G.R. No. 168715 : September 15, 2010 MEDLINE MANAGEMENT, INC. and GRECOMAR SHIPPING AGENCY, Petitioners, vs.

GLICERIA ROSLINDA and ARIEL ROSLINDA, Respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Medline Management, Inc. (MMI), on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Grecomar Shipping Agency (GSA), hired Juliano Roslinda (Juliano) to work on board the vessel MV "Victory." Juliano was previously employed by the petitioners under two successive separate employment contracts of varying durations. His latest contract was approved by the POEA on September 9, 1998 for a duration of nine months.6 In accordance with which, he boarded the vessel MV "Victory" on October 25, 1998 as an oiler and, after several months of extension, was discharged on January 20, 2000.
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Months after his repatriation, or on March 6, 2000, Juliano consulted Dr. Pamela R. Lloren (Dr. Lloren) of Metropolitan Hospital. He complained about abdominal distention which is the medical term for a patient who vomits previously ingested foods. From March 8 to August 24, 2000, Juliano visited Dr. Lloren for a series of medical treatment. On August 27, 2001, Juliano died. On September 4, 2003, his wife Gliceria Roslinda and son Ariel Roslinda, respondents herein, filed a complaint against MMI and GSA for payment of death compensation, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. Ruling: 1. n the present case, the cause of action accrued on August 27, 2001 when Juliano died. Hence, the claim has not yet prescribed, since the complaint was filed with the arbitration branch of the NLRC on September 4, 2003. 2. as heirs of Juliano, have the personality to file the claim for death benefits. As the parties claiming benefits for the death of a seafarer, they can file a case with the Labor Arbiter as provided for under Section 28 of the POEA SEC. It is clearly provided therein that the NLRC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any and all disputes or controversies arising out of or by virtue of the Contract. Having shown that respondents have the personality to file the complaint and that the Labor Arbiter has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the said claims, then this ground for petitioners' Motion to Dismiss has no basis and, therefore, its denial was proper. 3. Having shown that respondents failed to bring this matter to the Grievance Machinery as provided in the POEA SEC, can we now conclude that the Labor Arbiter erred in denying the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that respondents failed to comply with a condition precedent? We answer this in the negative. The denial by

the Labor Arbiter of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioners on the ground of noncompliance with a condition precedent is still proper. 4. in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract." "The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. Juliano did not die while he was under the employ of petitioners. His contract of employment ceased when he was discharged on January 20, 2000, after having completed his contract thereat. He died on August 27, 2001 or one year, seven months and seven days after the expiration of his contract. Thus, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits under the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers.

G.R. No. 167678 : June 22, 2010 SOUTHEASTERN SHIPPING, SOUTHEASTERN SHIPPING GROUP, LTD., Petitioners, vs. FEDERICO U. NAVARRA, JR., Respondent.

Money claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those specified in the Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers, prescribe within three years from the time the cause of action accrues.1 However, for death benefit claims to prosper, the seafarer's death must have occurred during the effectivity of said contract.
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Facts: Petitioner Southeastern Shipping, on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Southeastern Shipping Group, Ltd., hired Federico to work on board the vessel "George McLeod." Federico signed 10 successive separate employment contracts of varying durations covering the period from October 5, 1995 to March 30, 1998. His latest contract was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on January 21, 1998 for 56 days extendible for another 56 days. On March 30, 1998, Federico arrived back in the Philippines. On June 4, 1998, he was diagnosed at the Philippine General Hospital to be suffering from a form of cancer called Hodgkin's Lymphoma, Nodular Sclerosing Type (also known as Hodgkin's Disease). This diagnosis was confirmed in another test conducted at the Medical Center Manila on June 8, 1998. Held: in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of the employment contract.16 For emphasis, we reiterate that the death of a seaman during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits, but if the seaman dies after the
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termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not entitled to the death benefits.

G.R. No. 186289 : June 29, 2010

ORIENTAL SHIPMANAGEMENT CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. ROMY B. BASTOL, Respondent.

Facts: OSCI is a domestic manning agency engaged in the recruitment and placement of
Filipino seafarers abroad. Paterco Shipping Ltd. (PSL) is a foreign shipping company which owned and operated the vessel MV Felicita and a client of OSCI. Protection & Indemnity Club (PIC) was the insurer of PSL covering contingencies like illness claims and benefits of seamen. Pandiman Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is the local representative of PIC. As agent of PSL, OSCI hired Romy B. Bastol (Bastol) as bosun on November 29, 1995 evidenced by a Contract of Employment. On December 5, 1995, Bastol was deployed on board the vessel MV Felicita. The genesis of the instant case emerged when, on February 17, 1997, while on board the vessel, Bastol suffered chest pains and cold clammy perspiration. He was hospitalized in Algiers and found to be suffering from anterior myocardial infarction. In short, he had a heart attack. He was subsequently repatriated due to his illness on March 7, 1997. Thus, PPI referred Bastol for medical treatment to the Metropolitan Hospital under the care of company-designated physician Dr. Robert D. Lim. Unsatisfied with the treatment by Dr. Lim and seeking a second opinion, he went to Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo. Feeling abandoned and aggrieved with OSCI and PSL, Bastol, through counsel, sent a November 27, 1997 letter on December 2, 1997 to Capt. Rosendo C. Herrera, the President of OSCI, for a possible settlement of his claim for disability benefits. He attached the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Vicaldo. His letter did not merit a response from OSCI. Held: Applying the foregoing provisos in the instant case, it is thus clearin either the revised 1994 and the 1996 SECthat Bastol, suffering from a heart ailment and repatriated on March 7, 1997, must comply with two requirements: first, to submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days from his repatriation; second, he must allow himself to be treated until he is either declared fit to work or be assessed the degree of permanent disability by the companydesignated physician. Most importantly, the mandatory compliance of the second requirement is qualified by the limitation or condition that in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. The 120-day limitation refers to the period of medical attention or treatment by the company-designated physician, who must either declare the seafarer fit to work or assess the degree of permanent disability. In all, after his repatriation on March 7, 1997, Bastol went to see Dr. Peralta on March 8, 1997, and until the last examination by Dr. Lim on October 28, 1997, he had been treated by these company-designated doctors for a period spanning around seven months and 20

days or for approximately 230 days. Clearly then, the maximum period of 120 days stipulated in the SEC for medical treatment and the declaration or assessment by the company-designated physician of either being fit to work or the degree of permanent disability had already lapsed. Thus, by law, if Bastols condition was with the lapse of the 120 days of post-employment medical examination and treatment, which actually lasted as the records show for at least over eight months and for over a year by the time the complaint was filed, without his being employed at his usual job, then it was certainly total permanent disability. Thus, we can say that Bastol had the right to seek medical treatment other than the company-designated physician after the lapse of the 120-day considering that said physician, within the maximum 120-day period stipulated in the SEC neither declared him fit to work or gave the assessment of the degree of his permanent disability which he is incumbent to do. Moreover, as the CA aptly noted, Dr. Vicaldos diagnosis and assessment should be accorded greater weight considering that he is a Cardiologist and Congenital Heart Disease Specialist of the Philippine Heart Center. It is undisputed that Dr. Lim, the company-designated physician, is not a cardiology expert being a Diplomate in Rehabilitation Medicine and who seemed to be not the attending physician of Bastol in the Metropolitan Hospital as shown in his September 16, 1997 letter to PPI stating his cardiologist opines that he has to continue taking his maintenance medications.

PAUL V. SANTIAGO VS. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT Facts: On 3 February 1998,petitioner signed a new contract of employment with respondent, with the duration of nine (9) months.He was assured of a monthly salary of US$515.00, overtime pay and other benefits.The following day or on 4 February 1998, the contract was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).Petitioner was to be deployed on board the MSV Seaspread which was scheduled to leave the port ofManila for Canada on 13 February 1998. petitioner was thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore, but he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some future date. Held: 1. However, respondent failedto deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties. 2. However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship.The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein.The

commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. 3. Respondents act of preventing petitioner fromdeparting the port of Manila and boarding MSV Seaspreadconstitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioners cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered. 4. Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships.Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:

Sec. 10.Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x [Emphasis supplied]
Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.

G.R. No. 183879 : April 14, 2010 ROSITA SY, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. Held: The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused the offended party or third person. The act complained of in the instant case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. It is committed by using fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are the following, viz.: (a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.10
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In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that Sy misrepresented and falsely pretended that she had the capacity to deploy Felicidad Navarro (Felicidad) for employment in Taiwan. The misrepresentation was made prior to Felicidad's payment to Sy of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). It was Sy's misrepresentation and false pretenses that induced Felicidad to part with her money. As a result of Sy's false pretenses and misrepresentations, Felicidad suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the money she paid was never recovered.
Illegal recruitment and estafa cases may be filed simultaneously or separately. The filing of charges for illegal recruitment does not bar the filing of estafa, and vice versa. Sy's acquittal in the illegal recruitment case does not prove that she is not guilty of estafa. Illegal recruitment and estafa are entirely different offenses and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other.

G.R. No. 173198

June 1, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DOLORES OCDEN, Accused-Appellant.

Facts: That during the period from May to December, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment as factory workers in Italy to more than three (3) persons. Held: It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a nonlicensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and

placement of workers. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal recruitment "whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority." Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault." In People v. Hu,28 we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether individually or as a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial, nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

G.R. No. 187730 : June 29, 2010 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , Petitioner, vs. RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, Accused-Appellant, FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, Accused.

Facts: accused ere charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts of estafa committed against eighteen complainants. Held: We disagree. To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of 'recruitment and placement' defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;[8] and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.[9] When illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is considered an offense involving economic sabotage.[10] Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, 'recruitment and placement' refers to 'any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not'. After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 ('R.A. 8042'), otherwise known as the Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. G.R. No. 181475 : April 7, 2009 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. LARRY "LAURO" DOMINGO, Appellant. Issue: appellant maintained that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, no receipts to show that he actually received money from private complainant having been submitted in evidence. Held: To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution must prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he/she did not have the license or

the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) he/she committed the prohibited practice against three or more persons individually or as a group.7 That no receipt or document in which appellant acknowledged receipt of money for the promised jobs was adduced in evidence does not free him of liability. For even if at the time appellant was promising employment no cash was given to him, he is still considered as having been engaged in recruitment activities, since Article 13(b) of the Labor Code states that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It suffices that appellant promised or offered employment for a fee to the complaining witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment.

G.R. No. 182232

October 6, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NENITA B. HU, accused-appellant.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code.19 Recruitment and placement is "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contact services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."20 The crime becomes Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale when the foregoing two elements concur, with the addition of a third element - the recruiter committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as group.2 In the appreciation of evidence in criminal cases, it is a basic tenet that the prosecution has the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused for the offense with which he is charged. Ei incumbit probation qui dicit non qui negat; i.e., "he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove." The conviction of appellant must rest not on the weakness of his defense, but on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.23 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that illegal recruitment was committed against three or more persons. What we have uncovered upon careful scrutiny of the records was the fact that illegal recruitment was committed against only one person; that is, against Garcia alone. Illegal recruitment cannot successfully attach to the allegations of Panguelo, Abril and Orillano, since they testified that they accomplished

their pre-employment requirements through Brighturn from June 2001 up to October of the same year,24 a period wherein Brighturn's license to engage in recruitment and placement was still in full force and effect. 25 While there were six private complainants in this case, four of whom were presented during the trial, the prosecution, nonetheless, failed to establish that Hu engaged in illegal recruitment acts against at least three of these complainants. In offenses in which the number of victims is essential, such as in the present petition, failure of the prosecution to prove by convincing evidence that the offense is committed against the minimum number of persons required by law is fatal to its cause of action.

G.R. No. 179931

October 26, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. NIDA ADESER y RICO, Appellant.

llegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the offenders undertake any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code. Under Article 13(b), recruitment and placement refers to "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.12 The law imposes a higher penalty when the crime is committed by a syndicate as it is considered as an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code.13 Undoubtedly, what transpired in the instant case is illegal recruitment by a syndicate. As categorically testified by Palo and Caraig, appellant, together with her co-accused, made representations to Palo that they could send her to Australia to work as an apple picker. There is no denying that they gave Palo the distinct impression that they had the power or ability to send her abroad for work such that the latter was convinced to part with a huge amount of money as placement fee in order to be employed. And this act was committed by appellant and her coaccused even if they did not have the required license to do so. Appellant herself admitted that Naples, the travel agency which she owned and managed, only offered visa assistance, ticketing, documentation, airport transfer and courier services. Clearly, neither she nor her agents had a

license to recruit Palo to work abroad. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment unlawful or criminal.14 Thus, as against the positive and categorical testimonies of Palo and Caraig, appellants denials cannot prevail.15 Moreover, there is no reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses as there is no showing that any of them had ill motives against appellant or her co-accused and especially since it appears they were motivated solely by the desire to bring appellant and her co-accused to justice for the crimes they have committed.16 Neither can this Court sustain appellants contention that her participation in the recruitment is negated by the fact that her signature does not even appear on the vouchers issued to Palo. Even if Palo did not present receipts signed by appellant, this would not rule out the fact that appellant did receive the money. This Court has consistently ruled that absence of receipts as to the amounts delivered to a recruiter does not mean that the recruiter did not accept or receive such payments. Neither in the Statute of Frauds nor in the rules of evidence is the presentation of receipts required in order to prove the existence of a recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. Such proof may come from the credible testimonies of witnesses17 as in the case at bar. G.R. No. 170834 August 29, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO NOGRA, accused-appellant. The appeal fails. The CA did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the RTC. R.A. No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code17 and provided stiffer penalties, especially those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate. Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal: SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such nonlicensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, nonholder, licensee or holder of authority:

xxxx (l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In the present case, evidence for the prosecution showed that Loran International Overseas Recruitment Co., Ltd. is a duly licensed recruitment agency with authority to establish a branch office. However, under R.A. No. 8042, even a licensee or holder of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment, should he commit or omit to do any of the acts enumerated in Section 6. Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042. Section 6 (l) refers to the failure to actually deploy without valid reason, as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Section 6 (m) involves the failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases in which the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault. A thorough scrutiny of the prosecution's evidence reveals that it failed to prove appellant's liability under Section 6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042. The law requires not only that the failure to deploy be without valid reason "as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment." The law envisions that there be independent evidence from the DOLE to establish the reason for nondeployment, such as the absence of a proper job order. No document from the DOLE was presented in the present case to establish the reason for the accused's failure to actually deploy private complainants. Thus, appellant cannot be held liable under Section 6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042. As to Section 6 (m) of R.A. No. 8042, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that private complainants made payments to Loran, and appellant failed to reimburse the amounts paid by private complainants when they were not deployed. The prosecution presented the

receipts issued by Loran to private complainants evidencing payment of placement fees ranging from P27,000.00 to P35,000.00. Appellant does not dispute that private complainants were not deployed for overseas work, and that the placement fees they paid were not returned to them despite demand. However, he seeks to exculpate himself on the ground that he is a mere employee of Loran. The Court is unswayed by appellant's contention. The penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 explicitly states that those criminally liable are the "principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable." Contrary to appellant's claim, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and the documentary evidence for the prosecution clearly established that he was not a mere employee of Loran, but its Operations Manager. The license of Loran, the files of the POEA and the nameplate prominently displayed on his office desk reflected his position as Operations Manager. As such, he received private complainants' job applications; and interviewed and informed them of the agencys requirements prior to their deployment, such as NBI clearance, police clearance, medical certificate, previous employment certificate and the payment of placement fee. He was also responsible for the radio advertisements and leaflets, which enticed complaining witnesses to apply for employment with the agency. Clearly, as Operations Manager, he was in the forefront of the recruitment activities. The defense of being a mere employee is not a shield against his conviction for large scale illegal recruitment. In People v. Gasacao18 and People v. Sagayaga,19 the Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Cabais,20 People v. Chowdury21 and People v. Corpuz22 that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal by direct participation, together with its employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process. In the present case, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private complainants. He interviewed and informed them of the documentary requirements and placement fee. He promised deployment within a three or four month-period upon payment of the fee, but failed to deploy them and to reimburse, upon demand, the placement fees paid. The Court is not persuaded by appellant's argument that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence. Unlike the flight of an accused, which is competent evidence against him tending to establish his guilt, non-flight is simply inaction, which may be due to several factors. It may not be construed as an indication of innocence.23 Of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private complainants had any ill motive against appellant other than to bring him to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be against human nature and experience.24 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence.25

It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such findings.26 After all, the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses.27 The absence of any showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution evidence. Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. In the present case, five complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his acts tantamount to economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 31, 2995 of the Court of Appeals affirming the conviction of appellant Antonio Nogra for large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 (m) and 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 8042 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.