has no authority either to formulate local bargaining goals or to compel strike action to carry them out.While International Trusteeship could eliminate local control over bargaining, this danger appears to be somewhat muted by Sec. 302 of the Landrum-Griffin Act (29 U.S.C. Sec. 462) which limits the purpose for which trusteeships can be imposed, and the pursuit of a pension fund financial interest would appear to fall outside the list of permitted objectives. In sum, we find the constitutional powers permit only a limited entry into local bargaining activity, and that the Local constitutes the initiating and pervasive force in dealing with employers. In 226 NLRB No. 65, 10-18-76 the Board found at, 489 at (3) Not only do the Advisory Committee's bylaws and Respondent's admissions establish that one purpose of the Committee is to deal with the Respondent concerning employees' grievances, labor disputes, and conditions of work but, additionally, as described in detail supra, the employees in fact transmit grievances and requests

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to the Committee concerning their conditions of work which the Committee brings to the attention of Respondent which takes these matters under consideration and, in some instances, has acted favorably upon them.' Based on all of the circumstances set forth above, I find that the Advisory Committee is an organization in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in part, of dealing with the Respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes , and conditions of work, thus, it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I have carefully considered Respondent's argument that the Committee is not a labor organization because it does not bargain with the Respondent. Specifically, Respondent urges: The committee is limited to advising management or advising the department heads as to the existence of a problem. They are free to propose solutions. However, they have no authority whatsoever, to take any final action or to negotiate with management regarding what action, if any, should be taken. Its function is solely to advise management of the existence of a problem, to delve into it and make the details available so that management can make an intelligent decision.  At 490, The United States Supreme Court, however, has rejected this argument, holding that a committee may be "dealing with" an employer-and hence be a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5), even though its activities may not be equated with the usual concept of collective bargaining. N. L. R. B. v. Cabot Carbon Company, supra at 210-211, 214, and fn. 15. I am persuaded that the record herein establishes that the Advisory Committee was created and exists for the purpose, at least in part, of "dealing with" the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Only after top management read over and approved the planning committees ideas was it given the authority to schedule elections to elect representatives for the advisory committee. At 490 at (2) Respondent is in a position to exercise and in fact does exercise substantial control over the administration of the Advisory Committee.  Respondent exercised a veto power over the adoption of the Committees bylaws. The bylaws went into effect only after Respondents top management read an approved their content At 491, the Board stated Based upon the aforesaid circumstances, taken in their totality, I find the Advisory Committee is a dominated labor organization, thus, as alleged in the complaint, I further find that the respondent has violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.. The statute forbids all employer interference or domination whether benevolent or malevolent, NLRB V. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. 308 US 241 (1939). Movants note some additional points here: JURISDICTION AND POWERS OF LOCAL UNIONS The UBCJA International Constitution Section 25 A states It is the continuing obligation of every Local Union to organize workers.

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Section 25 B states Local Unions shall be governed by applicable uniform bylaws and have the power to make laws and trade rules which in no way conflict with the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood, and must be approved by the General Vice President before becoming law, and shall be filed with the General Vice President; likewise, all future amendments must be submitted and filed. Movants note that the Independent Review Officer for the NYCDCC Civil Consent Decree has established an and Advisory Committee to review the proposed By-Law, Restructuring Plan dated May 26, 2011 and to review and discuss any & all proposed Contract language and negotiation issues and concerns; and that said Advisory Committee being duly authorized and accepted under the terms and conditions of the Consent Decree with the approval of this Court said Advisory Committee members have been locked out of any and all negotiations for the future contract regarding the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA ) with the Wall & Ceiling Association.  Movants therein request that this Court issue an Order, sua-sponte under its exclusive jurisdiction and grant to said Advisory Committee standing as a Labor Organization as defined within the NLRA, Sec. 2(a)(5).  Movants also note, the UBCJA Constitution Section 25 is facially unlawful,; as it unduly restricts and prohibits the constituent Local Unions and its rank & file worker and employee members from participating in any meaningful way as per the guarantees provided with the NLRA Sec. 7., and said language be declared facially unlawful and the UBCJA be directed to strike it from the Constitution and the NYCDCC By-Laws wherever and however it may appear, form or changed language notwithstanding. {violates NLRB Board D & Os in Garlock & Lebovitz}  Movants further note said language is an express veto power over the Local Union & District Council ability to govern their own affairs, whether at the Council Level or the Local Union level in regards to free association, negotiating, wages, hours and other working conditions, inclusive of crafting their own By-Laws which comply with the law(s) in order to run their own affairs and maintain the Local Union autonomy and independence free from domination or interference as the NLRA contemplated and as it demands. In 288 NLRB No. 31, Garlock Equipment Company and District Lodge No. 77, IAMAW, the Board stated at 247 As found by the judge, the GEC as initially constituted may & June 1980 was a classically simple democratic institution At 248 the Board stated The record also supports the judge's finding that the affiliation vote effectively "transformed an amoeba-simple independent labor organization into a dependent affiliate of a large organization, subject to new controls and restrictions and stripped of a substantial amount of pre-affiliating autonomy." As set forth by the judge, the basic unit of the IAM is the local ldge. The International constitution determines the governance structure of such lodges including the number of officers and trustees and the manner of their selection, the setting of initiation fees and dues, payment of per capita taxes and assessments, and restrictions on member conduct enforceable by fines and expulsion. Movants note, the basic unit of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters is the Local Union.

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The amended certification, however, did not certify the GEC as a local lodge or affiliate of the IAM or of District Lodge 77, the Charging Party in this unfair labor practice proceeding. Rather, the Regional Director substituted the District Lodge as the certified bargaining representative. In 1980 District Lodge No. 77 represented approximately 10,000 to 12,000 employees within 11 local lodges located in 27 counties of Minnesota and Wisconsin. The bylaws of District Lodge No. 77 specifically require, in the context of general supervision of its local lodges, that all collective-bargaining agreements be negotiated and signed in the name of the District Lodge by an "authorized Representative and the Shop Committee." The judge found that prior to the affiliation vote the GEC members were told by International Representative Woltz that the on-going contract negotiations with the Respondent would continue in "basically the same" manner, the only difference being that the GEC executive committee would be assisted by a professional provided by the "Machinists Union." Woltz told the GEC membership that after the Respondent made its final offer the bargaining committee would present this offer to employees with a recommendation whether it should be accepted or rejected. However, in assessing the weight to be given this testimony the judge found it critical that Woltz was not, and had never been, a business representative for District Lodge No. 77 and therefore probably could not state authoritatively what the post affiliation procedure would be for contract acceptance. The judge noted that Woltz did not state that the employees retained total control over the decision whether to accept or reject a contract proposal. The judge found, and we agree, that under these circumstances the requirement that a District Lodge representative must sign any final agreement essentially constitutes a veto power by the District Lodge over the GEC's former exclusive authority to contract with the Respondent. In our view, the judge correctly characterized this precondition to any collective-bargaining agreement as a "meaningful diminution" in the GEC's autonomy. Overall, we also agree with the judge that the record evidence drawn from District Lodge No. 77's bylaws on control over the GEC's collective bargaining negotiations, financial obligations, and formal governing structure reveals not a continuation of the GEC but the substitution of a new labor organization as the representative of the unit employees. These changes in the GEC wrought by the affiliation have shifted the effective locus of control from a small independent organization to a large division of an international union many times its size and substantially more structurally complex. We also rely on the absence of any evidence that the District Lodge No. 77 governing documents and those of IAM itself were not controlling following the affiliation. Specifically, there is no evidence of any assurance that the employees would retain local bargaining autonomy or its selection of elected officials. In Western Commercial Transport, supra, the Board applied the "sufficiently dramatic" standard derived from NLRB v. Financial Institution Employees Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192 (1986), for determining when changed circumstances, such as organizational changes resulting from an affiliation, will raise a question concerning representation. Applying that standard here, we find that the changes associated with the affiliationparticularly the greatly lessened autonomy of the GECwere sufficiently dramatic to result in the substitution of a new entity for that originally certified. Consequently, a question concerning representation has been raised that must be resolved through an election under Section 9(a) of the Act. 4

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We therefore will vacate our amended certification, dismiss the underlying petitions, and accordingly will also dismiss the instant refusal-to-bargain complaint. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that its Decision and Order in Case 18-CA-6846 (263 NLRB 684) is vacated and the complaint is dismissed. 4 Gulf Oil Corp., 135 NLRB 184 (1962) See also Port Chester Nursing  Movants request the Court issuing an Injunction against the UBCJA International prohibiting its General President from negating the worker and employee Section 7 Rights to bargain with Representatives of their own choosing and from stripping the Local Unions of their autonomy or its selection of Local Union and District Council Officers and replacing them with pro-tem highly compensated Executives, who are not under the protection of the NLRA and who thus have no right to run, seek or hold any Local Union office in the first instance.  We also respectfully request the Court issue an Order prohibiting the UBCJA International from substituting a new Labor organization via their May 26, 2011 proposed Restructuring Plan with appointed UBC International Executives and any other highly compensated managerial supervisor as the representative of the unit employees without holding the mandatory NLRA Sec. 9(a) Representation Election; and that this Court further enjoin the NLRB and/or the UBCJA International, its General President, Executive Board, Officers or any other agent from submitting and signing an Amended Certification of the Certified Bargaining Representative with the Department of Labor (DOL). In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) at Chief Justice Hughes stated, at Third: CONTINUEDIf the federal government may determine the wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce of a state, because of their relation to cost and prices and their indirect effect upon interstate commerce, it would seem that a similar control might be exerted over other elements of cost, also affecting prices, such as the number of employees, rents, advertising, methods of doing business, etc. All the processes of production and distribution that enter into cost could likewise be controlled. If the cost of doing an intrastate business is in itself the permitted object of federal control, the extent of the regulation of cost would be a question of discretion and not of power. The government also makes the point that efforts to enact state legislation establishing high labor standards have been impeded by the belief that, unless similar action is taken generally, commerce will be diverted from the states adopting such standards, and that this fear of diversion has led to demands for federal legislation on the subject of wages and hours. The apparent implication is that the federal authority under the commerce clause should be deemed to extend to the establishment of rules to govern wages and hours in intrastate trade and industry generally throughout the country, thus overriding the authority of the states to deal with domestic problems arising from labor conditions in their internal commerce. It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it.  Movants respectfully request the Court issue an Order and Permanent Injunction preventing the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, International and the New York City District Council of Carpenters and its Local Union affiliates from initiating any form of a centralized governing body or system within the UBCJA & NYCDCC. We further note that the UBCJA, via and through their proposed Restructuring and By-Law Plan submitted to the

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Court May 26, 2011 demands that the Court acknowledge and accept their complete control of all executive, legislative functions through the Restructuring Plan and the UBCJAs & District Councils control of all judicial functions through the UBCJAs & NYCDCCs Constitution and By-Laws and the Obligation (UBC Constitution, page 92). Movants, in agreement with the Supreme Court in A.L.A. Schechter, for want of any other way to state it can offer no more and merely remind the Court again of the Supreme Courts admonition with regard to such a centralized system It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it. Accordingly, neither should this honorable Court. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986), Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court stated Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject [475 US 211, 224] matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935). The UBCJA Constitution, its By-laws and the NYCDCC By-laws, the Collective Bargaining Agreements and the individual Trust Fund Agreements; and, the UBC Obligation, all form a contract. The UBC International and the NYCDCC have now jointly proposed that they be granted the Powers of the 3-branches of Government established by the Federal Constitution that of the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch, via the Unilateral Implementation of a Centralized Restructuring Plan, wherein the Bylaw changes grant to them all plenary powers. The UBC International and the New York City District Council now pray that this honorable Court allow them such unilateral control as is only present within Dictatorships. It begs no more, to say that this Restructuring Plan makes a prima-facie case for violation of any & all due process rights, is proffered in bad faith, and that it wholly and completely eviscerates the NLRA, TAFT-HARTLEY & the LMRDA in one fell swoop. Moreover, under the limited controls granted to International Unions in federal LMRDA Trusteeships, those which seek illegitimate ends are expressly prohibited as a matter of law. Chief Justice Hughes stated, at Third, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935): It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it.  Movants respectfully request the Court with the exact legal precedent established above, with respect to the NYCDCC Proposed Restructuring Plan dated May 26, 2011 that it is sufficient to say that such a centralized system as proposed by the UBCJA & NYCDCC ByLaw rules changes for the operation of the District Council could not be allowed under the Federal Constitution that it not be allowed under the terms and conditions of the Consent Decree here in New York., that it be declared facially unlawful and vetoed in its entirety.

UBCJA, International Constitution The Obligation, pg.92 11-1-10 edition

OBLIGATION I do, of my own free will and accord, solemnly and sincerely promise on my sacred honor that I will never reveal by word or deed any of the business of this United

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Brotherhood unless legally authorized to do so. I promise to abide by the Constitution and Laws and the will of the majority observe the By Laws and Trade Rules established by the Local Unions and Councils affiliated with the United Brotherhood and that I will use every honorable means to procure employment for brother and sister members. I agree that I will ask for the Union Label and purchase union-made goods and employ only union labor when same can be had. And I further agree that if at any time it should be discovered that I have made any misstatements as to my qualifications for membership I shall forever be debarred from membership and donations in this order. I pledge myself to be obedient to authority orderly in the meetings respectful in words and actions and charitable in judg[e]ment, sic, of my brother and sister members. To all of this I promise and pledge my most sacred word and honor to observe and keep and the same to bind me as long as I remain a member of this Brotherhood. And I further affirm and declare that I am not now affiliated with and never will join or give aid comfort or support to any organization that tries to disrupt any Local Union District Council Regional Council State or Provincial Council or the International Body of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. PRESIDENT [to Newly Initiated Members] You have now been admitted into the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and you are entitled to all the rights. benefits and privileges as a member thereof, as specified in the Constitution, and having assumed the duties and honors of a member of the United Brotherhood, we extend to you the hand of fellowship. [After that the President will return to his (her) chair, give one distinct rap, when the members take their seats. He (she) will address the Conductor.]

PRESIDENT - Brother (Sister) Conductor, you will now lead the newly initiated Brother (Sister) to the Financial Secretarys desk, where he (she) will hand in his (her) name and address, and comply with all other requirements of the Constitution and Laws. He (she) will then obtain his (her) card of membership.

[NOTE: The Financial Secretary in this meantime should have the card of membership prepared, to avoid delay. After complying with this, the Conductor will escort the new member to his (her) seat]  Movants note the aforementioned Obligation is a condition precedent to any & all employment and is unlawful on its face, and for the reasons noted below. It further requires the swearing to an unlawful oath, prior to membership being accepted, and the working card being granted and is without the proper form of a Beck Notice or any form of acknowledgement of NLRA Section 7 rights to refrain from any & all such activity or mandatory sworn affirmations, known to violate Federal law, NLRB Board precedent and precedent decisions of the Supreme Court as noted herein. It also violates the members free speech rights and is an illegal Individual Contract, long prohibited by the NLRB Board & the Supreme Court. UBCJA International Constitution, Section 25 B states Local Unions shall be governed by applicable uniform bylaws and have the power to make laws and trade rules which in no way conflict with the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood, and must be approved by the General Vice President before becoming law, and shall be filed with the General Vice President; likewise, all future amendments must be submitted and filed.

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The United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Inc.- International Constitution Section 25B, page 26 & 27, and, the Obligation, page 92 as noted above, form together a condition precedent to any & all employment of rank & file member workers and employees, as the Act defines them in the Preamble and Section 7 NLRA; and together (irrespective of where & how the UBCJA Attorneys try to hide and separate the phrases-legal language) form a Contract requiring specific compliance, by both signature and oath/sworn affirmation of all rank & file UBC Members nationwide before any & all employment is allowed and under the direct threat of debarment from any & all future employment. Said contract, although being inserted to differing sections of the UBCJAs Constitution and all 36 Regional and District Council By-Laws throughout the 50-States and by direct incorporation to all Local Union By-Laws have been declared facially unlawful by multiple NLRB Board Decisions & Orders, and through multiple Supreme Court cases. The veto powers subsumed by the UBC International and every Regional & District Council effectively eviscerate and negate rights guaranteed by the NLRA. The NLRB Board and its General Counsel refuse to enforce same, and the UBCJA International, all 36 Regional and District Councils and their Counsel of Record (Latham & Watkins, LLP, for the UBCJA) refuse to abide or follow Board Decisions & Orders and Supreme Court precedent; and, strike said language, thus frustrating the members. Movants note the same prescription is applicable to the Union when it so violates the Act, with the express intent to violate member rights guarantee under NLRA Section 7, and therein reduce any member objection(s) to a futile exercise of exhaustion without remedy or recourse.  Movants thus note, when the NLRB Board & General Counsel refuse to Act; and, when the UBCJA International & its subordinate Regional & District Councils refuse to apply, abide and follow the law(s) and precedents cited below, that jurisdiction and venue are proper under the Courts exclusive jurisdiction in the Consent Decree, No. 1:90-cv-5722 to try, hear and finally adjudicate this issue, and issue an Order directing the UBCJA to strike the language in UBC Constitution Section 25B and the Obligation in their entirety, and replace with language that complies with the law(s), the NLRA and the express requirements of the precedent case law cited below, and that this Court issue the appropriate form of Injunction against the illegal contractual language. Movants further note that the UBCJAs International Constitution & its Obligation, taken together as a whole; and as compared with the law(s), legislative history and precedent cases cited herein, amongst others inure to the UBCJAs enactment of an Individual Contract for each & every member who joins and who is required to be sworn in under said requirements.

See J.I. CASE, 321 US 332 (1944) The Board held that the Company had refused to bargain collectively, in violation of 8(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 158(5); and that the contracts had been utilized, by means of the circulars, to impede employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 157, with the result that the Company had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of 8(1) of the Act. It ordered the Company to cease and desist from giving effect to the contracts, from extending them or entering into new ones, from refusing to bargain and from interfering with the employees; and it required the Company to give notice accordingly and to bargain upon request...

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Individual contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act looking to collective bargaining, nor to exclude the contracting employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to forestall bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement. 'The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices.' National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 364 , 60 S.Ct. 569, 577. Wherever private contracts conflict with its functions, they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility. [321 U.S. 332, 338] It is equally clear since the collective trade agreement is to serve the purpose contemplated by the Act, the individual contract cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit to which the employee otherwise would be entitled under the trade agreement. The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group. Its benefits and advantages are open to every employee of the represented unit, whatever the type or terms of his pre-existing contract of employment. See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the unionsecurity clause unlawfully required compliance with the unions constitution and bylaws); See Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423, 430(1969) (unions are free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforce[d] sic, against union members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule). See Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972) wherein the Supreme Court stated Yet when a member lawfully resigns from the union, its power over him ends. We noted in Scofield v. NLRB, [409 U.S. 213, 216] 394 U.S. 423, 429 , that if a union rule "invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion, without violating 8 (b) (1)." On the facts, we held that Scofield, where fines were imposed on members by the union, fell within the ambit of Allis-Chalmers. But we drew the line between permissible and impermissible union action against members as follows: ". . . 8 (b) (1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id., at 430. Under 7 of the Act the employees have "the right to refrain from any or all" concerted activities relating to collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right to join a union and participate in those concerted activities.

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The UBCJA Constitution & its Obligation invade, frustrate and impair the above from becoming operative as well as the right to refrain from any & all such activity, and by expressly prohibiting free speech necessarily required as a check upon any democratic organization, by prohibiting any & all form of protest, disagreement, free association or open debate under the dictum of [and the same to bind me] with Language qualified to as long as I remain a member of this Brotherhood. And I further affirm and declare that I am not now affiliated with and never will join or give aid comfort or support to any organization that tries to disrupt any Local Union District Council Regional Council State or Provincial Council or the International Body of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America.language that along with other portions wherein members are threatened with fines, suspension, expulsion and permanent debarment, serve to impinge on the Policy of the United States NLRA Preamble, Section 7 & 8 rights that the Act guarantees. See Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) The Court's decision in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), demonstrates that many union rules, although valid under the common law of associations, run afoul of 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 26 There the union expelled [473 U.S. 95, 114] a member who failed to comply with a rule requiring the "exhaust[ion of] all remedies and appeals within the Union . . . before . . . resort to any court or other tribunal outside of the Union." Id., at 421. Under the common law, associations may require their members to exhaust all internal remedies. See, e. g., Medical Soc. of Mobile Cty. v. Walker, 245 Ala. 135, 16 So.2d 321 (1944). Nevertheless, the Marine Workers Court held that "considerations of public policy" mandated a holding that the union rule requiring exhaustion violated 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A). 391 U.S., at 424 ; see also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S., at 430 (union rule is invalid under 8(b)(1)(A) if it "impairs [a] policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws"). See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986), Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court stated Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject [475 US 211, 224] matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935). See Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) (finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list). See Carp. Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz (2009) wherein the Board citing the ALJ stated 5. Is the union-security clause facially unlawful? Finally, the unionsecurity clause in article V is facially unlawful. The union-security clause explicitly requires compliance with the Unions constitution and bylaws, a requirement which violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). See Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 559, 560 (6th Cir. 1964) (finding that employer did not violate the Act by refusing to sign a collective-bargaining agreement in which the union-security clause unlawfully required compliance with the unions constitution and bylaws); Electrical Workers Local 3 (White Plains), 331NLRB 1498, 1500 (2000) (finding facially unlawful a union rule requiring hiring hall users to comply with internal rules to maintain their position on the referral list).

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While unions are free to enforce properly adopted rules against their members, Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, including the right to refrain from joining a union. See Scofield v. NLRB, 34 U.S. 423, 430(1969) (unions are free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforce[d] sic, against union members who are free to leave the union to escape the rule). Thus, employees must be free to resign their union membership and escape the rule. The rule here, however, requires employees to comply with the Unions constitution and bylaws as a condition of employment. Such a requirement violates the Act. At p 2, the Board Decision & Order stated: ORDER - The National Labor Relations Board orders that the A. The Respondent, New England Regional Council of Carpenters, Boston, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Maintaining in its collective-bargaining agreements a union-security clause requiring employees to comply with the Respondents constitution and bylaws as a condition of employment.

See Andrew Kevin Price v. Carpenters District Council, U.S.D.C. SD Illinois (2011), case no.10-cv0741 MJR-PMF granting both a temporary Injunction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(3); and vacating same and issuing a permanent Injunction for free speech & other issues under LMRDA Sec. 411415, dated 3-17-11. Movants note, the UBC Obligation prohibits free speech under the aforementioned requirements and also as a direct violation of NLRA Sec. 7 rights to refrain from any 7 all such activity and thus should be similarly enjoined. See NLRB Brief, DC Circuit Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2011, Nos. 10-1300, 10-1301, 101353, 10-1355 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS AND COMPANY, wherein the Boards General Counsel argues against such illegal unilateral contractual conditions which effect employees terms & conditions of employment, citing: In its 1962 decision NLRB v. Katz, the Supreme Court held: that an employer violates the duty to bargain by unilaterally changing a term and condition of employment under negotiation, regardless of its motivation for doing so.83 The Court reasoned that such a change constitutes a refusal to negotiate about the affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congressional policy.84, andThe proscription against unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment applies with full force where, as here, an existing agreement has expired and negotiations on a new one have yet to be completed.87 When the contract expires, terms and conditions continue in effect by operation of the NLRA. They are no longer agreed-upon terms; they are terms imposed by law, at least so far as there is no unilateral right to change them.88 This is required in order to protect the statutory right to bargain.89 This Court has noted the serious damage inflicted by an employers implementation of unilateral changes to terms and conditions of employment: A unilateral change not only violates the plain re-

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quirement that the parties bargain over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions, but also injures the process of collective bargaining itself. Such unilateral action minimizes the influence of organized bargaining. It interferes with the right of self organization by emphasizing to the employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent.90 - 22 For this reason, a violation of Section 8(a)(5) also derivatively violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: unilateral changes tend to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to engage in concerted activity.91 As the Supreme Court observed in NLRB v. Katz, unilateral changes plainly frustrate the statutory objective of establishing working conditions through bargaining.92 C) PROPERTY RIGHTS as applied to NLRA sec. 14(b) & MOBILITY In, 949 F.2d 199: United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Debs, Defendant-appellant United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. - 949 F.2d 199 at 10 stated: Courts have long held that the concept of property under the Hobbs Act is not limited to tangible property, but also includes "any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 1258, 25 L.Ed.2d 530 (1970). Intangible business rights, including the business rights of unions, are considered property. United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 1221, 59 L.Ed.2d 459 (1979); United States v. Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281-282 (3d Cir.1985). Intangible property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act includes LMRDA rights. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local 95, 627 F.Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y.1985). At 15 stated: By contrast, union politics is more like one-party government. The statutory right to participate in union government is not held accountable by anything remotely like a thriving two-party system. Here, the federal legislature and courts have a greater duty to combat labor corruption and electoral vice. The Hobbs Act is an important instrument in service of this democratic objective. For all of these reasons, LMRDA rights are property under the Hobbs Act. At issue here is the 100% full mobility system which the UBC International Union has implemented nationally under the decisions issuing from the NLRB in Carpenters Local 43.and Lebovitz. The defined geographical jurisdiction is part & parcel to the contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), as are all items within the May 26, 2011 Restructuring Plan. The By-laws are Contracts. The rank & file UBC worker & employee, per the NLRA & LMRDA retains the right to vote, all contract and legal rights, the right to Local Union autonomy and more. This is true under the LMRDA, wherein, when an International Union orders a subordinate Regional or District Council and/or Local Union to be placed into a Trusteeship, that under the LMRDA, it is a temporary suspension of the autonomy which must be preserved intact and returned to the members., along with its tangible and intangible property and assets.

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The UBCJA Internationals proposed changes are facially unlawful, and will alter the former NYCDCC to the point where it is unrecognizable, to such a degree an extent that a new NLRA Sec. 9(a) Representation Election shall be required. Both, the contract rights of UBC Rank & File members, the LMRDA rights and the right of exclusion are property rights under the Hobbs Act. Any attempt by the UBC International to take these rights away is indicative of the exaction being required and as such warrant charges under the Act. D) NLRB ABEYANCE & WITHDRAWAL OF LEBOVITZ MOBILITY CASE DATE UNKOWN, BUT POST MAY 16TH BRIEF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS, LOCAL 43 and NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS (McDowell Building & Foundation, Inc.) and Case 34-CB-3047 KEVIN LEBOVITZ, an Individual ORDER On December 31, 2009, the two sitting members of the Board issued a Decision and Order in this proceeding, which is reported at 354 NLRB 122.1 Thereafter, Respondent- Carpenters Local 43 filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and the General Counsel filed a cross-application for enforcement. Thereafter, the court ordered that the review and enforcement proceedings be held in abeyance, and the record in this case was not filed with the court. 1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the powers of the National Labor Relations Board in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kirsanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Thereafter, pursuant to this delegation, the two sitting members issued decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases. On June 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635, holding that under Section 3(b) of the Act, in order to exercise the delegated authority of the Board, a delegee group of at least three members must be maintained. Accordingly, in view of the Courts decision in New Process Steel, L.P., pursuant to Section 10(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board hereby sets aside the above-referenced Decision and Order.2 The Board will retain this case on its docket and take further action as appropriate. By Direction of the Board: _______________________ Lester A. Heltzer, Executive Secretary 2 Section 10(d) states [u]ntil the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it. See also In re NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938).

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____________________________________________________________________________________ E) LOCAL UNION AUTONOMY & PROPERTY RIGHTS HOBBS ACT. Also at issue here are the inherent Property rights under both the Hobbs Act and Local Union Autonomy is at issue and it is the defined right of the rank & file worker or employee, whether man or woman to govern and legislate their own Local Unions with the full autonomy granted and enacted into Federal Law & statute under both the NLRA Preamble & Section 7 and under the LMRDA. The UBCJA International & its subordinate 36-Regional Councils, its Officers, Agents, Directors, Business Agents and Representatives, Organizers have initiated a national program of illegally crafted UBCJA International Constitution and By-Law rules changes, changes so readily drastic and apparent that they afford the aforementioned parties an unfettered Dictatorial Regime, ruled by the Autocratic fiat, by fear, coercion, intimidation direct and indirect threats, fear of and imposition of Economic reprisals such as banishment to the perennially flawed and disturbingly corrupt Out of Work List (OWL) scheme, that 99% of the body or the rank & file dare not speak for fear of personal ruin and bankruptcy. The entire system is rigged, it is inherently corrupt, the US Attorney and RO have done little else than collect their hourly billings and offer little if any real or actual resistance to anything that the UBCJA has proposed. Private Counsel for other pro-se interveners fare no better; and, rather than challenge any of the illegal activity simply go along with it. Centralization of the UBCJA NYCDCC under the proposed Restructuring Plan must fail as a matter of law and right. That the US Attorney refuses to act is not an acceptable defense for the Government to live up to its end of the bargain under the Consent Decree. That the ROs office is not yet up to speed and that it knows little on how the Construction Industry operates, and therefore relies wholly on and upon what the UBC International tells it is all but readily apparent to all, less those predisposed to garnering or playing the system for their own gain. That the Second interim RO Report looks toward the Union members to cite to him and his staff of attorneys specific law(s) violated or specific citations of cases prior to his taking any action on our behalf is disturbing. The RO then cites member apathy without acknowledging the fact that for 21-years, United Brotherhood of Carpenter rank& file members have footed the bill for the UBCJA Internationals Attorneys, footed the entire bill for the District Council Attorneys and indirectly via Taxation fund the operations of the Court & the United States Attorneys office yet at no point in the prolonged 21-year history of the RICO Civil Consent Decree has the Court awarded a dime of legal fees to Pro-se Union members seeking to do the job that the US Attorney & RO refuse to do. The Court, in allowing a former Federal Judge, who had a legacy of legal decisions issuing in the Teamsters RICO Civil cases, and subsequently served as the Review Officer within the UBCs RICO Civil Consent Decree to defend and represent rank & file Carpenters is now allowed to jump ship and work for a law firm representing the UBC Internationals interests flies in the face of common sense, is a clear conflict of interest, serves to impugn the former judges character, reputation and legacy and is a complete mockery of justice to all those who have had it denied to them for so long.

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The Hobbs Act was patterned after a New York extortion law, under which one New York court held that union membership rights are protected property interests. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 36, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup.Ct.), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 263 A.D. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941)  We respectfully request the this Court, issue a permanent Injunction banning the implementation of the Right to Work State Mobility laws within the defined geographical jurisdictional boundaries of the New York City District Council of Carpenters, and that it direct the UBCJA International General President and bind him, his Executive Board an all agents therein from usurping the Congressional authority to Legislate and/or from colluding with DOL & NLRB officials to deprive members of the rights via the introduction of suits through the NLRB which by design are proffered to end run the amendment procedures to Federal laws, a right to which only Congress has been granted under the Federal Constitution of the United States of America. I) 2403 -Hobbs ActExtortion By Force, Violence, or Fear In order to prove a violation of Hobbs Act extortion by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, the following questions must be answered affirmatively: 1. Did the defendant induce or attempt to induce the victim to give up property or property rights? "Property" has been held to be "any valuable right considered as a source of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) (the right to solicit garbage collection customers). "Property" includes the right of commercial victims to conduct their businesses. See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (the right to make business decisions and to solicit business free from wrongful coercion) and cited cases). It also includes the statutory right of union members to democratically participate in union affairs. See United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (the right to support candidates for union office); United States v. Teamsters Local 560, 550 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1985) (rights guaranteed union members by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. 411). 2. Did the defendant use or attempt to use the victim's reasonable fear of physical injury or economic harm in order to induce the victim's consent to give up property? A defendant need not create the fear of injury or harm which he exploits to induce the victim to give up property. See United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 349 and 351 (5th Cir. 1978) (offer by employer to pay union official for labor peace held to be "simply planning for inevitable demand for money" by the union official under the circumstances); United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds and superseded in part on denial of reh'g, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) (causing some businesses to refuse operations with the victim sufficiently induced the victim's consent to give up property, consisting of a right to contract freely with other businesses, as long as there were other businesses beyond defendants' control with whom the victim could do business).

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Did the defendant's conduct actually or potentially obstruct, delay, or affect interstate or foreign commerce in any (realistic) way or degree? [ see page ____ re: Mobility, the condition precedent to initiate all other wrongs, inter-state & intra-state transport of illegal aliens, undocumented workers, 1099 & cash workers, defrauding Benefit Funds, State & Federal Tax Coffers, Workers Compensation programs, Insurance & Bonding companies, kick-backs and pay-offs to Business Representatives, Drug Trafficking & Money Laundering, theft of property & NLRA - LMRDA rights] The Hobbs Act regulates extortion and robbery, which Congress has determined have a substantial effect on interstate and foreign commerce by reason of their repetition and aggregate effect on the economy. Therefore, the proscribed offenses fall within the category of crimes based on the Commerce Clause whose "de minimis character of individual instances arising under [the] statute is of no consequence." United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding Hobbs Act convictions for robberies whose proceeds the defendant would have used to purchase products in interstate commerce), quoting, United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995); material in brackets added; see also United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) (robbery of out-of-state credit and ATM cards); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 1996) (robbery of commercial business); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995). Hobbs Act violations may be supported by proof of a direct effect on the channels or instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce, as for example, where the threatened conduct would result in the interruption of the interstate movement of goods or labor. See United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) Indirect effects on such commerce are also sufficient, as for example, where the obtaining of property and resulting depletion of the victim's assets decreases the victim's ability to make future expenditures for items in interstate commerce. Taylor, supra (depletion of contractors' assets). However, the Seventh Circuit has distinguished Hobbs Act cases involving depletion of a business' assets from those involving the depletion of an individual employee's assets which, the court has ruled, are not as likely to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1982). Other circuits have agreed where the extortion or robbery of an individual has only an "attenuated" or "speculative" effect on some entity or group of individuals engaged in interstate commerce thereby diminishing the "realistic probability" that such commerce will be affected. Whereas, the Consent Decree requires the Restoration of Democracy and the Elimination of Corruption as the 2-primary prongs, and wherein the recent conviction and imprisonment of the NYCDCC EST & Officers, Employer Trustees and Shop Stewards clearly show a continued pattern of racketeering activity in the District Council and the UBCJA International & the NYCDCC seeks to permanently displace and remove some 8,000 rank & file UBC members from the protections afforded under the Civil Consent Decree 90-cv-5722, speculation is not on the table for discussion, as these recent cases and the continued vetoes of corrupt NYCDCC employees has continued unabated, therein a prima-facie case is

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established if only the United States Attorneys Office would act. The UBC International Restructuring Plan submitted May 26, 2011, under the auspice of the UBCJA International General Presidents imposition of a Trusteeship, wherein he and his Executive Board members and appointed overseers, feign innocence and clean hands; said affirmative defense also must fail as the UBCJA International has shown itself to be just as corrupt as the NYCDCC ever was. By Federal Law, Unions are operative as collective bargaining entities and under J.I. Case, Patternmakers and other Supreme Court precedent decisions, yet overturned union workers & employees are prohibited from negotiating individual contracts. Accordingly, the collective contracts and the associated collected losses which inure to the group as a whole, covering some 23,000 Union Rank & File members and which losses are in the tens of millions of dollars thus extorted via wages and benefits yet paid, certainly qualify for Hobbs Act protections and Movants so request that such protections be afforded. ____________________________________________________________________________ Was the defendant's actual or threatened use of force, violence or fear wrongful? Generally, the extortionate obtaining of property by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence in a commercial dispute requires proof of a defendant's intent to induce the victim to give up property. No additional proof is required that the defendant was not entitled to such property or that he knew he had no claim to the property which he sought to obtain. See United States v. Agnes, 581 F.Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 293, 297-300 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim of right defense to defendant's use of violence to withdraw property from a business partnership). In its labor-management context, the claim-of-right defense is not applicable where defendants do not have legitimate labor objectives. The labor claim-of-right defense has been held not to excuse the following kinds of coercive demands:
y

payoffs to union officials and employee representatives in violation of the federal labor laws (29 U.S.C. 186); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1259 (5th Cir. 1975) (solicitation of church donation in return for removal of labor pickets); United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1984) (request for payoff to remove pickets); y sham fees which labor unions are not entitled to collect under the labor laws; United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439, 444 (8th Cir. 1983) (economic coercion of dues and initiation fees from truck drivers who were self-employed or who were told they would receive no member benefits); y employee payments which violate existing labor contracts; United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (under threat of job loss, employees' payment of health and pension contributions which labor contract required employer to pay); y employer payments to labor unions which are not included in existing labor contracts; United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1989) (violence used to collect fines on employers for non-compliance with union rules which were not made part of the labor contract); y demands that a non-union employer cease business operations during a sham union organizing campaign; United States v. Edgar Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1002-03 (6th Cir. 1985) (violent campaign by union officials and union-represented competitor to drive the non-union employer out

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of business under the pretext of persuading employees to join the union and enforce area wage standards); y employer payments for labor consulting to establish a bogus "sweetheart union" and thereby discourage legitimate organizing by other unions; United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1986). y construction contractors' payments of money, wages for unwanted and superfluous employees, and subcontracts with employee representatives which were unrelated to the hiring of employees. United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1319 and 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (extortion of contractors by leaders of minority labor coalitions). Where the claim-of-right defense applies, courts have generally held that the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was not entitled to receive the property which he sought to obtain. United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1979) (demand by labor union official on employer that the official and others be hired for no-show employment using threat of labor unrest); United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1989) (in prosecution involving debtor's withholding of property from a creditor-bank, "the term 'wrongful' requires the government to prove, in cases involving extortion based on economic fear, that the defendant knew that he was not legally entitled to the property that he received."); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992) (failure to instruct that defendant must know he had no entitlement to property he sought by use of economic fear did not rise to the level of plain error; but "knowledge of the extortion encompasses knowledge of the lack of lawful claim to the property.").

CURRENT CBA 7-1-06 to 6-30-11, DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION REFUSAL TO BARGAIN : Movants note NLRB v. Katz 369 US 736 (1962) and demand that the Current Contract negotiations be suspended, pending the demand for arbitration. In lieu of the demand for arbitration given the context and pattern of ongoing fraud, deceit, fraudulent inducement and continued corruption that this honorable Court, sua-sponte extend the current contract (the Collective Bargaining Agreement) for one year, unchanged and that it not renew negotiations until Local Union Elections and District Council elections are held and the statutory pose election challenges have expired.

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ARTICLE XIII HARDSHIP & GRIEVANCE: 7-1-06 to 6-30-11 CONTRACT

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In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) at Chief Justice Hughes stated, at Third: - cont. If the federal government may determine the wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce of a state, because of their relation to cost and prices and their indirect effect upon interstate commerce, it would seem that a similar control might be exerted over other elements of cost, also affecting prices, such as the number of employees, rents, advertising, methods of doing business, etc. All the processes of production and distribution that enter into cost could likewise be controlled. If the cost of doing an intrastate business is in itself the permitted object of federal control, the extent of the regulation of cost would be a question of discretion and not of power. The government also makes the point that efforts to enact state legislation establishing high labor standards have been impeded by the belief that, unless similar action is taken generally, commerce will be diverted from the states adopting such standards, and that this fear of diversion has led to demands for federal legislation on the subject of wages and hours. The apparent implication is that the federal authority under the commerce clause should be deemed to extend to the establishment of rules to govern wages and hours in intrastate trade and industry generally throughout the country, thus overriding the authority of the states to deal with domestic problems arising from labor conditions in their internal commerce. It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corp., 475 US 211 (1986), Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court stated Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject [475 US 211, 224] matter which lies within the control of Congress, they have a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co, 294 US, 240, 307-308 (1935).

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The UBCJA Constitution, its By-laws and the NYCDCC By-laws, the Collective Bargaining Agreements and the individual Trust Fund Agreements all form a contract. The NLRA, the Wagner Act and the Policy of the United States as stated in the Preamble and Sec.7 gave the worker & employee the Right to Vote on all matters regarding wages, hours and working conditions of employment. This new right gave members the right to bargain with representatives of their own choosing, which lead to negotiation for a contract, hence giving rise to the Collective Bargaining Agreement or CBA. All CBAs arise before or in unison with benefit provisions of the contract and thus, the CBA language is controlling. The UBCJA International Union and/or the NYCDCC Benefit Fund Trustees and Fiduciaries cannot remove the condition precedent or the operative effects of Federal Law(s) by making separate contracts about them and/or by the establishment of a separate corporation, albeit it a paper corporation to remove themselves from the requirements of Federal Laws, or to achieve illegitimate ends under the limited Trusteeship imposed which by design and purpose is made to avoid compliance with the laws. The UBC International and the NYCDCC have now jointly proposed that they be granted the Powers of the 3-branches of Government established by the Federal Constitution that of the Legislative Branch, the Executive Branch and the Judicial Branch, via the Unilateral Implementation of a Centralized Restructuring Plan, wherein the Bylaw changes grant to them all plenary powers. The UBC International and the New York City District Council now pray that this honorable Court allow them such unilateral control as is only present within Dictatorships. It begs no more, to say that this Restructuring Plan makes a prima-facie case for violation of any & all due process rights, is proffered in bad faith, and that it wholly and completely eviscerates the NLRA & LMRDA in one fell swoop. Chief Justice Hughes stated, at Third, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935): It is not the province of the Court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system. It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it.  Movants respectfully request the Court with the exact legal precedent established above, with respect to the NYCDCC Proposed Restructuring Plan dated May 26, 2011 that it is sufficient to say that such a centralized system as proposed by the UBCJA & NYCDCC ByLaw rules changes for the operation of the District Council could not be allowed under the Federal Constitution that it not be allowed under the terms and conditions of the Consent Decree here in New York., that it be declared facially unlawful and vetoed in its entirety.  Movants further note that the United States District Court, SDNY is within the Judicial Branch of the Federal government. With all due respect and deference to the Court, it is not the role of the judiciary, the United States Attorneys office or the Independent Review Officer to change, amend or alter federal law(s), a role specifically reserved for the Congress. A civil RICO Consent Decree does not authorize the abandonment of the United States Federal Constitution to achieve its ends. It must be done within the purview of the laws which are in place as put forth by Congress, and signed into law by the respective President.

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F) PROPERTY RIGHTS as applied to NLRA sec. 14(b) & MOBILITY In, 949 F.2d 199: United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, v. Richard Debs, Defendant-appellant United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. - 949 F.2d 199 at 10 stated: Courts have long held that the concept of property under the Hobbs Act is not limited to tangible property, but also includes "any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 1258, 25 L.Ed.2d 530 (1970). Intangible business rights, including the business rights of unions, are considered property. United States v. Santoni, 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910, 99 S.Ct. 1221, 59 L.Ed.2d 459 (1979); United States v. Local 560 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 281-282 (3d Cir.1985). Intangible property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act includes LMRDA rights. Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union, Local 95, 627 F.Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y.1985). At 15 stated: By contrast, union politics is more like one-party government. The statutory right to participate in union government is not held accountable by anything remotely like a thriving two-party system. Here, the federal legislature and courts have a greater duty to combat labor corruption and electoral vice. The Hobbs Act is an important instrument in service of this democratic objective. For all of these reasons, LMRDA rights are property under the Hobbs Act. At issue here is the 100% full mobility system which the UBC International Union has implemented nationally under the decisions issuing from the NLRB in Carpenters Local 43.and Lebovitz., a case now withdrawn by the UBCJA & NLRB Board in what appears to be a collusive effort between them. The defined Geographical Jurisdiction is part & parcel to the contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), as are all items within the May 26, 2011 Restructuring Plan. The By-laws are Contracts. The rank & file UBC worker & employee, per the NLRA & LMRDA retains the right to vote, all contract and legal rights, the right to Local Union autonomy and more. This is true under the LMRDA, wherein, when an International Union orders a subordinate Regional or District Council and/or Local Union to be placed into a Trusteeship, that under the LMRDA, it is a temporary suspension of the autonomy which must be preserved intact and returned to the members. The UBCJA Internationals proposed changes are facially unlawful, and will alter the former NYCDCC to the point where it is unrecognizable, to such a degree an extent that a new NLRA Sec. 9(a) Representation Election shall be required. Both the contract rights of UBC Rank & File members, the LMRDA rights and the right of exclusion are property rights under the Hobbs Act. Any attempt by the UBC International to take these rights away is indicative of the exaction being required and as such warrant charges under the Act.

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G) NLRB ABEYANCE & WITHDRAWAL OF LEBOVITZ MOBILITY CASE DATE UNKOWN, BUT recently published on nlrb.gov wesbsite POST MAY 16TH BRIEF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS, LOCAL 43 and NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS (McDowell Building & Foundation, Inc.) and Case 34-CB-3047 KEVIN LEBOVITZ, an Individual ORDER On December 31, 2009, the two sitting members of the Board issued a Decision and Order in this proceeding, which is reported at 354 NLRB 122.1 Thereafter, Respondent- Carpenters Local 43 filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and the General Counsel filed a cross-application for enforcement. Thereafter, the court ordered that the review and enforcement proceedings be held in abeyance, and the record in this case was not filed with the court. 1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the powers of the National Labor Relations Board in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kirsanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Thereafter, pursuant to this delegation, the two sitting members issued decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases. On June 17, 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635, holding that under Section 3(b) of the Act, in order to exercise the delegated authority of the Board, a delegee group of at least three members must be maintained. Accordingly, in view of the Courts decision in New Process Steel, L.P., pursuant to Section 10(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board hereby sets aside the above-referenced Decision and Order.2 The Board will retain this case on its docket and take further action as appropriate. By Direction of the Board: _______________________ Lester A. Heltzer, Executive Secretary 2 Section 10(d) states [u]ntil the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it. See also In re NLRB, 304 U.S. 486 (1938).

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H) LOCAL UNION AUTONOMY & PROPERTY RIGHTS HOBBS ACT. Also at issue here are the inherent Property rights under both the Hobbs Act and Local Union Autonomy is at issue and it is the defined right of the rank & file worker or employee, whether man or woman to govern and legislate their own Local Unions with the full autonomy granted and enacted into Federal Law & statute under both the NLRA Preamble & Section 7 and under the LMRDA. The UBCJA International & its subordinate 36-Regional Councils, its Officers, Agents, Directors, Business Agents and Representatives, Organizers have initiated a national program of illegally crafted UBCJA International Constitution and By-Law rules changes, changes so readily drastic and apparent that they afford the aforementioned parties an unfettered Dictatorial Regime, ruled by the Autocratic fiat, by fear, coercion, intimidation direct and indirect threats, fear of and imposition of Economic reprisals such as banishment to the perennially flawed and disturbingly corrupt Out of Work List (OWL) scheme, that 99% of the body or the rank & file dare not speak for fear of personal ruin and bankruptcy. The entire system is rigged, it is inherently corrupt, the US Attorney and RO have done little else than collect their hourly billings and offer little if any real or actual resistance to anything that the UBCJA has proposed. Private Counsel for other pro-se interveners fare no better. Centralization of the UBCJA & NYCDCC under the proposed Restructuring Plan must fail as a matter of law and right. That the US Attorney refuses to act is not an acceptable defense for the Government to live up to its end of the bargain under the Consent Decree. That the ROs office is not yet up to speed and that it knows little on how the Construction Industry operates, and therefore relies wholly on and upon what the UBC International tells it is all but readily apparent to all, less those predisposed to garnering or playing the system for their own gain. That the Second interim RO Report looks toward the Union members to cite to him and his staff of attorneys specific law(s) violated or specific citations of cases prior to his taking any action on our behalf is disgraceful. The RO then cites member apathy without acknowledging the fact that for 21-years, United Brotherhood of Carpenter rank& file members have footed the bill for the UBCJA Internationals Attorneys, footed the entire bill for the District Council Attorneys and indirectly via Taxation fund the operations of the Court & the United States Attorneys office yet at no point in the prolonged 21-year history of the RICO Civil Consent Decree has the Court awarded a dime of legal fees to Pro-se Union members seeking to do the job that the US Attorney & RO refuse to do. The Court, in allowing a former Federal Judge, who had a legacy of legal decisions issuing in the Teamsters RICO Civil cases, and subsequently served as the Review Officer within the UBCs RICO Civil Consent Decree to defend and represent rank & file Carpenters is now allowed to jump ship and work for a law firm representing the UBC Internationals interests flies in the face of common sense, is a clear conflict of interest, serves to impugn the former judges character, reputation and legacy and is a complete mockery of justice to all those who have had it denied to them for so long. The Hobbs Act was patterned after a New York extortion law, under which one New York court held that union membership rights are protected property interests. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc.

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35, 36, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup.Ct.), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 263 A.D. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941)  We respectfully request the this Court, issue a permanent Injunction banning the implementation of the Right to Work State Mobility laws within the defined geographical jurisdictional boundaries of the New York City District Council of Carpenters, and that it direct the UBCJA International General President and bind him, his Executive Board an all agents therein from usurping the Congressional authority to Legislate and/or from colluding with DOL & NLRB officials to deprive members of the rights via the introduction of suits through the NLRB which by design are proffered to end run the amendment procedures to federal laws, a right to which only Congress has been granted under the Federal Constitution of the United States of America.

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I) 2403 -Hobbs ActExtortion By Force, Violence, or Fear In order to prove a violation of Hobbs Act extortion by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, the following questions must be answered affirmatively: 3. Did the defendant induce or attempt to induce the victim to give up property or property rights? "Property" has been held to be "any valuable right considered as a source of wealth." United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) (the right to solicit garbage collection customers). "Property" includes the right of commercial victims to conduct their businesses. See United States v. Zemek, 634 F.3d 1159, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980) (the right to make business decisions and to solicit business free from wrongful coercion) and cited cases). It also includes the statutory right of union members to democratically participate in union affairs. See United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1991) (the right to support candidates for union office); United States v. Teamsters Local 560, 550 F. Supp. 511, 513-14 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 780 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1985) (rights guaranteed union members by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. 411). 4. Did the defendant use or attempt to use the victim's reasonable fear of physical injury or economic harm in order to induce the victim's consent to give up property? A defendant need not create the fear of injury or harm which he exploits to induce the victim to give up property. See United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 349 and 351 (5th Cir. 1978) (offer by employer to pay union official for labor peace held to be "simply planning for inevitable demand for money" by the union official under the circumstances); United States v. Gigante, 39 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds and superseded in part on denial of reh'g, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) (causing some businesses to refuse operations with the victim sufficiently induced the victim's consent to give up property, consisting of a right to contract freely with other businesses, as long as there were other businesses beyond defendants' control with whom the victim could do business). Did the defendant's conduct actually or potentially obstruct, delay, or affect interstate or foreign commerce in any (realistic) way or degree? [ see page ____ re: Mobility, the condition precedent to initiate all other wrongs, inter-state & intra-state transport of illegal aliens, undocumented workers, 1099 & cash workers, defrauding Benefit Funds, State & Federal Tax Coffers, Workers Compensation programs, Insurance & Bonding companies, kick-backs and pay-offs to Business Representatives, Drug Trafficking & Money Laundering, theft of property & NLRA - LMRDA rights] The Hobbs Act regulates extortion and robbery, which Congress has determined have a substantial effect on interstate and foreign commerce by reason of their repetition and aggregate effect on the economy. Therefore, the proscribed offenses fall within the category of crimes based on the Commerce Clause whose "de minimis character of individual instances arising under [the] statute is of no consequence." United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding Hobbs Act convictions for robberies whose proceeds the defendant would have used to purchase products in interstate commerce), quoting, United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ---, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1630 (1995); material in brackets added; see also United States

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v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir. 1996) (robbery of out-of-state credit and ATM cards); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 1996) (robbery of commercial business); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995). Hobbs Act violations may be supported by proof of a direct effect on the channels or instrumentalities of interstate or foreign commerce, as for example, where the threatened conduct would result in the interruption of the interstate movement of goods or labor. See United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) Indirect effects on such commerce are also sufficient, as for example, where the obtaining of property and resulting depletion of the victim's assets decreases the victim's ability to make future expenditures for items in interstate commerce. Taylor, supra (depletion of contractors' assets). However, the Seventh Circuit has distinguished Hobbs Act cases involving depletion of a business' assets from those involving the depletion of an individual employee's assets which, the court has ruled, are not as likely to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1982). Other circuits have agreed where the extortion or robbery of an individual has only an "attenuated" or "speculative" effect on some entity or group of individuals engaged in interstate commerce thereby diminishing the "realistic probability" that such commerce will be affected.  Movants note: Whereas, the Consent Decree requires the Restoration of Democracy and the Elimination of Corruption as the 2-primary prongs, and wherein the recent conviction and imprisonment of the NYCDCC EST & Officers, Employer Trustees and Shop Stewards clearly show a continued pattern of racketeering activity in the District Council and the UBCJA International & the NYCDCC seeks to permanently displace and remove some 8,000 rank & file UBC members from the protections afforded under the Civil Consent Decree 90-cv-5722, speculation is not on the table for discussion, as these recent cases and the continued vetoes of corrupt NYCDCC employees has continued unabated, therein a prima-facie case is established. The UBC International Restructuring Plan submitted May 26, 2011, under the auspice of the UBCJA International General Presidents imposition of a Trusteeship, wherein he and his Executive Board members and appointed overseers feign innocence and clean hands; said affirmative defense also must fail as the UBCJA International has shown itself to be just as corrupt as the NYCDCC ever was. By Federal Law, Unions are operative as collective bargaining entities and under J.I. Case, Patternmakers and other Supreme Court precedent decisions, yet overturned union workers & employees are prohibited from negotiating individual contracts. Accordingly, the collective contracts and the associated collected losses which inure to the group as a whole, covering some 23,000 Union Rank & File members and which losses are in the tens of millions of dollars thus extorted via wages and benefits yet paid, certainly qualify for Hobbs Act protections and Movants so request that such protections be afforded.

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____________________________________________________________________________ Was the defendant's actual or threatened use of force, violence or fear wrongful? Generally, the extortionate obtaining of property by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence in a commercial dispute requires proof of a defendant's intent to induce the victim to give up property. No additional proof is required that the defendant was not entitled to such property or that he knew he had no claim to the property which he sought to obtain. See United States v. Agnes, 581 F.Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 293, 297-300 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim of right defense to defendant's use of violence to withdraw property from a business partnership). In its labor-management context, the claim-of-right defense is not applicable where defendants do not have legitimate labor objectives. The labor claim-of-right defense has been held not to excuse the following kinds of coercive demands:
y

payoffs to union officials and employee representatives in violation of the federal labor laws (29 U.S.C. 186); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1259 (5th Cir. 1975) (solicitation of church donation in return for removal of labor pickets); United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1984) (request for payoff to remove pickets); y sham fees which labor unions are not entitled to collect under the labor laws; United States v. Wilford, 710 F.2d 439, 444 (8th Cir. 1983) (economic coercion of dues and initiation fees from truck drivers who were self-employed or who were told they would receive no member benefits); y employee payments which violate existing labor contracts; United States v. Russo, 708 F.2d 209, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (under threat of job loss, employees' payment of health and pension contributions which labor contract required employer to pay); y employer payments to labor unions which are not included in existing labor contracts; United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 381-82 (3d Cir. 1989) (violence used to collect fines on employers for non-compliance with union rules which were not made part of the labor contract); y demands that a non-union employer cease business operations during a sham union organizing campaign; United States v. Edgar Jones, 766 F.2d 994, 1002-03 (6th Cir. 1985) (violent campaign by union officials and union-represented competitor to drive the non-union employer out of business under the pretext of persuading employees to join the union and enforce area wage standards); y employer payments for labor consulting to establish a bogus "sweetheart union" and thereby discourage legitimate organizing by other unions; United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1986). y construction contractors' payments of money, wages for unwanted and superfluous employees, and subcontracts with employee representatives which were unrelated to the hiring of employees. United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313, 1319 and 1333 (2d Cir. 1996) (extortion of contractors by leaders of minority labor coalitions).

Where the claim-of-right defense applies, courts have generally held that the Government must prove that the defendant knew that he was not entitled to receive the property which he sought to obtain. United States v. Arambasich, 597 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1979) (demand by labor union official on employer that the official and others be hired for no-show employment using threat of labor unrest); United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir. 1989) (in prosecution involving debtor's withholding of property from a creditor-bank, "the term 'wrongful' requires the

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government to prove, in cases involving extortion based on economic fear, that the defendant knew that he was not legally entitled to the property that he received."); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1515 (9th Cir. 1992) (failure to instruct that defendant must know he had no entitlement to property he sought by use of economic fear did not rise to the level of plain error; but "knowledge of the extortion encompasses knowledge of the lack of lawful claim to the property.").

United States v. Gotti 459 F. 3d. 296 (2d Cir. 2006)

89 II. CHALLENGES BY THE DEFENDANTS TO THEIR CONVICTIONS 90 A. The Defendants' Challenge under Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003) ("Scheidler II") 91 The defendants-appellants first argue that numerous extortion counts in the indictment became invalid upon the issuance of Scheidler II, which was decided by the Supreme Court on February 26, 2003, just as the trial in this case was concluding. For Ciccone and Bondi, who were charged with and convicted of multiple Hobbs Act extortion counts (both as separate offenses and as RICO predicates, as set forth in detail above), this argument goes to their actual convictions. For Peter Gotti and Richard G. Gotti, this is a sentencing issue: they were not charged with extortion, but the extortion counts included in the indictment were considered by the district judge as relevant uncharged conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines when imposing their sentences. 92 It is undisputed that we evaluate the legal issues of whether the indictment properly charged Hobbs Act extortion and whether the district court correctly charged the jury on these counts under a de novo standard. In assessing these issues, we begin by discussing Scheidler I and analyzing its scope. We then apply our interpretation of Scheidler II to each of the challenged extortion counts in this case, and ultimately conclude that each of them can stand. 93 Scheidler II, as set forth below, tightened the requirements for finding that a defendant has committed extortion under the Hobbs Act. To appreciate the significance of Scheidler II, it is therefore necessary to begin with the text of the Hobbs Act, upon which the challenged extortion counts here rested. It provides: 94 Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article

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or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 95 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) (emphasis added). The Hobbs Act further defines "extortion" as 96 the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 97 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added). 98 Before Scheidler II, this Circuit (and others) had interpreted the phrase "the obtaining of property from another" quite broadly, in two key respects: (1) "property" had been held to encompass intangible as well as tangible property rights; and (2) "obtaining" had been held to encompass cases where the defendant caused a loss of or interference to the victim's property rights, even though the defendant had not actually sought to exercise those property rights for himself or herself. Clear examples of these two propositions can be found in our precedents. 99 As to the first proposition&#x2014;namely, the expansive interpretation of "property"&#x2014; our Circuit's decision in United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.1969), stands as an early landmark case. The Tropiano defendants were partners in a garbage collection company who were displeased when a new competitor, Caron Refuse Removal, Inc. ("Caron"), started soliciting business in their vicinity and taking away some of their customers. Id. at 1072. They then used threats of violence to force Caron to stop recruiting their customers and to agree not to solicit any business in the area. Id. On appeal, this Court upheld the Tropiano defendants' Hobbs Act extortion convictions, rejecting their argument that "nothing more than `the right to do business' in the Milford area was surrendered by Caron and that such a right was not `property' `obtained' by the appellants." Id. at 1075. We explained: 100 The concept of property under the Hobbs Act, as devolved from its legislative history and numerous decisions, is not limited to physical or tangible property or things but includes, in a broad sense, any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth and does not depend upon a direct benefit being conferred on the person who obtains the property. 101

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Obviously, Caron had a right to solicit business from anyone in any area without any territorial restrictions by the appellants and only by the exercise of such a right could Caron obtain customers whose accounts were admittedly valuable. Some indication of the value of the right to solicit customers appears from the fact that when the [Tropiano defendants' company's] accounts were sold for $53,135, [the] agreement [obtained from Caron] not to solicit those customers was valued at an additional $15,000. . . . Caron's right to solicit accounts in Milford, Connecticut constituted property within the Hobbs Act definition. 102  Id. at 1075-76 (internal citations omitted). More recently, this Circuit similarly held that "[t]he right of the members of a union to democratic participation in a union election is property; that the right is intangible does not divest it of protection under the Hobbs Act," and on that basis, crime families who sought to replace control of the union could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit extortion. United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 59293 (2d Cir. 1999). 103 As for the second proposition (the expansive interpretation of "obtaining"), in United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir.1999), this Court held&#x2014;in a case involving anti-abortion protestors who tried to shut down a clinic&#x2014;that the "obtaining" prong of the Hobbs Act's definition of "extortion" was satisfied in cases where an extortionist used violence to force his victim to abandon the property rights in question, even though the extortionist was not seeking to exercise those property rights for himself. The Arena Court explained that "where the property in question is the victim's right to conduct a business free from threats of violence and physical harm, a person who has committed or threatened violence or physical harm in order to induce abandonment of that right has obtained, or attempted to obtain, property within the meaning of the Hobbs Act." Id. at 394. 104 This second proposition was evaluated by the Supreme Court in Scheidler II, which implicated facts similar to those in Arena. In Scheidler II, the defendants were anti-abortion protestors who had attempted to shut down abortion clinics. 537 U.S. at 398, 123 S.Ct. 1057. The plaintiffs argued that these defendants&#x2014;"by using or threatening to use force, violence, or fear to cause respondents `to give up' property rights, namely, `a woman's right to seek medical service from a clinic, the right of the doctors, nurses, or other clinic staff to perform their jobs, and the right of the clinics to provide medical services free from wrongful threats, violence, coercion, and fear'" &#x2014;had committed extortion under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 400-401, 123 S.Ct. 1057. The Seventh Circuit agreed, stating that "the defendants assert that, even if `property' was involved, the defendants did not `obtain' that property; they merely forced the plaintiffs to part with it . . . [but] this argument is contrary to a long line of precedent in this circuit." Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 709 (7th Cir.2001). 105 The Supreme Court reversed. Initially, the Court noted that on appeal, the respondents "had shifted the thrust of their theory" with regard to precisely which property rights had been extorted from them. Scheidler II, 537 U.S. at 401, 123 S.Ct. 1057. It stated that although the respondents had argued

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below that the extorted property rights were those of the women and the clinics to receive and perform medical services, they 106 now assert that petitioners violated the Hobbs Act by "seeking to get control of the use and disposition of respondents' property." They argue that because the right to control the use and disposition of an asset is property, petitioners, who interfered with, and in some instances completely disrupted, the ability of the clinics to function, obtained or attempted to obtain respondents' property. 107 The United States offers a view similar to that of respondents, asserting that "where the property at issue is a business's intangible right to exercise exclusive control over the use of its assets, [a] defendant obtained that property by obtaining control over the use of those assets." 108 Id. (internal citations omitted; alteration and emphasis in original). 109 The Court then concluded that even this revised construction was inconsistent with the Hobbs Act's explicit reference to "obtaining of property from another," 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(2). See id. at 402, 123 S.Ct. 1057. It stated that 110 [w]e need not now trace what are the boundaries of extortion liability under the Hobbs Act, so that liability might be based on obtaining something as intangible as another's right to exercise exclusive control over the use of a party's business assets. . . . Whatever the outer boundaries may be, the effort to characterize petitioners' actions here as an `obtaining of property from' respondents is well beyond them. 111 Id. The Court went on to state that the anti-abortion protesters had neither 112 pursued nor received something of value from respondents that they could exercise, transfer, or sell. To conclude that such actions constituted extortion would effectively discard the statutory requirement that property must be obtained from another, replacing it instead with the notion that merely interfering with or depriving someone of property is sufficient to constitute extortion. 113 Id. at 405, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

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114 The Court also explained that such a construction would eliminate the distinction between "extortion and the separate crime of coercion. . . . The crime of coercion, which more accurately describes the nature of petitioners' actions, involves the use of force or threat of force to restrict another's freedom of action." Id. The Court found it telling that in drafting the Hobbs Act, Congress had specifically included extortion as a Hobbs Act violation, while not including coercion. Id. at 406-07, 123 S.Ct. 1057. The Court concluded that "[b]ecause . . . [the anti-abortion protestors] did not obtain or attempt to obtain property from respondents, . . . there was no basis upon which to find that they committed extortion under the Hobbs Act." Id. at 409, 123 S.Ct. 1057. 115 Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, protested that the Scheidler II majority's "murky opinion seems to hold that this phrase [`the obtaining of property from another'] covers nothing more than the acquisition of tangible property," and that "[n]o other federal court has ever construed this statute so narrowly." Id. at 412, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In other words, Justice Stevens argued that Scheidler II had struck down not only the second proposition (the expansive definition of "obtaining") but also the first proposition (the expansive definition of "property"). Id. at 412-16, 123 S.Ct. 1057. 116 The majority opinion, however, expressly disclaimed the notion that it swept so broadly. Indeed, in addition to stating that it "need not now trace what are the outer boundaries of extortion liability under the Hobbs Act," such as whether "liability might be based on obtaining something as intangible as another's right to exercise exclusive control over the use of a party's business assets," the majority explicitly stated that "the dissent is mistaken to suggest that our decision reaches, much less rejects, lower court decisions such as . . . Tropiano . . ., in which the Second Circuit concluded that the intangible right to solicit refuse collection accounts constituted property within the Hobbs Act definition." Id. at 402 & n. 6, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (internal quotation marks omitted). 117 In construing the scope of the Scheidler II holding, we are guided by the majority's explicit statement that Scheidler II did not even reach, much less reject, our holding in Tropiano. Indeed, we believe that the appropriate interpretation of Scheidler II must be one that co-exists with Tropiano, both as to the "property" and "obtaining" prongs. Thus, as an initial matter, we easily conclude that Scheidler II did not overturn Tropiano's broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act's reference to "property," nor otherwise suggest that only tangible property rights can be extorted under the Hobbs Act. The Scheidler II majority, in going out of its way to emphasize that it was not reaching Tropiano, essentially said as much. Indeed, Scheidler II consistently emphasized that it was only tightening the "obtaining" requirement of the Hobbs Act, and that in this regard, an important inquiry was whether the defendants had "pursued [or] received something of value from [victims] that they could exercise, transfer, or sell." Id. at 405, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the case of the antiabortion protestors who sought only to shut down abortion clinics, they had not. Generally speaking, however, intangible property rights&#x2014;such as, for instance, non-competition or exclusivity agreements &#x2014;are certainly things of value that are capable of being exercised, transferred, or sold. We therefore read Scheidler II as leaving intact this Circuit's precedent that intangible property

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rights can qualify as extortable property under the Hobbs Act and as simply clarifying that before liability can attach, the defendant must truly have obtained (or, in the case of attempted extortion, sought to obtain) the property right in question. 118 The more complex question is precisely what, pursuant to Scheidler II, it means to "obtain" a property right. The Scheidler II Court framed this question as a two-part inquiry that requires both a deprivation and an acquisition of property, explaining that while the anti-abortion protestors in that case "may have deprived or sought to deprive respondents of their alleged property right of exclusive control of their business assets, . . . they did not acquire any such property." Id. at 404-05, 123 S.Ct. 1057. In further explaining why the anti-abortion protestors could not be viewed as having acquired such property, the Court stated that they had "neither pursued nor received something of value from respondents that they could exercise, transfer, or sell." Id. at 405, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 119 This explanation, in our view, provides the key to understanding what it means, pursuant to Scheidler II, to acquire property and thus to obtain it. We read the Court's emphasis on the possibility of exercising, transferring, or selling the property as a concern with the extortionist's intent with respect to the property at issue. The "ultimate goal" of the anti-abortion protestors in Scheidler II was merely "`shutting down' a clinic that performed abortions." Id. at 405, 123 S.Ct. 1057. This did not constitute acquisition in the eyes of the Scheidler II Court, we believe, because there was no further intended activity on the part of the protestors, and mere interference with the clinics' right to conduct their business, even to the point of getting them to cease conducting their business altogether, was closer to coercion than extortion. But had the protestors sought to take further action after having deprived the clinics of their right to conduct their business as they wished&#x2014;by, for example, forcing the clinic staff to provide different types of services, forcing the clinic to turn its operations over to the protestors, or selling the clinic or its property to a third party9&#x2014;we believe that they would have satisfied the Scheidler II Court's definition of "obtaining." 120 Against this backdrop, it becomes clear why the Supreme Court indicated that Tropiano remains good law notwithstanding Scheidler II. The Scheidler II Court characterized the right at issue in Tropiano as "the intangible right to solicit refuse collection accounts." Id. at 402 n. 6, 123 S.Ct. 1057. Had the Tropiano defendants sought merely to get Caron to stop soliciting collection accounts because they believed that the Milford area should be entirely free from any solicitation, Tropiano could not stand; like the anti-abortion protestors, the Tropiano defendants would have been seeking simply to deprive someone of a right without doing anything affirmative with that right themselves. But unlike the anti-abortion protestors, the Tropiano defendants did seek to take action with respect to Caron's solicitation rights; they sought to transfer those rights to themselves so that they could continue their own solicitation unimpeded by competition, and thus, in a sense, broaden their own solicitation rights. In other words, the Tropiano defendants essentially forced Caron to give them&#x2014;at no cost&#x2014;a non-competition agreement, which, according to the Tropiano Court, was valued at about $15,000, and they used that non-competition agreement to further their own business activities. Tropiano, 418 F.2d at 1076. Their goal was ultimately to enrich themselves, something that could not be accomplished without

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appropriating to themselves the economic value of Caron's property rights. These actions, unlike those in Scheidler II, constituted extortion under the Hobbs Act. {Movants note here Douglas J. McCarron recently completed transactions with the illegal consolidation of Empire Regional Council of Carpenters (ESRCC) and the New Jersey Regional Council of Carpenters (NJRCC), wherein without cause, the UBC International revoked the charters of fully functioning Local Unions, such as Local 370 in the ESRCC; and, other similarly situated local unions. Said consolidations occurred because these Locals refused to allow the International to come in and exercise an illegal veto power over the Local Union autonomy guaranteed by the NLRA, and change their By-Laws to reflect the Internationals desire that their rights cease to exist. The UBCJAs primary desire was to gain control of both tangible assets such as buildings and training facilities, wherein proper legal title is held in the Local Unions name, and properly recorded in the State of New York and/or New Jersey and for the misappropriation of those assets via illegal transfer, sale and recording of titles to those properties in the International and/or NRCCs councils name, conversion and misappropriation of both ESRCC & NJRCC Benefit & Trust Funds (Pension, Annuity, Health & Welfare etc) totaling several billions of dollars to the International and/or NRCCs name wherein all of the proceeds from said transactions are not properly returned, wherein records are shredded verses being archived for 6-years as required under Federal law (ERISA), so as to dispose of the evidence of the illegality of same, and are performed under the auspice of an internal union rule and/or UBC Constitution which has been upheld as being facially unlawful and not in conformance to the requirements of the many varying laws. The UBCJA broke into said Local Union offices and with the aide and assistance of non-union bonded locksmiths, broke into same and locked out the Local Union officials, duly elected by the rank & file and duly in control of and possession of said property. Said actions do not comport with the laws of the State of New York and/or the State of New Jersey relative to the sale and transfer of property, none of which were in any form of condition of any loan obligations, and wherein certain properties, legal title was in hand as there were no mortgages owed. The UBCJA is not a bank or a federal or state government agency with the authority to misappropriate and convert property for their use or benefit, their sale or their transfer; nor are they allowed to re-record a title in their name, either as the UBCJA International, and/or their newly formed Northeast Regional Council of Carpenters. Said fraudulent actions are also operative for the UBCJA Internationals fraudulent application with the NLRB Board to re-certify themselves as the duly authorized and chosen representative of the workers and employees, without holding a new secret ballot election under section 9(a) of the NLRA, per precedent decisions of the Board and/or the Appellate Courts & Supreme Court.}

121 Thus, we hold that in evaluating an extortion count's conformity with Scheidler II&#x2014;i.e., whether it adequately alleges the "obtaining of property" for purposes of the Hobbs Act's definition of extortion&#x2014;the key inquiry is whether the defendant is (1) alleged to have carried out (or, in the case of attempted extortion, attempted to carry out) the deprivation of a property right from another, with (2) the intent to exercise, sell, transfer, or take some other analogous action

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with respect to that right. A motive ultimately to profit by cashing out the value of the property right will generally serve as powerful evidence that the defendant's goal was to obtain the right for himself, rather than merely to deprive the victim of that right. {The UBCJA is cashing out the value of the property for themselves and they have not performed the required audits prior to the midnight and early morning raids, nor will they properly account for it after the fact they will simply bury & destroy the evidence of their crimes before anyone is the wiser}. 122 We thus proceed to apply this test to each of the challenged extortion counts. 123 On appeal, the defendants-appellants cite the following counts in the indictment as being invalidated by Scheidler II: the ILA-related extortion counts; the Local 1-related extortion counts; the MILArelated extortion counts; the Tommy Ragucci Counts; the Alayev Counts; and the Seagal Counts. They argue that in each of these counts, the allegations support only a charge of coercion, not extortion. Relatedly, they argue that the district court's charge as to each of these counts was inconsistent with Scheidler II. We therefore assess each count to determine whether it is consistent with our construction of Scheidler II, first looking at how each count was framed in the indictment, and then considering how the district court ultimately described each count to the jury when issuing its charge. 124 a. The Indictment 125 On both the ILA-related and Local 1-related extortion counts, the indictment alleged that the defendants sought to obtain, and did obtain, the union members' LMRDA rights to free speech and democratic participation in union affairs as well as their LMRDA rights to loyal representation by their officers, agents, and other representatives. It further stated that the defendants sought to exercise those rights themselves, by telling various delegates whom to vote for in certain leadership positions, and by controlling various elected officials' performance of their union duties. We believe that these allegations satisfy our interpretation of Scheidler II, because the government charges not only that the defendants caused the relinquishment of the union members' LMRDA rights, but also that the defendants did so in order to exercise those rights for themselves &#x2014;indeed, in a way that would profit them financially. 126 We note that the defendants-appellants have also argued that these counts must fail because they could not legally exercise the union members' LMRDA rights, and therefore cannot be said to have obtained them. This argument builds upon a recent split that has emerged, post-Scheidler II, among various district courts in this Circuit. Three of the four district courts considering this issue&#x2014; the district court in this case, see March 26, 2004 Sentencing Tr. 10-14, along with two other district

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courts&#x2014;have concluded that LMRDA rights can constitute extortable property under the Hobbs Act, notwithstanding the fact that LMRDA rights cannot be legally exercised by third parties. See United States v. Muscarella, 2004 WL 2186561, at * 6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.28, 2004); United States v. Cacace, 2004 WL 1646760 at * 2-*3 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004). One district court, however, has reached a different view, concluding in a pair of cases that intangible property rights can qualify as extortable property under the Hobbs Act, but only if they can be lawfully exercised, transferred, or sold, and that LMRDA rights therefore do not qualify. See United States v. Bellomo, 263 F.Supp.2d 561, 575-576 (E.D.N.Y.2003); United States v. Coffey, 361 F.Supp.2d 102, 108-109 (E.D.N.Y.2005). 127 We agree with the majority of district courts that have concluded that intangible property can qualify as extortable property under the Hobbs Act regardless of whether its exercise, transfer, or sale would be legal. The Supreme Court did not include a "legality" limitation in Scheidler II. Moreover, as the government points out, the Bellomo/Coffey approach adopted by one district court gives rise to the untenable implication that one can never "extort," under the Hobbs Act, illegal property (such as narcotics) because such property cannot be legally used, sold, or transferred. In Bellomo, the district court tried to distinguish this argument by stating that "[t]he victim's grievance in that hypothetical would surely not be the loss of his right to distribute drugs, but what the extortionist has obtained from him, the drugs." Bellomo, 263 F.Supp.2d at 576. It is, however, as illegal to possess tangible drugs as it is to exercise the intangible "right to distribute drugs." The Bellomo court thus seems to suggest that its "legality" gloss on Scheidler II only applies to intangible property. We see no basis in principle, policy, or the text of Scheidler II, however, for holding that tangible property is "obtainable" regardless of whether its use, transfer, or sale is legal, but that intangible property is "obtainable" only if its exercise, transfer, or sale is legal. Nor do we see any basis for imposing a "legality" requirement on the extortion of both tangible and intangible property. Accordingly, we hold that the ILA-related and Local 1-related Hobbs Act extortion counts all survived Scheidler II. 128 Similarly, as to the MILA-related extortion counts, the indictment alleges that the defendants sought to obtain, and did obtain, the MILA participants' and beneficiaries' rights to have the MILA trustees contract with the service provider of prescription drugs of the trustees' choice, and to have MILA trustees and fiduciaries discharge their duties in MILA's best interest. The indictment further asserts that the defendants sought to exercise these rights for themselves by telling the MILA trustees which service provider to support, and thereby ensuring the selection of a Gambino-associated enterprise (GPP/VIP) that would pay kickbacks. Here, too, the allegation is that the defendants exercised the rights in question in order to profit themselves. Thus, the MILA-related Hobbs Act extortion counts satisfy the dictates of Scheidler II. 129 As to the Tommy Ragucci Counts, the relevant portion of the indictment alleges that the defendants attempted to obtain "money and the right of John Doe 1 [Tommy Ragucci] to be an employee of Howland Hook Container Terminal." Indictment 169, 171. In its brief, the government similarly characterizes the extorted property from Tommy Ragucci as his "salary and right to be employed at Howland Hook." We note that while Tommy Ragucci was presumably an at-will employee with no guaranteed right to continued employment at Howland Hook, he surely had the right to be employed

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there for as long as he sought the job and his employer would have him. The defendants unquestionably sought to deprive him of that right, and of its attendant salary, when they ordered him to quit. The defendants also sought to take affirmative steps with respect to those rights of employment and salary, insofar as their ultimate goal was to transfer those rights to their own preferred candidate. Thus, for the same reason that we believe Tropiano survives Scheidler II, we conclude that the Tommy Ragucci Counts similarly survive: in both cases, the defendants tried to force their victim to relinquish a property right so that they could transfer that right either to themselves (as in Tropiano) or to a third party of their choice (as in the Tommy Ragucci Counts). 130 The Alayev Counts also state a claim for Hobbs Act extortion under our interpretation of Scheidler II. Here, in relevant part, the indictment alleges that the defendants obtained Alayev's intangible property rights to make various business decisions (such as whether to keep illegal gambling machines on the premises) free from outside pressure. As the government aptly states in its brief, "[t]he defendants did not seek merely to `shut down' Alayev's business but essentially made themselves his silent partners and exercised his rights to their own advantage." Because here the allegation is that the defendants sought to exercise for themselves Alayev's rights in a manner that would profit them, the Alayev Counts survive Scheidler II. 131 Finally, the Seagal Counts also satisfy the Scheidler II standard. Here, it is alleged that the defendants sought to exercise for themselves Seagal's right to make his own business decisions, by threatening him with possible violence unless he worked with Jules Nasso again. Thus, here the defendants sought to exercise for themselves Seagal's intangible right to decide with whom to work, in order to secure profit for themselves. This constitutes Hobbs Act extortion under Scheidler II. 132 b. The Jury Charge

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EXHIBIT A
HISTORY OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE NERCC MOBILITY: CARPENTERS LOCAL 43 & ..LEBOVITZ ----- Forwarded Message ----From: bruschawnee@comcast.net To: markerlich@aol.com Sent: Thursday, December 23, 2010 6:56:05 AM Subject: Re: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY Mark, I have the snail mail response - Thank You. Merry Christmas too ----- Original Message ----From: markerlich@aol.com To: bruschawnee@comcast.net Sent: Tuesday, December 14, 2010 9:17:38 PM Subject: Re: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY Bill: I am very frustrated. I sent it to you again and it did not bounce back. I have no idea why you don't have it. It is barely two pages. This is not a complicated issue and I'm sure you will be disappointed by the memo because both the attorney and I disagree with your interpretation. I will snail mail it.

Mark Erlich

-----Original Message----From: bruschawnee <bruschawnee@comcast.net> To: markerlich <markerlich@aol.com> Sent: Tue, Dec 14, 2010 2:04 pm Subject: Fwd: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY Mark,

Is the Legal Memo from NERCC Counsel regarding the Mobility Provisions of the Contract en-route to me (via mail, e-mail etc.)?

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I would be more than happy to pay for the cost of postage, irrespective of the length, number of pages. When you say they have prepared a memo, I take that as a page or two. If they wrote a book on the subject - fine, I'll come down & pick it up. It should not take them 11+ weeks to draft a simple memo on the matter, given the issue appears to be cut & dry. Your Stewards need a reasonably based legal response so they can intelligently respond to member brother/sister concerns. To date, the issue has not been addressed by Lou, Nick or any other NERCC rep that I am aware of yet when the issue does come up at Union Meetings, we get non-sensical, babbling type responses that do little to nothing to inform or educate the body. When the BA does nothing but blame you at the meetings, state that you & he disagree on the issue of mobility & the chair gives myself & other members the old "sit down, shut up" routine from days of old - in response to intelligent questions, you have a problem management wise and a perception issue with the newer & younger members. Leadership is supposed to be top down.....lead by example, welcome intelligent ideas & people etc. We're simply requesting an intelligent response in lieu of our Locals alleged leaders inability to answer a simple straight forward question. Our dues money & weekly work assessment pay everyone's salaries & also pay the NERCC Counsel legal bills, so we deserve a response from them without any further delay on their part. Thank You

William T. Doherty (address redacted) (U-Number redacted)

----- Forwarded Message ----From: bruschawnee@comcast.net To: markerlich@aol.com Sent: Sunday, December 5, 2010 12:44:49 PM Subject: Re: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY Mark,

Sorry - I have Windows Vista & have experienced several major crashes in the system, hence the change on the e-mail...when all the data is lost, Comcast blocks the old address for 180 days.

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I have checked the account & bruschawnee@comcast.net works (send & receive). If it blocks you again - could you have your secretary mail it to me...U-5420-4567 125 Peele Rd, Nashua, NH 03062-2577 Thank You. Bill

----- Original Message ----From: markerlich@aol.com To: bruschawnee@comcast.net Sent: Sunday, December 5, 2010 7:47:45 AM Subject: Re: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY I did and it bounced back. Mark

-----Original Message----From: bruschawnee <bruschawnee@comcast.net> To: markerlich <markerlich@aol.com> Sent: Sun, Dec 5, 2010 8:04 am Subject: Fwd: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY Mark,

Can you send me a copy of the legal memo please.

Thank You Bill

----- Forwarded Message ----From: bruschishawnee@comcast.net To: MARKERLICH@AOL.COM Sent: Tuesday, November 9, 2010 10:35:35 AM Subject: Fwd: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY

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----- Forwarded Message ----From: bruschishawnee@comcast.net To: markerlich@aol.com Sent: Tuesday, November 9, 2010 11:33:06 AM Subject: Re: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY Mark,

Could you have the NERCC Counsel send me a copy of their Legal Memo explaining how the Board, via Lebovitz expanded the rights of a Traveling Member. Thank You Bill ----- Original Message ----From: markerlich@aol.com To: bruschishawnee@comcast.net Sent: Monday, August 30, 2010 6:53:02 AM Subject: Re: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY Bil: My reading of the Board's ruling is very different from yours. In upholding the Lebowitz case, the Board actually expanded the rights of a traveling member; it did not restrict them. We inserted language in the last round of collective bargaining agreements to accomodate the Board's concerns. I have asked our attorneys to prepare a legal memo interpreting the decision. Hope you are well.

Mark Erlich

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-----Original Message----From: bruschishawnee <bruschishawnee@comcast.net> To: markerlich <markerlich@aol.com> Sent: Fri, Aug 27, 2010 11:47 pm Subject: NERCC COUNCIL BYLAWS - MOBILITY

August 27, 2010 Dear Brother Erlich. The NLRB Board issued the Final D & O for UBC Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz re: ALJ Decision & Order dated 7-7-09 and the Slip Opinion dated & issued December 31, 2009. It was formally published online today Subsequent to the D & O published today, August 27, 2010 came New Process Steel before the Supreme Court, which issued on Bunker Hill Day, June 17, 2010. Said D & O was upheld with minor modifications. Given the implications to the UBC Constitution, Bylaws & members work opportunities, I believe it prudent to conduct working sessions with yourself, your executive board NERCC Attorneys and rank and file members to discuss changes which need to be made so that we are in compliance with the NLRA, Supreme Court precedent(s), NLRB Board precedent and the inclusive/combined wishes of both Employers and Employees - whether Company Men and/or Men & Woman who work from the 27-Locals Hiring Halls within NERCC. Review of Local's Steward Reports from the time this policy was originally implemented will clearly show that men & woman who've always worked from the Hiring Hall(s) have been disproportionally effected in terms of hours, wages, benefits and lost work opportunities. Many times on far too many projects to list and/or mention, Rank & File Members have been forced to give way and make room for out of State Workers, out of Council Workers, Illegal Aliens and others working under the International Agreement. Our Business Agents and Fund Attorney's often end up having to chase these firms for not only wages, but benefits as well. Your NERCC Rank & File Carpenters have had to watch, as Business Agents pull their hair out after having gained no employment for members with the exception of the Steward. Many Projects have ratios of 90-10 with a majority having 99-1. Few projects rarely if ever top 20% Local Employees from the Hall(s). Mobility has had devastating consequences upon families - destroying many, for with all the other unpleasantries of long-term unemployment, come the inexorable arguments, splits, breaks in marriages & relationships which ultimately lead to their destruction and ultimate end. I have witnessed it too many times. I believe it is high time we came to stand up for then men & woman, the rank & file hall employee

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and that the Employers need to meet Local Business Agents with something better than an "all or nothing" proposition. We have had some great discussions in the past and we all have our disagreements, but I still believe that we can & should honor UBC Platform item 1 and incorporate that philosophy into future discussions on these matters. We can & should work together in a proactive manner to execute an agreement which benefits all. We must end this mindset, engendered from a good majority of "company-men, that all hall carpenters "suck", have no talent, are lazy, unskilled etc. We see it, hear it, live & experience it each & every day on every project - and it's is wrong and facially/patently false. However, perception as you know has a way of becoming reality. Moreover, as you are aware, the majority of company men are the same people who never attend Union Meetings, participate, volunteer, mentor or give back; and that is a qualified fact with very little exception. What Mobility has done to Union Members which no one dare discuss is simply this - it took the "brother" out of brotherhood. And since you are old school as am I, you know exactly what I mean. The rank & file member have a simple expectation, one which simply put means that when you live, work, shop & pay taxes in your locals geographic area; that they expect to be put to work for 40hours per week before a traveler from out of Council or another part of the country is allowed to work here. It makes perfect sense when you are not a salaried employee. In this economy, many of your BA's may not dare broach this subject. Can't say I blame them - so I'll say what they want to say but won't. It would be my pleasure to serve on any committee you may wish to set up on these issues. None of us have to be attorneys to discuss what are clearly common sense issues, being mindful of the basic tenets of the NLRA, UBC philosophies as recently discussed in Las Vegas at the General Convention, Regional Business practices, NERCC Council views as well as those of both the Employers and Employees - company men & woman as well as those from the Hiring Halls, or alternatively as we like to call them now - 'referral halls'. I believe the sooner we address this ruling, meet, confer & bang out an agreement acceptable to all one that can be incorporated to the CBA, the better off we'll all be. We can then move on and forward to proactively address other issues, such as PSA's or PLA's which should be on the immediate agenda. We have a market potential right now of $6 - $10 Billion dollars of work, all of which could easily be underway were we to bring in the right players, accelerate project delivery methodologies, address, scheduling requirements, bonding, credit and insurance obligations and requirements and minority business enterprise and disadvantaged business enterprise programs. The market potential includes both public & private entities which will require the engagement & active participation of our vast political contingent and participation from both parties to be successful, and which should also involve a few key outside forces. I also think we should redirect market opportunity funds toward such efforts, rather than apply said funds to small non-union

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projects which ultimately produce little if any man-hours and are not thus cost effective. The point is simple, address key projects, public & private institutions, bring all the trades together & get a nice hotel, conference rooms etc and knock out some agreements. Will we get all on board...no. Will we succeed in getting half aboard and signed, most definitely. When we do that, your halls & the other trade union halls will be cleared out in short order, relatively speaking. The impact to the material suppliers, vendors, area merchants, large retail institutions and the entire area and business community will be widespread. Enjoy your vacation, no need to respond now. However, when you return, I would like to hear from you at your convenience. Thank you for your time & consideration in these matters. Sincerely,

William T. Doherty UBC Local 26 (telephone number redacted) cc: file

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----- Forwarded Message ----From: bruschishawnee@comcast.net To: lizzy@metrocast.net, jpbrawley@comcast.net Sent: Friday, August 6, 2010 1:18:27 PM Subject: LTR TO NLRB BOARD IN DC - MOBILITY ETC
NOTE: MAILED TO THE BOARD VIA STD. U.S.P.O. First Class Mail (wtd) August 5, 2010 National Labor Relations Board 1099 14TH St. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20570-0001 Board Members: Wilma B. Liebman Peter C. Schaumber Craig Becker Mark G. Pearce Brian Hayes Subject: UBC Local 43 (McDowell Bldg. & Fndn.) and Kevin Lebovitz New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB 130 S.Ct. 2635

Reference: Dear Board,

I am writing on behalf of 16,614 Union Carpenters in the New England Regional Council of Carpenters who have long awaited a decision in the aforementioned Supreme Court case decided on June 17, 2010. Ironically enough, here in Boston June 17th is Bunker Hill Day, which is expressly fitting given the principles at stake. As expressed in the ruling in UBC Local 43 (page 1 & 2 enclosed), the D & O, I am specifically requesting that the NLRB re-issue the ruling & my request should be considered a Petition for Enforcement as I have been informed. Contrary to what ALJs sometimes see in particulars of a given case are the impacts to the group as a whole. Legal determinations are not always representative of what the policies represent. In the instant case, the Illegal Union Security Clause for Mobility is in

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actuality a reformation of Right to Work Legislation inserted into our CBA, NERCC wide, through the 6-State New England Agreement. The NERCC EST & his subordinate Regional Managers & Business Agents routinely utilize the Mobility clause to punish dissident members, initiate wrongful termination of employment & eliminate the local from the Local. Accordingly, Rank & File Union members are prohibited, albeit-illegally from working in the areas where they live, own homes, shop & pay taxes. The requisite purpose as unstated (important as what is stated and/or practiced), which they have hid via the use of cute language is not demonstrable of why it was inserted to the contracts in the first place. In essence, the Mobility Clause is used in reverse and it allows travelers from states near & far, foreign nationals & illegal aliens to work in place of legitimate Union members. The NLRA was set up to protect American workers, citizens & those with the proper credentials. NERCC Officials & Contractors use said clause to hire Illegal Aliens for cash, without paying them benefits owed under the CBA. The BAs then routinely hit the Illegal Alien up for a C-Note a week ($100) cash & the Contractor benefits via saving monies otherwise devoted to the CBA Benefits & putting said cash in his coffers as profit. Mobility, the now twice defined Illegal Union Security Clause, by the ALJ & the previous two-member Board Decision of 12-31-09, thus discriminates openly against workers who play by the rules. The long-term effects are elimination of work opportunities, as displaced workers average 300-500 man-hours per year. Even at our Union Wage Rate, after taxes & long form Itemization, the Union Carpenter earns Net Wages below that of the Federal Poverty Line. Pre-Mobility, I worked on average 2500 hours per year. Post mobility has reduced the hours to the point of oblivion. I have caught many a Contractor playing this game as a working Union Steward. I have also enforced the Contract upon them & made sure that the effected workers, illegal or otherwise received their CBA Benefit Payments for Pension Annuity & Health & Welfare Funds. Doing so, and via exposing the fraud has cost me dearly. In actual 1989 dollars, earning $18.06 per hour at Union Rates, I would earn $47k-$52k per year. Now, at $31.73 per hour, I earn $10k. Enforcing the prior decision(s) shall go a long way toward restoring the status quo & providing the men & woman of the UBC-NERCC with a

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wage that one could live on, and shall also restore to the rank & file the actual intent of the NLRA, that being Protection of Basic Worker Rights. I have been on many a Union job wherein the only person there from the Local is the Steward & everyone else is out of state, mostly foreign born & here illegally. I do not blame them, however, having said that enforcement of the prior Decisions will force the UBC & NERCC leadership to operate within the confines of the law; and it will take away from them their incentive to rob their own members as well as other so mentioned. Again, I respectfully request that the NLRB Board RE-ISSUE THE DECISION for UBC local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz as was done today in ADF, Case 1-CA-45068, Chrysler, Case 7CA-51553 & Regal Health & Rehab Center, Cases 13-CA-44481, 44482 and 44619 (attached). I also respectfully request that the Board direct the New England Regional Council of Carpenters Executive Secretary Treasurer (EST) Mark Erlich to post the Final D & O in all 27 Union Halls throughout New England, as he failed to abide by previous Board Direction to do so & as he failed to do so as ordered by the ALJ. The NERCC EST & their legal Counsel (which we pay for, not to mention all of their salaries & 2.5 for 1 year Pension Specials, plus perks) routinely behave as if they are above the Law(s) and intentionally & willfully with-held all of this information from the Rank & File Union Carpenters. The EST refused to modify the previous CBA as directed, the current CBA negotiated 9-1-09 for three years & said conduct was prior to New Process Steel. Moreover, the Region 1 Office has serious bias & conflict of interest with Board Attorneys & NERCC Officials, one of whom readily admitted to me her detailed personal association with NERCC Officials, their legal counsel & readily admitted to having their home telephone numbers, personal cell numbers & business cell numbers. Any charges by Union brothers or sisters are routinely, after consultation with NERCC and/or Local Business Agents deep-sixed, tossed out w/o so much as the slightest hint of any investigation whatsoever. Not only are these actions contrary to Board Policy, they are reprehensible on their face and constitute ethical & disciplinary violations for attorneys otherwise sworn to uphold the law, before the Board of Bar Overseers. When myself or others within NERCC have to give way to workers from Texas, Louisiana, Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil etc. and your Board

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Agents & Attorneys fail to protect American workers that is a huge failure for the NLRB. When we complain or otherwise seek charges with NLRB Board Agent & they squash them w/o a second look, in spite of 75 years of known landmark & precedent decisions from the Board, Appellate Courts and/or the Supreme Court, the NLRB has a problem with corruption no different from that of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (UBC). It seems to me, that in Boston, unless NERCC files charges none shall ever see the light of day before an ALJ. The illegal Union Security Clause known as MOBILITY must be struck down & removed from the CBAs. The Ruling on the Constitution & Bylaws of the UBC must also be examined concerning their very specific details wherein 80% of said written procedures conflict directly with the NLRA. Currently, as written, the UBC Constitution & the NERCC Bylaws have set up a Totalitarian Regime with complete, utter, unquestionable Dictatorial Control in complete disregard of the NLRA as written. I would suggest a separate Committee comprised of Board Members and/or your subordinates, the General Counsel, Associate General Counsel etc. to review both Documents on a line by line basis & remove all such language in direct and flagrant contravention to the mandate & purpose of the NLRA. Thank you for your time & consideration in this matter. I expect my name to be kept out of any discussion with any NERCC or UBC Officials & that it be held in the strictest confidence, without exception.

Sincerely,

William T. Doherty

Attachments:  UBC Local 43 (McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz Page 1 & 2 of 16-Page D & O  8-5-10 D & O in ADF, Inc., Chrysler & Regal Health & Rehab 1 page each  NERCC Council Bylaws 8 pages

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From: bruschishawnee@comcast.net To: lizzy@metrocast.net Sent: Monday, August 23, 2010 12:54:31 AM Subject: JAY - CONTRACT 10-8-09 & RATES 3-1-10
----- Forwarded Message ----From: "Cynthia Faro" <cfaro@nercc.org> To: wtdoherty@comcast.net Sent: Friday, March 5, 2010 10:07:12 AM Subject: rates/contract Hi Bill, Here are the rates and the contract. They are both PDF files. Have a good weekend Cindy Carpenters Local Union 26 350 Fordham Road Wilmington, MA 01887 (978) 658-5520 Fax (978) 658-3878 www.neteamcarpenters.org

Close

JAY - CONTRACT 10-8-09 & RATES 3-1-10

Sent By: bruschishawnee@comcast.net On:Aug 08/23/10 12:54 AM To: lizzy@metrocast.net Boston Eastern ...nal 10-8-09.pdf (137.1 KB) Download | Remove Download all attachments as zip file Remove all attachments
Note: Mark Erlich, NERCC EST claims the Contract (CBA) was amended on October 8th, 2010 a full 51-Days prior to the Boards Slip Opinion in Carpenters Local 43(McDowell Building & Foundation) and Kevin Lebovitz, # 354-122. Given the Contract was not executed until March 2010 & printed and made available, and was first made available on March 5, 2010 the fact that he lied is readily apparent. The contract could not have been modified prior to the D & O; irrespective of the fact that, NERCC & their Counsel of Record, Souris & Krakow, LLP have willfully lied & refused to

New rates 3-1-10.pdf (266.5 KB) Download | Remove

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comply with the Board D & O FAILING TO STRIKE the ILLEGAL MOBILITY LANGUAGE from the CONTRACT (CBA).

HARRINGTON v. CHAO & Extortion of the Right to Vote

United States v. Gotti 459 F. 3d. 296 (2d Cir. 2006)

102 Id. at 1075-76 (internal citations omitted). More recently, this Circuit similarly held that "[t]he right of the members of a union to democratic participation in a union election is property; that the right is intangible does not divest it of protection under the Hobbs Act," and on that basis, crime families who sought to replace control of the union could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit extortion. United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1999).

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Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 1 Opinion of the Court NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________ No. 091227 _________________ CAROL ANNE BOND, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT [June 16, 2011] JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether a person indicted for violating a federal statute has standing to challenge its validity on grounds that, by enacting it, Congress exceeded its powers under the Constitution, thus intruding upon the sovereignty and authority of the States. The indicted defendant, petitioner here, sought to argue the invalidity of the statute. She relied on the Tenth Amendment, and, by extension, on the premise that Congress exceeded its powers by enacting it in contravention of basic federalism principles. The statute, 18 U. S. C. 229, was enacted to comply with a treaty; but petitioner contends that, at least in the present instance, the treaty cannot be the source of congressional power to regulate or prohibit her conduct. The Court of Appeals held that because a State was not a party to the federal criminal proceeding, petitioner had no standing to challenge the statute as an infringement upon the powers reserved to the States. Having concluded that petitioner does have standing to challenge the federal statute on these grounds, this Court now reverses that 2 BOND v. UNITED STATES Opinion of the Court determination. The merits of petitioners challenge to the statutes validity are to be considered, in the first instance, by the Court of Appeals on remand and are not addressed in this opinion. I This case arises from a bitter personal dispute, leading to the criminal acts charged here. Petitioner Carol Anne Bond lived outside Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. After discovering that her close friend was pregnant and that the father was Bonds husband, Bond sought revenge. Bond subjected the woman to a campaign of harassing telephone calls and letters, acts that resulted in a criminal conviction on a minor state charge. Bond persisted in her hostile acts, placing caustic substances on objects the woman was likely to touch, including her mailbox, car door handle, and front doorknob. Bonds victim suffered a minor burn on her hand and contacted federal investigators, who identified Bond as the perpetrator. Bond was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for, among other offenses, two counts of violating 229. Section 229 forbids knowing possession or use of any chemical that can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals where not intended for a peaceful purpose. 229(a); 229F(1); (7); (8). The statute was enacted as part of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 2681856, 22 U. S. C. 6701 et seq.; 18 U. S. C. 229 et seq. The Act implements provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, a treaty the United States ratified in 1997. In the District Court, Bond moved to dismiss the 229 charges, contending the statute was beyond Congress constitutional authority to enact. The District Court denied the motion. Bond entered a conditional plea of

145 guilty, reserving the right to appeal the ruling on the validity of the statute. She was sentenced to six years in prison. In the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Bond renewed her challenge to the statute, citing, among other authorities, the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court of Appeals asked for supplemental briefs on the question whether Bond had standing to raise the Tenth Amendment as a ground for invalidating a federal statute in the absence of a States participation in the proceedings. In its supplemental brief in the Court of Appeals, the Government took the position that Bond did not have standing. The Court of Appeals agreed. 581 F. 3d 128 (2009). When Bond sought certiorari, the Government advised this Court that it had changed its position and that, in its view, Bond does have standing to challenge the constitutionality of 229 on Tenth Amendment grounds. See Brief for United States (filed July 9, 2010). The Court granted certiorari, 562 U. S. ___ (2010), and appointed an amicus curiae to defend the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Stephen McAllister, a member of the bar of this Court, filed an amicus brief and presented an oral argument that have been of considerable assistance to the Court. II To conclude that petitioner lacks standing to challenge a federal statute on grounds that the measure interferes with the powers reserved to States, the Court of Appeals relied on a single sentence from this Courts opinion in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118 (1939). See 581 F. 3d, at 136138. As the Court of Appeals noted here, other Courts of Appeals have taken a similar approach. E.g., United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 525 527 (CA8 2009); Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F. 3d965, 971972 (CA9 2009); Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v.Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F. 3d 219, 234235 (CA2 2006);Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F. 3d 25, 3336 (CA1 2005); United States v. Parker, 362 F. 3d 1279, 12841285 (CA102004). That approach is in tension, if not conflict, with decisions of some other Courts of Appeals. See Gillespie v. Indianapolis, 185 F. 3d 693, 700704 (CA7 1999); Metrolina Family Practice Group, P. A. v. Sullivan, 767 F. Supp. 1314 (WDNC 1989), affd 929 F. 2d 693 (CA4 1991); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. United States Dept. of Energy, 666 F. 2d 1359, 1368, n. 16 (CA11 1982); see also United States v. Johnson, 632 F. 3d 912, 918921 (CA5 2011) (reserving issue); Lomont v. ONeill, 285 F. 3d 9, 14, n. 5 (CADC2002) (same); Nance v. EPA, 645 F. 2d 701, 716 (CA9 1981) (same). Tennessee Electric is the appropriate place to begin. It should be clear that Tennessee Electric does not cast doubt on Bonds standing for purposes of Article IIIs case-or controversy requirement. This Court long ago disapproved of the case as authoritative respecting Article III limitations. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 152154 (1970). In the instant case, moreover, it is apparentand in fact conceded not only by the Government but also by amicusthat Article III poses no barrier. One who seeks to initiate or continue proceedings in federal court must demonstrate, among other requirements, both standing to obtain the relief requested, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560561 (1992), and, in addition, an ongoing interest in the dispute on the part of the opposing party that is sufficient to establish concrete adverseness. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). When those conditions are met, Article III does not restrict the opposing partys ability to object to relief being sought at its expense. The requirement of Article III standing thus had no bearing upon Bonds capacity to assert defenses in the District Court. As for Bonds standing to appeal, it is clear Article IIIs prerequisites are met. Bonds challenge to her conviction and sentence satisfies the case-or controversy requirement, because the incarceration . . . constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation of the conviction. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 7 (1998). To resolve the case, this Court must consider next whether Tennessee Electric is irrelevant with respect to prudential rules of standing as well. The question in Tennessee Electric was whether a group of private power companies could bring suit to enjoin the federally chartered Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from producing

146 and selling electric power. It was conceded that competition from the TVA would inflict substantial damage upon the power companies. 306 U. S., at 137. According to the companies, the federal statute authorizing the creation and operation of the TVA was invalid because, among other reasons, it exceeded the powers of the National Government in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Declining to reach the merits, the Court concluded the power companies lawsuit should be dismissed. It explained that the suit was premised on the principle that a person threatened with injury by conduct which, but for statutory authority for its performance, would be a violation of his legal rights could request an injunction from a court of equity and by this means test the validity of the statute. Ibid. But the Court concluded that the TVA, even if it were shorn of congressional statutory authority, had done nothing more than compete as a supplier of electricity. Id., at 138. And since state law did not purport to grant any of the power companies a monopoly, there was no basis for a suit in which the TVA might be forced to invoke its congressional authorization. Id., at 138143. In that part of its analysis, and throughout its opinion, the Tennessee Electric Court stated that the problem with the power companies suit was a lack of standing or a cause of action. It treated those concepts as interchangeable. E.g., id., at 139 (no standing because no legal cause of complaint); id., at 139140 (no standing without a cause of action or a right to sue); id., at 142 (no standing, no right to sue for an injunction); id., at 144 (no Tenth Amendment standing and no Ninth Amendment cause of action for same reasons); see also Bellia, Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 826830 (2004). Even though decisions since Tennessee Electric have been careful to use the terms cause of action and standing with more precision, the distinct concepts can be difficult to keep separate. If, for instance, the person alleging injury is remote from the zone of interests a statute protects, whether there is a legal injury at all and whether the particular litigant is one who may assert it can involve similar inquiries. Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 9697, and n. 2 (1998) (noting that statutory standing and the existence of a cause of action are closely connected and sometimes identical questions). Still, the question whether a plaintiff states a claim for relief goes to the merits in the typical case, not the justiciability of a dispute, id., at 92, and conflation of the two concepts can cause confusion. This is the case with the Tenth Amendment discussion in Tennessee Electric. The Tennessee Electric Court noted that [a] distinct ground upon which standing to maintain the suit is said to rest is that the acts of the Authority cannot be upheld without permitting federal regulation of purely local matters reserved to the states or the people by the Tenth Amendment. 306 U. S., at 143. The Court rejected the argument, however, concluding the Tenth Amendment did not give one business a right to keep another from competing. Id., at 144. (The sale of government property in competition with others is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment). The Court then added the sentence upon which the Court of Appeals relied in the instant case, the sentence that has been the source of disagreement among Courts of Appeals: As we have seen there is no objection to the Authoritys operations by the states, and, if this were not so, the appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no standing in this suit to raise any question under the amendment. Ibid. The quoted statement was in the context of a decision which held that business competitors had no legal injury, and the word standing can be interpreted in that sense. On this reading, the statement reiterated an earlier point. The statement explained that the States in which the TVA operated exempted it from their public utilities regulations; and that even if the States had not done so and the TVA had violated those regulations, the regulations were for the States to enforce. See id., at 141142. They conferred no private right of action on business competitors. This reading is consistent with the Tennessee Electric Courts use of the term standing elsewhere in its opinion to refer to the existence of a state-law cause of action. A holding that state utilities regulations did not supply a cause of action against a competitor is of no relevance to the instant case, and we need not explore all of its implications. See also Data Processing, 397 U. S., at 157158 (cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 702, permits suit based on injury from business competition).

147 Yet the quoted statement also could be read to refer to standing in the sense of whether the power companies were the proper litigants to raise a Tenth Amendment issue. To the extent that might have been the intention of the Tennessee Electric Court, it is, for reasons to be explained, inconsistent with our later precedents. The sentence from Tennessee Electric that we have quoted and discussed should be deemed neither controlling nor instructive on the issue of standing as that term is now defined and applied. III Amicus contends that federal courts should not adjudicate a claim like Bonds because of the prudential rule that a party generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499, 500 (1975); see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 129130 (2004). In amicus view, to argue that the National Government has interfered with state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment is to assert the legal rights and interests of States and States alone. That, however, is not so. As explained below, Bond seeks to vindicate her own constitutional interests. The individual, in a proper case, can assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines. Her rights in this regard do not belong to a State. A The federal system rests on what might at first seem a counterintuitive insight, that freedom is enhanced by the creation of two governments, not one. Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 758 (1999). The Framers concluded that allocation of powers between the National Government and the States enhances freedom, first by protecting the integrity of the governments themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom all governmental powers are derived. Federalism has more than one dynamic. It is true that the federal structure serves to grant and delimit the prerogatives and responsibilities of the States and the National Government vis--vis one another. The allocation of powers in our federal system preserves the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the States. The federal balance is, in part, an end in itself, to ensure that States function as political entities in their own right. But that is not its exclusive sphere of operation. Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different institutions of government for their own integrity. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power. New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Some of these liberties are of a political character. The federal structure allows local policies more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society, permits innovation and experimentation, enables greater citizen involvement in democratic processes, and makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458 (1991). Federalism secures the freedom of the individual. It allows States to respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the initiative of those who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without having to rely solely upon the political processes that control a remote central power. True, of course, these objects cannot be vindicated by the Judiciary in the absence of a proper case or controversy; but the individual liberty secured by federalism is not simply derivative of the rights of the States. Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power cannot direct or control their actions. See ibid. By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power. When government acts in excess of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake. The limitations that federalism entails are not therefore a matter of rights belonging only to the States. States are not the sole intended beneficiaries of federalism. See New York, supra, at 181. An individual has a direct interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and

148 the States when the enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete, particular, and redressable. Fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate. The recognition of an injured persons standing to object to a violation of a constitutional principle that allocates power within government is illustrated, in an analogous context, by cases in which individuals sustain discrete, justiciable injury from actions that transgress separation of- powers limitations. Separation-of-powers principles are intended, in part, to protect each branch of government from incursion by the others. Yet the dynamic between and among the branches is not the only object of the Constitutions concern. The structural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual as well. In the precedents of this Court, the claims of individualsnot of Government departmentshave been the principal source of judicial decisions concerning separation of powers and checks and balances. For example, the requirement that a bill enacted by Congress be presented to the President for signature before it can become law gives the President a check over Congress exercise of legislative power. See U. S. Const., Art. I, 7. Yet individuals, too, are protected by the operations of separation of powers and checks and balances; and they are not disabled from relying on those principles in otherwise justiciable cases and controversies. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983), it was an individual who successfully challenged the so-called legislative vetoa procedure that Congress used in an attempt to invalidate an executive determination without presenting the measure to the President. The procedure diminished the role of the Executive, but the challenger sought to protect not the prerogatives of the Presidency as such but rather his own right to avoid deportation under an invalid order. Chadhas challenge was sustained. A cardinal principle of separation of powers was vindicated at the insistence of an individual, indeed one who was not a citizen of the United States but who still was a person whose liberty was at risk. Chadha is not unique in this respect. Compare Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. 417, 433436 (1998) (injured parties have standing to challenge Presidential line-item veto) with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 829830 (1997)(Congress Members do not); see also, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561U. S. ___ (2010); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U. S.211 (1995); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50 (1982); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935). If the constitutional structure of our Government that protects individual liberty is compromised, individuals who suffer otherwise justiciable injury may object. Just as it is appropriate for an individual, in a proper case, to invoke separation-of-powers or checksand balances constraints, so too may a litigant, in a proper case, challenge a law as enacted in contravention of constitutional principles of federalism. That claim need not depend on the vicarious assertion of a States constitutional interests, even if a States constitutional interests are also implicated. B In this regard it is necessary to address a misconception in the position the Government now urges this Court to adopt. As noted, the Government agrees that petitioner has standing to challenge the validity of 229. That concession, however, depends on describing petitioners claim in a narrow way. The Government contends petitioner asserts only that Congress could not enact the challenged statute under its enumerated powers. Were she to argue, the Government insists, that the statute interferes with a specific aspect of state sovereignty, either instead of or in addition to her enumerated powers contention, the Court should deny her standing. Brief for United States 18 (filed Dec. 3, 2010). The premise that petitioner does or should avoid making an interference-with-sovereignty argument is flawed. Id., at 33. Here she asserts, for example, that the conduct with which she is charged is local in nature and should be left to local authorities to prosecute and that congressional regulation of that conduct signals a massive and unjustifiable expansion of federal law enforcement into state-regulated domain. Record in No.

149 2:07cr00528JG1 (ED Pa.), Doc. 27, pp. 6, 19. The public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, enacted in its capacity as sovereign, has been displaced by that of the National Government. The law to which petitioner is subject, the prosecution she seeks to counter, and the punishment she must face might not have come about if the matter were left for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to decide. Indeed, petitioner argues that under Pennsylvania law the expected maximum term of imprisonment she could have received for the same conduct was barely more than a third of her federal sentence. There is no basis to support the Governments proposed distinction between different federalism arguments for purposes of prudential standing rules. The principles of limited national powers and state sovereignty are intertwined. While neither originates in the Tenth Amendment, both are expressed by it. Impermissible interference with state sovereignty is not within the enumerated powers of the National Government, see New York, 505 U. S., at 155159, and action that exceeds the National Governments enumerated powers undermines the sovereign interests of States. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 564 (1995). The unconstitutional action can cause concomitant injury to persons in individual cases. An individual who challenges federal action on these grounds is, of course, subject to the Article III requirements, as well as prudential rules, applicable to all litigants and claims. Individuals have no standing to complain simply that their Government is violating the law. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 755 (1984). It is not enough that a litigant suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923) (decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon). If, in connection with the claim being asserted, a litigant who commences suit fails to show actual or imminent harm that is concrete and particular, fairly traceable to the conduct complained of, and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, the Federal Judiciary cannot hear the claim. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560561. These requirements must be satisfied before an individual may assert a constitutional claim; and in some instances, the result may be that a State is the only entity capable of demonstrating the requisite injury. In this case, however, where the litigant is a party to an otherwise justiciable case or controversy, she is not forbidden to object that her injury results from disregard of the federal structure of our Government. Whether the Tenth Amendment is regarded as simply a truism, New York, supra, at 156 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941)), or whether it has independent force of its own, the result here is the same. *** There is no basis in precedent or principle to deny petitioners standing to raise her claims. The ultimate issue of the statutes validity turns in part on whether the law can be deemed necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the Presidents Article II, 2 Treaty Power, see U. S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 18. This Court expresses no view on the merits of that argument. It can be addressed by the Court of Appeals on remand. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered

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